STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 18 No. 1, Spring 1974]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010010-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 73
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2005
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 1, 1974
• Content Type: IS

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VOL. 18 NO. 1
SPRING 1974
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CONTENTS
Page
The Case of Major X ...................................... Hans Moses 1
From the double agent's viewpoint. (SECRET No FOREIGN DISSEIvi )
Masterman Revisited ............................... A. V, Knobelspiesse 25
Another look at double agent deception. (SECRET )
Vietnam in Retrospect ................................ Ellsworth Bunker 41
An address at CIA by Ambassador Bunker. (CONFIDENTIAL )
CHURCHWAY, SNOOPY, MAD, et al ................................ 49
Morris V. Baxter Jr., and Curtiss L. Olson
The computers close in. (SECRET )
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature ................................ 61
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No Foreign , Dissem
From the double agent's viewpoint:
THE CASE OF MAJOR X
"Now it can be told: the biggest spy story since the Alger Hiss (tease. It
concerns the Russian spies who were ...TRAPPED AT THE WASHINGTON
MONUMENT."
That is how Jack Anderson and Fred Blumenthal, then known as the
principal associates of the late Drew Pearson, captioned a feature story published
in Parade Magazine on 6 January 1957. Theirs was probably the most interesting
of the various stories on the same topic that had begun to appear in the press
some three years earlier. In January 1953, two American residents of Vienna,
Austria, Kurt Ponger and Otto Verber, had been arrested on espionage charges,
and Yuriy Novikov, a Soviet diplomat accredited to Washington and linked to
therm in the indictment, had been declared persona non grata. Six months after
their arrest, Ponger and Verber had pleaded guilty and had been sentenced to
jail. Thus there had been no need for a trial, and most of the events leading
to the legal climax were never disclosed.
Anderson and Blumenthal had set out to provide part of the missing back-
ground, and, perhaps, to dispel some of the mystery. For introductory purposes,
their account is worth summarizing here. They related how Ponger, once an
inmate of Nazi jails, had fled in 1939 to America, where two years later he met
two fellow refugees, Otto Verber and his attractive sister Vera. In World War II,
both men had enlisted in the U.S. Army, where Verber rose to the rank of
Second Lieutenant and Ponger to Staff Sergeant. Both had maneuvered them-
selves into Army intelligence assignments, and later wangled jobs as interpreters
at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, where they made contact with a professional
spy. In 1948, Ponger married Vera Verber, who had meanwhile worked for a
red spy ring in England. Ponger opened a press agency in Vienna, and Verber
helped by carrying the photographer's bag. In 1949, as Parade put it, Verber
made one mistake: he solicited information from a U.S. Air Force officer-
"Major X"-who happened to be acounter-intelligence officer.
The major's superiors instructed him to play along. This, the authors noted,
was a delicate assignment; both spies had been trained by our own Army
intelligence; both had served as interrogators at the war crimes trials; both had
started by learning to parry questions in concentration camps. But "Major X"
turned out to be their match. Ponger and Verber, masterminded by the scheming
Vera, were duped into thinking he was an easy mark, and paid him in old
untraceable $20 bills for carefully phonied "secret" defense documents. "Major X,"
meanwhile, watching the spy ring over a period of four years, discovered that
Ponger and Verber were only links in a spy network that reached all the way
across the Atlantic into the Soviet Embassy in the United States. He thereupon
doctored some seemingly vital documents which Verber and Ponger found so
MORI/HRP
from pg.
01-24
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SECRET Double Agent
exciting that they arranged for "Major X" to carry them personally to their
contact in Washington.
`Chun, on a balmy April evening in 1951,* "Major X" passed his doctored
data at the Washington Monument to a mysterious Russian who turned out to be
a Soviet diplomat. The scene might have been staged in Hollywood, the authors
abserved; but the only cameras aimed at the meeting were operated by FBI
agents hidden in the vicinity. Surveillance continued for two more years. Finally,
when counter-intelligence had learned enough about the spy ring, they arrested
Verber and Ponger and sent the Soviet diplomat packing.
1 1.7ad a far more than ordinary interest in the Anderson-Blumenthal version
of the events for, unbeknownst to the authors, I was the man they had dubbed
"Major X." Thus I venture to call my own reminiscences of the operation "The
Case of Major X," even though I do have a name, and I have never been a
major. Like Ponger and Verber, I had left Europe in the late 1930s, and during
and after World War II served in the infantry and in U.S. Army intelligence.
