OFFICE OF SECURITY SURVEY REPORT (DRAFT)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00498A000300100005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 116
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 17, 1976
• Content Type: MF

101) 17 _1 J
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
mix
File
17 DEC 1976
FROM , Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security ~
VIA : Deputy Director for Administration ' i u~c 4 I6
SDhJI CT : Office of Security Survey Report (Draft)
REFERENCES (a) Memorandum to the Director of Security
from TG dated 23 November 1976, same
subject
(b) Memorandum to the Director of Security
from IO dated 13 December 1976,
subject: Revisions to the Office
of Security Survey Report
1. Pursuant to your request this Office has reviewed
the draft report and offers the following comments for
your consideration.
2. We must emphasize that this Office never recommended
any kind of crash project to purge our records. We did
offer alternatives to fulfill this commitment (Attachment 2,
Annex A), one of which projected a two-year completion
date contin ent upon the addition of thirteen new slots
to accmpls this task. Recognizing the improbability
of acquiring any additional slots and for other reasons
set forth in Attachment 2 of Annex A, we specifically
suggested a more moderate, less disruptive program that
could be accomplished within the existing ceiling. Any
significant diversion of manpower to accomplish the recommended
two-year crash program would evoke an intolerable disruption
of our regular activities.
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4. The draft report suggests (page 4, paragraph b(1))
that the practice of furnishing information on named
Americans who are not the primary subject of investigation
is of questionable propriety and recommends (page 7,
paragraph 9) that this practice be terminated. This Office
believes that the legal judgment of the Office of General
Counsel (Attachment 2, Annex B) fully supports office of
Security participation in the National Agency Check program
as it is presently constituted. We do not believe that
there are any grounds for compelling the Office of Security
to take the lead in dismantling a valuable investigative
function that has served all U.S. Government investigative
.agencies for many years.
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5. Annex F, page F-5 parag notes that considera-
tion was being given to providing I I with pro" STAT
tective service. Please be advise a preparation
of the draft report these services have been afforded the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence/Intelligence Community.
6. Overall, we find the draft report to be an objective
and sincere document. It is especially heartening to note
the observation that Office of Security personnel are acutely
aware of the need to conduct all their activities in a
completely legal and proper manner. We are thoroughly dedi-
cated to this proposition.
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Distribution=
Original & 1 - Addressee
1 - DD/A
Robert W. Gambino
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DRAFT
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY
MARCH - AUGUST 1976
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
FROM John H. Waller
Inspector General
SUBJECT : Office of Security Survey Report
Enclosed is a draft of our Office of Security Survey Report.
I would appreciate it if you would review this draft and return
it to me by 15 December together with any comments you
may have. It would be appreciated if you state where you
disagree with any of the conclusions or recommendations
and the reasons for any such disagreement, in order that
I may consider them and report to.the DDCI such differences
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Attachment: a/s
cc: General Counsel
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Adxnir istrative
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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL.
SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY
MARCH - AUGUST.1976
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S E C R E. T
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OFFICE OF SECURITY SURVEY
MARCH - AUGUST 1976
[3ackground:
1. On 24 March, a four-man team of inspectors began a survey of
the Office of Security (OS). By design, the survey was limited in
I..r scope. Its major thrust was to address the legality and propriety of
law OS activities, as distinct from a management overview of the entire
Office. The last IG Survey of OS was completed in July 1973.
2. In carrying out its task, the Survey Team relied heavily on
interviews at all levels within OS and a review of Agency and OS
directives and OGC opinions. Considerable time was spent reviewing
.~. OS files which, in themselves, provided insights into the character
and operating style of the Office.
'r? 3. Throughout the entire survey OS management was kept fully
apprised of our general findings and possible problem areas. Because
omid
we were convinced that the survey report should contain no surprises
Now for the D/OS, we undertook to resolve problems as they surfaced,
rather than to await the final report. To some extent this approach
low
has been successful. Consequently, some sections of this report will
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,.., identify problems which already have been or are well on the way to being
resolved by OS.
Conclusions:
4. During the course of the survey, the Survey Team was impressed
by the acute awareness by OS personnel, both at Headquarters and in the
field, of the need to conduct all OS activities in a thoroughly legal
and proper manner. Undoubtedly, this sensitivity reflects the strong
leadership of D/OS who, by his actions, has sought to insure that all
OS personnel are given clear guidelines and directives that identify
the policies and parameters governing OS activities. Management has
gone one step further, as they have encouraged all employees to seek
clarification and justification of any activity that, in their judge-
ment, is not covered by existing Office directives or Agency regula-
tions.
5. We found that the new operational restrictions governing OS
activities have made implementation of OS mission and function more
difficult. Nevertheless, we have found no evidence (except for the
Polygraph Program) to suggest that these restrictions have significantly
affected OS's effectiveness. In the case of the Polygraph Program, the
now requirement to report possible violations of law to the Department of
2
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Justice reduces the atmosphere of confidentiality desirable for effective
polygraph examinations. This finding pertains not only to the conduct of
field investigations, but also to the handling of support functions both
at Headquarters and in the field.
6. We found that, for the most part, OS is carrying out its re-
sponsibilities in a legal and proper manner. There were, however,
certain OS activities that we believe to be either illegal, improper,
or (if not clearly illegal or improper) to b6'questionable. These are
briefly described below and discussed in greater detail in the Annexes,
as indicated:
a. Illegal Activities:
(1) OS has considerable information on Americans in its
security investigation files, collected over the past two decades;
information which is now illegal to retain under the provisions of
the privacy Act of 1974 and Executive Order 11905. It would be a
substantial undertaking and would take considerable time for OS to
purge its files of such information. However, OS has a plan for ac-
complishing this in an orderly manner within a two-year period
(Annex A).
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(3) The authority of Agency personnel to carry firearms
in the United States in limited by statute to the protection of con-
fidential documents and materials. To provide armed protection to the
DCI and DUCI, OS officers use the stratagem of having those officials
carry classified documents on their person in order to technicall,%.-
comply with the law. As this is an area where the Agency's legal
authorities is in question, OGC is actively pursuing broader legisla-
tion to clearly permit the arming of Agency officers for the purpose
of protecting senior officials and Agency installations (Annex F).
b. Imp roper Activities:
(1) OS has a long-standing practice of furnishing
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information on named Americans who are not the primary and proper sub-
ject of an OS investigation to some 50 other government agencies. While
OGC has ruled this practice to be legal and OS believes it is an im-
portant and integral part of their exchange of security information with
other agencies, we judge this practice to be of questionable propriety
on the grounds that it permits the unnecessary exchange'of unverified
and unrecorded derogatory information on Americans without their knowl-?
edge or permission.(Ahnex B).
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c. Other Activities Which Raised Questions
(1) O5 had been using an elementary school teacher as a
contract security investigator. When we questioned the merits of this
relationship in comparison with the potential for unfavorable publicity,
OS terminated the contract (Annex D).
(2) We found that OS personnel had questions concerning
the legality or propriety of certain aspects of the polygrah program.
At our instigation, OS and OGC have reviewed these issues and have re-
solved questions of legality or propriety. As a result, OS will develop
clearer guidelines on polygraph practices (Annex C).
7. Finally, we were impressed by the openness and the spirit of
cooperation shown by OS in discussing their reservations about certain
of their activities and their eagerness, particularly in light of the
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a. The Attorney General and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence be advised that, following the lifting of the Senate Mora-
torium and other restrictions on destruction of illegally held informa-
tion on Americans, it will take considerable time to purge this informa-
tion from OS files. (This topic has already been taken up with the IOB
Staff (Attachment 4 to Annex A)).
8. Concerning questions of illegally-held information on Americans
described in Annex A, we recommend that:
recent external investigations, to jointly seek resolution of question-
able areas of activity.
Recommendations:
b. The Office of Security institute its two-year program to
identify and purge all illegally held information on Americans from.
its files so that OS security file holdings comport with the spirit
and the intent of the Privacy Act and Executive Order 11905, when the
restrictions on file destruction are lifted.
c. The Director of Security issue written guidelines specify-
ing the type of information that may be placed in OS files and specify-
ing the proper criterion for its indexing.
f t'
.9. With respect to the question of access to OS in orma ion y
other agencies described in Annex B, we recommend that the practice
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of providing information to other government agencies on named American
citizens who are not the primary and proper subjects of OS investiga-
me* be terminated..
10. On the questions raised about the Polygraph Program described
in Annex C, we recommend that the Director of Security issue updated
guidance on the conduct of OS's polygraph program, incorporating the
legal opinions and management policy contained in Attachment 2 to
Annex C.
12. Concerning the firearms issue described in Annex F, we recom-
mend that explicit authority be sought through appropriate legislation
for CIA to provide armed protection to the DCI, the DDCI, and such
other senior officials as the DCI might name, and that legislation
also provide for the specific use of armed guards to protect CIA
installations in the United States.
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"ILLEGALLY-HELD INFORMATION ON AMERICANS
Background:
1. Over the years, OS has accumulated a vast array of personal
data on American citizens as a result of its security investigations
of applicants, employees, contractors and their employees, and other
1"' persons with similar relationships with the Agency; as well as on
persons other than the primary subject of OS investigations, intel-
ligence sources, and corporations. In order to manage this informa-
tion, OS established automated and manual indexes and dossiers for
.use in the initial screening of candidates for employment; in deter-
%MW the security suitability of employees, contractors, etc.; in
counterintelligence research; and in supporting security checks by
%no
some 50 other accredited Federal agencies.
2. These indexes and dossiers are managed by the Security
Records Division (SRD) of OS. SRD indexes pertinent data identified
by operating components within OS, mainly the Clearance Division,
for inclusion either in the manual indexes or in the Secuoity Auto-
mated Name Check Activity (SANCA) system. Until about 1974 there
was little selectivity in the indexing process as the operative mode
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OS escaped being indexed.
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encouraged over-indexing. Consequently, little information collected by
3. An appreciation of how this system works and how such a massive
volume of data was accumulated is described in the OS-memorandum at
Attachment 1. This memorandum also shows that, because of intensive
indexing, OS now holds retrievable information on American citizens
which the Privacy Act of 1974 describes as a "record" and thus, in cer-
tain instances, is illegal to use. Further, the limitations contained
in Executive Order 11905 on collecting and storing information on "U.S.
Persons" not only limit the categories of information that may be col-
lected, but limit the range of information previously collected and
currently stored.
4. As OS is well aware, the provisions of the Privacy Act of
1974 and Executive Order 11905 bear heavily on the legality and pro-
priety of OS holdings:
a. Key provisions of the Privacy Act that apply include the
following:
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"Each a enc that maintains a system of records shall
maintain in its records only such information about an
individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a
purpose of the a enc rej i red to be accomplished by_
statute or by Executive Order of the President."
"Each agency that maintains a system of records shall
maintain no records describing how any individual exer-
cises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless ex-
pressly authorized b statute or by the individual about
whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized or a law enforcement
activi
The Privacy Act defines records as follows:
"The term record means any item, collecting or group-
ing of information about an individual that is maintained
by an' agency including but not limited to his education,
financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or
employment history, and that contains his name or the
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying_Part~cu--
lars assicned to the individual such as a finger or voice
print or photo ra ham" (emphasis added)
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"The term system of records means a groups of any record
under the control of an agency from which information is re-
trieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying
number, s y m b o l - o r other identifyincdyarticular assigned to
the individual." (emphasis added)
b. Executive Order 11905 concerns itself with the same matter.
