EMERGENCY DECONTAMINATION CENTER
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79-00434A000200010016-1
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 9, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 10, 2000
Sequence Number:
16
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 23, 1953
Content Type:
MF
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP79-00434A000200010016-1.pdf | 218.86 KB |
Body:
Approved For Releas%.2000/0,
020001001611.
23 March 1953
MEMORANDUM FOR : C/PCD
: &O/PCD
SUBJECT : Emergency Decontamination Cen
Docwabnt Na. 4_7..._.
No Ehauge In Class. {3
^ Declassified
'i tass. Changed to: T
Next R.priew a
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for A 96tablis~men ' Of emeigen y eco
the' C ntral Into7.ligence gency~ in the eve
upon the city f Washing n..
a. That all personnel and equipment entering the center are
contaminated.
b. That personnel numbering approximately =will be pro-
cessed through the center.
3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:
a. To properly evaluate a site to be used as a decontamina-
tion center, it is desirable to investigate the nature of contamina-
tion, decontamination, personnel protection and the disposition of
radioactive waste.
b. Radioactive contamination may be caused by the fission
products formed in the detonation of an atomic bomb, by neutron-
induced activity in soil and water and the deliberate use of
specific radioisotopes, apart from their association with the bomb,
as radiological warfare agents. The type of blast, whether an air-
burst, an underwater burst or an underground burst, will also deter-
mine the extent to which an area will be contaminated. Therefore,
the degree of radiation intensity to which individuals will be ex-
posed depends upon the manner in which the contamination is propa-
gated.
c. The feasibility of decontamination depends upon the im-
portance of the equipment and the risk to personnel involved. If
contamination is heavy, it is preferable to put aside the equip-
ment whenever possible, allowing radioactivity to decay with time.
When this is not possible or desirable, the most appropriate chemi-
cal or physical method should be employed. Contamination is largely
a surface phenomenon and very often can be removed by simply scrub-
bing and washing with detergent and water. Where porous surfaces
Approved For Release 2
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.tami ?atio , center for
t of" an atomic attack
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a. Witk the foregoing brief discussion of contamination and
decontamination in mind., an evaluation of the two available sites
will be made ins porating five additional factors; transportation,
manpower, security, medical and economy. 25X1A
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are involved, more stringent chemical or physical methods may be
required. The actual decontamination process can be reduced to two
steps; first, immediate emergency measures, and second, final opera-
tions of a thorough nature. Decontamination of contaminated person-
nel is, of course, a primary requirement.
d, In all decontamination procedures, adequate measures must
be taken to protect the personnel comprising the decontamination
teams from excessive radiation dosages. Personnel employed in this
capacity should wear protective coveralls, gloves and boots. If
there is danger of inhaling radioactive dusts, masks and goggles
should be provided. Additional safeguards include film badges and
pocket dosimeters.
e. In any decontamination procedure, radioactive waste pro-
ducts are obtained and constitute a disposal problem. These products
may be solids, liquids or gases and provision must be made to prevent
their further contaminating an area. Normal peacetime methods for
disposal involve storing of the materials, allowing as much of the
radioactive substance to decay as possible with subsequent burial
of the material in a properly labeled area or with burial at sea.
Gases constitute another sort of problem since storage and burial
are not feasible. Most radioactive particles can be removed from
gas by filtration with the release of the gas to the atmosphere.
The filters are then contaminated and can be disposed of as solid
waste. During a period of emergency, the restrictions placed upon
disposal will naturally be relaxed, but whenever possible they should
be obeyed.
4. DISCUSSION :
co In addition to the't sportation probm, a force of at
least eight engineers wool? e required to man the annsportation
vehicles, to unload and terect eight tents, two of ch are
16 x 32 feet, to install 16 shower units running at least 300 feet
of pipe from a pond tough wooded and possibly muddy terraIfr-up
a 20-foot grade to the selected shower site. The estimated time
Approved For Release 2000/U8Si.ydVQDOtP9-00434A000200010016-1
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Approved For Release 2000/08/23 : CIA-RDP79-00434A000200010016-1
Approved For Release
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h. Control of contamination at would not present 25X1A6a
a problem. There is sufficient ground immediately beyond the sta-
tion gates for the parking of automobiles and at this vantage point,
personal property, other than clothing, which may be contaminated
can be removed. At a later time, automobiles could be brought on
to the Station proper to a designated area for decontamination. All
contaminated clothing can be sealed in metal barrels and disposed
of by burial or can be decontaminated at a later date by repeated
washings. To assure safety, periodic monitoring of the entire area
in use could be performed along with regular analyses of food, soil
and water. Such protective procedure would require a minimum of
trained personnel.
5. CONCLUSIONS:
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a. uld bea more advantageous site`f'or the estab-
lishment of la decontamination ?enter~. tse of the fact lities at
would.,:save .uplicatidn i ide 'tifying perso el, would 25X1 A6a
25X1A6a eliminate confusion at the Would con-
serve manpower equipment ancr' would eliminate the ecessity of
_7
depending upo 'auxiliary equi ent like 'gas pumps d generators
without incr sing th probab, lity of contaminati the Station.
6. ACTION RECOP 'SENDED:
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a. After a careful 'study of the factors involved and after
personally visiting each of the proposed sites, I would recommend
that be chosen as the permanent site for the Central In-
telligenceAgency's emergency decontamination center.
b. Provision should be made to permit" changes in this recom-
mendation whenever indicated by the availability of new atomic
data.
MO/ICM:nh (21 March '53)
Distribution:
Orig & 1 - Addressee
2 - File
Approved For Release 2000/08123 CCA-RDP79 O17 34A000200010016-1