DOMINICAN REPUBLIC HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2002
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1972
• Content Type: REPORT

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Dominican aepub-ic
Handbook
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No. 0585
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I. GEOGRAPHY
Location and area
1
Topography
1
Climate
1
Human resources
2
II. ECONOMICISACKGROUND
Growth rate and trends
1
Main sectors of the economy
2
Fuels and power
3
Transportation and communication
4
Economic policy
5
Foreign trade
6
Balance of payments
6
III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
Historical summary
1
Structure of the government
3
Voting
5
Political dynamics
5
IV.
SUBVERSION
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VI. ARMED FORCES
Military budget
2
Manpower
2
VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
VIII. US INTERESTS
IX. CHRONOLOGY AND TABULAR DATA
MAP
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INTRODUCTION
Geographic proximity and chronic political instability have brought the
Dominican Republic to the more or less permanent attention of the United
States. The blessings of a benign climate, fertile soil, good harbors, access to
busy shipping routes, and the relative absence of racial tensions have been
largely dissipated by chronic social tensions and the failure to develop
effective political institutions.
The inauguration in 1966 of President Joaquin Balaguer saw the start of
a period of relative civil tranquility and modest but steady economic re-
covery from the effects of the civil war of 1965. These trends have con-
tinued into Balaguer's second administration. The gains are tenuous, how-
ever, arid their permanence, much less their growth, is continually menaced
by lack of economic and social reforms and by Balaguer's personalistic and
highly centralized style of government.
Nearly 60% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming on
small plots of land. Little more than a third of the population is literate;
managerial talent and technical skills are in short supply; and one of the
highest sustained rates of population growth in the world further compli-
cates any plan to improve economic and social conditions. Neither the upper
class (less than 1%) nor the small emerging middle class (5-15%1 is conspicu-
ously wealthy. Nonetheless, the contrast between the economic well-being of
these groups and the poverty of the majority of the population is obvious
and a source of ':ension.
Leftist and Communist forces are small, and their fragmentation has
kept them from becoming a serious threat since 1965. It remains to be seen
whether the authoritarian nature of the Balaguer regime, the prospect of a
third term for Balaguer, and the absence of political alternatives will increase
the chances of a new explosion of violence from which leftist extremists
might benefit.
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I. GEOGRAPHY
Location and area
The Dominican Republic occupies the eastern two thirds of the island
of Hispaniola, the second largest island in the Caribbean (Cuba is the largest).
Its northwestern coast is about 600 nautical miles southeast of Miami,
Florida, and the southwestern tip of the country is about 420 nautical miles
north of Maracaibo, Venezuela. Puerto Rico lies 60 nautical miles to the
east. Roughly triangular in shape, the Dominican Republic, exclusive of the
offshore islands, occupies an area of approximately 18,800 square miles.
Topography
Extensive areas of rugged, complex highlands separated by valleys and a
coastal plain make up the Dominican topography. The highlands, which
cover about 60% of the country, consist of four parallel, northwest-southeast
trending ranges separated by valleys; one east-west trending range; a hilly
peninsula; and many small, isolated groups of hills and mountains scattered
throughout the plains. The highest elevations in the Caribbean islands are
found in the Cordillera Central of the Dominican Republic, where many
peaks exceed 7,000 feet. Pico Duarte is the highest, rising to a height of
10,414 feet.
The remairing 40% of the land area consists of three generally parallel
interior plains; a broad, gently rolling southeast coastal plain and a number
of smaller, narrow coastal plains; and several small, scattered intermontane
valleys and bas ns located in the highlands. Most of the population and
cultivated areas are concentrated in the Valle del Cibao, the northernmost
interior plain, and on the broad southeast coastal plain.
Most of the plains are subject to damaging earthquakes. The coastal
areas between Bani and Barahona in the vicinity of the capital city of Santo
Domingo on the southern coast and near Nagua on the northeastern coast
experience damaging seismic sea waves (tsunamis).
Climate
The Dominican Republic has a tropical and strongly maritime climate
dominated by rnoistu re-bearing trade winds. The varied but predominantly
mountainous topography causes pronounced variations in rainfall,
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temperature, and cloudiness, but most of the country has a wet season from
May through October or November and a dry-to-less-wet season during the
remaining months.
Seasonal temperature variations are slight; the lowlands are hot
throughout the year, and the highlands are cool.
Human resources
The US Census Bureau estimated the population as of January 1971 at
4,128,000. The annual growth rate is estimated at 3.0%, and life expectancy
at birth for the period 1965-70 was put at 52.1 years by the Latin American
Demographic Center in Santiago, Chile. In 1966, about 47.3% of the popu-
lation was estimated to be under 15 years of age. Males outnumber females
102 to 100, according to the 1960 census.
Dominicans are predominantly mulatto, a mixture of former African
slaves and European immigrants. Of the indigenous Taino Indians who
welcomed Columbus in 1492,!scarcely a trace remains. The tiny upper class, a
social rather than an economic entity, is largely white, although the mixing
of blacks and whites has been so thorough over the years that few ethnically
pure specimens of either race are found in the population. There is an
awareness of race, however, and lighter color and higher social and economic
status tend to go together. Still, the Dominican Republic has been spared the
kind of race consciousness that generates social antagonism.
Class distinctions are based primarily on wealth, employment, and
education. At the upper levels, family background is an important factor.
Family ties are important at all levels of Dominican society, and family
loyalty takes precedence over the demands of the community and the state.
Most Domlnicans are country dwellers. Santo Domingo and Santiago de
los Caballeros are the only sizable urban areas, accounting for about half of
the urban population. Urban dwellers are listed as 40% of the total popula-
tion, but this is somewhat misleading since it includes people in all populated
sections with more than 7,000 inhabitants even though not all actually live
in an urban environment. The over-all settlement pattern is one of small,
agriculturally oriented areas. Nearly all population centers are located on the
plains. In the highly productive areas around Santiago de los Caballeros,
density exceeds more than 600 persons per square mile, but the Valle del
Cibao as a whole includes uninhabited areas with good land. Population is
particularly sparse in the extreme east and far west.
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Theoretically, education is free and compulsory for all children be-
tween the ages of 7 and 14, but neither schools nor teachers are adequate.
Although estimates of literacy vary, probably not more than 35 to 40% of
the population is literate. Predictably, literacy rates are lowest among the
peasants, who make up about 70% of the population.
The potential labor force is estimated at 1.3 million. Reliable statistics
on the rate of unemployment are lacking, but unemployment and serious
under-employment is roughly estimated at between 25 and 30%. About 73%
of those employed work in agriculture, about 8% in industry, and the
remaining 19% in services and other activities. Most of the available man-
power is unskilled. The demand for skilled technicians, professional, manage-
ment and supervisory personnel far exceeds the supply.
Most Dominicans live at a bare subsistence level, and both the rural and
urban poor have severe health and sanitation problems. Civil unrest, lack of
capital, too few technicians and skilled workers, and the apathy and ignor-
ance of most of the people are major obstacles to the development of
adequate public health programs.
