PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE CIA AND ITS DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00498A000300040024-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 25, 2002
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: May 16, 1975
• Content Type: MF

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Remarks:
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SIGNATURE
Remarks:
Coming on the heels of your formal session
this week with the Senate Select Committee, this
paper may have an air of unreality about it. I
continue to think though that after the most
explosive issues have been dealt with, the Select
Committee will increasingly focus on a series of
questions which are at least as fundamental.
Attached is an attempt to set these issues down in
one place, and to suggest that we need to give mud
additional formal and systematic attention to them.
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
John D. Lams, Comptroller 1 G
MAY 1975
LLLUNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL
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DD/A_ 26--77-
16 MAY 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Problems and Prospects for the CIA and Its
Director
1. For the next several months, the House and Senate Select
Committees will devote much time and attention to factfinding
about alleged past indiscretions. However, the mandate of the
Select Committees is far broader, allowing a searching inquiry
into virtually every aspect of the Agency and the Community. Our
feeling is that it will be some months before the two Committees
determine what many of the real issues are, not to mention what
their recommendations for dealing with those issues may be. The
small team put together by Jim Schlesinger at 0MB to study
intelligence worked for over a year, with a staff which began the
effort with considerable knowledge of the Intelligence Community,
to develop its analysis of what was wrong and its recommendations
for change. The Murphy Commission has also devoted considerable
time to aspects of the problem. Can the members of the Select
Committees and their staffs, some of whom are new to Government
and many of whom are new to intelligence, accomplish this task
more quickly, or more competently?
2. For an organization whose very lifeblood involves
considering the intentions of others, we believe we have not yet
taken the time necessary to consider formally and systematically
how the Senate and House Select Committees may come to view us
and what issues they may ultimately decide need resolution.
Further, we think we have the time and the opportunity to
consider ourselves the issues which should be addressed and what
our views on them may be. At the least this would enable us to
set forth, at an appropriate time, our best thinking and our
recommendations for change where desirable. It is even possible
that events will unfold in such a way as to allow us to seize the
initiative in pointing one or both of the Select Committees
towards the issues as we perceive them and our recommendations
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for meeting them. This paper then represents an attempt to
identify systematically the questions which will arise and to set
forth some analysis of them. Much more remains to be done. Some
of the discussion which follows is detailed and reflects
considerable thinking over a long period of time by many people.
In other cases we have been able to do little more than suggest
areas for further consideration. If you agree after reading this
that more attention to these issues is warranted, we have some
thoughts on the way this process could best be organized and
would like to discuss them with you. For purposes of analysis,
we feel that the questions to be faced fall in four general
categories:
1) Does CIA have effective internal controls over
what it does and if not, how might these be strengthened?
2) Do the very broad authorities conferred upon the DCI
continue to be desirable or essential?
3) What Community-wide responsibilities should the DCI
have?
4) Congressional Relationships: What kind of
congressional oversight can best meet our and the Congress'
needs? What does this mean for our relationship with the
Executive Branch? What kind of relationship ought to exist
between the Legislative Branch and the Intelligence
Community on substantive (production) matters?
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Attachment:
Issues Papers
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No. 1--Does the CIA have effective internal controls
over what it does, and if not, how might these
be strengthened?
This is a highly complex question with many organizational,
managerial, resource, and other policy implications. We are now,
and have long been, a highly decentralized organization with
heavy emphasis on giving operational components real authority to
act within broad discretionary limits and policy approval. This
approach over the years has contributed substantially to our
flexibility and effectiveness. In the last three years, the
abolition of the Executive Director position and its replacement
by the Management Committee; changes which have been made in how
the Comptroller carries out his responsibilities and in the
financial controls he imposes; the post-audit concept; the
elimination of the DDO's complex project review system; and the
general scaling back of the Inspector General's responsibilities
have given additional effective authority to line managers and
reduced central control.
This. issue then requires reconsideration of the
responsibilities and procedures of those Agency-wide offices or
entities which might function to "balance" the authority given to
line managers: the Management Committee, the Comptroller, the
Audit Staff, the Inspector General, and the General Counsel. It
may ultimately also involve reconsideration of the way approval
authority has been delegated throughout the organization. The
DCI must be able to respond to any allegation with confidence
that he has knowledge of all relevant facts. The basic problem
is to provide approval and review systems which guarantee that
there can be no unpleasant surprises.
