DCI SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES FOR FY 1976

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78Z02997A000100050028-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 14, 2000
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: August 18, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

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./5' F' 75
uCI SUBSTNidTIVE: IiiTELLIGEHCE O3JECTL S FOR FY i976
PROVIDE RELIABLE AND TIMELY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS,
ASSESSMENTS, AND ESTIMATES TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER ELEMENTS
OF THE US GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN POLICY FOF,` ULATION, INTERNA-
TIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON:
SU.6ST Aid T IVE OBJECTIVE d0. i
Soviet policies, intentions, and capabilities for the execu-
tion of political, security and economic programs, with particular
reference to:
-- changes in Soviet leadership and the dynamics of
and factors affecting Soviet decision making.
-- providing early warning of scientific and technical.
advances which could significantly affect the US na-
tional security or national welfare.
-- major developments in Soviet military RDT&E of weapon
systems, deployment, and order of battle.
-- Soviet compliance with the Strategic Arms Limita-
tion agreements, the Limited Test Ban Treaty,
possible Mutual Balanced Force Reduction agree-
ments, and the observance of cease-fire or peace
treaty arrangements; Soviet perception of US and
Allied negotiating positions and force capabili-
ties with respect to these issues.
-- Soviet extension of political influence and mili-
tary power outside of the USSR.
KEY INTELLIGEivCE OUESTIOrdS
SOVIET POLITICAL DYNAMICS
1. What are the prospects for progress, stagnation, or
cooling in bilateral Soviet-US relations?
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Include how the USSR evaluates the ['S as both
adversary and partner. particularly in arms control
negotiations, economic relations, and comoet_tion
in major regions of the wcrld?
2. How are the political alignments and policy. priorities
of the Soviet hierarchy and key interest groups dev-loping as
the USSR undertakes the 25th Party Congress and looks toward a
post-Brezhnev era?
Consider what difference the eventual departure of
the Politburo seniors might make in Soviet policy-
making.
3. What are Soviet objectives and curren': nol i.c, the
following areag
A
Western and Southern Europe -- with special atten-
tion to Portugal . ^ 6JLXI" 2.1rPF --_ "f nc~w e~ e
7 c> Ct (~'~ ?-rte
The Middle East, including attitudes and tactics
tilities; bilateral Soviet dealings with the major
a Lac k 1 H Qc E?q Lt
regional states; the Persian Gulf
~IvO4~(~E~ctS(, ~aV~~eaSt LZuG~ EOLA)
AsiaAin the post-Vietnam period.
4. In the Sino-Soviet relationship, what are the capa-
tilities, intentions, and expectations of the two sides --
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conflict, confrontation, accommodation, or continued uneasy
stalemate?
5. What is the importance to the Soviets of imported Western
technology, and how successful are they in acquiring it?
Particular importance attaches to technology having
possible strategic utility.
SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES
6. What are Soviet objectives, policies, deployment plans
and perceptions relating to strategic weapons and the strategic
balance?
Give particular attention to how the Soviets rationalize
their strategic weapons programs and what goals they
have set for themselves in the area of strategic
weaponry vis-a-vis the US -- such as catching up,
or attaining some sort of superiority.
7. What doctrine, strategy, and plans do the Soviets have
for the command and control and use of strategic nuclear forces,
including limited employment of nuclear weapons?
SOVIET MILITARY R&D AND ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
8. What progress are the Soviets making in early research
and development and advanced technologies which could lead to
significant qualitative improvements in existing weapons systems,
or to the development of weapon systems based on novel technical
means?
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9. What progress are the Soviets making toward
strategic applications of lasers and beam weapons?
NEW. What are the prospects that Soviet dependency on
space systems for support of military and intelligence
operations will deter them from interference with similar
US satellite systems?
Consider how, and under what circumstances,
they might attempt to neutralize any such
US systems.
