REPORT OF TRI-PARTITE WORKING PARTY ON SOVIET STRATEGIC SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE DEPLOYMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: NGA Records (Formerly NIMA)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T04757A000300010004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 28, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: September 16, 1963
• Content Type: REPORT

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GMAIC R/163-5
19 December 1963
REPORT OF TRI-PARTITE WORKING PARTY ON
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
of the
United States Intelligence Board
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REPORT OF TRI-PARTITE WORKING PARTY ON
16 - 23 September 1963
Washington, D.C.
GMAIC R/163-5
19 December 1963
Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee
of the
United States Intelligence Board
SOVIET STRATEGIC SURFACE-TO-SURFACE
MISSILE DEPLOYMENT
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The National Photographic Interpretation
Center furnished illustration, publication, and
reproduction support for this report.
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List of Delegates ................................. v
Agenda ....................................... vii
Summary and Conclusions
Intercontinental Balistic Missile Deployment ........... 1
Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile Deploy-
ment ...................................... 3
Soviet Rocket Force Organization and Training .......... 6
Soviet Rocket Force Command and Control ............ 6
Annex 1 - Soviet ICBM Deployment
General .................................... 7
Test Range Facilities Related to Deployment ........... 7
Deployed ICBM Weapons Systems .................. 10
Physical Description of ICBM Launch Sites ......... 11
Support Facilities at ICBM Complexes ............. 14
Timing of Confirmed Complexes ................ 14
Figure 1 - Basic Configurations, Soviet ICBM Sites .... 16
Annex 2 - Soviet MRBM/IRBM Deployment
Test Range Facilities - Related to Deployment .......... 17
MRBM/IRBM Deployment ........................ 17
MRBM/IRBM Construction Timing ............... 18
Appendix A - Site Configurations ................... 20
Appenxix B - MRBM/IRBM Status .................. 20
Annex 3 - Soviet Rocket Forces Organization and Training ..... 21
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Washington, D.C.
16-23 September 1963
1. Tyuratam Range
a. Area Al and A2
b. Area B
c. Area C (Cl and C2) (C2 and C3)
d. Area D1 and D2
e. Area E
f. Area F
g. Area G
h. Area H
i. Weapon Association/Prototypes
Monday P.M. (1300- 1630) & Tuesday (0900-1200 & 1330- 1630)
1. ICBM Deployment
a. Locations
b. Site signatures
c. Construction timing
d. Operational concepts and readiness
e. Refire capability
f. Hardening
g. Weapon Association
Wednesday A.M. (0900 - 1200)
1. Kapustin Yar Range
a. Area E
b. Area 2C
c. Area 3C
d. Area 4C
e. Area 5C
f. Others
g. Weapon Association
1. MRBM/IRBM Deployment
a. Locations
b. Site signatures
c. Construction timing
d. Operational concepts and readiness
e. Refire capability
f. Hardening
g. Weapon Association
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1. Soviet Missiles in Cuba
a. Deployment
b. Equipment
c. Operational Concepts and Readiness
1. Organization and Training (0900- 1100)
2. Deployment Indicators and Suspect Areas (1100-1200)
a. MRBM/IRBM
b. ICBM
1. Command and Control (1330-1500)
2. Standardization of Terms (Configurations and Names) (1500- 1630)
1. Summary and Conclusions
2. Preparation and Approval of Minutes
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A. General
All three delegations were in general agree-
ment as to the number and operational status of
Soviet ICBM sites currently deployed in the
USSR. There were no areas of majordisagree-
ment regarding ICBM deployment although the
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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elegations do not believe that
the SS-8 missile is operational at the present
time. Certain other problem areas exist, and
these are presented in the form of unresolved
questions in Par III.
B. Level of Confidence
Through extensive usable 0 cov-
erage of the Soviet rail system, all conferees
have a high degree of confidence that the re-
sultant assessment of Soviet ICBM deployment
is accurate.
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A. ICBM
Soft Sites
Hard Sites*
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complexes located generally between 50 and 60
degrees north latitude and along the Soviet rail
system. Of the 211 deployed launchers thus far
identified, 142 are soft and 69* are hard. About
100 launchers are currently believed to be oper-
ational, excluding the Tyuratam Test Range.
The following numbers represent an assess-
ment of the operational status of identified
deployed 95 sites (211
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B. Future Trends
The type IIC deployment program will prob-
ably be limited to those sites existing at Tyumen,
Kozelsk and Plesetsk. However, a recent start
of a hard site at Kozelsk (Site C), if for the
SS-8, would represent the first start of its kind
since about the and would rep-
resent continued deployment of the SS-8. Con-
tinued deployment of SS-7 in both a soft and hard
configuration is in evidence.
C. Readiness/Refire/Salvo
The Soviets have at least 102 deployed
launchers (excluding TTMTR) which appear to be
complete as of I Ifrom which
ICBMs could be fired. It is believed that soft
ICBM sites have a refire capability. The exact
time to refire is undetermined, but could prob-
ably be accomplished in about 10 hours. The
hard sites do not have an immediate refire
capability. Although the Soviets have demon-
strated multiple ICBM launchings at TTMTR,
we are unable to apply this information to Salvo
capability of the field force. Information on
Soviet doctrine, guidance, fueling techniques,
missile reliability and launch options is such
that it does not permit us to assess the Soviet
Salvo capability.
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D. Construction Timing
The SS-7 deployed sites (Type IIA, IIB)were
constructed in about 12 to 15 months. Some
Type IIC sites took as long as 18-24 months to
complete, and hard sites are completed in about
2 years. Construction of the new Type IID sites
will probably take on the order of one year
to complete.
E. Hardening
Hardening techniques (bunkering) of build-
ings have been observed in recent photography
at some of the deployed IIC andllDlaunch sites.
Hard silo type launch sites for the SS-7 and prob-
ably for the SS-8 have been observed at 14 (in-
cluding Tyumen) of the 18 ICBM complexes.
Although studies were available on ICBM harden-
ing, this conference did not attempt to assess
the degree of hardening.
The following questions cover problem
areas where available evidence is either insuf-
ficient to permit an evaluation or further analysis
of existing evidence is required.
A. Number of Launch Silos in Hardened
ICBM Launch Sites and Mode of Operation
1. Background
It is the position that hard ICBM
0
evidence to determine whether the 3rd silo is
in fact a launch silo.
2. Questions
a. What is the most likely function of
the 3rd silo?
b. Do the Soviets employ silo lift or
do they fire directly from the launch silo?
c. Is the missile maintained in a
fueled condition in the silo, or are there under-
ground storage facilities adjacent to the launch
silos?