To facilitate analysis, the issue is appropriately separated
into two parts: the first dealing with the adequacy of the
policy and decision making function at the top of CIA (and
involving the Management Committee and/or an Executive Director)
as well as the Comptroller and the General Counsel; the second
concerned with the adequacy of the process by which top
management is assured that decisions reached are implemented in a
responsible way, essentially involving the Inspector General and
the Audit Staff but also the General Counsel and the Comptroller,
The policy and decision making function of this Agency are
in general lodged in the DCI and the four deputy directors. The
Management Committee however serves as a forum for consideration
of certain Agency-wide or cross-directorate problems, The
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Committee has great potential and some real strengths; it also
has serious deficiencies as presently constituted. A principal
problem is that there is no conscious process which forces
certain kinds of problems onto the Committee's agenda; issues are
(with important exceptions) raised for discussion in the
Committee only at the discretion of its individual members.
Partly because of this, many issues considered are not of great
significance; and conversely, some significant issues are not
considered at all. A second problem is that individual Committee
members are responsible for implementation of decisions reached,
which has sometimes meant that no one is responsible for
implementation. Related to this, decisions reached by the
Committee have too often not been effective decisions in that
they took account of everyone's special problems, leaving
participants unsure as to what precisely had been decided.
Finally, we think that the authority of the Secretary of the
Committee to crystalize issues is greatly reduced by his being
formally only first among equals and that attention should be
given to enhancing his charter.
The DCI has said that when he became Executive Director he
discovered that the position really only constituted half a job.
From one point of view, the position as then constituted can be
considered no job at all. The Executive Director's function
basically consisted of an administrative overview role more
properly exercised by the DDA (and which was quickly returned to
the DDA); and a comptrollership function which can be as
effectively exercised by the Comptroller as by an Executive
Director. When the Management Committee was created, the
partially completed de facto parceling out of these
responsibilities to the DD and the Comptroller was in effect
formalized. However, the precise question of what the Management
Committee was to do was not systematically considered.
In an uncirculated paper prepared for the since-postponed
February conference, we proposed consideration of a list of
explicit functions for the Management Committee. Each of these
functions was Agency-wide in character and each would involve
some changes in the de facto authorities of the deputy directors,
though none of the functions would appear, nor was intended, to
infringe on the day-to-day direction of each directorate's
program by the responsible managers. The functions included:
responsibility for setting the ethical tone of the organization
and dealing with policy questions about certain sensitive
activities (developing a broad code of conduct for Agency
employees, recommending standardsty_which to fudge operations
involving or considering policy
recommendations with respect to classified contracts which
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require US corporations accepting business from us to deny their
involvement with us, might be examples); participating actively
in the overall resource management task as presented to the
Committee by the Comptroller; insuring our continuing vitality by
reviewing (not approving) the selection of personnel for senior
management positions everywhere in the Agency; planning for the
future, giving independent attention to evolving customer needs
and future policy or resource constraints; and considering
periodically and systematically the adequacy of our
organizational arrangements to insure continuing reexamination of
fundamental assumptions. No claim was made that the functions
proposed were the best that could be developed for the Management
Committee. Rather.we hoped to generate thoughtful debate about
the Committee's functions and purposes, a subject which has yet
to be explored both systematically and in depth.
If we could agree on a specific list of functions for the
Management Committee, we think that the Committee's other
problems are relatively easily solved. The questions of how to
insure the flow of significant issues to the Committee for
discussion and of responsibility for follow-through on
recommendations and decisions, for example, could be facilitated
by assigning to each Committee member responsibility for one of
the Agency-wide functional areas decided upon, holding him
responsible for developing agendas for discussion in his
functional area on a periodic basis, perhaps through letters of
instruction. This approach would serve to give eac em er of
the Committee a specific Agency-wide functional assignment,
tending over time to strengthen the functioning of the Committee
as a body in which individuals see the whole organization and its
problems,
We think that a Management Committee structured along these
lines could effectively meet most of the criticisms now directed
at it. Such a body could not only substitute effectively for the
Executive Director role but would have major advantages over it,
although not without cost. Another approach of course would be
to reconstitute the position of the Executive Director, giving
him the same or a similar list of functions. Or we could have
both an Executive Director and a Management Committee, possibly
with the Executive Director chairing the Committee. The critical
issue would not seem to be whether we have a Management Committee
or an Executive Director (or both),, but rather whether we can
agree on the specific functions to be exercised by one or both,.