In 1949, when the story began, I was a civilian employee of an air intelligence
unit of the U.S. Army, not an Air Force officer.
':Che Parade story needs correction and elaboration in many other respects,
if we are to view the case as intelligence officers rather than as magazine
readers. Firstly, it was not a matter of one man's exploits against the Soviet
spy system; it was a story of teamwork on one side against teamwork on the
other.
Secondly, it was not a sequence of romantic adventures. Even though it
had its share of excitement for the participants, it was mainly a grim and tedious
operation, with more than a fair share of disappointment and frustration, which
brought me as close to a breakdown as I would ever want to come. Thirdly, it
was not a story of superior planning crowned by success; it was rather a tale
of trial and error, with only partial successes.
hinally, it was not an operation run under perfect conditions, thoroughly
supported by all security organs, to the undimmed benefit of the nation's security
interests; it was a matter of give and take, of risk and compromise, and, I think,
of well-suited as well as misapplied security considerations.
'this raises a number of questions, among them the following:
1. Were American personnel, including myself, properly prepared for
the method of approach used by Soviet agents?
2. Was the U.S. Government sufficiently well equipped and organized
l~or this type of operation?
3. How, if at all, could we have gained more than we did?
'Chose and related matters have long been debated by participants in the
"Major X" case, and by others who have studied and analyzed it. It has been
and continues to be a useful debate. My contribution to it can be made most
informatively, I believe, in the form of an abbreviated chronological review.
*Parade evidently overlooked the fact that this date would not have allowed the afore-
mentioned "four years" of observation.
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My account of these experiences is being offered here in print for the first time.
Although I have provided some comments, it is my hope that the story for the
most part will speak for itself.
Background
Of the two individuals mentioned, I came to know Verber much better, but
I actually metPonger first. In November 1946, when I was aboard ship headed
for Europe, Ponger was one of my co-passengers. Like myself, he had been hired
as a civilian government employee. I heard from others aboard the shhip that
he had a distinguished combat record with the Office of Strategic Services. Only
once did I have any occasion to talk to him alone. At that time, he askc;d me if
I intended ever to return to the United States. When I expressed my surprise at
such a question, he informed me that he himself would never go back. What
little he owed to the United States, he said, he had paid back a hundred times.
The only ties he had anywhere bound him to Austria, where his family had once
owned property which he would try to recover.
This was the last talk I had with Ponger for a number of years. Should it
have given me a clue as to his real state of mind? Perhaps it should have. The
fact remains that it did not. It appeared to indicate no more than an odd sort of
attitude.
I saw both Ponger and Verber in 1947, when I was assigned to the war
crimes trials in Nuremberg where both of them worked as interrogators. Here I
had no private contact with either of them, and the only observation I made
was that Verber wrote good concise interrogation reports, whereas Ponger
produced practically none at all. It is indeed possible, as Parade says, that they
made contact with a professional spy there. If so, the fact is that no one seemed
to know, or take notice.
My first more personal contact with Verber was made some time in 1948
in Vienna, where I had taken a civilian job with an air intelligence unit of the
U.S. Army. Verber, originally a Viennese, had arrived in his old home town
as a student under the G.I. Bill and, I heard, also intended to go into t:he news
business with Ponger, his brother-in-law. Verber occupied a house in the
American sector in Vienna; Ponger lived in the Soviet sector.
In the months that followed, Ponger kept very much in the background.
Verber I met at first casually. After I invited him, equally casually, to look me
up same time, I was surprised when late in 1948 he paid me an unscheduled
visit at the office, getting past the Austrian receptionist's desk by introducing
himself as an old friend of mine. I found him extremely curious about two escaped
Soviet flyers who had landed in Austria. Inasmuch as the story had just been
published in the Austrian press, however, his curiosity seemed explainable.
There followed a period of social contact with Verber and his wife. Nothing
remarkable seemed to happen during those days. The Verbers did their level
best to teach us how to play bridge, but never quite succeeded. It may be signifi-
cant that he maintained this kind of contact for several months without asking
for information.
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First Phase: The Approach
IIe made a different approach, however, in June 1949, when my family
and I had returned to Austria from home leave. We were sitting in Verber's
garden in the beautiful Viennese sunshine, sipping cool drinks and thinking
everything was all right in the world, when Verber asked to talk to me privately.
