CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000100160001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 18, 1953
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI NO. 9619
C
18 September 1953
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
OCUMEW+T NO.
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NO CHANGE ti`1 CLASS. [_i
DE..CL. SS TIED
CLASS . CHANGED TO: TS
N rX, T .FV EVV DATE:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RET
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1 T41
SUMMARY OF CONTEN
TS
L
THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
VIET MINH FALL OFFENSIVE IN TONKIN DELTA APPEARS
PROBABLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Fragmentary indications suggest that the
Tonkin delta will be the principal theater of Viet
Minh operations this fall, but the Viet Minh could
simultaneously launch diversionary attacks in Laos
and in central Vietnam. (SEE MAP)
THE TUDEH PARTY UNDER THE ZAHEDI REGIME. . . . . . Page 9
Prime Minister Zahedi's anti-Communist cam-
paign has impaired Communist morale in Iran and
hampered activities of the Tudeh? However, only
constant firm pressure on the Tudeh will prevent
its re-emergence as a powerful group.
USSR INTENSIFIES APPROACHES TO FRANCE. . . . . Page 11
Recent Soviet approaches to France suggest
that the USSR is intensifying its efforts to thwart
Western defense plans in both Europe and Asia by
playing on France's fear of German rearmament
and its growing desire to drop the burden of the
Indochina war.
SOVIET UNION TAKES MEASURES TO INCREASE CONSUMER
GOODS AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT... . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The Soviet government has in recent weeks em-
barked upon a number of reorganization and economy
measures apparently designed to improve the output
of consumers goods and agricultural products while
maintaing a high level of heavy industrial and mil-
itary production.
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PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PARTY APPARENTLY PLANNING FRAUD
IN NOVEMBER ELECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Philippine Liberal Party leaders faced with the
great popularity of Ramon Magsaysay are preparing to
use every device to retain control of the adminis-
tration.
THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS' DESIGNS ON NEIGHBORING
STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The Guatemalan Communists, continuing their efforts
to promote the establishment of sympathetic regimes in
the other Central American republics, find the situation
in Honduras most favorable to this objective.
POTENTIALITIES OF THE ARAB-ASIAN BLOC. . . . Page 19
The 16-member Arab-Asian bloc in the UN remains
a source of friction between the United States and its
allies as well as a sensitive area for Orbit diplomatic
maneuvering.
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THE SOVIET WORLD
By electing N. S. Khrushchev as the party's first
secretary, the 7 September plenum of the USSR Central Com-
mittee confirmed a situation which has existed since G. M.
Malenkov left the Secretariat on 14 March. While Molotov
may continue to be ranked second in official listings,
Khrushchev would appear to be above him in actual influence.
The Central Committee decree following Khrushchev's re-
port to the plenum places an increased emphasis on agriculture
and will have far-reaching economic and political effects.
The new program establishes goals for sharp increases in live-
stock, vegetable, and fodder production by 1954. These are
to be achieved by improving the organization and methods of
production, b y.substantial additional investment in capital
equipment, and by providing additional material incentives
for both the individual farmers and collective farms.
To carry out this program,-the Kremlin subsequently an-
nounced important ministerial changes in agriculture, trade,
and the consumer goods industries. These shifts include the
re-establishment of the Ministry of State Farms apart from
the Ministry of Agriculture and Procurement, the reorgani-
zation of the Ministry of Internal and Foreign Trade into two
distinct ministries, and the similar division of the light
manufacturing and food industries. These changes point up the
political character of the ministerial mergers following
Stalin's death and suggest that the internal political scene
is now sufficiently stable to permit the delegation of re-
sponsibility necessary for more efficient administration.
They also suggest that the government intends to fulfill the
promises Malenkov made on 8 August to increase the output of
consumer goods and food.
The East German regime appears to be doing what it can
to limit the Western food distribution program without re-
sorting to measures that could result in a dangerous popular
expression of resentment. The regime is handicapped to some
extent by the reluctance of the police and railroad personnel
on the working level to carry out the repressive measures re-
quired of them. The confiscation of food parcels by East
German customs authorities and police has continued on a vary-
ing scale, with the result that about half of the food recipi-
ents -.. who now number approximately 65,000 daily -- have been
leaving their parcels in West Berlin for future disposition..
4
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The Satellite regimes continue to announce and implement
economic concessions. In a major policy statement on 8 Sep-
tember, Bulgarian premier Chervenikov indicated for the first
time some modification of his internal program by promising
help to agriculture -- mostly cooperative farms -- through in-
creased investment and a reduction of taxes and crop collec-
tion quotas. He also hinted at more stress on consumer goods
production and a slight de-emphas:Ls on the development of
heavy industry.
