SENEGAL HANDBOOK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00891A001000070001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 36
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 21, 2001
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1971
• Content Type: REPORT

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N2 92
No. 0610
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Topography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Natural resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Human resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND
Growth and trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Income distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Main sectors-trends in agriculture and industry . . . . . . . . 1
Transportation and communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Government economic policy and financial systems . . . . . . . 3
Foreign trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Balance of payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
III. POLITICAL SITUATION AND TRENDS
Historical summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Governmental system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Communist party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Foreign activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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VI. ARMED FORCES
Organization and manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Mission and capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Equipment and logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Military budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Military agreements and aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Security system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ? .
VII. FOREIGN RELATIONS
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Communist countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Western countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
VIII. US INTERESTS
Aid ...........................1
Economic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
US .citizens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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Located on the western bulge of Africa, the Republic of Senegal
encompasses an area of some 76,000 square miles. Senegal was France's
oldest colony in Africa and served for many years as the base for French
penetration and development in West Africa. Until 1960, Dakar-the
capital-was the administrative, commercial, and cultural center of the entire
region. At that time the hinterland was divided into eight independent states,
and the economic and political importance of the newly independent Sene-
gal decreased drastically.
Senegal's one-crop agricultural economy has made little headway since
independence, and the country's future prospects are bleak. Persistent eco-
nomic malaise has led to smoldering political unrest, which in recent years
has increasingly erupted into violence. The only hopeful sign in the country's
economic firmament is the industrial sector, particularly the fishing and
extractive industries, both of which have shown progress. Dakar has been
seeking to diversify its sources of investment, but the French will probably
retain their economic pre-eminence for the foreseeable future.
Leopold Sedar Senghor, Senegal's first and only president, has dom-
inated the political scene since the late 1940s, when his party-a precursor of
the UPS-was overwhelmingly elected to represent the country in the French
Parliament and later at local levels. Senghor has proved to be a skilled
politician, carefully balancing Senegal's highly competitive political, eco-
nomic, and religious interest groups. The President has succeeded in giving
the country a decade of stability, but has been stymied by his inability to
offer much in the way of economic advancement. The deteriorating relations
between the Senghor regime and the economically powerful Muslim brother-
hoods-at one time one of the major pillars of the regime-is in large part a
result of the country's continuing economic malaise for which the Muslims
hold the President responsible.
Although the Senghor regime has so far successfully weathered all
major challenges to its authority, there are signs of increasing unrest, par-
ticularly among youth. The vanguard of these dissidents are Dakar University
students who have long been in fundamental disagreement with the regime's
conservative, pro-French orientation. The youthful radicals have been unable
to mount a serious threat to the government, however, except in 1968 when
they temporarily succeeded in working in partnership with the labor move-
ment. Meanwhile, the government's carrot-and-stick approach has wooed
most labor leaders toward its side.
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In foreign affairs Senegal, while professing nonalignment, actually leans
toward the West, in particular toward France with which it has close
cultural, intellectual, economic, and political ties. Under increasing pressure
from Senegal's younger generation to decrease the country's dependence on
France, Senghor has been cautiously searching for alternatives. In Africa,
Senegal sides with the moderates on most major issues. It maintains formal
relations with the USSR and a number of other Communist governments ,
but President Senghor is basically suspicious of the Communists and their
representatives are watched closely. Although Senghor has long distrusted
the Chinese Communists, he supported their membership in the UN-at the
expense of Taiwan-in late 1971, and there are indications that Dakar and
Peking may soon exchange ambassadors.
Senegal's 6,800-man armed forces plus its 3,000-man national police
have thus far proved to be reliable defenders of the established order. Their
primary mission is to maintain internal security, and they have demonstrated
that they are able to deal forcefully and effectively with domestic dissidence.
The chief of staff, General Diallo, and most of the military are unswervingly
loyal to President Senghor. The security forces are still almost entirely
dependent on France for materiel, logistic support, and training. In addition,
France's continued military presence on the strategic Cap Vert peninsula and
its defense commitments to Senegal serve to discourage any potential in-
ternal or external aggressors.
Senegal
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Senegal is located on the western bulge of Africa; the peninsula on
which its capital city, Dakar, is situated is the western extremity of the
continent. The country is bounded by the Atlantic on the west, separated
from Mauritania on the north by the Senegal River, and bordered on the east
by Mali and on the south by Guinea and Portuguese Guinea. The inde-
pendent republic of The Gambia penetrates more than 200 miles into
Senegal and cuts the country off from its southern province.
Covering an area of 76,000 square miles, Senegal is about the size of
South Dakota. It extends about 365 miles on an east-west axis and about
280 miles on a north-south axis.
