STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 20 No. 1, Spring 1976]

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010022-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 74
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: January 1, 1976
• Content Type: IS

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CTU 1717~'~S
IN
IGENCEf
INTELL
VOL. 20 No. 1
SPRING 1976
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CONTENTS
Page
CIA Intelligence Support for Policy Making .... Forbush, Chase & Goldberg 1
SECRET
Truman on CIA ............ . ......................... Thomas F. Troy 21
Truman's role in establishing the Agency SECRET
The National Intelligence Daily .......................... Nathan Nielsen 39
How we got into the newspaper business. SECRET NFD
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature ................................. 53
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS ISSUE
Ramsey Forbush, a veteran OCI and ONE officer, retired as Director of the Office of
Political Research. Gary Chase, after five years in OCI, now is in OPR. Ronald
Goldberg, an OSR officer, has been with CIA for eight years.
Thomas F. Troy of the Office of Training is an intelligence history buff particularly
interested in the establishment of CIA and its predecessors, CIG, OSS, and COI.
Nathan Nielsen, an experienced newspaperman from Omaha, joined the OCI
Production Staff in 1968 and has been involved in the National Intelligence
Daily from conception through inception to the present.
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There is no phase in the intelligence business
which is more important than the proper
relationship between intelligence itself and
the people who use its product. Oddly
enough, this relationship, which one would
expect to establish itself automatically, does
not do this. It is established as a result of a
great deal of persistent, conscious effort and is
likely to disappear when the effort is relaxed.
Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for
American World Policy, 1949
CIA INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT FOR FOREIGN
AND NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY MAKING
Center for the Study of Intelligence'
Sherman Kent and other early commentators of the connection between
intelligence and policy' posited policy makers who consciously and carefully
assembled information relevant to their problems, weighed policy options and
implications, and proceeded to select courses of action. Intelligence provided part of
the factual and interpretative background for this process and aided in the projection
of the consequences of alternative strategies. The role intelligence producers were
supposed to play was seen as sizable, yet carefully delineated; they were admonished
to guard against too intimate an involvement in the policy-making process, lest they
compromise their impartiality and objectivity.
With the benefit of additional years of perspective on the policy-making process,
it now seems doubtful that such rational actor-based models ever adequately described
it. They surely fail to do so today. Increasingly sophisticated analyses have revealed an
intricate, often disorderly system of human and institutional interactions that is
incompatible with traditional maxims about the role of intelligence. The Decision-
Making models that emerged in the early 1960s' and more recent attempts to develop
and apply sophisticated conceptual frameworks-notably the Organizational Process
'This paper was prepared by a study team comprising Ramsey Forbush (Office of National
Estimates/Office of Political Research-retired), Gary Chase (Office of Current Intelligence), and Ron
Goldberg (Office of Strategic Research). It will be noted that the study concentrates almost entirely on
policy making by the executive branch. The extent to which the Agency will be called upon in the future to
provide increased intelligence support to the legislative branch depends in large part on the outcome of the
recent investigative process, and on how strongly Congress persists in asserting prerogatives in foreign affairs.
The study team believes that the implications of the intelligence-congressional relationship deserve separate
study when the still-evolving nature of that relationship becomes more evident. The study also does not
concentrate on the role of the DCI, inasmuch as this position transcends direction of the CIA and includes a
great deal of intelligence community responsibility.
'See, for example, George Pettee, The Future of American Secret Intelligence (1946), and Washington
Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production (1957).
'See Charles Lindbloom, "The Science of 'Muddling Through"' in Public Administration Review, Vol.
XIX, No. 2 (1959) and The Policy-Making Process (1968). See also, Synder, Bruck, and Sapin, Foreign Policy
MORI/HRP
Decision Making (1962).
from pg.
01-19
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and Bureaucratic Politics models4-highlight the variety of forces at work in the
policy-making process. They provide valuable insights into the dynamics of individual
actuation, organizational functioning, and bureaucratic maneuver. Although the
models deal with informational inputs and communications channels in policy
making, they unfortunately tend not to single out intelligence for separate special
treatment.
The same is true of the intriguing work psychologists and organization theorists
have done on perception, information processing, and decision making by individuals,
small groups, and bureaucracies.,' There have been some attempts to apply the insights
gained in these studies to foreign and national security policy making,6 but without
any systematic effort to assess the impact of intelligence as distinct from that of
information in general.'
This study recognizes the utility of theoretical work in a variety of fields, but is not
cast in terms of a particular model or framework. It attempts a fresh, pragmatic
examination of the working elements in the intelligence-policy relationship, and a
necessary starting point in this examination is an understanding of the policy-making
milieu into which intelligence support funnels.
Traditional thinking about this milieu tends to focus on policy makers at the
top-the Presidents and their closest advisors. Unquestionably these figures play a key
role, especially in crisis situations, but there also is a great corpus of policy that is made
or influenced by others-by the incremental day-to-day decisions of country desk and
embassy officers, by the staff people who draft papers for their principals, and by the
innovative suggestions of junior officers or aides.
Some policy decisions do rest on deliberations by a very few. Others, however,
stem from recommendations of a high-level body reviewing the work of a middle-level
committee that was derived from a series of options formulated at a lower level on the
basis of inputs from the next level down. Policy can also result from nothing more than
unchecked momentum. Thus, policy makers must be thought of as many and varied.
Whether a policy determination occurs high, low, or in between, the set of people
involved obviously will vary with the subject and geographical area, and the impact of
intelligence will differ from case to case.'
'See, for example, Graham Allison, Essence of Decision (1971) and Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic
Politics and Foreign Policy (1974). See also, Wilfrid Kohl, The Nixon-Kissinger Foreign Policy System and
U.S.-European Relations" in World Politics, October 1975.
'See Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (1957); Robert Abelson, Theories of Cognitive
Consistency (1968); Katz and Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (1966); March and Simon,
Organizations (1958); Holsti and George, "The Effects of Stress on the Performance of Foreign Policy
Makers" in Political Science Annual, Vol. 6 (1975).
'See Joseph DeRivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (1968); and John Steinbrunner,
The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (1974).
'Despite the lack of theoretical work specifically geared to the intelligence-policy connection,
sophisticated and insightful studies that aid in understanding individual and organizational behavior should
be of interest to intelligence producers. The Agency has tended to neglect these areas, and this probably has
adversely affected efforts to make intelligence products more relevant and useful.
'There are, of course, those who would challenge application of the term "policy maker" to anyone
except the President, his inner circle of advisors, and perhaps some key Under Secretaries. Others would
attempt to distinguish between policy makers, advisors, and drafters. This paper arbitrarily uses the phrases
"policy makers" and "policy people" very broadly, to encompass a wide range of individuals who are
involved in the policy-making process regularly or on an ad hoc basis. References to "top" to "high-level"
policy makers are to individuals at or above the Assistant Secretary level. The rest are those below that rank,
i.e., mainly-but not exclusively-at the desk level.
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Policy makers differ in interests, temperament, and working styles. These
variations are not always apparent, however, and intelligence producers caught up in
the effort to provide day-to-day support sometimes fail fully to appreciate resulting
problems or opportunities.' There is also a less than complete understanding of areas of
congruence and divergence in attitude and approach between policy makers and
different kinds of intelligence producers. This is especially so regarding the operational
orientation and activist inclination that policy makers share with operations officers.10
Policy people regard themselves as having certain expertise and ample
sophistication. They are accustomed to interpreting, analyzing, and projecting, as well
as planning, deciding, and operating. They tend, therefore, to be most receptive to
intelligence that provides new information, makes the esoteric comprehensible, or
answers a particular question on their minds. Intelligence that attempts to do for them
what they believe they can accomplish competently themselves generally is less well-
received.
Intelligence, of course, often is only one among a number of information sources
available to policy makers, and they are under no obligation to be guided solely by its
light. Policy may, in fact, be shaped by personal, bureaucratic, political, or other
factors having little or no relation to intelligence input.11 Intelligence producers
nevertheless are obliged to do their best to insure that policy makers are aware of
relevant intelligence and take it into account.
The Varieties of Intelligence Support
CIA intelligence feeds into the policy-making milieu in a wide variety of forms.
The Agency's products and services could be categorized in a number of different
ways. One such arbitrary format is developed below as an aid to the analysis in
subsequent sections of the paper. The categories are not meant to be rigid, and there
actually is considerable overlap.
Current Intelligence, provided orally and by a varied array of written products
including finished intelligence publications, the output of the Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), and DDO disseminations, keeps a core of top policy
officials and a corps of others apprised of a very wide range of developments. Current
Intelligence includes reporting, interpretation, analysis, prediction, and even some
customized service. Several different types of products and services are embodied in the
category.
-Broad Spectrum Reporting from CIA is conveyed principally through the
National Intelligence Daily and Bulletin and by the President's Daily Brief. White
House Spot Reports, DDO Field Reports ("TDs"), and FBIS ticker help keep this
coverage current, and some periodicals provide a reviewing service.
-Focused Coverage, by area or function, is handled partly by directing to certain
policy makers only those materials pertaining to their responsibilities, and partly
through publications specially designed for this purpose. Among the latter are the
informal staff notes sent to selected policy people by office of Current Intelligence
'intelligence producers are unlikely to become aware of preferences and idiosyncrasies that affect policy
makers' receptivity to intelligence unless they engage in "market research" through personal contacts with
consumers. This subject is dealt with further in a subsequent section.
'?The strong natural linkages between officers of the Deputy Directorate for Operations (DDO) and
certain policy makers are discussed more fully below under "Oral Intelligence and Personal Relationships."
"An illustration of this kind of policy making appears in the section on "Use."
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(OCI) divisions, the Office of Economic Research (OER) weekly on international
petroleum developments, and periodicals from the Deputy Directorate for Science and
Technology (DD/S&T) with current intelligence for policy people having scientific,
technical, or strategic responsibilities.
-Crisis Response Intelligence is provided when a fast-breaking situation causes,
among other things, a great surge of incoming traffic and acute need on the part of
policy makers to know quickly what is happening and what may be about to take
place. It is usually embodied in a series of up-to-date situation reports.
Customized Service is directly keyed to specific concerns of policy makers. It may
be supplied in response to requests by policy people, special needs ferreted out by NIOs
or others in contact with consumers, or concerns that intelligence officers determine
independently. Examples include support for the delegations at the Strategic Arms
Limitations (SALT) and Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks, some
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), and other material produced by various
Agency components, including the DDO.
In-Depth Analysis is the process of obtaining and evaluating all available pieces
of evidence which seem reasonably to bear on an intelligence subject; seeking the
counsel of other specialists; developing, testing, and refining hypotheses; and, finally,
recording and issuing findings. The emphasis is on comprehensiveness rather than
speed. Analysis of this kind for which the Agency has become respected is mostly in
highly specialized fields-scientific/technical, military/strategic, or
economic/financial. The Agency still is in the process of establishing a reputation for
routinely high-caliber in-depth political analysis or for compelling analysis on the sort
of broad questions that require interdisciplinary attack-whether political/military,
political/economic, or all three.
Predictive Intelligence involves a willingness to think the unthinkable and an
ability to forecast discontinuities as well as to identify trends. It includes much more
than formally issued National Intelligence Estimates. Much predictive intelligence
work is done in customized service and in certain kinds of in-depth analysis. Some also
appears in Current Intelligence. The National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) have a
special responsibility regarding the most critical kind of predictive intelligence, the
Alert Memoranda. These are the formal warnings of the Director of Central
Intelligence to top-level policy makers of possible developments abroad of major
concern to the United States.
The Flow of Words and Paper
The breadth and depth of the production described in the preceding section is
impressive. Production of even the finest intelligence does not, however, guarantee
that it will have an impact on the policy-making process. The intelligence message
must be effectively communicated to policy makers, and this means that it must be
received as well as sent.12 There are clearly a variety of factors affecting delivery of the
Agency's products and services. Many of them tend to blur the intelligence message,
'Communications theorists contend that no communication takes place until there is a transference of
meaning in the mind of the receiver-see, for example, Thayer, Communications and Communications
Systems in Organization, Management, and Interpersonal Relations (1968). This distinction is dealt with
later in the sections on "Receptivity" and "Use."
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and it does not appear that the extent of their impact is fully understood by
intelligence producers.
Changing Structural Arrangement
Formal institutional arrangements create some of the channels through which
intelligence flows. Structural patterns tend to change with the varying concerns and
attitudes of different sets of policy people, and the routes intelligence travels are
shaped accordingly.
In the mid-1950s, when Robert Cutler was Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs in the Eisenhower Administration, the National Security Council Planning
Board had an established system for intelligence tasking and for the consideration of
formal intelligence estimates as a regular part of the process of preparing policy
recommendations for the NSC. The procedure was supposed to ensure that-as Cutler
put it-"both Planning Board and National Security Council members should be
inseminated (sic)"" with the intelligence. Unfortunately, that was not the result;
though there was regular intercourse, the coordinated intelligence input usually
seemed to be sterile, and the unschooled policy position often turned out to be
impregnable.
The NSC machinery was substantially altered and then used less and in looser
fashion during both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For CIA intelligence,
this meant both an expansion of the policy audience and an increased receptivity to
insightful intelligence not coordinated within the intelligence community. In 1966,
midway in President Johnson's term, a new substructure was adopted under the
authority of the Secretary of State for "the overall direction, coordination, and
supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas,"14 It
provided for a Senior Interdepartmental Group-headed by the Under Secretary of
State- and for a set of Interdepartmental Regional Groups subordinate to it. The
President, at the same time, continued to take counsel from ad hoc groups and from
advisors outside the government on a certain number of issues. Thus, the SIG/IRG
never became the primary decision-making machinery under Johnson and Walt
Rostow.
When President Nixon took office, he and Henry Kissinger replaced the system
with the machinery still in nominal use today: the National Security Council Study
Memoranda and Decision Memoranda. The NSSM approach has had the advantage
for CIA intelligence of opening up new opportunities for productive working
relationships between intelligence and policy people. Partly as a result of Henry
Kissinger's being for a time both Secretary of State and Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, however, structured use of the NSSM-NSDM apparatus declined
considerably. 15 Even so, the NSSM-NSDM system has meant that the integration of
intelligence and policy considerations frequently is undertaken at a relatively low
level. This practice of mixing intelligence and policy early in the game is not unique to
the NSSM-NSDM; it had become increasingly commonplace following the
Eisenhower administration, and during the Nixon and Ford presidencies the tendency
has simply intensified.
"Cutler, "Intelligence as Foundation for Policy," Studies in Intelligence 111/4, p. 65. (Winter 1959.)
14NSAM 341, quoted in Clark and Legere, The President and the Management of National Security
(1969).
"Specialized entities such as the Verification Panel and its working group, in which CIA intelligence
participation is particularly strong, have, however, been increasing in importance.
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Getting Intelligence Through
The way in which the structural overlay has evolved has resulted in an
increasingly significant part of the intelligence message being conveyed to top-level
policy makers in other than intelligence formats. Intelligence may be the implicit
stimulus for an action proposal, inextricably interwoven in a set of options, or
unrecognizably reincarnated in a policy paper. That a policy decision does not clearly
reflect an identifiable intelligence input, therefore, does not conclusively demonstrate
that intelligence played no'. role. The impact of intelligence often lies in a difficult-to-
trace influence upon the people at lower levels who drafted, reviewed, revised, and
forwarded options or recommendations. The importance of reaching these policy
makers should not be underestimated. Intelligence producers must nevertheless aim for
and reach the top-ranking policy people.
The path of written intelligence to policy-making principals almost always runs
through at least one set of their "gatekeepers," the staff assistants who screen, select,
and summarize. The widespread use of such human filtering mechanisms means that
much written intelligence produced by the CIA today does not reach high-level
consumers intact in its original context. In fact, the identity of a particular item as a
CIA-produced piece of intelligence may be lost once it is excerpted, digested, and em-
bedded amidst a collection of other equally anonymous bits of information. Even
when a particular intelligence document actually does go through, the top-level policy
maker will, like as not, read only a summary of its contents written and attached by an
aide." Many policy makers, moreover, tend to be unable to recall exactly where in the
voluminous daily flow of information they have picked up particular items they find
interesting or useful.
Personal delivery and oral exchange appear to be the surest-sometimes the
only-ways of guaranteeing that intelligence-as intelligence-reaches those at or
near the apex of the policy-making pyramid. The most notable recent instance of
personal delivery paying off handsomely, of course, involved the President's Daily
Brief (PDB) and Mr. Ford's copy of the National Intelligence Daily (NID). The
President normally read them in the presence of the Agency officer who delivered them
right to the oval Office. This arrangement not only insured that these products got to
and were read by the President, it afforded an opportunity for daily interchange
between Mr. Ford and the Agency that proved valuable in providing intelligence
producers with feedback on their efforts and insights into presidential concerns. 17
"At the State Department, for example, high-level officials get their intelligence from the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research (INR) which, in addition to producing its own analysis, selects, summarizes, and
comments on material from other agencies. The fact that INR has coordinated an item for a national
intelligence publication does not insure that it will endorse the item in its compilations and briefings. The
National Security Council staff is another screening mechanism. Staff members will be the last readers of
intelligence documents that they feel do not warrant higher-level attention. Products sent forward invariably
are accompanied by a summary-extract-commentary which, unless coupled with a recommendation that the
paper be read in full, is likely to be all that is read by key officials.
"Every President since Harry Truman has received the Agency's current intelligence, but in varying
ways. President Nixon, for example, received a package of material from the White House Situation Room
that contained intelligence produced by several agencies including CIA. President Eisenhower got oral
intelligence briefings from his staff. President Ford initiated, but later discontinued, regular exchanges with
an Agency officer. Whether a new mechanism for personal delivery of Agency products will be established is
presently unclear. The NSC system gives the Director of Central Intelligence certain opportunities for direct
access to the highest-level policy makers, especially during crisis situations. Beyond these structured settings,
however, the DCI's ability for personal delivery of intelligence directly to the top may depend on his
personal relationship with the President and other key policy officials. This element in the intelligence
support process is critical in establishing the overall impact down the line of the Agency's product. It would
appear that the support process can best function when the DCI has direct and routine access to the
President.
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Oral Intelligence and Personal Relationships
There are several traditional forums in which intelligence is conveyed orally. DCI
briefings of the NSC, the Washington Area Special Action Group (WASAG), and the
Senior Review Group (SRG) usually are the first order of business when these bodies
meet, and regular substantive briefings of certain Congressional committees have
become standard, The DDS&T has utilized the oral delivery form heavily since the
late 1960s. More recently, OER has been employing oral briefings on a regular basis.
Its presentations to top-level Treasury Department officials and other ranking
economic policy makers-and its support to the briefers on their own staffs-have
been highly successful.la
A number of policy makers, busy as they are, seem willing, oddly enough, to take
time to be briefed even when the process winds up consuming more time than it would
have taken to read a piece of written intelligence. Policy people seem to like the idea of
having someone at hand to answer questions and take requests for further or different
information. Assured delivery and attention, instant feed-back, and a chance to stay
attuned to the policy makers' concerns are cited by those who have done extensive oral
briefings as the key benefits to intelligence producers.19
There are, of course, potential pitfalls in providing intelligence orally. It takes a
certain kind of personality to do the job successfully. The wrong approach can turn a
policy maker off to intelligence in any form. There also are problems regarding
monitoring what is said, correcting mistaken impressions, and avoiding an inattention
to caveats-on either end of the exchange-that can result in tentative conclusions
being given more weight than they deserve. These problems do not appear to be
unsolvable; they would seem, in fact, to be outweighed by the positive benefits that
flow from oral delivery.
Informal personal contacts and conversations between intelligence producers and
policy makers also are responsible for the delivery of a good deal of intelligence. It is
abundantly clear that operations officers are particularly adept at developing and
maintaining such contacts. They are geared toward dealing with people by
temperament and experience, and high-level DDO officers often are long-time
acquaintances of ranking State Department officers. Friendships and mutual respect
born of service together overseas carry over to relationships in Washington. The need
for regular discussion of operational matters, and the fact that DDO officers normally
represent the agency on many interdepartmental groups and committees, are
important factors in sustaining these contacts.
There is, moreover, a quite understandable preference among many policy people
for dealing with intelligence people they know and have had productive relationships
with in the past. It also is evident that many policy makers have only a vague
understanding of the organizational division within the Agency between intelligence
collection and analysis. Even policy makers who are aware of Agency structure and
who maintain regular contact with an NIO or a finished intelligence producer will
"Much of the impetus for regular OER intelligence briefings of high-level economic officials came from
former Treasury Secretary Schultz. When William Simon took over at Treasury he decided that the
presentations were useful and should be continued. OER also polled officials outside of Treasury to see if
they wanted their briefings to go on, and the answer was strongly affirmative.
"Economic policy makers have, as noted above, recently become very receptive to orally-delivered
intelligence. The Pentagon, traditionally a heavy user of oral briefings itself, is another receptive audience.
The Agency provided regular briefings on military and technical subjects to Secretary of Defense
Schlesinger. Oral presentations are often given to various senior Defense officials by CIA components.
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often turn to an operations officer for the answer to a substantive question.20 This may
he because the policy maker finds it more convenient to do so, or because he has
particular respect for the opinion of an individual he knows has served in the area in
question and dealt first hand with the people concerned. It may also be because the
operations officer not only can tell the policy maker what is happening or may be
about to occur, he can discuss these matters in an operational context that parallels the
way in which the policy maker approaches the problem. The operations officer, in
other words, can speak to the question of what the Agency can and cannot do to help
influence the course of events. This is a dimension that is simply beyond the scope of
those who produce finished intelligence.21
There have been instances in which finished intelligence producers have been
very successful in developing productive interchanges with their customers. Force of
personality and previous service on the policy side of things are two factors that seem to
bear heavily on the success of such efforts.22 Another factor is imagination and
ingenuity in approaching policy makers with new ideas and specific suggestions about
ways in which intelligence can help them, rather than empty-handedly asking in
vague fashion, "What can I do for you?""
Degrees of success in establishing good personal relationships with policy makers
vary widely outside the Operations Directorate. Many finished intelligence producers
lack the regular opportunity for contact with policy makers that operations officers
have by virtue of their seats on policy-related, inter-agency committees, groups, or task
forces and ad hoc discussions of "operational" matters. The pressure of day-to-day
production for publications, moreover, tends to limit the amount of time finished
intelligence producers-analysts and managers alike-can devote to developing and
maintaining personal contacts with policy people.
The NIO system, established in 1973, was intended in part to alleviate this
situation by creating high-ranking and highly visible bridges between policy makers
and finished intelligence producers. The results have been mixed. The NIOs vary in
"'One high-level State Department official, for example, indicated that the DDO Division Chief with
whom he dealt on operational matters was also his major source of substantive information. He did know the
name of the NIO responsible for the area, but noted that personal contact was infrequent. Another State
Department official remarked that CIA analysis was first rate. The analysis he referred to turned out to he a
situation report from a Chief of Station.
"Within the context of this aspect of the relationship between the operational officers of the Agency
and their policy-making colleagues resides one of the traditionally more troubling internal problems for the
Agency in terms of policy support. Is intelligence colored in ways which tend consciously or unconsciously to
favor an operational activity or course of action upon which the Agency is embarked or involved? This issue
has troubled a number of outside commentators on the Agency, most notably in connection with the Bay of
Pigs endeavor. The question is particularly difficult and sensitive as a research topic and was not pursued at
length in this paper, although it warrants a hard look in an internal Agency study.
