ALTERNATE EMERGENCY PLAN
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00434A000200010018-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
7
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 12, 2000
Sequence Number:
18
Case Number:
Publication Date:
November 3, 1952
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79-00434A000200010018-9.pdf | 364.49 KB |
Body:
Approved For Rele 2000/08/23 ,s . g~79-00434~G0002OOtT~ 0018-9 bob, V& if 4nam,
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3 November 1952
TO: C/MS
FROM: AC/PCD
SUBJECT: Alternate Emergency Plan
1. PROBLEM.--To devise a relatively simple, practical plan for the
fullest utilization of the medical potential of the Central
Intelligence Agency in the event of a surprise atomic or
other attack upon the Washington, D. C. area,'in order to
provide the maximum of medical attention and professional
advice to the evacuation plan selectees.
n
A. An enemy, in attacking Washington, would use the most des-
tructive device and plan available to him. The optimum
site for the most destructive weapon (the atomic bomb)
would be a 2000-foot high air burst over ground zero at
approximately 8th and G Streets, N. W., at 9:30 a.m. on
a workday morning.
B. In considering the range of destruction of such an attack,
various facts become evident.
1. The personnel in the immediate area could not be
relied upon in an emergency, since an unknown
quantity would be available for service; i.e.,
all headquarters assigned medical personnel.
2. Memorial Bridge, Key Bridge, 14th Street Bridge,
South Capital Street Bridge, Anacostia Bridge, and
the Sousa Bridge could not be relied upon for evac-
uation purposes.
3. No supplies could be stored in the immediate area
that were intended for use in such an emergency.
C. A surprise attack would probably be accompanied by acts of
sabotage on the part of enemy agents in the area. The
Document
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litary reserves immediately available to the area
ginia, hence it must be assumed that the Chain
whatever bridges may be left after the immediate
even before, will be simultaneously sabotaged.
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3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM.-
A. The refuge site is in such a position that the Potomac
River must be crossed in order to reach it.
B. The refuge site is inadequately prepared by physical setup
to accommodate any large number of casualties.
C. Civil Defense in the District of Columbia is reported to be
only 20% completed in their disaster preparations.
D. The total medical staff that could be relied upon physically
after such an attack would be insufficient to provide for
any other than the 600 evacuation selectees.
4. DISCUSSION.-
A. Collecting and Screening Points
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2. Purpose.-The purpose of these areas would be:
a. To screen potential evacuees to the Refuge
site in order to prevent seriously wounded,
severely burned and patients otherwise in-
jured, beyond the medical facilities of the
Refuge site, from proceeding to the site.
b. To administer immediate attention to serious-
ly wounded, before directing them to nearest
civil defense medical station.
c. To administer treatment to moderately injured
so that they could continue their journey.
d. To perform initial radiation monitoring in
order to effect initial decontamination in
the form of discarding clothing, belongings,
etc., prior to proceeding to decontamination
area.
3. Medical Personnel.--
a. Each screening point would be manned by a
staff physician and a consultant civilian
physician with one medical technician and
four non-medical assistants requisitioned
from early arrivals. It is assumed that
each collecting point will have a security
representative assigned to verify credentials.
b. Consultant physicians must be utilized in
view of the fact that all headquarters per-
sonnel are vulnerable to attack and hence
cannot be used for planning. Since approx-
imately 309 of medical personnel would escape
injury, duplicate assignments have been made
to assure medical attention at each station;
i.e., a staff physician and a consultant
physician.
e. In the event that both staff physician and
consultant physician arrived at screening site,
the consultant would be released to nearest
registration point for other CIA personnel.
d. Consultant physicians would report to their
stations automatically upon attack, and after
allotted emergency evacuees had been cleared,
would then report to one of registration points
for other CIA personnel.
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4.
e. It is not necessary that the consultant physi-
cians know the whereabouts of the Refuge site
in order to work in this plan.
f. After twenty-four hours, screening sites would
be abandoned by medical personnel who would
report to Refuge for reassignment.
Ass~.-
a. Each Refuge evacuee will be assigned a specific
collection point and an alternate nearest his
home so as to distribute the load at any given
point.
b. Each evacuee will be responsible for learning
the exact location and alternate routes to
collection point.
5. Sup-plies.-
a. It will be the responsibility of the Medical Of-
fice to determine what supplies are necessary
and to procure these supplies.
b. It will be the responsibility of I & S to store
these supplies and to provide for transportation
of these supplies to collection point.
