STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1974
• Content Type: IS

Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001000 ,
SECRET
STUDI'rrS
IN
'TEN
IN, CE
VOL. 18 No. 4 WINTER 1974
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES, BLDGC
Approved For Releas
SECRET
2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T0b194A00040 }10007-49 9 1 25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET
25X1
Materials in the Studies are in general to be reserved to US per-
sonnel holding appropriate clearances. The existence of this journal is
to be treated as information privy to the US official community. All
copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered serially and
subject to recall.
25X1
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
25X1
Approved For Release 4
A000400010007-4 25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET
25X1
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may be
written on any theoretical, doctrinal, operational, or
historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or rejecting an
article rests with the Editorial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether or not, in the
opinion of the Board, the article makes a contribution
to the literature of intelligence.
DAVID S. BRANDWEIN LAWRENCE 11. HOUSTON
GEORGE A. CARVER, JR. RICHARD LEIIMAN
MAURICE C. ERNST WALTER L. PEORZIIEITIEII
SAYRE STEVENS
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TQ3194A000400010007-4
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may come from
any member of the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons
outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in
Intelligence, Room 5G29, Hq. and need not be coordinated or sub-
mitted through channels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced,
the original on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text
following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be classified
through Secret. Supplements, separately distributed, can accommodate articles
of higher classifications.
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office dissemina-
tion center or the responsible Central Reference Service des For back
issues and on other questions, call the Office of the Editor,
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AND
SHERMAN KENT AWARDS
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribution to the
literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the Studies. The prize may
be divided if the two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal
merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.
An additional $500 is available for other prizes.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any
subject within the range of the Studies' purview, as defined in its masthead, will
be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily on substantive origi-
nality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies
editorial board and staff are of course excluded from the competition.
The editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards but reserves
to itself exclusive competence in the decision.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2 :7TA717upits 1031 4A000400010007-4
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET
CONTENTS
Page
The Last Days of the FBIS Mediterranean Bureau ........ DENNis BEREND 1
An FBIS monitoring station is overrun by an invasion (SECRET)
General de Gaulle in Action ........... LIEUT. GEN.. VERNON A. WALTERS 39
Another recollection of the 1960 Summit Conference (CONFIDENTIAL)
Decision Trees ................................ EDWIN GREENLAW SAPP 45
Can information science techniques help the intelligence
analyst? (UNCLASSIFIED)
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature .................................. 59
Approved For ReleasIe 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TOO194A000400010007-4 25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET
An FBIS monitoring station is overrun
in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus
THE LAST DAYS OF THE FBIS MEDITERRANEAN BUREAU
Dennis Berend
The FBIS bureau in Cyprus, officially called Mediterranean Bureau but
better known as Medburcau among FBIS employees, is located about seven
miles west of Kyrenia and a mile north of Karavas on the island's north coast.
It stands in a serene setting of citrus and olive groves, less than a mile from
a beach where the sand still yields relics of earlier civilizations.
FBIS staffers who have spent tours of duty there since the bureau began
operations 25 years ago have considered it one of the most desirable posts FBIS
could offer. The beauty of the location alone, a shallow coastal plain between
the Mediterranean and the Kyrenia mountain range, would be worth a tour
of duty there. Describing his efforts to buy a house in Kyrenia, Lawrence Durrell
had said in his book, Bitter Lemons: "I had begun to feel guilty of an act of
fearful temerity in trying to settle in so fantastic a place." The relaxed style of
living in the small seaside town of Kyrenia also made an assignment there most
attractive.
But it all came to an end at dawn* Saturday, on 20 July 1974, when Turkish
forces invaded Cyprus. Three days later, the FBIS bureau would stand aban-
doned and shell-scarred. Weary employees and families, lucky to be alive,
would gather on beaches where they once enjoyed themselves, waiting to be
rescued. An operation that had accounted for 10 percent of all FBIS field bureau
reporting and that had covered some of the world's most crucial events would
be out of business.
The bureau previously had survived three other crises. EOKA terrorism
against British rule in 1955-56 became so widespread and violent that FBIS
families were given the option of leaving the island. No one did, and the bureau
continued its work. The outbreak of violence between the Greek and Turkish
communities at Christmas in 1963 ravaged part of Nicosia and spread elsewhere,
including the Kyrenia coast. At that time, the threat of an invasion from main-
land Turkey led to evacuation of FBIS dependents to Beirut. But the bureau
carried on. A new outbreak of, intercommunal violence in November 1967 again
forced. the evacuation of families to Beirut when a Turkish invasion appeared
imminent. Indications that it would take place in the area between Kyrenia
and Karavas led to a temporary closing of the bureau. But the operating staff
remained on the island and continued work at a communications site in Yero-
lakkos, on the outskirts of Nicosia.
*Various time references are used in this account, depending on the locale involved.
Washington time is four hours behind GMT and six hours behind Cyprus time. For example,
S7~pproved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A0004000100017-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
'SECRET 1815 Cyprus
Jpproved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040004
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
At 1651 GMT on 14 July, FBIS Headquarters in Rosslyn, Va., was notified
that its primary communications link with the bureau in Cyprus would
be interrupted for routine maintenance at 0001 GMT 15 July. The link is
part of the high-speed worldwide AUTODIN communications network. The
outage took place as scheduled. Since it was planned and routine, it caused no
particular concern in FBIS. A backup circuit via facilities of the Cyprus Tele-
communications Authority (CYTA), Cable & Wireless in England, and the FBIS
London Bureau immediately replaced the AUTODIN link.
Monday, 15 July
For FBIS, the new crisis actually began in the early hours Monday when
the backup link also went dead, without apparent reason and without warning,
at 0635 GMT on 15 July. One or the other of the circuits normally carried a
daily load of about 21,000 words of material monitored from the radios, press
agencies, and newspapers of 23 countries in 12 languages. Vital information
on such major developments as the 1956 Suez crisis, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-
Israeli wars, and the three Cyprus crises had reached Washington through these
channels. Now any new crisis in the eastern Mediterranean would catch Mcd-
bureau without the means of sending its monitored product to Washington.
But communications outages do happen, for a variety of reasons, and there
was no way of knowing that this one was in fact the first sign of a crisis.
At 0417 hours Washington time (0817 GMT) on 15 July the Reuter teletype
machine in the FBIS Wire Service office on the 11th floor of Key Building gave
out a series of bell sounds to indicate that an important report was coming up.
It was short: Air traffic between Beirut and Nicosia had been suspended at
the request of Cyprus. There were no details. Moments later, FBIS Wire Service
teleprinters in watch offices and operations centers throughout Washington
alerted duty officers to the report. Meanwhile the missing details already were
being flashed to FBIS headquarters from the Bangkok Bureau: AFP had re-
ported at 0814 GMT that President Makarios had "died" and that the Cyprus
radio was broadcasting martial music.