Most Dominicans are baptized in the Roman, Catholic Church, but,
according to a church-sponsored survey made in the early 1960s, only 10%
regard themselves as practicing Catholics.
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II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Growth rate and trends
Economic performance in the 1960s was seriously affected by the
political instability that plagued the Dominican Republic after Trujillo's
assassination in 1961 and the civil war in 1965. Gross Domestic Product
declined 13% in 1965, recovered by 1967, and has since increased by about
23%. Per capita GDP in 1970 was still less than three fifths of the Latin
American average.
Relative political stability under the Balaguer government, combined
with high sugar sales to the US market at preferential prices and substantial
inflows of official and private capital, enabled the economy to grow at the
average rate of 6.6% during 1969-70. At the end of 1970, the balance of
payments showed a surplus of $6 million. Rapidly rising imports in 1971,
however, are expected to cause a substantial deficit despite the considerable
inflows of capital. Sugar sales account for about half of Dominican export
earnings, and preferential US sugar prices are essential to continued balance
cif payments equilibrium. The economy remains heavily dependent upon
external assistance, despite a decline in new commitments from $110 million
in 1966 to about $50 million in 1970.
The estimated growth of industrial production, including sugar proc-
essing, was 9.4% in 1969 and 10.7% in 1970. In 1970, it contributed 17% to
GDP. Since 1966, there has been some improvement in operations of the
State Enterprise Corporation (CORD E), which manages government-owned
interests. CORDE generates nearly 22% of industrial salaries and wages,
excluding the sugar industry. The Investment Fund for Economic Develop-
ment (FIDE), set up jointly by the Central Bank, AID, and the Inter-Amer-
ican Development Bank, has been a steady source of financing for industry.
In 1970 private enterprise made major mining investments in a ferro-nickel
project and in a petroleum refinery scheduled for construction in 1971.
Agriculture became one of the fastest growing sectors as a result of
improved weather in 1969-70, and in 1970 output of many food crops
reached record levels. Among agricultural commodity exports in 1970, sugar
and cacao exports surpassed the 1964 levels, but coffee exports did not.
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Main sectors of the economy
Agriculture is the principal sector of the Dominican economy, employ-
ing most of the labor force and contributing about 85-90% of the value of
exports. Poor farming methods, bad weather, and political problems caused
agricultural production to fluctuate widely during the 1960s; however,
government agricultural improvement programs, relative political stability,
and good weather made possible a 9% rise in agricultural production in 1969
and about a 5% rise in 1970.
Sugar cane is the most important crop, and its cultivation and proc-
essing is the most important Dominican economic and industrial activity,
contributing about 7% of the GDP and accounting for about half of the
country's export earnings. Seventy percent of the sugar crop is produced by
government-owned estates, 25% by the US-owned La Romana Estate, a
subsidiary of Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., and the remainder by private
Dominican interests. Climate, soil, and rainfall are suitable for agriculture,
but extensive subsistence farming and inefficient methods prevent full utili-
zation of the country's agricultural potential.
Coffee ranks as the second export crop. The Dominican Republic is a
member of the International Coffee Agreement but has failed to fill its basic
quota (25,560 tons in 1969) for several years. Cocoa and tobacco are also
grown for export.
During the 1960s, livestock production increased at an annual rate of
5% and currently accounts for one third of the country's total agricultural
output. Beef exports have increased substantially since export taxes were
repealed in 1967 arid Dominican beet was subsequently approved for export
to the United States. By 1969, beef exports had reached nearly 5,000 tons,
but in 1970, they fell to 3,400 tons.
Although production of food crops for domestic consumption has risen
steadily, it has not kept pace with requirements. Consequently, the Domin-
can Republic imports substantial quantities of foodstuffs.
There are significant bauxite and nickel deposits, some commercially
exploitable copper reserves, and limited iron ore, gold, silver, and platinum
deposits. Bauxite is the most important non-agricultural export. Nearly 1.3
million tons were produced in 1970, all of which was exported to the United
States. Proven reserves are estimated at 20 million metric tons, averaging
45% alumina. Bauxite is mined by Alcoa Exploration Co., a subsidiary of the
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Aluminum Company of America, under a concession granted until the year
2007 with an option to renew for 20 additional years.
Nickel will become a major foreign exchange earner when the Falcon-
bridge ferro-nickel processing plant becomes fully operational in 1972.
Ferro-nickel reserves are estimated to be sufficient for 25 years of operation
at a production rate of 28,500 tons per year. The complex is owned by
Falconbridge Dominicana, a subsidiary of Falconbridge Nickel Mines, Ltd.,
of Canada. Smaller interests are held by the Dominican Government and by
the US firm, Armco Steel Co.
Manufacturing accounted for 17% of the GDP in 1970 and employed
about 10% of the labor force. Food processing and beverage industries
contribute more than three fifths of the total industrial output. Light
consumer goods, manufactured under high protective tariffs, account for the
remainder.
Sugar milling is the most important industrial activity, and the gov-
ernment owns 12 of the 16 sugar mills. Since President Balaguer set up the
State Sugar Council in 1966, the government-owned mills have earned a
profit. The largest nongovernment-owned mill belongs to the US enterprise,
Gulf and Western Industries, Inc.
The rest of the manufacturing sector produces mainly for the domestic
market. Low quality and high production costs require protective tariffs to
allow the plants to operate profitably.
Consfruction, both publicly and privately financed, accounted for 5%
of GDP in 1970.
Fuels and power
The Dominican Republic has few energy resources; none of the known
petroleum deposits is commercially exploitable, and hydroelectric output is
insignificant, although its potential is considerable. In 1966, the import of
petroleum products rose to 500,000 metric tons. When the joint government
- Shell International Petroleum Co. refinery now being built near Santo
Domingo is completed in 1974, its 30,000-barrel-per-day capacity is ex-
pected to be adequate for domestic fuel requirements. Import demand is
then expected to shift from petroleum products to crude oil.
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Electric power production was about 710 million kilowatt hours in
1970. The per capita production of 175 kilowatt hours is less than half the
Latin American average. The system is overloaded and power blackouts are
routine. Five sixths of capacity is concentrated within a 25-mile radius of
Santo Domingo, and most of the remainder serves the sugar cane area on the
north coast. When the Tavera and Valdesia dam projects are completed,
over-all electric power capacity will be increased by about 55%.
Transportation and communication
Transportation and telecommunications systems compare favorably
with those of other Caribbean countries. The basic transportation network
consists of 6,000 miles of roads and highways, 3,000 miles of which are
concrete or bituminous, 1,400 miles of improved earth, 800 miles of unim-
proved earth, and 800 miles of gravel-surfaced roads. Most concrete roads
and the bituminous sections of the three major routes that radiate west,
north, and south from Santo Domingo are in good condition. Branch routes
connect these three highways, and other routes extend to isolated areas of
the interior. Two main highway connections with Haiti are made at Dajabon
in the north and Elias Pina in the south. Neither rail nor inland waterway
transportation is significant. Small, privately owned bus, truck, and taxi
companies transport passengers and freight.