B. Site Orientation
Site orientation varies widely in an arc from
West to East and there appears to be a uniform
difference in orientation for each weapons
system.
1. Questions
a. What is the significance of the vari-
ous site orientations?
b. Can likely target areas be deter-
mined from site orientation?
C. Operational Concept
Photography has provided considerable evi-
dence of launch control bunkers, checkout or
missile ready buildings and other structures at
Soviet ICBM launch sites. Many facilities pres-
ent at the launch sites have not had specific
function ascribed, therefore, it has not been pos-
sible to establish the internal concept of op-
eration at the launch site.
1. Questions
a. What is the function of the "missile
ready building (s)" located at soft ICBM sites?
Do both buildings serve the same function?
b. How many missiles are kept on
site, within the complex support facility, and
in what readiness condition?
c. Where is the ground support equip-
ment kept, and how is it used in the operation?
d. Do the Soviets use mobile ground
support equipment, or have they gone to an
integral system?
D. Organization
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*Based on two launch silos per hard site. Should MRBM/
IRBM hard sites contain three launchers each the total
would be 719. Should hard MRBM sites contain 4 launchers
and IRBMs three, the total would read 740.
A. General
All three delegations were in general agree-
ment as to the number and operational status of
IRBM/MRBM sites currently deployed in the
USSR. Areas of disagreement involved the num-
ber of launch silos at hard IRBM/MRBM sites
and the probability that all soft MRBM complexes
will eventually be augmented by the addition of
a hard site.
B. Level of Confidence
Evaluations of site deployment were based
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collateral information with a high degree of con-
fidence. All three delegations believe it unlikely
that more than a few completed deployed sites
remain unidentified. Areas in which evaluations
could not be made due to lack of evidence are
included in paragraph III on page 4.
A. MRBM/IRBM Site Status
1. Status as of A total
of 190 MRBM/IRBM sites have been identified on
25X1 IIphotography. These sites contain a
total of 678* launchers, including 82 in a hardened
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configuration. A total of 644 launchers, including
60 hard, are estimated to be operational.
2. Future Trend
All three delegations agree that the con-
struction of soft MRBM/IRBM sites is virtually
complete, but that construction of hard sites
will continue into
j be-
lieves that the final deployment pattern will
provide for complexes of three sites, most
consisting of a mixture of hard and soft sites.
The delegations be-
lieve that the MRBM/IRBM program will level
off byith a total of 700-800 launchers
(considering two launchers per hard site). Fur-
ther, they believe that recent photography indi-
cates that a hard launch site will not be added
to more than a few of the soft complexes.
B. Geographic Location
IRBM/MRBM complexes are deployed pre-
dominantly in the Western USSR and to a lesser
extent in the Southern and Far Eastern USSR.
(See GMAIC report "Evaluations of Soviet Sur-
face-to-Surface Missile Deployment, 9th Re-
vision," dated
locations).
C. Site Signatures
There are two basic signatures for the soft
MRBM and one for the hardened version. In the
case of the IRBM, there is one basic soft and
one hard configuration. With the exception of the
earliest deployed MRBM sites, these component
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soft and hard configurations are observable at
the Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range.
D. Construction Timing
It is generally agreed that MRE3M/IRBM
soft sites require 12 months under normal con-
ditions. Earlier versions may have taken as
long as 18 months. As far as hard sites are con-
cerned, 15 to 20 months appear to be required,
depending on local conditions.
E. Weapon Association
1. There is complete agreement that the
SS-5 IRBM is the only weapon system deployed
at existing IRBM sites, both soft and hard.
2. As far as MRBM weapons systems are
concerned, all agree that the SS-4 SANDAL is
the weapon system deployed on the majority, if
not all, existing soft and hard MRBM sites.
The SS-3 SHYSTER is obsolescent and few, if
any, remain deployed.
F. Hardness
There is no direct evidence of degree of
hardness of MRBM/IRBM sites. Therefore, the
conferees did not address themselves to this
question.
G. Operational Considerations
It was generally concluded that the observed
mixture of soft and hard site configurations in
both the MRBM and IRBM deployment programs
provides a variety of options in the operational
employment of these sites.
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2. Refire
It is agreed that soft MRBM/IRBM sites
have been provided with a capability to carry
out at least one additional firing from each
launch pad. Hard launch sites do not have an
immediate refire capability.
The following questions cover problem
areas where either available evidence is insuf-
ficient to permit an evaluation, or further
analysis of existing evidence is required. In
some instances, the lack of hard evidence has
resulted in divergent views. In others, avail-
able information is so scant that no firm po-
sition has been taken by any of the delegations.
In all cases, further evidence will be required
to provide a firm basis upon which to make
an evaluation.
A. Alternate/Reserve MRBM Positions
1. Background
Recent photcgraphy has revealed the existence of
a few field-type sites, but it is not known if these
are, in fact, alternate or reserve positions. All
but a few fixed sites thus far observed are con-
sidered to be primary sites.
2. Question
Do alternate/reserve sites exist? If so,
what do they look-like?
B. Number of Launch Silos in Hardened
MRBM/IRBM Launch Sites and Mode of Op-
eration.
1. Background
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2. Question
a. Is site orientation indicative to
primary targets?
b. What are the limits of the primary
arc of fire?
others believing that both contain two,
ossibl three, launch silos.
p
cause of differences in technical-
I
analysis, reserve in their opinion pending fur-
ther study. The mode of firing from silos can-
not be determined at the present time.
2. Questions
a. What is the function of the third
(lower left) silo at both MRBM and IRBM
hard sites?
b. Is there a fourth silo at MRBM
hard sites? If so, what function does it per-
form?
c. Where is the personnel and equip-
ment entrance to MRBM/IRBM hard sites lo-
cated?
d. Do the Soviets employ silo lift or
fire directly from the launch silo?
C. Organization
D. Site Orientation
1. Background
Site orientation appears to be uniform for
each weapons system, and it is believed that a
directional relationship exists between site or-
ientation and target areas.
E. Salvo Fire
1. Background
All sites have a theoretical capability to
salvo fire. However, it is not known whether
the weapons systems involved have inherent
restrictive factors preventing the simultaneous
firing of more than one or two missiles from
each site.
2. Question
What is the Soviet capability for salvo
fire from MRBM/IRBM sites?
