THE SOVIET MISSILE SYSTEM: GOA [U]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05439A000500010016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 87
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 16, 2002
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 1, 1965
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2002/07/02 :CIA-RDP78T05439A000500010016-2
Approved For Release 2002/07/02 :CIA-RDP78T05439A000500010016-2
 SfCRE~
AN ARMY INTELL-IGENCE DOCUMENT
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PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS.
THE SOVIET MISSILE .SYSTEM:
GOA (U)
MIS 21-65
M-A R~C H 19 6 5
PREPARED BY
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U..S. ARMY MISSILE COMMAND
REDSTONE ARSENAL, ALABAMA
THIS- DOCUMENT WAS -COMPILED -AND PUBLISHED BY THE-
ARMY MISSILE COMMAND AFTER APP~tOVAL IN TH.E OFFICE
OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE -
AND. THEREFORE CONTAINS AGREED DEPARTMENT OF THE
.ARMY INTELLIGENCE. ~ - -
-WA-RN 1 NG: NOT-ICE-
SENSITIVE SOURCES AND METHODS fNVOLVED
- THIS INFORMATION 1~
FOREIGN GOV$RNMENTS
SECRET
RELE.AS-ABLE TO
25X1 C.
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? (S) .FOREWORD' (U)
(S) MIS-21 -65 presents the results of an engineering analysis
of?the GOA missile and transporter. -Photographs of the.-missile and
transporter as they appeared for the first time in the November 1964
Moscow Parade, and scalings from the. photographs, were the- basis
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a - for the analysis.
- (S) This study was prepared by .the Dir.ect~rate of Missile
Intelligence, U. S. Army Missile Command, Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama with support from the Research and Development Director-
ate,' -U. S. Army Missile-Command, and-the U. S: Army Foreign
`Science and TechnoTog-X Cen"ter, Washington, D: C. , ~ - - - --
(U). Comments or queries relating to this report should be ad-
dressed to the Commanding General, U~ S: Army Missile Gourmand; .
Redstone, Arsenal, Alabama, ATTN: AMSMI-.Y. -
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 S EC R~~"~_
(S.) TABLE.OF CONTENTS (U)
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(S) INTRODUCTION (LJ)
:' (S) SUMMARY (U) .
(S)' CONCLUSIONS (U) .
D. (S) -Performance (U) .
-E. (S) Warhead (U) .
F. ~(S7 Transport"er" (U) -' .'
Pa~C
~A.- (S) Propulsion (U) - _ _ .. 7
B. (S) Aerodynamics" (U) 7
C. (S) Electronics (U) .. ti
IV. (S) DISCUSSION (U) ~ ?.
A. (S) General (U) - - ,-- - - . - - ? 9 ,
B. (S) Propulsion Systeiizs (U) - - 9
C. (S) Aerodynamics (U) 15
D: (S) Electronics (U) _ 19
E. (S) Performance (U) . .- '. 21
F. (S) Warhead (U) - - - . 23
G. ? (S) Transporter (U) . " 23
APPENDIX I. (S) GOA MISSILE PROPULSION
ANALYSIS (U) ,
51
APPENDIX III- (S) FLAT FACE RADAR (C) 69
A. (S) Description .(U) _ ~. _ 69
B. (S) Technical Characteristics (U') , . E,')'
. ~ I
APPENDIX II. (S) MISSILE AERODYNAMICS'- (U) .
A. (U) Symbols a,Xd Nomenclature (U). ~ .
. I3. (S) Aerodyiidii~ic Analysis (U). i..
APPENDIX I~'.
APPENDIX V.