22 An outstanding example of the force of personality at work is the case of OCI's Panama analyst
several years ago. The analyst convinced policy people of the value of himself and his work to such an extent
that he was considered to be practically a member of the policy team. Intelligence producers who serve
temporary stints on the policy side often are able to develop insights and cultivate personal relationships that
can be extremely useful when they return to their parent organizations. The experience of one such
individual during recent Middle East negotiations is a case in point. Even if a rotational assignment turns
out to he permanent, the former intelligence producer will carry with him an understanding of intelligence
that is likely to have a positive effect on the intelligence-policy connection.
'A case in point was a scale model of the Sinai Peninsula, showing all terrain features, that was given to
policy makers for use in the Middle East negotiations. CIA provided the model on its own initiative, and it
became an invaluable tool during the discussions.
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their concept of their roles and in the duties they choose to emphasize, 14 Some finished
intelligence producers seem to believe that the system has relieved them of any
responsibility for consumer relations; others profess a desire to better their relationships
with policy people, but feel inhibited by the existence of an NIO-some complain of
being specifically discouraged from dealing directly with consumers.25
The lack of consensus among finished intelligence producers, and between them
and the NIOs, on the allocation of responsibility for contacts with policy people
appears to be causing some confusion and frustration. Clearer delineation of
responsibilities would aid in efforts to improve policy makers' receptivity to
intelligence through personal relationships.
The receptivity of policy makers to intelligence also hinges very heavily on the
subject matter of the material offered, the policy makers' attitudes and preconceptions,
and on certain other matters to which we now turn.
Receptivity
Physical delivery of intelligence, written or oral, still does not insure that it will
influence the policy-making process. Receptivity on the part of policy makers is
required. They must appreciate intelligence as worthwhile and worthy of being taken
into account.
Generally speaking, policy makers value and are receptive to the Agency's
support, but they like some kinds of intelligence more than others. They tend to prefer
hard-or hard-looking-facts to philosophical arguments, and they most appreciate
receiving from intelligence that which they cannot-or cannot efficiently-provide for
themselves. Especially coveted is the unique piece of information obtainable only from
intelligence sources.
There is, thus, wide appreciation and brisk demand for material that some
intelligence producers tend to regard as rather prosaic and routine-FBIS text,
statistics, maps, charts, and biographies. It is clear that these products are more than
raw inputs into the production of the finished texts of national intelligence; they are
regularly received as independent products and used by policy makers who, right
through the top levels, also take on sizeable quantities of so-called "raw" intelligence
reports from the DDO.26
Attitudes toward finished intelligence products tend to vary with the subject
matter. Receptivity is greatest in areas where it is recognized that manipulation of data
and worthwhile analysis require special expertise or methodological know-how, as in
24Some NIOs appear to accord their responsibility for personal contact with policy makers first priority,
and the bulk of their effort is in this area. Others, however, tend to concentrate more of their attention on the
process of producing estimates and other-primarily interagency-intelligence products.
"Attitudes on this issue vary among the NIOs. Some do appear to believe that they are supposed to be
the exclusive point of contact between finished intelligence producers and policy makers, at least with
respect to high-ranking policy makers. Others, however, seem quite content with the existence of parallel
channels of communication.
26The FBIS product in particular is widely distributed both electrically and in formal publications, and
is viewed by many intelligence consumers as a key Agency product. FBIS field stations often provide the first
indication of a coup or other important change within a country. Service personnel did a commendable job,
for instance, in reporting on the invasion of Cyprus from positions in the middle of the battle. Occasionally,
a foreign leadership will use the open radio to present new policies for the first time or will outline
negotiating positions when speed is essential. The Mayaguez incident was a case in point.
The Agency's biographies of foreign leaders are also used extensively. When dignitaries visit the United
States, policy makers turn to CIA for insights into their background or personality.
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the military, scientific, technical, and economic fields. Political intelligence that
conveys a new piece of information or a fresh analytical approach is almost always
welcomed, but there is less receptivity to the ordinary kinds of political interpretation
and analysis, which policy people are prone to believe is surplus, if not inferior, to their
own thought processes.
These distinctions are applicable to generalizations about policy makers' attitudes
toward the various categories of CIA intelligence referred to earlier-especially so with
regard to the variety of products and services that make up the Agency's current
intelligence support. Feelings about the broad spectrum reporting of the NID and
National Intelligence Bulletin run the gamut of personal tastes. Critics make mention
of blandness of style, of inadequacies in coverage, and of lack of absolute currentness.
Other policy makers find these publications useful-though in different ways and
for different reasons. Some like the convenience of a quick means to inform themselves
about events other than those in their own areas of specialization. Others read only the
coverage of developments pertinent to their specialities-and for the purpose of
assuring that they have not missed any important information in their broader flow of
traffic. The attention paid to the more analytical articles in broad spectrum reporting
also varies widely among policy makers, depending upon the person's attitude, the
subject matter involved, and the quality of presentation.
But some NID readers-including some of the most important readers-are not
substantive experts on any particular area. The general educational service that the
NID performs for these consumers appears to be of considerable importance. It seems
clear that the Agency has to produce some kind of written daily intelligence product
for a varied NID-level audience, and that no publication is likely to please all of these
people all of the time.
It is at least arguable, however, whether the resources-especially analyst
time-expended in producing the NID correspond to what it can reasonably be
expected to accomplish. A good case can be made for the proposition that the NID's
consumption of resources is out of proportion to this kind of publication's potential
pay-off. Resource allocations necessarily involve trade-offs, and the Agency may be
depriving activities that could have greater impact on the policy-making process.
Focused coverage finds a generally receptive audience. The economic, scientific,
and technical publications are widely read and well-regarded. There is also much
favorable opinion about OCI Staff Notes. Receptivity to these seems to be the greater
because they have individualistic flavor-being the least edited and least coordinated
of the many political intelligence products.
Crisis response intelligence is an Agency strong point. Policy people almost to a
man prefer CIA Situation Reports to similar products produced by other agencies.
Intelligence tends to he at a premium in crisis situations, but policy people want to
know more than what is happening at the moment. They look to intelligence to
anticipate and answer the next questions even as they are just beginning to arise.
Much of the Agency's most effective and influential work takes the form of
customized service; providing answers to the questions posed by policy people, and
focusing on the issues which especially concern them. Intelligence producers
specializing in economic, scientific, and military matters, capitalizing on the strong
interest in their material, have succeeded better in establishing the kind of intelligence-
policy relationships needed for really productive interchange than have those
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concentrating on political subjects. Despite varying degrees of acceptance for specific
categories of intelligence, however, there is a conviction widely held among policy
makers that the Agency is a "can do" organization-that it is willing and able to
respond quickly and helpfully on almost any kind of topic.
Many intelligence officers believe that customized service could be made even
more relevant and useful if policy makers were persuaded to confide more about their
plans and activities. To some extent and on some subjects this undoubtedly is so, and
the quality as well as the responsiveness of the intelligence product suffers. In certain
cases, policy makers realize that this is a price their confidentiality entails-and they
are quite willing to pay it. They may, nonetheless, put a peculiar value on intelligence
judgments which they know are made without the benefit of tightly held information
available only to them. Their explanation for this seeming anomaly is that intelligence
provides valuable checks on assumptions, and useful alternative points of view, even
when intelligence producers are not privy to all that the policy maker knows. An
argument can be made, moreover, for the proposition that a degree of standoffishness
on the part of policy makers is sometimes beneficial in helping to diminish the danger
that intelligence might become engulfed by policy making through enthusiastic
provision of customized service that causes important longer-range issues to be
overlooked or ignored in the effort to tend to customers' immediate concerns. On
balance, however, the danger of irrelevance would seem to outweigh that of
overinvolvement, and there is ample justification for persistent efforts to persuade
policy makers to be more forthcoming.
Policy people profess a high degree of receptivity to in-depth analysis, and many
say they would like to see more of it. They tend, however, to have difficulty describing
with specificity the kind of thing they have in mind-although they are on occasion
able to point to examples.27 This "I'll know it when I see it" attitude is paralleled by
annoyance with intelligence producers who expect policy people to suggest what
intelligence can do for them in the way of in-depth analysis. There is a far more
positive attitude toward the intelligence producer who has thought out in advance
what ought to be relevant and who arrives with a first draft, an outline, or even a set of
ideas.
Policy makers generally have little confidence in the Agency's ability to anticipate
their concerns or in its predictive intelligence. This is particularly so with regard to
formal National Intelligence Estimates, except for those that deal with
military/strategic subjects. It is significant that NIEs are not usually accorded any
27 The following papers, produced over the last two years, have been specifically referred to by policy
people as representing imaginative and helpful analytical work by the Agency.
-India: Developing Power or Developing Power Vacuum (OPR)
-China in 1980-1985 and in the Year 2000 (OPR)
-The Mood in Egypt (OCI)
-Potential Implications of Trends in World Population, Food Production and Climate (OPR)
-Military Implications of Technology Transfer to the Soviet Union (Interagency)
-What's Wrong With Political Europe (Office of the NIO)
-Authoritarianism and Militarism in Southern Europe (OPR)
-The Communist Party of Italy (OPR)
-Soviet Commentary on the Capabilities of U.S. General Purpose Forces (OSR)
-A Soviet Land-Mobile ICBM: Evidence of Development and Considerations Affecting a
Decision on Deployment (Interagency)
-Prospects for Determining the Accuracy of Soviet Strategic Ballistic Missiles (Interagency)
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special treatment by "gatekeepers"; the NIEs undergo the same screening process as
do seemingly less prestigious intelligence products. Many policy makers, in fact, seem
to prefer an incisive solo treatment by a good analyst to a "watered down" estimate.
Some, on the other hand, believe intelligence producers benefit from the rigors of the
formal estimative process, and express appreciation for clear delineation of dissenting
views.
The generally negative attitude toward predictive intelligence is founded on the
belief among policy makers that the Agency's estimative record over the years has not
been very good. Policy makers, however, share with intelligence producers the
realization that predictive intelligence is a difficult line of business. They understand
that some things are by their nature unpredictable and that others are virtually
impossible to predict accurately. What policy people seem to want from predictive
intelligence is an identification of forces at work, an indication of which trends are
lasting and which merely transitory, an exposition of probable turning points, and an
idea of what kinds of signals will portend particular types of changes. Policy makers
especially want a helpful predictive performance on matters of great import to the
United States. Failure to predict a coup that produces little real change in an area of
marginal importance matters little to policy makers, if at all. Failure to provide
advance warning of events such as a war in an area of major concern, however, is quite
another matter.
Intelligence producers must be skilled in both short and long-range anticipation.
Short-range anticipation is really an extension of independent determination by
intelligence producers of the questions policy makers have, but fail to make explicit,
and the questions that should be on their minds in a given situation, whether they are
there yet or not. It involves anticipating the problems policy makers will need to have
addressed as the situation develops. At present, this is at best a haphazard process in
intelligence production, with results depending largely on the time and attention
analysts and managers choose to give it. No one in the Agency has continuing
responsibility for doing the special kind of thinking required. An entity formally
charged with such responsibility might significantly enhance the relevance of finished
intelligence products to policy makers' concerns.
Long-range anticipation involves foreseeing and warning policy makers of broad
or specific problems they are likely to be confronted with in the future. It should be
accompanied by a readiness on the part of intelligence producers to redeploy resources
in preparation for future demands. It must be noted, however, that policy makers are
by their own admission much less receptive to intelligence that attempts to warn of a
problem far down the road than to material that helps them to cope with the day-to-
day problems they face in the here and now.
Fven delivery to policy makers who recognize its quality and relevance to the
problem at hand does not mean that intelligence necessarily will be the determining
factor in a particular decision.
The impact of intelligence often depends on factors far removed from its intrinsic
quality. Among these factors-which may operate singly or in combination-are:
whether the intelligence message coincides with or runs counter to preconceptions on
the policy side; how intelligence fits in or conflicts with other counsels and pressures;
the ostensible "hardness" of the intelligence and the extent of unanimity of CIA
elements-and of the intelligence community-in advancing it; the state of
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interpersonal intelligence-policy relationships; and whether different policy makers are
undecided, of the same mind, or divided in their approach to the problem.
Thus, intelligence quality, the adequacy of communications, and the degree of
policy receptivity all bear upon the impact of intelligence. As the ensuing illustrative
examples indicate, optimum achievement in all three categories is difficult.
Problem Cases: Policy makers are, from time to time, quite capable of deciding
upon and becoming wedded to seemingly ill-conceived and uncompromising courses
of action. Intelligence in such cases may ultimately help turn around-but seldom
quickly or easily.
CIA's conservative evaluation of the effectiveness of the various U.S. bombing
programs in North Vietnam was a consistent example of sound, careful analysis, clearly
communicated. In contrast, the case originally made by military intelligence that the
bombing effort was paying high dividends had an inherent weakness-the enemy
resupply effort continued at a high level. Yet Secretary of Defense McNamara was not
immediately persuadable that the CIA appraisal was the correct one, and President
Johnson took years to convince. The policy makers' mind-sets and the mixed signals
coming from the intelligence community both played a role.
During the period prior to and during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan,
CIA intelligence did much to explain the motivations that lay behind Indian policy
and to describe the dire situation in East Pakistan. The analysis suggested that India
was impelled to take action in East Pakistan because of the unstable refugee situation,
and had at least some justification for assisting a Bengali population oppressed by the
West Pakistan military occupation. The U.S., nevertheless, "tilted" its support to the
Pakistani side. U.S. leaders apparently chose to take a "big picture" view of the
situation, possibly seeing support to West Pakistan as enhancing a developing Chinese
connection. A further consideration for U.S. policy makers was a profound irritation
with the Government of India, which had shortly before signed a 20-year treaty of
peace and friendship with the Soviet Union. Policy makers' attitudes were so firmly
shaped by factors other than intelligence that they paid no great heed to it, except
perhaps for such bits and pieces as served to reinforce their views.
Quite a different sort of problem can arise in those situations where a hot and
seemingly hard piece of CIA intelligence conveys exactly-or almost exactly-what
the policy makers are keen to believe. CIA's initial reporting on the 1965 crisis in the
Dominican Republic seconded the worry that was already perturbing President
Johnson and his aides, i.e., that the rebel movement in the D.R. was Communist-
infested and that the U.S. thus faced the danger of a "new Cuba in the Hemisphere."
Subsequent CIA and INR intelligence inputs provided a more accurate and balanced
picture, but they never quite caught up with the initial impression that had been
conveyed.
Policy makers can develop another sort of predilection, becoming overly sure that
intelligence will be able to provide them appropriate support. This attitude may lead
to unfortunate results if the expected intelligence is not forthcoming, or when it is
impossible for the intelligence community to implement policy decisions. In 1970, the
Israelis and Egyptians agreed to a limited cessation of hostilities along the Sinai front.
The U.S. agreed to assist in monitoring the agreement, particularly in respect to the
introduction of Egyptian air defense equipment into a denied area along the Suez
Canal. The intelligence community, however, did not know the exact number of
surface-to-air missiles in the prohibited zone. There was, therefore, a significant time
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lag before the U.S. could confidently state that the Egyptians were in violation of the
agreement. As a result, Egypt was able to ignore Israeli protests and build up its forces
in the denied area.
Mixed-But Better Results. Considering the variety of things that can go wrong on
the intelligence side, the policy side, or in the relationship between them, it is worth
noting that sometimes things go right. Unfortunately, it is far easier to document
intelligence failures than to ascertain intelligence successes. Being accurate is adjudged
normal and ordinarily is accepted without fanfare; errors or omissions, in contrast, are
greeted with much dismay.
Intelligence judgments, moreover, may lead to action by policy makers that
makes their accuracy impossible to determine. Early in 1975, for example, the
intelligence community reported that the Turks might attempt to expand their hold on
Cyprus. As a result of community concern, high-level policy makers sent messages to
Ankara noting U.S. displeasure over any possibility of a renewal of warfare. It may
have been that the Turks never intended to stage another military action and that the
intelligence judgment was faulty; it is equally possible that the Turks were dissuaded
from war by U.S. actions. Thus, in the very area where intelligence may have its
greatest utility, there is a considerable problem in measuring its true impact.
Frequently intelligence is reasonably sound and persuades some policy makers
readily, but further data and argument are required by others. In the latter part of
May 1967, when tensions between Egypt and Israel had risen abruptly, high-level
policy makers levied a series of questions on the CIA-the two most important being,
"Will there be war?" and "Which side, if the U.S. stays out, will win?" The "yes"
answer to the first was readily accepted, partly because Israeli officials were leaning on
their U.S. counterparts to take the threat seriously. But the Agency prediction that
Israel would win-quickly and decisively-was received with greater doubt. Secretary
of State Rusk and Ambassador to the United Nations Stevenson posed the most
vehement questions; DCI Helms came back with a reiteration of the judgment and an
amplification of the basis for it. Even then Rusk was reluctant to accept the appraisal.
His comment was "Dick, there is only one thing I want to say-as LaGuardia once
remarked, if this is a mistake, it's a beaut!"
Intelligence support that is quite difficult to appraise is the "mixed bag" where
intelligence does well in some of its aspects, not so well in others. Those who conduct
"post mortems" have to evaluate the positives and negatives and come out with an
overall judgment. Often these conclusions turn out to be harsher in their appraisal of
intelligence performance than are the statements of the top policy makers involved.
During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the intelligence community underestimated the
imperatives that drove the Soviet Union to place missiles in Cuba. Intelligence did
provide the first indication that the missiles had arrived and enabled the U.S.
Government to verify missile deployments. Intelligence-derived materials were used to
brief friendly countries on the new development. And during the ensuing naval
embargo, reports from a high-level CIA source in the Soviet military apparently
provided President Kennedy some additional assurances that the Soviet Union would
not go to war over Cuba.
The more recent October War was another example of good and bad.
Initially-and well ahead of time-the attention of high-level policy makers was
focused on the Middle East by CIA intelligence reports that noted that possibility of
military action. On the negative side, the analytical community reinforced policy
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makers' beliefs that war was not in the offing. Once military action began, however,
CIA provided excellent crisis support including the critical judgment that the Soviet
Union would not place regular ground forces in Syria.
CIA reporting on the Cyprus explosion also had its ups and downs. Analysts failed
to predict the change in Greek leadership on Cyprus and never adequately described
the motivations of the Greek "generals." CIA did provide advance warning of the
Turkish invasion of the island and predicted the exact date, However, in attempting to
ascertain the size of the Turkish invasion force, CIA analysts relied on the reporting
from a defense attach& who greatly overestimated its strength. Dependence on this
source occasioned a substantial error over how fast the battle would progress.
Picture Book Examples: Sometimes, albeit not too frequently, we find that
virtually everything went right. Three instances in the Far East area reflect the variety
and range of importance of these "picture book" situations.
Henry Kissinger and associates have been recurringly concerned over the past
half-dozen years about the degree of tension between China and the Soviet Union and
about the danger of major hostilities between them. In response to his urging, CIA has
repeatedly assessed the issue, studying the military and strategic posture on both sides
and probing into other aspects. The findings have been consistently sound and
obviously helpful to the President and Kissinger during a delicate period when they
have been nurturing new ties with China.
An instance of more measurable benefit had to do with a recent determination on
military aid to South Korea. High-level policy people were concerned over the
direction and levels of aid during the 1970s. They requested that the Department of
Defense and CIA undertake a detailed examination of the North Korean "military
threat"-i.e., of the forces of the North, their equipment holdings, their likely strategy.
This intelligence study showed the need for a pronounced change in the mix of
equipment provided to South Korea-more aircraft, fewer tanks, etc.-and also
indicated the feasibility of a stretch-out in the planned delivery period. The study
became the basis for developing a new and far more realistic long-term military
assistance program to South Korea.
An area in which the Washington-based intelligence community is not regularly
involved is that of tactical intelligence support to the field. The use of unique
community resources, a correct appraisal of the situation, and a prompt warning to
interested consumers provided a quick salutory result in November 1972. A CIA-
chaired intelligence task force warned on the basis of cratology analysis that a
squadron of Komar guided missile boats would be moving from Chan-chiang in South
China south toward a North Vietnamese port. U.S. naval forces in the area were
alerted, and the boats were intercepted and destroyed,2e
Other kinds of highly-specialized intelligence service which CIA is capable of
providing should not be omitted from this "picture book" discussion. As Henry
Kissinger has proceeded with his long and painstaking diplomatic efforts to bring
about a tentative Egyptian-Israeli peace accord, Agency specialists have assisted with
crucial support in a wide range of areas. Special note should be taken of the CIA
geographers whose detailed maps and intimate knowledge of terrain have been
"The Komars were the first of their type to be provided to North Vietnam by the Soviet Union. They were
shipped by freighter to Chan-chiang and off-loaded prior to their high-speed run to North Vietnam. Had the
Komars reached their destination, they would have been a serious threat to U.S. Naval vessels on patrol
nearby.
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particularly valuable, and of the technicians who were able to advise on feasibility and
operation of an appropriate sensor system.
A final example which must be noted here-though with a reservation-is that of
SALT support by the intelligence community and particularly by CIA. It is clear that
the policy makers' confidence in intelligence verification, in the community appraisals
of future missile force levels, and in the direct assistance provided to decision makers
by CIA made the SALT agreements possible. It is equally clear that this is presently the
most important of all the intelligence support accounts. Whether the 10-year
intelligence projections that underlie the treaty-negotiations will hold cannot be
foreseen. Thus, prudence dictates that intelligence support for SALT not be evaluated
as an absolute success until more time has elapsed.
Recommendations
The research team believes that a number of measures aimed at making the
reality of the intelligence-policy relationship more closely approximate the ideal are
worthy of consideration.
-An effort should be made to increase intelligence producers' specific
understanding of the policy-making process.
-Recent and ongoing theoretical work on decision making,
organizational dynamics, and psychological factors should be selected,
distilled, related to the intelligence-policy connection, and distributed to
analysts and supervisors on a regular basis. A knowledgeable individual should
be given full-time responsibility for the task.29
-Discussion of policy making and the role of intelligence, including
realistic specifics on how various policy makers take intelligence aboard, should
become standard practice within the Agency.
-The Office of Training should increase and sharpen the attention its
courses and seminars give to policy making and the intelligence-policy
relationship.
-Opportunities to place intelligence officers in rotational policy-related
slots outside the Agency should be taken advantage of to the fullest possible
extent. The experience gained by returnees from these assignments should be
exploited by having them share their perspectives with other intelligence
producers in appropriate forums.
-Written intelligence products should be closely aligned to the realities of how
information is received, screened, and processed on the policy side.
-A very short executive summary containing the principal conclusions of
the paper should precede all memoranda.
-Papers aimed for the top policy levels especially must seize attention
quickly and get to the point rapidly.
-A paper should immediately tell the reader why he should he reading it,
i.e., the problem or issue and its implications for the U.S.
2"Intelligence producers are likely to find that this material will also provide highly illuminating
insights into the process of intelligence analysis.
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-Rationale for judgments, if too long or too involved to be included in
the body of the paper, should be attached as an annex.
-Analytical differences should not be obscured in the name of
intelligence community consensus. Policy people clearly prefer alternative
interpretations to watered down consensus.
