PORTUGUESE GUINEA HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00891A001300040001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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PO
rtu
U
ese Guinea
Handbook
Secret
1141 99
No. 0627
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources
and Methods Involved
Classified by 62-0001, exempt
from general declassification
schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval
of the Director of Central
Intelligence
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Page
Location and area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Topography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Minerals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Human resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Government policy and development . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Labor and income . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Structure of the economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Transportation and telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Foreign aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Foreign trade and balance of payments . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Government structure and functioning . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Security system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Organization and manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Military budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Training and logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
VIII. US INTERESTS
MAP
Portuguese Guinea
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Portuguese Guinea is the oldest and poorest of Portugal's African
provinces. It has been the scene of an active and moderately successful
armed insurgency since 1963. Anti-Portuguese rebels operating primarily
from bases in neighboring Guinea and Senegal have tied down sizable
Portuguese military forces in a guerrilla war that in 1972 seemed stalemated.
Although Portuguese Guinea is of little economic value, Lisbon believes that
a defeat there would encourage the active rebellions in its more valuable
territories of Angola and Mozambique, and undermine the Portuguese posi-
tion.
The province is among Africa's poorest and least developed countries.
Deep rivers and large tracts of swamp dissect much of the interior. Both
climate and topography are inhospitable. Although over 70 percent of the
indigenous population engages in subsistence agriculture, the province is a
net importer of food and most other vital necessities.
Portuguese Guinea is governed by Lisbon through a highly centralized
administration manned largely by metropolitan Portuguese and a sizable
number of Cape Verdean mulattoes, whose educational level is much higher
than that of local Africans. This structure employs broad police powers,
strict press censorship, and tight curbs on most political activity. The present
governor, who assumed his post in 1968, has tried to give the black African
majority a greater voice in running their own affairs and has shown greater
interest in developing the province's weak economic base.
The durable insurgency has spurred the Portuguese to greater efforts to
woo the province's 17 tribal groups through economic and social action
projects. Some progress has been made among the province's Muslim tribes,
notably the large Fulani group, although these groups traditionally have
cooperated with the government. The rebels' recruiting efforts have been
most successful among the animist tribes, particularly the Balantas, the
province's largest and most backward tribe. The pagan Balantas have long
resented the favoritism shown by Portugal toward the Muslim tribes. The
rebels and Portuguese, who are increasingly aware of the necessity of
winning the allegiance of the indigenous people, are stressing their respective
abilities to provide health services, schools, and security to the population.
The government has embarked on a strategic hamlet strategy, which occa-
sions the resettlement of large groups of people. At present, the military
situation is stalemated, with the Portuguese in control of key towns and
most of the population, while the rebels, ensconced in tracts along the
southern border and operating from sanctuaries in Senegal and Guinea,
appear capable of attacking practically anywhere in the province.
Portuguese Guinea
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Portuguese Guinea, an overseas province of Portugal (sometimes known
as Guinea-Bissau), is wedged between Senegal to the north and the Republic
of Guinea to the east and south. Its territory includes various coastal islands
and an offshore archipelago, the Bijagos Islands. Portuguese Guinea's perim-
eter is 605 miles, of which about 435 are land boundaries and 170 miles are
coastline. With an area of about 14,000 square miles, Portuguese Guinea is
almost twice the size of New Jersey.
Topography
Much of the province is comprised of low coastal plain with numerous
swamps, especially in the southwest. The coastline is deeply indented by
several rivers. The country can be divided into four main regions. The Boe
hills, in the east, are flat-topped, grass-covered areas with a maximum
elevation of 990 feet above sea level, the highest part of the province. These
hills give way to a plateau of grassy savanna where the climate is drier, and
elevations are chiefly between 115 and 415 feet. Between the savanna and
the coastal region lies a hot and humid forest area. The long coastal strip
consists of a maze of mangrove swamps and areas of coconut palms and
other tropical vegetation.
The climate is tropical-hot and wet with two seasons. The mean
average temperature is 77 degrees F. April and May are the hottest months
(about 84 degrees F), and December and January the coldest (about 73
degrees F). Rainfall is abundant. The wet season lasts from June to Novem-
ber; during the dry season from December to May the northerly harmattan
(a dust-laden wind) blows from the Sahara Desert.