Two domestic (Compania Dominicana de Aviacion CDA, and
Aerovias Quisqueyana, C por A.?AC) and five foreign airlines link the
Dominican Republic with nine countries and 13 cities. Government-owned
CDA recently concluded a civil air agreement with the United States that
will permit it to fly to New York as well as to Miami. AC, privately owned,
operates scheduled passenger services linking Santo Domingo - San Juan,
Puerto Rico - Santiago de los Caballeros. It also operates a cargo charter
service throughout the Caribbean. Additional air services are provided by the
recently revived Alas del Caribe, three cargo charter carriers that use four
heavy transport aircraft, and five agricultural aircraft companies that carry
out country-wide cropdusting operations using a fleet of 16 specially de-
signed light aircraft. The country has 25 usable airfields and one seaplane
station. Ten of the fields are military; three are joint military/civilian fields;
three are civilian; and the remainder are privately owned. The fields are fairly
well distributed throughout the country. The heaviest concentration is along
the sugar cane belt on the south coast. Most are within reach of road, rail, or
water transportation.
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The telecommunications service, one of the best in the Caribbean area,
has undergone continuous expansion and modernization since the mid-
1950s. Most cities and towns are connected by telephone and telegraph lines.
Internal telephone service is provided by the Canadian-owned Cia. Domini-
cane de Telefonos, C. por A. There is wireless telephone communication to
all parts of the world. The republic is served by All America Cables and
Radio, Inc., with offices in Santo Domingo, Puerto Plata, and Santiago de los
Caballeros, and by RCA Communications. Service and equipment are most
heavily concentrated and most efficient in the urban areas. Seventy-two
percent of the 40,200 telephones are in Santo Domingo.
Effective national radio coverage is provided by 84 AM and 4 FM
stations. There are an estimated 400,000 radio receivers in use, and 250,000
television sets receive the transmissions of three television stations.
Economic policy
Conservative economic policies imposed during President Balaguer's
1966-70 term repaired much of the economic damage caused by the civil war
of 1965, but the pace of recovery was slowed by cautious monetary and
fiscal policies which tended to inhibit private investment. During 1966-69,
government austerity policies succeeded in slowing the inflationary trend of
the politically and economically volatile early 1960s. Still, in 1970 the
cost-of-hying index rose 5%.
Public investment, financed partly through foreign aid but increasingly
from domestic savings, has increased substantially under the Balaguer gov-
ernments. The public sector's share of total investment grew from one fifth
to three eights from 1965 to 1969. Political effect, however, sometimes took
precedence over economic considerations, thus robbing government expend-
itures of full economic impact. The National Planning Office's National
Development Plan for 1970-74 calls for government investment of $530
million over the four-year period, primarily in agriculture and irrigation,
transportation and communications, and energy production.
Tax relief, import preferences for firms producing for export, credit to
new industries from the Central Bank Investment Fund for Economic
Development, price supports, and government storage facilities have been
made available to encourage private investment. But the government's desire
to encourage private investment is often frustrated by policies inconsistent
and sometimes in conflict with its goal. Various pieces of legislation that will
better define government policy are being considered.
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Because the numerous enterprises formerly owned by Trujillo and his
associates were nationalized, government ownership is fairly extensive. In
addition to most of the sugar estates and mills, the government controls 33
firms that produce a wide range of products. It has a minority share in 16
other enterprises. The Dominican Corporation of State Enterprises (CORDE)
manages the government-owned interests. Indirect government control is
exerted over the rest of the economy through price regulations, import
restriction, and credit and money policies.
The second Balaguer administration, which took office in August 1970,
has shown greater interest in long-range economic planning, but the pro-
jected pace of economic growth from 1970-74 is probably overly optimistic.
Continued reliance upon external financing, large sugar exports to the US
market at preferential prices, and political factors will continue to influence
the economic planning and performance of the government.
Foreign trade
Foreign trade is essential to the Dominican economy because of the
country's narrow resource base and small domestic market. During 1965-70
imports averaged 18% of GDP, while exports averaged about 14%. Consumer
goods, the largest component of imports, include raw materials, semi-fin-
isheci goods, machinery and equipment, and fuels. Sugar and sugar cane
by-products are the most important exports, earning 56% of export revenues
between 1964-69. Other agricultural products supplied an additional 30% of
earnings. Bauxite is the largest non-agricultural export; earnings from this
source grew from 5% in 1964 to 8% or more during 1965-69.
The United States supplies over halt of the Dominican Republic's
imports and buys nearly 80% of its exports.
Balance of payments
Balance of payments showed a surplus of $6 million in 1970, due to
large sugar exports to the US and substantial inflows of capital. Rapidly
rising imports in 1971, however, are expected to cause a substantial deficit,
despite the continued inflow of private and official capital.
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1111. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
Historical summary
Harried through their long history by poverty and isolation, foreign
occupations, dictatorships and varying degrees of anarchy, the Dominican
people can scarcely be faulted for lacking national pride and purpose. Nor is
it surprising that their country is virtually barren of the traditions, institu-
tions, even the impulses, required to produce government respectful of the
rights and responsive to the needs of the people.
The colony of Santo Domingo was the first permanent European
settlement in the New World, but its pre-eminence as the political and
commercial center of Spain's American empire was quickly lost as Spain's
interest shifted to richer conquests in Mexico and Peru. By 1550, the
all-but-abandoned colony was languishing in poverty and neglect. There was
a modest resurgence of prosperity in the 18th century, but, even so, by 1789
the colony's population had grown only to 125,000 of whom 15,000 were
slaves. In 1795, Spain ceded the future Dominican Republic to France, but
pressing European commitments prevented France from taking an active
interest in the acquisition, and in 1805 the colony suffered its first invasion
from Haiti. In 1809, when nearly all of Spain's New World colonies were in
rebellion, Santo Domingo sought the protection of Spanish rule and did not
declare its independence until 1821. Nine weeks later, it was again invaded
by Haiti.
The 22-year Haitian occupation well-nigh gutted the country, spiritu-
ally and materially. The church as an institution was crushed; the university
was closed; governmental machinery was demolished; the more enterprising
and able citizens fled; the bases of the modest economic revival of the 18th
century were wrecked. When the Haitians were finally expelled in 1844, the
rigors of independence were too much for the politically and economically
destitute nation to handle. The idealistic leaders of the drive for independ-
ence from Haiti were soon exiled and power was then traded back and forth
between a pair of dictators, Pedro Santana and Buenaventura Baez. "Brazen
opportunists" is the politest of the epithets historians have applied to them.
Well-founded fears of another Haitian occupation once again drove the
country to reunion with Spain in 1861. When the experience proved unre-
warding, efforts were then made to interest the United States in establishing
a protectorate over the Dominican Republic. The US Senate refused to ratify
the treaty.