-Thoughtful, clearly labeled speculation regarding less likely
eventualities or the implication of "irrational" actions by foreign leaders
should be encouraged, especially in in-depth analysis.
-A new intelligence product should be considered.
-There would be considerable receptivity to ultra-current "Morning
Briefing Notes" on the part of the aides of high-level policy people. The
purpose of such a publication would be to make the recipients' morning
briefings and compilations sounder, fuller, more consistent in their use of
intelligence information, and more reflective of the Agency's view of what
should be brought to the attention of principal policy makers. The idea is
similar to that of the once popular, internally distributed Night Journal.
Distribution of the "Notes" could be made so as to reach the desks of aides as
morning briefings were being prepared.
-The "Notes" would be informal, non-coordinated summaries and
comments on significant overnight traffic-e.g., important State of Defense
cables, DDO reports, intercepts, and press-not accounted for in the NID. The
NID is more current than the old Central Intelligence Bulletin, but only the
most critical new items are usually added in the wee hours, and they are often
only factual treatments. A widely voiced criticism of the NID is its failure to be
consistently relevant to the ultra-current morning concerns of many policy
makers.
-The new product could be prepared by night NID representatives and
electrically disseminated at the last possible moment.
-There is a need for serious study of what a realistic estimative mission ought to
be for the CIA and of what resources the Agency ought to devote to it. Policy makers
seem to be less interested in estimative judgments per se than in the basis for them; i,e.,
the laying out of the forces at work, the possible turning points, and the leverage- if
any-that the U.S. has in determining the outcome.
-A study of the estimative mission would aim basically at generating
some suggested guidelines on the scope, format, and most useful organizational
approaches for the production of estimates.
-It would need to be based principally on in-depth research with
consumers and producers, and the use of case studies.
-Greater emphasis should be placed on reaching mid-level policy makers.
-Fuller advantage should be taken of publications aimed specifically at
this audience; they should cease to be the stepchildren of top-of-the-line
products. To the extent possible, content of such publications as the National
Intelligence Bulletins0 should be especially tailored for the mid-level consumer.
30Since this writing, the NIB was terminated in May 1976 and has been replaced by the
electrically-disseminated NID Cable.
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Intelligence Support
Analysts whose accounts are relatively inactive, for example, should prepare
longer, more analytical items for the NIB.
-Some predetermination should be made, where possible, of the
intended audience for memoranda and other intelligence papers so that they
can be tailored accordingly. If the audience is primarily mid-level, the paper
might contain more detailed background, explanation, and argument than one
designed especially for senior officials.
-Although admittedly difficult on a consistent basis, intelligence
products should, to the extent feasible, be addressed to intended recipients by
name.
-There should be increased organizational awareness and coordination of
disparate policy support activities.
-Consideration should be given to the establishment of a centralized
Agency mechanism-perhaps computer-based-for improving intra-agency
awareness of ongoing policy support projects, maximizing opportunities for
contributory inputs, and helping to make policy makers more aware of the full
range of potentially relevant intelligence products and services,
-A comprehensive study of the problems and prospects of oral
dissemination should focus on the impact of oral delivery on efforts to improve
the coordination of intelligence support.
-The Agency should try to increase policy-maker receptivity to its political
interpretation and analysis.
-The aim should be to convince policy makers that there is something
about the Agency's work in this area that separates the CIA's finished political
products from the kind of thing policy people believe they can do just as well or
better themselves.
-Efforts along this line should include further attempts to impart a
measure of uniqueness to finished political intelligence through sophisticated
interweaving of political, economic, military and psychological analysis. In
this regard, further study is needed of the efficacy of various methods-e.g.,
team approaches, cross-disciplinary training, structural reorganizations-of
fostering truly integrated interdisciplinary analysis,st
-It should be clearly understood that the NIOs' important responsibility
for developing personal relationships with consumers is not meant to preclude
other contacts between intelligence producer and policy maker at appropriate
levels, and political analysts should be given the opportunity, encouragement,
and incentive to take especially vigorous initiatives to develop and sustain
these relationships. Individual analysts should be responsible for monitoring
s' Greater interdisciplinary synthesis would have a number of beneficial effects. OER's success in
building a receptive audience for its products has been significant, but this constituency consists primarily of
a particular group of economically-oriented policy people. There remains a need for economic analysis to be
truly integrated with insights from other disciplines and presented in a manner intelligible to the high-level
policy maker unfamiliar with purely economic terms and concepts. Policy people value even speculative
material that tells them something about what makes an individual tick, and the Agency's psychological
profiles are well regarded. Greater use of psychological insights might further enhance appreciation for this
aspect of the Agency's work as well as increase receptivity to political analysis.
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Intelligence Support
policy personnel changes and for making and keeping themselves known as
specialists with something to contribute. They should be aware of and utilize
the kinds of approaches that evoke positive responses on the policy side, and
avoid the unproductive "What can I do for you" syndrome.
-The Agency should continue to impress upon policy people the fact that the
relevance and utility of intelligence are directly related to their willingness to share
their concerns and other information with intelligence producers.
-Intelligence officers in contact with policy makers at all levels should
persist in efforts to make this point.
-Significant informational gaps that intelligence producers believe
policy people might be able to fill if they were so inclined should be explicitly
noted-both in formal publications and informal conversations-so as to
encourage communication and avoid misunderstandings concerning the basis
for intelligence judgments.
-Insufficient feedback and a degree of secretiveness concerning policy plans and
developments will persist, however, and the Agency should also strive to improve its
ability to determine independently the questions policy makers need answered.
-The DDO and the Deputy Directorate for Intelligence (DDI) must
work together in this endeavor, and the DDO's unique operational links to
policy officials should play a key role. Regular meetings between DDO
Division Chiefs, NIOs, and representatives from DDI production offices should
include detailed discussion of policy makers' current and incipient concerns.
Working arrangements between DDO Division Chiefs and the NIOs currently
are positive and helpful, but they generally fail to achieve the mutually
reinforcing relationship needed between the DDO and the producers of
finished intelligence because there is no mechanism for insuring that insights
into concerns on the policy side gained by the DDO are fully shared with the
DDI.
-Concern for improving the immediate relevance of intelligence should not be
allowed to obscure the equally important need for the Agency to improve its ability to
anticipate the problems that policy makers will be confronted with in the future.
-Consideration should be given to the establishment of broadly-based
mechanisms within the Agency charged with routine review of substantive
areas with the mission of providing continuity, consistency, and direction for
thinking ahead, challenging accepted hypotheses, and sensing changes in
underlying trends. The NIO system and the KIQs (Key Intelligence Ques-
tions) are steps in this direction, but much remains to be accomplished.
-A great anticipatory burden will, however, always rest on individual
intelligence producers. They must avoid becoming so immersed in the
problems of the moment that they fail to foresee those of the future.
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Examining President Truman's role
in the establishment of the Agency
TRUMAN ON CIA
President Harry S. Truman had his own version of his role in the establishment of
the Central Intelligence Agency. He once summed it up this way: "I got a couple of
admirals together and they formed" the CIA.' Another time he was quoted as
describing the CIA as "his invention."2 Again, while still President, he told a CIA
audience: "I . . . suggested [to Admiral William D. Leahy] that there should be a
Central Intelligence Agency," and consequently "The Admiral and I proceeded to try
to work out a program."3
In Truman's most extended account, in his Memoirs, he related how he
discovered the lack of coordinated intelligence in Washington, asked what was being
done about it, solicited advice, issued what he referred to as an "Executive Order,"
and-prestol-then began to receive a "daily digest" of information first from his
Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and then, when CIG was "renamed" in the
National Security Act of 1947, from his CIA.' That was his view of the event-" one of
his proudest accomplishments," according to daughter Margaret.'
Unfortunately, Truman's version is the only one left to the public by anyone
involved in the event. Until recently, there was little scholarly interest in the subject,
and in any case there was little unclassified primary source material on which scholars
could work. They could only make passing remarks about Pearl Harbor, President
Roosevelt, "Wild Bill" Donovan, and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), sink their
teeth into a few unexciting public documents such as the 1947 Act itself and then
happily pick up Truman's first-hand account. Of late, moreover, scholars and writers
alike have been so hard pressed to keep up with daily publicity about CIA's alleged
deeds and misdeeds that again they can only fall back on Harry Truman for a few
necessary introductory remarks about CIA's origins. His view, in short, has become
gospel, and not surprisingly he himself is generally credited with providing "the real
impetus" 6 to the creation of CIA.
Unfortunately again, Truman's version is not quite accurate or adequate. The
result is that it does little justice to the decade of intelligence history that preceded
1 Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman, (Berkley, New York, 1973) p.
420. Presumably Truman was referring to Adm. William D. Leahy, then Chief of Staff to Truman in
Truman's capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy, and Adm. Sidney W. Souers,
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence and then the first Director of Central Intelligence.
2 Robert Alan Aurthur, "The Wit and Sass of Harry S. Truman," Esquire, August 1971, p. 115. He is
further quoted as "being sorry he'd started the whole thing."
""Remarks at a Meeting of an Orientation Course Conducted by the CIA," Nov. 21, 1952, Public
Papers of the Presidents. Harry S. Truman. 1952-53. (GPO, Wash., D.C. 19666), p. 1061.
"Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. 2: Years of Trial and Hope, 1946-1953 (Doubleday, New York, 1956)
pp. 55-58. (Actually Truman did not issue an Executive Order, but a presidential directive in the form of a
letter addressed to the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy.)
"Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (Morrow, New York, 1973) p. 332.
"David Binder, "Idea for Creating a C.I.A. Grew Out of Pearl Harbor," New York Times, Dec. 26,
1974, p. 1.
MORI/HRP
from pg.
21-38
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SECRET Truman on CIA
Truman, to the creative genius of Donovan, and to the administrative trailblazing of
Roosevelt. Also, Truman's account-especially as related in a 1963 syndicated article
to which we shall come later-has left an erroneous account of the original character
and functions of the Agency.
Hence an examination of the records now available will not only set the record
straight and do justice to Donovan and Roosevelt, but also provide helpful
illumination on the origins of certain elements of the CIA character in which there is
considerable current interest.
A "Calamitous" Prospect
Today the United States has an "intelligence community" of which the members
are CIA, State, Defense, the FBI, Treasury, and the former Atomic Energy
Commission, now the Energy Research and Development Administration. To this
community, the Director of Central Intelligence is central. For the greater part of the
nation's history, however, there has been no community, no center, and not even the
parts with which to make a community. For the first hundred years, organized
intelligence, both overt and clandestine, was at best a tolerable wartime necessity, a
peacetime "no-no," a thing without permanent status or organization in the American
governmental system.
The situation changed significantly in the 1880s, a decade which coincidentally
saw the birth of three men central to this story-Donovan, Roosevelt, and Truman.
First the Navy and then the War Department, responding to technological and
organizational changes, copied European nations by establishing on a regular,
peacetime basis the country's first naval and military intelligence services-the Office
of Naval Intelligence (ONI) in 1882 and in 1885 the Military Intelligence Division (G-
2), as they were known in the World War II period. Their work was essentially the
overt collection of information on the armies and navies of the world and the discovery
of enemy activity in the U.S. In wartime they carried on espionage and
counterespionage.
These two departmental newcomers-small, underfinanced, and lightly regarded
in the Navy and War departments-co-existed over the next half century with equally
small and half-hearted foreign intelligence collection and production efforts in State
and Treasury, and later in Commerce, Agriculture, Interior, and Justice (FBI). Their
co-existence, however, was that of strangers on a highway. They pursued their
respective departmental tasks in isolation and often in distrust of one another. What
was needed, said an ex-naval attache in 1929, was something he mistakenly thought
the British already had, namely a "Wheel of Intelligence" with a "Central hub,"
which would coordinate all the intelligence received and funnel it to top policy-
makers. He thought they needed a coordinator.'
Ten years later Roosevelt, worried about German and Japanese spying in the
United States, and unhappy with his investigative services, ordered the FBI, G-2, and
ONI to coordinate themselves. He directed them in 1939 "to function as a committee
to coordinate" the investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage
matters affecting the country.' From this directive came the Interdepartmental
'(John A. Gade,I untitled memo [n.d.,] Records of the Office of Naval Intelligence, Record Group 38
(U.S. National Archives, Wash., D.C.), job 3679, box 66, exhibit 20751.
"Memo, Roosevelt to Secretary of State et al, June 26, 1939, quoted in J. Edgar Hoover, "Role of the
FBI in the Federal Employee Security Program," Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 49, no. 3 (July-
Aug., 1954) p. 333.
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Truman on CIA
Intelligence Conference (IIC) where the heads of those agencies met weekly to share
what bits of information each cared to divulge.
Connected with this development were two early American ventures in 1940 into
the foreign clandestine intelligence field. One was the Navy's "Special Intelligence
Section" (SIS) whose founder, ONI chief Admiral Walter S. Anderson, today recalls
that "it never got off the ground, because it was taken over by Bill Donovan."9 The
second was another SIS, the "Special Intelligence Service" which was run by the FBI in
Latin America; J. Edgar Hoover had to give it up six years later when Truman
established the CIG.
These three organizations-the IIC and the SIS pair-were primarily concerned
with counterintelligence, and they were operated on a mixed basis of independence
and self-coordination. None of the parent organizations was prepared to accept an
outside coordinator.
Hence ONI and G-2 were shaken up in March, 1941, by a story circulating about
the then Colonel Donovan. "In great confidence" ONI reported to G-2 that Donovan
was fostering "a movement ... to establish a super agency controlling all intelligence."
The G-2 chief, Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, relaying the news upward to Gen. George C.
Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, described such a development as "very
disadvantageous, if not calamitous."" There was enough truth in the story to justify
their alarm,
A Beginning
First, William J. Donovan had been for years a public figure of great standing: the
almost legendary "Wild Bill" of World War I fame, a Congressional Medal of Honor
winner, founder of a large, prestigious Wall Street law firm, and an articulate stalwart
of the Republican Party. More to the point, as a private citizen he had from 1935 to
1939 seen more of foreign chancelleries, battlefields, and military installations than
many whose business such things were. Furthermore, he had taken two unprecedented
trips as FDR's emissary-first to London in the grim days of mid-1940, and then later
in the year for three months to Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East--and
had emerged in the press not only as a seasoned observer of the international scene but
also as Roosevelt's "mystery man" in foreign affairs.
Secondly, this influential "mystery man" had developed a special interest in
strategic intelligence and special operations. He had studied not only Nazi military
strategy and tactics but also Nazi radio propaganda, economic warfare, political
subversion, and psychological warfare. Likewise, he had been thoroughly briefed on
British experience in intelligence, propaganda, subversion, and commando
operations-thanks largely to the efforts of Britain's wartime intelligence chief in the
U.S., now Sir William S. Stephenson, lately celebrated in A Man Called Intrepid. 1I By
early 1941 Donovan was convinced by the course of the war that the U.S. had to get
into all those fields; and he, collaborating with Stephenson, had indeed developed a
plan for a new agency to do just that.
('Interview with the author, Feb. 12, 1968.
]('Memo, Miles to Marshall, "Coordinator for the three Intelligence Agencies of the Government,"
April 8, 1941, Records of the Army Staff, Record Group 319 (Washington National Records Center,
Suitland, Md.), file 310.11
"William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1976). See also
11. Montgomery Hyde, Room 2603 (Farrar, Straus, New York, 1963).
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To the dismay of G-2, ONI, and the FBI, who were not even consulted by
Roosevelt, Donovan's plan was implemented on July 11, 1941, when FDR named
Donovan "Coordinator of Information" (COI). As such he was the nation's first chief
of foreign intelligence and special operations. COI is little known today, because it was
transformed a year later into the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which subsequently
garnered all the publicity. Even so, it deserves close attention, because it embodied
fundamental principles of theory and organization which are basic to the CIA as it was
set up by Congress in 1947.
One, Donovan, breaking with the traditional narrow conception of intelligence as
"military" or "naval," broadened it to include the political, economic, social,
scientific, topographical, and biographical-anything that constituted a nation's
strength or weakness in international affairs. Two, Donovan conceived such
intelligence as serving primarily the President as foreign policy chief and Commander-
in-Chief. Three, this orientation to the President produced the distinction between
strategic or national intelligence-what the President needed-and "departmental"
intelligence-what the various departments, such as Army and Navy, needed-to
accomplish their particular missions. Four, this last distinction required the
establishment of an independent agency alongside of and yet central to the other
intelligence services. Five, in Donovan's concept the new agency had a variety of tasks,
including such diverse enterprises as espionage, research and analysis, subversive
operations, and commando operations. Finally, the new agency encompassed both
overt and covert activities. For intelligence, in sum, Donovan in 1941 sought high
status, independence, centrality, and diversity of functions.
Donovan also laid down some restrictions, which are especially relevant to current
interest in CIA's charter. In the first paper he ever wrote on intelligence, before he
became COI, he stated that an intelligence agency must not be controlled by "party
exigencies," inasmuch as its only raison d'etre was national defense. Also, he empha-
sized that the agency had nothing to do with domestic affairs, that its work was
"foreign investigation[s]" and "intelligence work abroad." Finally, with due regard
for the right of other agencies to do their jobs, he declared that a foreign intelligence
agency should not take over "the home duties" of the FBI or the work abroad of G-2
and ONI. <
To Donovan, then, who needed no schooling in American political theory,
constitutional law, and sound democratic procedures, it was axiomatic that a foreign
intelligence agency, such as he conceived it, had no monopoly on intelligence, no
domestic political role, and no domestic police or law-enforcement function.
Furthermore, he held to those positions in all the planning and debating that led to the
National Security Act. Indeed he, and no one else, was the first to make those points
clear.
No sooner had the news of Donovan's imminent appointment been bruited about
than all the regular departments got "their hackles up over the danger that somebody
is going to take something away from them."13 Their opposition turned out to be as
steady as had been anticipated. They feared empire-building by Donovan-"a
physical activator," according to FDR's advisor judge Sam Rosenman, and "a real
buccaneer" in the eyes of Amb. David K. Bruce, who served in OSS.14
2 Letter, Donovan to Frank Knox, April 26, 1941, Donovan Papers, (CIA Historical Intelligence
Collection), job 66-595, folder 22.
':T (Ater; Knox to Roosevelt, June 25, 1941, Roosevelt Papers (Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.,) OF
4485, box 1.
"Author's interviews with Rosenman, Nov. 11, 1971, and with Bruce, Dec. 11, 1969.
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Donovan never did really become "Coordinator of Information," simply because
the military services never gave him the information to coordinate. In the early days he
had to rely for information and other assistance on Stephenson and British intelligence.
Indeed, in the internecine warfare that engulfed Washington, COI was almost
destroyed twice. Though shorn of its foreign propaganda function, COI was saved by
Roosevelt in 1942 when it was reorganized as OSS-when Donovan, still reporting
directly to the President, was subordinated to the joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It was
saved again in February, 1943, by JCS intervention at the White House. Indeed it was
not until late 1943 that OSS was assured continued wartime existence.
Skullduggery and Death
By then intelligence had become an "in" thing. There were more than forty
agencies collecting, producing, or disseminating intelligence; personnel rosters,
budgets, and activities had skyrocketed. Despite serious problems and conflicts,
people-scholars and spies alike-liked the variegated business. They all agreed the
prewar intelligence setup was faulty, the wartime situation was chaotic, and the
postwar situation had to be better than either. With ultimate victory assured by 1943-
1944, intelligence practitioners turned their thoughts to the postwar organization of
intelligence.
It was a case of the world against OSS, of the oldline agencies against a
pretentious Johnny-come-lately. G-2 and ONI were resolved that OSS, a warborn
agency, would die with the end of the war, and that they would grow in strength and
prestige as they had not been able to do after World War I. The FBI, having tasted
foreign operations in South America, and having established a few non-American
posts, looked forward to displacing OSS and expanding its SIS on a world-wide basis in
collaboration with traditional colleagues-G-2, ONI, and State. In State some
forward-looking elements, more interested in research than espionage, tried to
persuade their upper echelons to organize a State Department intelligence unit so that
State could not only do its own job but also take the lead-befitting its foreign affairs
primacy-in organizing the intelligence activities of the remainder of the government.
Except for OSS, no intelligence service and no department really had a viable idea
of what the postwar intelligence setup ought to be. None had progressed beyond the
idea of the IIC and the various joint intelligence agencies and activities that had
grown up like Topsy within the military services. None certainly had any wish to be
made a spoke in any "Wheel of Intelligence," and none desired any wheel made by
any outsider, least of all by Bill Donovan.
OSS, for its part, though fully conscious of its tenuous hold on life, was none-
theless convinced it held within itself the only adequate idea for a permanent system.
Donovan's original COI proposal was geared to permanency as well as to war. In 1943
Donovan told a military audience he hoped the country would have sense enough to
continue something like OSS into peacetime. Later that year he gave the JCS his
outline for permanent establishment of OSS as "a fourth arm" of the military services.
In 1944 OSS, as a going concern-with a leader, personnel, programs, facilities,
experiences, energy, and ambition-felt it was a natural nucleus for a permanent
agency.
Seizing an opening provided by Roosevelt, Donovan brought the matter to a head
on November 18, 1944, by submitting a formal proposal for the establishment of a
postwar central intelligence service. Its essential features were: an independent agency
responsible to the President and advised by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy;
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several functions, including the coordination and production of intelligence, the
conduct of espionage and counterespionage, "subversive operations abroad," and
"such other functions and duties relating to intelligence" as the President might assign
it, and certain restrictions, including the denial of any "police or law-enforcement
functions, either at home or abroad."15 The plan, with Donovan's energy and
influence behind it, was a major challenge to the other intelligence services.
They had their first opportunity to attack it when Roosevelt asked for the
comments of the joint Chiefs of Staff-Donovan's bosses-who sent the paper down
the JCS ladder to the joint Intelligence Staff (JIS) for the initial preparation of a reply
to the President. Calling the plan "unsound and dangerous," the military members of
the JIS (Army, Navy, and Air Forces) said it interfered with the chain of command,
deprived commanders of control of their intelligence, and-by vesting operating
functions in a coordinating agency-threatened the existence of all other intelligence
services.16 They feared Donovan aimed to take over G-2 and ONI. As their
recommendations, they vested responsibility for coordinating all federal foreign
intelligence activities in the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy, and left it to them
or the JCS to establish or run three separate, interdepartmental services for
coordination, production, and operations. In other words, they did not stray far from
the traditional approach of self-coordination.
The JIS civilian members-State, OSS, and the Foreign Economic Administration
(FEA)-agreed with their colleagues in subordinating intelligence not to the President
but to the three secretaries plus a JCS representative in time of war. The civilians
additionally considered "subversive operations" not the "appropriate function" of an
intelligence agency." (They failed to say to whom it was proper.) Otherwise the
civilians, whose FEA member Max Ways had already done much work on the subject,
were very sympathetic to the Donovan plan. They wanted a central agency, an
independent budget, the functions-including espionage-the powers, and restrictions
much as laid out by Donovan. Hence they took over the form, the substance, and very
much of the language of the Donovan plan, made their modifications, and submitted
that as their response, but the military considered it almost as bad as Donovan's plan.