The item had barely cleared the FBIS Wire at 0434 Washington time when
Reuter rang the bell again, four minutes later, and reported that the Cyprus
National Guard had seized power on the island.
A full-blown crisis was in progress, and the FBIS bureau on the scene was
incommunicado.
In Washington, the Wire Service duty editor, alone on the job during the
midnight shift, already was initiating action to cope with the situation. Staff
officers were called out of bed and told what was happening. The London
Bureau was asked to help in trying to contact Mediterranean Bureau and quickly
:replied that all communications with Cyprus had been lost. Without much hope,
the Agency telephone operator was asked to put a call through to Cyprus. FBIS
bureaus in Okinawa, Bangkok, and London, as well as the BBC Monitoring
Service, were asked for fullest possible filing on the coup from secondary sources.
At 0925 GMT (0525 Washington time), a little over an hour after Reuter
had given the first indication of trouble, a ZZ precedence message arrived at the
5 kA ved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007.4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
Wire Service citing the Nicosia radio as announcing at 0707 GMT: "Half an hour
ago authority in the island came into the hands of the army." Incredibly, and
despite the communications outage, the message came from Medbureau. It had
found its way into a British military communications channel, and it was the
last bureau message containing monitored information to reach Washington for
48 hours. An immediate effort to reach the bureau through the same channel was
fruitless. The hope raised by the unexpected appearance of the message was short-
lived.
Several problems clearly had to be resolved: The Cyprus bureau presumably
was on the job, monitoring the sources giving first-hand information on the
coup-Greek and Turkish radios in Cyprus, Athens radio, Ankara radio-and
a way had to be found to get that information to Washington. Meanwhile, all
efforts had to be made to attempt coverage of the same sources elsewhere. In the
absence of such coverage, monitoring of secondary sources had to be stepped up to
fill at least part of the gap. And, not least, the Cyprus bureau's normal coverage,
particularly of the Arab world and Israel, had to be reconstituted somehow,
somewhere, and as soon as possible. The immediate needs had to be considered
along with long-range needs should the crisis worsen and become prolonged
through a renewal of intercommunal fighting-a strong possibility.
Difficult as the problems were, their. occurrence at this point was a blessing
in disguise. By the time the coastline around the Cyprus bureau became a battle-
ground five days later, FBIS was far along with solutions.
Shortly after noon on 15 July, FBIS Headquarters received a cable via Agency
communications from Medbureau. It consisted of a first report on what was
happening at the bureau: "Commercial communications out. Bureau employees
standing fast. Movement between Kyrenia and bureau controlled but we are
able to make bus run. Bureau staffing overnight shift. Bureau has only radio-tele-
phone communications with Embassy." Obviously, such a communications setup
would not be able to carry even a fraction of the bureau file.
As early as March 1974, FBIS had made exploratory contacts with the U.S.
military, who were establishing a new, highly sophisticated communications
network. One of the terminals was being set up in Cyprus.
FBIS now resumed these contacts at high level and met immediate willingness
to help and to cut red tape, although it was expected that some difficulties and
technicalities still w.)uld have to be ironed out.
Tuesday, 16 July
By noon on 16 July, Medbureau had reestablished a teletype link to the
Embassy in Nicosia, replacing the radio/ telephone link. A limited amount of
bureau monitoring output now could be transmitted to the Agency communica-
tions office at the Embassy. And, during a brief relaxation of the curfew that had
been imposed in Cyprus, the bureau dispatched an engineer/ technician to
Nicosia to help the already overburdened communications personnel transmit
material on to Washington. Some of these urgent items by now were more than
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000' fl
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
24 hours old. As it turned out, addressing technicalities and an insurmountable
backlog of high-precedence messages at the Embassy communications office
held up the FBIS traffic for another 24 hours, until the cooperation promised by
military communications began to pay off.
Wednesday, 17 July
During the early morning of 17 July, Cyprus bureau managed to get two
advisory messages to Washington via Agency communications. According to these
messages, the bureau had changed shifts normally that morning and was con-
tinuing full monitoring operations; its communications with the Embassy were
functioning, but various difficulties still shortcircuited the material at that
point. The bureau even suggested that the backlog material eventually might
have to be mailed-if and when mail service was restored.
FBIS Headquarters, still without first-hand reports from Cyprus nearly
48 hours after the coup, answered at 0623 Washington time: "We vitally need
monitored reports on Cyprus situation." ". . . some of our traffic should be
flowing through, but none is." Patience was wearing thin, and Headquarters
officers who had gotten little more than cat naps in two days and nights were
getting weary.
The CIA Office of Communications at Headquarters also was getting anxious,
and told in an urgent cable that morning: "There is high-level interest
at Headquarters in receiving FBIS Kyrenia traffic." "Request you begin relaying
FBIS traffic, if at all possible, within your capabilities."
The communications office in cabled its situation: "Even with two
operators, the volume of incoming and outgoing traffic (has) reached a point
where it (is) impossible for our comcenter to keep up with the load levied on
it by the Embassy nd by incoming traffic." Some of the FBIS
material on hand was being upgraded to flash precedence but still had to take
its place in the long queue. Meanwhile, the operators were "bleary-eyed and
dragging as a result (of) little sleep and constant hustling."
But things already were looking up elsewhere.
Work to link FBIS into the new military circuit bore fruit at 1124 Washington
time, when FBIS Headquarters communicators confirmed they were receiving
a test indicating the new Kyrenia-Washington circuit was complete and ready
to carry traffic. Thirteen minutes later, the first monitored item from the Cyprus
bureau appeared in FBIS Headquarters. It was a report on the departure from
Ankara of Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit for consultations in London. Almost
immediately after the item was received in Washington, the circuit failed be-
cause of technical trouble. There were three anxious hours at both ends until
communications were restored.
At 1420 Washington time on 17 July, Medbureau began filing its huge back-
log consisting, of course, of all the monitored Cyprus material as well as material
from the bureau's coverage of other countries. New items were interspersed.
WWYFoTved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001000754
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
Thursday, 18 July
More than 300 messages had come across the new circuit by 0800 Washington
time the next day, 18 July. By 1000 hours, the entire two-day Cyprus bureau
backlog had been cleared. FBIS was fully back in business.