F. Manning of Soft MRBM Sites
1. Background
The operational manning of all soft
MRBM sites would require personnel levels
which appear to be inconsistent with current
estimates of SRF overall strength. On the
other hand, all but a few such sites appear to
represent primary positions.
2. Questions
a. How many of the soft MRBM sites
are operationally manned?
b. If all are not currently manned,
which ones are not, and in what manner, and
over what time period will they be manned in
the event of an emergency?
c. What is the overall strength of
the SRF?
G. Unusual Site Configurations
1. Background
Five isolated and unusually configured
soft MRBM/IRBM soft sites have been identi-
fied. None have support facilities in the im-
mediate vicinity.
2. Question
What is the function of these sites?
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The strategic rocket forces are responsible
for operational ICBM, IRBM and MRBM. systems
as well as the test ranges at Kapustin. Yar and
Tyuratam. The planned number of SS-7 launchers
to a division may be as many as sixteen, al-
though twenty-two (excluding possible hard site
Kat Yurya) launchers have been identified at
one complex. In the case of both systems,
combinations of hard and soft sites are to be
found within a division. IRBM and MRBM di-
visions are believed to consist of at least three
regiments, the battalions of which are deployed
in various combinations of hard and soft sites.
The foregoing is based mainly on photographic
evidence. From this source it has only been
possible to deduce a skeleton structure at regi-
mental level, and little is therefore known of
the detailed organization.
Very little progress has been made in the
past year in determining the level of training
in the strategic rocket forces. Although the
speed and facility with which SANDAL missiles
were deployed in Cuba gave a good indication of
the state of training of the forces engaged in
this operation, it is not possible to determine
from available intelligence the number of trained
crews available for the weapons systems in the
strategic rocket forces.
III. PROBLEM AREAS
a. What is the current operational strength
of the SRF and how is manpower allocated be-
tween the various weapons systems?
b. What can be done to improve collection
of intelligence on the state of training and the
detailed organization down to battalion level of
the various components of the SRF?
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
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There was complete agreement among the
delegations on the command and control system
for the deployed strategic missile complexes.
There is believed to be an operational chain
of command from Khrushchev, acting as Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Supreme High Command
down thru the General Staff of the Ministry of
Defense to the Commander of the Strategic
Rocket Forces, and then directly to the de-
ployed complexes.
We have not definitely seen command and
control of strategic missile units in
0
which is believed to serve the Strategic Rocket
Forces, but to date, insufficient evidence exists
to allow us to label it definitely as a command and
control network (see Annex).
It is expected that landline, microwave and
MERCURY GRASS normally constitute the pri-
mary means of communications in command and
control system, but high-frequency radio will
provide back-up.
What is the function of the radio network
mentioned above and what other communication
facilities are available for use by the SRF?
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 Through extensive usable ~ov-
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erage of the Soviet rail network (which amounts
to about 90percentsince a total
of 18 deployed ICBM complexes have now been
identified, with a total of confirmed launchers of
three basic configurations in various stages of
construction. (See Figure 1) About 100 of the
confirmed launchers both soft and hard, are
currently believed to be operational excluding the
Tyuratam Test Range. The number of con-
firmed launchers by type and operational status*
The following table represents our estimate
of the cummulative number of observed launch-
ers that will be completed and probably op-
erational by Quarter:
Table 0.
ANNEX 1 - SOVIET ICBM DEPLOYMENT
as of
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Table 1
Estimated Status of Confirmed* ICBM Launchers
at Deployed Complexes
LAUNCHERS
COMPLETED
'QET
*Does not include possible sites at:
Omsk - Launch Site B
Yurya - Launch Site K
"Considering Type III Sites as having 3 launch silos. It is
I I that type III sites probably have 3
iauncn i o er, feels that
there is insufficient evi ence to e ermine w e er the 3rd
silo is infact a launch silo.
***Figures exclude R&D and prototype launchers at the
Tyuratam Missile Test Range (TTMTR).
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1. TEST RANGE FACILITIES RELATED TO
DEPLOYMENT
A. TTMTR Launch Facilities
Soviet requirements for the concurrent test-
ing of three different ICBM systems, space ve-
hicles, as well as the introduction of hard sites
has caused an extensive expansion of Tyuratam
launching facilities from the original, single
launch pad to a present total of 14-18 completed
launchers with associated ground support equip-
ment. Much detailed information on the chron-
ology of test range expansion and the nature of
range facilities is known from repeated
photographic coverage, supple-
mented by other technical and clandestine col-
lection means. Based on the general character-
istics of the ICBM systems, the firing schedules
and telemetry usage at the range head and the
missile and space tracking reports passed by
Soviet radars downrange, the probable relation
of launch areas at Tyuratam with the ICBM
programs follows.
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Launch Complex A: The original, massive,
rail-served A-1 launcher with pit has been used
for all R&D firings of SS-6 missiles and most
space boosters. An adjacent, smaller, flat pad
A-2 has also been available since The
launcher consists of a concrete pad approxi-
mately 150 feet square. Two small structures
are located adjacent to the pad, one on each
side. The separation distance between the two
structures is about 165 feet or slightly greater
than the pad width. The rail served facility at
A-2 has several distinct similarities to Launch
Area E and probably was used to launch the
SS-8 missile and the first 5 months
0
In addition to its function as R&D launch
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area for the SS-6 and SS-8 missiles, Launch
Complex A serves as the space facility at
Tyuratam.
Launch Complex B: This is a large, rail-
served launcher, similar to the original at
Launch Area A. The area was first observed
under construction in was ready for
operational use bylnd may have been
operational as early as F____ Additional
facilities were added between
Several SS-6 missiles have been reliably back-
tracked to Launch Complex B and these facil-
ities probably have been used for troop train-
ing and quality control firing of the operational
SS-6 missile system. Two new large buildings
25X1 are being added to the complex
Launch Complex C: At the present time
this Launch Complex has three launch pads and
an associated support facility. It has, however,
undergone two modifications since completion
of the original launch facilities and has been
used for research, development, production
quality control and troop training firings for the
25X1 SS-7 missile system. Since Oa total
of nineteen SS-7 missiles have been reliably
stage of construction. I it was
almost complete, and probably became opera-
tional shortly thereafter. At this time it had
two road served launch pads within a secured
launch site, and an extensive support facility
with rail and road service.
In late I he launch complex
was observed in the process of expansion. Con-
struction of a third launch pad was initiated
afterl 25X1
and probably was complete by the
This new launch pad, C-3, was added about 900 25X1
feet east of C-2 and had the same alignment.
A new access road had been built from the main
road, and ran midway between C-2 and C-3.
