ELECTRONICS FACILITIES AT KAPUSTIN YAR SSM RANGE AND VLADIMIROVKA ADVANCES WEAPONS AND RESEARCH COMPLEX USSR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T05162A000100010074-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 74
• Publication Date: April 1, 1970
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL PHOTOGRAPHIC
INTERPRETATION CENTER
PHOTOGRAPHIC
INTERPRETATION
REPORT
ELECTRONICS FACILITIES AT KAPUSTIN YAR
SSM RANGE AND VLADIMIROVKA ADVANCED WEAPONS
AND RESEARCH COMPLEX
USSR
GROUP 1: EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION
APRIL 1970
COPY N0118
45 PAGES
PIR-017/70
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INSTA I.LATION OR ACTIVITY NAMF
Electronics Facilities at Kapustin Yar SSM Range and Vladimirovka
Advanced Weapons and Research Complex
? NA
See Below
See Below
See Below
ACIC. US Air Target Charts, Series 200, scale 1:200,000
NA
250592AA
INTRODUCTION
This report on range-wide electronics components is based on large-scale
photographic coverage which makes possible an analysis of many pieces of
electronics equipment not previously identified. * This detailed analysis clarifies the
relationships between the launch facilities and near range and downrange
electronics facilities, and reveals five basic functional categories of range electronics
facilities.
The first major category includes those facilities associated with surface-to-
surface missile (SSM) testing. These vary greatly in size, equipment, and location.
Their common function is the collection of missile performance data.
The second functional group of facilities is associated with the Vladimirovka
Advanced Weapons and Research Complex (VAWARC). These facilities are all
located at the rangehead or in the near range area and appear to be similar to some of
the SSM-related electronics facilities surrounding them. They are distinguishable
from other electronics facilities by their configuration and equipment.. The function
of these facilities is the collection of ballistic vehicle performance data.
The differences in functions between the SSM and the Vladimirovka Complex-
related 'tracking facilities can be clarified by stating that the SSM-associated
facilities record data on the performance of missiles (MRBMs, IRBMs, and orbital
launch vehicles) from launch to impact or insertion. The VAWARC-related facilities
fl are used in testing ballistic vehicles (bombs, rockets, tactical air-to-surface missiles,
and the warheads and "shapes" relating to these devices) for properties related to
the ballistic flight of air-to-surface weapons and the accuracy with which they are
delivered.
*The dimensions given in this report are derived from mensuration performed prior to
implementation of the NPIC practice of stating dimensions in metric units.
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See Below I See Below
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The third functional group of facilities is the range-associated air warning (AW)
air traffic control facilities. There are several of these facilities, and their overall
function includes range safety, air traffic control, control of test aircraft, and air
warning.
Communications facilities comprise the fourth basic functional category of range
electronics facilities. Two major and three minor high frequency/very high frequency
(HF/VHF) facilities serve as the basic detected communications medium between
the Kapustin Yar rangehead, downrange facilities, and other correspondents,
including Moscow. Microwave and VHF antennas located at the rangehead facilities
indicate that the HF links to the downrange facilities are at least partially
supplemented by one or both of these systems. Unfortunately, coverage in the
downrange area has not been of adequate resolution to confirm the existence of these
systems.
The fifth and final category of range electronic facilities, those associated with
surface-to-air (SAM) missile testing, including SAM range communications, were
analyzed in a previous NPIC report.' Generally, the SAM range communications
system, consisting of microwave and troposcatter facilities, is an internal range
system. External SAM range communications traffic would have to be carried by the
two major HF communications facilities covered in this report. There is a possibility
that external range traffic is also carried over microwave links. A known microwave
relay link extends into Volgograd, approximately 50 nautical miles (nm) west of the
rangehead. However, microwave towers necessary to connect range microwaves
systems into the trunk link in Volgograd have not been detected. Landlines could
connect these two systems.
Each of the four functional groups covered in this report is examined separately.
However, there is a good deal of overlap of function between individual facilities. For
instance, all the downrange tracking facilities have communications links of one
type or the other. These communications links are an integral portion of the tracking
facility and, where visible, are treated as part of the tracking facility. Also, a number
of the Vladimirovka Complex-associated ballistic vehicle tracking facilities in the
near range area could provide additional data on SSM launches. There are
interferometers, exclusively related to SSM activity, at two ballistic vehicle tracking
facilities. Obviously the Vladimirovka Complex facilities were situated in an
advantageous locale for SSM data collection and now serve both missile and ballistic
vehicle- testing.
The facilities analyzed in this report are listed below. The Kapustin
Yar/Vladimirovka rangehead, near range and downrange facilities, and impact areas
are shown in Figures 1 and 2. A functional description of individual facilities and
associated equipment at the Kapustin Yar SSM Range and Vladimirovka Advanced
Weapons and Research Complex is given in Table 1.
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Kapustin Yar Range- 48-39N 045-46E
head Tracking
Facility
Kapustin Yar 48-37-30N
Telemetry/ 046-12-05E
Tracking
Facility
Kapustin Yar Range 48-38-19N
Rate/Tracking 046-16-44E
Facility
Kapustin Yar 48-41-45N
Instrumentation 046-15-57E
Facility A-1
Kapustin Yar 48-44-59N
Instrumentation 046-21-16E
Facility A-2
Kapustin Yar 48-36-54N
Instrumentation 046-18-41E
Facility A-3
Kapustin Yar 48-46-59N
Instrumentation 046-28-10E
Facility A-4
Kapustin Yar 48-33-25N
Instrumentation 046-23-42E
Facility A-5
Kapustin Yar 48-41-26N
Instrumentation 046-13-58E
Facility A-6
Kapustin Yar 48-38-22N
Instrumentation 046-14-05E
Facility A-7
Kapustin Yar 48-36-21N
Instrumentation 046-25-58E
Facility A-8
Kapustin Yar 48-50-30N
Instrumentation 046-29-30E
Facility H-1
Kapustin Yar 48-35-47N
Instrumentation 046-15-49E
Facility C-1
Kapustin Yar 48-43N 046-24E
Instrumentation
Facility C-2
Kapustin Yar 48-27-13N
Instrumentation 046-23-26E
Facility C-3
0
Kapustin Yar 48-36N 046-32E
Instrumentation
Facility C-4
Kapustin far/Lake 49-09-33N
? Elton Tracking 046-51-44E
Facility
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Kapustin Yar/
48-11N 046-42E
Verkhniy
Baskunchak
Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar/
48-33-20N
Shungay Tracking
046-47-45E
Facility
Kapustin Yar/Turgay
48-18-15N
Tracking Facility
046-56-30E
Kapustin Yar/
48-ION 048-36E
Terekty Tracking
Facility
Kapustin Yar/
48-59N 049-33E
Novaya Kazanka
Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar/Auzy
48-40N 049-26E
Kuduk Tracking
Facility
Kapustin Yar/
48-43N 050-12E