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Chaos, a brief experience of representative government under Ulises
Espaillat, followed by worse chaos, culminated in 1882 with the emergence
of Ulises Heureaux whose 17-year dictatorship one historian characterizes as
"perhaps the most pitiless tyranny in the history of Latin America," rivaling
only the future rule of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. Heureaux was assassinated
in 1899, and during the next six years the country experienced four
revolutions and five presidents. A brief period of recovery under Ramon
Caceres ended with his assassination and the outbreak of civil war. The habit
of raising revenues simply by printing currency and floating ruinous foreign
loans had brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy, and threats of
European creditors to send battleships to collect unpaid debts prompted the
United States to take control of the Dominican customs house and begin to
repay the foreign loans from customs revenues. Meanwhile, the political
situation managed to degenerate further, and in 1916, fearful that a foreign
power hostile to the United States might take over the country, President
Woodrow Wilson authorized military occupation of the Dominican Republic
by the US Marines.
The occupation had several permanent effects upon the country. Road
construction irreversibly broke down regional isolation. Centralization of
authority reduced the power of provincial leaders, whose rivalries and
ambitions had been a major cause of the chaos and anarchy that prevailed
when the hold cif dictatorship or foreign occupation relaxed. To contain and
control chronic domestic disorder and violence, the occupation authorities
organized a modern unified National Constabulary. These and such construc-
tive undertakings as improved sanitation, communications, and education
facilities were unfortunately, if inevitably, accompanied by arbitrary assump-
tion and at times abuse of authority by the occupying military. The con-
stabulary later served as Trujillo's vehicle to power, earning him the bitter
title "bastard son of the occupation forces," and earning the US lasting
hatred as the accomplice, however unwitting, of Trujillo.
In 1924, the occupation ended, a new constitution was promulgated,
and Horacio Vasquez was elected president. The relative order and freedom
of the early days of his administration dissipated as his term wore on, and
when Vasquez, who had extended his term from four to six years, left the
country for medical treatment, conspiracies against his government ripened.
In 1930, an attempt was made against the shaky government, and the former
constabulary, now the National Army and firmly under Trujillo's control,
refused to come to its rescue. The government fell, and Trujillo became
president.
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Between 1844 and 1930, the Dominican Republic had had 50 presi-
dents, 30 revolutions, and 22 constitutions. For the next 31 years it had one
leader, one government, and one policy. The objectives of keeping Trujillo
firmly in power and satisfying his greed for wealth were, until quite near the
end of his rule, achieved with an efficiency as murderous as it was effective.
Trujillo was assassinated in 1961 by former associates. Between his
death and the Inauguration in 1966 of President Joaquin Balaguer, there
were eight governments, three coups d'etat, a civil war, and a foreign military
intervention. The divisions and bitterness engendered by the civil war and
subsequent US military intervention in 1965 continue to influence Domini-
can politics.
Under Balaguer, the country recovered from the devastation of the civil
war and made modest, although poorly coordinated, socioeconomic progress
while enjoying relative political stability and political liberty. Balaguer was
returned to office in comparatively peaceful and honest elections in May
1970 with a 57% majority of the vote.
In his second term, President Balaguer encountered stiffening resistance
to the government's increased use of repression to contain radical revolu-
tionary dissent. Fears are growing that Balaguer will seek yet another term of
office, and demands that the government take broader socioeconomic re-
form measures are intensifying.
Structure of the government
Most of the country's 27 constitutions have been notable only for their
irrelevance to the actual administration of government. A short-lived excep-
tion was the constitution of 1963 promulgated by President Juan Bosch that
emphasized the government's responsibility to initiate social and economic
reforms. This idealized statement of governmental responsibility was inter-
preted by many in the church and the military and by businessmen and
landowners as the foundation for revolutionary change. The Bosch constitu-
tion was abrogated after Bosch's overthrow in 1963, and the present con-
stitution, adopted in 1966, contains none of the controversial features of the
1963 document.
According to the constitution, the Dominican Republic is a representa-
tive democracy. Power to govern is vested in an elected president and the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government. The constitu-
tion es tab I ishes the political subdivisions of the National District
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(encompassing Santo Domingo) and 26 provinces. The provinces are further
subdivided into municipal districts. The provincial governors?all of whom
are women?are appointed by the president. The National District and the
municipal districts are administered by elected mayors and municipal
councils.
Congress consists of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputes. The
National District and each province elects one senator by direct vote for a
four-year term. The chamber is composed of 74 deputies, also elected for
four-year terms. Each province has a minimum of two seats, and the more
populous provinces are allotted one seat for every 50,000 inhabitants or
fraction over 25,000. Congress holds two regular sessions per year and can
convene extraordinary sessions at need. Congressional powers are mainly
legislative and fiscal. Congress levies taxes, approves the budget, and may
amend the constitution by a two-thirds vote. Also, it passes on contracts,
treaties, and conventions negotiated by the executive. Legislation can be
initiated not only by members of Congress but also by the president, by the
Supreme Court of Justice and, on electoral matters, by the Central Electoral
Board, In practice, Congress has traditionally been a rubber stamp for the
executive. Strong congressional leadership independent of the executive is
unknown.
Members of the judiciary, including the president of the Supreme Court
of Justice, are elected by the Senate. The Supreme Court, consisting of at
least nine men, has sole jurisdiction over actions against the president,
members of Congress, and other specific public officials. It hears appeals
from lower courts and exercises administrative and disciplinary authority
over them. In fact, the judiciary is ineffective and traditionally is a source of
political patronage. Although President Balaguer has strongly criticized judi-
cial irresponsibility, corruption, and leniency, he has done little to improve
the situation.
The president is directly elected by popular vote every four years and
may succeed himself without restriction. A presidential candidate must be
Dominican by birth, at least 30 years old, and may not have been on active
police or military service for one year before election. The president's duties
are assumed by the vice president should the president vacate office. If there
is no vice president, the presidency is temporarily assumed by the president
of the Supreme Court of Justice until a new president is elected by Congress.
The actual powers exercised by a president far exceed those granted by
the constitution. Tradition expects a strong executive, and his effectiveness
in office requires it.
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Voting
Voting is obligatory for all Dominicans over 18 years of age and for all
married Dominicans regardless of age, except for members of the armed
forces and police who are forbidden to vote. Election results are determined
by simple plurality for president, senators and mayors. Proportional repre-
sentation determines the allocation of seats in the Chamber of Deputies and
places on the municipal councils.
Political dynamics
Instability and violence, ruthless dictatorships, and foreign inter-
ventions have prevented the development of political institutions and parties
through which public demands can be presented and satisfaction obtained.
Lacking political institutions, groups in conflict have traditionally resorted
to direct and violent confrontations. The civil war of 1965 is an extreme
example of the phenomenon, as was the more recent display of terror and
counter-terror by the government and elements of the political opposition.
Of the several political organizations that were formed after Trujillo's assassi-
nation in 1961, most proved to be transitory alliances of civilian/military
cliques and were unable to accommodate the vastly increased number of
participants in the political process that resulted from the downfall of the
dictatorship.
