SOVIETS CONTINUE TO EXPAND SAM AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000500300074-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 15, 2002
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: April 1, 1965
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

ILLEGIB
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000500300074-6
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 : CIA-RDP78TO5439A000500300074-6
 SOVIETS CONTINUE TO EXPAND
SAM AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM
SmmE the early 1950's, the Soviets
have been engaged in an extensive
research and development program on
surface-to-air missile (SAM) air de-
fense systems. This effort has resulted
in the development and subsequent
deployment of three distinct SAM
systems. - They are:
? The S A - 4 :-(Guild). -
The SA-2 (Guideline).
? The SA-3 (Goa). -
The SA-1
This missile system has been de-
ployed only in the Moscow area, and
it is expected to be eventually phased
out in favor of other SAM systems.
The SA-1 has a maximum operational
range of 20 to 25 nautical miles,' a
maximum effective altitude of 60,000;
feet, and a minimum altitude effective-
ness of about 3,000. feet. It would
have ' a limited effectiveness up to
80,000 feet, especially if equipped with
a nuclear warhead. The SA-1 site is
handicapped by-a limited field of fire
of about 60 degrees, but it can direct
a high rate of fire against a large
number of targets- simultaneously.
Furthermore, the SA-1 is operation-
ally inflexible and has a limited capa-
bility against high-speed targets. .
Beginning in 1954, the same year
the missile became operational, the
Soviets initiated construction of a ring
of SAM sites around Moscow. In the
late 1950's, two rings had been com-
pleted-an inner ring of 22 SA-1
sites having a radius of about 25
nautical miles from the center of
Moscow and an outer ring of 34 sites
having a radius of about 45 -nautical
miles. -
Each SA-1 site has a herringbone
pattern of' transverse concrete roads
nearly 15- feet wide and contains 60
launch pads (see diagram on page 6).
A basic load of four missiles per
launcher is estimated to be available
either at the site or nearby.
The SA-2 -
The SA-2 system is estimated to .
have achieved an initial operational
capability in_ 1957. Currently, ap-
proximately 1,100 SA-2 sites are be-
lieved to be deployed for point and
area defenses throughout the USSR
and other Warsaw Pact countries.
The SA-2 system with the C-band
Fars : Song radar has about a 25-
nautical-mile maximum operational
range and is effective against aircraft
flying at speeds up to about mach 1.2
to 1.4. The system can have' a 360-
degree field of fire and is capable of
engaging targets at altitudes between
3,000 and =90,000 feet with some
effectiveness - above 90,000. This
missile has provided the Soviets with
a good medium- and high-altitude
air defense weapon with - a limited
low-altitude- capability. Thus, the
SA-2 is not the ultimate air defense
weapon against manned aircraft.
Each SA-2 site contains six drive-
through launch revetments laid out
in a generally circular pattern approx-
imately 500 feet in diameter with
launchers being, about 250 feet -from
each other. .?1 service road surrounds
the six revetments, its perimeter-
forming a circle approximately 900
feet in diameter. Most sites have
three hold revetments, each capable
of holding two missiles. An estimated
four missiles per launcher are available
as a basic load (two on site and two
in the support area), but the reload
capability has the same shortcomings
as the SA-1.
SA-3 (Goa) system
Operational deployment of the SA-3
system is believed to have started in
'the latter part of 1961. Currently,
slightly -more than 100 SA-3's are
deployed primarily around Moscow,
Leningrad, and in certain border
areas most susceptible to low-altitude
attack.
 Air defense posture of Warsaw Pact countries now includes a total of more than 1,200 surface-to-air
missile sites; currently the Soviets have three SAM systems: SA-2's are widely deployed in the Pact
countries, SA-1's and SA-3's also are deployed in the Soviet Union with SA-1's only in Moscow area
The SA-3 missile, which has a maxi-
mum operational range of between 10
to 15 nautical miles, is believed de-
signed to cope with low altitude
attacks, that is, at about 1,000 feet,
although there is no evidence as to
its actual low-altitude effectiveness.
Its maximum effective altitude is
between 25,000 and 50,000 feet.
A typical SA-3 site has a trapezoidal
configuration with four launch pads
about 200 feet apart. Each pad is
connected by access roads to a central
revetted guidance area about 100 by
60 feet in size. Reads also connect
this guidance area to a 140-by-80
foot missile holding-location which is
about 600 feet from the forward
launch area.