The second aspect of this issue concerns the adequacy of the
process which guarantees that broad policy and resource decisions
made at the top are responsibly carried out. We touched on this
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issue in the discussion above covering the Management Committee.
Here, however, we are more directly concerned with the
implementation of policy decisions made by deputy directors
acting as deputies rather than as members of the Management
Committee. Rockefeller Commission staffers appear'to be
grappling with recommendations in this area; the Select
Committees can do no less. The issue has at least two aspects:
how much central staff review of projected Agency activities
ought to take place before line components are able to carry them
out; second, how vigorous an audit process (in the largest sense
of that word) should be maintained to review the implementation
of decisions? This necessarily involves debate about the way the
Comptroller and the various planning staffs carry out their task
and about the adequacy of our Audit and IG functions.
The Comptroller and the directorate planning staffs are now
the focus for most prior review of proposed activities or
programs. We are confident that the process allows reasonably
responsible decision making about resource levels. However,
there is serious question as to whether this process generates an
adequate independent look at what might be called the policy
aspects of the program, i.e., the legality and/or the propriety
of the proposed program in all its details. The existing system
is vulnerable to the criticism that the approval authority for
the policy is separate from the approval authority for the
resources. Independent policy review, admittedly
administratively cumbersome and somewhat subversive of the role
of line management, does not now occur independently from line
management. At issue would seem to be such questions as how much
such prior review, if any, ought there to be; how would such
review be carried out if thought to be needed; and who would be
responsible? Perhaps a small, independent group with access to
any and all information should be created to selectively examine
high-risk activities, reporting independently to the Director.
Several other possible approaches deserve critical discussion.
There is also the question of independent central review as
programs are carried out, or after they are completed, The
nature and adequacy of IG, Audit Staff, and General Counsel
review of programs have been the subject of considerable
discussion over the years. There are numerous models elsewhere
and in our own past which suggest how our capabilities in these
areas might be improved if a decision were to be reached that
such an attempt should be made.
We may well be told by congressional investigators to
strengthen management control in all three fields--prior policy
and other review, implementation, and post-audit. We need to
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decide now and in some detail what we believe should be done. At
the very least we should be prepared with proposals of our own to
offer in preference to accepting whatever may be recommended by
outsiders.
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No. 2--Do the very broad authorities conferred upon
the DCI continue to be desirable or essential?
The investigation by legislative committees of, alleged past
CIA excesses should logically lead to consideration of whether
the basic statute under which such activities were authorized
should be "tightened up." There are three basic areas in which
the Agency has been granted enormous discretion and authority.
In each of these areas it should be useful to us to develop our
own view as to how much of the authority presently granted is
absolutely basic to our mission.
a) First, are the definitions of missions and functions
set forth in the 1947 and 1949 Acts still appropriate in
1975 or is more specificity now required or desirable?
b) Second, is the broad authority for protection of
sources and methods as set forth in the 1949 Act relevant
today?
c) Third, what modifications in our financial
authorities might be considered desirable?
Missions and Functions. The first question involves the
continuing relevance an or appropriateness of our missions and
functions as set forth in the 1947 Act, primarily Section 102(d).
The first three duties enumerated under Section 102(d) give the
Agency the duty to provide advice to the NSC, to make
recommendations to the NSC on the coordination of intelligence
activities, and to correlate and evaluate intelligence. Possible
changes in these three provisions are considered in the next
issue dealing with the DCI's Community responsibilities. Our
focus here is on provisions 4 and 5 which require the Agency:
"(4) to perform, for the benefit of the existing
intelligence agencies, such additional services of common
concern as the National Security Council determines can be
more efficiently accomplished centrally;
.(5) to perform such other functions and duties related to
intelligence affecting the national security as the National
Security Council may from time to time direct."
Two issues arise: what authority for covert action
activities is the USG to have; and to what extent could or should
this authority, as well as those for other functions provided for
here (clandestine, technical, and overt collection; research and
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development; information processing; communications; and
support), be stated explicitly in law?