It defines collection as follows:
"Collect-ion means any one or more of the gathering,
analysis, dissemination or storage of non-publicly.
available information without the informed empressed
consent of the subject of the information."
5. The Executive Order establishes certain restrictions on col-
lection by foreign intelligence agencies. It restrains:
"Collection of information however acquired con-
cerning the domestic activities of United States
persons, except information concerning present or
former employees, present or former contractors, or
present or former employees or applicants for any
such employment or contracting necessary to protect
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources
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or methods or national security information from un-
authorized disclosure; and the identity of persons 'in
contact with the foregoing or with a non--U.S. person
who is the subject of a forei n intelligence or
counterintelligence in uiry." (emphasis added)
7. OS holds a significant, but as yet unidentified, segment of
records on Americans who were not dissenters; nor were they of foreign
intelligence interest, nor were they relevant to the mission and func-
tion of the Agency. Although the legality-of maintaining such infor-
mation as separate records was not questioned prior to the passage of
the Privacy Act, and the issuance of Executive Order 11905, retaining
recoverable records/files on such Americans are now illegal.
8. OS had planned to purge such information from their files as
a by-product of normal file use and in accordance with established
National Archives and Records Service (NARS) records control schedules.
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Under this procedure, OS estimated that it would take over ten years to
complete the purging and destruction process. At our urging, OS has
considered speedier solutions and estimates that they could complete a
search and purge crash program in six months using 150 persons. They
do not favor this approach as they feel it would seriously disrupt the
normal functions of the Office. Alternatively, they estimate that the
task could be completed in a two-year period using 13 people. Their
views are at Attachment 2.
Conclusions:
9. OS recognizes that they are storing information on Americans
that is now illegal to collect, store, and disseminate. We share their
concern over the difficulties of purging illegally-held information from
their files, but believe it to be in the Agency's best interests to rid
itself of such holdings as soon as it is possible to do so. This should
be a matter of high urgency as soon as destruction is permitted. In
this connection, it should be noted that MARS records control schedules
do not apply, in our view, to illegally-held information, records, and
files. While we do not know with certainty what period following the
lifting of the Senate moratorium and other restrictions described in
0
(Attachment 3) would be allowed for the purging of illegally
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held information from OS files, we believe that the two-year, 13 man, plan
is acceptable and would accomplish this purpose in a manner consistent
with protecting our security.
10. We find that OS's current input of information on Americans in
its files and the indexing of this information is in accordance with the
Privacy Act, Executive Order 11905, and under the close supervision of
the Chiefs of the Clearance Division and the Security Records Division.
However, OS's guidelines for the indexing of this information is verbal
and not written.
11. Without suggesting that field investigators refrain from col-
lecting authorized information needed to assess the security suitability
of an applicant or others of similar interest to the Agency, we believe
that OS should collect only such data as is relevant to the primary sub-
ject of the investigation and that this data should be kept only in the
primary subject's file. No separate records should be maintained on
secondary subjects unless they are of legitimate foreign intelligence
or foreign counterintelligence interest.
12. As an interim measure, I have asked the DDA to issue an Agency
regulation enjoining employees from using illegally held information
(attachment 4).
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Recommendations:
13. We recommend that:
a. The Attorney General and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence be advised that, following the lifting of the Senate
Moratorium and other restrictions on destruction of illegally held
information on Americans, it will take considerable time to purge this
information from OS files. (This topic has already been taken up with
the IOB Staff (Attachment 5)).
b. The Office of Security institute its two-year program to
identify and purge all illegally held information on Americans from
its files so that OS security file holdings comport with the spirit
and the intent of the Privacy Act and Executive Order 11905, when
restrictions on file destruction are lifted.
c. The Director of Security issue written guidelines speci-
fying the type of information that may be placed in OS files and
specifying the proper criterion for its indexing.
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18 June 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
Acting Director ot Security
SUBJECT OS Record Holdings
ieeting in Mr. Gambino's office,
participated in a discussion of
various aspects o- the u ject. At the conclusion of that
meeting these gentlemen asked that a document be prepared
by this Office which would represent a comprehensive state--
ment of what Security is now doing and sees itself able to
do in the near term to reduce its excess record holdings.
Subsequently a kind of "White Paper" on this Subject was
prepared by this Office's Security Records Division. It
is attached hereto in the hopes that it satisfies the
instant requirement.
2. I will'be pleased to discuss any aspect of this
matter that requires further elaboration.
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I. Security Records, Systems and Holdings
1. Security Records, consisting of indexes and dossiers, are
essential to the personnel security and counter-intelligence programs
of the Agency. Information in these holdings is used in the initial
screening of each candidate for a security approval, for research in
counter-intelligence programs, and as an orderly means for keeping
information on one individual in one personal subject file. Security
Records are basic tools required in the protection of sources and
methods, responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as
established by the National Security Act.
2. A ersonal subject security dossier and personal subject
index record(s) are established the first time an individual is pro?
,cessed for a security approval. Any subsequent actions or information
on that individual is placed in the personal subject file. If in the
course of the investigation, an FBI report is obtained on a relative,
a personal reference index card is created in the name of this person.
This reference index card would lead to the FBI report filed in the.
dossier. Th re uiremen sf~ x ensi-c-inde.xaxui--o-f--a-r p~lr an a
ers ~ ?h.~r Than ~t e s Lb j.ect_ oF t~x~._v ~i~~a .i can s4~et i mes results is . STATINTL
in a personal subject dossier ping reated.
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0=0 information that we now want to purge. STATINTL
STATINTL 8. In order to determine whether stored information pertains STATINTL
to a "dissident", or whether it is obsolete, one must examine the con-
tents of the dossiers.
9. fter dgc.jdi ng that a document or_a Pntire-clasier soul d
be urged, it is n_ry ecessar to 1 ocate all t o
46ent or dossier. Some dossiers have thousands of index records
leaden to them. lJn}ie-index records have been destroyed, we have
ri s purged our holcTings a~sinteadeit ure~tci pr~`3cperly purge index
recd`-rd w1IT-1-ii ad to future u 1 surprises and mass inefficiencies.
10. Our Security Records system is essential for proper
personnel security and counter-intelligence programs. A crash program
to get rid of information-on "dissidents" and to get rid of obsolete
material, using untrained and unqualified people who will have no future
accountability, would be a disservice to the Office and the Agency.
II. Requirements for Purging FOIAB3X
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7. In developing these index and information storage systems,
the primary purpose was to be able to retrieve any stored information
on a person or an organization., little consideration was given to the
- I__.._ s... . 11 incn"mai--inn t.ihirh
pertained to ,dissluenTs .
th
in the purge program, it was not designed to pinpoint the typ
1. There have always been requirements for purging, ranging
from the deletion of erroneous or dupl =ti
leading to the I
dossier. It is no problem, and there is very little work involved, in
the destruction of such a dossier. The robl cam is in the loc -dt and
destruction of monde :_-records. ?he automated index has made it pos--
Bible to accomplish purging tasks of such magnitude with no increase
SRD resources, so long as the work could be done on an "as time permits"
basis.
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Although the automated index is extremely helpful
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3. We need to be concerned about our voluminous holdings of
obsolete information, consisting of Security dossiers (and index
records leading to them) on certain "Types of Cases" which have been
inactive for specified periods of time. These were legitimate and
necessary collections of information, but the information has outlived
its usefulness, and is now a hindrance to efficient operations and
expensive to store. Long range efficiency and economy would be served
if we could apply additional resources to the task of expediting the
purging of this obsolete. information. In volume, it is probably ten
times as great as our holdings on dissidents.
4. Our critical concern is with the question of the legality
of some of our information holdings. .The Privacy Act is so worded that,
by some ~ssible interpretation, it may preclude us from creating an
index record and storing a document which establishes that an individ-
ual has advocated the bombing of CIA buildings. Such a person, if he
just talks and takes no action, may be exercising his constitutional
rights under the First Amendment.
a. The Privacy Act states that each agency which maintains
records shall "maintain no record describing how an individual exercises
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized by
statute or by the'individual about whom the record is maintained, or
unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforce-
ment activity".
b. Further, the Privacy Act states that such information can
be disclosed to a law enforcement activity, "only if the head of the
agency or instrumentality seeking the information or records has made
a written request to the agency specifying what is desired and the
reason for the request".
5. In other words, the Privacy Act is so written that it may
preclude the Office of Security from maintaining information needed by
the Director- of Central Intelligence in order to fulfill his responsi-
bilities (under the National Security Act) to protect sources and
methods.
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IV. What We Have Done to Date
STATINTL
1. Proceeding under these assumptions, we have gone through all
of our impersonal dossier those which are primarily con-
cerned with dissidents. which, in the
opinions of our analysts, fell in that category. We found an additional
which, in the opinions of our analysts, con-
STATINTLtained no information of current sic, ini-ficance from the standpoint of
STATOTH
III. Assumptions
1. The- Office of Security has proceeded on the assumption that
Congress, with the Privacy Act, did not intend to relieve the DCI from
the responsibility of protecting sources and methods. If he still has
that -responsibiltiy, then the Office of Security has a responsibility
to support him with a records system which can be used in screening
candidates for security clearances, and for conducting research for
counter-intelligence purposes.
2. At the same time, the Office of Security recognizes that
we have considerable information holdings that are clearly inappropriate
and very possibly illegal. It is our earnest desire to rid ourselves of
such holdings, among which the most embarrassing are the personal ;
subject dossiers which have been established on individuals who were
dissenters, but clearly'not threats to security.
3. To rid ourselves of such holdings, we have to be able to
get our hands on them. We have operated on the assumption that we
should place the highest priority on getting rid of the ersonal subject
folders which hold accumulated materials on the most active "dissidents"
who have never been candidates for any substantive association with the
Agency.
security or counter-intelligence; which contained some obsolete
information. STATINTL
2. Our next concern was to make the best use of the impersonal
files which contain information on dissidents, using information from
those files as a source of "names of dissidents" on whom we may have
created a personal subject file.
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INTil TH K Ell I 1 USE L
A , 5`
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STATOTHR
4. In the meantime we had established criteria for deciding that
certain information is obsolete. The same analysts who are searching for
*moo STATINTLdossiers on "dissidents" have been looking to see whether the dossiers
meet the criteria for obsolescent. information. Analysts have identified
to be obsolete and other SRD personnel nave identified
Also the obsolescent criteria are applied to files
thorough cleansing of our record holdings on dissidents.
wait are for microfiching. During the past three (3) months
personnel of the Microfiche & Retirement Branch have identified 3151 such
obsolescent files.
5. We are finding a much higher proportion of files which are
obsolete than we are finding on dissidents. However, were we not approach-
ing the task by looking for personal subject.files with names extracted
from the files on "dissidents" organizations, we would never achieve a
6. In searching "dissident names" from the three (3) cited
impersonal dossiers, we prepared cards on all unique names. We' placed
those cards in alphabetical sequence. We have searched our index for
leads to personal subject dossiers and have reviewed all dossiers with a
subject name starting with "A" through "J". We believe that we have
found personal subject files on dissidents which would have remained un-
detected for years had we proceeded in some patently obvious fashion,
such as "start with highest-(or lowest) number and analyze each dossier
in sequence".
7. We have prepared card decks or listings of the dossiers which
our..analysts consider purgable.
V. Plans
1. We plan to continue the procedures which have led to the
ferreting out of personal subject dossiers which were created because of
our prior interest in dissidents. This will require searching names
starting with "K" through "Z" (from our "dissident names" deck) and
analyzing the dossiers which bear those names.