Political force is exerted mainly by the military and the conservative
business and financial community rather than by political parties. Force has
frequently been the deciding factor in Dominican politics. The unified
military was Trujillo's main instrument of power. Factions developed after
his death and made common cause with various civilian groups. Since the
civil war in which members of the armed forces were in open armed conflict
with each other, the military has managed to compose its differences,
motivated by self-interest and curbed by the executive's custom of shifting
military commanders from post to post to prevent the development of
support that might tempt an officer to try his political luck.
Political parties have not prospered under President Balaguer. After the
1966 election, and again in 1970, he offered posts and preference to leaders
of minor opposition parties that had contested the election. The leaders for
the most part accepted the posts, and their parties, never very vital to begin
with, have since drifted toward disintegration. The President's purpose was
to protect his government by eliminating potential hotbeds of conspiracy
against it.
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At present, the Reform Party (PR) and the Dominican Revolutionary
Party (PRD) are the only parties of significance. The PR is important not
because of its political ideology--it has none?but because it is the party of
President Balaguer. The glamour of former president Juan Bosch, founder
and leader of the PRD, is an important asset, but it is the party's reformist
ideology and large membership that allow it to qualify as a non-personalist
political party that would probably survive the loss of Bosch. The PRD did
not take part in the 1970 election, swelling Balaguer's majority and depriving
itself of patronage and exposure. Since the election, Bosch has devoted
himself to re-establishing his control. over the party. He has imposed a policy
of non-violence because he is afraid that a violent assault on the government
would simply precipitate a military take-over that would postpone in-
definitely his hopes of coming to power at the head of a reform government.
His current tactics have alienated some of the younger, action-oriented PRD
members, although defections have not yet become serious and Bosch's
leadership has not been directly challenged. The PRD's present policy of
preparing itself to take advantage of political developments rather than
actively trying to change the political atmosphere will no doubt be modified
to permit more positive maneuvers as the 1974 election comes closer.
The left and the extreme left do not participate legally in the political
process. They are weak, disunited, and badly led. Although the more violent
factions are capable of sporadic incidents of terror, even including the
assassination of President Balaguer, the extreme left could not subsequently
take over the government or even assume a significant political role. A
repressive government controlled by the military would be the probable
immediate outcome of a successfu' leftist attempt on the life of the Presi-
dent.
Stability and economic recovery were the principal aims of President
Balaguer during his 1966-70 term. US aid and support and cautious fiscal
and economic policies helped the government to achieve the latter objective
to a remarkable degree. In the first term, stability was attained through the
President's skillful manipulation of various sectors of influence to maintain
their support, because the opposition, left and right, was weak and divided
and because the country was worn out with the violence of the post-Trujillo
years and the shock of the civil war and the US military intervention. The
government largely avoided outright repression against intransigents of the
right and the extreme left during this period.
During Balaguer's second administration, which began in August 1970,
the people have become increasingly impatient over the President's insistence
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that stability is the first priority of government. Growing demands for more
in the way of socioeconomic improvement are pressing the government to
introduce reforms. In September 1971, the government used terror to
intImidate or eliminate the radical revolutionary left. The opposition PRD
seized on this tailor-made opportunity to embarrass the government, forcing
Balaguer at least temporarily to abandon violent tactics.
Still, there are no signs that support of the government is weakening,
and the second administration's greater emphasis on economic development
may pacify some of the dissenters without alarming the conservatives.
Balaguer is the essential man in government, and his removal or incapacita-
tion would trigger a disruptive scramble for power.
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IV. SUBVERSION
No faction has a monopoly on subversion in Dominican politics. The
extreme left, the non-Communist left, the right and far right, and factions of
the military have all conspired against various post-Trujillo governments,
occasionally resorting to violence to achieve their political ends. The well-
established Dominican tradition of conspiracy and conflict to settle political
differences, the absence of a sense of nationhood and civic responsibility,
and the fragility of the tradition of constitutional government encourage
apathy and indifference in potentially stabilizing political moderates.
The Communist left in the Dominican Republic consists of six parties
and several subfactions, having an estimated total strength of about 675
militants and 780 sympathizers. Ideology ranges from the current conser-
vatism of the pro-Soviet Dominican Communist Party (PCD) to the radical
revolutionary extremism of the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), the
Communist Party of the Dominican Republic (PCRD), and the badly splin-
tered pro-Cuban 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4) and
various splinter groups. The PCD, probably the best organized party, has the
largest membership (475 militants and sympathizers). As a result of its
present policy of non-violence, it has joined in a loose collaboration with
Juan Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD), which also opposes the
use of violence. Disagreement among the radical extremist groups has
erupted from time to time in violent and sometimes fatal confrontations that
have weakened the contenders. The MPD was the most activist and terror-
prone of the Communist parties. Its leadership and ranks have been deci-
mated by government police action, severely limiting its effectiveness. In the
early 1960s, the MR-1J4 was the largest leftist party in the country, but by
1968 internal disagreements had split it into seven factions. Its membership
has declined from 5-8,000 members to about 350 members and sympa-
thizers.
The Communist movement has never been strong enough in itself to
constitute a major threat to political order. But Communist insurgency,
terrorism, and political agitation have been important disruptive factors.
During the civil war, the Communists gained political leverage by participat-
ing in the constitutionalist movement (the groups that sought to restore
Juan Bosch to office). They emerged from the war with increased prestige
and membership, having obtained a leading role in the student movement,
increased their influence in labor, displayed and enhanced their paramilitary
capability, and taken part in anti-US demonstrations. Intense disagreements
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over tactics and ideology developed almost at once, however, and since 1966
often violent quarrels among the Communist parties have cost them much of
the prestige and force that they gained during the civil war. A second
important factor in the decline of the Communist parties has been the
Balaguer government's continual campaign of harassment and, more re-
cently, the use of outright counter-terror. The parties have been kept
off-balance, disorganized, and intimidated, and death or exile has robbed
them of a number of talented leaders. Little discernible progress has been
made in efforts to unify the various leftist factions.
The various Communist groups are capable of sporadic acts of terrorism
and violence, but they could not sustain a campaign that would seriously
threaten the stability of the government. Even should they destroy the
government by assassinating the President, they could not themselves assume
power. Before they could play a significant political role, the Communist
groups would have to unify and then collaborate with a substantial section
of the non-Communist left. In order to come to power, they would require
significant military support, or at least acquiescence, at present a very
remote possibility.
During the 1965 civil war both the Revolutionary Social Christian Party
(PRSC) and the PRD engaged in violence and subversion. Since the 1970
election, the PRSC has steadily lost strength. ,The PRD, under former
President Bosch, has forbidden participation in acts of violence or terror
because of the danger of precipitating a military crackdown. For the time
being the PRD will probably stick to this policy, but it would no doubt try
to take advantage of any threats to public order that might improve the
party's chances of exercising real political power.