That made three plans under consideration. The JIS, united only in opposing the
Donovan plan, could not resolve their own differences and sent the disagreement up
the ladder to their parent body, the joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
The JIC, consisting of the heads of the intelligence services and top
representatives of State and FEA, one December day vigorously debated the issue for
three hours. The major issue was control. The military members thought the plans of
both Donovan and the civilians established an intelligence dictator; the civilians
argued that their plan gave the CIA only enough stature and power to enable it to
survive likely opposition from powerful departments. The military thought the
civilians' plan, like Donovan's unsound and dangerous; the civilians claimed the
military plan put something into effect but nothing happened. Unable to reach
agreement, the JIC returned the problem to JIS and told them to try again.
While compromise seemed impossible, both the JIS and the JIC knew they had to
produce a decent reply for the JCS to send to the President. That reply, they knew, had
"Memo, Donovan to Roosevelt, Nov. 18, 1944, and enclosure, "Substantive Authority Necessary in
Establishment of a Central Intelligence Service," Donovan Papers, "OSS Reports to the White House, Nov.-
Dec. 1944."
"1JIS Serial 96, "Proposed Establishment of a Central Intelligence Service," Dec. 9, 1944 (SECRET)
OSS Records, (CIA, Wash., D.C.), Wash-Dir Ad 67 (JIS Series 96.)
"JIS 96/1, ibid.
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either to accept the Donovan plan or offer an acceptable alternative, The civilians had
offered one; but since the military had not done so, it was they who felt the pressure to
yield. Exacting their price, they finally, on January 1, 1945, accepted the hitherto
heretical idea of a new agency, with an independent budget, and with a concentration
of functions. These last included the coordination and production of intelligence, the
performance of "services of common concern"-which everyone knew included
foreign espionage-and the performance of "such other functions and duties related to
intelligence" as might be authorized. They accepted all this only because they insisted
on subjecting the agency to the rigid control of a "National Intelligence Authority"
(NIA) whose membership-the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, and a
representative of the JCS-guaranteed the military considerable influence, to say the
least.
The proposed agency-largely Donovan's agency but under military
control-was not Donovan's idea of an independent agency serving the President and
advised by the various secretaries, but it was considerably more than the military
services had ever previously contemplated. In fact, thanks to unrelenting pressure from
Donovan and probably to the surprise of the military themselves, the latter actually
now had in this JIC compromise their own plan for a postwar, multi-purpose
intelligence agency. Even so, it was by no means out of the woods.
This JIC plan and the original Donovan plan next climbed to a third rung of the
JCS ladder-that of the joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), a body of senior
advisors. They also condemned the Donovan plan. Endorsing the JIC compromise but
reflecting continuing deep opposition within the military, the JSSC considerably
slowed down the process of implementation. They recommended immediate
establishment of the NIA, a Director of Central Intelligence, and an intelligence
advisory board and left to all of them the task of drawing up the plans for the agency
itself. They also recommended, in response to Navy pressure-and with no opposition
from anyone-that the new agency be obligated to protect "intelligence sources and
methods."
Meanwhile, skullduggery of the first order was in the works. Before the matter
could be taken up by the joint Chiefs themselves, and while Donovan was preparing to
carry the fight for his own plan to the JCS and, if necessary, to the President,
someone-Donovan immediately suspected J. Edgar Hoover-leaked both his and the
JIC plans to reporter Walter P. Trohan of the anti-Roosevelt McCormick-Patterson
press, which then published them word for word. Trohan, now living in retirement in
Ireland, described Donovan's plan as a New Deal "super spy system" which would
take over all American intelligence services, including the FBI, the Secret Service,
ONI, and G-2; moreover, wrote Trohan, it would, "spy on the postwar world" and
"pry into the lives of citizens at home." He called it a "super Gestapo agency." He
said the Army and Navy agreed with Donovan's objective, but wanting the setup for
themselves they had "declare[d] war on OSS."18 Donovan cried "foul" and called in
vain for an investigative body with subpoena powers; the culprit never was identified.
His work was well done, however, for the JCS, taking shelter from congressional alarm
at the prospect of an American "Gestapo," advised Roosevelt to drop the matter for
the time being.
Within two months, however, Roosevelt, at the urging of economist Dr. Isadore
Lubin, now with the Twentieth Century Fund, directed Donovan to resubmit his
"The Donovan Plan appeared in the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Times-Herald, and the New
York Daily News on Feb. 9, 1945; the JIC Plan appeared in the first two papers on Feb. 11, 1945.
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proposal, this time to the Cabinet members. A week later, April 12, 1945, Roosevelt
died, and Donovan lost a patron.
Contrary to a common misconception, Roosevelt and Donovan were never
personally close, but the President liked "secret" intelligence, and he was quite happy
to have the oldline bureaucracy stirred up by an intelligence chief of Donovan's
"unlimited imagination and gall."19 Roosevelt had created Donovan's post, sustained
Donovan in office, and encouraged his postwar planning. Donovan had a fighting
chance of winning FDR's support for his plan despite the departmental lineup against
him. Columnist Drew Pearson was correct when two weeks after FDR's death he listed
Donovan as one of those who would "miss Franklin Roosevelt most."20 In truth
Donovan and OSS were done for, but Donovan's plan would, as we shall see, rise
Phoenix-like.
Clearing the Deck
Pearson also noted that while Roosevelt had given Donovan "free rein, including
grandiose plans for a postwar espionage service," the new President, Harry Truman
did not like "peacetime espionage" and would not be "so lenient."21 What role that
attitude played in Truman's relationship with Donovan is not clear, but it is clear that
there was no rapport between the two. Truman left an unmistakable indication of his
disdain for Donovan when he summed up their first official meeting on May 14, 1945,
with the comment that Donovan had come in "to tell how important the Secret
Service Isic I is and how much he could do to run the government on an even basis."22
In the succeeding weeks, Truman rebuffed every attempt by Donovan to discuss the
future of OSS and the organization of a postwar central intelligence organization.
Truman showed no interest in FDR's directed -reconsideration of the Donovan plan,
which State, War, Navy, and justice agreed to shelve for the duration of the war. At
war's end, when Truman and the Budget Bureau director, Harold D. Smith, were
hurrying to dismantle the war machinery, Smith reported that Donovan was
"storming" about the Bureau's proposed order abolishing OSS.23 "Forget it" was the
gist of the reply of the President, who observed that Donovan had been in that
morning-to have an OSS hero meet the President-but they had not discussed the
subject of abolition! Months later, Truman smilingly pinned a medal on Donovan, but
then eleven days later, January 22, 1946, established, without soliciting Donovan's
advice, a new national intelligence system-the National Intelligence Authority and
the Central Intelligence Group. But that has taken us ahead of our story.
When Truman was catapulted into the presidency, he had had neither the need
nor the occasion-nor the opportunity-under Roosevelt to become familiar with the
intelligence situation. He had had nothing to do with the coordination of intelligence
activities, with the collection, evaluation, and production of intelligence, with the
conduct of espionage, counterespionage, or with clandestine military, political, and
psychological warfare. He could have known little about the battle going on among
the intelligence services.
''Joseph H. Rosenbaum, in an interview with the author Jan. 10, 1972. Rosenbaum, an OSS member,
served in a liaison capacity between OSS and the White House in 1944-45.
"Drew Pearson, "Washington Merry-Go-Round," April 27, 1945.
21ibid.
"=Margaret Truman, op. cit., p. 250.
"Diary entry, Sept. 13, 1945, Smith papers (Roosevelt Library) "Conferences with President Truman,
1945. "
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To compound this shortcoming, the President, having rejected Donovan as a
guide to this new field, relied instead upon a very fine public servant but an equally
poor intelligence counselor, Budget Director Smith, Smith had once been described by
former Vice President Henry A. Wallace as "the most important man" in the Roosevelt
administration.24 That high regard was shared by Truman, who acknowledged Smith's
expertise in handling government problems the day he asked Smith to stay in his job.
One of the problems in which Smith thought himself and his staff particularly
competent was intelligence.
Certainly they had had considerable experience with the administrative problems
and the jurisdictional conflicts of the various intelligence services. The Bureau had
been deeply involved in the problems of COI and OSS, had worked on the
organizational problems of G-2 and ONI, and had kept close watch on the FBI's
budget and plans for the future of the SIS. Finally, Bureau staff, believing State was
the intelligence wave of the future, were happy to work on the department's internal
problem. All this experience convinced the Bureau of its ability to advise the President
on meeting the intelligence needs of the country in both peace and war.
Smith had already warned Roosevelt, after his return from Yalta, about the
"Gestapo" charge; and, noting the "tug-of-war" among the intelligence agencies,
asked the President to help him "hold the fort" against anyone-obviously Donovan
and the military-who would try to take his time "prematurely" in the matter.25 No
sooner was Roosevelt dead-a week later in fact-than Smith made the same pitch to
Truman and asked him to do nothing until the Bureau had its recommendations ready
for him. For his part Truman opposed establishing a "Gestapo"-which made it
unanimous-and vaguely referred throughout the summer to having something new
"in mind," to an information rather than an investigative service, to "a broad
intelligence service attached to the President's office," but he never did spell it out,26
His invitation to Smith to do some thinking about it fitted in nicely with Bureau
activity.
Nothing happened, however, until the war suddenly ended on August 15, and
then actions-by Donovan, Truman, and the JCS-tumbled rapidly after one another
until they reached a climax on September 20. First Donovan, responding to an inquiry
from Harold Smith, suggested liquidation of OSS could be completed early in 1946,
and to facilitate establishment of a new centralized system of intelligence, he
submitted a new statement of principles as a point of departure. He circulated copies
to the President, the JCS, and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. Moreover Donovan,
stung by a spate of anti-OSS material once again fed to the McCormick-Patterson
press, countered with his own barrage-the first in OSS history-of pro-OSS publicity
and thereby brought the future of OSS into the open.
Meanwhile, Truman had initiated the abolition of such agencies as OSS. Smith's
staff had drafted an executive order abolishing OSS and distributing its parts to the
War and State departments. To the former they proposed sending the clandestine units
and to the latter they would send the research and analysis and presentation units. The
proposals were cleared with both departments before they were brought, rather
belatedly, to the attention of either Donovan or the JCS. Getting the news about a
'4 Quoted in Current Biography 1943, p. 710.
25 Memo, Smith to Roosevelt, Mar. 2, 1945, with enclosures, Records of the Bureau of the Budget,
Record Group 51 (Office of Management and Budget, Wash., D.C.), Proj. 118, folder "Intelligence
Functions, (AM-217),"
26 Diary entries, Sept. 5, May 11, and Sept. 13, 1945, Smith Papers, loc. cit.
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week before the scheduled abolition, Donovan quickly sought the assistance of the
JCS, who in turn moved to get a stay of execution-of their agency!-until they could
study the matter and make their own recommendations.
Meanwhile also, the JCS had finally become seized of the problem of postwar
intelligence. On the recommendation of the Army, worried about the atomic bomb
and intelligence, the JCS had ordered the joint Strategic Survey Committee-their
advisory group-to review that JIC plan which had been shelved after the disastrous
Trohan revelations in February. Now eager for action but fearing another "Gestapo"
charge, the JSSC proposed, as their only change, specifically denying the proposed
CIA any espionage function in the U. S. and any police powers anywhere in the world;
but others, worrying that such denial implicitly constituted admission of foreign
espionage, scratched the revision and returned to the very wording that had not been
able to forestall the original charge! Then top Army planners, with the concurrence of
the JSSC, yielded to G-2 pressure and-striking out an independent budget-made the
CIA dependent on financial contributions from State, War, and Navy. The new
agency, with its several functions and restrictions, was more dependent than ever on
the three departments. Thus diluted, the plan was officially approved by the joint
Chiefs on September 18, 1945. They then rushed to send the plan to the secretaries of
War and Navy for transmittal to the President and to hold up action on the abolition
of OSS.
't'hey were upstaged, however, by the President and Harold Smith who,
unbeknownst to them, met in the President's office at 3:00 P.M. on September 20 and
effectively nullified-at least for the nonce-all the OSS and JCS hustling about. First,
the President signed the order which abolished OSS on October 1, distributed its
salvageable parts to the War and State departments, and dismissed Donovan, with
nary a nod to his new statement of principles. That was Truman's first step in
reorganizing the country's intelligence setup. The JCS learned the next day that it had
been taken just two hours before their requested stay of execution had been received in
the Budget Bureau!
When Truman signed the order, he remarked that he had "in mind a different
kind of intelligence service from what this country has had in the past."27 Again he
seems not to have spelled it out, but there was no need to do so. Smith, having briefed
him on the completion of the long-awaited Budget Bureau study of intelligence, had
another directive for him to sign. It was a letter instructing Secretary Byrnes to "take
the lead in developing a comprehensive and coordinated foreign intelligence program
for all Federal agencies concerned with that type of activity." 28 The Bureau also had a
plan. Opposed to the military and interested in the coordination problem, the Bureau
proposed the establishment of an interdepartmental coordinating mechanism
dominated by State, and left other problems much to the future.
The situation was ridiculous. For more than a year and a half the State
Department had not been able to establish its own new, unified intelligence office.
Secondly, never had the Department evidenced any serious interest in "taking the
lead" in developing any government-wide coordination of foreign intelligence
activity. Finally, all it did have for such coordination were the recommendations of
administrative and management specialists in the Bureau of the Budget. Nevertheless,
State was in charge. Truman, having dismissed Donovan and apparently unaware of
"ibid., Sept. 13, 1945.
2Rl,etter, Truman to Byrnes, Sept. 20, 1945, Public Papers of the Presidents. Truman. 1945. (GPO,
Wash., D.C., 1961), p. 330.
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the JCS plan, had draped the mantle of intelligence leadership on the one agency least
able to do anything about it. It was his second step in the intelligence field, and both
steps now led to much wandering in the wilderness,
Second Beginning
Initially, however, there was considerable enthusiasm in part of State.
Undersecretary Dean Acheson, with Byrnes's approval, snapped up Smith's offer of the
OSS research and analysis and presentation units and almost as quickly had a man-a
peacetime lawyer from G-2, Col. Alfred McCormack-on the job the day OSS was
abolished. Within two months, however, McCormack, an abrasive person, had
encountered the stiff opposition of the potent political desk officers who wanted no
intelligence office inserted in State between themselves and both the Secretary and the
President. Initial enthusiasm was gone by Christmas, and by April 1946, so were
McCormack and his new office.
Meanwhile, McCormack had had to put the larger problem of organizing a
government-wide system on a back burner, but the Army and Navy, rejoicing in the
possession of their own plan and worrying about foreign tensions, would suffer no
delay. First, the JCS plan had been incorporated in the Navy's so-called Eberstadt
report, which envisioned a broad reorganization of the military-political structure for
national security, and then personally and departmentally endorsed by Navy Secretary
James F. Forrestal. Then, in the War Department, the plan was not only endorsed by
Secretary Robert P. Patterson, but his Lovett Board also recommended a return to the
idea of an independent budget for CIA. The Army preferred that, but the Navy was
cool to the idea. Nevertheless, the military stood together. Eager for action, they dis-
liked State's temporizing; they also wanted their plan implemented so the new agency
could take over the R & A unit, which they disliked leaving in State. Hence, late in
1945, Forrestal and Patterson vigorously pushed the JCS plan at the White House, and
McCormack felt the pressure. Embattled with his colleagues, he nevertheless had to
take time to draft a plan with which to counter the military.
All McCormack had to go on was that Budget report, the assistance of Budget
staff, and some charts and supporting papers they had prepared. That report did have
some excellent observations on the nature and diversity of intelligence, the importance
and validity of intelligence as a function of government, and the great need for better
coordination among its collectors and producers. Getting to practical matters, the
report primarily stressed the need to develop strong departmental intelligence services
and therefore recognized only a small residual need for a central research staff for the
President and for such centralized operations as espionage. Hence the report
recommended the establishment of two high-level committees of assistant secretaries, a
joint secretariat, and a host of subcommittees. It was a complicated, interdepartmental
system. While essentially self-coordination almost at its theoretical best, it was meant
to be dominated by State, and not surprisingly it was adopted by McCormack as the
heart of State's plan.
It was strongly opposed, however, by Secretaries Forrestal and Patterson when
they met with Byrnes in November, and it was also disliked by Byrnes himself. The
military, who had found the Donovan plan too strong, found State's plan too weak. Its
coordinating mechanism they considered unworkable; they objected to vesting State
with the preparation of strategic estimates and to leaving centralized
operations-espionage, biographical records, topographical studies, etc.-to future
assignment to ad hoc organizations. In the background of military opposition was
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basic distrust of State itself; generals and admirals remembered the loose security
practices of Secretary of State William Jennings Byran and the closing of the "Black
Chamber" by Secretary Stimson; and they were currently witnesses to McCormack's
embarrassing inability to organize a viable State intelligence unit. For his part, Byrnes
found that McCormack structure too elaborate and too big.
Revision did not help. The plan still reflected State's own distrust of military
domination of intelligence; it remained a State-run mechanism. The military stood
fast for an agency responsible to the three cabinet secretaries and charged with the
three functions of coordination, production, and operations. There were numerous
major and minor issues on which both sides spent much time, defining, revising, and
arguing. A meeting was even scheduled with the President but had to be postponed,
because Byrnes could not resolve differences of opinion within the State Department.
Harold Smith, frustrated with the failure of others to follow the Bureau's lead,
complained to Truman on November 28, 1945, that the situation was "getting royally
bitched up."29
Even so it was a month before Truman himself could take a look at both plans.
"My inclination," he later wrote, "was to favor" the JCS plan.'0 That was not a
difficult choice. There was a simplicity and coherence about the plan-an authority
(NIA), a central agency (CIA), and an Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB)-which
contrasted favorably with the complexity of State's revised offering-an NIA, an
executive secretary, two advisory groups, nineteen committees, and indeterminate
"centralized activities" to be activated in the indeterminate future. Truman's choice
had a touch of irony. He had commissioned State to "take the lead," but after four
months of his and State's wandering in the wilderness he had ended up endorsing the
very plan-minimally modified-which the JCS had tried to get to him in September.
Truman apparently communicated his preference to Byrnes, who probably
needed little nudging. In any case, Byrnes, meeting with Forrestal and Army
Undersecretary Kenneth C. Royall, surrendered almost unconditionally; so the three
secretaries on January 6, 1946, formally recommended adoption of the JCS plan.
Truman was "ready to put it into effect," he wrote, but he held off, because Harold
Smith wanted his people to make "a thorough anaylsis" of it."
Smith's people, though forced to swallow the JCS plan, managed to change the
nature of the proposed central agency. They made it so dependent on the three
departments for funds, personnel, and facilities that it no longer qualified as an
"agency." Instead it became "a cooperative interdepartmental activity,"32 or "a
group." Hence the projected CIA became instead the CIG. The military, prepared to
accept anything as a beginning, agreed.
On January 22, 1946,33 Truman, taking his third major step in intelligence,
constituted the three cabinet secretaries and his (not a JCS) representative as the NIA
and established the CIG to assist them. Their mission was the planning, development,
and coordination of all federal foreign intelligence activities. The idea was approved
by the press and public, which deemed the best intelligence possible a necessity for
"Diary entry, Nov. 28, 1945, Smith Papers, loc. cit.
:11 Harry S. Truman, op. cit., p. 57.
"Ibid.
"The phrase first appears in NIA Directive No. 1, Feb. 8, 1946 (CONF), OSS Records, Wash-Gen
C-Ad 30.
:'The document signed on this date was the letter Truman subsequently referred to as his "Executive
Order." It can be found in Truman's Public Papers, 1946, pp. 88-89.
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national survival. That included espionage; Time approvingly observed that the
President "had put the U.S. in the business of international espionage."34 Almost alone
as a dissenter was Henry Wallace, who thought spying "Hellish,"35 Truman was
pleased with what he had accomplished. He also thought the problem of intelligence
was solved. He sat back to receive his "daily digest."36
Permanency
On the surface, NIA and CIG were impressive. The very names-National
Intelligence Authority and Central Intelligence Group-gave to intelligence an
ostensible stature that not even Donovan could have found wanting. Actually they
were more appearance than substance.
First, CIG was literally nothing more than an interdepartmental committee
subsisting on handouts of money, people, and facilities from three departments
which-capriciously or otherwise-could withdraw their sustaining support at any
moment. Also, while CIG could enumerate the many functions assigned to it, the
embarrassing truth was that it lacked the power to carry them out. CIG could not hire
people (or fire them), certify payrolls, authorize travel, procure supplies, or negotiate
contracts. It could not do any business except through the medium of one of the
departments. In short, it was fundamentally hobbled by substantive and
administrative deficiencies which left both it and the NIA unequal to organizing all
Federal foreign intelligence activities and operating the centralized services
increasingly assigned it by the various departments.
Second, the NIA included the three cabinet secretaries, who had so many other
pressing responsibilities that intelligence was bound to become, as Donovan argued it
always had been, "the Orphan Annie" 37 of the services. Donovan described the NIA as
"a good debating society but a poor administering instrument."38
There was an obvious solution-a grant of legal and financial independence.
That of course required legislative action by Congress, and that was recommended by
CIG's first director, Admiral Sidney W. Souers-and then vigorously pushed by its
second chief, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg. CIG sent drafts of enabling legislation to
the White House, but they had a cool reception. Meanwhile there opened up an
alternative legislative route, the merger or unification bill which eventually became
the National Security Act of 1947.
The military had come to recognize that modern intelligence has a non-military
as well as a military character, but they still thought of it as peculiarly their own field,
in which they had the history and for which they had the qualifications. They had a
big stake in the new CIG, and they certainly assumed that it would be headed
alternately by an admiral and a general, and so it was-two admirals and a general in
only a year and a half of existence. Fully aware of CIG's weaknesses, and appreciating
the need for legislation, they had always found a place for it in their proposals.
Not until January 1947, however, had the military, who had many profound and
bitter interservice arguments over the merger issue, been able to agree among
themselves and with the White House on the grand design of the legislation to be
"Time, Feb. 4, 1946.
""Wallace Decries Spying as hellish," New York Times, Mar. 19, 1946.
116 Harry S. Truman, op. cit., p. 58.
37I.etter, Donovan to Gurney, May 7, 1974, Donovan Papers, "Central Intelligence, 1941-1950,
Vol. I.-
""Donovan Tells of Intelligence Agency's Flaws," New York Herald Tribune, c. April 10, 1946.
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submitted to Congress. To some extent they and the White House reached agreement
by leaving many thorny issues for later decision, They wanted no more controversies
than necessary. In that context they and the White House-the latter now resigned to
CIG legislation-made brief provision for CIA in the unification bill Truman sent to
Congress on February 26, 1947.
The bill's drafters had found the proposed CIG legislation too long and possibly
troublesome, and therefore reduced it drastically. They briefly provided for a new
agency-a big step forward-and subordinated it to another new organization, the
National Security Council (NSC) which the Eberstadt report had put forth as the top
policy-making body for national security. Second, they protected the military status,
pay, and benefits of any military officer who might-as they expected-serve as
Director of Central Intelligence. Fianlly, in a tactic that eventually boomeranged, they
eliminated all reference to the functions, powers, relationships, and restrictions on the
new agency; this they did by the expedient of a brief provision intended to give
legislative effect to the President's directive of January 22, 1946. The eliminated
portions, it was decided, could be better handled in separate CIA legislation.