2. We plan to obtain more definitive criteria as to the types of
information holdings which are legal. We now believe that the best way
to do this will be to massage some actual examples of information holdings
which seem valuable from the standpoint of security, but which may be of
questionable legality under the Privacy Act.
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3. Once such criteria are established, we would purge all
holdings which-are illegal as quickly and thoroughly as can be done.
with suitable resources which can be found for the task.
4. After such illegal information is purged, we plan to use
those suitable resources in an accelerated program to purge our holdings
of useless and obsolete information.
VI. Resources needed if OS is given a deadline of 31 December 1976
to rid itself of all holdings on dissidents.
1. In order to estimate resources, we need to understand more
precisely what is meant when we undertake to rid ourselves of "all STATOTHR
holdings on dissidents". If we investigated Jane DOE. as an a licant
and found that her father was an active member of the
Party, are we to remove that information concerning her father? If so,
then we will have to look at each page in each Security dossier, cut
out portions of pages or re-type them, and carefully trace down and
remove all index records which lead to the excised information. STATINTL
2. Using round numbers,
STATINTLSecurity dossiers. Assume that a as ? force wou , anu
that there would be 100 working days remaining in calendar year 1976.
ossiers would have to be completely processed
"'r on each working day. The task force would consist of dossier analysts,
STAT
clerk typists, indices clerks, file clerks and keypunch operators. A
proficient analyst might be able to complete his part of the work on
100 dossiers per day', could be required to complete the
work by the deadline. Assuming-That-two (2) analysts could keep one
clerk typist busy (excising or re-typing, and maintaining records re-
quired to control the operation), we would need 40 clerk typists. In
addition, we would need 10 each of indices clerks, file clerks, and
keypunch operators. Thus, to even attempt a thorough purge of all
holdings on dissidents, we would need a task force of 150 people. In
order to operate efficiently, these 150 people would have to be located
in contiguous space in the vicinity of the shelves which hold most of
Prior to beginning the task, these people would have to
our dossiers
.
be provided clear and concise instructions. Throughout the task, close
supervision and controls would have to be applied.
3. We believe that such a massive crash program could not be
properly administered and controlled. We do not recommend it.
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4. It would be more realistic to undertake to rid ourselves
of impersonal dossiers which contain information- about dissidents, and
all of the index records leading to information in such dossiers; and
rid ourselves of all personal subject dossiers which we can identify_
as holding in-formation on dissidents, and all of the index records
leading to such dossiers. In order to obtain most efficient use of
resources, we would purge obsolete information which incidentally comes
to our attention'while we are attempting to identify dossiers on
dissidents.
5. We will assign to the task such suitable personnel as are
available, and attempt to accelerate the progress which we have made
during the past year..
6. Acknowledging that we will not, with an operation of this
scope, rid ourselves of all information on dissidents, we feel that we
would be achieving the maximum results with resources at our command,
and this is the course which we recommend.
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29 November 1976
SUBJECT: Purging of Security Files - Issues and Options
Security Records:
The principal record holdings of the Office of
Security consist of dossiers and indices thereto which are
essential to the personnel security and counterintelligence
programs of the Agency. For the most part they involve
file material on individuals, American and foreign, and
organizations who are and/or have been of Security interest
to the Agency. Security records are comprised of personal.
subject files, impersonal files, an automated indexy of STATINT
f
. 7 w _- 7_ _ tL ..L
m
tionAli i
t o
or are
en
these files, and a manual index of the impersonal subjects
STATINTL
Beginning during the 1975 investigation of CIA'
activities within the United States by the Rockefeller
Commission, serious questions have arisen concerning the
propriety of some files and records maintained by the Office
of Security. These questions were first brought to a head
by Recommendation (17) of that commission which read:
25X1A
"All files on.individuals accumulated by the
Office of Security in the program relating
to dissidents should be identified, and, ex-
cept where necessary for a legitimate foreign
intelligence activity, be destroyed at the
conclusion of the current congressional in-
vestigations, or as soon thereafter as per-
mitted by law."
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Other aspects of the Rockefeller investigation as
well as the legislative inquiries that followed raised
additional questions about the propriety of files main-
tained in our holdings on United States citizens whose
affiliation with the Agency is or has been less than
direct. A provision of the, Privacy Act of 1974 added
additional fuel to consideration of the problem in
that it spoke of the maintenance of. records reflecting
'how a citizen exercises his first Amendment, rights.
Executive Order 11905 established some guidelines
concerning the propriety of Agency records, which also
contributed food for the consideration of the problem.
In addition, of considerable, importance in developing
an approach to the records purge issue has been our
own experience in handling requests for information
under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy
Act. This experience has not only taught us a lesson
concerning the embarrassing nature of some of our
holdings which are releaseable under the provisions of
this legislation, but has also demonstrated that a
considerable amount of material in our records is
clearly obsolete.
Considerations
While a review of the above issues might lead one
to a sudden decision to undertake a massive purge of
Security records, other considerations dictate a
significant degree of caution should be exercised in
approaching the 'problem.
Most important among these considerations is the
fact that our security records are indeed essential
elements in our personnel security and counterintelligence
programs. A massive crash effort to purge such records
would have a seriously adverse impact on these programs.
While we are convinced that among these records there is a
considerable amount whose propriety is questionable and
whose utility is obsolete, we are equally certain that the
vast majority of the records are legitimately maintained
and necessary to the execution of our responsibilities.
Secondly, efforts to purge our files have been and
still are encumbered by the moratorium on the destruction
of Agency file materials. In the case of security files
this moratorium is drastically complicated by the requirement
to maintain (who knows for how long?) even questionable files,.
if they are related to cases in litigation.
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Above all, the most substantial inhibiting factor
dictating caution in any purge program is the manpower
problem. The review of all security dossiers for
questionable and obsolete material 'in itself is of great
proportion. The magnitude of this, job, however, is
increased in geometric proportion by the need to purge
simultaneously their indices. In'order to maintain our
file system as a going concern, one cannot be purged
without the other.
Efforts to Date
Since early in 1975 when the overall problem was first
recognized, the Office of Security has pursued a vigorous
if modest program aimed at the identification of questionable
and obsolete file material in our security records. on an
STATINTL average this program has encompassed the full time services
of .one part time employee. This,
which the analysts participating in the program consiaer T.0
fall in the "dissident category" and/or to represent obsolete
information. With the exception of the part time employee,
an annuitant on contract, these results have been achieved
within existing ceiling.
At the same time we have begun to establish new
criteria for. determining when file material becomes
obsolete and purgeable. We have also taken action
to prevent the initial filing of material, the propriety
of which i's:s.interdicted.
Options
It is not debatable that the problem of purging
security records of questionable and obsolete material
requires our continued attention. The question is only
one of approach.
On the one hand we can continue the direction of
our efforts to date within existing resource limitations,
supplemented in the future as ad hoc and temporary man-
power requirement troughs occur. We would also under
this option, develop an automatic purge process similar
to that extant and routine prior to the Rockefeller
Commission investigations. This supplemental purge
process would mandate a review for questionable and
obsolete material of every file "pulled" from our
records by any professional in the office. This option
has the obvious disadvantage that the purge effort would
extend over at least ten years.
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On the other hand we could institute a crash
purge program on a task force basis. Such a force
would be totally dedicated to the locating and purging
of materials and index records in our file system which
would qualify for purging for any reason. Such an effort
would require close supervision and control. A review
of the task force approach suggests that with a two year
target date for completion a complement of thirteen
people would be required including a project leader,
six analysts, and six clerical employees. In approaching
such a task in this manner we feel less than comfortable
with our estimate, but more important we are concerned
that the impetus of the purge syndrome may likely include
babies in the bath water that is thrown away.--
Conclusion
While the results of our efforts to date in
identifying for disposal dissident and obsolete material
in our files have been moderate, they have been significant
and accomplished within resource limitations. These efforts
have been successful in avoiding the pit falls of a sudden
mass purge and they have not taken away from the other
efforts of the office aimed atmore positive goals.
We believe that our approach to the problem should
continue along this approach, complemented by the periodic
assignment of additional personnel, probably in small
numbers and spasmodically, when other Office requirements
may enjoy temporary lull periods, and further supplemented
by the initiation of an automatic purge review program
involving all our officers when they "pull" files for
other purposes.
We do not recommend a crash program for reasons
outlined in the preceding section. Not only do we feel
that such a crash program would be counterproductive, but
there is no way that we could undertake such a program
and assign. the necessary personnel resources without
seriously impairing other office requirements. If it is
determined that we must undertake a crash program of the
magnitude described, the only way it can be done is
through the assignment of additional positions to the
Office of Security.
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Attachment 2, Annex A, is being revised
by OS and will be forwarded separately,
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',- STATINTt,
update-bby-3USeptiemut- 1- -7 ,.,..~."
Administration fox approval by NABS prior to the ;destructs on o xe
,i..,
t
7.n 'Ar rii" 1976, the% DCI directe a
tlirnilull the Directorate:-of .':,.
]
. LL
records control'schedules by - ec
h t Agency.records control schedules be
d
#
for *approval:-by- the;.J'ch1vist;.o :t e, ..
uires;;Federal agencies to. submit to? NARS updated
dated `22>;Januazyr: q76, :,Teq
D ember 1976. ; ; In a memorandtun dated
es
records ..control. schedu
?' h Uin ited.?States . GSA. Bulletin I=PptR B-
NTROL SQ[EDULES AND TAPE DESTRUCTION NORATORIUN;
CO
RECORDS,
:>, , ?7"-.~'{ r - ; 1J J+.~ a .::. w t s. --
.t
33) to apr, S
1 CIAJtlias; statutory obligatiS fox he retention -mdtdestriictionlo#f
the Administtatox .of;, General. Services
records.2;;,.Tlxe mechanism,for.:..obhae i at on s Phiveoand Records~nServiceo (NABS)
tot 7
l
t
p
Senar'c te;~Select Comrmi~ttee to Study.4Gov?rxirrien requested in a letter dated
Tntelli.Qence-Act~:ties ', ",The Seate leadership anv ~records or, documents
n-P
CIcLICU 4-L '11--l
aSenate Resolution
eration With Respect': to
1 O
lrmoratox xi_mi ion destxirction of re co, s
letter- to. the Senate leaclersnlp a.aaau(ltil 10 December 1976.
This. was;. extended to include pra
rred to as "the moratorium." In a
memorandum dated 4u iwit-ty -, .._ _ ,
dociunents that may have a bearing on Senate Regolutidocuments.,eThis-hold
d ctically all. Agency
l7Y,Taniaiy 1975 that, the rge1B_Y 11W tti~_ a
l,~a,ins on . the. subjects:under`investi gation;by the Select record in
?o_-1 - a;,-ortPrl that any any records: or
;~ ~. ra+ ~7 -1, _l Imr]Pr Senate.
l. records, including .those a i.ng Li
A b
e
coo
chedules`;will be coverey re
Select
r dto the Senat
pproved-by :NABS (with a copy provided r
rior to their destruction..._;
_, -f -
t
p
Routines ana ns stxa~ > ve , ~:~~~ ,~~ ..~
rrnned ate destruction
-1.
, u
fo
'
.
r
r
are schedule
Resolution 21 that
of NABS approval and after
ceipt
will be destroyed upon re
ate Select Committee
S
en
om the
appropriate clearance fr
21 that are
so
R
u
e
on
Records involved under Senate
will be destroyed
ucts
t
d
r
es
scheduled- for immediate
te clearance from the
i
a
ppropr
after NABS approval, and a Senate Select, Committee but in no case prior to 1.0 December 1976.