Agricultural-Agriculture is the principal economic activity. It is en-
tirely an African activity; there are no European settlers. Rice is the staple
food of the population. Swamp rice and upland rice amount to about 85,000
metric tons annually. An additional 15,000 tons must be imported each
year. Maize, beans, cassava, and sweet potatoes also are raised by villagers to
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supplement their meager diets. Traditional exports are peanuts-approxi-
mately 50,000 tons annually in good years-grown in the interior and palm
oil products. In 1969, peanuts and coconuts accounted for 60 percent and
30 percent respectively of the value of exports. Other export items include
palm kernels, timber, hides, and skins. Cattle-breeding is an important
activity among the Muslim tribes.
No minerals have been discovered in quantities warranting commercial
exploitation.
Population composition-According to official US estimates, Portu-
guese Guinea had an estimated population of 489,000 in July 1972. The rate
of growth was an unusually low 0.2 percent annually. The vast majority of
the people are Africans, with the principal tribal groups-at least 17 have
been identified-being the Balanta (30 percent), Fulani (20 percent), Man-
dyako (14 percent) Malinke (13 percent), and Papel (7 percent). Smaller
groups include the Brame, Biafada, Felup, Bayote, Nalu, and Bissago. Wide
differences prevail in language, customs, and social organization. Tribes in
the coastal region, such as the Balanta, have retained their traditional
religious beliefs (animism), although some have converted to Christianity.
The Fulani and Malinke, located in the northeast, have been most closely
associated with the Europeans. Most Fulani and Malinke are Muslim, as are
the Biafada. All these tribal groups are agriculturalists. The Fulani also breed
cattle. Of the nonindigenous people, mulattoes from the Portuguese Cape
Verde Islands are the most numerous (about 10,000). The mulatto com-
munity is important in the middle and lower ranks of government and
commerce. Most of the 2,000 resident Europeans are Portuguese; there are a
number of Lebanese traders as well. Guinea has never attracted settlers
because of its forbidding landscape and generally unpleasant climate. The
bulk of the labor force is engaged in subsistence agriculture.
According to government figures, average population density for the
province is 20 per square kilometer. The insurgency has added to normal
disparities in population density. Currently, government-held areas report-
edly have a population density of 40-50 per square kilometer. About 60,000
people reside at Bissau, the provincial capital and largest town. Government
resettlement measures have also increased the population around the prov-
ince's eight other towns, but no more than 20 percent of the province's
489,000 inhabitants live in the resettled areas or fortified hamlets. Between
50,000 and 70,000 Portuguese Guineans have taken up permanent residence
in neighboring Senegal since the insurgency began.
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II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Government policy and development
The economy is completely dominated by metropolitan Portugal. Eco-
nomic policies are formulated almost exclusively by Lisbon, although the
current governor-general, Antonio de Spinola, actively pushes for develop-
ment funds. Most inhabitants derive their livelihood from subsistence agricul-
ture. The limited commercial activity that exists is dominated by Portuguese,
Lebanese, and Cape Verdian tradesmen. General Spinola has had some
success convincing African producers to sell their peanuts and palm oil to
commercial firms and thus enter the cash economy.
Portugal and its overseas provinces have a centralized development plan,
a common monetary and payments system, and a well-integrated credit
system. Lisbon treats Portuguese Guinea as a captive market for Portuguese
goods and by means of quotas assures that its own needs will be met by
Portuguese Guinea's exports of agricultural products.
The guerrilla war in the province has prompted the government to give
greater impetus to development as a means of winning over the population.
In 1968, the newly appointed Governor Spinola launched a six-year Develop-
ment Plan (1968-73), which aims at an annual growth rate of 7 percent.
Agriculture receives first priority. Since 1968 almost $4 million has been
invested in building a modern fish processing plant at Bolama. Small ship-
yards at Bissau and Puana are also being expanded. In the agricultural sector,
the Spinola program has placed greatest stress on convincing African farmers
to enter the cash economy through the development of production and
marketing cooperatives. The 1969 gross domestic product (GDP) in 1963
constant prices was $106.5 million.
Over 70 percent of the province's population was engaged in subsist-
ence agriculture as of 1970. Economic development is made particularly
difficult because of the lack of capital, skilled labor, technicians, and
administrators, and the failure to find commercially exploitable natural
resources. Wage earners are limited to a few thousand Portuguese, Cape
Verdian, and Lebanese merchants, and civilian government employees. The
more than 25,000 Portuguese troops in the province bolster the cash econ-
omy. Portuguese Guinea's 1969 gross domestic product (GDP) of about
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$200 per capita, conceals the great disparity of wealth that exists between
blacks and whites.