.Polish premier Beirut-took a similar line on agriculture
in a 6 September speech. In addition to state aid to both
private and cooperative farmers, which he promised on 21 July,
Beirut pledged an increase in the production of agricultural
machinery. Rumania and Albania have introduced new measures
to encourage agricultural production by lightening the tax
burdens of the peasants, and Rumania also has reduced various
tax rates affecting communal services. The Hungarian govern-
ment has announced price reductions ranging from 12 to 40'per-
cent on some 10,000 food and industrial products including
clothing, bread, and sugar, but not meat and dairy products.
On 15 September the Czech National Assembly was convoked,
six weeks earlier than usual, to approve a reorganization and
simplification of the government similar to those carried out
earlier in the USSR, Hungary, and Albania, and a more liberal
domestic policy along the lines announced in other Satellites.
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VIET MINH FALL OFFENSIVE IN TONKIN DELTA APPEARS PROBABLE
Fragmentary indications suggest that the Tonkin delta will
be the principal theater of Viet Minh operations this fall (see
map, p. 8). The current disposition of the enemy's regular
forces and their improved supply position, however, are such
that the Viet Minh could simultaneously launch diversionary
attacks in Laos and in central Vietnam.
Operations in Tonkin usually start in October. The Viet
Minh may choose, however, to move earlier this year in view
of the announced intention of General Navarre to seize the
initiative. If the French are actually planning an offensive
of their own, the Viet Minh, whose intelligence is excellent,
would probably have foreknowledge of it.
During the. summer, intensive activities along the princi-
pal lines of communication into Laos strengthened a widely
held belief that the Viet Minh would resume its conquest of
that state at the end of the rainy season. Within the past
few weeks, however, these activities appear to have largely
subsided. This and the reported return to Tonkin of two
regular battalions which had been operating in Laos suggest
that the enemy plans only minor action there this fall.
Largely on the basis of these negative indications re-
garding Laos, French officials expect extensive Viet Minh
action in the Tonkin delta, which they consider the only
other important objective within the enemy's capability. Their
deduction has been given some recent support by the Viet Minh
high command's reported interest In French dispositions in the
southern sector of the delta and by the.movement of the 320th
division to positions along the delta's southwestern periphery.
An independent regiment has reportedly begun to infiltrate the
delta in the same general direction.
25X1
The French are seriously worried over the possibility of
heavy attacks on the delta. Security there deteriorated seri-
ously during the last campaign season as the result of the
diversion of large elements of French forces to counter Viet
Minh operations in northwestern Tonkin and Laos. More recently
a marked improvement in Viet Minh sabotage techniques has been
noted which threatens to immobilize a considerable number of
Franco-Vietnamese troops. The situation had become so serious
in late July 25X1
that the Viet Minh was capable of overrunning the delta if
it was prepared to incur the necessary casualties.
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As in 1951 and 1952, the Viet Minh has been able to use
the rainy season to rest, train, and resupply. The French raid
on Langson in mid-July constituted the only serious inter-
ference with these activities. There is little indication that
the French will act quickly enough to prevent the enemy from
choosing the locus and nature of the fall operations.
Whatever course of action the Viet Minh embarks on this
fall, its capabilities for sustained offensive action are at
an all-time high as a result of a marked increase in Chinese
aid and the relatively light casualties suffered during the
last campaign season.
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THE TUDEH PARTY UNDER THE ZAHEDI REGIME
Prime Minister.Zahedi's vigorous anti-Communist campaign
has impaired Communist morale in Iran and hampered the activi-
ties of the Tudeh. Repressive efforts such as those now under
way will have little more than a transitory effect unless in
the months to come Tudeh activity is kept under constant gov
ernment pressure.
25X1
Estimates of Tudeh strength vary widely and are at best
informed guesses. There may be between 20,000 and 35,000 card-
carrying members with an estimated hard-core of 1,000. Sympha-
thizers may number between 170,000 and 400,000.
General Zahedi, fearing a widespread Tudeh outbreak
against his government, moved to break the power of the Commu-
nists as soon as he took over. The police and army were
alerted, Tudeh headquarters were raided, Tudeh printing presses
were seized and incriminating documents captured. Rewards were
offered for information leading to the capture of Tudeh cells'
and individual members. By mid-September over 1,300 suspects
had been arrested. Many of them are presumed to be card-
carrying members and some have been named as belonging to the
party's top central committee. 25X1
There has been a nearly complete suspension of overt Tudeh
activities. The Communist front press has ceased publication.