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? .. ,.~ , , ..., _ ~.. _ . .
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration
FROM John H. Waller
Inspector General
SUBJECT . Suggested Regulation on Illegally Held
Information on Americans
00 PECT0
Fed
1. This memorandum confirms our conversation of Thursday, 26 August
1976, in which I suggested that a regulation be issued to enjoin all
Agency personnel from using files.and records on Americans which existing
Flaw prohibits the Agency to collect, maintain or disseminate. Such a
regulation would:
intention to comply with the law, aria
b. Help to mitigate the compliance problem by clarifying guide-
lines on what constitutes illegally held. information on. Americans, and on
the use of such information by Agency employees. STATINTL
2. Such files and records are now held by the Agency under a Senate
Moratorium prohibiting file destr~ t in contravention to Execu-
tive Order 11905, as- expressed in and the Privacy Act of
1974. 1 recognize the difficulty o early an complete compliance as, in
the case of the Office of Security, it is estimated that it may take some
two years under optimum conditions to identify and remove illegally held
information from their files. Inspectors from my Office, who have become
familiar. with this problem, are available to discuss details with Your
representative.
or
Ft, ti~r'at~~r
John H. Waller
cc: General Counsel
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22 July 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
.SUBJECTS Meeting with Messrs. Hardy and Cargal from the IOB
1. On 1320 hours, 21 July 1976 the undersigned met with Messrs.
Hardy and Cargal of the IOB. These gentlemen had requested the meeting
via established IG channels to discuss files and file destruction. .
2. At the outset.of the meeting they were both informed that I
was only prepared to discuss file matters as they related to the Office
of Security, because that was a subject I knew something about. ;Further,
they were informed that the-matters we were to discuss derive from an
on going survey that the Inspector General was conducting of the Office
of Security and that the. undersigned was only one member.of a four
member survey team.
3. In response to a series of questions, mainly from Hardy, the following
information was offered.
a. That the current problem stems from a policy followed by
OS for over two decades (1950-.73) which emphasized extensive indexing of
documents and field investigative reports on applicants, staff employees,
contractors, and people with similar employment re4atfonshipswith the Agency.
b. That there were no guidelines, statutes, and. or E.O.'s that
prohibited such actions and, that OS instituted pol i ci es, of -which this was
one,'to insure protection of sources and methods by insuring solid security
records.
c. That this indexing policy, in force for over two decades, has
resulted in the collection of information on Americans, the niaintainance
of which is bath illegal and impro er under current guidelines set.forth
in the Privacy Act, EO 11905, and ' 25X1A
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d. That OS recognizes it has a problem and is now in the
process of preparing plans to purge the holding once the existing file
destruction moratorium is lifted,
e. That the problem is difficult.' Its solution will require
time and manpower. Files on dissidents represent only a small portion
of the questionable holdings. Indeed, they have' already been identified
qMW and can be purged in relatively short order. However, we still need to
size the remaining problem area and in the end we may have to review
all 920,000 security dossiers to excise all-illegal information. After
..y we do that we will then have to remove all records from the automated
name index.
4. Mr. Hardy then suggested that as long as we removed the data
from the file we would not have to worry about the index for compliance
with EO 11905. -1 reminded Mr. Hardy that we are-guided not only by
FO 11905 but also the Privacy Act which as a Federal statute takes
legal precedence over an Executive Order. tie agreed.
5. 1 suggested to Hardy and, Cargal that the IOB can be of help
,..~ in this matter of file destruction by providing some guidelines on how
25X1A
much time tie-can reasonably have to destroy those files and records we
should not be maintaining once the moratorium is lifted. I emphasized
that we cannot redress ills that have accumulated for some 20 or more
years overnight; that we have identified the problem but need. time to
institute destruction procedures and carry them through effectively.
6. To a seri?es.;of'other questions I assured both men that
a. OS does little or no indexing now and what is done i s
tightly controlled.
c. Other files such as those maintained by DDOJCI may have
some information duplicative of that in OS files, but that I reserve
my judgement inasmuch as the survey team did not review. such CI holdings.
7. Toward the end of the meeting both Hardy and Cargal raised the
issue of dissemination of OS information. I told them that 'our prelimirt
ary findings indicate that security data dissemination procedures now in
face by OS in its relations with 50 other government agencies may involve
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transfers of data on American citizens that are improper and may
indeed breach the spirit and intent of the,'Privacy Act. I emphasized
that the I00 should take no action on this matter until the survey
team has a firmer.-base of inquiry and if our preliminary judgements' are -
borne out,the Inspector General will initiate appropriate action.
They both agreed and the meeting concluded about 1420 hours.
Comments
fiardy's and Cargal's rather precise questions led me to inquire
toward the end of the meeting what information. had been made available
to them by the IGand the Deputy, IG. They told me that they had seen the
package of material I had prepared for the Deputy IG on the general
subject. They then asked for clarification on some aspects of an
Os memo prepared for the survey team.which I provided Forthwith.
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ACCESS BY OTHER AGENCIES TO OS SECURITY FILES
Background:
1. More than 50 agencies in the Federal Government that conduct
National Agency Checks have access to investigatory information in OS
files. A list of these agencies is at Attachment 1. These files con-
tain the results of OS investigations of applicants, employees, con-
tractors, and other persons with similar associations with the Agency -
individuals (in many cases, U.S. citizens) who have specifically
authorized CIA to release information about them to other government
agencies. These files not only contain information about the primary
subject of an OS investigation, but also contain information -- sometimes
derogatory - about secondary persons associated in some way with the
primary subject of an OS investigation. When OS receives a request for
a name check on an individual who is the primary subject of an OS file
from designated representatives of one of these agencies, OS shows .the
representative a sanitized version of the subject's security file.
This version contains only the subject's Personal History Statement and
OS field investigation reports. It does not contain information from
polygraph examinations, nor does it contain the basis of OS's security
B-1
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determination if it is based on polygraph results. The representatives
may not remove the sanitized file from OS, but they may extract any
portion of its contents. OS keeps a record of the inquiry. No record
is kept on what information is extracted.
2. This means that other agencies may extract information on
secondary persons in an OS file on a primary subject (applicant, em-
ployee, contractor, etc.) without the knowledge or permission of the
individual concerned. It also means that no record is kept of the
fact that such information has been provided to another agency and no
effort has been made by OS to ensure that such information is accurate,
timely, or relevant. Further, since polygraph results are not made
available to other agencies, but the final OS judgement on the security
suitability of a primary subject is; false conclusions on the validity
of the partial information provided may be easily drawn. As a result,
it is entirely possible for another agency to set up a file on an
individual, using data from OS files, without the knowledge of OS.
Conclusion:
3. We find that this uncontrolled and casual transfer to other
agencies of information on individuals:
a. that has not been formally requested by another agency,
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b. that has not been subject to a test of its accuracy,
relevancy or timeliness.
c. that has been transferred without the knowledge or
permission of the individual concerned, and
d. on which OS maintains no record of its transfer
stretches the bounds of propriety, if not the spirit and intent of
the Privacy Act of 1974. We recognize the General Counsel's ruling
(Attachment 2) that this practice is legal and within the letter of
the Privacy Act.
4. We further recognize the dynamics of the security suitability
milieu and certainly do hold that derogatory information on primary
subjects be made available to other agencies as a service of common
concern. Nonetheless, we believe that it is sufficient to inform
other agencies that our investigation of the subject of their inquiry
surfaced data suggesting acts of moral turpitude or other matters
that may condition the subject's security suitability. Yet, we believe
it unnecessary and improper to identify other persons involved in the
liaison, unless these other persons represent a clear threat to the
Agency and/or national security. It is entirely possible, in our
opinion, to delete the names of these other persons before showing
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OS files to other agencies without significant damage to the National
Agency Check process. Accordingly, we should avoid the inequity of
needlessly providing information on Americans to other agencies with-
out their permission.
5.. Notwithstanding the General Counsel's ruling and OS's con-
cern that restricting the availability of information to other
agencies may restrict the flow of security information to OS, we
believe that this practice is of questionable propriety.
Recommendation
6. Therefore, we recommend that the practice of providing
information to other government agencies on named American citizens
who are not the primary and proper subjects of OS investigations be
terminated.
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ANNEX C
OS POLYGRAPH PROGRAM
Back round
1. Past Congressional interest in the Agency's polygraph pro-
gram, coupled with the strong belief on part of the Agency that the
polygraph program is a critical tool in the personnel security
investigation apparatus and concerns expressed by OS personnel,
prompted the IG Survey Team to review the polygraph program in de-
tail to insure the program functioned in all respects within exist-
ing statute.
2. The Polygraph Branch Chief and polygraph operators were
interviewed individually covering all activities of the Branch. All
manuals, instructions, regulations, directives and procedures were
reviewed by the Survey Team to determine if the office was operating
under proper and sufficient authority.
3. Paragraph a(6) of issued in April 1976, based on
Section 4c(5) of Executive Order 11905, requires Agency employees to
report any information on possible violation of the criminal pro-
visions of the U.S. Code to the General Counsel.
4. In May of 1976 the Attorney General's office issued an
interpretation of Section 4(a)(5) of Executive Order 11905. This
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interpretation has had a significant impact on the OS polygraph program
in that possible violations of the U.S. Criminal or Civil Code detected
during the course of a polygraph examination must now be reported to
the Department of Justice 'in every instance. Heretofore, certain
information acquired during the course of a polygraph examination,
particularly involving applicants for employment, was held on a con-
fidential basis solely within the Office of Security. In those cases
where the polygraph examination revealed an applicant had violated
the U.S. Code, he was neither admitted for employment nor was the pos--
sible, violation reported outside of the Agency. Under the present
guidelines, an applicant must be warned that information obtained dur-
ing the polygraph examination which is in violation of the U.S. Code
will be reported to appropriate authorities, i.e., the Department of
Justice. Experience has shown that though an applicant may be inno-
cent in all respects from any unlawful activities, the lack of con-
fidentiality imposed by such a warning significantly detracts from
the desired atmosphere and environment which should exist during the
course of a polygraph examination.
5. As a result, the Director has recommended to the White House
that Section 4(a)(5) of Executive Order 11905 be amended, citing (in
part) the adverse effect that this reporting requirement has on OS`s
use of the polygraph for security investigations (Attachment 1).
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6. The Executive Order 11905 with attendant DOJ interpretation
raised numerous questions in the minds of the OS polygraph operators,
some of which in their opinion had not been satisfactorily answered.
The number and scope of unresolved questions raised by the operators
were of such significance that the IG Survey Team compiled a list of
22 questions to D/OS. OS referred one third of the questions to OGC
for opinion. These questions and the OS/OGC answers are at Attach-
ment 2.
7. Finally, we note the apparent inconsistency between the re-
quirement in Section 3(d)(x) of Executive Order 11905 that the DCI
"Ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence Community, of common
security standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence
systems, information and products, and for granting access thereto."
and the practice of requiring a polygraph examination for CIA em-
ployees and assignees and NSA civilians and not for other members of
the Intelligence Community who have access to very sensitive infor-
mation on sensitive intelligence sources and methods, in many cases,
the same information. This anomaly has raised questions on the need
for CIA's polygraph examinations and compliance with the Executive
Order, and has caused embarrassing problems for certain individuals,
detailed to CIA from the military services. The standards established
in DCID 1/14 are minimal and permit selective use of the polygraph.