Broaching the subject of anti-Semitism in general, he charged that the U.S.
Government was actually engaged in furthering anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi pur-
poses. As examples, he mentioned former Nazi technicians and scientists, who
normally would have been considered war criminals, and who now were being
sent under secret contracts to the United States. Informants of American intel-
ligence agencies in many cases were also former Nazis, he said. I could help
the cause of anti-Nazism if I could give him the names of such people as they
might become available to me in the course of my duties.
When I asked him how someone like myself could separate Nazis from
non-Nazis, he told me I could Ieave that to him; as long as I gave him the
names, he could find the criminals. When I wanted to know what he proposed
to do about them once he knew their names, Verber said he could get the
Israeli government to launch official protests. He had the necessary contacts,
lZe said.
I would like to point out here how carefully Verber adjusted his approach
to what he thought were my points of vulnerability. He did not try to persuade
me to work for the Soviet Union or for Communism; that evidently would not
have worked. Instead, he tried to take advantage of the fact that I was a Jew,
an anti-Hitlerite, and a former employee of the war crimes trials. In effect, by
implying that if there was any government involved it was Israel, he was using
the classic recruitment tactic of the "false flag approach."
T.aunching the Operation
t1s it happened, his judgment was not very sound. I left him with the
impression that I was going to think about his proposition, and I did think
about it. In fact, on the very next working day, I invited my entire office staff
to help me think. At least one of them had the idea that Verber might, con-
sciously or unconsciously, be working for the Soviet Union. Accordingly, we
checked his file at the counter-subversive section that same morning. There
was, we found, no information on him, but quite a bit on his brother-in-law
Ponger. There was enough reason far me to make a written report of the
incident. I did this with mixed feelings, and requested that I be allowed to
Stay away from Verber in the future.
[:f my request had been granted, there would be no story to tell. But after
stn interval of a few days, I was asked through the local CIC office to stay in
touch with Verber, and report on possible subversive activities. I agreed to
cio what I could, especially since such an investigation seemed to have its
intriguing possibilities. I then made my next appontment with Verber.
[At this point, the 1949 Cold War atmosphere in Vienna is portrayed
l,y a senior CIA operating officer who at the time was the senior U.S. ci-
vilian air intelligence officer in Vienna, and the author's direct superior.]
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9
The visitor to contemporary Vienna will see little tangible retard
beyond the Soviet Memorial in Schw~arzenberg Platt o f the city's mast
recent military occupation:, nor sense anything o f the atmosphere o f
sometimes lethal clandestine combat o f the first few years f o~llowing
the end of military hostilities in 1945. Viewers of "The Third Man"
may dismiss mention of the hazards of the "Soviet Era" of Vienna as
fanciful melodramatics. But the Soviet troops, moving freely through-
out the city, and in control of Europe from the Enns River far to the
west, all the way to Siberia, were an inescapable reality to the Viennese.
During this 1949s period in Vienna, people simply disappeared-a high
police official, for example, or a government economics expert, on:e o f
the few who eventually returned after years in Soviet prisons. In those
years Soviet intelligence even succeeded in recruiting two American
military policemen to abduct a Western agent (although this mystery
was unsolved when the case o f "Major X" began.--all that was known
was that another Austrian has disappeared totally, without trace).
"Siberia" could he a present reality in the Vienna o f 1949.
Or murder. Irving Ross, for instance, who was found brutally
battered to death with. the jack handle o f his car, late at night, in the
Soviet sector of Vienna on l November 1948. And there wwere to be others.
In such an atmosphere, the risks which might be invodued in
embarking upon a double agent operation against Soviet intelligence
were clear to all concerned, most especially to the central figure,
"Major X:'
I count it my good fortune to have been one of those in the author's
office staff . I recall the discussion vividly still, and remember distinctly
my immediate visceral feeling that Verber~s pitch had the ring of
authenticity. Here was no amateur proposal, but a real attempt, by
what I (and all others privy to the case) assumed from the' outset u~as
Soviet intelligence, to recruit a member o f the American intelligence
staf f in Vienna.