The country has two well-defined dry and humid seasons resulting from
alternating winds from the northeast in the winter and from the southwest in
the summer. Dakar's annual rainfall of about 24 inches occurs between June
and October when maximum temperatures average between 81 and 89
degrees F; December to February minimum temperature ranges are greater
along the coast, while elsewhere the annual average rainfall varies from about
10 inches in the north to 70 inches in the south. Sudden thunderstorms with
heavy downpours are frequent in periods of seasonal change.
Topography
Senegal consists mostly of rolling plains with savannah-type vegetation
and an altitude generally less than 650 feet. In the southeast, however,
plateaus rise to elevations of 1,600 feet to form the foothills of the
Fouta-Djalorl Mountains. Marshy swamps interspersed with tropical rain
forest are common in the southwest. The northern coast is almost straight;
farther south it is marshy and indented by many estuaries. Senegal is drained
by four major rivers: the Senegal, Saloum, Gambia, and Casamance, each of
which is navigable by oceangoing vessels for a substantial distance.
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Senegal's agricultural resources are its main natural assets. Large phos-
phate deposits are the second most important earner of foreign exchange.
Among various agricultural products raised, peanuts dominate, accounting
for almost half of total agricultural production and the bulk of the farmers'
monetary income, while providing some 70% of the country's export earn-
ings. Cereals, chiefly millet and sorghum, are the main food crops. Govern-
ment attempts to diversify agricultural production have had mixed success;
cotton cultivation, introduced in 1963, is cited as a successful venture, but
rice cultivation has proved to be a disappointment. Other potential assets are
the country's substantial water resources, which offer plentiful supplies of
fish for domestic consumption and for export, as well as providing future
sources of hydroelectric power. The country's sizable livestock industry has
grown rapidly over the past decade but is still far from being fully exploited.
Efforts to find alternate sources of wealth have so far yielded few results. An
American oil prospecting team conducting offshore drilling in late 1970
reportedly was pessimistic about finding commercially exploitable quantities
of oil. Other prospecting teams, including a Soviet group, have been combing
the country's desolate interior region for gold, diamonds, and other minerals,
but so far no major finds have been reported.
Senegal, in common with most, other black African countries, has a
relatively young but poorly educated and mostly unskilled population.
Unlike the majority of other black African countries, however, Senegal's
long domination by the French resulted in a legacy of highly educated
indigenous personnel, especially in the professions and administrative affairs.
Population was estimated at 4,029,000 in January 1972, and was increasing
at about 2.3% annually. Six major tribes compose 95% of Senegal's total
population. By far the largest of these is the Wolof (36%), followed by the
Fulani (17.5%), Serer (16.5%), Tukulor (9.0%), Dyola (9.0%), and Malinke
(6.5%). There are estimated to be about 48,000 non-Africans in Senegal, two
thirds of whom are French. The remainder are other Europeans, Syrians, and
Lebanese. Most non-Africans live in Dakar or other large cities. Population
density varies widely, ranging from a scant 5 per square mile in the arid and
inhospitable eastern regions to 3,150 per square mile in the area around
Dakar. The active population, estimated at 1.7 million, is mainly employed
in the rural sector. Substantial migration to the urban centers, particularly
Dakar, has begun largely because of rural underemployment, and the urban
population, estimated at 748,000 in 1969, makes up almost one fifth of the
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total population. Dakar, the country's fastest growing metropolitan area, is
one of West Africa's major seaports and contains the region's largest indus-
trial complex. The city's population has reached an estimated 600,000
inhabitants and continues to increase as industry lures underemployed and
unemployed youth and farmers. Only four other Senegalese cities have
populations of more than 40,000: Kaolack, Thies, Rufisque, and Saint
Louis.
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Senegal's economy has grown little in recent years, mainly because of
poor weather conditions and unfavorable prices for peanuts. The annual rate
of growth probably averaged less than 1 % between 1963 and 1969. Programs
to increase productivity in the peanut sector have been undertaken, and the
authorities hope to diversify agricultural production and expand industrial
activities. The success of these policies, to be implemented within the
framework of a new four-year plan begun in 1969, will be of key importance
to the future growth of the economy. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
has risen from US $678 million in 1963 to US $720 million in 1969 (in
constant prices), but per capita income declined over the same period
because of population growth. Senegal has never regained the pre-eminent
commercial and political position it held in France's West African empire.