Structure of the economy
Agriculture-Portuguese Guinea's economy is based exclusively on agri-
culture. Rice and millet are the main subsistence crops, and peanuts and
palm kernels are exported. Forests occupy about one third of the area, but
exploitation is limited. Livestock is important, and some hides are exported.
Lack of power has been a major obstacle to industrial development.
Electrical power production in 1968 was 7.7 million kwh. A few small
factories process agricultural products and produce soap. Oilseeds make up
about 80 percent of exports. Most exports go to Portugal. Principal imports,
mainly from Portugal, are textiles, foodstuffs, wines, and industrial products.
Mineral-Although no significant resources have been found, geologists
believe that bauxite deposits of some importance may exist in the southeast.
Oil prospecting operations are now taking place off the coast. Fishing offers
some promise, but it is still in its infancy. The unsettled political and
military conditions militate against the exploitation of any mineral wealth.
Transportation and telecommunications
Surface routes-Rivers, lagoons, and canals provide a main means of
transportation. Internal water transportation is important in the western two
thirds of the country, and civil and naval shallow-draft vessels are used for a
variety of transport missions. Besides Bissau, the major port, there are two
minor ports. Some waterways are navigable by oceangoing ships for consider-
able distances upstream.
The Spinola administration has made improvement of the province's
limited road network a major objective. Using engineers from the metropole
and local labor, the Portuguese have pushed ahead with roadbuilding as part
of the countersubversion program. In addition, the new roads are intended
to facilitate trade. By mid-1971, paved roads linked Bissau with Buruntuma
on the Guinean border and with Texeira Pinto in the north. All told, 250
kilometers of road have been improved since 1968; 330 of the territory's
2,330 kilometers of road are now paved.
Civil Air-Portuguese Guinea has a total of 58 usable airfields, three of
which have permanent surface runways. The province also has a seaplane
station. Bissau airfield, the largest and most important, is capable of handling
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large passenger and military jet aircraft. TAP, the Portuguese National
Airline, had four flights weekly between Lisbon and Bissau in 1972. Portu-
guese Guinea is also linked with Portugal's other two African provinces,
Angola and Mozambique, by TAP flights. The province has its own domestic
airline, whose service includes frequent hops to the Cape Verde Islands and
the offshore Bijagos Islands.
Telecommunications-There are two radiotelegraph stations, 23 tele-
graph stations, and one radio station. In 1968, there were only 1,517
telephones. Government-owned Radio Bissau, the sole radio network, pro-
vides up to six hours daily of programming in Portuguese and in three
African languages. Daily broadcasts in French and in African languages are
beamed to Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. A new transmitting center
near Bissau is being built by the military. Two new transmitters were built in
1970. The province has no TV station.
Foreign aid
Despite an over-all reduction in development aid from the metropole to
Portugal's three African provinces, Portuguese Guinea, never a priority area
for Portuguese economic planners, seems to have been given increased
attention. Portugal is the only donor of economic assistance, having granted
$1.9 million in government loans in 1968 plus an undetermined amount in
technical assistance grants. The guerrilla war and the province's lack of
natural resources discourage potential foreign investors.
The majority of the funds needed to finance the conflict in the
province is provided by the metropole in the form of a loan to the provincial
government. The amount of the loan is not known.
Foreign trade and balance of payments
Portuguese Guinea's trade is totally oriented toward the metropole. The
country's basic economy has undergone serious dislocations after nearly a
decade of insurgency. In the best years before the conflict, the peanut
crop-the chief export-was about 50,000 tons; in 1964 it was 46,000 tons
and by early 1969 it had dropped to about 30,000 tons, one half exported
and one half processed into oil locally. Rice has been imported in significant
amounts since 1969 (15,000 tons per year). At one time the province
exported between 10,000 and 20,000 tons annually.
Trade has been in serious imbalance since the insurgency began in the
early sixties: exports of peanuts and peanut by-products in 1967 were $3.2
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million and imports, mostly manufactured goods, fuels, transport equip-
ment, and rice, amounted to $16.4 million. Trade figures for 1969 showed
exports continued at a low level ($3.6 million) while imports had grown
substantially ($23.3 million). Future trade prospects look dim as the insur-
gency shows no sign of abating.