The second modification of the C area in-
cluded the addition of canted structures at launch
pad, C-2. These structures have been observed
at a new type of deployment system (II D) in the
field; however, their specific function is not
known. It has been suggested that these struc-
tures may serve as propellant storage. This
new construction phase was initiated in
and completed in the first
Launch Complex D: This launch complex
consists of two road served hard launch facil-
ities, each containing three silos. It is the Q
hat it is more likely that all 3 silos
are launch silos. feels
that there is insufficient evidence to determine
whether there is in fact a third launch silo. Al-
though initial traces of construction activity at
D-1 were present in the photography of
he area was first identified in
I Construction of the facility was
definitely complete by I hen two
missile firings were backtracked to this launch
area. However, the facility may have been
operational as early as
t
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external finishing work was required from the D
Launch Complex. Construction at D-2 was
initiated in late or about one
year later than D-1, and it will probably become
operational late in the third quarter or the
fourth quarter I
Launch Area D-1 became operational too
late to play a part in the initial R&D test phase
of the SS-7 ICBM. It probably was used for
R&D of the missile for the hard configuration as
well as troop training and quality control tests.
In Ithere was an attempt to fire three
SS-7 missiles at 5 minute intervals. These may
have been simulated operational firings from a
single launch facility and could have been a test
of the launch facility at D-1.
Launch Complex E: This area has 3 soft
launchers within the launch site. Two of these
launchers are identical, and were constructed
concurrently. The third, E-3, was started con-
siderably later but has the same basic features of
E-1 and E-2. Similar features include the size
and spacing of three structures surrounding the
pad, and an unusual rail connection from the mis-
sile ready building to the launch pad. However,
at E-3 the structures are mounded and the road
pattern is slightly different. Two probable pylons
approximately 150 feet high are located at each
pad area. The entire area is road served and has
only a very small support site, and is not con-
nected to the main complex rail system. Con-
struction of Launch Complex E began in the third
quarter Iand two launchers became opera-
tional in Launcher E-3 started con-
struction in and probably
was The distinct
Launch Complex F: This launch site desig-
nated Type III B, is a hard facility with three
silos. Construction started about
Iland the facility should have reached opera-
tional status by II At F there is a heart-
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shaped road pattern about 1,200' across, and along the north edge of the area are three silos
in a line. The silos are spaced 180 feet between
center and a control bunker about 240 feet from
the line of silos.
This facility is different in configuration
from the hard sites at the D area. Deployed
sites resembling this prototype have been found
at two complexes in the field. At one complex,
Kozelsk, it is found with launch areas similar to
Area E at TTMTR. Therefore, we believe
Launch Complex F maybe the hard operational
prototype for the SS-8 missile.
Launch Complex G: In the
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Soviets had begun building a road and a rail line
out towards an area NW of Launch Area F. This
area now incorporates several secured areas
under construction and a large support area.
Two rail served launch areas are currently
under construction and the first may be ready
to launch missiles as early as the fourth
quarter of = The evidence indicates that this 25X1
is a facility for a new system; however, there is
insufficient evidence to determine whether this
is for a new ICBM, or a follow on space system,
or both. No deployed facilities of a similar con-
figuration have been identified.
Launch Complex H: This facility is a launch 25X1
area identified in 0 in an early stage of
construction and probably started in 25X1
Located 1.8 miles east of Launch 25X1
Complex C, it is a partially secured area con-
taining at least 12 buildings, a possible bunker,
one shallow irregular excavation and two smaller
rectangular excavations. The installation is rail
and road served, the rail being an extension of
the spur next to the assembly and checkout build-
similarities between A-2, Launch Area E and the
sites observed in the field indicate they are re-
lated to the same missile system. Two SS-8
missiles have been backtracked to the E area.
Because of these factors we believe that area E
is the soft prototype launch site for the SS-8.
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ing at the support site of Launch Complex C. The
area was last observed ml I The pur-
pose of this facility is unknown. Two additional
areas, one between launch area A and E, one
between launch area A and B are in early stage
of construction.
B. Relation Between Facilities at TTMTR
and Operational Complexes
The configuration and utilization of test
range facilities at Tyuratam provide a key to
recognition of deployment in the field. The test-
ing of ICBM systems at Tyuratam involves, not
only R&D on the missile itself, but also the de-
velopment and proving out of compatible ground
support equipment for use in deployment com-
plexes and, later, quality control and operational
training firings. From the chronology of the
ICBM programs, it appears that Soviet practice
is to develop missiles and ground support equip-
ment concurrently as a complete weapon system.
We believe that field support equipment is some-
what less complex than corresponding R&D
equipment, and the differences between the SS-6
launch facilities at Tyuratam Areas A and B,
and the SS-7 facilities at the original C-1 and
C-3 installations provide support for this belief.
The program for each of the launch site
configurations associated with each missile
system has followed a discernible pattern in-
volving test range and field activity overlapping
in time. In the case of the SS-7, construction
activity had commenced at a number of locations
in the field before the first test firing of the
missile at TTMTR. To date, all confirmed
ICBM launch sites in the field are recognizable
outgrowths of prototype facilities at TTMTR.
A. SS-6 ICBM Deployment System
1. Soft Sites
At Plesetsk we have identified four
large, soft launchers, each served directly by
rail from missile ready buildings and a central
support area. Their rail service, close sim-
ilarity to the launcher at Tyuratam Complex B,
and evidence that construction was in progress
confirms that these launchers are 25X1
for the first generation, SS-6 ICBM system.
They have probably been operational 25X1
and the latest photography, indi-
cates the sites are still active. 25X1
Plesetsk. is the only deployment complex at
which launchers of this type have been identi-
fied. The operational SS-6 deployment config-
uration and its resemblance to the test range
facilities are clearly recognizable in good
quality, cloud-free 0 photography.
Photography of this quality has been accumulated
on over 95 percent of all rail lines in the best
suited regions of the USSR OThere-
fore, we believe that SS-6 deployment exists
only at Plesetsk.
2. Special Role of Plesetsk
The Plesetsk ICBM Launch Complex has
held a special position in the Soviet missile pro-
gram since the beginning of the deployment pro-
gram for long range strategic missiles. It was
selected as one of the sites for the deployment
of the first Soviet ICBM, the SS-6. When further
deployment of the SS-6 was cancelled or cut
back, Plesetsk remained as the only SS-6 de-
ployment location.