Taskuduk Tracking
Facility
Kapustin Yar/Makat
47-55N 053-43E
Tracking Facility
Emba Tracking
48-27-54N
Facility 4
057-43-23E
Emba Tracking
48-11-31N
Facility 5
058-16-05E
Sary Shagan
46-02-30N
Tracking Facility 4A
072-07-20E
Sary Shagan
46-01-50N
Communications
072-07-22E
Facility 3 (HF)
Kapustin Yar
48-27-04N
Instrumentation
046-15-48E
Facility D-1
Kapustin Yar
48-28-19N
Instrumentation
046-13-55E
Facility D-2
Kapustin Yar
48-28-54N
Instrumentation
046-08-59E
Facility D-3
Kapustin Yar
48-32-09N
Instrumentation
046-09-52E
Facility D-4
Kapustin Yar
48-26-45N
Instrumentation
046-17-45E
Facility D-6
Kapustin Yar
48-31-03N
Instrumentation
046-17-51E
Facility D-7
Kapustin Yar
48-33-16N
Instrumentation
046-48-56E
Facility L-1
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Kapustin Yar 48-21-20N
? Instrumentation 046-48-32E
Facility L-2
Kapustin Yar 48-21MON
Instrumentation 046-54-OOE
u Facility L-2A
Kapustin Yar 48-21-05N
Instrumentation 046-58-40E
Facility L-2B
Kapustin Yar 48-21-06N
Instrumentation 047-04-41E
Facility L-3
Kapustin Yar 48-20-58N
Instrumentation 047-12-49E
Facility L-4
Kapustin Yar 48-25-02N
AW Radar 046-14-45E
Facility G-1
Kapustin Yar 48-24-07N
A\V Radar 046-14-15E
Facility G-2
Kapustin Yar 48-26-15N
Air Traffic Control 046-26-15E
Facility G-3
Kapustin Yar Airfield 48-39-30N
Air Warning Radar 045-42-45E
Facility
Akhtubinsk/ 48-19-OON
Vladimirovka Air 046-13-OOE
Warning Radar
Facility 1
Akhtubinsk Air 48-17-ION
Traffic Control 046-11-OOE
Facility, Operations
Area A
Akhtubinsk Air 48-17-20N
Traffic Control 046-12-40E
Facility, Operations
Area B
Kapustin Yar 48-36-30N
Communications 046-12-15E
Facility I (HF
Transmitting)
Kapustin Yar 48-36-40N
Communications 045-58-30E
Facility 2 (I-IF
Receiving)
Kapustin Yar 48-26-30N
HF Communi- 046-12-45E
cations Facility D-5
Akhtubinsk 48-18-ION
Communications 046-10-15E
Facility
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Q HIGH RESOLUTION
INTERFEROMETER
aoJ \
A-7 "RANGE RATE
'~ / TRACKING
~! ceni ITV
?~ OPS AREA B AKHTUBINSK AIR TRAFFIC
OPS AREA A ` CONTROL FACILITY
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Road
Railroad
Cable scar
Mobile instrumentation
facility
Permenent instrumentation
facility
^ AW Radar facility
o Commo facility
GROUND
TARGET MARKER
TURGAY
INTERFEROMETER
1
47?00'
-
,NPIC M-8671
2r 1 A
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^LAUNCH \O COMPLEX A,'
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Kapustin Yar Rangehead Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar Telemetry/Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar Range Rate/Tracking
Facility
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility A-1
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility A-2
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility A-3
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility A-4
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility A-5
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility A-6
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility A-7
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility A-8
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility H-1
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility C-1
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility C-2
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility C-3
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility C-4
Kapustin Yar/ Lake Elton Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar/Verkhniy Baskunchak
Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar/Shungay Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar/Turgay Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar/Terekty Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar/Novaya Kazanka
Tracking Facility
Kapustin Yar/Auzy Kuduk Tracking
Facility
Kapustin Yar/Taskuduk Tracking Facility
SSM--electronics tracking
SSM--optical and electronics
tracking, and telemetry
collection
SSM--collection of range/
rate data
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking and
communications
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical tracking
SSM--optical and electronic
tracking
SSM--optical and electronic
tracking
SSM--electronic tracking
SSM--electronic tracking
SSM--optical and electronic
tracking
SSM--optical and electronic
tracking and telemetry
collection
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High-resolution interferometer
1st generation interferometer, tele-
metry antennas, 1 cinetheodolite,
other optical equipment, 2 SHIP
WHEEL radars, microwave anten-
nas, HF antennas.
Doppler shift measuring antenna
No apparent equipment
No permanent structure, no equip-
ment
No apparent equipment.
No permanent structure, no equip-
ment
No permanent structure, no apparent
equipment
2 pedestal-mounted cylindrical optical
device shelters
2 pedestal-mounted cylindrical optical
device shelters
2 pedestal-mounted cylindrical optical
device shelters
2 cylindrical optical device shelters
2 cylindrical optical device shelters,
2 VHF antennas
2 cylindrical optical device shelters
2 cylindrical optical device shelters
2 cylindrical optical device shelters
1 SHIP WHEEL radar, 1 cinetheo-
dolite, and a 1st generation inter-
ferometer
1 SHIP WHEEL radar, 2 cinetheo-
dolites, and a 1st generation inter-
ferometer
2nd generation interferometer
2nd generation interferometer
1 SHIP WHEEL, 2 BAR LOCK
radars, 1 cinetheodolite, 1 cylindri-
cal optical device shelter, HF com-
munications antennas, numerousve-
hicles, and a 2nd generation inter-
ferometer ucon.
2 SHIP WHEEL radars, I cinetheo-
dolite, HF communications and tele-
metry antennas, and numerous ve-
hicles
1 SHIP WHEEL radar
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Emba Tracking Facility 4
Emba Tracking Facility 5
Sary-Shagan Tracking Facility 4A
Sary-Shagan Communications Facility 3
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility D-1
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility D-4
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility D-6
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility D-7
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility L-1
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility L-2
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility L-2A
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility L-2B
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility L-3
Kapustin Yar Instrumentation Facility L-4
Kapustin Yar AW Radar Facility G-1
Kapustin Yar AW Radar Facility G-2
Kapustin Yar Air Traffic Control
Facility G-3
Kapustin Yar Airfield Air Warning
Radar Facility
SSM--electronic and optical
tracking
Electronic tracking
Electronic tracking
SSM--electronic tracking
HF communications receiving
ASM--bombing range support
base
ASM--impact recording
ASM--impact recording and
ground control communi-
cations
ASM--impact recording
SSM and ASM--optical
and electronic tracking
SSM and ASM--optical
tracking
ASM--ballistic object data
collection
ASM--ballistic object data
collection
ASM--ballistic object data
collection
ASM--ballistic object data
collection
ASM--ballistic object data
collection
ASM--ballistic object data
collection
Apparently inactive air
warning facility
Apparently inactive air
warning facility
Air traffic control
3 SHIP WHEEL, 1 BAR LOCK, I
STONE CAKE, and 2 cylindrical
optical device shelters, a 1st gener-
ation interferometer, and a 2nd
generation interferometer ucon.