The fragmentary data on employment that are available suggest that
there are gross disparities in the distribution of income. The economically
active population according to estimates made in 1968-is composed of
approximately 1.7 million Africans, about 90% of whom were employed in
the rural sector where they engaged in semisubsistence agriculture, and some
18,000 non-Africans. Total employment in the monetary sector was about
105,000 in 1971 (around 6.2% of the economically active population).
Almost half were employed by private industry, one third by the govern-
ment, and one fifth by public enterprises. Most of the country's cash income
goes to some 35,000 civil servants and to persons engaged in Senegal's most
active industrial and commercial sector, the purchase, sale, and milling of
peanuts and peanut by-products. Unemployment and underemployment are
among the country's most serious problems and are largely responsible for
the steady flow of migrants to the urban areas.
Main sectors-trends in agriculture and industry
Agriculture-Agriculture, which is the mainstay of the Senegalese econ-
omy and employs about 90% of the labor force, has been experiencing
serious difficulties. During the last decade, the growth of traditional food
crops has been unable to keep pace with population growth, and early
indications suggest that the 1970s will bring no improvement. Bad weather
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conditions, the loss of the French peanut subsidy, and the rural exodus have
all had adverse effects on agriculture. Peanuts (including processing) account
for almost 20% of GDP and 70% of exports, and any shortfall in production
is bound to have a serious effect on the over-all economy.
Manufacturing-Senegal has a relatively well-developed industrial sector,
evidenced by the high proportion of manufacturing in GDP-13.5% between
1965 and 1968. France, which used Senegal as its regional headquarters in
West Africa, established an industrial base on the Cape Verde Peninsula
before World War II. The French presence continues to be manifest in all
major manufacturing enterprises because of Senegal's need for French capital
and skills. Since independence, the Senegalese, with French help, have
expanded the capacity of certain industries, particularly footwear, food
processing, textiles, chemicals, cement, oil refining, and automotive assem-
bly. The government has also built a fertilizer plant in an effort to reduce its
dependence on imports. Oil mills, which account for about 30% of total
industrial production, have been operating at less than capacity because of
the poor peanut crops in recent years. Although the decreased purchasing
power in the rural areas has led to a decline in the domestic sale of textiles,
increased exports of textiles to neighboring countries has more than offset
this loss. Overall, the output of the manufacturing sector, excluding oil mills
and canneries, increased by 8% in 1969, and appears to be doing well in the
early years of the 1970s.
A semipublic industrial development company (SONEPI) was created in
1969 to promote small- and medium-sized industry and to encourage foreign
participation in Senegalese enterprises. The company has already started a
program of management training and has prepared feasibility studies for
selected industrial projects. A special fund, designed to give Senegalese
businessmen access to bank credit, has also reportedly been established.
Prompted by a growing Senegalese business class whose demands for rapid
"Senegalization" have become more persistent, the government announced
in late 1970 that it was setting aside 35 trades-mainly in commerce-ex-
clusively for Senegalese nationals, which traditionally have been dominated
by the French and Lebanese.
Transportation and communications
Senegal's transportation and telecommunications systems are adequate
for the country's present stage of development. All major communications
systems originate in Dakar, Senegal's commercial and industrial metropolis
and one of West Africa's busiest ports. The government-owned railroad
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system, which extends for some 700 miles, connects essential points of
Dakar, Saint Louis, and the Malian border town of Kidira with the railroad
center in Thies. Other branches run deep into the interior where they serve
the peanut production centers at Kaolack, Linguere, and Touba, as well as
the phosphate works at Taiba. Senegal's road network, consisting of about
1,300 miles of paved roads and about 1,100 miles of improved earth roads
that provide connections with highway systems of Mauritania, Mali, Guinea,
Portuguese Guinea, and The Gambia, is comparatively advanced for this part
of Africa. The highways serve chiefly as feeder lines to the railroad.
Inland waterways are widely used to move agricultural products from
deep in the interior of Senegal to maritime ports. The Senegal River,
extending along the Mauritanian border and into Mali, is the only important
international waterway connection.
Seventeen airfields are scattered throughout Senegal. The most impor-
tant facility is Dakar-Yoff, where 3 runways are equipped to handle all types
of jet traffic. The country's telecommunications facilities-with connections
to Paris-provide limited coverage and barely meet the country's needs.
Nevertheless, these facilities compare favorably with those of other under-
developed African states. A skeletal open-wire line system is supplemented
by one radio-relay link and a few radio-communication stations.