As new deployment systems came into being
they were also deployed at Plesetsk. With the
introduction of soft SS-7 sites it became ap-
parent that Plesetsk performed a special role
in the missile program, perhaps an operational
training facility. Although the Soviets con-
structed both R&D and operational prototype
launch facilities at the Tyuratam Test Range,
it is quite possible they had an additional re-
quirement for a field operational orientation and
training of SRF troops, or for deployment system
refinement under more realistic conditions than
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existed at Tyuratam. Whatever its mission,
Plesetsk occupied a unique position in the mis-
sile deployment program. This special role
D
Neither the hard III B or latest
II D soft configuration has made its appearance
at Plesetsk. No new construction activity is
currently apparent at Plesetsk, nor does there
appear to be any effort to modify any of the
existing launch areas.
Although the evidence suggests the training
role of Plesetsk has changed, the complex has
maintained its operational role. Possibly the
Soviets concluded that the training facilities at
Tyuratam were sufficient for their current
needs and that continuation or expansion of the
training role would have seriously hampered
its function as an operational launch complex.
B. SS-7 ICBM Deployment System
The SS-7 ICBM system is being deployed
at fifteen field locations in the USSR and
Plesetsk. One of the field locations, Gladkaya,
where two soft launch areas were identified
under construction was converted to
the SS-7 system in
Although each complex contains a number
of variations, an SS-7 complex typically con-
sists of three basic elements; a complex sup-
port base, a rail-to-road transfer point and a
number of launch areas. The launch areas in-
clude the launch site, the technical site, and
a housing facility. The SS-7 is being deployed
in launch sites of both a hard and a soft config-
uration, but there has been no apparent attempt
to harden either the technical site or the housing
facility. The soft launch sites contain two
launch positions and the hard sites contain at
least two, and probably three, launch positions.
Of the fifteen confirmed locations of SS-7 de-
ployment, four contain only soft sites, two only
hard sites and nine contain both.
1. Physical Description of ICBMLaunch
a. Soft Type II Sites
Each soft launch site occupies from 85
to 116 acres, and is enclosed by a double security
fence. It contains two elongated launch pads,
(approximately 1,000 feet apart), missile ready
buildings, '2 to 4 major structures in the central
area, an unidentified structure adjacent to each
pad and several smaller buildings. Guidance and
alignment equipment, handling and fueling facil-
ities, and a control bunker are probably within
this area; a second missile for each launcher may
also be available in the area. Evidence at some
sites suggests that facilities may be located
below the pad level. A road branches from the
main service road and leads to the operations
area of the launch site and links the two pads
with other directly associated facilities. Soft
sites have appeared in the field in three deploy-
ment modes, A, B, and D, which reflect sequen-
tial modifications in the SS-7 system. A fourth
variant C appears to be intended for the SS-8.
(1) Mode A
These sites represent the earliest
deployment mode for the SS-7. Only five of
these sites have been identified. Yurya A and B,
Plesetsk A and Verkhnaya Salda B and C. At
these sites, the two missile-ready buildings
(approximately 170 by 105 feet) are parallel and
are situated on a concrete apron along the
center road.
(2) Mode B
The principal difference apparent
between Mode A and Mode B sites appears to be
the positioning of the two missile-ready build-
ings. At Mode B sites these buildings are lo-
cated directly to the rear of the launch pads
and are a drive in type. In most instances
where the stage of construction and quality of
photography has permitted measurement, these
buildings are 170 by 125 feet and 170 by 105
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feet, with the wider of the two buildings canted
25 to 35 degrees from the long axis of the pads.
(3) Mode C
Sites described as Type IIC exist
at three known locations within the Soviet
Union, Plesetsk, Kozelsk, and Tyumen. In ad-
dition an ICBM complex with two soft launch
areas of this type was begun in
Gladkaya near Krasnoyarsk, but was later con-
verted to the III) site assessed for the SS-7.
The total number of launchers at the IIC site
identified to date in the field, not including the
cancelled sites at Gladkaya, is 16 soft.
The soft site is a fenced rectangle generally
about 1800' by 1700' containing a loop road pat-
tern, two launch pads with fixed equipment, two
missile ready buildings and some additional
structures. The sites can be distinguished from
soft SS-7 sites by several major differences as
follows: the orientation differs from SS-7 sites;
pad separation is about 800' as compared to 950';
there is a ready building lined up to the rear of
each pad; the direct connection between the ready
building and pad does not appear to be a finished
road as to SS-7 sites but may be a railway of
about 800'; and finally an interferometer with
1,200 foot legs serves each launch site. In ad-
dition, there is a small triad or plus configura-
tion, about 300' wide, to the rear of the launch
site. We do not know the function of this facility.
(4) Mode D
Mode D launch sites represent the
most recent modification for deployment of the
SS-7 in a soft mode. A few of these sites are
considered complete and while similar in general
configuration to Mode A anb B, appear to have
the following differences: there are two canted
structures, 30 x 90 feet, located inboard of
each launch pad; there are two structures along
the center access road; and there is a larger
pad area. A definite pattern has not emerged as
to the number and arrangement of missile ready
p7M(l300010004-2
buildings at Mode D sites; however, it is apparent
these buildings will differ in size and number
from those found at the older sites. The pattern
varies from three buildings behind one pad, to one
building behind each pad, to two buildings behind
one pad and one building behind the other. Al-
though dimensions of the buildings vary, inmost
cases the individual buildings are smaller than
at the Mode A and B sites. In addition, a group
of three buildings, perhaps with a special func-
tion, has been consistently identified to the rear
of the launch site. While the road at Mode A
and B sites forms a loop pattern in the forward
area at Mode D sites, the forward road is absent
and turn around is allowed only by the en-
larged pad.
b. Hard Type III-A Sites
The average size of the secured area
at the hard launch sites is 1,600 by 1,400 feet.
When completed, these sites are characterized
by an oval road pattern, approximately 850-890
feet long and 360 feet wide, surrounding three
identical silo covers, approximately 80 by 40
feet, and a mounded control bunker. A prob-
able spray pond is located outside the oval road
pattern to the rear and left of the control bunker.
When the site is in a mid-stage of
construction, it is characterized by a rectangular
excavation 500 to 600 feet long and 150 to 200
feet wide, with a notch about 200 by 150 feet
nearly centered along one side. The excavation
contains three silos in a straight line separated
by approximately 180 feet on center. The ex-
cavation also contains two rectangular equip-
ment and/or fuel bunkers, 70 by 50 feet, between
the silos. The notched portion of the excavation
to the rear of the silos contains the control
bunker which appears to be a concrete structure
about 100 by 120 feet. Two probable buried tanks
have been identified outside of, and to the side
of the excavation.