Congress, when it took up the bill, was clearly ready for intelligence. No one
accorded strategic intelligence anything less than the high status for which Donovan
was the first to fight. No one did other than demonstrate he had learned a lesson
taught by ten years of tension and war, Rep. Ralph E. Church (R., Ill.) spoke for all
when he described intelligence as both "necessary for the proper functioning of our
military machinery" and "of primary importance for the proper conduct of our foreign
relations. ''
With the possible exception of one die-hard opponent of the entire bill, Sen.
Edward V. Robertson (R., Wyo.), all favored establishing an independent agency.
Even Robertson apparently only opposed what he saw as military control of the
agency, not the agency itself, much less intelligence. Indeed, no one raised any
question about the need for such an agency or wondered whether the job might not be
better done by an interdepartmental committee or some other device. A common view
was that of Rep. W. J. Bryan Dorn (D., S. Car.) who, recalling people who thought
that Hitler was "a comic character" and that Mussolini was "bluffing," declared
your Central Intelligence Agency is a very important part of this bill."40
Likewise, everyone accepted the bill's implicit inclusion of espionage. The fact
was plainly stated by Rep. Chet Holifield (D., Cal.) who reassured the House that
CIA's work was "strictly in the field of secret foreign intelligence-what is known as
clandestine intelligence."" Accepting the fact, however, was not easy; Rep. Forest A.
Harness (R., Ind.) had had "some fear and doubt about it" when he first considered
the matter. The country, he explained, had "never before officially resorted to the
collection of secret and strategic information in time of peace as an announced and
fixed policy." However, he now was "convinced" that CIA was "essential to our
national security. -41 Essential though it might be, Rep. Walter G. Andrews (R., N.Y.)
wanted the thing done right because, as he said, "it is a great and dangerous departure
for the American people to establish by law a 'spy agency,' which is what this agency
will actually be."43
"Congressional Record, Vol. 93, pt. 7, p. 9421.
41 [bid., p. 9419.
41 Ibid., p. 9430.
41 Ibid., p. 9412.
4' U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Establishment (Unification
of the Armed Services): Hearings on S. 758, 80th Congress, 1st session, Mar. 25, 1947, p. 593.
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Congress did have two problems, however: One, there was very strong opposition
to the idea of a military man heading CIA. Many, thinking the military had become
too prominent, feared the growth of militarism. Others, visualizing some militaristic
officer heading a national intelligence agency, feared the rise of a military "Gestapo."
Still others, thinking the post of Director of Central Intelligence very important, did
not like entrusting it to admirals and generals for short tours of duty between other
assignments. And still others, viewing the job more in line with Donovan's concept,
saw it as an essentially civilian post. In short, Congress passionately wanted a civilian
DCI, but the very fact that an admiral-Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter-now was the third
DCI and was expected to continue in the post, and the real possibility that the best
man for the job might actually be a military man made it necessary to make provision
for either a military or civilian occupant of the post. Though unhappy with the
necessity, Congress won in the long run, because its attitude established the essentially
civilian character of the DCI. Actually this accomplishment was the only new
contribution Congress made to the theory and structure of CIA. The rest was
copywork.
The other problem was provoked by the shortcutting tactic of the bill's drafters.
Blurted out Maryland's Democratic Sen. Millard Tydings: "that is an awfully short bit
of explanation, under the caption 'Central Intelligence Agency.' " He thought there
was a "void" in the bill.44 Of course there was, and a number of administration
spokesmen hurried before committees of both Houses to explain that they had not
wanted to overload the bill, that separate legislation was coming along, that the
President's directive was carried over into the law, and that if that were not clear, then
as one spokesman put it to a House committee, "eight or ten words"45 would do the
job. But neither Tydings nor numerous other objectors were mollified. House members
were particularly vocal in insisting on having the functions and restrictions spelled out
and not left to a parenthetical reference to an obscure presidential directive.
There were too many who had been exercised by the fear of a "Gestapo" to permit
the establishment of a "spy agency" unless they first detailed what it could and could
not do and where it could and could not operate. There were also many friends of the
FBI who wanted to make sure that the DCI could not actually-physically-go into
Hoover's office, into his files, into his cases, and thus blow his operations. There were
also just as many experienced and suspicious anti-New Deal congressmen who had
such an intense dislike of presidential directives and executive orders that they would
not leave an intelligence agency to such dangerous instruments of presidential power.
Others just did not like the shortcut. So the functions and limitations were spelled out.
Except for further protecting the FBI, however, Congress hardly did more than copy
out provisions-such as those on "services of common concern," police powers,
"sources and methods," and "such other functions and duties''-that had long since
been taken for granted. When the work was completed, Congress prided itself on this
accomplishment; but being agreeable to everyone, it was no big thing.
Congress made one other change in the bill that had an important, but
unintended, effect on CIA. Congress made the President the chairman of the NSC,
and that meant that the DCI for the first time reported directly to the President, albeit
as the chairman of the Council. Such reporting had always been opposed by the
military and by State, but of course it had always been considered an essential
characteristic of modern intelligence by Donovan, who as head of COI and OSS had
44Ibid., p. 176.
46 Admiral Forrest P. Sherman in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Department, National Security Act of 1947: Hearings on H.R. 2319, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 1947, p. 181.
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always reported to Roosevelt. The new arrangement-subordinating the CIA to an
NSC headed by the President-was an unexpected solution to the old dilemma of
giving the DCI too much freedom or too much external control. It gave the DCI access
to the President, and yet it gave the NSC members, particularly Defense and State, a
voice in CIA activities and productions. The solution coupled independence for CIA
with subordination to an American version of Britain's old "King-in-Council"
concept.
That surprising turn of events constituted what can be seen as a round trip
between the zenith and the nadir in the institutionalization of the idea of the Central
Intelligence Agency. What was launched by Donovan as a plan for a strong,
independent agency was watered down by the JCS in their plan for an agency
dependent upon State, War, and Navy, then devitalized by Truman when he
established his "cooperative inter-departmental activity," and then-moving upward
from this nadir-headed for a return to the JCS plan only to pass it by and wind up
close to the original point of departure. In other words, in concept, structure, and
functions, CIA as signed into law resembled the Donovan plan more than it did any
other proposal put forth in the entire developmental process. And to add an ironic twist
to this development, the man who proudly signed that law was of course none other
than he who had no use for Donovan or his plan, Harry S. Truman.
For his role in the establishment of CIA, the former President does deserve some
credit, but not as much as he gives himself. He wholeheartedly supported the warborn
movement for a permanent American central intelligence organization but, new to the
presidency and certainly hard-pressed by events, he had difficulty fashioning an
intelligence policy for his administration. He, indeed, had made the choice of the JCS
over the State or McCormack plan; and yet that was an easy choice, and beyond that
he had made no contribution to the theory and structure of the CIA. He, indeed, had
established the NIA and CIG and had provided the necessary executive push required
for passage of the 1947 act; but surely he did no more than FDR would have
done-and would have done more expeditiously. Truman did establish CIA, but in
doing so he was very largely-however unknowingly-returning to the Donovan plan
of 1944. He really only put the capstone on the work done by Donovan (and
Stephenson) and Roosevelt.
Second Thoughts
Surprisingly enough for a history buff, Truman persisted in ignoring his
indebtedness to others; CIA remained "his invention." This misconception inevitably
spawned in him other misconceptions about the Agency. Nowhere are these more apparent
than in his syndicated article4e which appeared in 1963 and then was widely reprinted
in 1975 after the New York Times leveled charges of "massive illegal domestic" spying
by the CIA and thereby provoked unprecedented criticism and examination of much
Agency activity.
In that article Truman denounced CIA, which he termed "this quiet intelligence
arm of the President," for becoming diverted-as he saw it-from the "original
""Harry Truman Writes: Limit CIA Role to Intelligence," Washington Post, Dec. 22, 1963, p. A-11.
For an interesting inquiry into the authorship of this article see Benjamin F. Onate, "What Did Truman Say
About CIA?" Studies in Intelligence Vol XVI1/3, (Fall, 1973), pp. 9-11. The author establishes that the
article was not written by the former President but by an assistant, David Noyes; doubt is also raised as to
whether the President ever saw the article prior to its publication. On this latter point see later footnote on
letter to Admiral Souers.
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assignment" he had given it and for becoming "an operational and at times a policy-
making arm of the Government," According to him, the agency's assignment had been
the collection of intelligence reports from all sources and their conveyance to the
President in their "'natural raw' state and in as comprehensive a volume" as he could
handle and free of "departmental `treatment' or interpretations" so that he could do
his "own thinking and evaluating." It had not been his expectation, he said, that CIA
would be "injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations."47
Whatever Truman thought in 1947 or 1963 about CIA's "original assignment," it
now ought to be clear that the 1947 Act had a history that precluded the possibility of
Truman being the sole and infallible expositor of what that assignment was. It should
also be clear that history made the Agency's functions far more numerous and
sophisticated than simply funneling "raw" intelligence to the President. It should also
be clear that throughout that history no one the least interested in the subject was
excusably ignorant of espionage as a part of the Agency's functions; and despite his
disavowal of "peacetime cloak and dagger operations," Truman, as we shall see, was
probably not ignorant of the fact either.
Only two points made by Truman remain to be considered. The first, "policy-
making," is easily disposed of; whether the Agency has or has not become such an
"arm of the Government" is clearly beyond the scope of this article, but certainly no
one is ever known to have held that such a function was part of the "original
assignment."
On the second, the "operational," point, Truman is on good but not unassailable
ground. The "assignment" did not explicitly include "covert operations." (Presumably
these at least are what Truman had reference to when he employed such ambiguous
language as "operational" and "peacetime cloak and dagger operations." The Agency
was designed to be "operational," that is, to perform various services and functions,
such as the conduct of espionage.) However, no sooner did the international situation
in 1947-52 virtually invite American covert operations in Greece, Italy, and elsewhere
than President Truman's administration, reading the 1947 Act and scrutinizing
resources at hand, found the new CIA the most convenient instrument to use. In other
words, Truman in 1947-52 seems to have accepted covert operations as an implicit part
of CIA's "original assignment."
If by 1963 he had changed his mind-and there is some doubt as to whether he
actually did-he seems not to have renounced covert operations per se but only their
conduct by "his invention." In that 1963 article, in a paragraph which is invariably
overlooked, especially by critics of all covert operations, Truman-throwing syntax
and punctuation to the winds-wrote this recommendation:
I, therefore, would like to see the CIA be restored to its original assignment as
the intelligence arm of the President, and that whatever else it can properly
perform in that special field-and that its operational duties be terminated or
properly used elsewhere.
That last word "elsewhere" surely demonstrates that Truman was only slightly
more helpful than the JIS civilians who in 1944 thought "subversive operations
abroad" not the "appropriate function" of an intelligence service but failed to say to
whom they were "appropriate." Truman at least positively assigned them
"elsewhere."
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Truman's recommendation brings us back to espionage. That Truman knew CIA
was intended to be a "spy agency" might be deducible from that elliptical reference to
"whatever else it can properly perform in that special field." Anything else could
certainly have been expressed in a less obviously veiled manner.
While Truman apparently did not actually write that 1963 article, an exchange of
correspondence with Admiral Souers4A shortly after its appearance demonstrates his
familiarity with and endorsement of it. About the same time-after the Bay of
Pigs-he was privately telling Merle Miller that CIA was "a mistake," which "if I'd
known what was going to happen, I never would have done it."49
Miller does point out some ambiguity between some public and private
statements of Truman's, 50 and while some people tend to stress this ambivalence, and
to suggest that memory and old age had gotten the better of the former President, the
weight of the evidence suggests that Truman, however proud he originally was of his
role in the establishment of CIA, did have some unhappy second thoughts. The
conclusion here is that to the extent he had such thoughts they are directly traceable to
his own ignorance of the history of that event.
15Letters, Souers to Truman, Dec. 27, 1963, and Truman to Souers, Jan, 17, 1964, Papers of Sidney
Souers (Truman Library, Independence, Mo.) Souers, congratulating Truman on the Dec. 22, 1963, article,
criticized Allen W. Dulles for "caus[ing] the C.I.A. to wander far from the original goal established by
you ..." In reply, Truman said he was "happy ... that my article rang a bell with you because you know
exactly why the organization was set up-it was set up so the President would know what was going on."
That Truman actually wrote this letter seems evident from the postscript written apparently by him: "The
girls aren't working today-so I fold'em and lick'em myself!"
49 Miller, op. cit., p. 419.
? Ibid., p. 420. Miller observed that "publicly Mr. Truman continued to uphold the CIA. This was one
of the few areas in which what he said publicly differed from what he said privately." As evidence, he cites a
passage in the 1971 Esquire article cited in footnote 2 above; Truman is quoted therein as noting
that CIA is "still going, and it's going very well." This writer could not locate the remark in the place given.
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How we got into the
newspaper business
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY
In the vaulted Special Printing Plant on the seventh floor of Headquarters stands
a blue-gray Miehle offset press that makes a curious "whisch-whisch" sound as it
operates. This German-made press is very handy for printing booklet pages, and for
decades the producers of national intelligence have served up their material in the
form of booklets. Thus, nothing sounded unusual in the Special Printing Plant before
dawn on January 10, 1974, as the press emitted its customary "whisch-whisch." But
something looked highly irregular. The press was not printing booklet pages; instead, it
was spreading out the sensitive, highly classified substance of national intelligence in
the form of a newspaper. A tabloid newspaper.
The newspaper consisted of one sheet, 17 by 22 inches, printed on both sides and
folded to form four pages. Unlike many tabloids, this one offered headlines of modest
size and careful statement. Compactly arranged with a section of general information
plus seven geographical and topical sections, it presented 31 intelligence items, three
maps, a chart, and a picture. Its four pages carried some 7,000 words, the equivalent of
what intelligence consumers normally find in 26 booklet pages. The Central
Intelligence Agency seal stood next to the name of the newspaper: the National
Intelligence Daily. Beneath the name appeared a notice: "Published by the Director of
Central Intelligence for Named Principals Only."
Volume 1, Number 1 carried an introductory statement signed by the DCI:
This is the first edition of the National Intelligence Daily. The newspaper
format permits the reader to make his own choices. He can scan the front page.
He can read selectively from it and from the other pages.
The Daily contains at least three times as much intelligence as its
predecessor, the Central Intelligence Bulletin. This enables the reader to note
the highlights or follow important intelligence problems in depth, and at the
same time and in the same place, to note issues of secondary importance and
immediacy. The format also enables us to offer longer feature stories on issues
of topical interest. Because a number of previously separate publications have
been brought together here, the substantive material can be more varied.
The Daily will be a security hazard. It will contain material from all
available sources dealing with policy matters of great sensitivity. A single issue
exposes a broader range of sources and subject matter than did its predecessor
publications. No copies or clippings may be made, nor may the Daily be passed
on to staffs, as stories in the Daily could be mislaid in a stack of newspapers.
Handling procedures have been devised to help reduce these risks, but the
reader's cooperation will still be necessary. It is essential to keep this
publication, and particularly its contents, inviolate.
Finally, the Daily is frankly an experiment; changes will no doubt be
made. We want it to carry the kind of intelligence information a highly
selective list of readers needs. When it misses the mark, let us know.
MORI/HRP
from pg.
39-51
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A Suggestion From 1952
The departure from a conventional presentation of intelligence may have
appeared abrupt, but the concept was well aged. William E. Colby had suggested it to
the late Allen Dulles in 1952, while Mr. Dulles was in the tub in Stockholm, but the
idea went down the drain with the bath water. In 1966, Mr. Colby raised the idea
again. The Office of Current Intelligence prepared a mock-up of intelligence in
newspaper form, but informed him that the difficulties involved were too great to
justify further work on the project. In the summer of 1973, after his appointment as
DCI, Mr. Colby once more asked whether OCI could produce a newspaper. On that
occasion, he reached into a drawer and pulled out a document he had saved for seven
years, the mock-up of intelligence in newspaper form that just about everyone else had
long forgotten.
OCI brushed aside jeers, sneers, and cracks about classified ads, crossword
puzzles, and funnies, and in July 1973 got down to serious work. The work had to be
serious because the problems were indeed immense, and there was considerable doubt
as to the wisdom and feasibility of the project. It was clear from the beginning that a
newspaper could not be done on the cheap, as just another by-product of OCI's usual
activities. It would be a major project, one that would draw in substantial manpower
and would necessarily regulate many other activities. The cost would be worthwhile
only if it provided a better way of informing OCI's primary audience, the officers of
government who make up the National Security Council, its subcommittees, and their
senior staffs. Most important, OCI was not confident that an intellectually respectable
product could be produced in this format, and was uncertain whether that product
would he recognized and accepted as such by the readers for whom it was intended.
OCI had to break new ground; a successful intelligence newspaper would have to meld
the professional and technical standards of the newspaperman with those of the
intelligence officer.
Questions of Function and Efficiency
The problems loomed as hard questions to answer. For example:
-A newspaper is a medium of mass communication, but sensitive
intelligence must circulate only among a few subscribers. Why build a sledge
hammer to pound tacks?
-Even a mere four-page tabloid would give consumers three times their
usual intelligence fare. Would they accept that much? And could the
producers suddenly triple the output of what normally goes into a generalized
intelligence publication? As quantity rose, would quality fall?
-National intelligence involves coordination, which takes time. A
newspaper operation requires speed. Could the intelligence community
compress the coordination of more material into less time?
-The number of pages in a booklet can go up or down in accord with the
ups and downs in daily intelligence production. A four-page newspaper would
offer the same amount of space, for 7,000 words, day in and day out. Could the
editors of a newspaper reconcile uneven production with steady consumption?
-The consumers of an intelligence newspaper would have habits and
attitudes that are not easily changed. They might tend to think that any
newspaper takes a casual rather than a responsible approach and offers
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The NID ``
sketchiness rather than comprehensiveness. Could they be persuaded to view
seriously that which came to them in a format often associated with the
frivolous?
-A booklet that contains certain categories of intelligence is supposed to
have a cover, like the top slice of bread on a ham sandwich, A newspaper with
a cover would not look like a newspaper. Would serving the meat of
intelligence as an open-faced sandwich violate security requirements?
-The equipment and skills at hand were for making booklets, not a
newspaper, and the budget did not allow for heavy capital investment. Could
the machinery and know-how already committed to booklets be adapted
efficiently to a new form of publication?
Calculations and Samples
In the initial attack on the technical problems, OCI used the composers in its
Publications Support Branch to produce justified lines of type. The Technical Support
Branch, Cartography Division, Office of Geographic and Cartographic Research,
created headlines on a machine customarily used for putting captions on illustrations.
The Visual Information and Design Branch of the Cartography Division designed
nameplates and security warning sections. Within two weeks, the first sample
newspaper rolled off the press in the Special Printing Plant of Printing Services
Division.
In the next four weeks, OCI and its support elements experimented with various
type sizes, column widths, headline styles, map and picture presentations, page
designs, and organizational patterns.
The calculations started with the Miehle press, the only readily available unit that
could run off a sheet of paper large enough to constitute two newspaper pages. The
Miehle had a limitation: it could print no sheet larger than 19 by 25 inches. It had a
customary setting, for a sheet 17 by 22 inches on which four booklet pages could be
printed simultaneously. The newspaper experiments had to proceed without disrupting
regularly scheduled production. It was practical, therefore, to keep the press at the 17
by 22 inch setting. This dictated the size of the newspaper. It would be a tabloid,
folded into pages 11 inches wide and 17 inches high.
Five columns would appear too squeezed on a small page. Also, the narrower the
column, the more hyphens at the ends of justified lines of type. Three wider columns
would ease the hyphenization problem but would give a small page more of a
magazine look than a newspaper look. Four columns, each about as wide as a column
in the Wall Street journal, seemed to present the most acceptable appearance, as did
body type of normal newspaper size.
Generalized, Specialized, and Systematic
The intelligence newspaper would have to provide an orderly presentation of
developments that are often chaotic. Such an arrangement would serve as a functional
guide for reading the newspaper and would also reflect the newspaper's relationship
with other intelligence publications. The newspaper would put together, in one
document, the essential intelligence that policy makers usually had to seek out in
several documents. Pages 1 and 4 would carry the principal and latest developments
that readers were accustomed to find in generalized intelligence publications; pages 2
and 3 would provide some of the background materials that appear in specialized
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SECRET The NID
intelligence publications. A systematic production flow, with background information
and items of less urgency going into the first press run (pages 2 and 3) and the most
significant and current intelligence going into the last press run (pages 1 and 4), would
contribute to a logical arrangement.
From the beginning, the work proceeded in consultation with the Office of Secur-
ity, for security was an obvious problem. Someone could mislay the Daily amid
sections of the Post or Times, or shove the intelligence newspaper under a pile of
unclassified material. The Daily would carry, on the same page, several articles of
varying classification and sensitivity. Decorating every page with enough security
warnings to give conventional notice of the document's sensitivity would result in
something that looked more like a circus poster than a newspaper. The Office of
Security cooperated in the development of terse warning notices and security markings
sufficient to flag the newspaper as highly classified without obscuring its message
under typographical clutter.
The wider the circulation, the higher the security risk. The Daily, therefore, would
go only to a few top policy makers. Similarly, few within the Agency would receive the
newspaper. Most consumers of intelligence, and most producers, would continue to
receive conventional publications-booklets-that are less of a security hazard than
the Daily.
One modest protection devised for the Daily-and one that can be employed
efficiently only with a strictly limited distribution of intelligence newspapers-was a
jacket in which the newspaper would arrive on the policy maker's desk. The jacket
would shield the newspaper's contents from accidental unauthorized inspection and
would bear an "eyes only" label naming the authorized recipient. The use of color on
the jacket and on the pre-printed portion of the Daily would emphasize the security
markings.
Speed in Black, White, and Gray
Except for use in pre-printed security markings, color was a printing luxury the
Daily could not afford. The loss of color in maps would be the price of speed. Printing
colored maps on the Miehle press would take hours; the Daily, if it was to be current,
would have to get on and off the press in minutes. Agency cartographers, who through
many years had earned a reputation for excellence in creating colored maps, now had
to develop a new map technology in black, white, and shades of gray.
As the cartographers worked out the new technology, the printers changed their
ways of reproducing both maps and photographs. In offset printing, texts and
headlines are pasted on a layout sheet. The printers photograph this sheet to get the
image from which they will make a press plate. This is fairly simple when the image
consists of black and white; the camera catches it all in one exposure. But the gray
tones in photographs that have to go on the press plate cause problems; the camera
cannot capture these tones accurately for the press plate at the same instant it registers
the black-white image of the type. In the old way of preparing a press plate that
included illustrations, the reproduction of photographs required extra camera work
and hand work after texts and headlines were photographed on the layout sheet.
Persisting with the old time-consuming way of putting photographs on the press plate
would have forced either an early deadline or a late press run. What the Daily needed
was a late deadline and an early press run.
To break through the time barrier, the Printing Services Division exploited the
photo-mechanical transfer process. What this amounts to is photographing a picture
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through a screen that breaks the gray tones into patterns of black dots. The image thus
produced, which in the process is reduced to one- or two-column size, can be pasted on
the layout sheet along with the type. The camera catches it all, the type and the
clusters of black dots that represent the pictures, in one exposure. To the camera eye
the screened pictures appear as black dots; to the human eye the black dots appear as
pictures, in tones of gray. The photo-mechanical transfer takes less time than
conventional photography, and the work is performed before the layout deadline. This
and other production innovations would help the Daily achieve one of its principal
goals: currency.