Government economic policy and financial systems
Over-all objectives of the government in the economic area are: re-
duction of inequalities in income between rural and urban areas; furtherance
of cooperative movements; and establishment of national enterprises to
supplement the private sector. A self-proclaimed African socialist, President
Senghor is a pragmatist in economic matters. He still relies heavily on French
expertise in running the economy and has sought to retain French en-
trepreneurs in areas where Senegalese skills and capital are lacking. The
government encourages foreign investment by offering a liberal investment
code which grants general guarantees and tax advantages for new invest-
ments, but the limited resources of the country and the small domestic
market militate against large inflows of foreign capital. Senghor has empha-
sized the importance of agricultural expansion and crop diversification, but
it is the agricultural demonstration programs of foreign technicians that have
been mainly responsible for what little progress has been made toward
decreasing the dependency of the economy on peanut production.
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The government attempts to regulate the economy through four-year
plans have thus far met with little success. Government control over both the
purchasing and selling of the country's major crop-peanuts-is ensured
through a state-run agency. Additionally, the state owns and operates the
country's only railroad and its telecommunications services; the West African
Water and Electric Co., the country's major producer of electric power,
recently was nationalized.
Senegal is a member of the franc zone, and its currency, the CFA franc,
is fully convertible with the French franc. Senegal shares with six other franc
zone states a common central bank, the Central Bank of the States of West
Africa (BCEAO), established with French assistance and located in Paris. Aid
from France-averaging about $30 million annually-has come in the form of
grants, loans, technical assistance, and budgetary support. This aid played a
vital role in the financing of Senegal's development efforts. Substantial
assistance is also provided by the World Bank and UN agencies. Senegal
remains committed to cooperate in regional economic development with the
states of the Senegal River basin despite the collapse of the Organization of
Senegal River States in late 1971. Senegal is also a member of the Afro-Mal-
agasy and Mauritian Common Organization and the West African Economic
Community.
Foreign trade
Neither exports nor imports have shown any sizable expansion during
the past decade. During the past five years, exports have averaged 20% of
GDP and imports some 25%. Senegal's main exports are peanuts and peanut
products, canned fish, and phosphates. Taken together, these account for
more than 80% of the total. The country's meager resources necessitate the
importation of most raw materials, including a major portion of its food-
stuffs-mainly rice-and virtually all machinery and equipment. France is by
far the most important trade partner of Senegal, although Senegal's export
trade with France has declined as a percentage of the total during the past
decade (from 76% in 1961 to 60% in 1969). France is likewise Senegal's
main supplier, providing 40% of imports in 1969. The other five EEC
countries accounted for 11% of Senegal's exports in 1969, representing an
increase of 5% since 1961. Trade with Communist nations over the same
period was negligible.
Balance of payments
The balance of payments has been in substantial deficit since 1966
largely because of the growing trade deficit resulting from a continued rise in
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imports and a decrease in peanut exports. As a result, Senegal has had to
draw on French banking reserves to meet its commitments. Procurement of
capital equipment from France and other countries plus price increases after
the devaluations of the French and CFA francs were largely responsible for
the increase in the price of imports. Export receipts, on the other hand, have
fallen, primarily because of the sizable drop in peanut exports since 1966.
Although exports of other products more than doubled between 1967 and
1969, the country's heavy dependence on peanuts, the lack of other prom-
ising sources of exports, and the continuing need to import foodstuffs all
work against an improvement in the country's balance of payments.
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Historical summary
Before 1960: Various pressures over the centuries had gradually forced
the Wolof, Serer, and Tukulor peoples to migrate from the northeast into
present day Senegal. European activity in the area began with the arrival of
the Portuguese at Cape Verde Peninsula and the Gambia River in the
mid-15th century. In the mid-16th century the Dutch arrived, and they were
followed a century later by the French.
Senegal was the only French African colony that had elected governing
councils before World War II, and the first to send a deputy to the French
National Assembly (Blaise Diagne in 1914). Unlike their practice in other
African colonies, the French made a real effort to educate the Senegalese. In
the 1850s, they established a school system which, although small, was able
to prepare selected Africans for study at any university in France. As a
result, generations ago a sizable educated African elite had emerged, and its
members had begun to think of themselves as Senegalese rather than as
members of particular ethnic groups. Consequently, the leaders of modern
Senegal were ahead of their confreres in other African countries in trying to
develop national consciousness among their people.
Senegal was the first African country in which France established
representative institutions that provided some opportunities for political
participation. In the latter part of the 19th century, four Senegalese coastal
towns were given the status of French communes, with their residents
receiving all the perquisites of Frenchmen, including the right to vote for a
deputy to the French parliament. Three of these four were also allowed to
elect their own mayors and municipal councils. (No other French commune
in Africa was granted this privilege until 1955). Meanwhile, however, Afri-
cans in the "bush" were, until 1946, of "subject" status.