Then a strange coincidence took place. At 1014 the new circuit failed again,
and at 1018 the CYTA circuit, as if by some planning miracle, suddenly opened
up again after an outage of 79 hours 43 minutes. The military circuit was to
remain silent for nearly 24 hours, until shortly before 0900 the following day,
19 July.
The restoration of communications had solved the initial problem of the
FBIS Daily Report, which on 15, 16 and 17 July had had to depend almost
entirely on press service reporting-spotty at best-to inform readers about
events in Cyprus. It was decided to publish the entire backlog "for the record"
since it represented a complete chronology of events-from the primary sources
themselves. This task was completed on 18 July, and the 19 July Daily Report
was fully current.
Meanwhile, Back in Washington....
The early loss of communications with Cyprus, the seriousness of the situa-
tion created by the overthrow of President Makarios, and previous experience
with Cyprus crises caused FBIS to prepare as early as 15 July for a major loss
of coverage not only of Cyprus but most of the Middle East. Even the eventual
restoration of communications, which easily might have instilled a sense of
euphoria, did not slow those preparations.
This determination resulted at least in part from the fact that most of the
decision-making echelon in FBIS, including the Director, the Chief of Opera-
tions, and the latter's deputy, had at one time or another served tours in Cyprus.
They were only too familiar with what had happened there in the past and
what might happen anytime.
Aside from various FBIS bureaus around the world assuming emergency
round-the-clock coverage of press agencies to keep up reporting on Cyprus
events, two major operations were initiated on 15 July in an effort, first of all,
to recapture at least some direct coverage of the island and, secondly, to pre-
pare for a prolonged disabling of the Cyprus bureau:
1. The BBC Monitoring Service was to send a small monitoring
team to one of the British "Sovereign Base Areas" (SBA) in Cyprus.
2. FBIS was to send a larger team to Tel Aviv, where a similar
emergency operation had been successful during the 1963-64 Cyprus
crisis.
Both operations naturally involved a mass of preparatory actions, including
documentation of personnel, selection of linguists, readying and transportation
of equipment, travel planning, establishment of communications, securing of
approval from other government agencies-the British Defense Ministry in the
BBC case, the State Department in the FBIS case.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A00040009Wl1T4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
The speed with which it was all accomplished speaks for the cooperation
of the governments and departments concerned.
The BBC team consisting of two monitors was in place at a Cyprus SBA
and filing its first reports on 17 July. A third monitor joined a few days later.
The team was capable only of handling Greek- and English-language broad-
casts, and much of its early monitoring of Cyprus radios in those languages
duplicated the efforts of the Cyprus FBIS bureau. But before the team was
finally withdrawn on 2 August, it made a very substantial contribution to the
coverage of Cyprus events.
The first member of the FBIS team for Tel Aviv, a British citizen, was a
long-time monitor for the Vienna Bureau who had retired a month earlier and
was living in Austria. Contacted by the bureaux' on 16 July, he immediately de-
clared himself ready and willing to go to Tel Aviv under a hastily drawn con-
tract. He arrived in Tel Aviv with a small receiver-recorder the afternoon of
18 July. Within two hours he had checked into a hotel, set himself up in the
American Embassy, and telephoned the London Bureau to report on what he
had heard so far. But his efforts, too, duplicated those of Medbureau. He was
told to stay put and continue to look for frequencies that could be monitored
in case of need. He would be needed three days later. Washington, meanwhile,
was asking the Embassy in Tel Aviv to provide him limited communications
support.
Friday, 19 July
A six-member FBIS team left Washington late on 19 July for Paris and a
connecting flight to Tel Aviv. The team was headed by a former Cyprus bureau
deputy chief and included two Arab linguists (one of them quickly "borrowed"
from the Voice of America), one Hebrew linguist, one technician, and one tele-
type operator. A complete equipment. package weighing 800 pounds prepared
by the FBIS Engineering Staff left for Tel Aviv via air cargo two days later.
It consisted of four receivers, three cassette transcribers, 10 cassette recorders,
an off-line tape-punch teletype machine (affectionately known as an "iron
horse"), as well as tools, meters, cables, and antennas.
Also on 19 July, the Medbureau Chief, who had been on TDY in London
and who had been stranded there for lack of flights during the week of the coup,
finally was able to return to his bureau. Before he did, however, he bought a
supply of high-protein rations and stopped off at the Embassy in Nicosia to
get five American flags for use at the bureau should an invasion take place.
As the week of 14 July drew to a close, the news from Cyprus went from
bad to worse. By Friday, 19 July, it had become ominous: Turkish forces were
boarding ships in southern Turkish ports. Tourists and journalists were being
told to leave two southern Turkish provinces where military activity was intense.
Landing craft were seen leaving ports and heading for Cyprus.
It had all happened twice before, during the 1960's, and FBIS personnel
in Washington and Cyprus were having lively discussions on whether Turkey
this time would make good its threat, or whether this would be merely another
show of force to improve bargaining positions.
p1 ved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001000774
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
Saturday, 20 July
During a normal night, only a technician would have been on duty at
Medbureau between 0000 and 0500 GMT as a watch officer to tend the receivers
and the teletype machines. But the coup and subsequent events that week had
necessitated long working hours and round-the-clock staffing.
Dawn of 20 July thus saw 14 Americans and 18 foreign national employees
of FBIS at the bureau and the adjacent houses of the Chief and the Chief
Engineer. The American complement consisted of the Chief and his wife, an
editor, the engineer and his wife and son, and seven Marine guards. The 14th
American was a visitor in the Chief's house, the daughter of a former Director
of FBIS who had been the bureau's first chief 25 years earlier.
The foreign national members of the team included teletypists, technicians,
and monitors for Greek, Turkish, Arabic and other languages. FBIS at all its
overseas bureaus recruits most of its linguists and other specialists from the
local population and from other countries where the needed language skills
are available. This often produces compositions of people which anywhere else
would be considered unusual if not unthinkable. Medbureau was typical:
Palestinian Arabs displaced by the creation of Israel worked side by side with
monitors hearing Israeli passports. Greeks and Greek Cypriots worked side by
side with Turks and Turkish Cypriots. As elsewhere in FBIS, they considered
themselves first of all professionals, members of one team, colleagues, often
friends. They considered it poor form to take sides in conflicts.
Shortly after daybreak, a Marine guard stationed on the roof of Medbureau
spotted a fleet of warships, presumably Turkish, close to shore near the bureau.
Almost simultaneously, two monitors reported that both AFP in French and
either the Beirut or Amman Domestic Service had broadcast flash items about
Turkish landings on Cyprus. The duty editor whipped off his own three-line flash
to Headquarters, including the on-the-spot observations; woke the Bureau Chief
at his house nearby; and set off the alarm rousing the offduty swingshift men
who were sleeping in side rooms at the bureau.