2nd-generation interferometer ucon
2nd-generation interferometer ucon
3 SHIP WHEEL radars
2 fishbone antennas
1 SHIP WHEEL radar and several
vehicles
Small undet instrumentation platform
with mounted equipment
Small undet instrumentation platform
with mounted equipment and com-
munications antennas
Small undet instrumentation platform
with mounted equipment
Cylindrical optical device shelter and
a SHIP WHEEL radar
Cylindrical optical device shelter
3 cinetheodolite, 1 SHIP WHEEL
radar, 1 prob optical device
3 cinetheodolites, 1 SHIP WHEEL
radar, 1 prob optical device
1 SHIP WHEEL radar, 1 prob opti-
cal device, 1 UI optical device
I SHIP WHEEL radar, I prob opti-
cal device
2cinetheodolites, 1 UI optical device,
1 SHIP WHEEL radar, 1 prob
optical device
Undet equipment
Unoccupied
Unoccupied
1 BIG BAR radar
2 BACK NET, 1 prob SIDE NET
(prior 5/67), 1 SQUAT EYE, 1
BAR LOCK, and 1 ROCK CAKE/
STONE CAKE radars, and 1
mobile TALL KING radar (after
5/67)
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Akhtubinsk/Vladimirovka Air Warning Air warning
Radar Facility 1
Akhtubinsk Air Traffic Control Facility Air traffic control
Operations Area A
Akhtubinsk Air Traffic Control Facility Air traffic control
Operations Area B
Kapustin Yar Communications Facility 1 Communications
(HF Transmitter)
Kapustin Yar Communications Facility 2 Communications
(HF Receiver)
Kapustin Yar HF Communications Facility Communications
D-5
Akhtubinsk Communications Facility Communications
BASIC DESCRIPTION
2 BACK NET, 2 SIDE NET, 5
BAR LOCK, 2 ROCK CAKE/
STONE CAKE, and 1 SQUAT
EYE radars
2BAR LOCK and 2 ROCK CAKE/
STONE CAKE radars (prior to
Aug 69, after Aug 69 - no equip-
ment)
I BAR LOCK radar (prior to 8/69,
after 8/69 - no equipment)
HF, transmitting rhombic, dipole,
and prob VHF antennas
HF receiving antennas and fishbone
antennas
VHF and HF antennas, dipoles, and
fishbone antennas
Probable UHF/VHF antennas
Kapustin Yar SSM Instrumentation
A large amount of instrumentation is necessary to support major multisystems
SSM testing programs such as those conducted at Kapustin Yar. The numerous
instrumentation facilities associated with SSM testing are divided into three groups:
first, the major electronics facilities at the rangehead, which collect data on all
missile firings; second, the small launch-complex-associated instrumentation
facilities; and third, downrange facilities, which record data on all missile flights
within their electronic and optical horizons.
Major Rangehead Tracking Facilities
Kapustin Yar Rangehead Tracking Facility. The facility (Figure 3) is located 4
nm north of Kapustin Yar and just north of the former rocket launch complex. This
facility is the westernmost electronics facility associated with SSM activity and
contains a high-resolution interferometer, a phase measuring device. This type of
instrument is also present at the Tyuratam and Plesetsk missile test centers. In each
location it is at or near the base support complex and at a considerable distance from
the launch complexes. At Kapustin Yar, the high-resolution interferometer is over 20
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nm west and to the rear of the closest launch complex. An additional indication of
the probable purpose of the instrument is that the three locations where high-
resolution interferometers have been observed are at the three centers of space
launching activity in the Soviet Union.
The apparent complexity of the instrument suggests that it is capable of space
positioning techniques in addition to phase measuring, such as Doppler shift
measurement. This is a common practice which is used in some US tracking
instruments. Determination of the technique used by this system would be greatly
aided if the exact configuration of the antenna structures mounted atop eight of the
nine antenna buildings could be positively identified. These antennas are pedestal
mounted, and are probably single dishes. Their pedestal mounts indicate these
antennas are pointed at the target, an unnecessary function for a simple phase
measuring device.
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Regardless of specific techniques used, the capacity of the high-resolution
interferometer probably exceeds that of a standard Soviet interferometer. In
contrast to the high-resolution interferometer, the standard Soviet interferometer
achieves a directed line segment or line of sight by a phase comparison technique. In
order to establish the target at a point in space, two of these instruments must be
paired and tracking the target at the same time. Using dual techniques, the high-
resolution interferometer can probably place a target at a point in space by itself. A
previously published report provides detailed mensural data and a comparison of the
device at its three locations.2
Kapustin Yar Telemetry/Tracking Facility. The facility is located 4 nm west of
Kapustin Yar launch complex C, site 1-C (Figure 4). The major telemetry antennas
at the rangehead are located here. This equipment monitors, tracks, and collects
data from all instrumented launch vehicles fired from the range. Its position, slightly
north and to the rear of launch complex C, is equidistant from the ends of the row of
launch complexes.
Equipment present at the Kapustin Yar telemetry/tracking facility includes a
first-generation, 390-foot baseline interferometer (oriented 0/180 and 90/270
degrees); a cinetheodolite (formerly radar A); two SHIP WHEEL radars (one van
mounted in radar C configuration and one building mounted); a Type I five-element
helical array; two Type II five-element helical arrays; a roof-mounted four-element
helical array; and four unidentified roof-mounted telemetry antennas. This
equipment has been present at the facility since January 1965. In mid-1967 an
expansion of the facility was initiated. Presently, two new support buildings, an
operations support building, and a new heating or powerplant have been completed.
Work continues on a new telemetry control building near completion, and also in the
vicinity of a newly constructed concrete hardstand of an undetermined purpose in
the rear of the facility. Two possible pedestal foundations are under construction
adjacent to the new telemetry control building.
Communications equipment at the telemetry/tracking facility consists of two
masts of undetermined frequency and configuration located at the north end of the
secured area, a small and a large tower near the southern end of the secured area
mounting microwave antennas, and a self-supporting lattice tower at the southern
edge of the secured area mounting undetermined equipment. Resolution and
interpretability of the coverage are not adequate to obtain azimuths on the
microwave antennas.
Kapustin Yar Range Rate Tracking Facility. The facility (Figure 5) is a square,
secured area located 1.7 nm north-northwest of launch complex C, site 1-C, and 3.2
nm northeast of the Kapustin Yar telemetry/tracking facility. There are two pads in
each corner of the security fence and similar pads in the center of the square. These
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pads are occupied by an electronics van and a mobile antenna in each area. Cable
connects the four corner antennas to the central antenna and its associated vans.
The central position has two additional vans. The basic configuration is crossed
baselines 2,300 feet in length with orientations of 05/185 and 95/275 degrees.
The device can be identified as a range rate or Doppler shift measuring device for
the following reasons: its mobile antennas cannot be placed with the positioned ?
accuracy necessary for an interferometer; there are no ambiguity resolving antennas;
the entire site has not been extensively leveled and prepared, which is necessary for
an interferometer site; there is no resemblance to known phase measuring systems,
and it is very similar to known Doppler measuring systems. Earlier coverage (April
1969) has revealed the presence of two cylindrical optical device shelters located in
the vicinity of the central antenna pads. These devices appeared operational. The
mobile antennas and their associated vans were not present.
The operations-support area is located immediately southwest of the central
antenna and contains eight structures and several vehicles. Rectified plots of the
Kapustin Yar telemetry/tracking facility and the range rate tracking facility are
available in a previously published report.3
Launch Complex Associated Instrumentation Facilities
In addition to the major rangehead facilities that are collecting telemetry and
tracking data, instrumentation is positioned immediately downrange of the launch
areas (Figure 2). There are two main groups of facilities associated with launch
complexes A and C. These two groups, aided by several additional facilities
positioned to fill gaps in coverage, provide complete optical coverage of launches
from all active complexes along the launch row.
Optical instruments are probably the primary equipment found at these
facilities. The facilities are small. Most of them consist of a cleared area containing a
22-foot square two-story building with an instrument deck on the roof and other
small pieces of equipment. They are usually enclosed by a firebreak.
Some of these sites have been downgraded in importance, the permanent
structures have been removed, and the areas are being used for placement of van-
mounted instrumentation, if any at all. Figure 2 shows permanent and mobile
instrumentation positions.