(S) POSTULATED: GUIDANCE S~'STEM_ ~ . 71
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(U). REFERENCES
7 -1
(U) DISTRIBUTION -LIST (U) ~ - 75
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(S) FIST OF FIGURES (U) -
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. Fi~ur.e _ page
1 (C) Soviet Missile GOA Mounted on Transporter (U) :. vi
2 (S) .SA-3 Site Configuration. (U) 2
3 .. {S-NOFORN) Photograph of SA-3 Site (C). 3
4 (S) SA-3 System Deployment in USSR (S) . 4
5 (?S) GOA Missile Dimensions (U) _ !0
6 (C) The GOA Transporter Dimensions (U) .? 11
7 (S) Probable Location of GOA Missile _
? Components (U) l2
8 '.(S) Assumed Booster Grain Design (U). 13
9 (C) Possible Antenna Locat~ons on the GOA
? Missile =(.U) 18
10 (S) Probable Oper~`ting Envelope of GOA Missile (U) 20
11 (C,) Main Support Beam Mounting Points (U) 24
12 (C)- GOA Missile. Transporter (U) 26
13 (C) Geo2zietry of the Loading and Unloading
.Transmission Assembly (U), -.- 27
14 (C) Front Support Assembly (U) . 28
15 (C) ? Loading and Unloading Brake Mechanism (.U) 29
lb (C) GOA Transporter Main Beam Assembly (U) . 30
17 (C) Recognitioxl Features of the GOA .Transporter (U) 31
18 (C) GQA. Loading Profile .Onto the Launcher (U) . 32.
_ T9 (S) Booster Motor Envelope (U). 41
20 (S).. Assui~~ed Booster Motor 'Configuration (U) 43.
21- (S) Estin~.ated Burning Rate as a Funr_Lion of
Chamber Pressure for Several ~ _
Propellant Temperatures `(U) ~~ ~ 44
22 (S). Sustainer Motor- Envelope (U) .. 47 '
23 (U) Nomenclature and Sigii Convention :(U). . ~ ~ 52
24 (S) Centel- of Pressure Location versus Mach
- Number for. Com_ plete Missile and
Sustainer (U) :. .- _ .. .56
~25 (S)Lero-Lift Drag Coefficient,. CD, as a Function
- of Mach Number and Altitude (U') _ _. ..- 57
26 (S) Variation ~of CNQ, with Mach Number (U) ~59
27 (S) Booster Stabilizer Fins;Variation of CN~Y ?With..
h4ach Number (U) 60
28 (S) Variation of CND, -with Macli Nunibei-, Sustainer
Stabilizer and Control Fins (U) 61
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(S)
30
(S)
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(S)
3Z
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33
(S)
34
(S)
(S) LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)
(U)
:.
pale
Variation _of CNQ, and Center of Pressure with
~ ..
Mach Number (-U) . ? _
62
im as a Function of Mach Number (U)
5/atr
63
.
Nor-mal Force per Degree Angle of Attack
Variation with Mach Number and -
Altitude
(U) -.
64
Maximum
Altitude
Allowable a and b as. a Function of
(Sustainer Ignition) (U). _
65
Maximum
Allowable a' and b as a Function of
Altitude
(Sustainer Burnout) (U)
6b
Estimated
Coi~~poncnt Locations and -Wei~ht5 (U)
67
(S) LIST OF TABLES (U)
Page
1 (S) summary of GOA Missile Characteristics (U) `. ~ 6
2 (S) -Summary of Estimated Booster Performance
(70?F) (U) '14
(U) ZIL- 1 57 Truck Characteristics
(S) Booster PerforrT~arice (U) ?:"
(S) Sustainer Perforii~as-x-e (U). -
(LJ) .
16
22
46
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 (S). The Soviets have developed and deployed a low altitude
surface-to-air defensive missile desi~nat~d by the intelligence con~-
munity as-the GOA. This missile was first displayed in the November
1964 Moscow :Parade (Figure 1). The missile is dual mounted on a
modified ZIL-157 truck. The transporter/loader :vehicle appears
equipped with missile..checkout equipment and the necessary mecHanisms
for missile off-loading onto the launchers. 'phis engineering ancly5i~,
-based upon photographic evidence and photographic interpretation, ~ir-
fine-s the configuration, performance and operating characteristics ~~f
the GO~ missile..