Although three silos have been identified
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in the excavation, the arrangement of the two
equipment bunkers, the appearance of one silo
as larger than the others on some coverages,
and the indistinct appearance of one silo have
raised the possibility that one of the three silos
is not a launch silo. However, the spacing of
the three structures and the identical appearance
and dimensions of the silo covers after the
excavation has been backfilled provide strong
indications that all three probably are launch
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only two launch silos.
c. Hard Type III-B Sites
The most advanced deployed hard site,
not yet complete, is secured by a single security
fence and covers an area about 2,000' x 1,400'.
The site is road-served, and although a finished
road pattern is not yet evident, a cardioid pattern
is suggested. The site contains three probable
launch silos similar in appearance, with an
inside diameter of 30' and about 160' apart. The
control bunker is centered to the rear of the
silos and is 80' by 120'. One hundred feet in
front of the three silos, there is one and prob-
ably two equipment bunkers measuring 25' x 130'.
When backfilled, they appear as a single bunker
85' x 140'. A possible spray pond, 100' x 135',
is to the left of the equipment bunkers. A triad
structure, similar to the "plus" configuration at
the soft sites, is situated 4,200' to the rear of
the launch site. Its purpose is not known, but
it probably has the same function as the triads
at the soft sites.
Hard sites have both similarities and
differences to Areas D and F at TTMTR. The
launch silo separation appears consistent with
that at both D and F, however, the location of
equipment and control bunkers the s ra and
P
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location, the road pattern, and the overall
orientation resemble Complex F rather than D,
indicating that F may be the hard prototype for
the SS-8.
d. Complex Support Facilities asso-
ciated with Type II C Sites
The complex support facility at these
complexes are very similar to the support fa-
cilities associated with SS-7 complexes. it is
one of the first identifiable features of a launch
complex, and during the construction stage,
serves as a base for building supplies and ma-
terial for the rest of the complex. After the
construction phase, it serves as a logistic and
maintenance center for the entire complex.
These complex support facilities are similar in
size and developmental pattern to the present
SS-7 complex support facilities and suggest
that they were originally designed to support an
equivalent number of launch areas.
A separate railroad transfer point is
also present and is probably used to transfer
missiles and propellants from rail-to-road.
It differs from the transfer point seen at most
complexes in that each contains an extra spur
at the same relative position branching at
the same angle.
2. Assignment of SS-8 to Type II C
Launch Sites
The principal basis for the assignment of
the SS-8 to these configurations stems from the
activities and physical arrangement of Tyuratam
and our ability to relate features at Tyuratam to
systems noted in the field.
Trajectory backtrack has established
with a high probability that SS-6 missiles are
launched from Area A or B, and SS-7 missiles
are launched from Area C and D, and that SS-8
missiles are launched from Area A and E.
The physical arrangement of these facil-
ities and the timing of their construction paral-
lels this grouping. Areas A and B were the first
completed and are centrally located. Areas C
and D are located to the east and use a common
support facility. Their construction timing fol-
lowed that of Areas A-1 and B. Areas A-2, E
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and F which run to the west also followed A-1
and B in time and were completed in that order.
The completion date of A-2 is consistent with
the early testing of the SS-8 and the backtrack
data of that period. The first backtrack to Area
E coincides with the photographic evidence of
site completion in 0 The strong re-
lationship between the SS-6 and the SS-8, stem-
ming from their common design heritage, is
consistent with the use of Complex A support
facilities in the test program for the SS-8, and
explains the construction of pad A-2 and the
placement of E with its transport connections
to the Complex A support area.
The physical characteristics of the de-
ployed Type II C sites and a few hard sites are
consistent with launch Complexes E and F and
show major differences from all other areas at
Tyuratam. All remaining configurations in the
field, equate to facilities at B, C and D at
Tyuratam.
Considering the physical and geographic
relationships at Tyuratam, the similarities with
deployed systems, established Soviet practice
in other missile systems, backtrack data, and
the lack of any reasonable alternative, we
believe that the SS-8 missile system is intended
for Type II C and III B sites.
3. Support Facilities at ICBM Complexes
a. Complex Support Base
The complex support base is one of
the first identifiable (although not unique) fea-
tures of a launch complex. During the construc-
tion stage, it serves as a base for building
material for the complex and then serves as a
logistic and maintenance center for operational
units. A typical base has 3 to 4 rail spurs, and
all weather roads. However, the absence of wide
radius turns and its location indicates that it is
not a weapons handling area. A large area of
barracks, family-type housing and administra-
tive-type buildings is also associated with the
0004-2
5 7 A 9
complex support base and provides quarters and
facilities for officers, troops and dependents.
Its location varies from about 1 1/2 to 21 nm
from the nearest town and does not appear to be
affected by security factors, since some of these
bases are very near large cities and main
highways.
b. Missile Transfer Point
A reasonably consistent road and rail
pattern is evident in this facility at all SS-7
complexes. An improved road enters from the
launch areas, parallels the rail spurs and forms
a turn-around before joining the main road in a
wide radius turn. The equipment for transfer
from rail-to--road has not been identified at the
operational launch complexes; however, some
detail is available on Launch Area C at Tyura-
tam. A spur terminates at an L-shaped pro-
jection of a loading dock which is about
This secure installation probably is
used to transfer missiles and propellants from
rail equipment to road equipment. Warheads
also may be transferred in this area. Its sim-
plicity indicates that no additional functions
are involved.
4. Timing of Confirmed Complexes
a. Construction Cycle
(1) Soft Type II Sites
Our estimates of the timing of con-
struction of launch sites are based on a very
large number of repeated photographic observa-
tions of confirmed sites and we believe that such
estimates for the hard and soft SS-7 systems
are highly reliable within 1 or at the most 2
months. To date, 69 soft launch sites con-
taining 138 launchers have been identified in
various stages of construction at deployed
complexes. Some 80 of these launchers are
currently believed to be operational. We have
estimated that construction of these sites re-
quired between 12 and 15 months. A later con-
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served launch site for this system contains hard
underground facilities, including at least two
and probably three launch positions, of a silo
type. Construction of a typical type III launch
site takes between 21-24 months from the be-
ginning of construction to the completion of in-
stallation of equipment.