Complex A Instrumentation Group. This group consists of eight facilities, five in
front of the launch complexes, and three to the rear. Until late 1968 the
instrumentation group consisted of six facilities, A-1 through A-6. At three of these
facilities, A-2, A-4, and A-5, the permanent buildings have been removed, and at a
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fourth, A-3, the site appears abandoned. The remaining two original facilities, A-1
and A-6, both located behind the launch complexes, appear active. A-1, located in
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the launch complex A support area, consists of only one building, 25X1
structure with a raised center section. This building is a standard range
instrumentation building, with an instrument deck on the roof of the raised central
section.
A-6, located 1.5 nm west of A-1, consisted until the fall of 1968 of 25X1
two-story instrumentation building, two ground-mounted cylindrical optical device
shelters, four sheds, and several small pieces of undetermined equipment. At that
time, construction was observed at A-6 (Figure 6) and two other locations (A-7 and A-
8). At A-6 control building, two pedestals, a small bunker, 25X1
approximately five support structures, and a new security fence were added to the
facility. A-7, located 3 nm south of A-6 and 3 nm southwest of launch complex A,
contains new buildings, pedestals, and fence identical to those added to A-6. A-8,
located 7 nm east of C-1 instrumentation facililAr and 7.8 m southeast of launch
complex A, consists of the same structures plus a building. This large 25X1
additional building may be a support structure necessary because the facility is in
front of the launch complexes and remote from other support, or it may indicate
additional instrumentation.
As the three facilities neared completion in August 1969, the type of equipment
mounted on the pedestals could be determined. At A-6, the removal of the two
ground-mounted cylindrical optical device shelters from their positions coincided
with the placement of two identical shelters atop the pedestals. Similar shelters were
emplaced at A-7 and A-8 during the same time period.
The construction at A-6, A-7, and A-8 began concurrently with modification
activity at launch complexes A and B. A plot showing the optimum optical look-
angle of each facility (determined by plotting a line perpendicular to a line
connecting the two pedestals) reveals that A-6 and A-7 look at the rear of launch
complexes A and B from the northwest and southwest respectively, while A-8 looks
at the flight path of missiles, immediately after launch from either launch complex A
or B. The three facilities can also be associated with launch complex A and B
operations by their cable connections. New cable was laid connecting A-7 to A-1
through launch complex B, A-7 to the telemetry/tracking facility, and A-7 to A-8
through instrumentation facility C-1. A-6, being a part of the original system, was
already connected by cable to A-1. Finally, the new activity at launch complexes A
and B made necessary the update of the A instrumentation group, which had been
allowed to deteriorate (see A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5) during the period of low R&D
activity at these launch complexes.
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G J/~ I
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An additional instrumentation facility has been designated H-1 (Figure 7), and
is located 4.5 nm north of the unoccupied instrumentation facility A-4. When last
observed hotography, facility H-1 consisted of a standard= 25X1
two-story building with an open cylindrical optical device shelter on the 25X1
instrument deck, and an additional, cable-connected cylindrical optical device
shelter located on the southern side. Other objects include at least three sheds, a
power generator shed connected by cable to the main building, three vans, and two
undetermined objects. The activity at this instrumentation facility is significant in
that the nearest adjacent instrumentation facilities have not been maintained.
Positioning of the facility may associate it with launch complex H, but it is more
likely that it is a primary data collection unit on any launch fired in a more
northeastern azimuth, for instance, anSS-5 launched for impact in the Bratsk impact
area. This vehicle would pass close to overhead instrumentation facility C-2, thus
perhaps limiting its, ability to track. Facility H-1 is sufficiently north not to. be
hindered by this difficulty.
Complex C Instrumentation Group. The C instrumentation group consists of
four facilities, three of which are located in front of the launch area, with facility C-1
located on the complex access road, 2 nm west of launch site C-2. Each of the, C-,
associated facilities contains on two-story building with a cylindrical 25X1
optical device shelter on the instrument deck. The forward facilities each have an,
additional ground-mounded cylindrical optical device shelter, a power generator
shed, several additional sheds, vans, vehicles, and some undetermined equipment.
Downrange units of the C group are very similar to H-1. It is probable that C-4,
which would be directly in the path of an eastern launch, is teamed with H-1 for
adequate optical coverage on a northeastern launch.
C-1 is the largest of the instrument facilities serving the launch complexes
(Figure 8). There are two, two-story buildings with an instrumentation/observation
deck adjacent to the previously mentioned building. The 25X1
southernmost of these two additional buildings has a cylindrical optical device
shelter on the instrument deck. No other instrumentation is visible; however, a hard-
surfaced pad, probably for mobile equipment, is located east of the three-instrument
buildings. Two probable FORK REST-type VHF antennas are east of, and
connected by cable to, the northernmost building. A cable trench from the new A-7
instrumentation facility extends into C-1, traverses the facility, and continues east
past launch complex C to A-8 instrumentation facility. Supporting elements of C-1
instrumentation facility consist of eight buildings, two POL tanks in a motor pool
area, and numerous vans and vehicles. A rectified plot of C-1 is available in a
previously published report.4
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Other Instrumentation Groups. Additional instrumentation facilities of the D
group (D-6 and D-7) are located north and south and slightly west of complex D.
These two facilities, which closely resemble the C group facilities, probably collect
data on launch complex D firings. They are connected by cable scars to air-to-
surface (ASM) missile/bombing range instrumentation facilities, 5 nm west of
complex D and will be described with this group of facilities. It is also possible that
these two facilities serve a dual function.
Downrange Tracking Facilities
Kapustin Yar SSM range extends in two directions (Figure 1). The primary
launch direction is east and the range extends to the 1,050 nm impact area at Sary
Shagan. A secondary, northeast launch direction is used when testing missiles
impacting in the 2,000 nm impact area near Bratsk.
A search of suspected areas in the secondary downrange area has revealed no
tracking facilities between the Kapustin Yar facilities, approximately 25 nm east of
the launch area, and the Bratsk impact area. This is logical because the launch
vehicles reach burnout, and are inserted into their final ballistic trajectory toward
Bratsk while still above the electronics horizons of the rangehead area facilities.
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Therefore, there is no primary need for tracking facilities until reaching the impact
area. A great circle route from Kapustin Yar to Bratsk passes within range of both
Kalpashevo and Yeniseyek earth satellite vehicle tracking facilities, and these
facilities could monitor telemetry and track vehicles.
A number of locations around the Bratsk impact area were searched for the
impact tracking facilities. While several unusual facilities were located, none of
these contained equipment to identify them as tracking facilities.
The primary range, extending to Sary Shagan, has a number of downrange
tracking facilities. The first group of four facilities is located approximately 25 nm
east of rangehead and has interferometers to track vehicles fired in both primary and
secondary range azimuths. Facilities further downrange are located opposite impact
and downrange launch areas and are probably primarily concerned with impacts
into and launches out of these various areas. This does not preclude these facilities
from collecting telemetry and tracking data on ballistic or cruise missiles launched
for impact far downrange. Equipment and size of each facility varies and aids in
interpreting the function of the facility on the range.
A fact of considerable interest is that a great circle route from Kapustin Yar to
Sary Shagan passes through the tracking patterns of both Emba and Tyuratam
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missile test centers. Identification of certain equipment indicates the probability of
dual range usage at some of these facilities.