(S) The Soviets have deployed the SA e3 missile system (using;
the GOA missile) to over 1 00 ~ sites within the Soviet Union (Figures L,
3, and 4). Although system development was underway in 1959 at the
Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range, the missile was not shown until the
7 November ~1-9.64 Moscow Parade. The system .'fire control radar,
designated .LOW -BLOW, -has not been seen in detail;.nor has a definite
ELINT signal been associated with this equipment. A generalized.
engineering- analysis of the two_probable guidance schemes can, how-
ever, be made on the basis of available information. y
 SfC?RET
450'
200
PROBABLE
GUIDANCE
AREA
(REVETTED
_J
? I U/I OBJECTS
REVETTED LAUNCH PAD ??';"~~?%~~:;;;.:
240
I I
U/1 BUILDINGS II
- NOTE -
DIMENSIONS TO ~5%OR~IOFT.
WHICHEVER 13 ('EATER
100 O 100 20~. 'HARDSTAND/
i I I I i
FEET - -
- 10..1I0
60'i+
'Fi%ure 2. (S) S_~-~ Situ Cunli~uratic>n. (iJ)
E
I40'
PROS ~ ~???,?
HOLD AREA''-???"' _
U/I
OBJECT
~~ I I O' -~i
~ U/ 1
OBJECT
NPIG 6-8919 (S/62)
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II. (S) SUMMARY (U) _ .
(S) The GOA surface-to-air missile is atandem-configured,
two-stage vehicle using solid propellant motors in both~stagt:s. -The
missile launch weight is estimated to be about 2050 pounds. TIiC most
probable warhead is high explosive with directional fragmentation and
weighs about 175 pounds.
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- (S )' Two GOA missiles are .mounted on a dual-rail launcher which
is probably trainable in both azimuth and elevaticin.
(S) The missile has a maximum slant-range capability of about
12 T}m, and a maximum altitude. capability of about 35, 000 feet (based
on a 2 g maneuver limitation at this altitude). 'The system minimum
altitude capability is unknown, but is not dependent upon missile .limi-
tations (beyond missile control dyad zone).
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 TABLE 1, (S) SUMMARY OF GOA MISSILE CHARACTERISTICS. (U)
Characteristics
Sustainer and
Booster
Length
19.23 ft
12.42 ft
6. 81 ft
Diameter
15. 2 in
21. ~ in
Empty weight
1273 lb
81O lb _
463 lb
Propellant weight
777 lb
260 lb ~ .
517 lb
Launch weight
2050. lb
1070 lb
980 lb
Warhead weight
175 lb' HE Frag
Propellant type
Double base solid
Double base solid
Thrust~(sea level)
3477 lb
30, 500 lb
Specific impulse.,
2141b-sec/lb
214 1b-sec/lb
Burning time
.o, .
16 sec (average)
3. 0'=4.3 sec
'Maximum velocity
Mach 1.65-1.7
Maximum effective
maneu~-ering altitude
!?pproximately 2g's)
~1,xim~in: c-f:ective range
' Mach 2. 5
9
35, 000 ft
X12 nm (approximate)
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III. (S) CONCLUSIONS (U) _
(S) A summary of'the GOA missile characteristics is presented
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in Table 1. The fallowing conclusions
of this report.
A. (S) Propulsion (U)
1. (S)_ ste~r (U)
B. (S) Aerodynamics (U)
- (S) Booster propulsion is provided by a solid propel-
lant rocket motor probably using an e}arude.d double-Vase solid pro-
pelIant similar to that used ~n the SA-Z booster. This motor. would
provic~le an average thrust of approximately 30, 500 pounds with a burn-
time between 3 and 4. 3 seconds depending on nozzle plug adjustment
for ambient temperature. The -total impulse is_ sufficient to boost the
missile to about, Mach 1.65-1.70 at booster burnout The nozzle plug
is manually adjusted .prior to launch to partially compensate for va~iia-
tions in the propellant grain temperature and to maintain the thrust
level within acceptable limits.