C. Suspect ICBM Deployment Areas
There are a number of locations within the
USSR that are or have been suspect ICBM de-
ployment sites. These locations have been
identified through occurrences of FPN
numbers from groups associated with the Stra-
tegic Rocket Forces, the scheduling of SRF as-
sociated air flights to these locations, the
apparent location of a possible SRF communi-
cation link terminus in the general area, and
the appearance in photography of U/I construc-
tion and/or rail spurs of a suspicious nature.
Many of the locations with some of these
deployment indicators have been negated by
photographic coverage of the area. The presence
of the indicator remains unresolved in some of
these instances. However, current estimates of
the Soviet deployment program indicate that
there may be 1-2 additional SS-7 complexes still
undiscovered. An examination of all available
evidence indicated two areas as the most likely
suspect locations for ICBM deployment. These
indicators, however, do not permit us to identify
the possible missile system at these sus-
pect locations.
We have reexamined the possibility that
there are SS-6 deployment complexes still un-
identified in the USSR. However, locations with
missile indicators during the time of SS-6 de-
ployment have largely been negated by photo-
graphic evidence since that time. This factor,
plus the obvious cancellation of the SS-6 de-
ployment program, makes it very unlikely that
there are unidentified SS-6 complexes in
the USSR.
Saransk - Kovylkino Area
FPN 01425,
FPN 41706-B,
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This area cannot be negated by photography
for the time period of the On
la suspect rail spur was
noted east of Kovylikino. The area has not been
observed on cloud-free photography.
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figuration (II-D) is estimated to take on the
order of twelve months.
(2) Hard Type III Sites
To date, 19 hard SS-7 launch sites
have been identified in various stages of con-
struction at deployed complexes. Five of these
appeared to be complete and probably operational
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ANNEX 2 - SOVIET MRBM/IRBM DEPLOYMENT
1. TEST RANGE FACILITIES RELATED TO
DEPLOYMENT
A. Kapustin Yar Launch Facilities
Complex C in the southern portion of the
rangehead is positively associated with the de-
velopment of the MRBM/IRBM weapons systems
of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, as well as
with space launchings. Complexes A and B are
probably associated now only with shorter range
missile systems, although it has been suggested
that the two "hump" structures in complex A
may have been utilized in the early development
of a hard launch configuration.
B. Launch Complex C
This complex consists of five launch areas.
When first seen in this area
comprised the two launch sites now known as
to those operationally deployed and are utilized
for unit training. They may also have a limited
R&D function, since no other hardened facilities
have been identified on the range.
5. Launch Area 5C consists of two soft
launch facilities. The northern facility, 5C1, is
associated with the'IRBM system, while 5C2 to
the south is linked to MRBMs. Both these fa-
cilities are utilized for unit training.
A. MRBM
1. General: MRBMs are deployed in both
a hard and soft configuration. While these sites
are compatible with both the SS-3 and SS-4 sys-
tems, the SS-3 is now obsolescent and few, if
any, remain deployed.
2. Complex Description: MRBM com-
plexes consist of up to three launch sites, usually
a mixture of one hard and two soft, the majority
of which have their own support facility. A few
sites have a common support area. While some
complexes contain only soft sites, none con-
taining only hard sites have been identified.
3. Site Description: (See appendix A for
detailed explanation and typing of site configura-
tions)
Sites
1C and 3C. In
a third
site,
2C, of two launch pads was noted. This
area
was at that time under construction and
had probably not been brought into use.
a completely new launch site, 4C, was
observed in about the mid-stage of construction.
I It was estimated that the site was
in the late to final stage of construction. On the
same date that 4C was first seen, 5C was also
noted although it was not until the later cover
I Ithat it was recognized
that there were two separate launch sites.
1. Launch Area 1 Cis the only rail served
launch area on the range and is probably being
utilized for the launch of space vehicles.
2. Launch Area 2C is associated with
R&D firings of the SS-5.
3. Launch Area 3C can be associated
with the development of MRBM weapons systems.
4. Launch Area 4C consists of two
hardened launch facilities. The southern fa-
cility (4C2) is for IRBMs, while to the north,
4C1 is for the MRBMs. These sites are similar
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a. Soft sites: While there is a variety
of configurations at deployed sites, all have
four launch pads. Early versions usually
have two missile ready buildings, while
sites of more recent vintage have a ready
building for each launch pad. Most of these
the consensus of opinion that all but a few
of these confirmed sites are primary. How-
ever, it is possible that all are not fully
manned. The view was expressed that a
number of the sites might be manned by
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cadre strength units which maintain equip-
ment and facilities and form the nucleous
for expansion to operational strength when
directed. Documentary and other evidence
indicates that deployment to field-type al-
ternate sites is a part of Soviet operational
doctrine. Furthermore, evidence from Cuba
shows a capability for this type of deploy-
ment. Recent photography has revealed the
existance of a few field-type sites, but it is
not known if these are, in fact, alternate or
reserve positions.
b. Hard sites: MRBM hard sites con-
tain a number of silos arranged in a H con-
figuration around an underground control
bunker. is firm in its
analysis that these sites contain four identi-
cal launch silos. There are differences of
with a possibility of a third.
Ibecause of differences in techni-
cal analysis, reserve in their opinion pend-
ing further study. Most hard sites are
connected by an access road to an off-site
support facility. The extent of this facility
is not known. It is possible that the hard
site relies to some degree on the support
installations at or near the two soft sites
within the complex. This is particularly
such facility has been identified at any
MRBM installation.
c. Status of Deployment: See appen-
dix B.
B. IRBM
1. General: IRBM's are deployed at both
soft and hard configurations. The SS-5 is the
only IRBM currently deployed.
2. Complex Description: IRBM com-
plexes consist of up to three launch sites. Each
complex has its own support facility. While the
majority of complexes contain both hard and
soft sites, three have been identified which con-
sist of three hard sites only.
3. Site Description: (See appendix A for
detailed explanation and typing of site con-
figurations).
a. Soft sites: Only one basic type of
soft IRBM site has been identified. It consists
of four elongated launch pads, arranged in-line
and characterized by a wider pad separation
than is present at MRBM sites. Each launch
pad has an associated missile ready building
and a fifth building of similar size, centrally
disposed among the other four. All of these
sites are considered primary.
b. Hard sites: IRBM hard sites con-
tain three silos arranged in an L pattern 25X1
around a central control bunker.
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and part of the elieve that all
three silos have an identical launch function. 25X1
Other are uncertain as to the
function of the third silo, since in their view
photographic: evidence appears to show dif-
ferences from the other two during the con-
struction stage.
cause of differences in technical analysis,
reserves in their opinion pending further study.
Support facilities for IRBM hard sites are not
yet clearly defined.