Lake Elton and Verkhniy Baskunchak Tracking Facilities. These facilities are
located 41 nm northeast and 32 nm southeast of the Kapustin Yar
telemetry/tracking facility, respectively. With the telemetry/tracking facility, these
two facilities form a vee opening downrange inclosing both primary and secondary
launch azimuths. The Lake Elton facility (Figure 9), to the north of the flight path,
has electronics equipment facing south, into the range. The opposite is true of the
Verkhniy Baskunchak, which is located south of the range and looks north.
These two facilities are practically identical except for their orientations. Each
has a first-generation interferometer, probably abandoned, identical to the
interferometer at the telemetry/tracking facility; a van-mounted SHIP WHEEL
antenna (radar C); a cinetheodolite (formerly radar A); and a cylindrical optical
device shelter. The only visible equipment difference is an additional cinetheodolite
at Verkhniy Baskunchak. There is also a building in each facility that resembles the
standard tracking facility control building (as at the telemetry/tracking facility).
It is probable that the interferometers at these two facilities are no longer active,
probably having been replaced by the construction of second-generation
interferometers at Turgay and Shungay in the summer of 1965. These two devices
were apparently intended to update the near range space positioning capability
Whether or not this obviated the need of the older interferometers is not determined.
However, their appearance remains the same.
The overall appearance of the Lake Elton and Verkhniy Baskunchak facilities is
slightly different than other downrange tracking facilities. Neither site has a large
number of vehicles or a motor pool. There is a relatively small number of support
buildings at each.. Each facility contains, in addition to the instrumentation
mentioned above, approximately eight major support structures and several minor
sheds. This seems to indicate that the two facilities are not involved in missile
component recovery operations as are tracking facilities further downrange.
Finally, a remote communications area at each location has been identified.
These areas are small and could contain, at most, a single dipole. Antenna type
cannot be determined; however, the remote communications area at Lake Elton
tracking facility is located slightly north of the main area on a ridge, perhaps giving
it line of sight to the rangehead.
Shungay and Turgay Tracking Facilities. These two facilities were constructed
near existing ASM-related facilities in the near range. The Shungay facility (Figure
10) is located 24 nm east of the Kapustin Yar telemetry/tracking facility, 36 nm
south of Lake Elton tracking facility, and is adjacent to the northern facility (L-1) of
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the ballistic vehicle tracking complex. The Turgay facility is 35 nm east-southeast of
the telemetry/tracking facility, 12 nm northeast of Verkhniy Baskunchak, and is
located south of the support base of the ballistic vehicle tracking complex.
These two devices are identical to the second-generation interferometers
deployed at Sary Shagan, and are an improvement over the earlier first-generation
interferometric instruments previously described at the Kapustin Yar
telemetry/tracking facility, the Verkhniy Baskunchak tracking facility, and the Lake
Elton tracking facility. The design base leg length was increased from 390 feet to 580
feet and there are an increased number of ambiguity-resolving antenna positions. As
is true with all interferometeric devices near the Kapustin Yar rangehead, their base
leg orientation is north/south and east/west.
Terekty Tracking Facility. This facility (Figure 11) is located 100 nm east-
southeast of the telemetry/tracking facility. Electronics and optical equipment
located on the north side of the facility consists of one cinetheodolite, one cylindrical
optical device shelter, one van-mounted SHIP WHEEL radar, and two BAR LOCK
radars. A large amount of mobile equipment is located immediately north of the
electronics equipment and some of this equipment is possibly instrumentation. An
additional area containing possible instrumentation is at the southeast edge of the
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facility. This area contains a self-supporting lattice tower, two buildings, seven vans
or vehicles, and four undetermined objects. Photography of February 1969 revealed a
second-generation interferometer under construction on the south-southwest edge of
the facility. This interferometer is identical in configuration to the interferometers
under construction at Makat and Emba tracking facilities 4 and 5 and has base leg
orientations north/south and east/west.
There are two remote communications areas, one east and one north-northwest
of the main facility. They jointly contain three HF dipoles generally oriented toward
communications facilities at the rangehead, and two masts that are 25X1
possibly VHF antennas. Interpretability of available photography does not permit
positive identification of these antennas as VHF or identification of equipment
mounted on the self-supporting tower previously mentioned.
The basic function of the facility is tracking and telemetry collection from
ballistic and cruise missiles passing over or impacting in the area. The tracking
capability of the facility will be greatly enhanced by the activation of the new
interferometer, which if paired with a similar device, would extend the positive
tracking capability (that is, accurate range, azimuth, and elevation data) of the
range. Factors pointing toward a broader function for the facility are the presence of
21 support buildings, the motor pool, the large number of vans and vehicles, the
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adjacent associated airfield, and the presence of AW radars. These factors indicate
that the facility is probably involved in the recovery of impacted vehicles in nearby
impact areas.
Novaya Kazanka Tracking Facility. The facility (Figure 12) is located 133 nm
east-northeast of the telemetry/tracking facility and 59 nm northeast of Terekty
tracking facility.
The electronics and optical components are located on the northern side of the
facility and consist of one cinetheodolite; one possible cylindrical optical device
shelter; a roof-mounted four-element helical array, two SHIP WHEEL radars (one
van mounted in the radar C configuration and one roof mounted on the corner of a
standard tracking facility control building), and a telemetry building with five roof
positions. There are a great number of objects scattered throughout this area that are
probably electronics equipment of various kinds. A possible HF dipole antenna is
adjacent to the northwest side of the control building and is oriented toward the
rangehead. There are two other instrumentation/communications areas, one located
north and the other east of the facility. No electronics can be positively identified in
these areas.
The function of the facility is apparently similar to the function of Terekty. It is
considerably larger (49 support structures); there is an adjacent airfield, more
mobile equipment, considerably more electronics; and it is close to what is probably
a more active impact area (130-150 nm). All elements necessary to support both
tracking/telemetry data reception and support of vehicle recovery operations are
present.
Auzy Kuduk and Taskuduk Facilities. The facilities are located 128.5 nm and
159 nm, respectively, from the telemetry/tracking facility. These facilities are
extremely small and positive identification of electronics equipment is not possible.
Auzy Kuduk is the larger of the two facilities, consisting of 12 buildings. A probable
van-mounted SHIP WHEEL radar is located adjacent to the westernmost buildings
of the facility. This is the only piece of identified electronics equipment. The
Taskuduk facility contains five secured buildings plus four nearby possible housing
structures. No electronics equipment could be observed at this facility. A significant
fact relating to the function of these two facilities is their geographic location. Both
facilities are located almost directly underneath the ballistic trajectory of a missile
launched from Kapustin Yar rangehead to impact in the Sary Shagan impact area.
Makat Tracking Facility. The facility (Figure 13) is located 306 nm downrange
from the telemetry/tracking facility. It is bordered on its east edge by the Sagiz river,
and extends over a considerable area west of the river. The airfield associated with
the facility is located on the western edge of the built-up area. Electronics
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equipment located throughout the facility includes three van-mounted probable
SHIP WHEEL radars, two cylindrical optical device shelters, a first-generation
interferometer similar to the ones at Lake Elton and Verkhniy Baskunchak, but with
a number of additional antenna pads, a second-generation interferometer under
construction, a BAR LOCK radar, and a STONE CAKE radar. No communications
antennas can be identified; however, there are two areas where mobile
communications equipment is apparently parked.
The antenna configuration of the first-generation interferometer is unique. The
north/south base leg has six antenna pads at the south end and one at the north end.
The east/west base leg has three pads at the west end and one pad at the east end.