Z. (S) Sustainer .(U)
(S) The sustainer also-has a solid propellant socket. _
motor -which provides an estimated 3500 pounds thrust for--_ an average
16 seconds burntime. The propellant is estimated. to be the same as
that used in the booster, i. e. an extruded, duubte-base type.. An
adjustable plug is also used in the sustainer nozzle to compensate for
variation in propellant grain temperatures. Maximum sustainer burn-
out velocity has been calculated to. be about Mach L. 5.. - .
(S) Aerodynamic control of the GOA missile
four canard:control fins near the Huse of the sustainer.
back cruciform fins
wink, cruciform fins
surfaces on one pair
'I'lie tapered forward
booster reduce form
are deriv.~d from the contents
is provided by
Fixed swept-
sustainc~r, and fold-out, straight
on the boosti~r provide stabilizatioli. Aileron
of sustainer stabiliser fins provide roll control.
section of the sustainer liudy and the. boat-tailed
and base drag. 'T'his detailed attention to drat;
reduction i5 necessary to perSoriziance in a lo~v :-Iltitudr_ niis~ic~n. r'~11
control sur-facts arc: in-line and oriented at_ an aligle~ of =i5 de~,r~es w-itli
respect to the pitch ;snd yaw planes. 7'he I~zissile is prul~ably flown-in
this carne rolativu position ttu obtain niaxill~ulli advantabe of the control _
surfaces.
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C. (S) Electronics. (U)
(S) Thy identical probable antennas, apparently polyrod
t~rpe, on each of the .sustainer stabilizer fin tips could be used in either
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command or a_ beam rider guidance system. Antennas could be lo-
ated in the top tunnel over the warhead section or in the open spaces
f the rod-like tunnels on the sides of the sustainer: Present infor-
ation is inconclusive to determine the existence of antennas in either
D. (S)~ Perform-ance (U)
(S) Structural design limitations on maneuver capabilities -
c nnot be~ determined with a high degree of confidence from presently -
a ailable information. "A maneuver capability limitation of.8 g's ap-
p ars reasonable and has been used in~his study to define the maximum
c pabilities. The maximum altitude capability of about.35, 000 feet has
b en based on a minimum 2 g maneuver capability at this altitude and
t e maximum slant range capability of about 12 nm was computed for
r sidual velocities and maneuver capabilities.of Mach 1. 3 an,d 2_g, ,_
r spectively. Minimum altitude intercept capability, unknown at this
t'me, is dependent primarily on the ground based, electronics and siting
c nditions. .The missile configuration and characteristics do not limit
the system low-altitude .capabilities (beyond .the missile contTOl dead
z ne). _
(S) Warhead (U)
(S) Availatble space and configuration of the warhead section,
~d weight and balance estimates, -are consistent with a high explosive,
directional fragmentation warhead weighing approximately 175 pounds.
(S) Transporter (U)
- (S) The GOA missile transporter utilizes the.LIL-157
t uck as the basic vehicle. Tv.~o missiles are secured. to ,individual
s pport beams which are probably utilized to load- the m'isrile onto a
T uncher rails A fixed tubular rack, separate from the missile sup-
p ~ rt beam-s, provides ready access to the missile and loading mecha-
nism for missile maintenance, preliminary checkout, and for trans-
.1_oading operations.
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-IV. (S) DISCUSSION (U)
1. (S) Booster (U) ..
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(S) Boost velocity i5 achieved u-sing a solid prul~ellant
A. (S) General (U) - - - .
1. (S) Dimen-sions of the GOA missile and trap purtCr -:
are? shown in Figures 5 and 6. ;Some dimensions will probably Ix? _
refined at a later. date. Minor dimensional refinements will-iiut ef- .
fect the over;-all estimated characteristics and performance capabili-
-.ties of the missile. -
2. (S) Photography of the missile does nut reveal access
hatches or doors, but external conduits, protuberances, and .actuator
rods are apparent which. suggeshe locations of various missile cuni-
ponents (Figure 7).