From the Bureau Chief's report:
Everyone knows when it all began, but perhaps I should record
the duty editor's words to me just before he pressed the alarm bell. He
said: "Get your ass over here. The Turks are landing." I would like to
have been summoned with more dignity, but I got the message. I was
at the bureau in 60 seconds. It was two days before I realized that my
shirttail was still out.
At 0532 local time, the bureau monitored a report from a Turkish Cypriot
radio station saying that Kyrenia was under artillery attack. The people at the
bureau hardly needed the confirmation. They had just flashed a message to
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040009E1OO4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
FB1S Cyprus SECRET
Washington, based on reporting from Marines who had gone to the roof of the
operations building to see what was happening:
"Planes, which the Marines believe are F-4's, are flying over
bureau. We have put flags on roof. We can hear bombs."
The FBIS Wire Service in Rosslyn was running a declaration dealing with
the Mexican President's visit to Argentina. This was unceremoniously abandoned
in mid-sentence at 2318 Washington time (still on 19 July) to make way for
a Reuter bulletin: "Turkish forces have intervened in Cyprus-official."
The duty editor then made the required series of telephone calls alerting
senior FBIS officers as well as major operations centers and watch offices
throughout Washington. The FBIS management arrived at Key Building within
half an hour.
In Kyrenia:
In the town of Kyrenia itself, off-duty FBIS employees and their families
awoke to the sound of explosions, gunfire, and low-flying jet aircraft. A drowsy
editor at first thought his young son had discovered a new game to create un-
reasonable noises at an unreasonable hour. One American staff member, who
had been roused by the humidity an hour earlier, probably was a witness to
the first shots of the invasion. From his balcony, where he was waiting for the
0500 VOA newscast, he saw high-flying planes apparently making reconnaissance
runs. A gun emplacement on the Kyrenia castle, at the harbor, opened fire
on the planes. Moments later the planes made their first low-level attack runs
over Kyrenia.
The first bombs seemed to be hitting a Greek Cypriot National Guard camp
located between 200 and 500 yards from several homes occupied by FBIS
people.
In Washington:
FBIS officers in Washington, including the Director and the Chief of
Operations, met in the small office of the Wire Service Chief, adjoining the wire
editorial room and the communications center, at first only to. look at incoming
messages and to get "read in" on the situation. It was midnight in Washington.
Developments came so rapidly, however, that those in the room would not
or could not take the time to move to their own offices. Such a move, at any
rate, would have required them to stay in almost constant telephone contact'
with each other. They automatically did the most logical thing under the cir-
cumstances: they stayed. Additional chairs were pulled in, office supplies ap-
peared in great quantities, and within an hour the office had taken on the
character of a military command post, a little chaotic in the first heat of battle,
but functioning. It remained staffed round the clock for 96 hours, with the
Director and the Chief of Operations generally present during the hours coin-
ciding with daylight in Cyprus, while their deputies took the Cyprus night
hours. The carpeted executive offices a floor below remained virtually unused.
Team Enroute to Tel Aviv Grounded
The jetliner carrying the six-member FBIS team on its way to Tel Aviv
touched down in Paris early that morning. The team, suffering the normal jet
SRC~~;ved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001000? 4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
lag, got off to switch to the scheduled Tel Aviv flight. Instead, they learned
that a Turkish invasion was under way in Cyprus and that all flights that
would have to cross the war zone had been cancelled. The team was diverted
to Ronne instead, still in the hope that El Al might fly to Tel Aviv from there.
Precautions in Kyrenia
One of the nearly 170 FBIS people, including dependents, at home in
Kyrenia as the fighting began was the bureau's Deputy Chief. Ile had returned
home the night before, after a week-long unbroken stint at the bureau as acting
chief. His presence in town was fortunate. Ile now was able to provide the
leadership which such a large and scattered group needed if it was to act as a
group and if there was to he any semblance of organization.
A warden system, long established and successful during earlier troubles
in Cyprus, came to his aid. Under the system, personnel were assigned certain
areas of Kyrenia and were responsible for contacting colleagues living within
their area if there was trouble requiring dissemination of information and
instructions.
Making use of the system, the Deputy Chief sent out his first instructions:
"Stay put. Keep to the center of your houses, preferably in windowless halls."
One problem of our warden system was the difficulty of contacting
people who did not have phones. In fact, the surprising continued func-
tioning of the telephone system was the only thing that kept the warden
system workable under fire. We had plans about how we might spread
some kind of alert without phones, but under fire or curfew it could have
been undertaken only in the direst need.
In the course of the morning, it seemed certain that Kyrenia would become
a battleground. Landings had taken place outside town, and the National Guard
was establishing positions oh rooftops and along streets to make a stand. Air-
craft were strafing and bombing, there was an almost constant rattle of small
arms fire, and ships offshore were shelling the hills just south of Kyrenia.
Medbureau's Reports
Interspersed among the steady stream of monitored material which began
pouring into FBIS Headquarters from Medbureau were further messages based
on observations from the roof of the bureau. Contents ranged from matter-of-
fact reporting to wry humor to earnest pleas for prayer. Even the appearance of
these messages changed gradually as the situation worsened. Early ones still
adhered strictly to format. Later ones, often hand-keyed by people sitting on
the floor to avoid shrapnel, looked ragged, garbled, full of errors. Format
finally went by the wayside completely.
Collations of the messages were sent to all FBIS field bureaus to keep
them advised as the battle wore on. Individual messages also were sent via the
FBIS Wire Service to the CIA Operations Center and other selected consumers.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001900AE4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
Early bureau reports speak for themselves: (all times GMT)
0335-"Rooftop observation confirms plane bombing village of Ayios
Ycoryios [St. George], three miles from Kyrenia, and that ground forces are
responding with rifle fire."
0400-"There has just been some machinegun fire so close (we) hit the
floor. Planes are strafing the main road. The UN in Kyrenia says that it is
telling people to head for the UN? sector. Movement is not possible. People
are gathering in lemon grove near bureau."
0414-"Eighteen C-47's have just flown over Kyrenia with doors open.
They were not fired on."
0425-"The Marines on the roof say they can see ships firing on the land.
The planes we saw go overhead with doors open now are coming back empty.
Still have phones to Kyrenia. Two destroyers are five hundred yards off Kyrenia."
(At this point (0436) the FBIS Chief of Operations wired the bureau:
"Keep personal observations coming and also reports you get by phone from
reliable sources. Interested, in eyewitness accounts of any landings or visual
sightings of Turks on land.")
0516-"The area within 500 yards of the bureau was shelled by destroyers
off the coast. Three destroyers and one gunboat steaming west were fired on
by army camp west of bureau and fire returned. Shelling lasted 18 minutes. Shells
landed near army camp, in village behind camp, and near Zephyros Hotel.*
As soon as ships started shelling, we put flags on seaward side of building.