The dramatic revelation over nationwide television by President
Balaguer on 30 June 1971 of an antigovernment conspiracy headed by
former General Elias VVessin y VVessin, leader of the far right Democratic
Quisqueyan Party (POD), revealed the willingness of the right to use sub-
version as a poli heal weapon. Military support of Wessin, who was exiled on
4 July, appeared to consist mainly of scattered groups of sympathizers
among the rank and file rather than within the officer corps of the military,
however.
The military has a history of political involvement. Factionalism has
often led to tension and, in 1965, even to armed conflict between military
factions. But President Balaguer, by regularly shifting high ranking military
and police officers before they can form power bases of their own, has so far
kept military support of the government essentially intact. As long as the
government retains the loyalty of a united military, danger of a successful
coup from either the right or the left is minimal.
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VI. ARMED FORCES
The Dominican military establishment consists of a 10,174-man army, a
3,194-man navy, a 2,925-man air force, and an 8,636-man National Police
Force. The president of the republic is the commander in chief of the armed
forces, acting through the secretary of state for the armed forces, who may
be either a military officer or a civilian. The chiefs of staff of the army, navy,
and air force are appointed by the president, ostensibly upon the advice of
the secretary of state. The individual services are organized on the traditional
military staff pattern of five sections: personnel, intelligence, operations and
training, logistics, and civil affairs. The national police chief is appointed by
the president.
The formal missions of the armed forces are defense of the republic,
defense of the constitution and laws, maintenance of public order, and the
promotion of social and economic development through civic action pro-
grams. The army grew out of the national constabulary organized by US
military authorities during the US occupation of 1916-24, and it still
functions more as a civil guard than as a typical military organization. The
armed forces, as long as they are themselves united, are capable of maintain-
ing public order against threats from political extremists, and, in combina-
tion with the National Police, could handle serious civil disturbances. The
Dominican military is superior to that of its traditional enemy Haiti and
could repel a Haitian attack. But it could not defend the country against
attack by a modern force comparable in size to the Dominican forces. The
army's over-all technical capability to perform its mission of territorial
defense and maintenance of internal security has improved as a result of the
US Military Assistance Program.
Collaboration between the military services has traditionally been poor,
and the Joint General Staff has failed to function effectively. A new
secretary of state for the armed forces was appointed in July 1970 and has
indicated interest in improving the performance of the staff. The Operations
Center of the Armed Forces, created in 1970 as a joint organization with
directive authority, has not fulfilled expectations.
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There is no central control of the logistics system. Military personnel in
logistics positions are frequently transferred in an effort to control graft in
the procurement system, a procedure which prevents the development of a
professional Quartermaster Corps. Because of the heterogeneous supplies and
equipment and the tendency to supply on an as-needed rather than on a
planned basis, the armed forces' logistics system is haphazard and inefficient.
No munitions have been produced in the Dominican Republic since
1964. The country depends on the United States and, to a lesser extent,
Canada and Western Europe for military equipment. The army has a large
but unstandardized supply of small arms and ammunition. Artillery and
armor are old. Dominican ships and equipment are mostly obsolete, and,
except for two fleet minesweepers and three 85-foot Sewart motor gunboats
acquired since 1965 from the US and some service craft, the navy's ships are
old and in fair-to-poor condition. As of June 1971, the air force's inventory
stood at 59 aircraft, 38 of which were operational.
Military budget
From 1963 to 1966, military expenditures averaged about 18% of the
national budget, but President Balaguer's first term austerity program and his
determination to reduce military spending to more manageable proportions
have had a degree of success. For the fiscal year ending December 1971, 12%
of the national budget was allocated to the military (US$32,392,978).
Manpower
The military manpower potential of the Dominican Republic was
estimated in January 1971 at about 1,014,400 males between the ages of 15
and 49 of whom three fifths were considered fit for military service.
Men between the ages of 18 and 54 are subject to conscription, but
volunteers have supplied the needs of all services for many years. Military
service is popular among the young men of the lower classes because it
ensures relatively high and steady wages, regular meals, health services, and
other benefits. A commission in the armed forces is a means of social
advancement for young middle-class males. Enlistments are for an indefinite
period and may be ended at the enlistee's discretion. There is no formal
reserve organization. Military personnel are generally in good physical con-
dition. Advanced military training is hampered by the generally poor educa-
tional level of most of the personnel, officers included. Discipline is generally
good.
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Preoccupation with its political role has prevented the Dominican
military from attaining much professionalism. Many high-ranking officers
owe their success to loyalty to the regime rather than professional excel-
lence. Mainly to prevent repetition of the politically motivated split that
resulted in the civil war in 1965, efforts to professionalize the military have
been made. Younger middle-grade officers who are better prepared tech-
nically for their jobs are discontented, but their discontent springs mainly
from frustrated ambition rather than from political disagreement with the
administration's policies.
Since the discovery that the antigovernment plotting by former General
Elias VVessin y VVessin drew some support from the ranks, President Balaguer
has sought to satisfy some of the grievances of the enlisted men in order to
reinforce their loyalty to the administration and insulate them from blan-
dishments of politically ambitious military officers.
Four sections, J-2, G-2, M-2 and A-2, responsible respectively to the
secretary of state for the armed forces, the Army General Staff, the Naval
General Staff, and the Air Force General Staff have the following respon-
sibilities:
J-2: The staff of 15 to 20 officers and enlisted men drawn mostly from
air force personnel are responsible for monitoring the activities of both
military and non-military personnel who are opposed to the government;
G-2: Three officers and 23 enlisted men are responsible for supporting
the personal security of the president, monitoring and neutralizing leftist and
Communist activities directed at army personnel and keeping tabs on anti-
government activities generally;
M-2: Five M-2 officers are stationed at consular posts abroad to deal
with contraband and related matters. Fifty to 60 collaborators, all of whom
are on active duty with the navy, and 13 port captains, also active duty naval
officers, are responsible for assisting in providing personal security to the
president, monitoring the activities of known Communists and antigovern-
ment organizations, supporting anti-invasion and anticontraband recon-
naissance patrols and performing limited counter-intelligence duties;
A-2: The ten members of A-2 contribute to the president's security
force, conduct background investigations on all air force recruits, and carry
out limited counter-intelligence responsibilities.
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VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
The close relationship between the Dominican Republic and the United
States dominates and, to a large extent, determines over-all Dominican
foreign policy. The notable exception is Haiti, where a long tradition of
suspicion and enmity heavily influences bilateral relations. Their common
border has been closed for several years. The death of President Francois
Duvalier in April 1971 alarmed Dominican authorities, but the smoothness
of the transfer of power to Duvalier's son, President-for-Life Jean-Claude
Duvalier, allayed the Dominican Government's fears. President Balaguer has
refuse() to permit Haitian exiles to use the Dominican Republic as a base for
anti-Duvalier activities, and there has been a slight warming of the normally
cool relations.