Initial Tudeh efforts to form a united front with remnants
of'the pro-Mossadeq factions have apparently slackened, and
captured party instructions indicate that the current emphasis
is on securing the safety of members and property against fur-
ther government attack.
9
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Despite the immediate effect of the government campaign
against Tudeh activities, there are signs that the present
round-up may not prove any more effective in the long run than
similar earlier repressions. The basic structure of the party
is still intact e The purge of Tucleh members from the govern-
ment ministries is reportedly being slowed by the ministers'
insistence that they do not know which of their employees are
Communists and that they therefore cannot act with despatch.
There is serious doubt that the Iranian army will succeed
in permanently weakening the Tudeho Current army plans for
the speedy release of rank and file members and the decision
to exile Tudeh captives to Luristan in southwestern Iran, a
relatively unsettled province, are typical of past efforts to
repress Communism. Such efforts have generally proved unsuc-
cessful, primarily because the government underestimates the
strength of Tudeh indoctrination,
The Communists' assertion that the government is unable
and unwilling to improve the lot of the masses has a major
appeal for the Iranian people. While both the shah and Zahedi
apparently desire to improve living standards, they have in-
herited from Mossadeq not only an empty treasury but a
weakened structure of constitutional government. Without funds,
without plenary powers, and without a functioning Majlis, the
prime minister is handicapped in efforts he may make toward
social reform,
While in the long run the appeal of Communism to Iranians
can be lessened by improving their economic and social position,
constant and firm pressure by the military is the only proce-
dure which holds promise of extended success in the near future.
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USSR INTENSIFIES APPROACHES TO FRANCE
25X1
Recent Soviet approaches to France suggest that the
USSR is intensifying its efforts to thwart Western defense
plans in both Europe and Asia by playing on France's fear of
German rearmament and its growing desire to drop the burden
of the Indochina war,
This effort was particularly evident in Malenkov's 8
August speech which singled out France. for attention. Malen.-
kov contended that "implementation of the European Defense
Community would mean the surrender of France to the German
revanchists" and suggested that more reliance be placed on 25X1
the existing French-Soviet mutual assistance pact as a solu-
tion.
In its propaganda the Soviet Union has also been at-
tempting to encourage a French policy which would be inde-
pendent of the United States. Broadcasting in French on 26
August, Moscow emphasized the "traditional cultural ties"
between the USSR and France and termed the 1944 French-Soviet
treaty of alliance as important for the "defense of the vital
interests of France,"
The French strikes in August were treated in Soviet pro-
paganda as a popular reaction to the government's "pro-American
policy," allegedly dedicated to speedier rearmament, continu-
ing the war in Indochina, and above all restoring the German
Wehrmacht, "the deadly enemy of France,"
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In addition to approaches on the German problem, the
USSR has hinted in its propaganda that the Indochinese war
can be settled by negotiation. Soviet propaganda attention
to the subject of Indochina since the Washington conference
of the Western foreign ministers in July further suggests
a Communist effort to increase pressure within France to
liquidate the war at any cost.
The Soviet Union also is finding trade useful as a
weapon to achieve its aims. The French press heralded the
new Soviet-French trade agreement signed in July as economi-
cally favorable to France and as further evidence of relaxed
tension between the East and West.
While the French government wishes to avert German re-
armament and to end the drain of the Indochina war, it is
also acutely aware of the USSR's real aims and of the ad-
vantages of France's ties with its allies. There is no
evidence that French officials reacted favorably to the
recent Soviet overtures. It is unlikely that the French
government would undertake bilateral negotiations with the
USSR without prior consultation with the United States and
Britain.
12
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SOVIET UNION TAKES MEASURES TO INCREASE
CONSUMER GOODS AND AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT
The Soviet government has in recent weeks embarked on a
number of reorganization and economy measures apparently de-
signed to improve the output of consumer goods and agricultur-
al products while maintaining a high level of heavy industrial
and military production.
These measures have included the division on 14 September
of three economic ministries previously concerned with agri-
culture, trade, and the production of food and consumer goods
into six ministries; the promulgation on 7 September of a new
agricultural decree calling for a substantially larger allo-
cation of heavy industrial output to agriculture; and an econ-
omy drive in all sectors of Soviet industry.
In connection with the ministerial reorganization, A. I.
Mikoyan, a member of the party presidium and fourth-ranking man
in the governmental hierarchy, has been named minister of in-
ternal trade, thereby focusing the attention of the USSR's top
expert in foreign and domestic trade on internal problems alone.