There are now heavy Greek troop movements from Kyrenia toward Karavas,
according to phone information." (See Figure 2)
0525-"We have seen 40 choppers going toward Nicosia over the pass on the
main Kyrenia-Nicosia road. Planes are back overhead. Jets are rocketing area
along main road from Kyrenia to Karavas about 400 yards from us."
0533-"There are 25 landing craft coming this way. They will land about
three miles east of Karavas. There are more in the mist just coming into view."
0547-"The landing craft are now about 11/z miles offshore and they seem
to be sailing almost directly toward us. It appears that they are headed toward
the Zephyros Hotel, north of bureau. Public power has just gone off and we
are using our generator. Now rockets and strafing 500 yards west of bureau."
(The FBIS Director, working in the command post, now sent a message to
the bureau: "We are at wire room following your reports. Continuing operations
extraordinary and deeply appreciated. Our hearts are with you all.")
The Landing
0605-"The landing craft have come into land and gone out of our view. The
landing must have taken place. Plane just rocketed area near here. Lots of
*This $14,000,000 hotel, less than a mile from the Bureau, had been completed only
three months earlier.
Akefdved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100d71-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET FINS Cyprus
FBIS
Complex
Bureau
Chief's
Home
Chief i n
Engneer`s
OWWORW. Home
. r ?ZeRhyros Hotel
HMS Hermes
r_apithos
Karavas
Scale 1:100,000
Elevations and contours in meters
~ooo
1- 60DO I-.
Fig. 2. Kyrenia area, north coast of Cyprus.
machinegun fire. We arc also reporting to Embassy from roof. Spent 20-mm
shells landed outside door."
0620-"It is strangely quiet for the first time after a considerable amount
of strafing and rocketing about 300 yards from here. The spent shells which fell
all around us have the following marking: `20 mm M105' and in the line below,
`MKE 1 72.' Thanks for message. It means a lot to all of us."
4uproved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000JLI-C9RJT4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
0707-"All still quiet near bureau except for occasional jet whooshing over-
head but not firing."
0741-"The small landing craft landed about an hour ago and now larger
landing craft are less than 1,000 yards offshore, the kind we used to call
LST's. We can hear heavy firing from the sea. Planes are flying overhead
directing fire. Some shells, according to our Marines on roof, arc landing in
Lapithos. We have not seen any Turkish troops."
0749-"Report over radio link with Embassy Nicosia says Greek National
Guard setting up machinegun positions on roof of Hilton Hotel, Nicosia.
Americans inside advised to stay in corridors at all times and to avoid lobby
area."
0828-"Phone reports from Kyrenia state many Turkish helicopters flying
over city with Greek National Guardmen firing from rooftops at them. Ac-
tivity near bureau picked up short while ago with jets strafing and rocketing
nearby hills."
0841-"At present we are only concentrating on Cyprus situation and
intend to keep filing as long as possible. Hopefully no significant reports will
be missed while ducking under desks, preparing for evacuation, etc. Nearby
air-to-ground attacks have reduced in past hour."
(The FBIS Chief of Operations wired the bureau at 0847 to advise that its
reports were being ripped off the machines at the CIA Operations Center one
by one and avidly read. He added: "It is a great show, but keep your heads
down,")
Arrangements at Headquarters
One of the first actions of the FBIS command post in Rosslyn was to dele-
gate a senior staff member to the CIA Operations Center in the Headquarters
Building to maintain liaison with the Center and the DDO Cyprus Task Force.
The idea was to get an immediate reading on Agency and other communications
traffic with bearing on the FBIS bureau situation and to coordinate all actions
with the Agency components concerned.
The liaison proved so effective that senior staffers, most of them with
Cyprus bureau experience, continued doing shifts at the Operations Center
until nearly 1700 on 24 July, when FBIS personnel had been evacuated from
Cyprus.
Early efforts to determine what contingency planning existed for an evacua-
tion of Americans from Cyprus were frustrating and yielded nothing conclusive.
A number of calls to the State Department later during the crisis led to the
conclusion that no firm evacuation plans existed.
Contrary to the experience a week earlier, communications with the bureau
held up well on 20 July. Curiously, the commercial CYTA link was fully func-
tional much of the time. Conjecture in Washington was that the Cypriots them-
selves urgently required the services of CYTA, and no one at CYTA had time
to consider "pulling the plug" on FBIS.
SE4 'oved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100QV-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
But with mounting evidence that fighting on the island was spreading and
intensifying by the hour, the FBIS command post had to anticipate that com-
munications could break down completely at any moment.
In Cyprus, too, the telephone and other means of communications continued
to function well. This and the warden system made it possible for the Deputy
Chief to advise the bureau and, by extension, Washington fairly early in the day
that most employees and their families had been accounted for and that there
had been no injuries so far.
The Administrative Staff of FBIS in Rosslyn immediately went into action
and by early morning (Washington time) was passing the information to anxious
relatives on the east coast. As the day went on, people in places farther west also
were called. Working in round-the-clock shifts, administrative officers contacted
the emergency addressees about every eight hours throughout the crisis with the
latest information. It was not always as simple a task as might be imagined.
The parents of the Medburcau Chief's house guest were at a fishing camp in the
northeastern United States and were finally contacted by way of a nearby store.
Close relatives of some of the Marine guards also had no telephones and had to be
contacted through various police agencies.
Chief Editor Isolated
At the same time deep concern developed in Cyprus and Washington for
the bureau's Chief Editor and his wife, the only Americans not accounted for.
They were living in an isolated area close to the beach outside Kyrenia, and the
last time they had been heard from was the evening of 19 July, when they reported
that they would seek shelter in their basement in case of trouble.
The Chief Editor had gone home for the first time that evening after a
week at the bureau. With him at the house were his wife and seven house guests.
When the fighting began, the group went to the basement for what the Chief
Editor later described as "an uneventful stay" of two days. Their telephone had
gone dead almost as soon as the invasion began. They later theorized that it must
have happened when a nearby house took a direct hit during the first hour of
fighting.
Another small group of employees, including the bureau's American Ad-
ministrative Officer, was isolated at a monitor's summer cottage on the edge of
the water about half-way between Kyrenia and the bureau, a place named
Tiger Bay. With fighting at times going on immediately next to the cottage,
the group had no choice but to sit out the invasion.