C. MRBM/IRBM Construction Timing:
1. IRBM/MRBM Soft Sites
a. Launch sites are almost invariably
located in wooded areas requiring a fair amount
of logging and clearing operations before con-
struction work proper can begin. Adequate
sources of construction material i.e. sand,
gravel, timber are usually locally available.
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Considerable use is made of preformed con-
crete sections prefabricated off-site (as seen
in construction of Cuban sites).
b. For access purposes, new roads
have been added and, where possible, existing
roads have been improved. In a number of
cases new rail sidings appear to have been built
to facilitate the delivery of construction mate-
rials and equipment, otherwise existing sidings
have been enlarged.
c. Estimate of Site Construction Time
(1) Although hard evidence on the
length of time required by the Soviets to construct
a soft site in the USSR is not available, interpre-
tation of a limited amount of sequential, photog-
raphy provides a fair bases for the follow-
ing estimate:
Early Stage
Logging, clearing and marking out; provision of
access road and construction camp; delivery of
construction material for foundations, etc.
Mid Stage
Concreting of internal roads, launchers and
aprons, construction of buildings, bunkers, se-
curity fence,etc.
Late to Complete Stage
Provision of permanent plant, generators, wiring
fuel storage,etc.
(2) Soft MRBM/IRBM sites gen-
erally have required a construction period of
from 12-18 months. Currently the lesser period
generally applies, except where local conditions
are unfavorable. The upper limit is more ap-
plicable to earlier site construction, before
adequate experience was garnered by construc-
tion personnel.
(3) Based on Soviet Cuban deploy-
ment, it is estimated that the Soviets can occupy
a field type MRBM position and attain an IOC in
approximately 24 hours or less. As far as the
IRBM is concerned, a period of approximately
three months would have been required to com-
plete the type of sites observed in Cuba. How-
ever, there is tenuous evidence that an earlier
emergency firing capability might have been
possible had the Soviets so desired.
2. IRBM/MRBM Hard Sites
a. Sequential photography of the vari-
ous stages of hard site construction is available
to a greater extent than is the case with soft
sites. We are therefore able to postulate a time
scale for their construction with a greater de-
gree of certainty.
b. As in the case of the soft sites
they are located, whenever possible, in heavily
wooded areas and require initial clearance,
provision of adequate access, delivery of build-
ing materials and plant etc., before construc-
tion can begin.
c. Broadly, we believe the time re-
quired to construct a hard site is at least 15
months, but that in certain areas, due to climatic
and terrain difficulties, a period up to 20 months
is necessary.
d. The construction time scale, we
believe, is as follows:
Early Stage
Area cleared of vegetation; levels established;
earth moving equipment moved to site. Ac-
commodations for construction personnel built.
Excavation starts; access roads constructed or
improved. Construction starts on off-site sup-
port facility.
Mid Stage
Excavations completed and construction of fa-
cilities starts in excavated area. Control
bunker and silos appear. Progress continues
on off-site support facility. Site secured.
Late to Complete State
Construction work in excavated area completed.
Area back filled and control bunker mounded
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over. Installation of launch equipment com- understanding of the operational requirements
pleted. Site area landscaped. Off-site support of a hard site, it is quite possible that although
facility completed. a site is assessed as complete, this may apply
e. Due to deficiences in our present only to its external appearance.
Four round launch pads, in-line or offset in-line-no direct access from Ready Mis-
sile Buildings (RMBs) - two drive-through-to pads. (MRBM)
Four round launch pads, in-line, direct access from RMBs - four drive-through - to
pads. (MRBM)
Four elongated launch pads, in-line, direct access from RMBs - usually four non-
drive-through - to pads. (MRBM)
Four elongated launch pads, in-line, direct access from RMBs - usually five non-
drive-through, four behind the pads with the fifth positioned centrally in the
launch area - wider pad separation than the A3 configuration. (IRBM)
Four round launch pads in rectangular formation, usually only two RMBs - drive-
through-each serving one pair of pads. (MRBM)
Four round launch pads in dumbbell formation, usually only two RMBs - drive-
through-each serving one pair or pads. (MRBM)
Four round or elliptical launch pads in irregular formation, usually only two
RMBs - drive-through-in launch area. (MRBM)
A hard launch site near an existing complex of soft MRBM launch sites, similar in
appearance to Launch Site 4C1 at Kapustin Yar.
A hard launch site near an existing soft IRBM launch site, or one of those forming
a complex of three hard launch sites, similar in appearance to Launch Site
4C2 at Kapustin Yar.
NO. LAUNCHERS
COMPLETED
NO. LAUNCHERS
U/C
Soft
Hard
149
41
596
82
584
60
12
22
*Should hard MR/IR sites contain 3 launchers each the total would read 719. Should hard MRBM sites contain 4 launchers
and IRBM sites three launchers the total would be 740.
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ANNEX 3 - SOVIET ROCKET FORCES ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING
A. The SRF has separate chains of command
for its deployed ICBM and IR/MRBM weapon
systems. The only complex which has a mixture
of ICBM systems is Plesetsk and it is also the
only location where the SS-6 is deployed. Soft
launchers arre deployed in pairs to form a site.
It is believed that most complexes will contain
a division of about 15-18 launchers although two
of the older complexes already have more than
this number. Locations of suspected SS-8 de-
ployment do not as yet appear to involve as many
launchers as those where the SS-7 is deployed.
Both hard and soft sites are found within SS-7
and SS-8 deployment areas.
B. At Annexes "A" and "B" are the various
regimental organizations as indicated by the
photographic evidence. It is only in the IR/MRBM
organization that there is good evidence of a
divisional type structure.
deployed in Cuba gave a good indication of the
state of training of the forces engaged in this
operation, it is not possible to determine from
available intelligence the number of trained
crews available for the weapons systems in the
strategic rocket forces.
Number of Launchers*
per Complex
a.
Hard Hard H
ard 6 - 9
b.
Hard Hard S
oft 8 - 10
c.
Hard Soft S
oft 10 - 11
d.
Soft Soft S
oft 12
BN BN
Soft Soft
Very little progress has been made in the
past year in determining the level of training in
the strategic rocket forces. Although the speed
and facility with which SANDAL missiles were
**
Number of Launchers
per Complex
BN BN
BN
a. Soft Soft
Hard 11 - 12**
b. Soft Soft
Soft 12
*Low figure reflects two hard launchers per site; upper fig-
ure reflects three.
**Low figure reflects three hard launchers per site; upper
figure reflects four for the hard sites.
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