SOVIET ICBM SYSTEMS
10. What progress are the Soviets making, and what
are their objectives, in increasing the countersilo capability
of their silo-based ICBM forces?
Give particular attention to the accuracies of
the Soviet SS-X-16, 17, 18 and 19 ICBM systems.'
11. What progress are the Soviets making in improving
the survivability of their ICBM forces?
Consider whether the Soviets are developing and
deploying land-mobile ICBMs, and if so, what
progress is being made.
SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS
12. What are Soviet objectives in nuclear weapons
technology, and what progress are the Soviets making in
5
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SOVIET CRUISE MISSILES
13. What are Soviet intentions and progress in the
development of long-range cruise missile systems for use
against land targets?
SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION
14. What is the intended size, role and armament of
the Backfire force?
15. What progress have the Soviets made in development
of improved tankers, a follow-on heavy bomber, or a stand-
off carrier for air-to-surface missiles?
SOVIET NAVAL SYSTEMS
16. What programs and plans do the Soviets have for
the development and deployment of ; A~ SLBM systems,
including modifications to existing systems?
Include any changes made in SSBN operational
practices and patrol areas, and command and
control capabilities.
17. What progress have the Soviets made in development
o f OKW&2A
antiship missile systems?
Include the characteristics of the guidance systems.
18. What progress are the Soviets making toward
acquisition of an effective capability for trailing submarines,
and for detecting and localizing them in the open ocean?
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19. What is the status of Soviet RDT&E, and what
progress is being made toward deployment of, and reporting
improvements in, a satellite-borne ocean surveillance
system?
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SOVIET STRATEGIC AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSES
20. What progress are the Soviets making in ABM development,
and what are their plans for further deployment?
21. What progress are the Soviets making in development and
deployment of defenses against bombers and missiles attacking at
low altitudes?
SOVIET DEFENSE COSTS
22. What are the costs of Soviet and Warsaw Pact weapons
systems and defense programs?
include information on how they are financed; how
they influence defense planning and overall economic
planning and performance; and on how the Soviet
weapons research and development and acquisition
processes work.
ARMS LIMITATION NEGOTIATIONS
23. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact objectives and positions
in arms limitations negotiations?
24. What are Soviet and Warsaw Pact intentions and actions
with respect to adherence to arms limitations agreements with
the United States?
EUROPE: WARSAW PACT - NATO - MBFR
25. What are the size and composition of the Warsaw Pact
and NATO forces in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA)?
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26. What are the capabilities, yd-the strengths and weak-
A
nesses, of the Warsaw Pact forces for conducting a war in the
central region of Europe without prior reinforcement?
27. What are Warsaw Pact views, plans and doctrine for con-
ducting war in Central Europe, including readiness, mobilization
e c and reinforcement of Pact forces?
28. What are Warsaw Pact. capabilities to fight a sustained
non-nuclear war in Europe, including critical stockpiles and
the operation of the rear services?
29. What are the strengths and weaknesses of non-US NATO
forces for war in Europe and the intentions of these forces to
.react in the event of war with the Warsaw Pact?
EASTERN EUROPE
30. How are political forces in Yugoslavia evolving, from
the standpoints of internal cohesion and international align-
:
ment in the post-Tito period?
v~--~~Vr
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IBC I SUBSTA
July 23, 1975
(Revised)
PROVIDE RELIABLE AND TIMELY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS,
ASSESSMENTS, AND ESTIMATES TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER ELEMENTS
OF THE US GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN POLICY FORMULATION, INTERNA-
TIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON:
SUBSTANT yE OBJECTIVE. NO, 2
Developments within and policies, intentions, decision-
making processes, and capabilities of the People's Republic of
China in key political, military and economic areas which impact
on important interests of the United States, its allies, the USSR,
the rest of Asia and the more influential underdeveloped countries.
KEY INTELLIGENC QUESTIONS:
CHINA: INTERNAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
31. What major trends and changes are likely in Chinese
foreign and military policies relating to the US and the USSR.