There are no apparent antenna pads in the center of the device. It is possible that
this device has increased capabilities because of the additional antennas. The
second-generation inte eter was first observed under construction on
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Coupled with identical interferometers presently under construction at Terekty
and Emba 4 and 5 tracking facilities, and the Kapustin Yar rangehead
interferometers, the new Makat interferometer will contribute to an interferometeric
network providing positive tracking data from rangehead to Emba. In addition to
tracking vehicles impacting downrange, the Makat interferometers are used to track
vehicles impacting at the Makat impact area and launched from the Makat field
launch point for impact at Sary Shagan. The size of the facility (66 structures of
various sizes) as well as the equipment deployed here, indicates this facility supports
missile launches and the recovery of impacted missiles in adjacent impact areas as
well as performing a tracking function.
Emba Missile Test Center Tracking Facilities 4 and 5. As mentioned above, a
missile traveling in a ballistic trajectory from Kapustin Yar rangehead to Sary
Shagan impact area passes above the tracking patterns of the Emba Missile Test
Center and the Tyuratam Missile Test Center. There are known instances where
range instrumentation facilities attached to one range have aided another range.5
Recent construction activity at Emba Tracking Facilities 4 and 5 indicates that
these two facilities are to perform an expanded tracking role, probably in relation to
missiles launched from Kapustin Yar. At each of these facilities a second-generation
interferometer, very similar in overall dimensions to the second-generation
interferometers at Sary Shagan, is under construction.
These new interferometers (Figure 14) apparently have a slightly longer base leg
(600 feet) and a slightly longer distance between the probable alignment antennas on
the rim of the circle (1,160 feet) than the earlier second-generation interferometers.
The orientation of these instruments is parallel and perpendicular to the Emba
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range azimuth of 190 degrees. While this would seem to indicate a direct association
with Emba range programs, it does not rule out use in Kapustin Yar range programs.
In fact, the two ranges are close to being perpendicular to one another and the two
new interferometers are on either side of both nominal range azimuths.
An additional factor involves the missile program at Emba. Present missile
activity at Emba is believed to be restricted to SA-4 and SA-6 testing. SAMs 1
through 4 were developed, tested, and deployed without any apparent need or use of
precise interferometric data. Thus, the interferometer deployment at Emba
indicates that either a new missile system is under development at Emba that is
more than an ordinary SAM or the interferometers are for the Kapustin Yar range.
The second possibility is supported by positive evidence of SS-12 missiles being
launched from Kapustin Yar rangehead and impacting in the middle of the Emba
tracking pattern, and by the concurrent construction of new interferometers at
adjacent Kapustin Yar tracking facilities.
One possible function for these interferometers is the tracking of warheads
launched toward the Sary Shagan impact area during the deployment of decoys or
multiple reentry vehicles. If the deployment took place before the warheads were
within the range of the Sary Shagan or Tyuratam interferometers (over Emba), the
interferometers at tracking facilities 4 and 5 would be necessary to evaluate the
deployment system. In conclusion, because of their ideal location for dual range
usage, positive determination of the uses of these devices can probably not be
obtained from photography.
Tyuratam Tracking Facilities. The ballistic path of a missile launched from
Kapustin Yar headed for impact at Sary Shagan crosses the Tyuratam tracking
pattern approximately 45 nm north of Tyuratam tracking facility 1 and 60 nm north
of tracking facility 2. The closest interferometers are at tracking facility 4, 75 nm
north, tracking facility 3, 120 nm north, and the Tyuratam rangehead tracking
facility, 105 nm south.
Any of these facilities could optically or electronically track a Kapustin Yar/Sary
Shagan vehicle in the portion of its track above their electronic and optical horizons.
However, there is no visible evidence at any of these facilities that would suggest
they are tracking Kapustin Yar/Sary Shagan missiles.
Sary Shagan Impact Area. The extensive complex of Sary Shagan tracking
facilities that surround and extend uprange from the 1,050 nm impact area are not
the direct concern of this report. However, data on the incoming vehicles collected
by these facilities contributes to the base knowledge being gathered on, the Kapustin
Yar launched vehicles and so they are, in effect, Kapustin Yar impact area tracking
facilities.
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One facility, Sary Shagan tracking facility 4-A (Figure 15), (0245-48A) appears
to be associated solely with incoming warheads. This facility, and its associated
communications facility, HF communications facility 3, are located south of the
impact area. Its major identifiable electronics components are three van-mounted
SHIP WHEEL radars and two HF 5-3-3-5 fishbone antennas. The fishbone antennas
have a receiving azimuth of 288 degrees, and are directed at the Kapustin Yar,
rangehead. The SHIP WHEEL radar and other undetermined equipment are
emplaced in two small areas on a ridge north of the support area.
This facility has the equipment necessary to receive the timing tone directed
from Kapustin Yar rangehead on HF, track and collect terminal telemetry data until
impact using the SHIP WHEEL radars, and other possible telemetry collection
equipment. The facility is also connected to the impact area by road and has an
adequate number of vehicles to perform warhead recovery operations. This small
facility, equipped to perform a terminal telemetry and warhead recovery function, is
insufficient in size and complexity to fit adequately into the broader function of the
major Sary Shagan tracking facilities.
Downrange tracking facilities, either associated directly with Kapustin Yar or
basically part of another range, appear to be capable of tracking a Kapustin Yar
vehicle continuously from launch until impact. This may not be a common practice,
but the capability to do so apparently exists. The extension of tracking facilities
from rangehead launch facilities to the 1,050 nm impact area is evidently necessary
to support downrange impact and launch areas. This large amount of
instrumentation allows extremely flexible use of the overall range area.
Vladimirovka Advanced Weapons and Research Complex Air-to-Surface
Instrumentation
The air-to-surface instrumentation facilities located at the Vladimirovka
Advanced Weapons and Research Complex rangehead serve two areas among the
many target areas where air-to-surface weapons are tested at the rangehead.
East of Akhtubinsk, and between that city and launch complex D, there are
many target areas set up with targets (usually aircraft) for strafing and bombing.
These areas include a dummy airfield, a series of circular ground target markers, and
single aircraft placed, apparently at random, out in open areas. Launch complex G is
also used as a target and has been cratered. None of the target areas mentioned have
any apparent instrumentation.
The two areas functionally associated with air-to-surface weapons testing and
evaluation that have instrumentation are the Kapustin Yar bombing range located
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to the rear of launch complex D and Kapustin Yar ballistic vehicle tracking complex,
located approximately 23 nm east of launch complex D.
Bombing Range and D Instrumentation Group
The bombing range is a set of ground target markers placed on and outside the
hypotenuse of the right angle triangular pattern of three instrumentation facilities
(D-2, D-3, and D-4). The facilities are approximately 3.4 nm apart along the legs of
the triangle, the hypotenuse (from D-2 to D-4) is approximately 4.8 nm.
The bombing range facilities appear to operate on a triangulation principle.
Aircraft drop bombs or other air-to-surface weapons at a target along the hypotenuse
or near it. Instrumentation at each facility is sighted in on the smoke plume the
weapon emits on inpact. The angular data recorded by the instruments is correlated
and the exact point of impact is determined. The instrumentation at the bombing
range does not appear complex enough to track falling shapes or bombs.