Headlines: Hazardous Journalistic Art
If the consumers were to take the intelligence newspaper seriously, the newspaper
had to present a serious appearance. This is more difficult to achieve in a tabloid than
in a newspaper of standard dimensions. In a tabloid, headlines do not have to get very
large and bold before they convey an image of sensationalism; yet headlines too small
and too light tend to resemble those in a mimeographed house organ.
When an over-simplification or a misleading term has slipped into the text of an
article, the discriminating reader often can make a quick interpretive adjustment that
corrects the error, so far as his own understanding is concerned. He finds, within the
balance of the article, information that keeps the message straight. He may pass over a
small deviation in the message, just as he may not notice a typographical error. But
when an over-simplification or a misleading term appears in a headline, even the most
discriminating reader may get the wrong message. If he reads only the headline, he will
retain only the misconception. If he reads the article, the errant headline still may have
left an impression so strong that it clouds the reader's perception of the message
conveyed in the text.
Distorted headlines, a problem in the commercial press, are a far more serious
problem when they affect the substance of national intelligence. Daily editors,
therefore, would have to pay particular attention to headline accuracy. It is difficult
under any circumstances to capture, in eight words, the essence of an 800-word article.
It is more difficult to write such a headline when the words must fit within a given
number of character spaces, and when various letters of the alphabet take up various
amounts of space. It is still more difficult to compose headlines of precision, both in
content and in length, when time is running out. Headline writing was one of the more
challenging journalistic arts the Daily editors would have to master.
More Resources Committed
From the first four experimental newspapers, OCI selected the elements that
would determine the appearance of a fifth sample. This one came close enough to the
mark so that OCI prepared a sixth, seventh, and eighth to be tried out on a few picked
consumers. The early indications of demand for the proposed new product were
positive enough to warrant committing more resources to the project.
In September, OCI assigned four pairs of editors to newspaper drills. The editors
would paw through the day's output of finished intelligence for regular publications,
reshape the drafts into newspaper articles, write headlines, design page layouts, and
rush the material into production. The trainees often discovered that a normal day's
output of finished intelligence did not quite fill a newspaper. Then they would scratch
up more. The editors had a word for their drills: frenzy.
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Initiating substantive intelligence officers into the techniques of journalism was
one problem; maintaining substantive depth and breadth was another. Each team,
therefore, would consist of a senior editor and an associate editor, each with a different
area of expertise. In assembling the editorial teams, OCI reached into the substantive
strength of all its division.
The Whip and the Wee Hours
With editors and production workers developing the skills that would give form to
the newspaper, it was time to bring analysts into the drills. Articles written especially
for the newspaper began to appear in the sample. Analysts, writing on deadline for
regularly scheduled publications, found themseleves called upon to write on deadline
for the newspaper, too. "Dry run" hardly seemed the appropriate term for exercises
that had so much sweat in them. Moreover, the whip kept cracking after the normal
close of business. Any morning newspaper with pretensions of currency must have
writers on the job well into the wee hours.
'i'he night of October 2-3, 1973, saw the first real-time drill. The troops went home
groggy in the morning, but they had put out a snappy newspaper, on time.
The analysts and editors had barely returned to normal business hours when war
erupted in the Middle East. War or no war, the newspaper dry runs ground on in every
aspect except, on three sample issues, the printing.
With form jelling, substance percolating, and the entire office running through
newspaper drills, it was time to bring in other heavy contributors of current
intelligence, principally the Office of Economic Research and the Office of Strategic
Research. With the scope of the newspaper project thus broadened, it was also time to
select a senior officer to manage Daily operations and articulate Daily doctrines.
One of this officer's first tasks was to explain newspaper writing style to the
analysts. In the old booklet style, a general statement introduced the topic, the
reporting came next, and the analysis concluded the article. In the new style, the
analytical clincher would appear high in the article, followed by the reporting in
paragraphs and sentences arranged in a descending order of importance. An orderly
arrangement of articles would require precise copy fitting. Any article might have to be
cut to fit. At deadline the cutting would be done with a knife, and the cuts would come
from the bottom.
Fresh Approach to Intelligence
In seminars with those who would be writing for the newspaper, editors went into
the rationale for the Daily-how it presented a fresh approach to intelligence; how
headline size and story placement could convey to readers the relative significance of
items more precisely than could the arrangement of similar items in booklets; how the
newspaper could incorporate maps and pictures more effectively and rapidly than
could booklets; how the problem-oriented background information that policy makers
need could get to them on a more timely basis in the newspaper than in publications
for specialists; how a carefully organized newspaper presentation could give policy
makers a daily intelligence briefing broad enough to touch on the major issues, current
enough to cover early-morning developments, deep enough to explore complicated
problems, and general enough to discuss a wide variety of topics.
Agency officials, meanwhile, briefed the policy makers on what they could expect
from the newspaper. The talking paper stressed readability, coverage, and currency. In
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The NID
pointing to what the reader could get from the newspaper, the talking paper
commented: "We could not provide the same choices in conventional ways without
confronting the reader with a formidable and unmanageable pile of papers every
morning."
The struggle for efficiency had produced dividends. The Daily could present more
information on less paper than could conventional intelligence publications. With
technical innovations that led to faster ways of reproducing pictures and maps, with
the installation of phototypesetting equipment, and with production flow systems that
were getting smoother, the Daily was winning the battle for currency. In the months
ahead it would scoop the morning metropolitan newspapers on events such as, the
Indian nuclear explosion and the coups in Portugal and Cyprus.
A Resolution of Contradictions
The great contradictions had been resolved. Who gets the newspaper is more
important than how many get the newspaper. The Daily's purpose is not to conform to
the newspaper stereotype of a mass circulation medium; it is to convey, with the
efficiency of a newspaper, intelligence to a few selected subscribers at the highest level
of government. The consumers can select what they want from the expanded
intelligence fare. For their purposes, scanning a newspaper is more efficient than
digging through a stack of booklets. The producers can triple the amount of what
normally goes into a generalized intelligence publication, and they can sustain the
quality. On mornings when intelligence of significance runs short, the Daily can
appear in a two-page version. The newspaper can select material prepared for other
purposes, and some material prepared for the newspaper can be disseminated in other
ways to consumers who do not receive the Daily.
Coordination can work, so long as it does not mire down in haggling over
commas. Astute editorial management can channel uneven production into steady
consumption. Consumers can be persuaded to give a new product a fair trial. A jacket
can replace a cover as a security mechanism. Those who are good at making booklets
also can teach themselves to be good at making a newspaper.
Staff and Publications Structure
In late November 1973, the DCI decided to proceed with the Daily on an
experimental basis. The laboratory newspapers had met with success. Still, OCI recog-
nized that the dry-run issues had had the benefit of novelty, of unusual attention, and
of stockpiled material. The real test would come when consumers depended upon the
Daily for their main intelligence fare, when contributors to the newspaper were
producing routinely, when night duty became a grind, and when material ran thin. To
prepare for the test, OCI established the National Intelligence Daily Staff with a chief
serving as managing editor of the Daily, a special assistant to the managing editor, and
four rotating editorial teams.
OCI revised the publications structure to provide:
-Material for the President and Vice President.
-The Daily for the Vice President, Cabinet members, the National
Security Council staff, and a few additional officers.
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-The Central Intelligence Bulletin, to be reconstituted with a larger
intelligence community input as the National Intelligence Bulletin,
for other policy-makers.'
-Semi-formal staff notes containing finished intelligence prepared by
OCI's divisions for specialized customers.
-The weekly intelligence publications.
For rapid response, spot reports disseminated electrically.
At year's end, construction men carved out office space for the Daily. In the first
week of January, 1974, those who had been drawn into the newspaper
project-analysts, cartographers, editors, publication typists, proofreaders, layout
men, printers, couriers-completed the production and in-house dissemination of four
final sample issues. After 33 dry runs, the Daily was ready to go to press for real,
Monday through Saturday, as long as its readers wanted it.
"An Experimental Publication"
On January 10, 1974, the first official edition of the Daily went to less than three
dozen principals in the White House, the Cabinet, the National Security Council, the
Department of State, and the Department of Defense. Vice President Ford headed the
list of subscribers. (The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
reported that President Nixon preferred no change in the way he received his
intelligence materials, and therefore would not read the intelligence paper.)
The Daily's own masthead labeled it "an experimental publication." It was
experimental not only for the producers but also for the consumers, who would require
time to get used to the unconventional presentation of intelligence, and who during
the experiment would receive no other kind of daily intelligence publication from CIA.
In spring it was time to discover whether the experiment had succeeded.
Questionnaires went to the readers. Did they find the Daily more accurate than the
Post and Times? Or less? More focused on policy issues? Or less? Merely repetitive?
Easier to read and digest? Or less? Did the readers scan the headlines and select? Read
the summary and select? Read the Daily cover to cover? Did they find the feature
articles useful? Did the Daily meet their daily intelligence needs except for longer
studies and estimates? Did the Daily offer the right balance between current reporting
and analytic treatment? Did coordination make the Daily more useful? Did they
prefer the Daily as is? With changes? A more conventional presentation of current
intelligence? A daily oral briefing?
By June the returns were in. Three fourths of the respondents were favorably
inclined toward the Daily.
Costs: Tangible and Intangible
The experiment had run up costs in OCI, with 12 people assigned to it full time
and heavy time requirements from analysts and line managers, including a skeleton
night shift. The project made waves that affected OER, OSR, OGCR, the Office of
Scientific Intelligence, the Office of Weapons Intelligence, the Central Reference
Service, and the Printing Service Division. Money costs were relatively small and
In May. 1976, the Bulletin was replaced with the National Intelligence Daily Cable, produced from
Daily articles.
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manageable. There were intangible costs in the memorandums and special reports that
analysts had not prepared because they were caught up in producing for the Daily,
and most important, there were substantial costs in human wear-and-tear.
Currency exacts a toll. Before the advent of the Daily, analysts generally could
complete their work during normal business hours. They might draw occasional night
duty as task force members in crisis periods, but for the most part they could wait until
the following morning to attend to things that occurred at night. This is not so with the
Daily, It requires reportorial and analytical updating through the night, six nights a
week, and that requires the presence of night representatives from each of the five
divisions of OCI as well as from OER and the Regional Analysis Division of OSR. That
much analytical manpower at night means less analytical manpower available during
the day. Night duty also has physical side effects, creates analytical continuity gaps,
and disrupts schedules to a degree that can be irritating.
The Daily requires firm editing, and this can bruise analysts. An OCI
memorandum observed:
"Editors, like death and taxes, will be with us always and will attract the
same measure of affection. The Daily by its nature requires the attention of
more editors than any other publication OCI has ever produced. This fact has
magnified an old OCI bugbear-levels of editorial review... .
Some characteristics of the editing on the Daily are common to other
OCI publications, some are quite different. The main differences are: The
Daily processes a far larger amount of copy each day, and the greater part of
the processing takes place after the normal working day. The Daily also
introduces headlines and layout, along with the peculiar problems of finite
space. .. .
The late nature of much of the work on the Daily means that, compared
to the Bulletin and the Weekly, the analyst has lost a measure of control over
his product. He cannot, for example, take part in writing a headline for his
story unless he is prepared to stay around half the night. He may not see the
final edited version of his story... .
"Textual editing will frequently seem capricious to the author, and some
of it will even seem brutal... .
There was no magic wand to make such problems go away. In June 1974,
weighing the costs against the results, OCI recommended that the DCI establish the
Daily as CIA's primary periodical for the policy-level officer. The DCI accepted the
recommendation, and the "experimental publication" label went off the Daily's
masthead.
Character of the Daily
Each issue of the Daily carries the intelligence that the editors believe will prove
most useful to policy makers that day. No edition could be considered typical, but any
could illustrate the kinds of things the Daily offers.
For example, the Daily on May 17, 1976 offered five items of intelligence on
page 1:
-An analysis of a Chinese leftist pronouncement commemorating the
tenth anniversary of the opening of the Cultural Revolution.
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--A judgment that the growth rate for industrial production in the
USSR this year will be the lowest since the end of World War 11 if first-
quarter trends continue.
-A report on Syria's severe financial setback, caused by a temporary
suspension of subsidy payments by Saudi Arabia and other Arab donors, the
recent cut-off of oil pipeline transit payments by Iraq, and the cost of Syrian
operations in Lebanon-estimated at $750,000 a day.
--A discussion of Moscow's attitude toward Syria's policy in Lebanon.
--A situation report on Lebanon.
The Daily devoted pages 2 and 3 to:
--A feature on EC relations with the Arab states.
---A feature on Botswana's policy toward Rhodesia.
--The outlook for the Free Democrats in West Germany.
--Observations on the similarity between the assassination of the
Bolivian ambassador to France in May 1976 and the murder of the
Uruguayan military attaches in France in December 1974.
- An assessment of the Peruvian president's campaign to shift his
government to a more centrist position.
Page 4 carried the continuations of three articles from page 1, plus:
- -The reactions of Italy's non-Communist parties to Communist chief
Berlinguer's call for the creation, after the election in June, of an emergency
government consisting of all parties except the neo-fascists.
-Discussion of a statement on the Eritrean problem by the chairman of
Ethiopia's ruling military council.
-Reporting on arrangements for Cuba to train Jamaican police officers
in techniques to counter urban guerrilla warfare.
Other items of intelligence available for the issue of May 17, 1976, were set into
type but were not published, because of space limitations. These items were held as
"overset," available for publication at a later date,
Just as strong players on the bench give a football team depth, so solid items in
"overset" give the Daily a reservoir of material that it can play at the appropriate time.
Analysts, naturally, prefer to see their articles played immediately rather than to have
them placed for a day or two in "overset," which they view as limbo. Editors, on the
other hand, see great utility in "overset." It increases their options and sharpens the
selectivity process. They can draw from it and replenish it-that is, have their cache
and eat it, too. "Overset," properly managed, helps reconcile uneven production with
steady consumption.
The Daily has some of the content of other intelligence publications, but differs
from them in form; it has some of the form of commercial newspapers, but differs from
them in content.
The Daily was never intended to compete with or duplicate the commercial press
on foreign news coverage, for it does not have the space to do so. Still, it must be more
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current than the commercial press in covering significant foreign news developments,
for that is what its readers require of it. In achieving currency, the Daily has notable
advantages:
-Classified information, which often can illuminate a development
earlier and more precisely than can information from open sources.
-Analytical expertise, which can detect the significance of a situation
before such knowledge comes to public attention.
-Deadlines four or five hours later than those under which commercial
morning newspapers operate.
The latter advantage is a dividend of technological innovations that whack
sizable chunks off the production time required between deadline and the start on the
press run. It is a dividend, also, of the Daily's small circulation. The fewer the copies,
the less time on the press and in packaging and distribution.
The Daily's function, that which distinguishes it from the commercial press, goes
much farther than scoring incidental scoops on foreign news developments. The Daily
focuses finished, all-source, national intelligence on U.S. foreign policy issues for a
select readership-the officials who have to contend with policy problems. Whenever
possible, the Daily must do more than tell the policy maker what happened yesterday;
it must tell him what is likely to happen tomorrow, and why. Part of the Daily's
analytical service to the policy maker is selectivity-not burdening him with articles
that have no bearing on policy.
It is one thing to aim at a target, and another to hit it. If the Daily errs, it runs a
correction. A newspaper cannot hide its blemishes; it can improve only when those
responsible are alerted to the errors they have made, The Daily does not have the
option of printing several morning editions and correcting in later press runs those
errors that occurred in the first edition. It has to strive to be right the first time.
One Day and Night in the Life of the Daily
The Daily cycle begins with the cables and reports that constitute the raw
material of intelligence. Analysts scan the material and propose articles. These
proposals, developed in branch and division sessions, emerge as items in a budget put
together during a planning meeting at 1100.2 It is not enough that an analyst propose,
say, an item on relations between Pakistan and Bangladesh; he must estimate, also, the
number of column inches that item will require in the Daily.' These column-inch
estimates, when totaled, give the editors an idea of what volume to expect and
contribute to decisions on what must get into the next edition, and what can wait
another day or so. The editors, meanwhile, inform the cartographers of map
requirements and scout out picture possibilities through the Central Reference Service.
Coordination of a draft within the intelligence community takes place while the
editors work over the draft for publication in the Daily. Either process can make sparks
fly. A disagreement in coordination can result in publication of a dissenting view. In
the normal course of business, however, what emerges from coordination and editing is
z Representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency participate in
the planning meeting and assist with draft coordination throughout the afternoon. A representative of the
Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, also works on coordination in the Daily offices
during the afternoon.
2At this writing, the Daily has not converted its length estimates from inches to centimeters.
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a draft that accurately and succinctly expresses the views of the intelligence
community on a given problem.
Shortly after 1800, senior OCI officers conduct an editorial meeting in the Daily
offices. A representative of the White House Support Staff participates. Out of this
session come decisions on what the Daily and other publications will carry, and what
play the most important articles will get. This meeting also produces suggestions
on features for future editions. Bylined features that probe more comprehensively into
significant problems have become one of the Daily's principal qualitative strong
points, as well as a quantitative mainstay in the grind of Monday-through-Saturday
publication.
After the other evening editorial conference participants have left, the Daily's
senior editor carries out the policy decisions and, when developments so require,
changes policy. A senior editor and an assistant editor work from 1200 to 2200. Another
senior editor and two assistant editors arrive at 2100 to take the overnight tour. Cable
editors are on duty from 1000 to 0130. Seven analysts remain on night duty.
In late afternoon, publication typists begin recording drafts on tape for the
phototypesetting machine. The machinery clacks and buzzes through the night as the
production staff catches up with the day's editorial output and keeps abreast of the
revisions, updates, and new items that the night representatives contribute. The
Operations Center keeps the traffic flowing, and the Senior Night Duty Officer alerts
the editors and night representatives to significant developments. Printers, meanwhile,
make screened prints of photographs and merge map plates into camera-ready form.
The substance of national intelligence comes forth as texts and illustrations on dozens
of pieces of paper.
The next task: to give form to substance, to integrate dozens of pieces of paper
into a tightly organized whole. It is, says an editor, like having to write a sonnet.
By midnight, the editors know which articles are contending for publication,
approximately how long the articles are, and what priorities the articles have. They
know, too, the nature and size of the available illustrations. They have estimates of the
significance and length of some articles still under preparation. They do not know
what might happen at 0400 to change things. Still, they must proceed, and within a
rigid deadline structure maintain some measure of flexibility to cope with what might
happen at 0400. One of the assistant editors, a specialist in such work, designs the page
layout-pages 2 and 3 first, pages 1 and 4 last.
The designer sketches a dummy showing where each article should go and the size
of the headline it should have. As the layout man begins pasting the articles into place,
the editors write the headlines to size. The headlines, produced on the
phototypesetting machine, then are pasted into the openings the layout man has left
for them. When articles do not fit, knives flash and bottom sentences fall. Shortly
before 0300, the page 2-3 layout goes to the Special Printing Plant. There, the printers
photograph it, make a press plate, and start the run on the Miehle press.
With pages 2 and 3 coming off the press, layout work proceeds on pages 1 and 4.
These pages can stay open for revisions and additions until after 0430. Then the page
1-4 layout goes to the Special Printing Plant. The printers make the page 1-4 press
plate, flip over the completed page 2-3 stack, and start printing page 1-4 on the other
side. As the newspapers come off the press in flat sheets at 0600, the printers fold them.
Registry Branch couriers slip the newspapers into jackets, and then into envelopes and
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briefcases, for delivery. The "whisch-whisch" of the Miehle press has barely subsided
before the couriers' cars head down the George Washington Parkway.
Another Daily-7,000 words of national intelligence incorporating the broad and
the deep with the latest-is on the way to the policy makers. Copy No. 1 goes to
President Ford, who continued his subscription when he moved to the White House.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE;
BODYGUARD OF LIES. By Anthony Cave Brown. (Harper & Row, New York, 1975.
947 pp.)
The rather improbable title of this book-an outstanding example of what might
perhaps best be described as scholarly investigative journalism applied to the field of
oral' military history-finds its origins in the following Churchill quotation:
"In war-time, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a
bodyguard of lies."
While ostensibly a narrative description of the role of "Bodyguard," the Anglo-
American deception effort in support of military operations against Hitler in World
War II, it is also a litany of compelling illustrations of the application of intelligence
(both human and military) and special operations in the winning of the war in the
West. Perhaps its greatest virtue is that it is the first detailed open-literature
presentation of an integrated view of both the political and military aspects of warfare
as expressed in deception and, specifically, of the contributions made by "special
means" to the achievement of strategic and tactical surprise before, during and after
the Normandy invasion.
Written largely from a British viewpoint, the book presents warfare as a vast game
of ploy and counterploy engaged in by small groups of high-level planners and
executives, men of great sensitivity and intelligence, who were striving to optimize the
effectiveness of limited resources (the British), while cooperating with a massive and
dynamic ally (the Americans), the latter impatient to get the job done as expeditiously
as possible and with only limited regard for the niceties of how or at what cost.
It is the story of a vast, interlocking conspiracy between the British, the Americans
and, during the invasion period itself, even the Russians, to deceive Hitler and the
German military leadership as to the time, place, and manner in which the invasion of
western Europe would take place. (For reasons of security, the French were forced to
play the role of silent partner, something for which de Gaulle was never to forgive
either Britain or America.) The centerpiece of this effort was the attempt to dupe Hitler
into believing that the main Allied effort would be made against the Pas de Calais of
France, and to sustain this belief even after the real attack had been launched against
Normandy. The remarkable success of this monumental deception is well known.
What the author has done for us here, in a very accomplished manner, is to present the
major elements of the story in both human and institutional terms.
A mere review cannot begin to do justice to the richness of example afforded by
this detailed compendium of descriptions of organizations, plans, operations, incidents
'Although Cave Brown made extensive use of published material and some limited use of official
records, his heavy reliance on personal interviews in support of key elements of his presentation is felt to
justify the reviewer's use of the term "oral history" in describing this work.
MORI/HRP
from pg. 53-64
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and personalities. Whether it concerns the sacrifices and failures resulting from the
need to preserve the security of the source of Ultra2 data, as in the decision not to warn
the town of Coventry that it was to be bombed, or the initial defeat of the British 8th
Army in North Africa because its then commanding general could not be told that the
intelligence concerning Rommel's impending attack was absolutely accurate, or the
many deceptions, stratagems, and special operations mounted in support of
Bodyguard and its subordinate elements, the book abounds in fascinating and
seemingly authoritative descriptions of events and situations. A multitude of errors of
detail arise from the author's need to rely on secondary sources, personal interviews
with participants in events long after the fact, and only limited access to official
records (even that only after the majority of his writing had been completed). It would
appear, however, that the main outlines of the story have been accurately preserved.
There are numerous neat little examples of the use of Ultra intelligence to defeat
the enemy on the field of battle, as in the case of Montgomery's victory at El Alamein,
and in the winning of the Battle of the Atlantic through destruction of the U-boat
resupply system and-eventually-the U-boats themselves. Then there were the vital
contributions of Ultra to air warfare in the winning of the Battle of Britain, and in
permitting the British to mount such an effective (if vain) defense of Crete against the
German paratroop and glider forces that Hitler lost faith in airborne warfare and used
these specially trained troops as infantry in future operations. All of this is presented in
engrossing detail.