Include Chinese policy towards use of nuclear
weapons and its general forces' offensive and
defensive postures.
32. What are the internal stresses and alignments within
the central leadership and at the key regional levels and how
are these likely to affect the main lines of China's foreign
policy and its economic and military policies?
Consider how these policies are likely to be
changed by the successors to Mao and Chou.
33. Will China maintain its economic development, and to
what extent will it rely on the West to support its economy
especially in areas related to its Military Industrial complex?
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34. What are China's policies and activities towards main-
taining and expanding its influence in the Third World, and do
these policies contribute to disorder or stability?
Pay particular attention to those PRC activities
detrimental to US interests.
35. What are Peking's objectives towards these four key
countries in East Asia; Thailand, Korea, Vietnam and Japan?
36. Will Chinese and Indian relations with respect to the
Himalayan States and Pakistan lead towards military confrontation
or accommodation?
37. What will be Chinese tactics against and negotiating
position on Taiwan?
Also consider Taiwan's policies (particularly
military) towards Peking.
CHINESE MILITARY CAPABILITIES
38. What progress are the Chinese making towards acquiring
nuclear capabilities against the US and the USSR, and what is
the status of their nuclear R&D technology?
Emphasize locations and capabilities of delivery
vehicles, and the numbers and types of weapons
in stockpile.
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July 23, 1975
(Revised)
DCI SUBSTANTIVE INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES FOR FY 1976
PROVIDE RELIABLE AND TIMELY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS,
ASSESSMENTS, AND ESTIMATES TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER ELEMENTS
OF THE US GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN POLICY FORMULATION, INTERNA-
TIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON:
SUBSTANTIVE OB_ JECTIV NOS
Political and military developments and trends (including
terrorism) in potentially volatile international situations of
strategic concern to the US.
KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIOBS
THE MIDDLE EAST
39. What are-
Arab (especially Egyptian, Syrian,
Jordanian, Saudi and Palestinian) views on and strategies toward
the major issues of a peace settlement?
40. What are Arab military capabilities, plans 25X6
and intentions?
41. How are the major inter-Arab bilateral and multilateral
relationships evolving?
Consider the implications of to changes in Iranian-
Arab relations. /
42. What is the possibility for and implications of serious
political and economic problems within the key Middle East coun-
tries (e.g., Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Libya,.1,r'a'~
and Iraq) ? 25X6
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SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
43. What indications are there of internal and regional
instability in South Asia?
Pay special attention to India, and the roles
of Iran and the major powers involved in the area.
44. What is the interplay in Southeast Asia among China,
the USSR, and the Communist states of Indochina? .
Include the strategies and objectives of the
Communist states; North Vietnamese and Chinese
support to insurgencies, particularly in Thai-
land; differences and rivalries among the Com-
munist states; and the reactions of the South-
east Asian countries.
45. What are the prospects for stability in the countries
.of Southeast Asia, especially Thailand, and for relations with
the US?
Include implications for US base rights and
intelligence facilities, progress toward re-
gional cooperation, and the impact of changes
in national policy.
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47. What developments --,domestic or international -- are
likely to seriously undermine the political or economic sta-
bility of either North or South Korea, alter the essential
military balance on the peninsula, and increase the possibility
of hostilities?
WESTERN EUROPE
48. What international forces are affecting the larger
West European states and the Community?
Consider how familiar European policies and
European relationships (in Europe, with the
USSR, with the Third World and with the US) are
being affected by:
-- the energy and raw materials problems;
-- international monetary and trade relationships;
-- the course of detente and East-West relationship
generally -- including MBFR and CSCE;
-- conflicts of interest and uncertainties in North-
South issues -- i.e., between Western Europe as
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World;
part of the industrialized world and the Third
rth European policiqs~oward Southern Euro
-- the search for European unity versus national-
istic forces; and
-- problems within the Atlantic Alliance and with
the US arising from the above and other factors.