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III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
Historical background
Portugal's oldest possession on the African mainland, Portuguese
Guinea, was discovered in 1446 by the Portuguese mariner Nuno Tristao.
Although Cape Verde islanders were granted trading rights in the territory in
1462, few prominent trading posts appear to have been in existence before
1581. During the 17th and 18th centuries Cacheu, probably established in
1470, was the chief slave trading center of the region. After the slave trade
declined in the early 19th century, Bissau, which had been founded as a fort
in 1765, became the chief commercial center.
I n the 19th century the Portuguese, who had held only a few coastal
trading posts and did not explore the interior, found themselves contesting
territorial claims by France and the United Kingdom. The island of Bolama,
which had been in dispute between the United Kingdom and Portugal for
more than a century, was awarded to Portugal in 1870 by US President
Ulysses S. Grant, who acted as arbitrator. France and Portugal settled their
problems in 1886, and final demarcation of the territory's frontiers was
achieved in 1905.
In the early days of Portuguese rule, relations between the settlers and
the indigenous people revolved around the slave trade. Between 1890 and
1910, when Portugal attempted to expand inland, there was a series of
uprisings by the indigenous people. The country was finally pacified in
1912-15, following a series of campaigns led by Captain Teixeira Pinto. In
1941 the capital of the territory was moved from Bolama to Bissau. By
constitutional amendment in 1951 the colony of Portuguese Guinea became
an overseas province of Portugal. Portugal officially regards the overseas
provinces as integral parts of the Portuguese nation and stresses the aim of
creating a multiracial, "pluricontinental" society.
Isolated terrorism and sabotage erupted in the province in 1961, insti-
gated largely by a group of rebels calling themselves the African Party for the
Independence of Portuguese Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC).
Founded in 1956 by a group of disenchanted Cape Verdeans, the PAIGC
sought independence from Portuguese rule. Guerrilla warfare broke out in
1963 and has continued ever since.
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Government structure and functioning
Portuguese Guinea is considered by Lisbon to be an integral part of
Portugal, and it is represented currently by one seat in the 130-seat National
Assembly in Lisbon. The governmental system, like that in the metropole, is
based on the corporate state. Control over Portuguese Guinean affairs
continues to be exercised by the Overseas Ministry in Lisbon, despite
constitutional changes in August 1971 which provided for more local auton-
omy in the overseas provinces.
Executive-Executive power is vested in the Office of the Governor,
who is appointed by the Council of Ministers and exercises executive and
legislative authority under the guidance of the overseas minister. In recent
years, largely due to the poor security situation in the province, the gover-
norship has been filled by a general grade military officer who also functions
as the commander in chief of Portuguese forces in the territory. The
governor serves a four-year term and exerts a great deal of authority over all
aspects of provincial affairs.
The governor is assisted in his executive duties by an advisory commis-
sion (junta consultiva). It consists of the governor, its presiding officer, the
provincial secretary-general, the attorney general, the treasurer, and three
members chosen by the provincial legislature, one of whom must represent
the parishes (rural administrative units). In his legislative capacity the gover-
nor is advised by a 14-member Legislative Assembly made up of 11 elected
members and three government officers serving ex officio. Three of the
elected members are determined by direct popular vote, and eight are chosen
by various interest groups (e.g., labor, employers, large taxpayers). The three
ex officio members are the provincial secretary-general, the attorney general,
and the treasurer.
Governor Spinola has run the province in his own fashion, with consid-
erable support, but apparently without too much interference, from Lisbon.
He has been allowed to develop in Portuguese Guinea counterinsurgency
policies different from those pursued in the other African provinces. These
include strengthening traditional institutions, maintaining close coordination
between the administration and the local people, and developing cooperative
efforts in various fields. Governor Spinola has also been a staunch proponent
of social and economic development. Under his aegis roads, dispensaries, and
schools have been built and more social services made available.
Legislative-The provincial 14-member Legislative Assembly exerts lim-
ited influence on the governor's decisions. The Assembly reviews the pro-
vincial budget and makes recommendations, but final authority rests with
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the governor, who in turn must answer to Lisbon. General Spinola has
permitted the establishment of annual peoples' congresses-an expanded
version of the traditional African village council-to sound out the Africans'
views. The congresses are long (about six weeks) and unstructured and the
format is largely left to the Africans. All tribal groups are represented as well
as all levels of authority.