- a. - (S) The- solid propellant i5 probably an extruded
double-Vase .type identical to_th.e SA-2 booster propellant. .Eight- pro- -
pellant sticks' of this type. can be arranged symmetrically iri -the motor
case (Figure f3)., The SA=L booster pr upellant characteristics- are
similar to a U. S. double-base propellant desi~,nated for JATO use.
b. (S) The booster motor case appears to be d. s~-aa,dard
cylinder with semiellipsoidal ends. The likely candidate for the case
`material is a chrome-vanadiu_ni steel such as. that designated EI-659
by the Soviets and: listed as a material fur rocket motors and-'cases.
An allowable desil;n hoop stress for this n,at~rial would t>.e about
-15, 000 to 50, 000 psi. The case wall ttiicknc=ss,, .estimated to 1~C about
0. L76 inches. (7 nzm), is compatible with the widths of the machines
w-olds obser-ved in the.photo?,rdphy. - -
? c. (S) L~~sulatiun is nurn~slly rcquircii to prevent n thickness
of about 0. 1 inch linYits the temYeraturi? ri s~~ -tu about 600 ? 1:':
d. (S) The 5tand
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control fin deflection angle is -required to maintain a -given trim angle
of attack. The allowable angle of attack increases with? altitude but
decreases with-increasing Mach number since the normal force is
proportional to the dynamic pressure.
- - c. (S) Figure 33 may be misleading? unless the partic-
ular conditions used for the computations are kept~n mind. The
Mach number range of 2. 2 to 2. 7 at sustainer burnout is based on
- minimum drag from a zero-lift trajectory. Drag will increase sharply
with angle of attack. Experimental data based on wind tunnel testing
of the sustainer configuration-are necessary to determine Lhe drag
- curve as a function of angle of attack for the low supersonic and-
transonic regimes. Theoretical approaches are not sufficiently ac=
curate to warrant computations of the. effects of maneuvers on mis-
a Bile velocity before or after sustainer burnout. -The computations
-that can be obtained for. zero-lift`trajectori-es do provide a reasonable
- basis for estimating a ma eimum altitude capat~ility of approximately
o , 35, 000 feet and a slant range ca_ pability of approximately 1 2 nm. -
Lv -
6 t3
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APPENDIX?III. (S) FLAT FACE RADA12.: (C)
A. (S) Description (U)
(S) The FLAT FACE is amedium-range, low-altitude,
surveillance radar. This radar has" two elliptical paraboloid re-
flectors, each approximately 7 feet by 18 feet; mounted horizontally
one above the other atop abox-bodied LIS-151 Van. This radar.is
considered to have an effective low-altitude search capability -and
probably lias anticlutter circuits to minii~~ize ground returns and
some _ECM.
B. - (S)
-
Technical Characteristics
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(U)
_
'~
RF ?
81 5-8-15,
880-91 5 Mcs
PRF " -
=X80-5Z0,
630-710 pps
PVV
1 . 5-2. '5 ?sec~
Seari
Circular 8: 5-9. 3 spr
? HBW
4. 5-11.0?
c, y
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APPENDIV IV. (S) POSTULATED GLJIDANGE SYSTEM (U)
(S) A postulated beam-rider guidance system compatible with
both the GOA-missile electronics and the general configuration of the
probable fire control radar, LOW BLOW (characteristics unknown,
see MIS 31 -63, "Sino-Soviet Block Missile and- Space Technology -
Summary 1963"), is described below. In general terms, the target
track radar would acquire and track the target making it possible to
determine the launch time. After launch, the missile would derive .