Deployment of SAM's
SAM deployment in the USSR
embraces a combination of barrier
and point defenses- The early pattern
of SA-2 -deployment in the Soviet
Union was classic for a short range
air defense weapon- Point defenses
initially appeared at' Moscow, Lenin-
grad, and other large cities, the vital
 links in civil and military command/
control and the backbone of basic war
materiel production. As SAM pro-
duction .mounted, dual- and single-
site defenses of major cities developed
into ringed- defense. In some cases,.
multiple ring defenses were deployed.
Deployment soon spread to surface-
to-surface missile sites, nuclear weap-
ons storage areas,- and along the pe-
ripheral areas of the Soviet Union. As
the number of defended points in-
creased, individual target protection
began to overlap, and perimeter and
coverage became by-products.
Concurrently with this massive
buildup inside the USSR, the SA-2
deployment in the Eastern European
Warsaw Pact countries followed a
parallel path, capital cities first, then-
other large industrial centers. More
than 150 sites-have been identified in
the European Warsaw Pact countries,
and the point defenses are merging
into area coverage in some locations.
A barrier of SA-2 sites-in the USSR
is deployed in a line from the :\Vhite
Sea area and the Kola Peninsula in
the northwest, southward along the
western borders, eastward along the
Black Sea and through the Caucasus,
and along the southern border of
Kazakhstan as Jar east as -'Semi-
palatinsk. In addition, a large num-
ber of SA-2's are deployed in point
defense around significant military
SA-1's are deployed only in Moscow area SA-3 site (above) is believed designed to
and are expected to be phased out. [SI cope with low altitude cttacks. [S]
and industrial targets and population
centers:.
The SA-3 system is complementary
to the SA-2 system and normally is
deployed in close proximity. SA-3's
currently are deployed with only
minor exceptions, in point defense of
ports and naval cities, and in the
SAM barrier along the Polish border.
SA-3's have been deployed, however,
in the outer ring of. the SA-1 sites
northwest and, southwest of Moscow,
and further deployment is expected to
Defense Intelligence Digest
 continue around the ring. Future
SA-3 deployment can he expected .to
reinforce the SA-2 barrier along the
western and southern borders of the
USSR as kvell as point defense in the
interior.
The large gaps in defense along the
far eastern borders and along the
northern perimeter of the country
indicate- an apparent Soviet doctrine
that does not provide barrier-type.
defense coverage as a primary goal.
Moreover, a number of points in the
interior of the USSR received SAM
defense prior.to many places along
the perimeters. The-_ western and'
southern SAM barriers, however, are
exceptions. The area- or zonal de-
fense patterns, for example, assumed
by the SAM sites along the border
areas are believed to play a vital role
in defending MRBM positions which,
'because of their range restrictions, are
near the border and are vulnerable to
enemy air attack.
the Eastern European Warsaw Pact
countries appears to be directed
,primarily toward the defense of that
-country's resources; however, the over-
all deployment reinforces the western
and southwestern air .defenses of the_
Soviet Union.
Defense of centers and installations
The USSR has undertaken a large
and rapid deployment of surface-to-
air missile systems for the point
defense from air attack of important
military installations, industrial com-
plexes, and population centers. The
Soviets probably" will continue to--
provide SAM defense for an installa-
tion-or center that is large-or vital to
the nation's economy or to the military.
This deployment includes installations
whose operations require a long lead
time in either personnel training and
development of skilled manpower or
the development of the area's resources. -
Such centers or installations may be
grouped as follows: -
? Long-range offensive installations
or centers. Included here are the
ICBM complexes and the IRBM/
bomber bases; nuclear weapons storage
sites such as those in Dolon, Ukraina,-
and Engels; and submarine bases and
construction centers such as Leningrad,
Apri11965
CAPABILITY OF ;SAM SITES -
RESTRICTED BY MASKING
THE effective minimum-altitude capability of individual SA-2 sites varies,
although inherent characteristics of associated hardware are static. The
differences in altitude capability depend upon masking effects of local ter-
rain,* radar conditions, and. target characteristics; The current estimated
minimum effective- altitude is 3,000 feet, but under certain optimum condi-
tions, the SA-2 is believed to possibly have a limited capability below 3,000
feet. Of 40 representative Soviet installations evaluated, 10 were masked in
75 percent, and 20 in 50 percent, of their field of fire. No site was found free
of limitation.