Judicial-The judiciary is directly responsible to Lisbon and operates
under the Portuguese civil code, which is based on Roman law. African
customary law also applies among the African population. Lisbon makes all
judicial appointments and can remove judges at will. The province of Guinea
forms one circuit within Lisbon's legal system. Trials are usually public
except for political crimes, which are tried in camera. The defendant usually
has no recourse to higher judicial authority.
Civil Service-Most members of the provincial administration are ap-
pointed by the minister for overseas or by the governor acting in his place.
One major administrative shortcoming is the lack of trained black Africans
to staff the provincial administration, a problem which has been particularly
noticeable since the 1964 decision to Africanize many local administrative
positions. So far the Portuguese have been able to place only a few Africans
in these posts because of the paucity of qualified applicants. The qualifica-
tions generally require literacy in the Portuguese language and a certain
amount of education beyond the primary grades. In lieu of qualified Afri-
cans the Portuguese frequently employ Cape Verdeans as well as metropoli-
tan Portuguese.
District and local government-The province is divided into nine dis-
tricts and three townships, each governed by prefects appointed by the
governor. Rural government is based on subdivisions called administrative
posts or parishes (currently numbering 51), determined largely by the
economic and social development of their inhabitants. The organization of
the individual tribes, which generally corresponds to traditional arrange-
ments, has no formal relationship to the modern system of government.
Traditional chiefs are considered to be representatives of the government in
areas under their jurisdiction.
Political dynamics-Political activity is rigidly controlled according to
strict guidelines issued from the metropole, where political activity other
than that by officially authorized organizations is banned. General Spinola
has permitted limited political activity among the indigenous population, but
the activity is closely scrutinized.
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The governor has developed a Guinean branch of Portugal's political
organization, National Popular Action (ANP), which unlike its counterparts
elsewhere in Portuguese territory, brings together political activists of virtu-
ally all persuasions. Another striking feature of the Guinean branch of ANP
is that it is virtually all black. Although some Cape Verdeans are involved,
black formerly unaffiliated political activists dominate its leadership. Gover-
nor Spinola seems committed to preparing more Guineans for an increased
role in running their own affairs, a novel concept among Portuguese author-
ities in Africa.
The constitutional revisions of August 1971, ostensibly designed to
grant greater "autonomy" to the overseas provinces, do not appear to
involve substantive changes. Despite name changes of provincial organs and
the upgrading of provincial governors to ministerial rank, final authority over
the provinces remains with Lisbon. The Portuguese Prime Minister and the
overseas minister are still the key decision-makers.
Portuguese Guinea's minimal representation in the National Assembly is
unlikely to change much. Voting restrictions exclude most Africans. The
only legitimate channel for the expression of popular sentiment is Governor
Spinola's annual People's Congresses, an ad hoc arrangement that brings
together African tribal elements and provincial civil servants to exchange
ideas. A limited number of Africans who have the franchise-mostly Cape
Verdeans-can vote for 11 of the 14 members of the Legislative Assembly,
the province's sole legislative body, which functions mainly as an advisory
body to the governor.
Security system
Police-Police strength in the province totals about 1,000 men, of
which 600 (organized into four companies) are African administrative police.
The remaining 424 are Portuguese members of the Public Security Police
(PSP). In Portuguese Guinea the PSP does not have control over other
paramilitary units as it does elsewhere in Portuguese Africa. The PSP is
responsible for normal police functions such as deterring crime, maintaining
order, and protecting lives and property. It is answerable to the minister of
the interior in Lisbon who coordinates with the minister of overseas. Al-
though the Portuguese do not maintain police forces in the villages, they do
provide training and arms, upon request, to local village self-defense units.
More than 100 of these units are now operational.
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Portuguese forces have been hard pressed to contain the full-scale
guerrilla warfare that began in Portuguese Guinea in 1963. As of early 1972,
nearly 30,000 Portuguese military personnel were being used against the
guerrillas, partly because of Lisbon's belief that any setback in Bissau would
have a domino effect on its African empire.
Headquarters of the African Party for the Independence of Portuguese
Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) are in Conakry, Guinea, which is one of the
party's staunchest backers. The PAIGC has proved itself to be a serious,
well-organized political and military movement. Aided by a steady stream of
armaments, mainly from the Soviet Union, and financial as well as moral
support from most African countries through the Organization of African
Unity, the PAIGC has forced the Portuguese to concede much of the
countryside and withdraw to the more easily defended urban centers. Even
these do not remain immune from attack, however. Twice during 1971 the
island capital of Bissau and another of the province's larger towns were
subjected to rocket attacks.