We had long realized, from Soviet defectors and from informa-
tion gleaned through Army counter-intelligence informants, that the
Soviets were actively seeking to penetrate the U.S. Headquarters in
Vienna. Moreover, we were forced privately to concede the possibility
that the Soviets had already managed to recruit operatives within
our ranks. The wartime assignments o f Lt. Verber to Army intelligence
and Sgt. Ponger to OSS rcere in themselves examples. The decision to
undertake the case took into account from the outset the consider-
ation that the Soviets might possess a formidable cross-check capability.
Prospects for a successful double agent play were poor for other
reasons, too. "Major X" was a member of the air intelligence staff, and
therefore separated physically from the main Army intelligence compo-
nents, G-2 and CIC, which were located in other buildings at some
distance from the air staff. That air staff, however, as was well knor~rc
in G-2 and CIC, was de facto a section o f G-2, responsible for evalu-
ating specialized air intelligence information and serving requirements
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in its particular area upon all Army field collection units in Austria.
That air intelligence sta f f comprised only four persons in 1949, when
the case began. We thus faced the dilemma of persuading the Soviets,
via Verber, that "Major X" had only limited access to intelligence in-
formation, all the while knowing that many members of G-2 knew or
would assume that this was not in fact sa.
Nor was ozzr problem made any easier by the presence in Austria
o f literally scores o f former civilian employees o f the Nuremberg war
r_rimes trials staff . Hired by G-2 in Austria as interrogators o f the
Austrian prisoners o f war returning from the USSR and Yugoslavia,
many of these interrogators knew Verber, Ponger, and/or "Major X,"
rend we lzad no idea what the Soviets might be able to construe from
even elicited remarks made innocently by former colleagues about
"Major X" and his activities.
O f course, not all these hazards were clearly perceived at the
outset, but they quickly became evident. Yet the decision to engage in
the double agent gambit, despite all, was not unsound viewed in th.e
perspective of the times. A vague awareness that American intelligence
in. Austria ivas a Soviet target was transformed, that April day in 1949,
into a highly personal, direct, and tangible reality. One of ours had been
approached by the Soviets, and was ready to use the opportunity to
f r~,estrate and negate the Soviet effort.
Throughout the overseas phase, those o f us engaged in the case
were constantly cognizant of the psychological stress imposed upon
"Major X." The difficulties we experienced in obtaining cleara~e far
build-up material moved some o f the of fieers with responsibility far
the case to a pessimistic estimate o f its viability. Some even. reached
the flat conclusion that the Soviets had perceived the double play and
u;ere laying a trap. (One o f the lessons I derived from this case was
provided after his arrest by Verber, who stated he never had been
suspieiaus of "Major X." What a help it was to us, at times, to haws
Verber actively looking far plausible excuses to~ explain his agent's
failure to produce!)
In this atmosphere o f uncertainty about the real state o f the case,
we countered what we regarded as a threat by a f airly sudden transfer
to Salzburg, fended of f with what we hoped were plausible arguments
t{ze importunings to meet "the General" in the Soviet Zone, and finally
felt compelled to adopt the precipitous transfer device once again,
rend sent our man back to the United States in early January 1951
to avoid the physical risk to him 2vhich we felt was real.
All of this, o f course, was mast clearly evident to "Major X" him
self . Still vivid in my memory is a telephone call i got from his wife on
New Year's Day, 1951, asking me to meet her. "Major X" was even
then, as our surveillance had confirmed, meeting with Ponger. She
handed me the gun we had provided him, and explained that he had
told her, in essence, that he was not afraid to meet Verber or Ponger,
but was afraid to carry the gun, lest one of them somelww notice it and
draw the proper inference.
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Ta me, thus, the point is clear. This was a successful counter-
espionage case, which achieved the goals o f exposing its Soviet intel-
ligence backing and neutralizing th.e Soviet agents directly involved.
There were many, many people involved in the support and', at times,
non-support of the operation, but its success was the work of one man:
"Mapor X:'
Early Stages
After having gotten my apparent agreement to work with him, Verber
expressed great interest in having a "fundamental talk" with me, which would
show him what kind of information I could get, and would enable him to ask
me "more intelligent" questions. When the first meeting in my house was in
prospect, I decided, rather than to depend on my own eyes and ears alone,
to ask for the installation of listening devices. My quarters were not exactly
designed for that sort of thing; we lived on the top floor of asix-family house,
and had only Austrian neighbors, among them. a very curious housekeeper. The
maid happened to be on vacation, however, and her room could be used. In
it we locked a CIC agent, a secretary, and an enlisted man who ran a huge
tape recorder. I maneuvered Verber onto a sofa with a microphone taped
behind it, and he talked quite freely about what he wanted me to do. His
requirements this time included one for names of employees of American intel-
ligence agencies. The meeting lasted for several hours. Verber was so absorbed
that he did not notice the noise when the microphone fell to the floor, and he
paid no attention to my badly disguised attempts to enunciate my words care-
fully. That effort was to no avail, anyhow, because the recorder failed to operate.