6. Transportation.--
a. Transportation should be provided by individual
groups as given in original "Instructions to
Emergency Force", or as assigned by I & S.
b. It may be advisable for security to provide
"skeleton" keys to responsible members so that
nearby cars could be commandeered by emergency
force.
B. Registration Points.--
1. All non Refuge site assignees would report to four sites
to be designated by I & S for registration and mobili-
zation.
2. Certain staff physicians not included in Emergency
Plan would be tentatively assigned to these areas to
assist in any way possible. Such registration points
should be coordinated with Civil Defense medical facili-
ties so that agency employees could get the benefit of
such facilities and would be aware of them.
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0.
3. The attendance of these physicians at the registration
points would be unpredictable in view of the proxim-
ity of the medical staff to ground zero.
4. These registration sites would be designed to register
surviving members of the Agency not assigned to Refuge
site, from which alternates could be selected to
quickly fill slots of Refuge evacuee casualties.
5. Thirty-six hours following the blast, the medical
personnel would be withdrawn from these sites and
would proceed to other designated assignments; i.e.,
to Refuge site or to Civil Defense establishments.
Decontaminatjon Station.--
2. Purpose.--
3.
4. Su es.--
Location.---Decontamination station would be located
on previously designated area.
a. The decontamination station would serve to
monitor and to decontaminate all persons who
were within ten miles of an atomic blast, and
who had been cleared by collecting stations
where initial decontamination procedures would
be undertaken.
b. It would also serve as a collection and screen-
ing point for Northern Virginia.
Personnel.--
a. The decontamination station would be set up by
ten men from Refuge under direction of local
medical attendant.
b. Two physicians, two technicians, and one nurse
from headquarters staff will be assigned to
station.
a. The medical Office would be responsible for
necessary supplies which are now or would be
stored at Refuge site.
b. Following attack, supplies and personnel would
be immediately dispatched from Refuge site to
decontamination center to set up decontamination
equipment.
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5. Assignment.--
a. Each Refuge evacuee upon clearing collecting
point would be instructed either to proceed
to decontamination station or to Refuge site.
b. It would be the individual responsibility of
each potential Refuge evacuee to learn exact-
ly where decontamination station will be and
to know thoroughly alternate routes of reach-
ing area.
c. The decontamination station would remain in
function for seventy-two hours, after which
the equipment and personnel would be recalled
to Refuge site, or it would be made available
to I & S to be used in decontaminating equip-
ment.
D. Refuge Site.--
1. Immediately upon enemy attack, the physician and two
of the technicians assigned to would be 25X1A6a
transferred to Refuge site.
2. Technician now assigned at site would be 25X1A6a
immediately assigned to Refuge site in the event of
enemy attack.
E. Headquarters Preparation.-
1. Medica .--
a. All Refuge evacuees should have medical his-
tory and physical examination microfilmed and
stored at Refuge site.
b. Every assigned member should be blood typed
and have this record stored at Refuge site.
c. All potential evacuees should keep basic im-
munizations current; i.e., typhoid, tetanus,
smallpox.
2. Training.-
a. All medical staff, doctors, technicians, and
nurses should have atomic medicine instruction.
b. All evacuees should have first aid instruction
and basic radiation medicine instruction.
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c. All I & S personnel assigned to stay-behind
force should receive first aid and radiation
medicine instruction.
3. Stay-Behind.--
a. One physician and two technicians should be
assigned to remain with protecting I & S
stay-behind force in order to protect them and
administer to any persons possible on the site.
b. Supplies for such effort should be stored in
the basement of Central Building.
c. The physician and technicians assigned would
be responsible for determining radioactivity
in area of operation and to advise responsible
I & S official when members in the area had
received maximum exposure to radiation present.
5. CONCLUSIONS.-The foregoing presents principles of an Emergency Plan
to be utilized by the Agency?in the event of enemy attack. It
is felt that the plan would provide a maximum of medical care for
Agency personnel with priority being given to Refuge assignees.
The plan depends upon the following points for success:
A. Dispersal of supply storage.
B. No reliance upon supplies to be transported by medical personnel.
C. Mobilization of consultant physicians.
D. Use of medical personnel now in stations outside immediate
Washington area.
E. Advanced training of all personnel involved.
Detailed personnel assignments will follow your approval of
plan as outlined.
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Attachients#.
A. Personnel Required
B. Map,
MO/WDB :nh (3 Nov.' 52)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
1-File
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