PAIGC-The PAIGC was founded in 1956 by Amilcar Cabral, a Lisbon-
trained Cape Verdean economist. Its leadership is made up primarily of Cape
Verdean mulattoes and its fighting ranks are filled largely by black Afri-
cans-mostly of the large Balanta tribe. Occasionally the blacks have ex-
pressed resentment over their having to bear a greater share of the fighting,
but so far this does not seem to have adversely affected their overall combat
capability.
Portugal estimates that the PAIGC has between 5,000 and 6,000
effectives and another 5,000 in a reserve or militia role. The USSR provides
sufficient weapons and ammunition to permit the PAIGC to sustain its
protracted campaign. In the past the PAIGC has hesitated to attack the
larger towns for a variety of reasons, but in mid-1971 it did attack urban
centers and, in general, exhibited greater audacity and confidence in its
overall combat ability.
Guinea and Senegal provide PAIGC forces with sanctuaries, with
Guinea being the much more militant supporter. Guinea serves as the major
conduit for Soviet arms and other material assistance from elsewhere. Cuba
provides significant help, largely in the form of instructors and training. The
OAU's African Liberation Committee has given financial as well as moral
support to what it considers Africa's most successful liberation movement.
Communist Subversion-Portuguese Guinea has never had a Communist
party. The Portuguese assert, however, that the PAIGC is actually an ex-
tension of world communism and that it has made a deal with the Soviets to
Portuguese Guinea Nov 72
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provide them with bases once Portugal is ousted. PAIGC leader Cabral
vigorously denies being a Communist and asserts his ideological independ-
ence, claiming to be an African nationalist who seeks only independence for
his people. Cabral denounces NATO and says that the US, France, and West
Germany especially continue to give financial and military support to Portu-
gal through their NATO affiliation. He considers the continuation of such
aid indispensable to Portugal's sustaining its African operations.
Portuguese Guinea IV-2
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Organization and manpower
Portuguese Guinea's armed forces are an integral part of the armed
forces of Portugal. All military units in the territory are commanded by the
commander in chief of the armed forces (CINC) Portuguese Guinea, who
also doubles as the provincial governor. The CINC is directly subordinate to
the minister of national defense in Lisbon.
The Portuguese Army-the predominant service in the province-falls
under the Independent Territorial Command of Guinea based in Bissau.
Subordinate to army headquarters are four sectors (west, east, south, and
Bissau), one operational group command, (CAOP) and one operational
command (COP). The CAOP is a brigade-level force created to suppress
insurgent activities in the west sector. Its operational area is flexible and
varies to meet the insurgent threat wherever it seems greatest. The COP is a
temporary battalion-sized task force, formed specifically to counter the
insurgents along the Senegalese border. There is no fixed number of units
assigned to the sectors or operational commands.
The Portuguese armed forces in the province were estimated at 28,000
men as of early 1972, (army: 25,500 organized mainly in battalion-sized
units; air force: 1,400; navy: 1,100). In addition, the Portuguese have been
training indigenous forces to carry a greater share of the struggle and have
integrated some of them into the armed forces. These forces were estimated
to number some 15,000: 5,000 militia, 5,000 village self-defense, and 5,000
regular army.
The armed forces have been steadily increased since 1961 to counter
the spreading insurgency. General Spinola has used his military forces ef-
fectively, relying heavily on helicopters for increased mobility. The army
also engages in a major civic action and pacification program, providing food,
medication, education, and other assistance to the indigenous population to
woo them away from the rebels. The army is also heavily involved in a
population resettlement program.
Portuguese Air Force strength in Portuguese Guinea includes 450 para-
troopers and 150 personnel stationed at the Portuguese air base on Sal Island
in the Cape Verde Islands, which forms part of the Cape Verde - Guinea Air
Zone headquartered at Bissau. The exact number of indigenous personnel in
the air force in Guinea is unknown, but probably is low. There are a small
number of African paratroopers. The total aircraft inventory in Guinea is 70,
including 12 jet fighter-bombers (G-91). The majority of the aircraft as well
as the paratroop unit are based in Bissau, although several airfields in the east
and northwest sectors can handle jets.