It seems obvious we should strive to continue to have
legislation which allows covert action. If there-are to be
limitations on us in this area, it is much more desirable that
they be imposed on us via the appropriations process or through
means other than a proscription in our basic legislation. This
would allow a future program in different circumstances to be
undertaken without requiring a change in law. Unless, however,
Congress intends to preclude any CIA covert action, it is
doubtful that the law can or should be made more explicit with
respect to our covert action charter than it now is. We could
however at a minimum anticipate an effort to include in our law
procedural language, perhaps drawing on the amendments to the
Foreign Assistance Act, which would.establish rules for
consultation with Congress. A requirement for prior
congressional approval of covert action projects is also a
possibility, but the precise meaning of "congressional approval"
will need to be carefully drawn.
Although our covert action charter--assuming it is
continued--probably cannot be spelled out in greater detail in
law, than it now is, it is less easy to make a case that some
statement of our collection, research and development,
processing, and support responsibilities could not be explicitly
acknowledged in law. Thus, we can probably anticipate that the
Select Committees may come to this conclusion, and we will need
to give consideration to the degree of specificity which will be
acceptable.
Sources and Methods. The second subissue raised--the
question of our authority for the protection of sources and
methods from unauthorized disclosure--has been extensively
discussed over the years even in US courts and is generally
regarded as fundamental to our ability to carry out our mission.
In general, there seems little doubt that this is the case,
Still we should ask ourselves whether the Select Committees might
not conclude that this authority could or should somehow be
limited to certain areas or activities, or that this broad
aut ority might be more explicitly defined in law, The General
Counsel has begun systematic consideration of the sources and
methods provision and that effort should be extremely useful. We
might consider whether we could develop language more clearly
focusing the sources and methods phrase without unduly
compromising our mission, If this proves possible, we can be
reasonably certain that others will be able to develop similar
language, and we will have in hand a specific proposal of our
own,
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CIA Financial Authorities. The third subissue concerns
possible modifications in our financial authorities or the
addition of new limitations in this area. This can be further
divided into the question of our authority to receive transfers
from other agencies as provided in law, an authority which is
basic to our appropriations process as presently conceived and
which has also allowed us over the years to receive money from
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our nee or confidential funds, which essentially means our need
to be able to deny GAO audit; the question of public disclosure
of our budget and any additional detail; and questions relating
to possible limitations on our ability to reprogram funds within
our appropriation.
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Transfers of funds to the CIA under authority other than
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doubtful that most of the activities we have undertaken with
funds transferred to us from other agencies under the Economy Act
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No. 3--What Community-wide responsibilities should
the DCI have?
The National Security Act of 1947 (Section 102(d)) provides
that: "For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence
activities of the several Government departments and agencies...
it shall be the duty of the agency, under NSC direction," to
(carry out the five functions outlined in the Act). Although the
coordination responsibility this provision created is somewhat
vague, it was for many years generally agreed that this provision
of the Act was essentially concerned with the coordination of
production. The very strong feeling after World War II that
Pearl Harbor might have been averted if we had had better
coordination of raw intelligence data seems to have been the
underlying reason for the emphasis Congress placed upon the
Agency's coordination role.
Until Mr. Schlesinger's November 1971 study of the
Intelligence Community, few had actively considered that
interagency "coordination" as provided for in the Act involved
much beyond systematic multi-agency consideration of substantive
estimative or production issues. (The DDO's responsibilities for
coordination of clandestine collection activities abroad
represents.a significant exception.) The Schlesinger study
however reached a different conclusion. The underlying
assumption of that study was that the US intelligence effort was
too costly and that there was duplication of effort within the
Community which the DCI had not caused to be eliminated. The
Schlesinger study assumed that the coordination task involved
resource issues as well as substantive issues, and it concluded
that DCI's had failed at the coordination task because they had
not exercised control over the resource allocation process.
In retrospect, it is probably fair to say that few DCI's had
perceived that their coordination responsibilities included any
serious concern about Community resource issues. In any event,
the Schlesinger study concluded that an effective Community-wide
resource review role could best be carried out by the DCI because
he--by virtue of his control over the production process--was in
the best position to determine collection requirements based on
production needs. While not explicit, this conclusion
acknowledged that 0MB (the President) could not adequately carry
out this resource review role, because it was too far removed
from knowledge as to how collection programs could best be
structured to meet substantive requirements developed in the
Community. Also implicit in this conclusion was the belief that
OMB's effectiveness in dealing with intelligence resource issues
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arising in Defense programs was reduced by the necessary but very
cumbersome joint review process between Defense and OMB, which
made difficult systematic attention to intelligence per se.