Much attention is given to critical tactical aspects of the Normandy invasion
through the breakout phase and into the early stages of the battle for northern France.
The use of Ultra intelligence to determine German plans and movements as a basis for
the application of both conventional and unconventional means in the isolation of the
battlefield is set forth in great detail. Always in the background is the necessity to
maintain the credibility of the threat to attack the Pas de Calais, so that the German
15th Army would continue to be held in reserve in that area and would, as a
consequence, not figure in the Normandy operations. The use of XX-Committee3
double agents contributed importantly to this deception. Hundreds of special forces
teams were employed at strategic points around the periphery of the battle area, either
to act on their own or to guide the actions of local resistance elements in harassing and
delaying German infantry and armored forces trying to reach Normandy from Brittany
and from south-central France.
The futile efforts of the Schwarze Kapelle,' the abortive high-level German
resistance movement against Hitler that functioned throughout the war and received
significant support from Admiral Canaris' Abwehr (military counterintelligence), is
treated in considerable detail, particularly in relationship to Anglo-American
planning. While the conspiracy purportedly provided some important intelligence
inputs and unwittingly served the British as a cover for Ultra in some instances, no
evidence is presented that this conspiracy was taken seriously and exploited in a major
positive fashion by the deception planners. The author is clearly of the opinion that
opportunities were lost in the non-utilization of the Schwarze Kapelle. British sources
'The British security codeword used to designate compartmented signals intelligence.
'The coordinating body, supported by MI-5, responsible for organizing the employment of a select
group of "doubled" German agents in deception operations (see J. C. Masterman, The Double-Cross System
in the War of 1939-1945, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1972.)
'The term of opprobrium reportedly used by Reinhard Heydrich, head of the intelligence and
counterintelligence operations of the SS, to designate the file on the German officer conspiracy (see Walter
Schellenberg. The Schellenberg Memoirs, Deutsch, London, 1956.)
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have subsequently claimed that the role of the Schwarze Kapelle in Anglo-American
deception activities has been greatly exaggerated.'
A most interesting and significant example of the effects of deception (and of self-
deception) presented by the author concerns Col. von Roenne, the able head of
Fremde Heere West (FHW), the Wehrmacht intelligence agency responsible for
appreciations of Allied threats to the German forces in western Europe. This officer
who, incidentally, was also a member of the Schwarze Kapelle, was the western front
counterpart to General Gehlen in the East. Since he was responsible for military
estimates relative to the anticipated invasion of, France, his office became one of the
main targets of Bodyguard's deception operations. The Allies were able to deceive him
into overestimating their forces in England through a variety of stratagems involving
leaks and double-agent disinformation actions, supported by Ultra intercepts that
permitted monitoring and estimation of the effects of their efforts,
Thus, after the Sicherheitsdienst (the SD or secret intelligence service of the SS)
had become dominant over German military intelligence early in 1944, Col. von
Roenne learned that they were halving his estimates of Allied forces in England before
passing them on to higher headquarters. On the advice of his assistant, who the author
suggests may actually have been a British agent, Col. von Roenne was supposedly
persuaded with reluctance to double his estimates of these forces. When the SD
subsequently ceased their editing of his figures, the overestimation of Allied strength
became very greatly magnified, thereby providing support to the London Controlling
Section's mythical scenarios of large forces being held in readiness in northern and
southeastern England. If true, this must have contributed in no small measure to the
successful deception of Hitler which resulted in retention of the 15th Army in the Pas
de Calais area long after the attack on Normandy.'
The general cover and deception plan for Overlord' was originally called Plan
Jael and, subsequently, simply Bodyguard. Bodyguard would attempt to persuade the
German leadership to believe the following six strategic considerations: (1) The Allies
had so much faith in the decisive character of the combined bombing and would give
it such high priority that the buildup of ground forces would be too slow to permit an
invasion until July of 1944, if one were intended at all that year; (2) German forces had
to be held where they were in western Europe because there were troops ready in
'H. R.Trevor-Roper, the distinguished Oxford historian and a WW II member of MI-6, in a quite
biased and highly unfavorable review of this book (See New York Review of Books, 19 February 1976),
asserts that Stewart Menzies, WW II head of MI-6, from whom Cave Brown obtained important aspects of
the Schwarze Kapelle and MI-6 portions of the book, was by the time of the interview senile and eager for self-
aggrandizement. Trevor-Roper's own objectivity is open to question when he claims that Cave Brown has
made M I-6 the controlling element of British deception efforts in which the role of the Schwarze Kapelle has
been grossly inflated. This is an exaggerated interpretation of admittedly erroneous tendencies on the part of
the author, through which Trevor-Roper attempts to show that the book contains fundamental
misperceptions, but Trevor-Roper's credentials as a participant in some of the events under consideration
cannot be ignored when it comes to matters of factual detail. He points out many such errors, strengthening
this reviewer's impression that this is the book's basic failing, arising out of the author's limited access to
primary source material, his lack of background in the area of intelligence, and his journalistic compulsion to
present a readable story, however fragmentary the available data.
'There is evidence that this fascinating story may have been considerably exaggerated. Gert Buchheit,
in Spionage in Zwei Weltkriegen (Verlag Politisches Archiv, Landshut, Bundesrepublik, 1975,) criticizes the
much less explicit treatment of von Roenne by Ladislas Farago (Game of the Foxes, David McKay Co., Inc.,
New York, 1971.) Specifically, Buchheit disputes the central role of Col. von Roenne in intelligence
estimating, noting that he was located in OKH (Army HQ,) while the estimates of enemy capabilities which
carried weight with German policy makers were being provided by OKW (Armed Forces HQ.)
'The overall Allied plan for the invasion of western Europe.
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England to take advantage of any weakening of German garrisons; (3) there would be
a joint Anglo-American-Russian attack on various parts of Norway in the spring of
1944; (4) the main Allied effort in the spring of 1944 would be against the Balkans; (5)
the Russians would not begin their summer offensive before the end of June; and (6)
the requisite Allied force for a cross-Channel assault would not be trained and ready
until the summer-in any event, the western powers would not launch their offensive
until after the Russians had opened their main summer offensive.
The broad strategic deceptions of Bodyguard included some 36 subordinate plans
and scores of associated stratagems. Elaborate deceptions were involved, which were
designed to threaten Norway, the Pas de Calais, and the Biscay and Mediterranean
coasts of France, their object being-in conjunction with continuing threats to the
Balkans and the existing military operations in Italy-to tie down German forces in
those areas before, during, and after Neptune.' In addition to these stratagems,
Bodyguard proposed to mount a large diplomatic and political offensive to induce, or
at least suggest, the possibility of defection of Finland, Hungary, Rumania, and
Bulgaria. A similar campaign, which would also include economic warfare, would be
launched to persuade the neutrals-Sweden, Turkey, Portugal, and Spain-to enter
the conflict on the Allied side, or to compel them to cut their links with Germany. And,
finally, a massive campaign of political warfare would be directed at the occupied
countries and at the Third Reich itself.9
While Bodyguard became the formal responsibility of General Eisenhower, its
operational coordination rested with a small group of British establishment
personalities (with one American representative) known as the London Controlling
Section (LCS) within Allied Supreme Headquarters. Many members of this group saw
themselves as representing the last vestiges of British tradition. As a consequence, they
had little difficulty in convincing themselves that they were fully justified in waiving
the rules in this life-or-death struggle with the Hun. This group, operating at the
highest levels of security, and with full access to Ultra intelligence, exercised general
guidance and coordination of the various Committees of Special Means (CSM)
located within the major war planning staffs of the Allied forces. The element within
the joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington was known as joint Security Control (JSC).
While Cave Brown does not make the point with clarity, the CSMs were directly
responsible for the planning and control of deception operations within their own
commands.
LCS had "A-Force" in the Mediterranean, and similar bureaus in the Near East,
India, and Southeast Asia through which to exercise its influence on military
operations. The contributions of the Soviet government to Bodyguard and Fortitude10
would be arranged by the British and American military missions in Moscow. (A
formal protocol between the Allies and the Russians, to cover cooperation during the
invasion period, was signed at the beginning of March, 1944, and was ended by the
Russians six months later.) When their services were required, all MI-6, SOE, and OSS
agents in the field were available to the LCS, as were the deception sections in the
Allied army groups, the various British and American economic and political warfare
agencies, the British Foreign Office, and the American State Department. The
"'The sub-element of Overlord concerned with the invasion of Normandy.
It should be pointed out that only a limited number of the deceptions envisaged in the early planning
were implemented, a fact which Cave Brown fails to make clear. He was obviously led astray to a certain
extent by overreliance on early planning documents.
'n Fortitude was the overall project for deceptions aimed at convincing the Germans that notional Allied
forces in the UK were poised to land at points other than Normandy.
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controlled double agents of the XX-Committee were to play an important role in
support of the effort, as well. In the words of the author, "deception had become a
major industry."
While specific examples of particular controversial aspects of this book will be
discussed below, it seems worthwhile to bring up at this point a general criticism of the
book's implied theme that the LCS served as the coordinator of all Allied deception
operations. While it probably maintained cognizance of all such operations in order to
avoid duplications of effort, inadvertent disclosures of policy, etc., it certainly did not
possess the capability for conceiving, planning, and executing the myriads of
strategems and deceptions that came into being in support of Allied efforts. Even in
the military field, it had to relinquish responsibility to the field commands for the
generation of local deception activity.
That LCS concerned itself with the deception planning in support of Overlord
cannot be disputed. Another organization which preceded it into existence by several
years, however, was responsible for many high-level stratagems and deceptions in both
the political and military realms. This was the British Security Coordination (BSC)
under Sir William Stephenson, which reported directly to Winston Churchill," Con-
ceived as a coordinating body for all British intelligence, counterintelligence, and
special operations in the days when the very survival of Britain was open to serious
question, this operation was set up in New York City in 1940.
It subsequently expanded to encompass a staff of some 2000 individuals (1,000 of
them in New York City), with a major communications center and extensive facilities
in Ontario, Canada, for the training of operational personnel and the development
and manufacture of special equipment. It was provided with full access to Ultra
intelligence and, through Stephenson, served as a key link between Churchill and
Roosevelt in the uncertain days prior to U.S. entrance into the war against the Axis.
An important early function of BSC was to provide the American president with
detailed information on Fascist activities directed against the United States, which
served to justify his approval of unofficial U.S. cooperation with Britain against
Germany. Moreover, once the United States was involved in the war, such intelligence
helped to assure that a major share of the U.S. military effort was directed toward
Europe. Among the most important contributions of BSC during this early period were
its efforts in support of the creation of the Office of the Coordinator of Information
(COI), 12 with William Donovan as its head.
Although the role of BSC as an intelligence coordinating body diminished after
Pearl Harbor, as the position of Britain became less precarious and that nation became
transformed into a mammoth staging area for an eventual return to the European
mainland, the organization continued to perform important intelligence functions,
particularly with respect to the security of the Western Hemisphere. Through the scant
attention which he gives to British Security Coordination in his massive tome, Cave
Brown reveals his ignorance of large areas of WW II intelligence history, and of the
scope of British intelligence activities in particular. He mentions BSC only once, and
then incorrectly, as the MI-6 organization in New York City.
There are many positive features of this ambitious work, aside from the above
criticism and the many minor errors of detail inevitable in a creative work of this size
"William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York, 1976.)
`The first U.S. central intelligence activity, which preceded and gave birth to the Office of Strategic
Services. See Thomas F. Troy, "The COI and British Intelligence," Studies in Intelligence XVIII-1-
Supplement.
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(i.e., dates, titles of offices, descriptions of events, translations of German terms, etc.),
based so heavily on secondary references and the oral testimony of individuals long
after the events in question-to say nothing of the limitations imposed by security. A
number of debatable or controversial matters, however, should be mentioned.
For one thing, the extent of the responsibility of Ultra, deception, and special
means for the success of the Normandy invasion is open to at least some question on
general principles. The author himself attributes much of the element of tactical
surprise to the relaxation of German vigilance because of the unfavorable weather
immediately prior to and during the early portion of the invasion. Moreover,
intelligence and surprise are generally conceded by military authorities to constitute
only a moderate portion of the prerequisites for success in battle, despite the fact that
they can be decisive in some cases, as the author would have us believe was true in this
instance. While there is little doubt that losses would have been much greater and
success would probably have been delayed had there been no Bodyguard, to call it
decisive may be journalistic exaggeration.
The tendency of the author to use the terms Ultra and Magic interchangeably is
regarded as an oversimplification by American code-breaking specialists. The author
tends to excuse use of the term by Bodyguard personnel as a means of cover for the
Ultra effort, certainly an understandable justification. Thus, prior to the Anglo-
American intelligence collaboration in 1941, the American Magic code-breaking effort
against the Japanese had proceeded along quite different lines, largely independent of
the British Ultra activity. This was despite the common origins of German and
Japanese encoding equipment in early forms of Enigma which were commercially
available in Europe in the 1920s. While Cave Brown fails to note the close
collaboration between the two efforts that was initiated prior to Pearl Harbor,13 he
does pay tribute to American contributions to Bodyguard through signals intercept
activity against the Japanese at Asmara, Ethiopia. There, the radio-teleprinter
communications of the Japanese ambassador to Germany were being read regularly to
reveal high-level German military and political planning information. Presumably,
Magic was involved here, rather than Ultra.
The occasional air of condescension about the author's descriptions of the British
origins of deception thinking and direction, and the supposed general deterioration of
deception efforts when Eisenhower took over the Allied command after the Normandy
invasion, is somewhat annoying. 14 One receives the distinct impression that the author
feels there would have been no coordinated deception activity had the British-and
Churchill in particular-not created the magnificent Bodyguard instrument. While
parhaps true in terms of the overall concept, tactical deception would certainly have
been included in Allied military planning whether or not LCS had ever existed. Debate
on this point is bound to be inconclusive and is probably pointless. It would seem to be
more a question of degree than of the likelihood of existence or non-existence of
deception and special means, had Churchill not introduced the idea.
The author's claim that Cicero,15 the valet of the British ambassador to Turkey
who delivered many of that gentleman's secret papers to the Germans, was actually
under the control of MI-6 as a deception operation, seems implausible, although there
are other indications that this may have been true toward the end of Cicero's tenure.
Thus, despite the reported assertion of the former head of MI-6, Stewart Menzies, to
"'Stevenson, op. cit.
t4 For one thing, deception's greatest role is played prior to the battle.
The code-name assigned to this spy by German intelligence.
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the author, that Cicero had been under British control, and certain circumstantial
evidence which the author adduces in support of the claim, it defies imagination to
believe that Overlord planning documents would have been unilaterally leaked to the
Germans by the British simply to convince the former of the overwhelming strength of
the Allies in preparation for the invasion. The fortuitous circumstance that the German
secret services (the SD in this case) did not believe the information and made no use of
it could certainly not have been foreseen by LCS.16 The inherent self-serving character
of this story is so apparent that it requires much more proof than Cave Brown advances
to justify its acceptance.
The author's story of the British acquisition of an Enigma machine from Poland is
certainly open to question. However, given that there are at least six supposedly
authoritative versions of this controversial issue, it scarcely seems profitable to argue
the pros and cons of any particular one. The true story will have to await some official
history of the events concerned. The main points of difference among the various
versions concern the role of French intelligence in bringing the British and Polish
intelligence forces together in 1939 to exploit Polish access to an Enigma device. Thus,
despite the claims presented by the French intelligence officer, General Bertrand, in his
book Enigma," to the effect that he brought the British and Polish code-breakers
together, there is recent evidence18 that the British may have been in secret contact
with the Poles with respect to Enigma as early as 1938. There is general agreement,
however, that the British did not bring a model of the Enigma machine back from
Poland until mid-1939.
One mystery in Cave Brown's version is his apparent acceptance of Bertrand's
book and his use of it in support of many arguments and discussions related to code-
breaking, while at the same time he ignores the description Bertrand gives of the
French acquisition of Enigma. Instead Cave Brown seems to favor the version
advanced by the former French intelligence officer Garder, which is presented in the
appendix of Bertrand's book but repudiated by Bertrand as completely false. To
compound the mystery, Cave Brown chooses to support his approach by quoting an
issue of Die Nachhut (The Rear Guard), the publication of former members of the
Abwehr, which also favors the Garder version. As neither story now seems likely to be
accepted by historians as the true one, the matter has become somewhat academic.
Cave Brown does, however, reveal a considerable measure of confusion on this subject.
The author is on somewhat less controversial ground when he claims that
Enigma-derived information was not shared with the Russians. At least three sources 19
maintain, however-albeit without any supporting evidence-that such information
was indeed made available to the Russians without letting them know the actual
source, using Roessler (i.e., "Lucy"), of Buero Ha20 in Switzerland as a cut-out to
Rado, - the chief Soviet intelligence agent in Switzerland, whose main radio operator
was the possible British double agent, Alexander Foote. The chief question here seems
to be whether Buero Ha, an adjunct of the Swiss military intelligence organization
10Gert Buchheit, op. cit.
'Gustav Bertrand, Enigma (Librairie Pion, Paris, 1973).
"Stevenson, op. cit.
19Richard Deacon, A History of the British Secret Service (Frederick Mueller, London, 1969;) Malcolm
Muggeridge, The Infernal Grove (William Morrow, New York, 1974;) and Charles Whiting, The Battle for
Twelveland (Lee Cooper, London, 1975.)
20 Roessler, code-named Lucy, provided information which purported to come from the highest German
government circles to the Soviet Resident, Rado, through one of Rado's subordinate agents. It is suspected
that Roessler actually received the information from the organization of Major Hausamann of Swiss
intelligence known as Buero Ha, for which Roessler worked. (c.f. Whiting, op. cit.)
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with a semi-official pre-war status, was the real source of Roessler's information and, if
so, whether Buero Ha obtained its information from Germany or from the British. To
date, this remains an open question.
The great detail presented on the so-called Schwarze Kapelle suggests a heavy
reliance on German source material. Comments on the misuse of German dissidents
and the loss of opportunities to avert the need of an invasion of Europe also have a
somewhat German flavor. The author leaves us with the feeling that the British never
took the German dissident movement seriously and, lacking any real understanding or
trust of it, used it without compunction as a cover for the source for Ultra material and
for other deception purposes. Whether any useful information was obtained from the
Schwarze Kapelle is left an open question. A more recent book21 confirms that the
British never really trusted Admiral Canaris and his associates and that it was left to
the Americans, working through the OSS in Switzerland, to exploit this doubtful
source.
The tone of condescension of the book toward the American war leadership is
perhaps inevitable in a work so dependent on British sources. For example, attribution
of the concept of "Unconditional Surrender" to an off-hand statement by President
Roosevelt when he could not think of anything better to say is open to serious question.
According to most accounts, Henry Morgenthau is supposed to have had something to
do with originating this uncompromising policy. The impression that the Americans
were lacking in sophistication in the matter of deception comes through frequently, as
does the low opinion of the capacities of Generals Marshall and Eisenhower held by
the British military leadership. Actually, the tone of the book with regard to U.S. lack
of sophistication is mild in comparison with that of the history of British Security
Coordination mentioned earlier. 22 Near the end of his presentation, Cave Brown tries
to balance the story on Marshall in the matter of the cross-Channel invasion
controversy by noting the existence of German contingency plans to withdraw from
France in 1943, observing that Marshall may have been right after all to press for an
early invasion of France over British opposition. Other more official histories of the
British point of view during that period remain umcompromising in their opposition to
an invasion of western Europe in 1943.23 Another bone of contention arising out of
different British and American strategic perceptions which comes in for frequent
comment is the special interest of the British in the eastern end of the Mediterranean
and Churchill's desire for an attack on the Balkans.
The sources of German tactical surprise in May 1940 and December 1944 come in
for considerable discussion. It is suggested that the Ultra capability was not fully
operable in the first case and that over-reliance was placed on it in the second case. It is
also suggested that the Germans may have become aware of the compromise of
Enigma before the Battle of the Bulge, thereby accounting for the employment of
radio silence by the German commander, Marshal von Rundstedt, during the period
prior to the attack. The author advances the view that a trusted member of the Dutch
underground and purported confidant of Prince Bernhard, operating under the code
name King Kong, had been doubled by the Germans and revealed the secret of Ultra
to them. No explanation of the highly improbable access of either Prince Bernhard or
King Kong to Ultra intelligence is offered by Cave Brown .21
Stevenson, op. cit.
Ibid.
2 Ibid.
11 Indeed, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, has recently repudiated this story and threatened to sue
the author.
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Whether von Rundstedt simply chose to maintain radio silence to further the
deception he was pursuing as to the number of divisions facing the Americans in
eastern Belgium, or whether he suspected the truth, is, of course, open to debate.
Certainly, the Germans went back to the use of Enigma after the beginning of the
Bulge action. Flicke25 offers as an explanation for the German ability to achieve
surprise the lack of German-speaking American agents behind the German lines (luring
a transition period in combat. This reported lack of rear-area radio traffic is consistent
with the claim made in the official OSS history26 that at the time of the Battle of the
Bulge, the First Army (U.S.) was the only army without an OSS field detachment.
Flicke, a former lieutenant-colonel in the Funkabwehr (signal security service,) notes
the absence of agent broadcasts from within the German lines after October 1944, as
the Allied forces in northern France left French-speaking areas behind in their advance
to the borders of Germany. He gives no hint of any German suspicion that Enigma had
been compromised, and he certainly should have been in a position to know such
information. The author offers the explanation that even if it had been suspected that
Enigma was no longer safe, it would not have been feasible-given the disrupted state
of German signal communications after Normandy-to have made a fundamental
change in encipherment techniques. On the face of it, this is a rather facile and
unconvincing argument.
In view of the many evidences of inconsistency, controversy, and simple errors of
fact in this book, of which only a few have been cited here, it seems appropriate to
inquire into the author's sources of information. For one thing, given official British
reluctance to cooperate with the author, to what extent are the interviews with British
sources entitled to belief? Has the author deliberately withheld material at official
request and, if so, to what extent is the accuracy of the presentation affected thereby?
Thus, the author admits that the text was nearly complete before he gained access to
declassified U.S. information. The majority of the writing must, therefore, have been
based on oral interviews with individuals concerning events far in the past and on a
study of secondary references, mainly in the form of openly published intelligence
literature, a notoriously unreliable source of information. How objective was the
author able to be when it came down to a decision between U.S. and British views of a
particular issue? Was the author's discovery that people opened up to him more, the
more he seemed to know about a subject, really evidence of openness on the part of
respondents, or was the author being used by some of those being interviewed,
particularly those with a British or German orientation? Only a detailed analysis of
source material can provide answers to questions such as these.
A number of general points arise after reading this extensive work on the role of
deception and special means in warfare, some of which may even be catalogued under
the designation of "lessons learned." The first and most obvious of these is what the
book's revelations do to the credibility of histories of WW II prepared with access to
the conventional source material only, such as press accounts and memoirs. While it
does little to the chronicle of events, it plays havoc with the validity of analytical
appraisals of cause and effect, particularly, appreciations of the reasons for the
outcomes of battles. We are in the position of the historians who have, over the
decades, commented glowingly on the inherent superiority of the German army at
Tannenberg at the outset of WW I, when in fact the Germans had been listening to
Russian radio traffic broadcast in the clear, and knew all of the latter's order of battle
"William F. Flicke, War Secrets in the Ether, NSA 1953-1954 (OUO.)