After that, Verber. and I had frequent meetings, most of them. with a social
flavor. We usually just separated from our wives, and conducted our business
in a "private" room in one of our houses. At my home, listening devices were
used regularly. On some occasions a photographer was placed on the back
porch, where he could take pictures of Verber and myself. There was even a
proposal to install atwo-way mirror in the wall-something to which I objected
as I did not know how I could explain the hole in the wall to outsiders..As time
went on, my wife became quite unhappy at the interference with her privacy,
and the need to keep the children and the maid out of the way at specified
times. Finally, when we were asked to transform. our maid's room. into a per-
manently equipped observation post, she put her foot down, and government
affairs had to move outside.
Security
During the first phase of the case, security precautions were somewhat
problematic. As I noted earlier, a fairly large number of people, including my
entire office staff, knew of the beginning of the operation. With a great deal
of enthusiasm and, for my part, all the blessings and afflictions of inexperience,
we made arrangements and decisions. A special problem was created for me
by the people who knew both Verber and myself, as I had to ask myself in
every case whether or not they could be trusted, whether they were in a position
to know anything that would give me away, and to what extent I should treat
each of them as a friend or a potential enemy. I sometimes compromised by
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warning people to be careful with Verber and Ponger, without telling them
about the operation. Fortunately, not too many people knew both sides well
enough to cause real difficulty.
Objectives and Methods
As for the objectives in the case, they were largely self-conceived in the
early stages. I determined my approach to Verber before each meeting, and
displayed the attitude which I thought would be best suited to gain his confi-
dence and at the same time attain results. We wanted to prove, first, that Verber
actually was a foreign agent, find out which country he was working for, and
discover the contacts he had and the operating methods he used. In order to
break his story of Israeli connections, I pretended to be just as dissatisfied with
the state of the world as he was, but indicated that Israel, to me, just was not
the right solution. I thus displayed an ideological vacuum which I asked Verber
to help me fill. In general, when he offered opinions or made requests, I tried
to appear receptive but not too bright, and usually willing but not always able.
Above all, I did my best to display a consistent attitude and have an expla-
nation for everything I did, just in case it was observed.
information to be passed to Verber was cleared for me through the CIC.
As weeks turned into months, Verber wanted to know more and more. I had
to help myself by pretending to get information from outside the office where
I could not follow it up, and by describing my activities in the office as very
limited, which made it impossible for me to observe. too much. One of the
subjects of his inquisitiveness was the Central Intelligence Agency. He tried
to find out who was representing it in Vienna, and what it did. I am afraid
that I was not of much help to him there.
t;onsidering how little guidance we had during this first phase, our efforts
seemed to have splendid results. Verber appeared to believe that he was leading
me on, and came somewhat closer to admitting his Soviet sympathies. I even
induced him to admit, to the benefit of a secret tape recording, that in case of
a war he would prefer to fight for the Soviet Union.
Second Phase: Commitment
Our own plans now became somewhat more ambitious. I was asked
through intelligence channels whether I would consent to become along-range
double agent, or whether-in' view of the danger to my family and myself-I
wished to be excused. If I would go along, I was told, this would mean that
the operation would become the foremost thing in my life, and that in effect I
would have to eat, drink, and sleep with it. In return for this service, I was
informed, I could virtually set my own conditions. What followed was very
simple: I accepted, and made no conditions whatsoever.
The working set-up now became more systematic, and security restrictions
were tightened considerably. I could no longer discuss the progress of the case
with just anyone in my office which, at times, was a bit uncomfortable. I also
received more direct guidance on what I was supposed to accomplish, and
how this was supposed to be done. The operation ~>as divided into prospective
phases: I was sugposed to establish myself progressively more firmly in a spy
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system. which by now we all assumed to be Soviet; eventually, the operation
was supposed to be transferred to Washington; and in the hoped-for final
stage, was to be used to feed the Soviets false information.