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Conclusions:
8. We have concluded that:
a. OS's polygraph program is conducted in accord with law
and regulation, but that formal OS guidance on the conduct of the CIA
polygraph program should be issued. We believe that such guidance
would allay the questions that have arisen within OS.
b. The anomaly of requiring CIA and NSA civilians to undergo
polygraph examination and not require other individuals in the Intel-
ligence Community having' access to the same or similar sensitive
information on intelligence sources and methods runs counter, in our
view, to the Executive Order 11905 requirement that the DCI ensure
that there are common standards for access to foreign intelligence.
CIA's experience with the use of the polygraph in security investiga-
tions and in screening applicants for employment has clearly demon-
strated its value. We are concerned that,if polygraph examinations
are not required of all members of the Intelligence Community having
access to information on sensitive intelligence sources and methods,
at some point in the future CIA's use of the polygraph may be
challenged.
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Recommendation:
9. We recommend that the Director of Security issue formal guidance
on the conduct of OS's polygraph program. This guidance should incorporate
the legal opinions and management policy contained in Attachment 2 to this
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 18 AUK 1976
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY *_ ~....?_ .. _.. ,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2050"a
DD/O7`'507C11
25Xr
The Honorable John O. Marsh, Jr.
Counselor to the President
The White I-louse Office
Washington, D. C 20500
AC
Dear J-ct:
DD/A Registry
:ec'?.tiva R^,.tvy
1NS T Q . GENE- RA1.
r?i G w:
This letter concerns Section 4(a) (5) of Executive Order 11905 and the
adverse consequences that will ensue if the CIA and the other Intelligence
Community agencies are bound to conform their practices and procedures to
what I regard as the unreasonable interpretation of that section that is set.
forth in a memorandum dated 7 2M_ y 1976 from the Office of Legal Counsel,
Department of Justice, to the White House, a copy of which memorandum is
attached. I would like to ask your help in obtaining some relief from that
interpretation .
all:
sh
w
to detection or prevention of possible violations o a y y
person, including an employee of the senior official's department
or agency.
According to the attached Department of Justice memorandums, this language must
iolations of federal law
ibl
e v
poss
be construed to require the reporting of all within the Department?s investigative or prosecutorial jurisdiction, whether
1 di ossihJe violations of the Di.strict.Of Columbia
criminal or civil, Inc u ng p -
Code, by any person, whether or not an employee of the CIA or other Intelligence
Community agency.
To begin with, you should be aware that the reporting obligations placed
on Intelligence Community agent' es by Section 4(a.) (5), as construed by the
_G - rrxEZxt ersonnel
i
Department
and to possible
Section. 4(a) (5) provides that senior officials of the Intelligence Comp-aunity
Report to the Attorney General that information which relates
b ar
fl
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?, ------ . r .--gin nc criminal misconduct, arc far more?Lurra,,,
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sweeping and onerous than the statutory obligations imposed on heads cr# all,
federal agencies, including intelligeni-e agencies , by 28 U . S . G . ?535. This latter
statute requires only such reports as may relate to possible violations of Title 18
In"
(Crimes and. Criminal Procedure) of the United States Code by Government
officers or employees. While apparently it was intended by the adoption of
.., Section 4(a) (5) to hold intelligence agencies to a more rigorous reporting
standard than iq made applicable by 28 U.S.C. ?535 to federal agencies in
general, I feel certain that it could not have been intended to hobble the intel].i-
MOW Bence agencies in the performance of their authorized functions. Yet that will
be the result if Section 4(a)'(5) must be read as having the meaning and scope
attributed to it by the Department of Justice. I can best illustrate this point by
reference to the CIA, but I believe the harmful and disruptive impacts would b
felt throughout the Intelligence Community.
Applicants.
Applicants for CIA emplop=en.t, and other persons being considered fox-
non-employment relationships the CIA, are screened by the Office of .
Security. In the case of applicants for employment, the screening includes the
administration of a polygraph e} a ination, with follow-up questions often asked
in order to clarify earlier responses or r. eac., ns. A good deal of personal
information, some of.it.unfavorahle, is disclosed during these screening pro-
cedures, and as a general rule t`zat information is received in confidence. Were
it otherwise -- that, to put the matter in the present context, were a formal
report to the Department of Just. required whenever the CIA received any
information indicating possible -.-:alations of civil or criminal law, no matter
how minor such violations -?- these screening procedures would cease to be
effective and the pool of applicants would be greatly reduced.
lnzployees.
CIA employees are encouraged to be forthcoming in discussing work-
related problems with their colleagues or superiors and to solicit guidance
before the problems grow into serious situa`ons. These policies would be
frustrated if employees perceived that the price of frank discussion would be
a report to the Department of Justice whenever there was any indication of any
infraction of law, even a technical or inadvertent infraction. .
U. S. Citizen Sources.
CIA contact officers often cbtain valuable intelligence information on a -
voluntary basis from U. S. citizens, who in turn acquire that information in the
course of their personal or business activities abroad. The assurances of abso-
lute confidentiality that are cus _o :aril}; given to such sources would be fore-
closed by the Department of Justice into-. re:a t-ion of Section 4(a) (5). In the
.;:bsenc~cp~i- cl ~1r`1 ~'I ~b?2`~I tfO ' li~= 2 1b0 ~' i~r0 $~'0 - ) collected
,would never be imparted to CIA contact o_,icers,
 25X11
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Foreign Inte li e2 ce Services.
In all the circumstances mentioned above, the CIA's ability to function
would be seriously impaired by a strict adherence to the reporting obligations
imposed by Section 4(a) (5), as construed by Justice.
As you know, the CIA and other intelligence agencies have been under
intense scrutiny over the last several years. A host of procedures and restric-
tions have emerged from this process, restrictions which represent for the most
part considered executive and legislative judgments about how the business of
intelligence agencies should be conducted. In this instance, however, in con-
sequence of the Justice Department interpretation of. Section 4(a) (5), we are
threatened with serious and in my view unworkable restraints that never were
intended and certainly would have, been rejected had they been considered,
since they are fundamentally at odds with our mission.
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We have thus far been unsuccessful in pert wading the Just.i. tD c 7 zinc nt
to alter its view about the meaning and scope of Section ot in compliance
)v/itl~ the section., as
time we have notified the ICJB that we are not good sen.~e and urging
construed by Justice. I am therefore appealing to your g
be of thi3
that you ask Justice to have a second look at its in.terpretatiorz in light
eve
summary of our objections. If nothing can be done along this line,
that consideration should be given to amendment-of latT~.;.xzlc.~.f.~aoul;d
I recognize the difficulties that stand in the way of that course,
be better to face those difficultie'- and follow that course rather than to leave -
CIA and the. other intelligence agencies saddled with responsibilities. that were
ence functions ?
lli
t
i
g
e
n
never intended and that conflict with basic
Attachment
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19
2 5 JUN 1176
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Inspector General.
ATTENTION . :Mr.
FROM Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security.
SUi3d'ECT. : Agency Polygraph 'Program
25X1A
1. Referexice is made to the list of twenty-t1questions
m which 'was provided
concerning the 'fig x of rah 'progra
of your Office ..
to this Office byTill
eeri of the.ffice.
Transmitted hexew1th are .our answers to. s of the wen
two questions. The 'remaining seven questions -( p
identified 'in the text of the attachment) involve legal matters
'Offi,cc .
concerni.a~.g which we. are.uxuOffaceytrillsbe~px' a vailed with our
of General Counsel. Yo
yes ponse- to these questions -following our. consultation With'.
the 'Office '.of General Counsel..,
2 In addition to the 'information contained in tl-Le the
attachment, there .is a volume on 'the' 'polygraph 'program
Support Services. Historical Series. which y.ou may find infor- r
)native.' This volume ..outl.ines. -tli.e history of the program from
its. inceiti.on through 1968. The 'original a11aporizationof
the 'program 'is -described and the 'subsequent hla pro l :the
various DCI ? s are '.identified. It also hig t program has bceri administered tliatrh 've 'occurred. .sThorci'are
the significant dev lopmen
only a. limited number of copies- 'ofthis 'historyxavae a l 5'
but .one can be made '.available '.if you
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. 25X1A
1)i.stribiitlon:
Ora.{ . #J l' r `Acldxessee.
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CuN!~IDENTIAL os 6 '2807. '
Robert W. Gambino
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Question l
What are the Agency requirements for the use of the
polygraph?
The polygraph is used in the Agency as an
aid to investigation for determining the security
eligibility of persons for. employment by or
assignment to the Agency, security clearance by.
the Agency, staff-like access to sensitive Agency
installations, s.~tua?-
tion.s, continued access to c assn- is in ormation
where implications of a security nature or inves-
.tigative information require clarifying security
interviews; and in the periodic reinvestigation
of employees.
Attached as Tab A is a list of the types of
cases where a polygraph is required. Tab B is
a.list of the types of cases that do not require
polygraph.
Qu.estion 2
What authority does the Agency-have
o polygraph?
Answer
The Director of Central Intelligence is
responsible by law and by executive-order -co
protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure. ' In exercising this
responsibility, the DCI has authorized the
Office of Security to conduct a, polygraph
program.
question 3
What is the origin of this authority?'
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Answer
-'_ The National Security Act of 1947 and CIA Act of 1.949 and
Executive order 11905.
4
(~uesti~_ oo
Trace the. source of auto:orityfrom la~vtsroogh ee xe utive
poly-
orders through Agency powers down to e
graph officer.
Answer
National. Security Act of 1947
Tab C; CIA Act 'of 1949.
25X1A
Section 1.02 (d) (3) ---
3 (d) (1) (vii) and
Executive Order 11905, Sections
4(b)(8)--Tab D
Director of Security
Memorandum from Director of Security
Examiners--Tab H
.Examiners Manual (not attached)
Memorandum from.the DCI to the
dated 21 February 1970---Tab G
Also:
to polygraph
DOD Directive 5210.45 Section III B 3--Tab I
(For military personnel and excepted service
DOD personnel assigned to the Agency-)
Letter from the Service
(Forcco npetitive~
to DDA dated 21 May
service personnel assigned to the Agency.)
Memorandum from the Director n of Security to the PCI
DCI dated 3 February 197S,
approved reactivation of the re:investigatioll
polygraph on 12 March 1975---.Tab K .
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Are Agency regulations adequate in your opinion on the
subject of polygraphing, and are these regulations available
to all employees?
Answer
In our opinion the Agency regulations which
grant the Office of Security authority to conduct
a polygraph program are adequate in terms of
giving sufficient authority to this Office.
Additionally, the letter from the DCI dated
21 February 1970 is a clear mandate concerning
the manner in which the polygraph is to be used
within the Agency. However, in view of the date
of the memorandum, this Office plans to conduct'
a.. review of its provisions and present a recom--
mendati.on to the DCI that he issue an updated
memorandum which will revalidate the procedures.
of the Agency's polygraph program.
Agency regulations concerning the polygraph
.are available to all employees and in conjunc-
tion with the briefing program that is carried
out by the Polygraph Branch, adequate information
concerning the polygraph is available to employees.
Question 6'
What instructions and guidance are given to. the polygraph
operators as far as who is to be polygraphed, when they are
polygraphed, what questions are to be asked, and under what
conditions will the information be used? .
Answer
Individuals to be polygraphed are those who
fit into one of the categories delineated in the
answer to Question 1. The examiner receives
specific assignments from the Desk Supervisor
in the Polygraph Branch, i.e., Staff Desk and
Operational Desk.
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O-uestion 7
Concerning the repolygraph program, what sanctions are
imposed if a subject refuses to take the polygraph?