Equipment at the three facilities is not complex. The basic component of each
facility is a two-story building with an instrument deck on the roof. The buildings at
the terminal sites (D-2 and D-4) are similar to the site at the apex (D-3); however,
both terminal site buildings are slightly smaller. This type of building is the only
structure at D-4. D-2 contains two smaller sheds, a mobile equipment pad, and
several unidentified objects in addition to the standard building.
D-3 (Figure 16) is more complex; in addition to serving the bombing range, D-3
is a communications facility. This accounts for the 11 structures and the additional
equipment. Some of the communications equipment is probably ground-to-air
communications for operations on the bombing range. However, the two rhombic
antennas are more appropriate for point-to-point communications. Azimuths for the
two rhombic antennas are shown on Figure 16. No logical correspondents for these
antennas have been found.
The D instrumentation group consists of three facilities (D-1, D-6, and D-7) in
addition to the triangular pattern of three facilities (D-2, D-3, and D-4) around the
bombing range. One additional facility (D-5), once considered. to be an
instrumentation facility of this group, can now be identified as a communications
facility. All of these facilities, excepting D-5, are electronically connected by a cable
scar. The functional relationship between the three bombing range facilities and D-
1, D-6, and D-7 is difficult to detect.
D-1 differs in appearance from all other instrumentation facilities on the range.
Previously it was considered to be an operations control center, but this does not now
seem likely because of the communications equipment located at D-3 and D-5. The
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facility may have an administration and maintenance function. Electronics
equipment identified at D-1 consists of a van-mounted SHIP WHEEL radar.
The apparent relationship of instrumentation facilities D-6 (Figure 17) and D-7
and launch complex D has been explained previously (see Kapustin Yar SSM
instrumentation, launch complex-associated instrumentation facilities, other
instrumentation groups). This relationship, however, does not explain the apparent
cable connection with the bombing range D facilities. Two reasonable explanations
are: D-6 and D-7 perform an additional electronics function related to activity at the
bombing range or they are cable connected to the communications facility at D-3. It
is probable that both explanations are true, thus giving D-6 and D-7 a dual function.
Both facilities consist of asquare two-story building with an instrument
deck, a probable cylindrical optical device shelter, and a probable power generator
shed. D-6 has an additional shed, several undetermined pieces of equipment, and a
mobile equipment pad occupied by a van-mounted SHIP WHEEL radar.
Ballistic Vehicle Tracking Complex
This complex is an expanded form of the triangular pattern of instrumentation
at the bombing range. The complex consists of three main facilities L-1, L-2 (Figure
18), and L-3 which form a right triangle with ground target markers along the
hypotenuse (Figure 1). Also, there is a facility (L-4) extending the east/west leg of
the triangle eastward, a base support for the complex, and two small sites (L-2A, and
L-2B) along the east/west leg between L-2 and L-3. Distance from L-1 (the northern
facility) to L-2 (the apex facility) measured along the north/south leg of the triangle
is 12 nm. Distance from L-2 to L-3 and L-4 along the east/west leg is 10.7 nm to L-3
and 16.2 nm to L-4. The distance along the hypotenuse from L-1 to L-3 is 15.2 nm.
Instrumentation equipment present at the three main facilities, L-1, L-2, and L-
3, suggests the use of the complex, because these facilities each contain three
cinetheodolites (two at L-3), a van-mounted SHIP WHEEL radar, and an
instrumentation building with probable optical equipment mounted on a roof
instrument deck. This large amount of optical equipment indicates that ballistic
objects dropped over the complex are optically tracked to impact. Correlated optical
data would enable determination of exact flight characteristics of the objects.
The exact function of L-4 in the overall operation of the complex cannot be
determined until equipment identifications can be made; however, it is evident that
the presence of this facility represents an expansion of tracking capability at the
complex. In November 1967 a possible 75-foot inflatable radome was identified at L-
4. At this time it appeared flat on the ground and deflated. Subsequent coverage
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revealed this object, whatever its nature, had been removed. No other equipment is
of adequate size to be identified at this facility.
Recent photography permits identification of equipment and equipment
positions at L-2A and L-2B. Each of these facilities has a rectangular hardstand
located in the northern section of their secured area. The hardstands at both
facilities have been observed occupied by SHIP WHEEL van-mounted radars. In
addition to the SHIP WHEEL van-mounted radars, each facility appears to have a
probable optical instrument position on the roof of the main building. Also, L-2A has
an additional optical instrument building similar to a building at L-3. The
equipment present indicates that L-2A and L-2B have probably been added to the
complex to increase the accuracy of data and do not indicate a change or addition to
the overall complex function.
The support area for the complex is located 2 nm south of the east/west leg at the
town of Turgay. This area also serves as support for the Turgay interferometer
located 1.2 nm east-southeast. A similar support arrangement was made with the
Shungay interferometer which is 0.9 nm west of L-1. These interferometers are
related to SSM operations and were placed at the complex for convenience.
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Extensive air-to-surface weapons activity takes place at Vladimirovka Advanced
Weapons and Research Complex. While a great deal of this activity does not utilize
identifiable instrumentation, the two instrumentation areas analyzed in this report,
especially the ballistic vehicle tracking complex, play an important role in the
development, perfection, and accuracy of new air-to-surface weapons.
Some of these facilities serve SSM activity as well. Certainly D-6 and D-7 have
dual roles and optical instruments at the ballistic vehicle tracking complex could
provide photographic coverage of SSM launch vehicles during their burn phase. Any
of these facilities, placed separately in an area, could be mistaken for a SSM data
collecting facility. It is their geometrical relationship to one another, their
equipment, and the surrounding features (ground target markers, craters, and
destroyed aircraft) considered together that aid in positive determination of their
specific function.
Kapustin Yar AW Radar Facilities
There are seven AW radar facilities at the Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka
rangehead. This does not include the electronics testing facility or the five Kapustin
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Yar SAM range AW facilities which were reported in a previous report on SAM range
electronics.) Of the seven facilities, two are inactive and unoccupied (G1 and G2),
two are large and are located at Kapustin Yar Airfield and 25X1
Akhtubinsk/Vladimirovka Airfield (Figure 19), and three are small 25X1
facilities probably performing air traffic control functions for the range (G-3 and
Vladimirovka Air Traffic Control Facility operations areas A (Figure 20) and
operations area B).
Air Warning Radar Facilities
AW Radar Facilities G-1 and G-2. These facilities are located to the west of
launch complex G and were constructed at the same time as the H-shaped AW
facilities associated with Kapustin Yar SAM Range. These two sites do not appear to
be associated with the SAM range program because of their location and lack of
activity.
G-2, a facility with a conventional H-configuration identical to Elton, Gorneyy
Balkley, and Pallasovka AW radar facilities, has not been observed to contain radar.
G-1 has been considered an AW radar facility, because its configuration, combined
with the H-configuration of G-2, closely approximates the configuration of
Kamyshin and Alexandrov Gay AW radar facilities. G-1 was observed to be occupied
by a probable BAR LOCK radar and a probable STONE CAKE radar on April 1964
photography. Several recent coverages have shown the facility to be occupied by
numerous vans, but no radars. Whatever their intended original purpose, neither of
these facilities can be considered an active AW radar facility.
Kapustin Yar Airfield A W Radar Facility. This facility is presently being
expanded with the addition of new equipment positions. The facility is located
immediately south of Kapustin Yar Airfield in the northwestern corner of the
Kapustin Yar SAM Range Support Base. The original site contained three radar
mounds in an east/west line with a series of flat pads extending the line to the east.