Initiatives and Problems
One of the first requests I had to make under the new program was this:
I had to ask Verber for money-a $5,000 bank account. When Verber declined,
the request was changed to one for a monthly salary of $50. After some apparent
hesitation, Verber seemed happy to comply. Altogether I collected about $300
from him in Vienna. He now needed a code name for me for use on his vouchers,
so he called me, of all things, "Lindbergh,"-probably because I had once reported
to him having met Charles Lindbergh at an air base in Bavaria. Verber con-
tinually admonished me not to take the money too lightly, because it not only
was a token of appreciation, but also represented the earnings of working I>eople.
(For the time being, however, he still refused to tell me who his actual sponsors
were. )
While Verber's pressure for information was still remarkably light after
the first payment, it soon grew much more intense. We often did our talking
in one of our cars, and I quite often carried listening devices in the car or on
my person. My meetings sometimes led me into the Soviet sector, and once
or twice to Ponger's home. In order to realize how uncomfortable that w,, were
willing to drop some of their earlier reservations. My description of the new
contact-about 30 years old, weighing about 200 pounds, with dark hair, round
face, horn-rimmed glasses, and speaking with a guttural accent-seemed to fit
someone they knew, although they could not be sure. At the FBI Field Office,
I examined picture after picture. Finally I pointed to one showing a man
walking in front of a building. This time there was no doubt. The man with
whom Ponger had placed me in contact was Yuriy V. Novikov, Second Secretary
of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.
The FBI agent ixi charge of the case took me home after midnight. Tlie case
had indeed begun, he said; the Bureau valued my services and was willing
to pay for them. I declined. Although the FBI would undoubtedly not have
seen it in the same light, it still would have given me the feeling that my
services were for sale. The information I obtained as the by-product of a
penetration attempt directed against the enemies of the United States was not
a commercial item, to be paid for upon delivery.
Job Problem
If my contact with a Soviet official in Washington was, as it seemed to me,
a tremendous thing, I failed to feel its effect in my relationship with the Air
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SECRET I7ou a gent
'~~"orce. As agreed, I started to work on about 20 April, although I was not
scheduled to go on the payroll until 1 May. Just prior to 1 May, moreover, I
eeceived word that I had not been properly processed, had not been cleared, and
~:ould not be allowed to work in the designated office until my papers had
properly gone through channels. This was supposed to take a maximum of three
>veeks-and it took exactly that. In the meantime, my available cash had dwindled
to almost nothing, and all my earthly possessions were tied up in what I had
a:ome to regard as the "Washington venture." At that time, I entertained serious
+loubts that the Air Force would honor its commitment to employ me, or that I
liad enough time to wait for the decision. I attempted and failed to find suitable
~;hort-term employment outside the government, and wondered how I would
have explained an outside job to my Soviet contact without making him lose
i~.terest in me.
i?or the second and third weeks of May, fortunately, my anticipated Air Force
salary was paid by the FBI. On 20 May, the Air Force finally opened its doors.
1 still had not been cleared, and my rating had been cut yet another notch, but
it was a starting point.
:V ext zYl ee~tings
~Yly next meetings with my Soviet contact were quite different from anything
t had experienced overseas. He seemed to be interested mainly in avoiding
possible surveillance. He never talked to me at the location where we met, and
refused to talk in the car. Usually he drove me around for as long as an hour,
going through a park, crossing main streets, suddenly stopping and reversing
himself, and all the time watching for other vehicles. When he seemed to be
r;atisried that no one had followed him, he parked in a spot quite distant from
r~ur meeting place, and we both got out of the car and discussed our business
while walking or standing out in the open. Afterward, he sometimes drove me to
the vicinity of my own car, but more often told me to take a cab. He always
?;ave me the time and location of the next meeting before we started on the
return trip, and also made careful arrangements for alternative meetings if we
should happen to miss each other. I usually wrote the details down, but could
never induce him to give me a sample of his handwriting.
Subject of Meetings
Novikov was as systematic in his approach toward my exploitation as he
:vas in his anti-surveillance precautions. Right at the beginning, he informed me
that he wanted to proceed "scientifically." First, he questioned me on my personal
history and background, then on my associates in the office, and finally on my
capability to provide information.
t)ne of the first things I got cleared for him was my job description, which
~.tated, truthfully, that I was working on general interrogation requirements as
swell as specific requirements on installations in the Soviet Union. Novikov im-
~nediately pounced on the latter and asked for as many details as possible.