Answer
The rei:nvestigati.on ; pol rgraph-, is part: of -the
overall security program of the Agency and as
such has been approved by the PCI. Even so,
there are no specific sanctions which are auto-
matically imposed in' the event an individual
declines to be rcpolygraphed. This Office
operates under a policy of making every effort
to convince an employee to participate volun-
tarily in the program, and to date there have
been no refusals. In the event an individual
initially declines to undergo a. repolygraph, he
,is referred by the examiner to the Chief of the
Polygraph Branch. If the matter is not resolved
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at that level, the individual is referred for
interviews with the DD/PSI or Chief of Opera-
tions/PSI and ultimately with the Director of
Security. During these interviews, the indi-
vidual is given. full opportunity to articulate
his reasons for declining. Following these
interviews, the Director of Security decides
what action will be taken. It is impossible
to speculate in the abstract as to exactly
what the decision would be since there are many
variables which would enter into it. Of the.
many factors that would be considered, one of
the key factors would be whether the Director
of Security is convinced that the individual
has some valid reason for declining the repoly-
graph, such as sincere religious or moral
beliefs. Based on an evaluation of all factors,
the Director of Security would decide whether
to*refer the matter to appropriate higher
authority or to close the matter within the
Office of Security.
~uestion 8
What information about the polygraph is available to
applicants and Agency personnel.in general?
Answer.
Applicants are informed by the Office. of
Personnel that a.polygraph examination is
required as part of the processing for employ-
ment with the Agency. They are also info-zrmed
that the examination will be used to verify the
statements made on their Personal History State-
ment. Aside from this general information,
applicants are given no details concerning the
polygraph examination' by the Office of Personnel'
unless they ask a specific question. At the
time of the polygraph examination, the purpose
and procedures of the examination are explained
to the applicant and an effort is made to answer
any questions the applicant may have at that.
time.
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In regard to Agency personnel in general,
representatives of the Polygraph Branch speak
to various Agency training groups to explain
the purposes and techniques of the polygraph
program. In addition, when the reinvestigation
polygraph program was recently reinstituted,
various Agency management personnel were briefed
on the objectives of the program.
.At the time of the actual repolygraph, every
effort is made to answer any questions the.sub--
ject may have concerning the polygraph.
(Zi.uestion 9
Should a polygraph subject confess to a criminal action,
what are our legal responsibilities to report this information?
Answer
The answer to this question will be provided
following consultation with the Office of General
Counsel,
Question-10
What sloes the polygraph officer
if the information he reveals will be
outside the Agency?
tell the person who asks
made available to anyone
The answer to this question will be' provided
following consultation with the'Office of General
Counsel.
Question 11.
IIow vulnerable is the individual examiner viz-a-vis a
court suit brought by a polygraph subject: What protection
can the Agency give to an examiner who is sued by a polygraph
subject for invasion of privacy or denial of employment because
of an admission?
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Answer
The answer to this question will be provided
following consultation with the Office of General
Counsel.
Question 12
What safeguards has D/OS established to prevent unwar-.
ranted invasion of privacy during a polygraph examination?
Answer
An examiner's manual has been prepared fox each
polygraph examiner. The manual contains policy
guidelines and explanations as to objectives that
are sought in basic test coverage given to all
applicants. The standard questions which are used
in staff-type and reinvestigation cases have been
approved by the DCI (see Tab L) . Areas to be
covered in specific issue polygraphs of employees
must be approved by the Director of Security.
Additionally, a senior supervisor/examiner elec-
tronically monitors examinations at random in
order to insure that no improper conduct takes
place. ..It should be noted that.polygraph examiners
are carefully selected and trained for their assignments
to the Office of Security Polygraph Branch.
uestion 13
What can a polygraph officer say in response to the
question by an applicant: "Do I have to take this test to get
a j,ob with the Agency?" or "What happens if I don't take the
test?"
Answer
Examiners have been instructed to reply that
the polygraph is a necessary part of employment
processing. If a subject does not take the test,
then he will not be employed since he has not
completed the employment processing. This i?s
originally brought to an applicant's attention
by the Office of Personnel. at the time his initial
processing is started. Tab M is a copy of CIA
h informs
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the applicant o P A t.ie polygraph 7
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Question 14
What is an examiner to do if a subject' demands that any
note or record of what lie said in the interview be destroyed
because .he believes the test to be an invasion of privacy and
says he doesn?t want to be employed?
Answer
When an applicant begins his procossing,`:.he.
is informed that he will be polygraphed as .pant
of the procedures and that the information in
his Personal History Statement will be verified.
At the time of examination, the purposes, .pro-
cedures, and areas of coverage are explained and
then the subject is asked to sign a polygraph
agreement (copy attached at Tab N). Having
voluntarily participated in the process up to
this point, it would seem -unlikely that a subject
would terminate his interest in employment in the
midst of the polygraph examination. In the event
this occurred, the subject would be informed that
while he was free to terminate the interview, the
Agency had a right and responsibility to retain
that
its record of what had transpired up to
point. Therefore, his request would have to be
denied.
Question 15
The Civil Service Commission has recently ruled -that
homosexuality, per se, is not grounds to deny employment under
Civil Service regulations. What is the Agency position with
regard to. employment of homosexuals? Is there a per se" rule
in practice in CIA against employing homosexuals? Can the
polygraph officer so state to individuals?
What is the Agency position with regard to employment
of homosexuals?
Answer
Homosexuals are not employed by CIA.
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Can the polygraph officer so state to individuals?
The role of the examiner is to obtain information
which is to be used. in the adjudicative process. The,
examiner presents himself to the applicant as an
impartial fact gatherer and as not the proper person
to address questions concerning the policy of the
Agency. This is done so that the polygraph process
is not adversely affected by the examiner becoming
involved in discussions or debates concerning the
Agen.cy's.policy on any particular subject. The
examiner advises the applicant that questions con-
Approved For
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officials of the Agency and requests that he address
.
policy questions to these officials.
Question 16
Whit is the Agency's obligation to report criminal infor.
mation to law-enforcement authorities? To withhold such
information? What happens to the legal -usefulness of such
information by virtue of its having been first uncovered during
a CIA polygraph interview?
Answer
The answer to this question will be provided
following consultation with the Office of. General
Counsel.
Question 17
What is the relevance of the Fifth Amendment to the CIA
polygraph interview-regarding questions or admissions-of
criminal activity, adverse but non-criminal activity, the
possibility of eliminating oneself from eligibility for CIA
employment?
9.
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Answer
The answer to this question will be provided
following consultation with the Office of General
Counsel.
question l8
Are there Constitutional points other than the Fifth,
Amendment which have a bearing on the CIA polygraph interview?
If so, which are those which the examiner might find more
significant or which he should be prepared to explain to his
subject?
Answer
/~ The answer -to this question will be provided
following consultation with the Office of General
Counsel..
Question 19
What are the legal parameters of the often-heard, but
vague -sounding,:,e pres.~ ion "invasion of privacy," especially
as it relates to CIA polygraph?
Answer
The answer to this question will be provided
following consultation with the Office of General
Counsel.
uestion 20
During the course of a polygraph interview, an individual
may give the name of another U. S. citizen (not connected with
CIA) in connection with some type of derogatory activity.? Is
it proper to include that name in the report whichis sent
forward? .
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Answer
The Office of security is authorized to conduct
a polygraph program as-an aid in gathering. information
to be used in security evaluations. The examiner's
role in this program is to gather information which
is provided to those who have the responsibility for
making adjudications. The operator is not in a posi-
tion to make a judgment concerning the significance
of a particular name or a particular item of infor-
mation in terms of the overall evaluation of the case.
Guidelines have been established outlining what infor-
mation is required by the adjudicators and what
information is-the proper subject of polygraphic
inquiry. Within these guidelines, the operator is
obligated to report information in sufficient detail
so that an informed judgment can be made by the
adjudicators in any. given case. Since a polygraph
operator is operating within an authorized. polygraph
program, it is not improper for him to report the
names of possibly non-CIA connected persons who may
have been a.rzvol.ved in some type of derogatory activity.
( ues Lion 21
During the course of a'polygraph examination where there is
an indication of wrongdoing, is the examiner only required to
obtain a simple admission of a disqualifying crime, misdemeanor.
or felony, or is he instructed to develop a full. confession?
Why?
Answer
Polygraph examiners have been instructed that
in the event the polygraph examination produces
admissions concerning illegal or improper activity,
the examiner is to continue to develop the line of
questioning to obtain relevant details so that the
examiner has a clear idea of what the.subject is
admitting. . Sufficient detail will be obtained
during the interview so that an accurate synopsis
can be made by the examiner. This information is
then forwarded through channels to the component
of the Office of Security which has the responsi-
bility to make an adjudication in the case.
11.
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CONI"ID'NTIAL.
 UJ 0V19 1LI I' I IMI.
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Question 22,
Other than employment and the repblygraph programs, under
what, other circumstances can the Agency use the polygraph? In
what circumstances will the Agency polygraph not be used?
Aside, from the polygraph requirements outlined
in response to question number 1, the polygraph is
also used. to resolve specific, allegations or issues.
reflecting on the continued security eligibility of
Agency employees. These polygraphs are referred-to
as Specific Issue Polygraphs and are not conducted
without the approval of the Director of Security.
The polygraph is not used by the Office of
Security on official or administrative matters
involving possible malfeasance, or for the sole
purpose of determining, violations of the criminal
laws of any country, .
Additionally, polygraph examinations are not
given where any indications of medical or psycho-
logical problems are present, or to individuals
who have not reached their 18th birthday.
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Following are the types of cases where a polygraph is
required:
a. All Agency staff employees;
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c. Independent Contractors who have staff-like
access to Agency installations;
d. Agency 'Consultants;
e. Military Assignees to the Agency, at Head-
quarters or in official Agency installations;
f. Civilian Detailees from other Government
agencies;
Career. Associates who have staff-like access
to the H a s tar - rs Building-or-official,
Industrial Contractor employees who have.
staff-like access to Agency installations;
i_. Federal Protective Service Officers who -work
in all Agency buildings;
General Services Administration Char Force
and Maintenance personnel;
k. Canteen Corporation Vendors working in all
Agency buildings;
1e Blind Stand Veridors in all. Agency buildings;
in. Part-time Credit Union employees;
n. Part-time Employee Activity- Association
Store employees;
o. C&P Telephone Company employees working in
the Headquarters Building;
p. Barber Shop personnel;
q. Periodic re-investigation of staff employees.
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The following cases do not require polygraph:
a. Dependent summer employees;
c. C?P Telephone Company employees working
outside of the Headquarters Building;
d. Non-?Government char force and maintenance
personnel (i.e., persons working for
.private firms)
.0. Government Services Incorporated Cafeteria
employees;-
E., Guest speakers for various Office o..E Train .ng
courses; .
One-time or short-term maintenance.person.nel
window washers and contract floor
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 1Ii i?R NDt7M FORz .,:-Inspector. General
-0049840
AUG 1976
4 ~~. P44J. Q'~.?_
-ref e,reiia? t- i ahea ' list
ro azr~ ~vh* you._pxev a~~ y
With
ncy. poiYgT p
cc~zaerraing, the--'A g o
~arri d o .t~his,:Off .~.e xe~pora~o~:.:t andum n $ uxz 3 9 f~~
forte o by:. rnonor
questian , we.rs prdvatdod .: u. which required??..
seven questions ,
f General:.: .
ri a in3
-
.