Three buildings behind the line of pads support the facility. Prior to the first
indications of construction, the facility contained two BACK NET radars on two of
the mounds, a probable SIDE NET radar on the third mound, a BAR LOCK radar, a
ROCK CAKE/STONE CAKE radar, and a SQUAT EYE radar. Construction was
first observed on the new area behind the radar mounds in November 1966. In May
1967, the BACK NET radars were removed. At the same time, the mobile TALL
KING radar was removed from the Kapustin Yar Electronics Test Facility and
placed at the eastern end of the radar line, evidently to replace the BACK NET
radars. More recent coverage shows that construction in the new area appears
complete with the addition of four van pads, two equipment aprons, and a new
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control building. Vans and vehicles have been positioned upon the pads and aprons,
however, coverage has not been adequate to determine the nature of these vans and
vehicles. The radar mounds have not been re-occupied.
Akhtubinsk/Vladimirovka A W Radar Facility. This facility (Figure 19) is
located at Akhtubinsk/Vladimirovka Airfiel adjacent to an aircraft 25X1
parking apron. It is extensively equipped with standard Soviet AW radars.
Equipment presen includes two BACK NET, two SIDE NET, 25X1
four BAR LOCK, two ROCK CAKE/STONE CAKE, and one SQUAT EYE radar.
Considering the amount of air traffic around and associated with the Vladimirovka
Advanced Weapons Research Center, this is probably not an excessive number of
radars. In addition to the actual radars, there are over 65 vehicles and eight buildings
to support operations. The configuration of the facility and the equipment has
remained basically static for several years.
Probable Air Traffic Control Facilities
Air Traffic Control Facility G-3. This facility is located on the east side of the
railroad that serves launch complex D, just south of the railroad turning Y. Because
of the proximity of the facility to a support area that is alongside, the actual size of
the facility is undetermined. The operational components consist of a hardstand
located between two radar mounds, the radar mounds (one is unoccupied and one is
occupied by a probable BIG BAR radar), six small buildings, 23 vans/vehicles, and
several undetermined pieces of equipment. The small size of the facility, the
equipment, and location suggest it is functioning as an air control facility for
bombing ranges in the immediate area.
Akhtubinsk Air Traffic Control Facility, Operations Area A and B. This facility
consists of two operations areas: operations area A (Figure 20) is located
immediately south of the Akhtubinsk/Vladimirovka Airfield support area.
Operations area B is located adjacent to an aircraft apron, 0.7 nm east-northeast of
operations area A. Operations area B is a vehicle parking area. A BAR LOCK radar,
apparently obtained from operations area A, was observed in the area. The presence
of this radar was of a temporary nature and possibly related to maintenance
activity. Operations area A normally contains two BAR LOCK and two ROCK
CAKE/STONE CAKE radar and approximately 24 vans and vehicles. There are at
least 13 permanent buildings in the facility. no radars were 25X1
present in either operations areas.
Assigning exact functions to the seven AW radar facilities at the range is difficult
because all occupied facilities, with the possible exception of G-3, are sufficiently
equipped and located to perform air warning, air traffic control, or air range safety
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functions, or any combination of these. An adequate number of AW radars are
present in the rangehead area to be aware of, and control all aircraft in the vicinity.
Communications Facilities
Communications equipment at the Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka Missile Test
Center can be identified at many locations. In each of the facilities
analyzed in the previous sections where there was identifiable communications
equipment, it was described with the facility.
There are indications of extensive use of microwave and VHF equipment.
However, in only a few cases has it been possible to identify these types of antennas.
Continued large-scale coverage will undoubtedly reveal a VHF or microwave (or
both) net extending at least into the near range area and probably beyond.
There are five, communications facilities (an additional facility, the Kapustin
Yar SAM Communications Facility, was described in a previous report) located at
the Kapustin Yar/Vladimirovka rangehead.l One of these, collocated with D-3
instrumentation facility, is covered in the ASM section of this report. Of the
remaining four, two are large (HF Communications Facility 1 and 2) and two are
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small (HF Communications Facility D-5 and Akhtubinsk HF Communications
Facility).
HF Communications Facility 1
This facility (Figure 21) consists of a large rhombic and dipole antenna field
surrounding a centrally located transmitter building and associated structures. It is
the major HF transmitting facility for the range, and is located 1.8 nm south of the
telemetry/tracking facility. There are four pairs of double day/night rhombic
antennas, one pair of day/night rhombic antennas, 18 dipole antennas, and four
possible VHF antennas in the antenna field. A previous report contains a table and
map showing probable correspondents.6
HF Communications Facility 2
This facility is the receiving counterpart of HF communications facility 1 and is
located 9 nm west of the transmitting facility. It has not been possible to determine
the exact number of antennas in the facility. Recent coverage did permit the
identification of fishbone antennas, verifying the receiving function of this facility.
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While mensuration was not possible, the fishbone antennas observed appeared to
have receiving azimuths comparable to the propagation azimuths of antennas at HF b
Communications Facility 1, indicating the same correspondents.
HF Communications Facility D-5 0
This facility (Figure 22) once associated with the D instrumentation group can
now be identified as a HF/VHF communications facility. Seven possible UHF/VHF
antennas and one VHF FORK REST-type antenna are within the security fence.
Fourteen hundred feet south of the secured area is a 5-3-3-5 fishbone antenna with
This antenna was first observed at the facility in May 25X1
1965 and may date from the construction of the facility. 25X1
reveals that a considerable expansion is underway at the facility. In the field
surrounding the secured area there are three 2-2-2 fishbones, five dipoles, and one
day/night dipole, a total of nine new antennas in initial stages of construction.
Azimuths for these antennas are shown on Figure 22.
The FORK REST-type antenna at this facility was the only VHF antenna on the
range from which an azimuth was obtainable. The azimuth at the time 25X1
of the photography (?5 degrees) covers the ballistic vehicle tracking complex in the
near range or perhaps Terekt Tracking Facility 100 nm downrange. (Terekty was
observed to have two masts that were possibly VHF antennas). While no 25X1
definite correspondents can be determined for any of the antennas at D-5, the wide
propagation pattern of the dipoles and fishbones would enable these antennas to
communicate with practically all downrange tracking facilities within their range
and along their general azimuth.
Akhtubinsk Communications Facility
Akhtubinsk Communications Facility is located southwest of
Akhtubinsk/Vladimirovka Airfield and 1.1 nm northwest of the Akhtubinsk Air
Traffic Control Facility, operations area A. It has a small antenna field containing
masts surrounding a small building. The masts are probably supporting UHF/VHF
antennas for ground-to-air communications, but this cannot be confirmed on
available photography.
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ACIC. US Air Target Charts, Series 200, scale 1:200,000
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4. NPIC. Complex C Operations Area KY/VIad MTC, USSR, Mar 67 (TOP 25X1
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Electronics Facilities at Kapustin Yar SAM Range, USSR, Mar 68 (TOP
2. CIA. High Resolution Interferometer Study, Tyuratam, Kapustin Yar, and Plesetsk,
Dec 68 (TOP SECRET RUFF)
3. NPIC. Complex C Tracking Facility and Complex C Interferometer/Range Rate
Facility, Kapustin Yar/Vlad MTC, USSR, Jun 67 (TOP SECRET CHESS RUFF)
DIA.I
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The Sary Shagan Anti-Missile Test Range, 1 May 67 (TOP SECRET
NPIC. Rangehead Transmitting Commo Facility, KY/Vlad MTC, USSR, Aug 67
(TOP SECRET CHESS RUFF)
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