.its guidance signals from a conically scanned beam transmitted by
the missile guidance rada-r. -The target tracking radar could employ
.two troughs and a dish antenna. Another dish antenna could function
with the missile guidance.-radar-. The antennas. for both radars could
be mounted on a single pedestal:-
(S) Target Track Radar (U) .
a. (S) This radar probably can function as limited
acquisition- type while transmitting energy at a lower PRF than that
used during the guidance mode.- It can be expected'to operate similar
to the FAN SONG in that a guidance officer initially chooses the tar-
get of interest from,data derived by the~I:OW BLOW .radar or from
some other acquisition radar (FLAT FADE) operating in the vicinity.
After acquisition, operators probably manually track the targeb using
scopes. An automatic tracking mode would be expected, although _
this mode ~~vould be dependent upon clutter return and jamming signals.
In case of jamming, alternate fz-equencies could be utilized since, in
the system being described, the missile is not in any way dependent
on the target track radar frequency for its guidance.. Circular polari-
zation of the transmitted energy from the LOW BLOW would be ex-
pecte This would allow the use of one transmitter for tracking pur-
t
i
es
ma
poses with the troughs receiving they.reflected energy. Since est
h
an.
of the maximum range o~ the missile appear to be. not greater t
ht b
i
e
g
appro ?imately 12 nm, a-PRF iii 'the range of 5000 to 3750 m
_ _ ,. ~_ ~~ ___ n -
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lower PRF of 2500 to 1875 might also be expected for the acquisition
mode of operation for ranges of 32 to ~3 nm, respectively. If~the PRF
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bandwidth
is ch nged from acquisition tc~ guidance modes,.. the receiver
and p lse width might also b-e changed as in the FAN SONG.
b. (S) This radar ~ti'ould Have advantages at low look
-angle in a clutter environment because the expected higher PRF'
would permit the use of narrower range gates. A second advantage
would be the- probable incorporation of narrower. receiver band~~~idths
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since the reception of a beacon signal for the missile is not a require-
ment in this guidance scheme. More clutter energy is returned from
horizontal rather than vertical polarized eYiergy, therefore, the ar-
rangement of the troughs (45? from horizontal) un the LOW BLOW ?m ay
be a compromise between the two.
2. (S) Missile Guidance Radar
a. (S) This radar is expected to radiate either one or
two beams of cun~cally scanned energy; however, for the purpose- of
presenting a postulated guidance s~eme, a system is described which
uses two beams, each operating at different frequencies. ~ The first
beam would be. radiated at a frequency designated ft and would be re-
latively large in width and of lower power density than the second '
beam. The second beam, frequency designated fL, -would be narrower
in width and its beam center would be oflset~frocn.the dish bor~esight
by a much smaller ankle than the fit 5t. "I'hc two beazzis should be
conically scanned at the same rata acid any n~ udulatiori appearing on
the radiated beams should be synchruniz~.d with the conical s~_an
frequency. The? frequency of these t~e-o beams would` probably not
differ by'more than a few mega:cycles. The dish ~vfiich radiates these
beams would be buresighted ~~ith the target track radar unless a lead
;collision course mode were: included in the-LOW BLOW system. If
a lead collision triode wort; included, the.niissilt: guidance dish would
be capable of mo~?enltnt in order that. its fine. buani~cquld be positioned
i?n space at a computed intercept point.
b. (S) During flight the. missile would utilize the two
beams in the fullo~~?ing rizanner:
(1) (L1) ~'ulluw an appruxi:z~ately straight flight from
launch until entering the brc~aci be~ri~ of the missile guidance r-adar.
? - (2) (S) Durivt coarse guidance signals from the
beam and guide. itself to the canter of the broad beam, placing it in
the narrow beam frequency (i~). "1'izu error deriving circuits would
automatieall}~ switch front the cuars~~ to the fint~ I~eani frequency.