The original concept of coordination as set forth in the law
then was effectively broadened by the November 1971 study to
include, in addition to substantive production issues, resource
allocation. And thus today, the DCI's coordination
responsibility has come to mean two things: orderly
consideration of the views of all informed observers on
substantive intelligence issues, and the development of a DCI
view on Intelligence Community resource issues.
We of course cannot predict with precision whether these
concepts will come under debate in the coming months. To the
extent that the issue of the ualit of the Intelligence
Community's product comes under discussion and--in the wake of
our Vietnam experience, this question may arise--we can expect
debate.
With respect to his responsibilities for coordination
of substantive production, a key question which may be asked is
to what extent should the DCI serve as the principal intelligence
advisor to the President, arraying all information and judgment
on the various substantive problems we face for consideration by
policy-makers in a coordinated product?
In this connection, there is a basic alternative to the
status quo which could come under consideration. This would
involve dismantling the USIB structure as a creature of the DCI
and recreating it in some form as a function of the National
Security Council. A decision to do this could be combined with
the alternative set forth below providing for a DCI located in
the Executive Offices and responsible for overview of the
Intelligence Community from a resource point of view, together
with the establishment of a new head of the CIA. Such a step
would imply a change in the concept of the NSC as a deliberative
body making policy judgments on the basis of intelligence
estimates supplied by others.
A formidable problem with such an approach would involve
considering whether a decision to locate the Community's
estimative functions closer to top policy-makers could be carried
out without compromising the objectivity of this process.
Another difficulty would be whether, politically, any President
would wish this function to be lodged in the Executive Offices.
Said another way, intelligence has classically been viewed as
supporting policy making and such an approach could be viewed as
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moving the support for policy making closer to the President than
the policy-makers themselves.
With respect to the DCI's resource coordination
responsibilities, at least four basic alternatives could come
under discussion in the coming months: abandoning the
Schlesinger concept entirely and relying on the traditional
processes to cope with this problem; continuing the status quo;
enlarging the DCI's resource control and overall management
responsibility within the Community; and reconstituting the DCI
as an institution separate from CIA, probably located in the
White House, with resource review and production
responsibilities. Within each of these, there are a nearly
limitless number of further possibilities, and of course, there
are other basic alternatives as well. We have selected these
four as representing the most likely.
The first alternative involves abandoning the Schlesinger
concept that the DCI has a responsibility to the President (and
Congress) to make recommendations on Community resource issues.
Arguments for such a position might be based on a judgment that
this function cannot be effectively carried out, or that it is
unimportant in any event. This line of thought should be
considered further. However, it is our belief that the Select
Committees will conclude that the Community resource review
function is important both to the President and to the Congress,
and that it should therefore be continued or even strengthened,
The second alternative is the status cyo, in which both
Defense and CIA continue to operate programs while the DCI
reviews all Community budgets and submits his views on the issues
to the President. Final resource decisions are made by the
President or 0MB and by Congress and implemented by the
organizations affected. The strengths of this approach include:
minimal change in present responsibilities and procedures;
providing an opportunity for the DCI to comment on significant
issues without requiring him to be deeply involved in the
implementation of decisions reached; and providing for heavy
continued Defense Department involvement in programs clearly
related to Defense's primary mission, national defense.
Weaknesses include the fact that the DCI will probably always
have considerable difficulty in developing the information needed
to carry out the responsibility given him. Also, although the
present arrangements were not developed with the idea that the
DCI should control resource allocation within the Community, it
does confer responsibility in this area without providing the
authority to carry it out.