9
,cos 2807J The:xo ? hc1 baen aTvJaxdo+~ lea the Of co
legal OPinlOnso
Counsal for..
uas ~a.ans "(fiUmb T d q ., -10 r .? ~~ ~ _, , ~ 7 A . 3 ; rid f are
seven q nrt~itaity t o u~ Sy-forwarded, herewI th. hav polygraph Program of he.;
thc~ . Ag ency! h b-ge
With you additiQna ... _ . _
General LOunso h sdyof thc~ overall of .e;c ppletion of a,. thoroug of a h? vragram~ I will. provide
nions : wil1 have ? an our p yg p be .apprt~p late.
t-nmMelits as Ii1ay
ne s W:Ltft
rote , scus my co
and .up an camp
F to
,ll~aw3n those discussions
t`these
retyjew the-' impac ...on.?. ?nses p thaw
`. e l:?pinlans ;rendered.? r, ,these ' as a ossi.blo :ramie ,
,gin myt .rr~3tia1 revue ' ,. ain
coat astiOr s 9h i s `~
'to q
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 LEGAL
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CONFIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENTS AND PERMANENT CONFIDENTJAL INFORMANTS
Background:
1. A Confidential Correspondent (C.C,) is an experienced investi-
gator, employed by the Agency as an independent contractor, who pro-
2. We reviewed theI land found
that the employment of two C.C.`s appeared to be questionable. The
first was an owner of al We asked OGC if employ-
ment of such a person by the Agency would be a violation of the Anti-
Pinkerton Act. When OGC ruled that it was, OS promptly cancelled his
26X1A contract. The'second C.C. was an When we
expressed our concern to OS that any publicity about this relationship
(however unlikely) might have an adverse effect entirely out of propor-
tion to the value of this relationship to the Agency, OS concurred with
our observation and terminated the contract with this individual.
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maw
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Conclusion:
5, We believe that there may be issues of propriety involved with
certain of these P.C.T. relationships. OS recognized that it may have
a problem and has initiated a review with OGC. A copy of OS's plan for
this review is attached. When this review is completed, OS plans to
issue appropriate guidelines on the use of P.C.I.'s. We believe that
this matter and the use of Confidential Correspondents is under ade-
quate management review and that no additional action is required at
this time.
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FIREARMS -- AUTHORITY AND USE
Back round:
1. Section 5(d) of the CIA Act of 1949 empowers the Agency to
"Authorize couriers and guards designated by the Director to carry
firearms when engaged in transportation of confidential documents
and materials affecting the National Defense and Security." In an
interpretation of the Act, the Office of General Counsel noted in a
memorandum to the Director of Security, dated 25 February 1975, that.
the "restrictive terms of the CIA firearms authority contrast markedly
with those of other statutes of this nature--and that--it must be as--.
sumed that the limits set out...are intended by design and not the
result of inadvertence." The OGC concludes that Section 5(d) of the
CIA Act, "will not support a liberal interpretation, but rather must
be interpreted strictly in accordance with its terms."
2 5X1A 2.1 gives the Director of Security the authority in the
Agency for issuance and control of firearms to Agency personnel within
the United States. The HR states that "The carrying of firearms may
be authorized in those cases where
(a) documents or materials of extreme sensitivity are being
transported;
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(b) classified documents or materials in bulk are being trans-
ported within the United States;
(c) the transportation of documents or materials affecting the
National Defense involving unusual risk or security hazard due to the
duration or condition of travel."
3. This strict interpretation of the law placed the Office of Se-
curity in something of a quandary for, in addition to the authorized
armed escort of sensitive documents and material, the office historic-
ally has deployed armed personnel to protect the Director and Deputy
Director of CIA;
In the memorandum cited in para-
graph 1, the OGC stated the strict interpretation of the Act would seem
to preclude the use of armed escorts to protect an individual whether
the individual be the DCI, the DDCI,I The OGC suggested
a way around this problem, however, in the observation that when the
"DCI or the DDCI carries confidential documents the terms of 5(d) would
permit an armed escort." It is on the basis of this opinion that the OS
has provided armed protection to the DCI and the DDCI. The OGC regarded
as being consistent with the Sec-
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tion 5(d) of the Act.
4. With two exceptions, the use of armed personnel by the Office
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of Security in the past year has been restricted to the protection of
the DCI and the DDCI. The exceptions involved the escort by personnel
of the
25X1A Ambassador Helms. Nevertheless, the Office of Security maintains a
modest capability to provide armed personnel should their services be
required'. At the present time a total of
u
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permits are
held in the Office of Security. Of these, 20 have been issued to
are held by the DCI
Security Staff, seven are assigned to the Security Duty Officers at
Langley, and three to Security Services.
5. The firearms permits are issued by the Central Intelligence
Agency. The permit carries the following statement regarding purpose
and authority:
"The bearer, whose photograph appears on the reverse side
is engaged in the transportation and protection of classified
material on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, United
States Government.
"Pursuant to Section 5(d), Public 110, 81st Congress, the
Central Intelligence Agency has authorized him to carry fire-
arms in the performance of his official duties."
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In compliance with the law, the permit is signed by the DCI and counter-
signed by the Director of Security. Gun permits are issued only to
those who have had a course of instruction in firearms and have quali-
fied in the use of the firearm assigned to them. The permit Is valid
for six months at which time the holder must requalify in order to re-
new the permit.
6. Tight control is maintained over all weapons in accord with
Excepting those carried daily by the DCI
Security Staff personnel the weapons are stored
in safes and are released only on specific authority of a senior of.--
ficer. Approval to carry a gun on a specific mission, other than the
protection of the DCI and DDCI, must be obtained from the Director of.
Security.
7. As noted earlier, the protection of the DCI and the. DDCI is
the only purpose for which armed men are used by the Office of Se-
curity on a regular basis. The DCI Security Staff was formed for this
role in 1955 and now comprises seven men qualified to carry weapons.
In carrying out its protective duties, the Security Staff assigns an
armed escort to accompany -the Director while he travels to and from
work, while he attends official functions, and while he is making
public appearances. The armed escort also accompanies the Director
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on official trips outside Washington A similar
service is extended to the DDCI, Mr. Knoche. (Whilel
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not protected by the staff at this time, consideration is being given
to providing this service to him also.)
8. In providing this service, the DCI Security Staff observes the
letter of the law by arranging for the Director to carry a classified
document while he is being escorted. But this contrivance does not ap-
pear to conform with the intent of the law, since the purpose of the
armed escort clearly is to protect the Director, not to safeguard the
document in his possession. The Office of Security is not comfortable
with the law as it is now written and has requested legislation which
will explicitly authorize the protective service it now provides. The
Office of the Legislative Counsel intends either to submit a separate
amendment to the 1949 Act, providing explicit authority for armed
escort of senior officials, or to cover this matter in the comprehen-
sive revision of the 1947 and 1949 Acts now being drafted and which
OLC expects to present to the next Congress.
9. CIA is authorized to assist the United States Secret Service
in various ways, including the assignment of armed personnel to aug-
ment the protective force of the Service. As stated in
"CIA may provide assistance to the U.S. Secret Service in 25X1A
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the performance of its protective duties in accordance with
Public Law 90-331, dated 6 June 1968, which authorizes such
assistance from other Government agencies."
An agreement between the U.S. Secret Service and the CIA, signed in No-
vember 1971, states: "The Secret Service, in accordance with PL 90-331,
may request CIA officers and employees to be detailed to augment the
capacity of the Secret Service to perform its protective duties.... the
officers and employees so detailed may perform armed, technical or other
protective functions." The agreement goes on to note that while de-
tailed to the Secret Service, CIA officers and employees "will come
under the direction and exclusive control of the United States Secret
Service..." .
10. Armed CIA personnel have been detailed to the Secret Service
on two occasions only: the funeral of President Kennedy and the
inauguration of President Johnson. There seems to be little possi-
bility that the Secret Service will require their service in the.
future.
11. Armed Office of Security 'personnel have been detailed on two
occasions to the Department of State to assist the Department in pro-
tective duties. There is no written agreement with the Department to
cover this form of cooperation. On the first of these occasions,
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12. Armed OS employees were loaned to the Federal Aviation Au-
thority several years ago for a brief period to augment armed per-
sonnel available to the FAA for the Sky Marshal Program. While the
services of armed OS personnel are not likely to be requested again
by the FAA, we believe that as a matter of principle, armed CIA em-
ployees should not be detailed to U.S. agencies engaged in domestic'
law enforcement.
13. In addition to the use of, armed staff employees described
above, the Office of Security hires contract personnel to protect
arrangements are similar in each case. Guards are hired locally and
The
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placed under contract to protect a building or installation. They are
armed by the Office of Security.
14. There is no clear cut statutory authority for the Agency to
perform this role. As noted earlier, the CIA statute of 1949 does not
authorize the use of armed men by CIA except to escort classified docu-
ments and materials. In the past, CIA has-received delegation of au-
thority from GSA to guard CIA installations, but the authority has ap-
plied only in the District of Columbia. However, Executive Order 11905
specifically authorizes CIA to "protect the security of its installa-
tions, activities, information, and personnel."
-25X1 A
civilian guards have been required
]armed
So far there have been on un-
toward incidents, but clearly the potential for trouble is there.
Moreover, the civilian guards
do not have written guide-
lines describing the circumstances under which they may use their
weapons.
Conclusions:
16. While there is clear authority for Agency personnel to carry
(and presumably use) firearms in the United States to protect classi-
fied documents, and information, the authority to carry firearms to
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protect Agency officials and facilities as such is unclear. The authority
to carry firearms for these latter purposes should be clarified and ap-
propriate guidance issued.
17. OS and OLC have this long-standing problem in hand are are seek-
ing new legislation.
Recommendation:
18. .We recommend that explicit authority be sought through appro
priate legislation for CIA to provide armed protection to the DCI, the
DDCI, and such other senior officials as the DCI might name, and that
legislation also provide for the specific use of armed guards to protect
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Security
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A0003 100005-2
+1)197 ._
Acting Inspector General
SUBJECT : Revisions to the Office of Security Survey Report
1. Attached for your review are the revised versions of the
summary and Annex A of the Inspector General Survey of the Office of
Security. Because Mr. Blake has not seen these revisions, we have
attached an extra copy for his review as well.
2. We would appreciate a response by COB 15 December.
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Attachment:
As Stated
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OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF SECURITY
MARCH - AUGUST 1976
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OFFICE OF SECURITY SURVEY
MARCH - AUGUST 1976
Background:
1. On 24 March, a four-man team of inspectors began a survey of
the Office of Security (OS). By design, the survey was limited in
scope. Its major. thrust was to address the legality and propriety of
OS activities, as distinct from a management overview of the entire
Office. The last IG Survey of OS was.completed in July 1973.
2. In carrying out its task, the Survey Team relied heavily on
interviews at all levels within OS and a review of Agency and OS
directives and OGC opinions. Considerable time was spent reviewing
OS files which, in themselves, provided insights into the character
we were convinced that the survey report should contain no.surprises
for the D/OS, we undertook to resolve problems as they surfaced,
rather than to await the final report. To some extent this approach
3. Throughout the entire survey OS management was kept fully
apprised of our general findings and possible problem areas. Because
and operating style of the Office.
has been successful. Consequently, some.sections of this report will
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identify problems which already have been or are well on the way to being
resolved by OS.
Conclusions:
4. During the course of the survey, the Survey Team was impressed
.by the acute awareness by OS personnel, both at Headquarters and in the
field, of the'need to conduct all OS activities.in a thoroughly legal
and proper manner. Undoubtedly, this sensitivity reflects the strong
leadership of D/OS who, by his actions, has sought to insure that all
OS personnel are given clear guidelines and directives that identify
the policies and parameters governing OS activities. Management has
gone one step further, as they have encouraged all employees. to seek
clarification and justification of any activity that, in their judge-
ment, is not covered by existing Office directives or Agency regulations.