Saturday Afternoon
By afternoon in Cyprus, the Deputy Chief, after consultation with the Chief,
reached the decision to send the FBIS employees and their families to the
Finnish UN camp located in the mountains just above Kyrenia, along the Kyrenia-
Nicosia road. It seemed an infinitely safer place than Kyrenia and its prospects
of house-to-house fighting. A BBC report-erroneous as it turned out-that
the entire Kyrenia-Nicosia road already was under Turkish control led to the
assumption, and quite naturally so, that the UN camp along that road would be
out of the line of fire.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000199ORE4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
Later in the afternoon, 127 FBIS people, including all the Americans who
had been in Kyrenia except the Chief Editor's party, had made their way to
the camp in private cars. Believing that a fight for Kyrenia would not last
long in view of apparent Turkish strength, few brought more than barest
essentials. They expected to be back home by the next day at the latest, and
they expected the camp to have more facilities and supplies than it actually
had. Also, surely an evacuation effort was under way.
One of first benefits derived from the move to the camp was that the
Deputy Chief was able to report to the bureau by radio that the Kyrenia families
were safe and in a group. (The Administrative Officer and his party, of course,
were still at Tiger Bay.) Word of the move also quickly made its way to FBIS
headquarters in Rosslyn. One major worry to both places apparently could
be discarded, at least for the time being. Any concrete plan for evacuation
now would be greatly aided by the fact that nearly all FBIS people were in two
coherent groups-at the bureau and at the camp.
While the people at the camp eventually found themselves in grave danger
as a result of heavy fighting around the camp, there is no doubt that most of them
were better off than they would have been in their homes. Official visits to these
homes some weeks after the fighting showed that several of them had hundreds of
bullet holes in the inside wall. It was reported that bodies had been found in
some of the homes.
As night fell on 20 July, the FBIS contingent bedded down for whatever sleep
they could get under the sheltering stand of trees. They did not get much.
Heavy fire fights broke out in the pass, and although none of the fire was aimed
at the camp, the noise alone was enough to keep people awake.
A Turkish enclave, consisting of a small town and a military camp was
located just south of the mountain range, not far from where the main road
comes off the mountains and into the inland plain. Turkish forces apparently
set down there by helicopter were beginning to fight their way north through
the mountains, intent on linking up with the forces that had been landed at
Kyrenia.
This put the UN camp squarely in the path of battle.
The Evacuation Question
The evacuation picture, which had begun with frustration, remained un-
certain throughout 20 July. The main question in everyone's mind was whether
an evacuation from the battle area in northern Cyprus would be possible at all
as long as the fighting was going on. Another consideration was that so long
as communications with Medburcau were holding up, the bureau was able to
provide invaluable information. Should not, therefore, at least a skeleton crew
remain at the bureau even if the rest were evacuated? And, finally, if there
was to be general evacuation, the bureau's foreign national employees, including
Cypriots, certainly would have to be brought along if FBIS coverage of the
Middle East was to be reconstituted elsewhere. Quite aside from humane con-
siderations, the language capabilities of those employees were essential.
SEWoved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010d(!-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
An early morning Agency cable to
pointed out that any evacuation would have to include all persons designated by
the Bureau Chief in Cyprus. The cable further urged that the Greek and Turkish
governments be made aware of the presence of the FBIS installation on the
coast, an annex of the Nicosia Embassy.
By early evening Cyprus time, Ambassador Davies in Nicosia came in with
a long cable outlining evacuation planning. He emphasized that it was "very
tentative," subject to the rapidly changing military situation. He made the
following points:
1. Nicosia airport had to be ruled out as departure point since it
continued to be a main military target.
2. A large convoy from Nicosia to one of the British bases in the
south might work if there was a firm cease-fire and if the belligerents
could give adequate assurance of safe passage. The Ambassador doubted
this. He also had bad news for FBIS:
3. "We see no conceivable safe way to move FBIS personnel and
other Americans on northern shore through battle lines." The only way
would be by sea, and the British High Commission shared this view
as regarded the large British community around Kyrenia. The Sixth
Fleet would have to move a ship with helicopter capability to the
north coast.
4. Close contact with the High Commission would be maintained
through the night, and citizens of both countries would be kept advised
of evacuation plans by the British Forces Broadcasting Service (BFBS)
in Cyprus.
A little later, the Sixth Fleet advised that it was planning to send ships to
the area off a British base the next day. There was no mention of the north coast.
Shortly after 2300 Washington time, the Agency cabled the U.S. military
command in Stuttgart, Germany: "FBIS installation in Kyrenia-Karavas area is
in danger of being beleaguered as new wave of Turkish landings and fighting
envelopes residential area where approximate 174 FBIS American and third
country national employees and dependents reside." The cable suggested a
helicopter evacuation and provided descriptions and grid coordinates of possible
helicopter landing zones (HLZ) in the area. However, it was pointed out that
the actual selection of HLZ's would have to be made by the evacuees them-
selves since only they would know where they could safely go.
More Bureau Reports
The afternoon and evening brought no relief to the bureau, as its situa-
tion reports show: (times GMT)
1036-"Planes are flying overhead but have done no rocketing or bombing
nearby since last report. We probably will have to do with the staff we have
here for at least another 24 hours. The ships offshore seem to be thinning out
and two destroyers are cruising slowly toward Kyrenia. One is remaining offshore
of station, The largest group of choppers seen totaled 44 at 1014 Cyprus time.
25X1
Apl*oved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000101br9jT
 treeduFor Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400051000ZT4
They were seen returning to their base at sea. We still have not seen a single
Turkish soldier. Strangely the phone system is working, and one of our Turkish
employees called from Nicosia. Right at this moment Marine came in to say every-
thing was quiet, both here and Nicosia. Also, just had a call from Kyrenia.
Everything there also relatively quiet."
1345-"We just saw two medium tanks, one light tank, four armored
personnel carriers, with approximately 10 men each and supporting machinegun
for each vehicle, and five unarmed jeeps with four men each heading toward
Kyrenia on main road. This Greek convoy was in good discipline and proceeding
about 10 miles an hour. They are moving in short spurts to avoid aircraft."
1352-(Bureau Chief )-"Helicopters continue in waves of as many as 60
to take troops through pass on main road from Kyrenia to Nicosia. Around
bureau there has been a firefight in progress. The shelling from ships is getting
very heavy and sounds like bigger stuff than earlier today. The big guns are
firing once or twice a minute, some of it about three miles away and some of
it possibly farther away. Ships firing are strung out off coast. There is no way
we can move or get relief. It has become clear that if we are to get out of
here it will have to be by sea. Without going into further detail, believe I can
assure you that this is thinking of Embassy. We will have to go separately. I
have some of our people resting now. Those still left are noble ones indeed.
Phone ringing constantly. Americans asking for help we cannot give. Have
drafted my wife as editor. No one here or in Kyrenia has seen a single Turkish
soldier or tank. Still cannot make contact with Chief Editor. House near theirs
took a shell but their house seems to be upright. Our house guest is at bureau
and cooking us meals. This all local color for now."