For the first time a Ministry of the Consumer Goods Industry
has been established, and a former politburo member, A. N.
Kosygin, has been named as. head. According to announcements at
the Supreme Soviet meeting last month, the reorganization of
ministries throughout the government since March is to result
in savings of 6.5 billion rubles.this year.
The agricultural decree of the Communist Party Central
Committee sets forth a series of far-reaching measures to pro-
mote a much,more rapid rate of agricultural development. It
specifies a larger allocation of heavy industrial output to
agriculture than is provided for in the current Five-Year Plan.
The new program calls for a substantial increase over
195.2 in the delivery of tractors, and for sharp increases in
livestock, vegetables, and fodder production by 1954. The
machine building, electric power, chemical, building materials
and construction industries are all directed to expand sub-
stantially their support of increased agricultural output.
Heavy industry is also to participate directly in expanding
the manufacture of consumer goods.
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Along with increased emphasis on party control of farm-
ing, there is to be a large-scale expansion of schools and
training facilities to produce agricultural experts. In the
interim some production experts and engineers are to be trans-
ferred from industry to agriculture.
In an effort to effect economies in all industrial plants,
Malenkov in his 8 August speech to the Supreme Soviet called
for an increased proportion of workers to be utilized directly
on the production lines at the expense of auxiliary, maintenance,
and administrative personnel. The USSR has hitherto been able
to use.only a relatively small part of it nonagricultural labor
force in direct production activities.
Since the Soviet budget for 1953 depends to a greater ex-
tent on profits from state enterprises, these and other measures
to reduce plant production costs in order to "achieve the prof-
itability of every enterprise" are now of extreme importance.
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PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PARTY APPARENTLY
PLANNING FRAUD IN NOVEMBER ELECTION
The Nacionalista Party in the Philippines is counting
heavily on the popularity of its presidential candidate, Ramon
Magsaysay, to carry it to victory in next November's elections.
Through arbitrary use of executive power, however, the incumbent
Liberals are in a position to frustrate the popular will. There
are strong indications that Liberal Party leaders, despite the
danger of a violent popular reaction to a fraudulent victory, are
preparing to use every device available to retain control of the
administration.
A number of political reassignments within the army since
Magsaysay's resignation as defense secretary last spring indi-
cate the government's intent to use the military to assure a
Liberal victory, There are rumors that Chief of Staff Duque,
who has himself often bowed to political pressure, will be
replaced by Brigadier General Arellann an even
_,._ 11
more
There are also indications that the administration plans
legal harassment of the opposition, Two,top Nacionalista
leaders were recently indicted for income tax evasion, and on
10 September Speaker of the House Perez, a Liberal stalwart,
reportedly hinted that the constabulary might make a mass
arrest of opposition leaders for a p:Lot to "disturb the
elections."
Political reassignments at the provincial command levels
of the constabulary indicate that it may again, as in 1949,
become a political instrument. In April President Quirino
transferred from the army to the police the responsibility for
maintaining order in the vi Islands and Mindinao. r
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Tony Quirino and House Speaker
Perez nave been negotiating for several months with the Communist-
led Huks in the hope of crediting the Liberals with a settlement
of the Huk rebellion before November. The Huks allegedly are
being promised amnesty and the cessation of
government military
o eratio.ns in return for assistance, in re-electin Quirino.
25X1
The Liberals have placed a numb 1f
e
l
r o
oyal Quirino men in
key provincial offices where they can influence votes and watch
the polls. If the Liberals use the Huks and other terrorists,
or army and constabulary units to coerce voters and harass
opposition leaders, Magsaysay's fight for the presidency will be
an extremely difficult one. The reaction of the public and of a
large element of the armed forces to such methods could result
in a civil uprising and in pressure for Magsaysay to seize power.
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THE GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS' DESIGNS ON NEIGHBORING STATES
From their position of growing strength in the Guatemalan
government, the Communists are continuing their efforts to
promote the establishment of sympathetic regimes in the other
Central American republics. The deteriorating political
situation in Honduras favors this objective.
The Guatemalan Communists have long furnished guidance,
mi).itant.propaganda assistance, and probably financial aid to
their comrades in neighboring countries. Through party and
front groups they provide the basic Communist liaison organi-
zation in Central America. The Guatemalan government, partly
from its long-standing hostility to the "dictatorial" govern-
ments of the area and partly from the effects of Communist
infiltration, is providing many Central American political
refugees, including Communists, with a friendly haven and
frequently with government jobs.