In 1946, Senegal became an Overseas Territory of the French Republic
within the new French Union. The distinction between "citizen" and "sub-
ject" was abolished, and French citizenship was extended to all Africans
outside the original communes. Senegal's representation in the French Na-
tional Assembly was increased from one to two. At the territorial level, the
former advisory colonial council became an elected General Council, much
as in a French department. From 1945 onward, France gradually extended
the franchise first to veterans, civil servants, chiefs, holders of school cer-
tificates, and gradually including more and more special categories until
suffrage became universal in 1957.
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Leopold Senghor, a protegee of one of Senegal's most illustrious pol-
iticians, Lamine Gueye, entered upon the political scene after World War II
as Gueye's running mate for Senegal's two seats in the French parliament.
Senghor subsequently broke with Gueye because of what he felt was Gueye's
alienation from the people and his close association with the French, and
formed his own party in 1948. Senghor at first directed his appeal primarily
to the newly enfranchised rural people with whom he shared a common
heritage. But by independence in 1960 he had succeeded in gathering
together Senegal's disparate political elements into a single party and was the
most prominent political figure. The loi cadre of 1956 gave Senegal a
considerable measure of internal autonomy, providing it with its own exec-
utive council. Senegal became an autonomous republic within the new
Franco-African Community in November 1958. In 1959, Senegal and the
French Sudan (now Mali) formed the Federation of Mali. France granted the
Mali Federation independence on 20 June 1960, but two months later the
federation broke up over political differences.
1960-1971: Independent Senegal. An abortive coup by Prime Minister
Mamadou Dia in December 1962 strengthened President Senghor's position
as chief executive and led to the abolition of the prime minister's office for
several years. Since the coup attempt, Senghor has remained on top, drawing
support from the country's military, its major economic interests, and his
former French mentors, whose financial assistance has kept the country
economically viable. Political malaise has increased, however, because of the
basically grim economic picture and the country's excessive dependence on
the French. The student and labor riots that flared up in the summer of
1968 seriously challenged the regime. (After these two politically active
groups had threatened further violence, Senghor finally moved to meet some
of their demands). The most ominous development in Senegalese politics
since independence, however, has been the gradual erosion of Senghor's
support from his traditional allies, the Muslim chiefs and the peasantry, and
his increasing reliance on the military to contain spreading dissidence.
Governmental system
The Senegalese Government is modeled after the French Fifth Re-
public. The constitution proclaims that the government shall be chosen by
the people, and the people are guaranteed the rights of liberty, equality, and
religious freedom. The president holds the power to appoint and dismiss the
prime minister and his cabinet, and all proposals submitted to the National
Assembly by the prime minister must be countersigned by the president. In
addition, the president has control over the army, may rule by decree during
emergencies, and is responsible for appointments at all levels of the govern-
ment. President Senghor recently has named a number of young technicians
to lesser cabinet posts as a sop to the youthful educated elite.
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The country's legislature-the National Assembly-is a unicameral body,
whose members are elected by universal suffrage for five-year terms at the
same time as the president. This 80-member body has the right to initiate
legislation along with the executive and has control over the budget and
taxes. A vote of censure by an absolute majority of its members can bring
down the government, but in the past it has routinely approved the pres-
ident's proposals with a minimum of debate.
The Senegalese judicial system is closely patterned after its French
counterpart, but is modified by customary law at the local level. The judicial
system remains-theoretically at least-independent of the executive and the
legislature. All magistrates are appointed for life by the President. At the top
of the judicial pyramid is the Supreme Court which rules on the consti-
tutionality of laws, on international treaties, on jurisdictional disputes be-
tween the other two branches of government, and even audits the govern-
ment's books.
Senegal is administered by a highly centralized bureaucracy head-
quartered in Dakar, but for administrative purposes is subdivided into seven
regions, 28 departments, and 90 arrondissements. Each region is headed by a
governor appointed by the president. The governor is assisted by a regional
development committee consisting of two deputies and the president of the
regional assembly. The administrators of the lesser subdivisions are also
presidential appointees and are answerable only to him.
Political dynamics
Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS): Status-The constitution omits
any mention of political parties and, therefore, at least in theory, more than
one party might be expected to exist. In practice, however, the Senghor
government has authorized only one party-the Senegalese Progressive Union
(UPS) headed by President Senghor.