49. What domestic forces are affecting the policies of the
larger West European states and the Community?
Include the economic, political and social forces
within the European states that are affecting
familiar patterns of European relations with the US,
policies toward NATO, toward the East, intra-
European relations and European policies toward
the Third World. This question includes such
widespread European domestic phenomena as infla-
tion and its social, economic, and political ef-
fects, the narrow political margins of most incum-
challenges to governing moderates or conservatives
bent governments, generational differences ,the
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from the left or splinter parties (including
altered strategies of the Wes European commu-
nist parties) and e? tab 1
ck,.
important interest groups in labor,
industry, students, intellectuals, and the media.
50. What signs of instability are there in Southern Europe?
Address the present and prospective uncertainties
in Iberia, Italy, and in.the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
triangle. These problems differ widely in origin
and effects, but they add up to a situation of
continuing volatility across the southern tier
of Europe, with manifold challenges to US interests.
They present dangers cwf]complicat to our
tor Egropeary lies, and o~portun>i'ties /as well
dilemmas to th tI8'R.
Iberia
-- The policies and politics of the AFM, the role
of the Portuguese Communists and the other po-
litical parties, Portugal's economic problems,
and the questions of Angola and the Azores.
-- The policies and politics of establishment and
opposition in Spain as the transition nears.
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Italy
-- Prospects for the PCI gaining influence and/or
entering the government, the postureeof thecen-
ter-left parties on this issue, and the implica-
tions for NATO and US interests.
Greece-Turkey-Cyprus
-- Domestic and external developments affecting
relationships among these states and between
them and the US, other NATO states, and the
USSR.
LATIN AMERICA
51. What political, economic, and security developments
seriously affect important US interests, particularly in major
countries?
Include blocs or alignments being formed among
Latin American states and indicators of insta-
bility of major governments.
52. What are Cuban attitudes and interests regarding the
normalization of relations with the US?
53. What will the Panamanian government's attitudes and
actions be during the course of negotiations for a new canal
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treaty and, if a treaty is signed, during the ratification
process?
Include willingness and/or ability to accept
delay or breakoff of negotiations, or delay or
rejection of a treaty, and plans for pressure
tactics against the US, particularly a resort
TERRORISM
54. What are the composition, intentions, and capa-
bilities of foreign terrorist or extremist groups?
Include their sources of funds and equipment,
the possibility of seizure or production and
use of weapons of mass destruction (BW-CW as
well as nuclear), their impact on government
policy and stability in their host countries,
and any evidence that Communist or other coun-
tries are influencing them, or rendering direct
support.
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July 23, 1975
(Revised)
JC SUBSTA~JTIVE I T T Ei I IGENCE OBJECTIVES FOR EY 1O 6
PROVIDE RELIABLE AND TIMELY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS,
ASSESSMENTS, AND ESTIMATES TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER ELEMENTS
OF THE US GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN POLICY FORMULATION, INTERNA-
TIONAL NEGOTIATIONS; AND MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON:
SUBSTANTIVE OBJECTIVE -JO , 4
Policies, intentions and capabilities of foreign states
other than the USSR and the PRC to develop nuclear weapons,
chemical and biological weapons, and delivery systems and to
employ them.
KEY INTELLIGEAE QUESTI011
55. What are the objectives, programs and capabilities of
countries other than the US, USSR, UK, France and the PRC for de-
veloping or acquiring nuclear weapons and delivery systems?
Include policies and actions of other countries (in-
cluding nuclear powers) toward assisting the non-nuclear
states in acquiring a nuclear capability.