(The FBIS Director replied at 1433: "I have been assured that sea or heli-
copter evacuation is planned if possible. Advise as soon as possible when you
recommend action, with Ambassador's concurrence if possible, without if con-
tact is lost. First concern of course is dependents and any employees not ab-
solutely essential to maintain operations so long as operations remain other-
wise possible.")
1639-"Greek Cypriot soldiers took over some of the houses of bureau
employees and erected gun emplacements over them, After changing houses
a few times, Kyrenia Americans and some foreign nationals have headed for
Finnish UN camp on main Kyrenia-Nicosia road. Some Americans, and pos-
sibly most of them, are now there, having passed through Greek roadblock.
Kyrenia Greeks went to Bellapais. Bombing and strafing near bureau continued
for several hours. We have been ordered to black out lights tonight. We will
continue filing. Any evacuation of dependents and nonessential personnel will
have to be by sea, Embassy believes. Am still in contact with Embassy but am
gradually losing contact with staff whose radios have apparently gone dead for
lack of power. If we lose contact for any reason connected with these events,
we will try to restore operations as long as there is the slightest hope. Then we will
try to keep together to get started again whenever and wherever we can."
(The FBIS Director wired the bureau at 1729: "We continue to follow
your reporting very closely. The DD/I says that all are very pleased with
SECRET 17
Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
bureau reporting and performance of all concerned. He relays his boss's com-
pliments.")
1739-"We are in blackout condition at moment with limited lighting,
making AFP coverage almost impossible. Please ask either Okinawa or Panama
to file AFP reports on mideast till further notice. FYI, heat pretty bad with
windows boarded up and no air conditioning-place would make good com-
mercial for Right Guard."
(The Wire Service duty editor replied at 1806: "Appreciate your situation.
It's a real stinker.")
2039-(Bureau Chief)-"We have put up blackout materials and are ready
for the night. The Kyrenia range is ablaze east and west as far as I can see.
There are literally hundreds of fires. I have made contact with Kyrenia Ameri-
cans who are now in the Finnish UN camp and therefore in UN hands. Our
power will last unless there is a mishap during the night or early morning
hours when we expect resumption of activity. Our Marines, monitors, engineers,
and teletypists have sustained themselves beyond what I would have thought
possible. The Lord has been with us today. For those of you in the wire room
who pray, please remember us."
(The FBIS Deputy Director, who had now spelled the Director, replied
at 2056: "Your file and your spirit are overwhelming. We are all praying.")
2325-"Local situation outside bureau relatively quiet. Will see what the
dawn brings."
Some 12 hours after the beginning of the invasion, the bureau finally aban-
doned its coverage of radio stations outside the immediate area of concern. A
Baghdad radio item citing Iraqi Foreign Ministry reaction to Cyprus events and
a Beirut radio item reporting the Lebanese Prime Minister's visit that day to Syria
were the last items from such coverage to leave the bureau. It was shortly after
1600 GMT.
Activity in Washing on
The stream of Cyprus material pouring into FBIS Headquarters made it
obvious early in the game that the Daily Reporting Division, normally off duty
on weekends, would have to go into action immediately if it was to cope with
the mountains of information. The decision was made to publish a special Cyprus
issue of the Daily Report dated Sunday, 21 July.
A team of editors and typists went to work on Saturday and Sunday to put
the issue together. Printing Services Division, too, cooperated by printing the 68-
page book on Sunday evening. Consumers found it on their desks Monday morn-
ing. Included were 150 items from Medbureau itself, supplemented by material
from other sources. The index alone provided a comprehensive chronology of
events. The book covered material monitored as recently as 0600 GMT 21 July.
Some of those who worked on the issue had a personal stake in the crisis.
Two of the young women editors involved had just seen off their husbands, former
FBIS monitors, to London and Tel Aviv to help with the emergency redistribution
of Cyprus coverage then under way.
4 proved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040003009FT4
 AL preyped For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000S10.DD7T4
Another such "coverage widow," wife of the man heading the Tel Aviv team,
spent her weekend helping type the special issue. One editor-linguist who had
been working on the issue Saturday was on a plane heading for Tel Aviv on Sun-
day. (Meanwhile the team headed for Tel Aviv was still grounded in Rome.)
Staffs of the Wire Service and the Communications Branch had to be aug-
mented beginning Saturday to handle the load. Of the record 291 items appearing
on the FBIS Wire during the GMT day of 20 July, only 58 were unrelated to
Cyprus events, and 22 of these appeared before the invasion reportage began. The
Cyprus bureau contributed 130 items-nearly half the entire run. The Argentine-
Mexican declaration which had had to yield early in the day finally made the wire
10 hours later. Wire wordage that day was 66,500-nearly twice that of a normal
day.
An FBIS engineer in Rosslyn on the evening of 20 July was giving thought to
what might be done if all communications with Medbureau should break down.
Even if the worst should happen and the bureau should not be able to communi-
cate with Headquarters, could one not at least maintain a one-way link from
Headquarters to the bureau? The engineer came up with a relatively simple
solution: The bureau was a monitoring station with the capability of receiving
and printing radioteletype traffic. Why not give the bureau a frequency to tune
in on and then have an Agency communications facility somewhere transmit a
signal that the bureau could intercept? The engineer called the Agency's Office
of Communications with his proposal. There had to be fast action. If other com-
munications broke down, it might become impossible even to give the bureau a
frequency. And a little time was needed to test such a hookup and to get confirma-
tion that it was working.
Shortly after midnight Washington time, the Agency's communications facil-
ity in Athens began transmitting a test beamed at Cyprus. The bureau confirmed
that it was hearing the signal but added that it was having trouble getting the
signal printed out on its teletype machines. After several hours of ironing out
technical matters, the bureau at last confirmed that it now was receiving and
printing the signal. The bureau in effect was able from then on to "monitor" in-
structions sent to it from Headquarters. It was a first for FBIS, and it came none
too soon.
Communications via the CYTA circuit were becoming more and more erratic,
and outages were getting longer. There was bad news, too, about the military link.
The Bureau Chief wired at 2240 GMT (0040 on 21 July Cyprus time, 1840 on 20
July Washington time) that he had just been notified the personnel manning the
Cyprus end of the link might have to evacuate their site. "If they leave," he said,
"we are satisfied that we will lose contact with Washington. Feel tomorrow is the
critical day. As I write this, heavy shelling from the sea resumed for about seven
minutes."
Sunday, 21 July
The GMT day of 21 July, it was clear in Washington and in Cyprus, would
bring rapid and critical developments in the bureau's situation, evacuation plan-
ning, communications and in the war situation itself:
0053 GMT-(Bureau message) -"Considerable firing in immediate area. All
lights out and employees in safchaven [center hallway of operations building].