Formation-In 1948, Senghor broke his ties with established political
leaders to form a new political party, known as the Senegalese Democratic
Bloc (BDS), which was supported largely by rural areas. After a series of
mergers, in 1958 the party changed its name to the Senegalese Progressive
Union (UPS). UPS nominees for governmental positions face no opposition
and are ensured election once they make the electoral lists. The party
continues to retain its rural base-drawing most of its support from local clan
and religious leaders, the peasants, and various middle class and minority
groups. The party, however, is racked by factional infighting and is further
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debilitated by a split between its old, predominantly rural, hard-line faction
and a younger, more reformist faction. Moreover, the party's firm grasp of
all governmental posts and the complete absence of competition have
tended, in recent years, to make the party complacent and unresponsive to
the needs of its constituents.
Organization-The UPS has a hierarchy of committees extending from
the local to the national level. At the top are a National Congress, a National
Council, and a Political Bureau. In the 70-man Political Bureau, the actual
center of power within the party, issues are freely discussed and decisions are
made by majority vote. The UPS organization parallels that of the govern-
ment, and there is considerable overlapping of personnel between the two.
Although the UPS claims to be the main link between the government and
the people, it is neither dynamic nor representative. Instead, it consists of
old-line political figures and is primarily responsive to wealthy, conservative
landowners.
Program-The UPS is a moderate party, sponsoring platforms generally
based on those of the French Socialist Party. Since assuming power, it has
promised to reform economic and social conditions, but in practice has
favored private enterprise, including foreign investment in commerce and
light industry. All major opposition elements, except for certain recalcitrant
groups which have been outlawed by the government for activities deemed
inimical to the state, have been absorbed by the UPS. President Senghor
views the party as the single most important link between the masses and the
regime and has attempted to absorb all potential pressure groups by pro-
viding party branches for youth, women, and labor.
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In the decade since independence, the moderate regime of President
Senghor has faced three serious crises. At the start of the decade, former
prime minister Mamadou Dia attempted a coup, in 1967 an attempt was
made-allegedly by Dia's followers-to assassinate the President, and most
recently, the country has suffered from persistent economic and political
malaise marked by labor-student unrest. In each instance, the support of the
country's military and paramilitary forces plus Senghor's own political
acumen have enabled the regime to remain in power. Senegalese students,
particularly those at Dakar University-a center of antiregime activity-
oppose the regime and openly advocate its overthrow because they feel that
the government has failed to make needed reforms and has maintained too
close relations with the French. The authorities have attempted through a
carrot-and-stick approach to win the students over, but without success.
Students will probably remain the greatest potential threat to the regime.
Government measures against the country's labor movement, including
the establishment of a rival union, temporarily at least have nullified labor as
a source of opposition. Only the teachers' union-a small segment of the
labor movement-remains recalcitrant, and it poses no serious threat to the
government. Attempts to forge an antiregime labor-student coalition so far
have failed to make any headway.
Heavily armed anti-Portuguese rebels based in Senegal's isolated south-
ern province have created a serious security problem. These rebel bands,
primarily targeted against Portuguese Guinea, have committed numerous
depredations against the local populace, many of whom are refugees from
Portuguese Guinea. Senegalese authorities occasionally have clamped down
on rebel activities but are incapable of controlling them completely.
Communist party
There is no Communist party in Senegal, but the crypto-Communist
African Independence Party (PAI), outlawed since 1959, has continued to
engage in limited antigovernment activity from neighboring countries. The
PAI tends to reflect Soviet thinking because of its ties to the French
Communist party, which is probably its main source of support. Since 1960
party members have been faced with arrest in Senegal, and those not fleeing
the country have either been bought off by the government or imprisoned.
The PAI in the past has smuggled antigovernment tracts into the country.
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These papers have occasionally surfaced during student disorders, indicating
that there is still some residual support for the PAI among the students. The
PAI was never able to gain mass support, largely because many of the party's
officials were out of touch with the peasants and urban masses. Constant
police monitoring of PAI activity and police infiltration of its ranks have
rendered it relatively ineffectual. Although its total membership is not
known, the PAI probably has less than a thousand active members.
The PAI, like other Senegalese political parties is divided. In 1965, a
group of PAI dissenters espousing a pro-Peking line broke away and founded
the Senegalese Communist Party (PCS). The PCS, also banned, has shown
even less organizational skill than the PAI.
Foreign activities
Senegal maintains relations with a number of Communist countries,
including the USSR, North Vietnam, and Poland. The Senegalese remain
wary of Soviet activity, and the movement of Soviet officials and the flow of
Soviet propaganda are subjected to close scrutiny. In 1969, the Senegalese-
piqued by the treatment of President Senghor's much vaunted philosophy of
negritude in the Soviet media-waged a brief but sharp war of words with
Moscow. Senegalese sensitivity about the activities of any foreigners, but
particularly those from the Communist world, was highlighted in 1968
during the labor-student troubles. At that time, two New China News
Agency staffers, based in Dakar, were expelled from the country because of
their alleged involvement with the disorders. Toward the end of 1970, the
government banned almost all propaganda activities of the Communist
countries and tended to blame much of the country's growing unrest on
"foreign influences."