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S.ERT
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July 23, 1975
(Revised)
DCI SUBSTANTIVE INIELLIGENC.f OBJECTIVES FOR EY 297E
PROVIDE RELIABLE AND TIMELY FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE REPORTS,
ASSESSMENTS, AND ESTIMATES TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER ELEMENTS
OF THE US GOVERNMENT INVOLVED IN POLICY FORMULATION, INTERNA-
TIONAL NEGOTIATIONS, AND MAJOR OPERATIONAL DECISIONS ON:
SU STANTIV OBJ .GAVE NO-L-5
Major foreign economic developments and trends relevant to
US international policy decisions and negotiations, particu-
larly those related to energy, raw materials, food resources,
and to international trade arrangements.
KEY INTELL~GFNCE QUES IO S
PROSPECTS FOR INFLATION AND RECOVERY
56. What changes in measures of economic performance are ex-
pected for the major non-Communist industrial nations, especially
Japan, Germany, Italy, the UK, France and Canada?
Include these governments' domestic and foreign eco-
nomic policies and the likely effect of these policies
on the future performance of these economies and the
US economy.
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
57. What are the principal objectives of the major economic
powers (especially France, Germany, Japan, the UK, Italy, Canada
and Brazil) in the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations?
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Include their possible negotiating tradeoffs and the
electoral and intra-governmental factors that affect
these objectives and tradeoffs. Appraise the con-
sequences of alternative trade agreements to the US
foreign trade balance.
ACTIVITIES OF MAJOR OIL EXPORTERS
What are the changes in amounts and composition (by loca-
tion, currency, type of asset and maturity) of the foreign assets
of the major oil exporting countries, and what are their policies
with respect to placement of surplus funds?
59. What are the policies, negotiating positions and vulner-
abilities of the major petroleum exporters with respect to the
production and marketing of oil?
Include the effects on these policies and vulnerabilities
of prospects for the development of new energy sources,
particularly non-OPEC oil.
POLICIES OF PRODUCERS OF IMPORTANT RAW MATERIALS OTHER THAN PETROLEUI'
60. What changes in production, marketing and pricing policies
are the major producers of important raw materials or primary prod-
ucts considering either individu-
ally or in concert?
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FOREIGN DEMAND FOR US AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
61. What is the likely demand (especially by the USSR,
China,. India, Japan) for imports of wheat, soybeans, rice, corn
and cotton?
Consider the capabilities of countries other than the
US (especially Canada, Argentina, Australia, Brazil)
for supplying these commodities to the world market.
25X6FOREIGN TRADE OPPORTUNITIES
LAW OF THE SEA
63. What are the negotiating positions and bargaining vul-
nerabilities of key countries on the form and content of a Law of
the Sea treaty?
Give particular: attention to issues on which the
attitudes and intentions of these countries are
likely to be so contentious as to jeopardize pros-
pects for a treaty even minimally acceptable to
the United States.
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(Revised)
ADDITIONAL KEY INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS
NARCOTICS
64. Who are the majorr producers, traffickers, and
financiers involved in illicit narcotics?
Include their methods of operation, the
location of their production areas, labora-
tories, storage and transportation facilities,
and how and by what routes and timing they
move illicit narcotics to the United States.
65. How effective are the anti-narcotics programs of
the countries in categories 1 and 2 designated by the Cabinet
Committee on International Narcotics Control as of priority
interest to the US Government's international narcotics con-
trol programs?*
Include the willingness of these governments
to cooperate with and commit resources to US
efforts to expose and prosecute producers,
traffickers and their collaborators. Also,
identify individuals in the respective gov-
ernments who protect and facilitate illicit
narcotics traffic.
A
li_At present, these two categories include Mexico, Thailand, Bur-
ma, Turkey, France, Pakistan, and Colombia; consideration is
being given to adding Ecuador, India, and other countries. It
should be noted that countries may be added to or dropped from
these categories by the Cabinet Committee on International Nar-
cotics Control as circumstances dictate.
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LESS DEVELOPE "COUNTRIE
66. How w'11 t e demands of the many LDCs whose economic
prospects have b seriously retarded by increased costs of
imports (manu ctured oods and energy), and whose export
earnings ( articularly om primary products) have declined,
t"
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