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The third basic alternative involves giving the DCI
operational and resource control over all or a substantial
portion of the National Intelligence Program through fundamental
change in present statute. Probably, were such an alternative to
be seriously addressed, it would be considered that the DCI
should be given responsibility for direction of a larger portion,
but not all, of the National Intelligence Program. Sensibly,
this might involve CIA as now, NSA (not the entire CCP) or
portions of it, and a larger portion of the overhead program than
at present. Other programs would continue to be operated by
Service or other Defense entities and could be included or
"defined out" of the National Intelligence Program. The
strengths of this approach would include unified management of a
larger portion of the Intelligence Community and, ultimately,
some efficiencies. Also, responsibility for success or failure
in the Community would be clarified. Weaknesses include the
political difficulties inherent in consolidating under DCI
control a greatly expanded program, particularly when the Agency
is under attack, as well as dilution of Defense Department
control over programs long perceived by them as essential to
their primary mission with possible future Defense development of
independent programs to insure their control over assets seen as
essential.
The final basic alternative would involve elevating the
office of the DCI to the White House where it would function to
make judgments about all Intelligence Community (however defined)
resource requirements. This would involve downgrading CIA's
present role in the Intelligence Community as "first among
equals," with CIA to be reconstituted as only one of several
Intelligence Community entities, responsible only for the
operation of its collection and production programs, Under this
formulation, OMB's present resource review role would logically
be absorbed by the DCI, This approach would have few advantages,
though It would enhance the DCI's ability to resolve bureaucratic
conflicts within the Community by lifting him above the battle,
and it would ease the management problems which arise within CIA
from the DCI's present two-fold responsibilities. Weaknesses
inherent in this formulation include the fact that the DCI, even
if located in the White House, unless he also absorbed some
important production responsibilities, would have little real
"clout" on Community resource issues which would continue to be
addressed within Defense and CIA essentially as now. Distance
from problems and bureaucratic information-hiding could render
this concept of the DCI an empty one.
To summarize: We have suggested that the concept of
coordination as currently conceived involves both production and
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resource responsibilities. Alternatives to present approaches in
both areas present some advantages; they also have fundamental
disadvantages. We suspect, however, that these issues will come
under discussion and that the Select Committees will advance
ideas for solving them. Thus it is important for us to consider
them further.
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No. 4-Congressional Relationships: What kind of
congressional oversight can best meet our
and the Congress, needs? What does this
mean for our relationsip with the Executive
Branch? What kind of relationship ought to
exist between the Legislative Branch and
the Intelligence Community on substantive
roduction matters?
In the past two years our relationships with Congress have
expanded in scope and character. Just a.short time ago we were
reporting only to portions of two Appropriations Committees and
to the two Armed Services Committees on some or all aspects of
our program.
Last year, however, amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act
required periodic reports by the DCI on covert action activities
to members of the Foreign Affairs Committees. In the House this
has meant that members of the House International Relations
Committee are now briefed on our covert action programs, and in
the Senate members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are
informed about this aspect of our program. In addition, the
establishment of the House and Senate Select Committees this year
has added congressmen and senators to the list of those who are
or will become knowledgeable about our program. Thus a
substantially increased number of congressmen and senators are
now in a position to find out a great deal about our program
directly.
It is highly probable that the Select Committees will
address the question of congressional oversight. We can
anticipate attention to at least two basic alternatives to the
status quo: revitalizing or strengthening existing oversight and
appropriations arrangements or creating a quite new oversight
arrangement.
Recommendations to revitalize or strengthen existing
arrangements could involve changes in committee size or makeup,
changes in committee staff capabilities, improved physical
arrangements for the consideration of intelligence materials
(vaulted reading rooms and the like), calls for more public or
executive session hearings, additional formal reporting
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requirements levied on us (especially in areas of sensitivity'),
GAO or committee staff audits or other periodic investigations of
our activities, and even an annual authorization process similar
to that applied to some other Federal agencies such as the Energy
Research and Development Administration (ERDA, formerly AEC), or
elements of Defense Department programs.