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Organization and manpower
Constitutionally, President Senghor has ultimate control over Senegal's
armed forces. Senghor turned over the defense portfolio to the prime
minister, who is directly accountable to him, when the office of prime
minister was reinstalled in 1970. But, in fact, it is Commanding General and
Chief of Staff Diallo who controls the army and is the de facto minister of
the armed forces. Although technically accountable to the prime minister,
Diallo is well entrenched in the administration and has authority to act on
his own in all ministry matters except those dealing with the creation of laws
and the appointment of certain top level civil servants. Diallo has proved to
be a loyal supporter of the Senghor regime, despite occasional differences
with the President.
The armed forces total of about 6,800 men is composed of a 5,100-man
army, a 150-man navy, and a 160-man air force plus a paramilitary com-
ponent, and a 1,350-man gendarmerie. In addition, there is a 3,300-man
Surete Nationale or National Police-subordinate to the Interior Minister-
which since 1969 has included the elite presidential guard unit-the Garde
Republicaine. The military manpower potential is estimated at about
930,000 males between ages 15 and 49, of whom about 48% are considered
physically fit for duty. There is a compulsory service law requiring military
service of 18 months, but volunteers usually oversubscribe the available slots.
Mission and capability
The mission of the armed forces is to ensure domestic order and defend
the country's territorial integrity. The Senegalese ground forces have prac-
tically no capability for any defensive or offensive actions against a well-
equipped, hard-hitting strike force like the Portuguese in neighboring Portu-
guese Guinea. Moreover, the armed forces are almost entirely dependent on
the French for logistic and even administrative support. Senegal's armed and
paramilitary forces would probably be able to handle most situations with-
out: seeking French intervention, however.
Equipment and logistics
Senegal has no domestic weapons production and has no facilities to
produce its own weapons. Arms and ammunition, most of World War II
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vintage and some produced in the United States, are provided by the French
Military Assistance Program. The available equipment is in fair condition,
and the Senegalese maintenance personnel are fairly well trained, although
major repairs still must be done in France. The age and frequent use of much
of the military's equipment create frequent maintenance problems. Small
arms are the main part of the Sengalese arsenal, although in recent years the
Senegalese have added some armored cars, recoilless rifles, French-built
patrol craft, and helicopters.
Military budget
The defense budget for FY 1972 is $18.0 million, 10.45% of the total
budget of $188 million compared to the 12.0% ratio for the FY-71 budget;
it represents a 1% increase over last year's total amount. The defense budget
continues gradually to increase, reflecting pressures on the Senegalese to
upgrade their forces to counter any contingencies that might arise from the
active guerrilla war in neighboring Portuguese Guinea.
Military agreements and aid
Under a defense agreement signed at independence in 1960, France has
continued to provide for Senegal's basic defense needs. Sizable French
paratrooper, naval, and air forces have been stationed on the Cape Verde
Peninsula, and Paris has provided both training and military hardware to the
Senegalese military forces. Since 1954, total French military assistance has
totaled about $20 million, mainly in grant aid. U.S. military assistance
between 1962 and 1970, most of it for Senegal's civic action oriented
engineer battalion, amounted to almost $3 million. Senegal also has a special
relationship with The Gambia requiring cooperation in the fields of defense
and foreign affairs.
Security system
Under the constitution, the President has blanket authority to rule by
decree should the internal situation seriously deteriorate. As commander in
chief of the country's military and paramilitary forces, the President has
sufficient force at his disposal to cope with most domestic disturbances. In
addition to the 5,000-man French-trained army-the largest and most de-
pendable force-the regime draws mostly upon its paramilitary forces, the
3,300-man surete (national police) whose efficiency has improved since the
1,500-man Garde Republicaine was incorporated into its ranks in 1969, and
the 1,300-man gendarmerie. The French military presence in Dakar, consist-
ing of army, navy and air force units, probably can be counted on to come to
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the aid of the regime in an emergency. The over-all coordination of internal
and external security is in the hands of a newly formed organization known
as the Senegalese Security Council. The council, which meets at least once a
month, makes recommendations to the President. Its membership is drawn
from the President's office, the Army, the Interior Ministry, plus the Pres-
ident's military and security counselors, both Frenchmen.