Honduras, already in political ferment over the October
1954 presidential election, is the most-vulnerable to Communist
subversion. The growing split within the Nationalist Party
between the supporters of ex-dictator Carias and those backing
President Galvez for re-election threatens to put an end to
the Nationalists' 20-year rule and give victory to the Communist-
infiltrated Liberal Party. As the political situation grows
more tense, law and order are noticeably deteriorating. Rumors
of an impending coup d'etat by one or another of the factions
are increasing.
Guatemalan Communists have actively intervened in the
confused Honduran political picture. They have given direction
and aid to the various Honduran front groups, and Honduran
Communist publications are frequently printed in Guatemala.
A potential Liberal Party presidential canuidate next year,
Angel Nunez A uilar now hold a government 'ob in Guatemala.
25X1
1
The Communists have had only limited success in the other
Central American countries. In Costa Rica, they apparently
suffered at least a temporary setback when Jose Figueres was
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elected president in July over their opposition. In the
long run, however, the Communists may be able. to capitalize
on Figueres'-nationalistic program, particularly with respect
to foreign investments.
Recognizing that the trend in Guatemala threatens them,
.the stable governments of El Salvador and Nicaragua have taken
effective steps to guard against it. Together with other
Central American republics, they are pressing for the creation
of machinery for controlling the movements and propaganda of
Communists and for exchanging intelligence on their activities.
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POTENTIALITIES OF THE ARAB-ASIAN BLOC
The 16-member Arab-Asian bloc in the UN remains a source
of friction between the United States and its allies as well
as a sensitive area for Orbit diplomatic maneuvering.
The core of the bloc consists of the Moslem states of
the Arab League--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria,
and Iraq. Weaker in allegiance are the non-Arab Moslem coun-
tries of Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Indonesia. India
often influences Burma in a regional sub-bloc which shares
anticolonialism, but not strong religious affiliations, with
the Moslem group. The remainder of the bloc, including
Thailand, the Philippines, Ethiopia, and Liberia, is given to
occasional anticolonial pronouncements but usually votes with
the West.
25X1
The countries most nearly approach unanimity on anti-
colonialism. Of the bloc, Ethiopia alone failed to support
the Moroccan and Tunisian items for the agenda of the Eighth
General Assembly. Although Liberia and, to a lesser extent,
Lebanon might weaken under strong French pressure, outbreaks
of serious violence in French North Africa would increase the
bloc's determination to press these issues.
The Arab-Asians, as a whole, favor conciliation of Commu-
nist China. Almost all voted to include India in the Korean
political conference, and they are likely to support a Burmese
complaint against the Chinese Nationalist government. However,
India's assumption of the role of leading peacemaker between
East and West induces Pakistan to break away from the bloc, and
this split will probably last as long as-the Kashmir problem
remains unresolved. In addition, stronger Ethiopian and Paki-
stani interest in the development of a Middle East defense
organization brings these two nations into closer alignment with
the West and separates them from the Arab states, which fear
such an organization would lead to the perpetuation of British
imperialism.
On the Palestine question, though the Arab states are
united in bitter hostility toward Israel, the bloc's South and
Southeast Asian and African members have little interest in this
problem and are reluctant to become involved.
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Arab-Asian neutralism and the open-door attitude toward
UN membership are obvious targets for Soviet manipulation,
particularly on the question of admitting Communist China.
The abstention record of the bloc, however, suggests that mem-
bers are likely to be as independent of Eastern as they are of
Western pressures. Geographic proximity to the USSR makes
some border countries fear an excessive increase of Orbit
strength, while others, particularly the Arabs, are concerned
over the threat of local Communism.
Nevertheless, the anticolonial feeling in the area is
subject to effective Communist propaganda exploitation. The
USSR has nothing to lose by encouraging Arab-Asian intransi-
gence on North Africa and on questions involving the UN
Trusteeship Council; Western opposition to the bloc on these
issues can be plausibly depicted as an imperialist conspiracy.
The Arab-Asians have been wary of such Soviet overtures in the
past, but further disappointment with the West may make at
least the Arab states more sensitive to Communist entreaties.
While the Arab-Asians have often been divided on impor-
tant world issues during the bloc's three-year existence,
their voting record, their increasingly frequent joint meetings,
and their sponsorship of petitions to the UN have demonstrated
a growing cohesion. For the short run, the political, economic,
and military weaknesses of individual members may continue to
make them vulnerable to big-power pressures. Growing political
experience and confidence, however, as well as recognition that
there is strength in unity, suggest the group as a whole will
adopt an increasingly independent attitude in the future.
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