The masking effects of the SAM defense complex at Yerevan, Armenian
SSR, are shown below. The diagram on the -left illustrates, for a single site,
the extent of radar masking or the limits of radar line-of-sight within a 27-
nautical-mile radius at 3,000 feet above the elevation of the SAM site, which
is about 5,360 feet. - For this site, an aircraft entering the unshaded area
would be in the line-of-sight of the radar. .Lock-on may not occur, however,
as radar capabilities may be handicapped by ground return which could
- The- large masked - area for the single site clearly illustrates the need for
additional defense installations.. Evidently, the Soviets are aware of the
masking problem and have deployed three ether SAM sites to. increase
defense coverage.
The diagram on the right, which is a composite of the four sites-A, B,
C, and D-greatly increases radar line-of-sight coverage. In each drawing,
earth curvature has not been -considered, but it would be a factor to be
With the SA-3 system, the masking
problem is considerably more acute.
As a result, deployment is. carefully
determined, and _ in . some cases, the
associated radars for the SA-3 such as
Low Blow and Flat Face, have been
placed on platforms 40 to 50 feet high.
This elevation is intended to clear the
masking of nearby trees and surmount
nearby low terrain. (S]
TYPICAL SA-3 radar on tower, [S]
'Since radar signals travel in a straight line, a terrain feature interrupting the signals
obstructs the line-of-sight. This obstruction creates a fan-shaped area behind the obstacle
which is not radar covered.. This is the masked area. -
Secret .7
 SA-2
Deployment
Murmansk, Pechenga, Kaliningrad,
Komsomolsk, and Nakhodka. The
great majority of such installations are
defended by SA-2's. -
? Important military research and
development ? centers. The primary
centers are Kapustin Yar, Tyuratam,
and Sary Shagan. The important
nuclear weapons research development
centers include' Sarova, Dodonovka,
Kasli, Kyshtym, Yuryuzan, and
Nizhnaya Tura.
? Industrial complexes and installa--
tions. Foremost in this category are
the large cities with their attendant
industrial capabilityand resources such
as Moscow, Leningrad, Kuybyshev,
Sverdlovsk, and Balzu. In - addition
are the large dams and hydroelectric
8 Secret
The present SAM deployment pat-
tern presents considerable difficulty in
actually determining which targets'
are defended by a particular SAM or
a group of SAM's. The defense cover- -
age by SAM's overlaps, and whether
a SAM site is a part of an area or
point defense pattern is.often open to
conjecture. Within the defense range
of an SA-2, installations may include
ICBM or nuclear weapons storage sites
near a large city which also includes a
number of impottant industrial tar- -
gets. Even with various areas of heavy
overlap, there is a wide range in the
quality and quantity of defense cover-
age. provided in the USSR-ranging .
from poor to excellent, with from 1 to
more than 80 SAM's- defending a
singlearea or center.
Role in ground- forces
Little information is available con-
cerning deployment of surface-to-air
missiles with the Soviet ground forces.
Each Soviet field army is believed, to
include three battalions (six launchers
each) of SA-2's and it is estimated that -
four battalions'of low-altitude SA-3's
or some other low-altitude missile
system will eventually be provided.
These weapons, however, probably
can be integrated into the PVO Strany
(Air Defense Forces of the.Homeland)
when required. -
In the Moscow 1964. May Day
Parade, the Soviets exhibited for the
first time the Ganef, a dual-mounted
missile system on. a tracked chassis.
This missile is believed to be a surface-
to-air weapon for deployment with
field troops and, with the exception of
a somewhat reduced maximum alti-
tude, has performance characteristics
roughly similar to those of *the.
Guideline. -
- The Ganef has been seen only in the
parades of last May and November,
and the extent of its deployment can be
estimated only on the basis of require-
ments. It does not appear likely,
however, that this missile would he
deployed in a fixed pattern similar to
those of previous SAM's.
Deployment of the SA-2 and SA-3
systems is continuing, and it is
expected they eventually will cover.
all significant targets in the. Soviet
Union. - [END]
Defense Intelligence Digest
stations such as those at Volgograd,
Kuybyshev, and Bratsk. -
Population centers. Practically-all
cities with populations exceeding
100,000 are within the effective de-
fensive range of at least one SAM site.
In this extensive deployment of SAM
defenses, the Soviets have chosen to
protect large cities- with their attendent
industrial capacity, important mili-
tary R&D centers, skilled manpower,
and over-all capability to produce
weapons- and other war materiel.
Also, the large cities are located on
the principal' surface transportation
links,. and many are key transportation
hubs. As more `militarily important
installations are located in or near the
large cities, the defensive requirements
in turn are increased. -