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Senegal's foreign policy, though formally nonaligned, is oriented
toward the West. Dakar's moderate approach reflects President Senghor's
philosophy, which stresses dialogue as the most important means of settling
disputes and which sees Senegal's role as a moderating influence between
East and West. Dakar has scrupulously avoided involvement in East-West
disputes and tends to concentrate on matters which affect its internal
stability or its economic development. In recent years, the government has
come under increasing domestic pressure to chart a more independent course
in world affairs, but continued reliance on France, particularly for economic
aid, militates against any sweeping changes in Senegalese foreign policy.
Senegal's primary focus continues to be on Africa, particularly West
Africa. Senegal has been an active member of the Organization of African
Unity and, especially, of the smaller, francophone grouping, the Common
Organization of Africa, Malagasy and Mauritius (OCAM). Senegal's pressing
internal problems-many stemming from economic causes-have forced
Dakar to direct its main attention toward regionalism. President Senghor was
a prime mover in the formation of the now collapsed four-state Organization
of Senegal River States in March 1968. His hopes for this organization, upon
which Senegal based much of its economic future, were unduly optimistic.
Senegalese-Guinean disagreements, most recently over Senegal's refusal to
repatriate anti-Guinean exiles, led to its collapse. Senegal's relationship with
The Gambia, which it surrounds on three sides, has also been troubled.
Differences between the economic systems of the two countries and the
Garnbians persistent footdragging on measures to curb the illicit trade
between them occasionally have caused a cooling in relations. Until these
basic issues are resolved within the context of a regional or bilateral eco-
nomic agreement, relations between Dakar and Bathurst will be subjected to
periodic buffeting. A much more serious problem exists between Senegal and
Portugal over Portuguese actions resulting from the guerrilla war in Portu-
guese Guinea. Senegal, which has allowed anti-Portuguese rebels to use its
territory, continues to complain of Portuguese violations of its borders. For
their part, the Portuguese apparently hope to convince Dakar of the need to
clamp down on rebel activity by demonstrating their capacity to strike
against Senegalese border villages at will. This sore spot in relations between
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Lisbon and Dakar will probably continue as long as the guerrilla war in
Portuguese Guinea drags on.
In order to preserve its nonaligned image, Dakar has sought diplomatic
ties with a number of Communist countries. Most of these ties have led to
commercial and cultural exchanges; the only significant aid the Senegalese
have received has come from the USSR, which has agreed to finance a $6.7
million tuna-fishing complex and also has provided some foodstuffs. Al-
though Dakar formally recognized Communist China as early as 1961,
diplomatic relations have not been established. Senegal did vote for the
seating of China in the UN and the expulsion of Taiwan, but President
Senghor harbors a deep distrust of the Chinese. During the 1968 student-
labor disorders in Dakar, two Dakar-based New China News Agency cor-
respondents were expelled for alleged involvement in the disorders. Despite
suspicions of the Chinese, Senegal is expected soon to establish full dip-
lomatic ties with Peking. In December 1969, Dakar recognized North Viet-
nam largely because of Senghor's sympathy with the North Vietnamese, with
whom he feels he shares a common colonial heritage. The Senegalese havy
occasionally exhibited irritation with the activities of Communist diplomats,
particularly those of the Soviet Union. Moscow maintains a sizable embassy
in Dakar and conducts an active cultural program;
Despite its attempts to project a nonaligned image, Senegal is essentially
Western-oriented. Senegal's historical, cultural and economic ties with
France are still paramount. Paris remains Dakar's major trading partner and
its main source of aid, mainly in the form of grants, loans, technical
assistance and budgetary support. French aid is estimated to average between
$20 and $25 million annually. Although Dakar has recently turned to
other-mainly western-sources for economic assistance, its almost total
dependence on France will probably continue for the foreseeable future.
From its associate membership in the Common Market, Dakar has derived
important economic benefits and has strengthened its economic ties with
other Western European countries. Senegal's relations with the United States
continue to be cordial. Dakar's increasingly difficult economic situation in
the past few years have prompted the Senegalese to encourage more US
public and private investment in their economy.
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 NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Joal
Saint-Louis
KtajI
S~db
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SAINT if16Y
Bakaij
Kaif rifle
Koungheul
V~lingar
-P E
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SENEGAL AND GAMBIA
. .- International boundary
H~ National capital
?397 Spot height (in feet)
Populated places
? Over 10,000
0 2,000 to 10,000
? Under 2,000
-I- I I Railroad (3' 3%" gage) Airfield
.Surfaced road Principal port
- - - - - Unsurfaced road
EASTERN
-r a
Bokolako
\,. , REGION
-F
`~rJ{alakoto''
Tambacounda
limata
Scale 11,500,000
25 50
Statute Miles
25 50 75
Kilometers
Balakonko'
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Secret
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Secret
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