9 Jnfortunately, it was subsequently decided that I could not give him such in-
i'ormation, and I had to figure out a very intricate retreat, involving a change
in my job description and a rearrangement of the functions attributed to other
office personnel.
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Dou61e Agent SECRET
Otherwise I had hardly any information for him at first. The fact that I
had not been cleared served as a temporary explanation, although it was some-
what difficult getting through a meeting with the pretense that :I knew
absolutely nothing. Novikov, however, was surprisingly patient, and even coun-
seled me to be patient too. He provided me with several hundred dollars;, which,
as always, I immediately turned over to the FBI, and told me to be careful, as
the time element was less important than the necessity for me to gain the
confidence of my associates.
I thus helped myself over the dismal present by making implied promises
for a more productive future. At the same time, I tried to get Novikov to give
some requirements, and to reveal something about himself and his superiors; I
thought it would be in character for me to be curious about those things.
Novikov, however, would only tell me that I was working for the benefit of the
Soviet Union, and that information of interest to the USSR was more important
to him than data pertaining to satellite countries. He advised me to use my
own intelligence in determining what information would be of interest to the
USSR. Beyond that, he never revealed anything-not even his own identity.
Clearance Procedures
In the early days, my official contact regarding all phases of the operation
was confined to the FBI. After I had stalled Novikov for a while, I kept asking
for the backlog of information which I thought I was supposed to receive. I was
told that there was some delay, and that in the meantime I should collect the
information myself and hand it to the FBI agent, who would hand it to the
clearing body, which would pass it back to the FBI agent, who could then
return the cleared items to me.
For some time, that was actually the way it worked. As I had not yet
received my clearance papers, however, I did not have a chance to do much
collecting. I could merely use some items which I had accidentally seen or
overheard, and I hated myself for handing them in. More to the point, that type
of information was neither voluminous nor significant enough to satisfy my
contact, especially because a fairly high percentage usually failed to get
cleared.
It was, I felt, an impossible situation. At one time, I asked the FBI whether
it would not be better to have me transferred to a different agency, preferably
G-2, where better working arrangements might be obtained. (I actually prepared
Novikov for a potential change to a "different intelligence agency," whereupon
he solicitously asked if, perhaps, I meant the Central Intelligence Agency. )
Finally, after some additional pressure, the Air Force came through with
my full clearance for the job, which helped the case as well as my morale. I had
to continue to collect my own information, however, and have it cleared by the
somewhat cumbersome procedure I outlined earlier. Usually I got my items
back so shortly before I was scheduled to meet Novikov that there seemed to
me to be too little time to clear up debatable points, weave the items into a
fitting cover story, and make my way to the meeting place. In addition, items once
cleared were occasionally withdrawn later. I was also told to volunteer nothing
and to give as little as possible, but instead to get Novikov to tell me what he
wanted.
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:iECRET Double Agent
My FBI contacts in those days gave me the impression that they appreciated
any difficulties, but could do little about them. After all, the FBI also had to
=wait for the items to be cleared. I was encouraged to do the best I could with
what I had. In retrospect, I can appreciate that my view of the goals of the
operation at that time may not have coincided with the concepts of those
who were setting the policy. At any rate, eventually I wrote a memorandum,
t~ointing out what I thought were the flaws in the working set-up, expressing
any conviction that they were endangering the operation, and making several
+~oncrete proposals, including one for direct contact between me and the
responsible organs of the Air Force. The memorandum was directed to, and
=,vidently vigorously supported by, the FBI. A short time later, I was called
into a joint conference of Air Force and FBI representatives. From then on,
1 had my own Air Force case officers, two senior colonels, whose efforts in my
behalf and in behalf of the operation I came to appreciate, especially when it
became evident to me that they were working with very limited resources.
i'olicy
To me, the purpose of the operation had seemed quite clear overseas, but
it was less clear in the United States. I knew, of course, that Novikov's identi-
a'ication had been useful to the FBI, and that the operation could help them to
+dentify some of his associates. I received no explicit guidance, however, as to the
Type of information I was supposed to provide, or what I was supposed to
,accomplish with it. Later, I heard that there was a policy to keep the case going
with a minimum of information. (This would be in keeping, of course, with a