The missile would than ~~ppruach tliu b~~resight axis of the guidance?
dish and prucetd toward the targ~-t. Ont ?pu5sible uunii~~uratiun of
_the electronic package unbuarci Lh~ ~?iii5sile would consist, of the four
antennas feeding ~iiergy to four fairs of niicru~vave cavities. One
cavity in each pair ~ti~uuLci bt~ tunc?cl to tht? I~ruacl beam frequency (ft)
and the other to tho n~irru~~? Learn frc-clucncy (f`). '1'ht output from
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these cavities would be amplitude detected and fed to error deriving
circuits. The error signals fed.to the guidance control components
would be determined by the amplitude and phe.se of the energy detected
from the cavities.
c. (S) The cavity pairs onboard the missile could be
tuned by plungers attached to gears and driven by a synchro. Another
synchro on?the external surface iii conjunction with some type frequency
scale would permit the quick changing of the cavity frequencies to c~r-
respond with any change in the broad and narrow beam frequencies of
the missile guidance radar. Such a device could tie located within the
box on the interstage section of -the missile (Figure 9).
d. (S) As indicated in the analysis of-the polyrod an-
tenilas, the center frequency is approximately L.7 gib.acycles. If
the guid~}rrce scheme described herein is used, the frequency of the
transmitted energy from the missile'k;uidance~radar sliuuld be shout
2. 7 gigacycles and scanned at- an approximate rate o~ between LO and
100- revolutions per second. "T lie transmitted power would be relatively
high if the missile package as dx~scribed was being used. 'i'he tran5.,-
mitted power would probably have coristaiit pulses with- an amplitude
or frequency modulation. Any niodul.atiun present sliuuld bc; sync?hro- -
nized with,the conical scan frequency.
e. (S) Terminal hullling could be incorporated into tihe
missile. If an antenna were placed in the nu'se section ui the missile
and its beam offset from-.the missile lungil:udinal axis ~It some. syuint~
angle and conically scanned at the: same rate as the Iiarruw -and I~r~dd
beam's of the. guidance radar; then terminal homing guidance could ve
.accomplished using the same errcir~_deriving circuits as used during
the initial stage of flight__ This :antenna ci~uld uYciratc~ at the, fre-quenc:y
of the target track radar by including another cavity unl~oard tuned to
this frequency.
" f. (S) The t;uiddnce schenlc described wuulci all~~w
several missiles to be fired gat a target ur grc, alp of targets. S(~I7l t,
time should elapse between firings to prevent a nilsslle di5turl~ing'
the guidance radar radiation pattern for~utkiur r.Iiissilos' Lirud ~~t the
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APPENDIX V. (U) REFERENCES (U)
1 . Pitts, William C. Nielson, and George E. Kaattari, "Lift
and Center of Pressure of ing-Body-Tail Combinations at
Subsonic, Transonic, and Supersonic Speeds", NA CA Report,
No. 1307, 1959
2. Love, Eugene S. "Base Pressure at Supersonic Speeds of
Two-Dimensional Airfoils and on 13odies of Revolution With
and Without Fins Having Tur}~ulent Boundary~Layers ", NA CA
TN 3819, 1957 .
3. Krost, H. H. W. L. Chow, and G. .W. Tumwalt, "R`esearch
on Transonic and Supersonic Flow of a Real Fluid at Abrupt
Increase in Cross 'Section", University of Illinois ME~ TR 392-5
4. Spearman, M. Leroy, "Aerodynaiiiic Characteristics ~in Pitch
of a Series of Cruciform-Wing Missiles with Canard Controls
at a Mach Number of 2. O 1 ", NASA TN D-839, May, 1 y61
5. .Love, Eugene S. , "Experii-nentdl and Theoretical Studies of
Axisymmetric Free Jets", NASA TR R-6, 1959
r
6. Chow, W. L. and A. L. Addy, "h7teraction Between Primary
and Secondary, Streams of Supersonic Ejector Systems and
Their Performance", AIAA Journal, 2, April, 1 y64"
UNCLASSIFIED
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APPENDIX VI. (U) DISTRIBUTION LIST (U)
State Department
.Central Intelligence Agency
National Security Agency. ~ .