5. We found that the new operational restrictions. governing OS
activities have made implementation of OS mission and function more
difficult. Nevertheless, we have.found no evidence (except for the
Polygraph Program) to suggest that these restrictions have significantly
affected OS's effectiveness. In the case'of the Polygraph Program, the
requirement to report possible violations of law to the Department of
Justice reduces the atmosphere of confidentiality desirable for effective
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polygraph examinations. This finding pertains not only to the conduct of
field investigations, but also to the handling of support functions both
at Headquarters and in the field.
6. We found that, for the most part, OS is carrying out its respon-
sibilities in a proper manner. There were, however, certain OS activities
that are not now in compliance with existing statutes or that may be
questionable, if not improper. These are briefly described below and
discussed in greater detail in the Annexes, as indicated:
a. Compliance:
(1) OS has considerable information on Americans in its
security investigation files, collected over the past two decades, re-
tention of which became subject to the-provisions of the Privacy Act in
1974 and Executive Order 11905 in 1976. The files are extensive, and
the information that should no longer be retained is also believed to
be of a very substantial volume. We recognize that it would be a sub-
stantial undertaking and take considerable time and manpower for OS to
purge such information from its files. To this end, a number of options
were discussed with OS -- from an accelerated, crash six-month program.
to a stretched-out program taking as long as ten years. Of the various
alternative approaches considered, one requiring some two years to
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complete seemed to offer the optimum time frame for an orderly approach
to the matter, while at the same time emphasizing the Agency's commit-
ment to bring its holdings into compliance with the new guidelines.
of protecting senior officials and Agency installations (Annex F).
authorities is in question, OGC is actively pursuing broader legisla-
tion to clearly permit the arming of Agency officers for the purpose
comply with the law. As this is an area where the Agency's legal
carry classified documents on their person in order to technically,
(3) The authority of Agency personnel to carry firearms
in the United States is limited by statute to the protection of con-
fidential documents and materials. To provide armed protection to the
DCI and DDCI, OS officers use the stratagem of having those officials
4
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b. C -sl'~ o~ s c4- ' L - ' (1) OS has a long-standing practice of furnishing informa-
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OS investigation to some 50 other government agencies. While OGC has
ruled this practice to be legal and OS believes it is an important and
integral part of their exchange of security information with other
agencies, we judge this practice to be of questionable propriety on the
grounds.that it permits the unnecessary exchange of unverified and un-
recorded derogatory information on Americans without their knowledge or
ti on on named Americans who are not the primary and proper subject of an
permission (Annex B).
(2) OS is concerned over the propriety of certain of
their long-standing relationships.with
individuals who assist OS investigators in obtain-
ing information on subjects of OS investigations. Recognizing that
there is no specific guidelines on the use of.these informants, we
agree with OS that there may be issues of propriety involved. OS has
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(2) We found that OS personnel had questions concerning
the legality or propriety of certain aspects of the polygraph program.
At our instigation, OS and OGC have reviewed these issues and have re-
solved questions of legality or propriety. As a result, OS will develop
clearer guidelines on polygraph practices.(Annex C).
7. Finally, we were impressed by the openness and the spirit of
cooperation shown by OS in discussing their reservations about certain
of their activities and their eagerness, particularly in light of the
recent external investigations, to jointly seek resolution of question-
able areas of activity.
Recommendations:
8. Concerning questions of information held on Americans, de-
scribed in Annex A, we recommend that:
a. The Attorney General and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence be advised that, following the lifting of the Senate mora-
torium and other restrictions on destruction of information on
Americans, it will take considerable time to purge such data from OS
files. (This topic has already been taken up with the IOB Staff (At--
tachment 4 to Annex A).
b. The Office of Security institute an aggressive program of
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citizens who. are not the primary and proper subjects of OS investiga-
of providing information to other government agencies on named American
other agencies described in Annex'B, we-recommend that the practice
9. With respect to the question of access to OS information by
fying the type of information that may be placed in OS files and
specifying the proper criterion for its indexing.
some two years duration to identify and purge its files of all informa-
tion that does not comply with the requirements of the Privacy Act and
the Executive Order 11905.
c. The Director of Security issue written guidelines speci-
legal opinions-and management policy contained in Attachment 2 to
10. On the questions raised about the Polygraph Program described
in Annex C, we recommend that the Director of Security issue updated
guidance. on the conduct of OS's polygraph program, incorporating the
tions be terminated.
Annex C.
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that consideration be given to advising the Attorneys General of those
states where OS intends to continue to conduct investigations under
12. Concerning the firearms issue--,described in Annex F. we recom-
mend that explicit authority be sought through appropriate legislation
for CIA to provide armed protection to the DCI, the DDCI, and such
other senior officials as the DCI might name, and that legislation also
provide for the specific use of armed guards to protect CIA installa-
tions in the United States.
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ANNEX A
INFORMATION ON AMERICANS
Back round:
1. Over the years, OS has accumulated a vast array of personal
data on American citizens as a result of its security'. investi gati ons
of applicants, employees, contractors and their employees, and other
persons with similar relationships with the Agency; as well as on
persons other than the primary subject of OS investigations, intel-
ligence sources, and corporations. In order to manage this informa-
tion, OS established automated and manual indexes and dossiers for
use in the initial screening of candidates for employment; in deter-
mining the security suitability of employees, contractors, etc,; in
counterintelligence research; and in supporting security checks by
some 50 other accredited Federal agencies.
2. These indexes and dossiers are managed by the Security
Records Division (SRD) of OS. SRD indexes pertinent data identified
by operating components within OS, mainly the Clearance Division,
for inclusion either in the manual indexes or in the Security Auto-
mated Name Check Activity (SANCA) system.' Until about 1974 there
was little selectivity in the indexing process as the operative mode
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encouraged over-indexing. Consequently, little information collected by
OS escaped being indexed.
that serve as reference to the impersonal sub-
ject files, i.e., files on organizations rather than people.
25X1A 3. An appreciation of how this system-works and how such a mas-
sive volume of data was accumulated is described in the OS memorandum
at.Attachment I. This memorandum also shows that, because of intensive
indexing, OS now holds retrievable information on American citizens
.which it no longer can retain under the Privacy Act of 1974. Further,
the limitations contained in Executive Order 11905 on collecting and.
storing information on "U.S. Persons" not only limit the categories of
information that may be collected, but limit the range of information
previously collected and currently stored,
4. OS is fully cognizant of the provisions of the Privacy Act of
1974 and Executive Order 11905 that bear heavily on the collection and
maintenance of security-related information.
a. Key provisions of the Privacy Act that apply include the
following:
"Each agency that maintains stem of records shall
maintain in its records only such information about an
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individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a
purpose of the a enc required to ha .4rrnmn
statute or by Executive Order of the President.
"Each agency that maintains a system of records shall
maintain no records describing how any individual exer-
cises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless ex-
pressly authorized by statute or by the individual about
whom the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and
within the scope of an authorized or a law enforcement
activity."
The Privacy Act defines records as follows:
"The term record means by any item, collecting or group-
ing of information about an individual that is maintained
by an agency including but not limited to his education,
financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or
employment history, and that contains his name or the
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particulars
l such as a finger or voice print
id
di
ua
v
assigned to the in
or photograph. ' (emphasis added)
"The term system of records means a group of any record
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under the control of an agency from which information is re-
trieved by the name of the individual or by some identifying
number, symbol or other identifying particular assigned to
the individual." (emphasis added)
b. Executive Order 11905 concerns itself with the same matter.
It defines collection as follows:
"Collection means any one or more of. the gathering,
analysis, dissemination or storage of non-publicly
available information without the informed expressed
consent of the subject of the information."
5. The Executive Order establishes certain restrictions'on col?-
lection by foreign intelligence agencies. It restrains:
"Collection of information however acquired con-
cerning the domestic activities of United States
persons, except information concerning present or
former employees, present or former contractors, or
present or former employees or applicants for any
such employment or contracting necessary to protect
foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources
or methods or national security information from un-
authorized disclosure; and the identity of persons in
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contact with the fore of
or with a non-U.S. person who
is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counter-
25X1C intelligence inquiry." (emphasis added)
7. OS holds a significant, but as yet unidentified, segmen o
records on Americans who were not dissenters; nor were they offoreign
intelligence interest, nor were they relevant to the mission and func-
tion of the Agency. Although maintenance of such information as sepa-
rate records was'not questioned prior to the passage of the Privacy
Act, and.the issuance of Executive Order 11905, compliance with the
statute and the Executive Order now require such information to be
purged.
8. OS had planned to purge such information from their files as
a by-product of normal file use and in accordance with established
National Archives and Records Service (NARS) records control schedules.
Under this procedure OS estimated that ten years or more would be
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required to complete the purging and destruction process.. We considered
alternative approaches that would achieve the desired result over a
shorter period of time. It was agreed that a crash program in six
months, requiring an estimated 150 persons, would be disruptive and un-
desirab1e. Among the alternatives the one that seemed to us the most
appropriate, in keeping with a need to address the problem with a proper
priority and at the same time not be disruptive would be one with a
time schedule of some two years. The number of persons to achieve this
is not small, ranging from 12 to 15 persons. It was estimated that
this would require either reassignment of personnel now-assigned other
.work, or the employment of retirees; possibly a mix of the two would. be
indicated.
Conclusions:
9. OS recognizes that it is storing information on Americans that
is not in compliance with new requirements. We share its concern over
the difficulties of purging such information from the files, but believe
it to be in the Agency's best interests to do so on a reasonably urgent
basis once the moratorium is ended. In this connection, it should be
noted that NARS records control schedules do not apply, in our view, to
information, records, and files that do not comply with imperatives that
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now govern Agency activities. While we do not know with certainty what
period following the lifting of the Senate moratorium and other restric-
tions described in Q (Attachment 3) would be allowed for the.
proach would be acceptable, both in' terms of orderly dispatch and
purging of such information from OS files, we believe that such an ap-
the Privacy Act, Executive Order 11905, and under the close supervision
of the Chiefs of the'Clearance Division and the Security Records Divi-
sion. However,.OS's guidelines.for.the indexing of this information. is
in its-files and the indexing of this information is in accordance with
10. We find that OS's current input of information on Americans
security.
11.. Without suggesting that field investigators refrain from col-
lecting authorized information needed to assess the security suitability
of an applicant or others of similar interest to the Agency, we believe
that OS should collect only such data as is relevant to the primary
subject of the investigation and that this data should be kepy only in
the primary subject's file. No separate records should be-maintained
on secondary subjects unless they are of legitimate foreign intelligence
verbal and not written.
or foreign counterintelligence interest.
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12. As an interim measure, I have asked the DDA to issue an Agency
regulation enjoining employees from using illegally held information
(Attachment 4).
Recommendations:
13. We recommend that:
a. The Attorney General and the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence be advised that, following the lifting of the Senate
moratorium and other restrictions on destruction of information on
Americans, it will take considerable time to purge these data from OS
files. (This topic has already been taken up with the IOB Staff (At-
tachment 5)).
b. The Director of Security initiate a program to identify
and purge all information in office files that should be removed
under the Privacy Act and Executive Order 11905, with a target date
of some two years for completion.
c. The Director of Security issue written guidelines speci-
fying the type of information that may be placed in OS files and
specifying the proper criterion for i is indexing.
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