26War Report-Office of Strategic Services (OSS), Vol. 2, Washington, D.C., 1949 (Declassified.)
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and planning secrets (a situation which, incidentally, did not change materially when
the Russians subsequently introduced a primitive system of encipherment).27
Another question is, of course, why, having all of this detailed knowledge of
German order of battle and planning through Ultra and other sources, the Allies did
not do a better job of beating the Germans. While the text presents numerous examples
as to why, the question really goes to the basic contribution of intelligence to success in
battle and the qualifications of the Germans as military opponents. As to the first
question, the limited possibilities of intelligence to control most tactical situations
should he apparent to anyone with military staff experience. As to the second, it
cannot he denied that the Germans had built a formidable military machine with a
highly competent leadership group in the form of the German General Staff and the
many talented field commanders. The author brings out the latter point very well in
his treatment of Rommel's masterful generalship in North Africa and his futile
improvisations during the Normandy campaign.
Clearly in the category of lessons to be learned is the superiority of a centrally
coordinated intelligence, security, and special operations activity, as represented by
the LCS and Bodyguard, over uncoordinated, largely independent, and competing
agencies, as represented by the German political and military intelligence services.
The main lesson of Enigma itself is never to place reliance on any device or
procedure that is not subject to periodic objective testing. Unfortunately, it is a
weakness of systems protected by extremes of security that they tend to be insulated
from adequate review by their very security procedures. On the other hand, Anglo-
American experience with Ultra shows that, given the proper incentives, mechanisms,
and, above all, choice of personnel, security can be maintained over very long periods
of time spanning both war and peace.
Were it not for the crucial nature of the failure of the Schwarze Kapelle, it would
scarcely be worthwhile to rehearse the much studied conspiracy of the generals, and of
Admiral Canaris in particular. The latter would seem to typify the paradox of the anti-
Nazi German nationalist, a patriot who desperately wished to see the downfall of
Hitler, but who could not bring himself to violate his soldier's oath and engage in
openly treasonable action until it was too late. It is little wonder that the British
intelligence agencies did not know what to make of Canaris and his associates. In any
event, it was no way to run a successful palace revolution. Proud men of action found
themselves enmeshed in the futility of indecision, while the SD slowly but surely closed
in on them.
Perhaps the greatest lesson to be learned from this study in strategic order of battle
deception concerns the validity of the traditional process of intelligence analysis in
which a picture of enemy "capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of
action" (the last being a cautious euphemism for intentions) is assembled from bits and
pieces of information of varying degrees of reliability. The British scheme was clearly
to defeat this process by systematically creating a false picture of the Allied order of
battle and operational plans (particularly the time and place of the main invasion
effort) through the leakage of slightly false items of information on major
matters, information carefully calculated to confirm what the German leadership was
predisposed to believe (i.e., a Pas de Calais invasion site), and gross distortions of those
things which the Germans could not readily confirm (the dispositions, strength, and
state of training of invasion forces in England). Through the medium of Ultra
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intelligence, the effects of this deception could be tracked, permitting the employment
of special means to repair any weaknesses that might develop in the false picture which
was being created.
An interesting side-observation arising out of this study of deception is the ease
with which senior commanders were convinced of a false pattern of developments,
despite the many doubts of working-level personnel of the German intelligence services
concerning the validity of particular elements of deception. Thus, once the
predispositions of the opposing military leaders were understood, particularly those of
Hitler himself, deception could be focused on the reinforcement of those
preconceptions. Considerable latitude in erroneous detail could be tolerated once a
general pattern of development had been established, without changing German
leadership perceptions. Buchheit's observations on the degree of knowledge possessed
by German military intelligence prior to the Normandy invasion are instructive in this
regard.28
Likewise, many deceptions which seemed quite promising in the planning stages
actually had little effect in practice. An example of this is the celebrated operation
known popularly as "The Man Who Never Was," in which a corpse dressed in the uni-
form of a British major and carrying false secret dispatches, was allowed to float ashore
on the coast of Spain.29 It was intended that the papers should find their way to
German intelligence and indicate to them the false intent of attacks against Sardinia
and Greece instead of against Sicily. According to a former German staff officer30 this
deception, despite its acceptance by the Germans, in reality had no significant
influence on the subsequent course of events. The threat of attacks on Sardinia and on
Greece had already been accepted by the German leadership many months before,
perhaps due to earlier deception efforts, and appropriate dispositions of troops had
been made. Likewise, several dozen intercepted messages originating from North
Africa clearly indicated that Sicily was a likely point of attack. Hence, the Axis forces
had prepared themselves to a certain extent against all eventualities.
Although one may argue that the success of the main Bodyguard deception
depended primarily on the failure of German intelligence collection capabilities within
Britain and on the increasingly disrupted character of the German military services
prior to the invasion of France, the Bodyguard story also points up the absolute
necessity for confirmatory evidence in support of the results of analysis of fragmentary
information. Thus, the much-touted "mosaic" approach to the analysis of intelligence
is highly susceptible to the influences of erroneous data, whether arising from natural
causes or from deliberate action on the part of the opposition. From the standpoint of
intelligence analysis and its pitfalls, alone, Bodyguard of Lies should be regarded as a
basic text and required reading for all aspiring intelligence analysts.
One incidental result of publication of the revelations of Bodguard should be to
answer certain nagging questions in the minds of those still surviving German generals
and admirals as to why, despite all their efforts, the "breaks" always seemed to go
against them in crucial situations, in seeming defiance of all the laws of probability.
Were it not for the still unforgettable Hitlerian overtones, one might even manage to
feel a bit sorry for the "honest gentlemen" of the German military officer corps, who
2e Buchheit, op, cit.
29As set forth in the book of the same name by the originator of the scheme, Ewen Montagu
(Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1953, 1966.) Montagu has stated privately that in two pages dealing with this
operation, Cave Brown has "ten factual errors and three embellishments."
3o Buchheit, op. cit.
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were up against another group of "honest gentlemen" who had elected to waive the
rules of gentlemanly behavior for the duration. In reality, of course, the Germans were
not above using deception themselves whenever the opportunity presented itself, as
witness the large-scale "North Pole" operation in Holland, when for more than a year
the Abwehr, by means of false radio transmissions from doubled agents, captured a
majority of the personnel being parachuted into Holland to work with the Dutch
underground, and caused futile airdrops of many tons of materiel.31
Cave Brown, the author of this spectacular if flawed work, is a retired foreign
correspondent for major British and Australian newspapers. He acquired an early
interest in the subject of deception operations through observation of his father, an
expert engraver, working on propaganda material and deceptive cartography for the
government in war-time England. He says that he first began thinking seriously about
this book when he was reporting from Washington during the Cuban Missile Crisis. In
the course of his research, he assembled great quantities of material derived from open
literature, declassified U.S. official documents, and the results of more than a hundred
interviews of former British, American, German, and French intelligence personnel
who were in one way or another associated with deception operations.
Denied access to official British records in no uncertain terms, Cave Brown was
more successful with the National Archives and the Office of Military History in
Washington, profiting greatly from recent declassifications of records under the
Freedom of Information Act. He reportedly still has more than 100,000 words of
unused manuscript with which he expects to do more publishing. Given the multitude
of errors of detail in the present work, there is probably little reason to fear prosecution
for security violations. It would be quite difficult for any prosecutor to show that the
author has told the absolute truth about any matter with which he has dealt.
The atomistic thinker or the academic interested in absolute historical accuracy
would probably do well to avoid this book. It is not a reliable reference text on the
minutiae of particular deception operations. However, the Gestalt thinker, who can be
satisfied with holistic impressions of the patterns of military deception operations and
who enjoys immersing himself in a highly readable presentation by a competent writer
who has taken pains to make the most of uncertain data and a modest understanding
of his subject matter, should find the hook a rewarding experience.
While far superior in the scope of its coverage and much better written than
counterpart publications such as Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret,: Bertrand's
Enigma, Stevenson's A Man Called Intrepid, and Delmer's The Counterfeit Spy, 33
Cave Brown's work fails to escape the common stigma of intelligence narratives:
considerable inaccuracy as to detail and occasional lack of validity of interpretation. It
raises enough questions to suggest the need for an official history of the subject of
deception and special means in WW It. Moreover, in addition to making such a
treatment available for the European Theater, there is need of a better understanding
of the role of Magic and U.S. deception operations in the winning of the war in the
Pacific.
Russell J. Bowen
:"The story of this considerable success of German military intelligence is presented in H. J. Giskes,
London Calling North Pole (Kimber, London, 1953.)
"'Frederick N. Winterbotham, The Ultra Secret (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1974.)
"Sefton Delmer, The Counterfeit Spy (Harper & Row, New York, 1971.)
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THE FIRST CASUALTY. By Phillip Knightley. (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New
York and London, 1975. 425 pp, notes, bibliography and index.)
A full generation before Churchill insisted that truth in wartime should be
shielded by "a bodyguard of lies," Senator Hiram Johnson was asserting in 1917 that
the first casualty when war comes is truth."
The main thrust of Knightley's history of war reporting seems to be that from the
Crimea in 1854 through Vietnam, war correspondents have been so censored, misled,
or patriotic that they have never shown war to be horrible enough to be outlawed.
Along the way, he analyzes in great detail how:
-during the Civil War "Sensationalism and exaggeration, outright lies, puffery,
slander, faked eyewitness accounts, and conjectures built on pure imagination
cheapened much that passed in the North for news;-
-in World War I, the British by and large kept correspondents far from the front
lines and prevented any criticism of the conduct of the war;
-in Ethiopia, correspondents confined to headquarters on either side knew
nothing of what was really going on;
-in Spain, balance could be achieved only by pairing biased reporters on either
side;
-in World War Two, correspondents were not only censored, committed to their
own side in most cases, and cooperative with the censors in muting the horrors of war,
but made no effort to circumvent censorship and tell the public when things went
wrong.
-in Vietnam, correspondents were not censored, and in many cases were not only
not for but strongly against the side they were covering. They were too caught up in
combat news, however, to put their main emphasis on the horrors of war.
Before going into any further detail, it should be noted that Knightley's
competence on the subject of both war correspondents and the horrors of war is
qualified by the dust-jacket statement that "He has never heard a shot fired in anger,
and hopes he never will."
Knightley has researched his book in depth, and he includes enough case histories
to cut the ground from under some of his contentions listed above, but in regard to
both censorship and propaganda-the two subjects which bring this book into the
intelligence purview-he ignores important distinctions.
Firstly, no accredited war correspondent has any right to expect, let alone
demand, that he be allowed in wartime to acquire and publish information unknown
to the enemy which will aid the enemy. Where there is mismanagement, bumbling, or
failure, and it is already known to the enemy or of no use to the enemy, however,
censorship stands on shaky ground in pleading "home front morale" and "comfort to
the enemy." If Knightley is aware of this distinction he never makes it.
Secondly, with regard to propaganda, the best role for the correspondent and that
which best serves the truth is objectivity. Herbert Matthews admits that in Spain he
MORI/HRP
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went overboard in his bias in favor of the side he covered-the Republicans. Similar
advocacy journalism reached its peak in Southeast Asia with those correspondents who
were working from the South Vietnamese side but were critical of everything the South
Vietnamese undertook. In these two examples, there is one sharp difference: the pro-
Republican correspondents in Spain wrote at length about atrocities perpetrated by
the opposing Franco side, but ignored those on their own side; in Vietnam there was
quick, lurid, and widespread reporting of alleged South Vietnamese atrocities, but very
little about those committed by the Communist forces.
In dealing with the first point-excessive censorship-Knightley on occasion saws
off his own limb. He notes that William Howard Russell of the London Times,
reporting from the Crimean War, described the catastrophic "Charge of the Light
Brigade" graphically and accurately. Press dispatches from the Crimea were also
responsible for the work of Florence Nightingale and the first efforts to provide nursing
services for the wounded.
In World War One, as early as August 20, British correspondents who presumably
had no access to the front lines nevertheless managed to report the British defeat at
Mons. Press reporting on the fighting at Gallipoli cost the Commanding General his
job.
In World War Two, Kasserine Pass and the Battle of the Bulge were accurately
reported as American defeats. Stars & Stripes, over the anguished complaints of
General Patton, came up with such "dogface" stories as the interception of the shoe-
pacs and jump hoots which could have been used at the front in Southern France by
the quartermaster echelons of Peninsular Base Section back at the Mediterranean.
Much of this, Knightley either ignores or doesn't know about.
fie notes, quite correctly: "Correspondents were not allowed in the theatre of war
unless they were accredited, and one of the conditions of accreditation was that the
correspondent must sign an agreement to submit all his copy to military or naval
censorship." And that, Knightley thinks, was that. He goes into some detail about the
men who evaded censorship, smuggled the news home, or wrote books or magazine
articles or lectured when they were no longer accredited and subject to censorship. But
one of the few instances he cites where a reporter supposedly went to the mat with the
censors is a freak case: my own eyewitness report of the Queen Mary's collision with an
antiaircraft cruiser, HMS Curacoa on Oct. 2, 1942. The Curacoa, which we would
now call an AA-frigate at best, was a type the Royal Navy desperately needed for the
Murmansk and Malta convoys. There was no way the Germans could know she had
been sunk. Hence, it was not in the Royal Navy's interest to release the story.' A CI
operation was mounted, in fact, against the five correspondents who had been on
board the Queen to determine whether they were inclined to talk about the incident,
and one was soon "slowboated" home. In my case, I had access to the Admiralty
censors because I was subsequently assigned to the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow, so I
wrote the collision story, left one copy with the Admiralty, and the other in the United
Press London safe. I then forgot about the story until VE-Day, when the Admiralty
censors promptly released it with nary a prod from me or the United Press. So much for
my going to the mat with the censors.
Conversely, the British realized that the Queen Mary could hardly limp into Glasgow with her prow
curled like a sardine can without some word reaching the Germans, so they "carelessly" ordered the
dockyard navvies to clean the only drydock in England which would accommodate QM. Several days later,
QM plodded off around Northern Ireland to Boston in a slow but heavily guarded convoy while British
destroyers scragged several U-boats waiting eagerly on the approaches to the Southampton dockyard.
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There is a sequel to the release of the Queen Mary story which demonstrates the
subtler forms of censorship. Deciding that the Admiralty now appeared to be of a mind
to "tell all," I dug back into my memory for a classified Royal Navy account I had
read of the hunt for the Bismarck. On May 26, 1941, when the Bismarck was finally
relocated south of England and making for the French coast, Admiral Somerville of
"Force H" coming up from Gibraltar had detached the fast light cruiser Sheffield to
close (staying just out of range of the Bismarck's guns) and shadow. Somehow, nobody
informed the pilots of the Swordfish torpedo planes aboard Ark Royal, also in Force H.
The 14 Swordfish, searching for Bismarck by radar, found Sheffield instead some
20 miles to the north-weighing about 9,100 tons to Bismarck's 45,000. As any
silhouette recognition expert will understand if he still remembers that WEFT meant
"Wrong Every Fool Time," they promptly dove through the clouds to press home a
determined but unopposed attack, and scored several hits before realizing their
mistake.2 Fortunately the torpedoes, according to the account I had read, were all
armed with a new magnetic "pistol," or detonator, and failed to detonate properly, so
no harm was done. Three hours later, a second attack by Swordfish found the proper
target, and disabled Bismarck's steering action in the key encounter of the entire chase.
By this time, "The failure of the magnetic torpedo pistols caused them to be replaced
by contact pistols,"3 and Bismarck was brought to bay.
Back in New York on leave in June, 1945, I wrote the story and turned it in with
an explanation of how I had come by it. Harrison E. Salisbury, then heading the UP
Cable Desk, was concerned that it might still be subject to censorship-the war still
being on in the Pacific-and he sent it to Washington to be cleared with the British
Naval Attache. That worthy-whose name I never learned or I would pay him
homage here for his one-upsmanship-knew he no longer had any censorship power,
but replied to Salisbury: "There is no security objection but I've never head of this."
Salisbury, grunting something about overreaching for stories, killed the report. Sir
Winston Churchill's war histories4 subsequently confirmed the Swordfish attack on
Sheffield, but implied that all of the torpedoes had missed.
I can recall, on the other hand, flying with a B-24 squadron assigned to bomb
Monte Cassino (the town, not the Abbey) which togglebombed instead on a similar
village near Venafro, five miles behind our own lines, I filed the story, the Fifteenth Air
Force censors killed it, and UP headquarters in Naples appealed it to Theater
Headquarters, which released the story some three days after the incident. The point is
that when correspondents felt censors had overstepped the bounds, the press appealed,
and the appeals in many cases worked. Criticism of the conduct of war per se, or of
defeats, or of snafus, did not constitute valid grounds for censorship; of this Knightley
seems to be unaware.
Postwar novels aside, the finest creative writing to emerge from combat is
probably the expense account. There is Bob Casey's classic explanation of "$50
miscellaneous" which auditors ordered him to itemize after an Alaskan assignment:
"Replacement of lead sled dog, killed by wolves, $49.50. Flowers for bereft bitch,
$0.50. I believe it was H. R. Knickerbocker who in Ethiopia accounted for several
hundred dollars gone astray by dreaming up and describing a desert safari attacked by
bandits, leaving Knickerbocker responsible for replacement of killed and stolen camels
'The aircraft then signalled the cruiser: "Sorry for the kippers."
' Roskill, Capt., S. W., RN, The Navy at War, 1939-1945, H.M. Stationery Office, London, 1954,
p. 513.
"The Grand Alliance, 1940-1941.
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and carts. Knightley's book charitably overlooks this particular brand of creativity, but
concentrates effectively on the inventive correspondent and his phoney reporting for
publication-particularly in the propaganda field.
The First Casualty documents at considerable length the contributions of
correspondents to anti-German atrocity propaganda in World War One-the violated
Belgian maidens, the Belgian babies with their hands cut off,5 the German factories for
converting bodies into glycerine-and to anti-Franco propaganda in Spain. The thrust
of the account is that eager correspondents and newspapers probably did as much as
the official propagandists, not only to circulate these stories, but to invent them. One
correspondent, Claude Cockburn of the English The Week, scolded Louis Fischer,
reporting for The Nation, for writing that in one action Republican troops were
demoralized and bewildered. When Fischer protested that the readers had a right to
the truth, Cockburn exploded: "Who gave [the readers] such a right? Perhaps when
they have exerted themselves enough to alter the policy of their bloody government
and the Fascists are beaten in Spain, they will have such a right."
-]'here is less stress on the pure fakers, who invented not to advance their cause, but
to grab headlines or column space. One correspondent in Italy, when the Allied
advance reached San Marino, reported that tiny San Marino had forthwith declared
war on Germany. It made such a good story that several days later the San Marino
government went along with the gag and did so. The censors, who might have known
better, did nothing to stop the original story; after all, they were not concerned with
accuracy, and the story gave no aid or comfort to the enemy.
Knightley, in urging correspondents to circumvent censorship, apparently has
little knowledge of censorship in depth. For a period of nine months from October,
1942, 1 covered naval operations around the British Isles. For five months of that
period, working for United Press but carrying orders signed by COMNAVEUR Adm.
Harold R. Stark which assigned me as U.S. Navy pool correspondent at Scapa Flow, I
sailed with British warships on a total of seven Murmansk convoys, in everything from
destroyers to battleships. Counting every hand at Scapa, in the Admiralty, and in
Admiral Stark's headquarters that got a crack at my copy, I was working through a
total of six censorships.
I managed to get off a second-hand description of the Christmas 1942 action
between a British cruiser force and the Hipper and Luetzow (I was at sea with the
wrong task force;) a number of features ranging from winter weather on the Murmansk
run to the loveable qualities of the ungainly British catapult amphibian, the Walrus;
the differences between life aboard a U.S. and a British warship; and the plight of U.S.
troops perched on a glacier at Akureyre above the Arctic Circle, the jumping-off point
for Murmansk. But I wasn't exactly covering the war.
Early in March, returning from RA53, my final convoy operation aboard King
George V, and about to be relieved by an AP man as the pool correspondent, I was
summoned by the Home Fleet Commander-in-Chief, Adm. Sir John Tovey, who
wanted to talk about Murmansk convoys in general. He invited me to use what he told
me on a background basis.
"This one was invented by The Times of London, embellished and given wide circulation by the
French, and gave the German government fits. My father, S. Beach Conger II, was at that time chief of the
Associated Press bureau in Berlin (1912-1917) and was given carte blanche by the German General Staff to
anywhere he wanted to in Belgium and talk to anybody without supervision; the incident was "widely
known" to the Belgians, but had always happened in the next town down the line or over the hill. Proving a
negative was, is, and remains difficult if not impossible.
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Over the next few days, I wrote a series of five articles, summarizing just
about everything I had experienced on the Murmansk runs, topped off with the
conclusions I had drawn from Admiral Tovey's remarks: (a) The Murmansk
convoys required 40 percent of the Home Fleet destroyer strength at a time when escort
ships were desperately needed for the Battle of the Atlantic; (they were also needed for
forthcoming offensive operations in the Mediterranean, but that didn't belong in a
news story); (b) Murmansk, the only Arctic Russian port open all winter, could barely
handle 12 to 18 ships a month; (c) with only a single-track railroad to haul the stuff
away, it sat on the Murmansk dock vulnerable to destruction by any German bomber
free to hedgehop the few miles from the Norwegian border; and (d) as for the summer,
when Archangel was available, the convoy route was exposed to German daylight air
attacks 24 hours a day. The message was that the Persian Gulf Route-which in the
course of the war handled 77.3 percent of all Allied aid to the USSR-was a far better
way of getting help to the Russians.
Sure, I was used, but it would have made a legitimate story and an excellent
series. What I didn't know was that because of all the reasons outlined by Tovey, plus
the mid-March arrival of Scharnhorst to reinforce Tirpitz and Luetzow in nothern
Norwegian waters, Churchill on March 30 sent a message to Stalin informing him that
the Murmansk convoys were being suspended following RA53, which had left
Murmansk homebound on March 1.
It was late April, and I was back in London before the kindly chief censor at
Admiralty summoned me to receive the remains of my Murmansk run series. There
was about enough left to make one good feature story, but none of Tovey's remarks. In
consolation, the censor pointed at some brown squiggles in the margin, in addition to
the half-dozen spoors of my usual censors.
"Those," he said with a sort of hushed solemnity, "are the personal comments of
the Prime Minister, and the whole shooting match was translated into Russian and
flown to Moscow."
A couple of months later I was home briefly with a U.S. Navy task force which
had been based at Scapa Flow, and I would have been able to write whatever I wanted
in the New York office. I wonder if Knightley would say I should have written that the
convoys had been suspended (the Germans could have used their forces in northern
Norway elsewhere had they been sure) or that I had in effect been "used" by Admiral
Tovey and the PM against the Russians.
"The point about censorship," Knightley notes, "is that while it can prevent a
correspondent from sending a story the military does not want published, it cannot
force him to send a false or exaggerated one." He shows that some correspondents can
be misled; others will go along; but he fails to show that-given a conscientious
objective press-Truth becomes the first casualty. Whole Truth may be wounded,
maimed, or captured at times. Nothing But The Truth will report sick from contact
with official communiques and briefings-the Bodyguard of Lies-plus the occasional
faker. Truth, however, is the combat-wise NCO who will still be around when all the
other casualties are gone.
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