National Indications Center.-
U. S. Intelligence. Board
(GMAIC) .
(JAEIC) ,
(SIC)
National Photographic Interpretation Center
Military Liaison to Atomic Energy Coninzissioii
Number of Copies
Naval-Intelligence .. . ^ 20
U. S. Naval Photographic Interpretation Center 2
10
6
USAF Foreign Technology Division 5
Air Force Intelligence 20
Joint G~hiefs of Staff, Technical Intelligence Branch, _
J-2 2
Defense Intelligence Agency .. ~ 24
OFFUT Air Force Base,. JLED 129. 1
CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group ~ 1
Undersecretary of the Army .. .
Assistant Secretary, Research anti Developiiic-nt
Deputy Chief of Staff, Military Operations
75 -
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DISTRIBUTION LIST (Continued)
Number -of Copies
Assistant Chief of Staff, Force Development . 3
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Office of Assistant Chief of Staff for Intellil;ence 10.
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(DSR for, SpAD) (1 )
(World -Wide Division) ~ (1 )
(Scientific and Technical Division) - (1 )
(DPP&A) _
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(U. S. Army Imasery InterprFtation Center) - (3)
U S. Army Europe . _ ._... 1 5'
U: S. Army Pacific _ - ~ 10
?VIII Airborne Corps .. 3
U. S. Army Materiel Con~,i~arid _ 5
U. S. Army Mobility Con~iz~and. 1'
U. S. Arm}r Munitions Coininancl 1
U. S: Army Weapons Coii~ci~and _ .. - 1
U_ S. Army Test and Evaluation Coiiz,>.,nd ' - Z
U. S. Ar-my Electronics Co,nil,and 2
llc?adqua-rt~rs, U. S. Army r~ir ?Dc~lc~n's~? Cc>n,cnanci 1
CG, Carlisle Barracks, Pa. Aitn; Ons Gp. Sew 6 1
CG, Fort Ritchie, Md. Attn: Det r'', Sec 9 1
CG, Aberdeen Pruvinl; Ground, IVlriryland '3
U. S. Army Arsenal, .F~'rankl'ort. - 1
U. S. A.rn~y Combat Development Coiiini~i,id 5
U. S. .Army C:on~hat Development Coti~m~~nd
Artiller}: A}~ency 1 .
U. S. Army Co~~~i~at Develol~ii~ent Cu,li,i:~acid Air -
Defens~ A~c:ncy. _ _1
U. S. Army Securit}~ .~~~;encv.. I
13arrv Diamond I~~il~or~ctories. - L
Foreign Scic?nc-e and Technology .Center l 0
LJ. S. Army Intelli~enc~e Center : Z
LJ. S. Air Defense Sr l,oo l 1
U. S. Army Artillc-ry rind Missile Sc~,c,ol 1
- U. S. Ariz~v Ordn~i,ic-e ~~uidE:d Missile Sc-l,ool. 1 .
U. S. Ar,n}' Ordnance School - 1
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U. S. Ai-n,y Aviation Cc?{atur '. -. 1
U. S. Army Artillery Board 1
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DISTRIBUTION LIST (Continued)
Number of Copies
U. .S. Army Air Defense Board.
1
U, -S. Army Airborne and?Electronics
U. ~S. Army Aviation Boa~d
Board.
1 .
I
Director, Special Weapons Development.
1
U.
S. Army Missile Command
43
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(1 )
?
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(1)
(AMCPM-MA)
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(AMSMI-R)
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(1 5) ? .
(AMSI~II-I)
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(1 )
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(1 )
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~ (1 )
(AMSMI-XBH)
(1 )
,(AIvISMI-Y)
_ (iL)
(Electronic Defense Laboratories,
Sylvania)
(l )
(Electromagnetic Systems Laboratory,
Inc.)
(l )
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THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, (18 USC 793,794),
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