Dominican interest on international issues, including hemispheric issues
that do not bear directly on Dominican affairs, is minimal. Because the
United States and Western Europe are the Dominican Republic's main
tradIng partners? the country has had few economic ties with its Caribbean
and South American neighbors. In 1969-70, the government became inter-
ested in economic cooperation with Puerto Rico and members of the
Caribbean Free Trade Association (CAR IFTA), but difficulties with Puerto
Rico have since dulled the attraction, and this aspect of trade will probably
remain relatively minor for some time to come.
Relations between the Dominican Republic and Cuba have been hostile
since Fidel Casiro came to power in 1959. Successive Dominican govern-
ments have given full support to OAS measures condemning and isolating
Cuba and to US policy regarding Castro. The gradual growth of Latin
American sentiment to recognize the Castro government has been coolly
received by the Balaguer government, which considers that any such unilat-
eral action on the part of OAS member nations would weaken inter-Amer-
ican solidarity.
The Dominican Republic does not maintain diplomatic relations with
any Communist country but has exhibited interest in establishing commer-
cial relations with some Eastern European countries. It has generally cordial
relations with the United Kingdom, France, Spain, and other Western Euro-
pean countries. It has economic ties to Japan and friendly relations with
Nationalist China.
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Dominican governments have shown little interest in the United Na-
tions and have regularly followed US initiatives. The Balaguer government is
somewhat wary (31 the UN because of the support the constitutionalists
found there during the 1965 civil war. In hemispheric affairs, President
Balaguer believes that the OAS takes precedence over the UN.
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VIII. US INTERESTS
Since the 1965 civil war, the United States has authorized economic aid
in the torm of loans and grants to the Dominican Republic totaling $338
million ($92 per capita), of which $287 million have been disbursed. In
addition, special sugar quota allocations have raised Dominican sugar sales to
the US. Most of the country's gain in export earnings has resulted from these
sales. The US is the country's most important trading partner, buying nearly
80% of its exports and providing 55% of its imports. US private investment
in the Dominican Republic in 1970 was estimated at about $170 million.
Major US firms having interests in the Dominican Republic are the Alumi-
num Company of America (ALCOA), Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., and
American Can Company. Chase Manhattan Bank, First National City Bank
of New York, and the Bank of America are all represented in the Dominican
Republic.
Since 1962, the Dominican Republic has had a bilateral military assist-
ance agreement with the United States, and Washington has supplied about
$19 million in loans and grants. The Dominican Republic is a signatory to
the Rio Pact and is a member of the Inter-American Defense Board.
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IX. CHRONOLOGY AND TABULAR DATA
Chronology of Key Events
1821 Dominican Republic proclaims independence from Spain.
1822-1844 Period of Haitian occupation.
1844-1861 Independence.
1861-1865 Period of Spanish rule.
1916-1924 US military occupy Dominican Republic.
1930 Rafael Trujillo begins 31-year rule.
1937 Massacre of thousands of Haitian squatters by Dominican
army.
1959 (June) Abortive anti-Trujillo invasion launched from Cuba
with Castro support.
1960 (August) OAS votes sanctions against Dominican Govern-
ment for plotting assassination of Venezuelan President
Betancourt. US and other hemispheric governments break
diplomatic relations with Trujillo regime.
1961 (May) Trujillo assassinated.
(November) US fleet supports President Balaguer; Trujillo
leaves country.
1962 (January) Balaguer forms Council of State, OAS removes
sanctions, US resumes diplomatic relations.
(16-18 January) General Rafael Rodriguez Echavarria leads a
short-lived coup. Council of State regains control with Rafael
BonneIly as President and in September announces presi-
dential elections scheduled for December 20.
(20 December) Juan Bosch elected President.
1963 (25 September) Armed forces leaders oust Bosch and install
provisional civilian triumvirate; US suspends relations and
aid.
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(14 December) US recognizes Dominican Government.
1965 (24-25 April) Revolt by pro-Bosch military officers results in
overthrow of Triumvirate and precipitates civil war.
(28 April) US Marines land to evacuate US and third-country
nationals and restore order.
(6 May) OAS votes to establish Inter-American Peace Force
(1APF) in the Dominican Republic.
(31 August) Civil war officially ended as opposing forces sign
Act of Reconciliation and Institutional Act, negotiated by
OAS ad hoc Committee.
(3 September) Hector Garcia Godoy takes office as provi-
sional president, later schedules presidential elections for 1
June 1968.
1966 (1 June) Joaquin Balaguer is elected president, receiving 57%
of the vote to Bosch's 39%.
(1 July) Balaguer is inaugurated and the provisional govern-
ment officially ends.
(20-21 September) Last IAPF troops depart, ending 90-day
phase-out.
1967 (31 August) Balaguer closes Haitian-Dominican border, bring-
ing relations to low ebb.
1968 (16 May) Municipal elections; Reformist Party wins 66
municipalities, Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC)
2, and Independents 9.
1970 (24 March) US air attache kidnaped (subsequently released in
exchange for release of 20 political prisoners).
(16 May) Balaguer elected to second term with a 57% ma-
jority. Balaguer's supporters also won 26 of the 27 Senate
seats, 60 of the 74 seats in the Chamber of Deputies, and 75
of the 77 mayoralties.
(16 August) Balaguer inaugurated.
1971 (30 June) Balaguer publicly denounces former General
Wessin y VVessin for coup-plotting; Wessin is exiled to Spain
i he following day.
Dominican Republic
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TABULAR DATA
Holidays and Significant Dates
1 January New Year's Day (Official Holiday)
6 January Epiphany
21 January Altagracia Day (Official Holiday)
26 January Duarte Day (Official Holiday)
27 February Independence Day and Flag Day (Official
Holiday)
19 March St. Joseph's Day
March-June Movable religious observances: Holy Thurs-
day, Good Friday (Official Holiday) Ascen-
sion, and Corpus Christi (Official Holiday)
24 April Civil War (1965)
1 May Labor Day
31 May Trujillo assassinated (1961)
14 June Abortive Cuban-sponsored invasion (1959)
29 June Feast of St. Peter and St. Paul
15 August Crowning of Our Lady of Altagracia
16 August Restoration of Independence (Official Holi-
day)
20 September IAPF departed
24 September Feast of Our Lady of Los Mercedes (Official
Holiday)
12 October Columbus Day
24 October UN Day
1 November All Saints' Day
25 November Death of Mirabel Sisters (1960)
8 December Immaculate Conception
19 December Hotel Matus incident
25 December Christmas (Official Holiday)
Selected Factual Data
LAND
Area: 18,800 sq. miles; 14% cultivated, 4% fallow, 17% pasture, 45%
forest, and 20% built-on or waste
PEOPLE
Population: 4,128,000 (Jan. 1971 est); density, 220 per square mile;
Dominican Republic
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males 15-49, 1,014,000, approximately 61% are fit for military service;
51,000 reach military age (18) annually
Ethnic composition: 73% mulatto; 11% Negro; 16% white
Language: Spanish
Religion: 95% nominally Roman Catholic
Literacy: 35% to 40% of adult population
GOVERNMENT
Unitary republic; constitutional democracy; President, 27 member
Senate, and 74 member Chamber of Deputies, elected by direct popular vote
every 4 years; 26 provinces and a National District
Political parties: Reformist Party (PR); Dominican Revolutionary Party
(PRD); Anti-reelection Democratic Integration Movement (MIDA); Revolu-
tionary Social Christian Party (PRSC); Democratic Quisqueyan Party (POD).