Portuguese Guinea Nov 72
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The principal mission of the air force is to provide close air support,
trooplift, reconnaissance, and medical evacuation. Although handicapped by
obsolete fixed-wing aircraft, insufficient numbers of helicopters, and short-
ages of pilots and technicians, the air force is effective in the performance of
its mission.
Portuguese naval strength in Guinea includes four special marine de-
t'achments-one of which is locally recruited-two marine companies, and an
underwater demolition team. Another African marine detachment is being
formed. All naval forces in Portuguese Guinea come under the Maritime
Defense Command based at Bissau. Ship strength consists mainly of small
patrol craft and a few larger supply vessels. The general mission of the navy
(excluding the marines) is two-fold; resupply by river of land forces in the
interior and river patrol. The navy's mission is crucial because 90 percent of
the total resupply operations are waterborne.
Military budget
The Portuguese armed forces in Guinea receive all their military equip-
ment and considerably more than half their financial support from Lisbon.
Most of the food used by the military forces has to be imported from the
metropole.
The military budget for the province is prepared by the governor in
conformity with Lisbon's guidelines. The budget is then submitted to the
minister of overseas for approval. Lisbon's actual contribution to finance the
conflict in Guinea-in the form of a loan-is not known but the provincial
share in 1969 was just over $1 million out of a total provincial budget of
about $7 million; the lion's share of the budget went for development
projects.
Training and logistics
Portugal depends almost entirely on conscription to maintain its army
in both Portugal and its African provinces. Army units arriving from the
metropole process through the army replacement center in Bissau, where
they receive weapons and equipment. After a short orientation, units are
assigned to the field, where they serve 12 to 22 month tours. Portuguese
conscripts receive only four to seven weeks of basic training after which they
are formed into units. These new units are then rotated with ones returning
from Guinea. Any advanced or further training is conducted in combat areas
under actual insurgency conditions. Indigenous personnel are recruited for
military service after a careful screening. Black units are being formed and
many have already been integrated into the armed services.
Portuguese Guinea
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The logistical system for Portuguese Guinea-unique because most of
the province's supplies must be moved by water-provides adequate support
for the current level of counterinsurgency. Airfield and helipad construction
has brought most military units and probably 95 percent of the population
within an hour of Bissau. Military units are considered well-equipped but
lack sophisticated electronic and communications equipment.
Portuguese Guinea VI - 3
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VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
As an integral part of Portugal, the African province of Guinea has no
independent foreign policy. Portugal's major foreign policy objective-as it
applies to Africa-is to defend its sovereignty over the African provinces in
the face of increasingly hostile international public opinion. While showing
no less a commitment than the Salazar regime to retain its African provinces,
the current government of Prime Minister Caetano has promised to make
long overdue reforms in the status of the overseas territories. These reforms
aim at giving the two more advanced African provinces of Mozambique and
Angola greater local autonomy. As for Guinea, the most economically and
politically depressed of the three African territories, the protracted conflict
there seems to militate against any sweeping change that might dilute
Portuguese control.
Portuguese ground and air forces in Portuguese Guinea have been
accused by Senegal and Guinea of territorial violations. The seriousness of
these apparent border violations has increased in recent years, culminating in
a Portuguese-led attack on Conakry in November 1970, which had among its
objectives the toppling of the Toure regime and the destruction of anti-Por-
tuguese rebel headquarters there. The Senegalese, who have shown some
restraint in denouncing the Portuguese, became more vocal in 1971 after a
series of mining incidents and shellings along their border. Senegal demanded
and received UN Security Council condemnation of Portuguese activities.
Dakar also showed a greater willingness to support the anti-Portuguese rebels
whose movements on its territory have occasionally been subjected to tight
curbs. Guinea, perhaps the shrillest of Portugal's detractors, has continued to
provide the Conakry-based rebels carte blanche. Military supplies and other
aid flow through Conakry en route to rebel units inside Portuguese Guinea.
Portuguese Guinea Nov 72
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The US provides no direct economic or military assistance to Por-
tuguese Guinea and since 1961 has prohibited the direct export to Por-
tuguese African territories of US arms or military equipment supplied to
Lisbon. Exxon Oil Company (Esso) is the only US business with a significant
interest in the territory. Under a 25-year concession the firm has invested
over $16 million on offshore oil exploration, so far with negative results.
Exxon has leased some of its exploration rights to Texas Gulf Sulphur. US
trade with Portuguese Guinea is negligible. There are very few US citizens
resident in the province.
Portuguese Guinea Nov 72
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Secret
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