Recommendations to develop a new oversight arrangement
largely outside the present dual Armed Services Committee
arrangement could take any number of forms, though it seems
likely that attention would be focused on the model provided by
the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. This Committee was
established in statute in the early post-World War II era to
oversee the Government's atomic energy program as carried out by
AEC. Because the Committee's existence and rules are largely
established in statute, it is not ordinarily subject to the rules
of either the Senate or House--an arrangement which if applied to
us could offer certain advantages. Its membership includes nine
senators and nine congressmen, and it has a staff of about 17,
including secretaries. The Committee seems to have had a good
record at keeping secrets over the years, and there has never
been any doubt as to the vigor with which they pursue their
oversight responsibilities. The basic statute provides that ERDA
will keep the Committee "fully and currently informed" on all
developments. This has been interpreted over the years in
different ways, but the Committee has consistently made it very
clear that they mean what they say. This provision has allowed
the Committee to involve itself in the Commission's day-to-day
decision making in a manner which has sometimes been considered
subversive of Executive Branch perogatives. ERDA today, and the
AEC before it, clearly has a much closer relationship to the
Congress than do most executive departments and agencies. In
thinking about applying the Joint Atomic Energy Committee model
to oversight of the Intelligence Community, there are several
factors which should be considered.
First, CIA is an instrument of foreign policy which is,
under the constitution, largely a Presidential function, though
Congress of course has many important responsibilities which bear
on it. While ERDA carries out many programs related to national
defense, it also has responsibility for many activities which
impinge directly on the US private sector. With respect to both
its national defense and civilian energy responsibilities, ERDA
is accustomed to being considered as an instrumentality much more
responsive to congressional requirements than are the departments
and agencies which make up the foreign affairs establishment.
Second, both programs have national security aspects and
thus face issues as to the public's right to knowledge about
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their programs, although this is also true of many other programs
as well. In the case of ERDA, debates about secrecy have arisen
both in connection with private sector interest in nuclear power
applications and because of public concern about safety and
environmental issues. With respect to the Intelligence
Community, the secrecy question has generally arisen in the
context of public debate over CIA activities, primarily covert
action, not supported by segments of the public, although other
aspects of intelligence programs have come under similar
scrutiny.
Third, both CIA and ERDA have statutes which confer on their
respective leaders a responsibility for protection of national
security data. The DCI has "confidential funds," "sources and
methods," and other specific authorities, and ERDA has its
"restricted data" authority.
Fourth, the Joint Atomic Energy Committee is the basic
congressional consumer of information and analysis generated by
ERDA on nuclear policy issues. The Armed Services Committees are
also consumers. Similary, the consumers of analysis produced by
CIA on a wide variety of issues include the Armed Services
Committees and other committees with information needs we can
help to satisfy.
Finally, the Joint Atomic Energy Committee is concerned with
only one agency of Government--ERDA--although that organization
does carry out programs, for example, weapons development
activities, for the Department of Defense. However, a joint
intelligence committee would logically be focused on oversight of
the entire Intelligence Community, including CIA as well as
Defense programs and possibly even including portions of the
FBI's program. A serious question to be addressed is how a
committee other than Armed Services could properly be held
responsible for oversight of Defense intelligence programs
planned and managed in the context of the total Defense program.
Possibly joint representation on the Armed Services Committee and
a Joint Intelligence Committee could ease this problem.
On balance, it seems clear that a joint oversight committee
arrangement could work and that it could offer some advantages.
It is of course by no means without problems. And considerable
effort would need to be devoted to avoiding a situation in which
the Committee could assume a disproportionate role in managing
the Community's programs, if Presidential foreign affairs
authorities are not to be seriously circumscribed.
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With respect to future congressional use of intelligence, we
have always briefed certain congressional committees on
substantive intelligence matters. This flow of information seems
however to have expanded substantially in recent years, and as US
international and domestic responsibilities are increasingly
perceived as interrelated, we believe Congress' demand for
intelligence information on a wide variety of topics will
increase further. If a new law is to be written, it seems
reasonable to assume that the Select Committees may address this
question of intelligence support to the Congress and consider
establishment of some procedural and other ground rules for the
future. It is even possible that consideration will be given to
requiring us to provide to Congress the same kind of policy
support we provide to the Executive Branch. There are other
recent congressional actions which could serve as a model for
such consideration.
The issue of our relationship to Congress on substantive
matters merits considerable further analysis. One of the
principal ways an inherently "constituentless" agency like CIA
can solidify congressional relationships is by providing a
service. Thus State Department works very hard at handling the
many problems of US citizens overseas brought to their attention
by the Congress. CIA produces information and analysis on a wide
variety of topics in which many congressional committees have an
interest. Therefore, a significant effort to analyze Congress'
information needs, trying to match up capabilities we have with
those needs and examining whether there are areas in which we
could offer more service to individual congressmen or committees
would seem to merit attention.
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