Leftist parties: 14th of June Revolutionary Movement (MR-1J4); Dominican
Popular Movement (MPD); Dominican Communist Party (PCD); Communist
Party of the Dominican Republic (PCRD).
Voting strength in May 1970 general elections: PR-57%; MIDA-21%;
PQD-14%; PRSC-5%; National Conciliation Movement (MCN)-3%;
PR [)---abstained
Suffrage: Obligatory for all citizens over 18 years of age and all married
citizers regardless of age. Military and police personnel deprived of vote
Next scheduled elections: general elections in 1974
Member of United Nations and Organization of American States
ECONOMY
GNP: $1.5 billion (purchasing power parity estimate, 1970); $360 per
capita, real growth rate 1970, 6.6%
Cost-of-living: 5% increase in 1970
Agriculture: sugar, coffee, cocoa, tobacco, rice
Food: generally not self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs, except rice and
beef; more than 15% of imports are foodstuffs including wheat, peanuts,
beans, and dairy products
Major industries: agricultural processing, particularly sugar milling;
manufacturing light consumer goods, including beverages, tobacco, textiles;
building materials, including cement
Critical shortages: petroleum products, industrial raw materials, capital
equipment
Electric power: 254,000 kw capacity (1970 estimated); 710 million
kw-hr produced 1970; 175 kw-hr per capita
Dominican Republic
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Exports: $213.5 million (f.o.b. 1970); 48% sugar, 12% coffee, 9%
cocoa, 6% tobacco, 7% bauxite, 18% other
Imports: $306 million (c.i.f., 1970); foodstuff, capital and intermediate
goods, petroleum products, pharmaceuticals and chemicals
Exports to US: $167.8 million (1970), 79% of total
Imports from US: $116.4 million (1969 estimate), 55% of total
Trade/aid: unfavorable trade account, balanced by inflows of private
and official capital in 1970. Economic aid authorizations (FY1946-70) from
US: $198.8 million in grants; $257.4 million in loans; from international
organizations: $82.2 million
Exchange rate: RD$1=US$1
COMMUNICATIONS
Railroads: 1,000 route miles; 65 miles of government-owned 3'6" gage
and 935 miles of privately owned lines, mostly 2'6" gage
Highways: about 6,000 miles; 3,000 miles of concrete or bituminous,
800 miles of gravel, 1,400 miles of improved earth, and 800 miles of
unimproved earth
Ports: 5 major ports, Santo Domingo is most important; 17 minor ports
Merchant marine: 3 cargo ships (1,000 g.r.t. or over) totaling 6,147
g.r.t. or about 8,073 d.w.t.
C:ivil air: 13 major transport aircraft, 9 of which are operational
Airfields: 25 usable airfields, 9 with hard-surfaced runways; 22 former
airfield sites; 1 seaplane station
Telecommunications: domestic system based on islandwide radio-relay
netvvork; 40,200 telephones and 400,400 radio receivers and about
1,250,000 TV viewers; 92 AM, 24 FM, and 6 TV stations; 2 submarine
cables
DEFENSE FORCES
Personnel: total 16,293, army 10,174, navy 3,194, air force 2,925
(including 1,500 ground forces and paratroopers)
Major ground force units: 3 infantry brigades and 19 battalions (11
infantry, 1 presidential guard, 1 military police, 1 armored, 1 artillery, 1
engineer, 1 ordnance, 1 transport and 1 communications)
Aircraft: total 59; 6 jet, 40 prop, and 13 helos
Ships: total 38; 3 patrol escorts (plus 2 inactive), 3 large submarine
chasers, 1 submarine chaser, 4 motor gunboats, 2 fleet minesweepers, 1
medium landing ship, 2 utility landing craft, 4 auxiliaries, 16 service craft
Military budget: 12% of 1970 national budget
Dominican Republic
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Military Assistance Program: 1962-1970, approximately $18 million;
fiscal year 1971: $1.065 million
RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Resident diplomatic consular and commercial missions: none
Trade: negligible
National Intelligence Survey (NIS) Material
The following sections of the NIS are relevant:
NIS Area 80 (Dominican Republic)
GENERAL SURVEY (August, 1971) and the following specialized
sections:
Sec 21 Military Geographic Regions (August 1964)
Sec 22 Coasts and Landing Beaches (May 1963)
Sec 23 Weather and Climate (July 1963)
Sec 23S Meteorological Organization and Facilities (March 1968)
Sec 24 Topography (January 1964)
Sec 25 Urban Areas (July 1964)
Sec 32 Highway (June 1963)
Sec 35 Ports and Naval Facilities (October 1962)
Sec 41 Population (December 1968)
Sec 42 Characteristics of the People (March 1966)
Sec 43 Religion, Education, and Public Information (July 1965)
Sec 44 Manpower (July 1965)
Sec 45 Health and Sanitation (August 1963)
Sec 57 Subversion and Insurgency (May 1967)
Sec 61 Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry (July 1964)
Gazetteer (March 1957)
Map
The best available reference map is: Esso Standard Oil S.A., Ltd.; Mapa
de la Republica Dominicana; 1:678,000; 1963.
Dominican Republic
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ntecristi
Puerta Plata
POPULATION
ANTO
DOMINGO
Persons per square mile
0 100
Fa? ?
1
200
400
600
800
309
0 39
77
/54
232
Persons per square kilometer
Data from 1960 census
Ma Mandel
Approv
LAND UTILIZATION
PwCIA-RDP79-00891A001100070001-4
SANTO
DOMINGO
171 Cropland
I !Cropland and pasture (mixed
' with forest, savanna, and scrub)
I-1 Forest
Scrub forest and thorn bush
Savanna (some pasture and
cropland)
Swamp or marsh
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
PRINCIPAL ZONES OF CULTIVATION
Sugarcane
Coffee
Cocoa
Rice
Tobacco
I Sugar milling
11 Textile mill
10 Tobacco factory
gg Steel plant
an Padre
s de Macon,
SANTO D. INGO
g Cement plant
IM Paper factory
Fertilizer plant
Cattle
Bauxite
Nickel
International boundary
Provincia boundary
National capital
Provincia capital
Railroad
Surfaced road
Unsurfaced road
Airfield
Major port
Populated places
0 Over 25,000
o 5,000 to 25,000
? Under 5,000
Cabrera
BAHL,' DE SAYIANA:
ALTO
'SAND
.Pedro SMchei]
EuLsE1BO -
Hato Mayor?
Azua
,
BA IIIA
DE OCOA
DIST RI TO
La Victoria ?
Villa on.
Mella. 01"
ACIONALe
Arroyo.
Hondo
SANTO
aina DOMINGO
Boca de Yum
PUNTA SANTANILLA
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