SnRE1
For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
Heavy mortar fire and intensive small arms as well as machinegun fire in area
immediately east of bureau."
0110-( Bureau message)-"It is much quieter here at this moment but may
hot up again any time. In fact, mortar has started firing again but not to earlier
extent."
0120-FBIS Headquarters is advised officially that the Cyprus end of the
military communications link will cease operations at 0200 to permit personnel
to evacuate. The equipment is to be destroyed. In fact, the link continues to op-
erate for another six hours.
0134-An Agency cable from ays evacuation planning at that point
is incomplete and unapproved for lac o JCS orders that the military instead
of the State Department carry out such a mission. "Responsibility continues rest
with State," the message says. It adds, however, that Sixth Fleet vessels are being
.sent to the south coast of Cyprus for evacuation of refugees from there-if JCS
approves. Such an evacuation could include people from an overland convoy from
Kyrenia, the cable says. The FBIS staff officer on duty at the CIA Operations
Center underscores this passage and makes the pencil notation "hopeless" in the
margin. The cable further proposes that ships be sent to the north coast and that
they could be on station by early light of 22 July. The cable notes that the Euro-
pean Command was advised of Headquarters concern for the safety and evacua-
tion of FBIS personnel.
0147-(Bureau mesage )-"During lull, want to tell you about situation. At
0025 GMT exchanges of artillery fire began between two forces. There have been
exchanges of artillery fire over the roof of the bureau. The battle expected will
begin about two miles east of bureau and will move toward Kyrenia. For the first
time we heard the low loud whistle of artillery rounds over bureau. We are re-
ceiving pieces of debris from rounds which are exploding near the bureau. For the
time being quiet, and it will be light in about 20 minutes."
0240-The incoming teletype machine at FBIS Headquarters suddenly begins
the rapid garbling which indicates that the circuit has been disrupted. At 0245
the machine resumes printing normally with the following message: "We just got
a hit. No injuries but considerable damage. Lost circuit breakers was reason for
outage. First aid room was hit and wiped out. We will try to salvage some items
should they be needed."
0251-(Bureau message)-"We still have telephone to the Embassy. Situa-
tion very grim. Heavy shelling continues. Day has just broken here. Chief was in
contact with Deputy who is at the UN camp and he reports much shelling but all is
well. CUL [cablese for "see you later"] hopefully."
0318-A message goes out from FBIS Headquarters to the London Bureau
with a request that the monitor in Tel Aviv be told to get ready for operations.
0319-(Bureau message)-"We have recovered the timing fuse-all this ac-
cording to our Marines-and it was an 81 mm M-51 A 5. It is American-made. This
is a mortar shell."
A~Sroved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010F4T
 .A preyvedsFor Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A000400%' 4
0327-(Bureau mesage)-"The Texan in many windows blew in, and the
glass panes in the door between the canteen and the lobby shattered. One of the
Marines had a very narrow escape. We are taking advantage of our experience
and are keeping to safehaven except for minimal operation which we consider
essential. We are monitoring Greek and, Turkish programs. The planes are back
and firing at this time. We think the fight is about to start. CUL, hopefully."
0403-The first item from the Tel Aviv monitor arrives at FBIS Headquarters.
He had dictated it to the London Bureau over the telephone. The item is from the
Nicosia radio and charges that Turkish forces have attacked civilians, particularly
the Famagusta hospital.
0505-(Bureau message) -"Turkish jets have returned in force with strafing
runs on nearby hills; sonic booms seem worse than actual gunfire."
0514-FBIS learns that evacuation of the Cyprus military communications
site has been postponed.
0735-The editor at the Cyprus bureau signs off on the last monitored item
to come from the bureau. Heavy fighting in the bureau area begins at that point
to make it impossible to tend the recording and playback equipment, to translate
material and to file it to Washington. The last item, monitored from the Turkish
Cypriot radio, says that the second phase of the invasion is about to begin. It adds:
"Landing craft which will land more troops on the island are ready, waiting for
orders, near landing areas off the Kyrenia shore."
0747-FBIS Headquarters sends a message to London, asking that the Tel
Aviv monitor be told to start filing material. "We have gotten nothing substantive
from Medbureau for two hours," the message adds.
0759-(Bureau message)-"We have almost ceased operation preliminary
to evacuation. No time yet available (and I expect it will be hours away)."
0802-(Bureau mesage )-"Note that in my previous I said almost rpt almost
ceased operation. We are still monitoring local radios."
0848-The military communications link with Cyprus fails at last. Personnel
at the Cyprus end leave the site.
Sunday Afternoon
1232-The CYTA communications channel is still working intermittently.
Medbureau makes use of it and reports: "We have had to abandon operation due
to extremely heavy bombing. We are awaiting evacuation but no time set. Possibly
may not come today."
1240-(Bureau message) -"Trying to continue operation after what appears
to be takeover by Turks although fighting still continuing in this area."
1256-A message from the Nicosia Embassy gives the number and location of
FBIS personnel and their dependents, as well as foreign employees. It notes par-
ticularly that the bureau's Chief Editor and his wife still are unaccounted for. It
adds: "We have telephone and portamobile contact with FBIS/Kyrenia. Tele-
phone link could be lost at any time. Portamobile signal is weak and at best poor
substitute for telephone. FBIS Chief has been advised of planning for helicopter
SECRET 21
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
evacuation." All bureau efforts, the cable notes, are to be devoted to evacuation.
"Chief was assured that we will continue to advise him via telephone or porta-
mobile of evacuation plans."
1330-(Bureau message) -"Considerable firing down toward Zephyros Ho-
tel. Not at all clear to me to who is on first or any other base for that matter. Shoot-
ing picking up again and I may leave in the middle of a word. We have spent the
past two or three hours on the floor as bombs and shells fell all around. You might
he interested to know that one of our water pipes was punctured by shrapnel. Tide
of battle has certainly not turned. Heavy firing and plane strafing very close to
bureau continues without letup. All personnel quite tired with hardly any sleep
in 48 hours. Monitors afraid for safety working next to relatively unprotected
windows. Have already had shrapnel penetrate bureau premises. Kitchen and first
aid room almost an open patio. At present, all personnel holed up in corridors as
safest place."
1404-(Bureau message from Chief Engineer)-"My office was raked with
shrapnel. That is why we are in safehaven area and will not monitor and keep on
the floor. We have some info on hotel burning and will send later."
1417-(Bureau message)-"We just had several Greek Cypriot employees
of hotel climb over bureau fence for safety. They said that the hotel was bombed
and burned. They also said that there were about 70 guests in the hotel and it
was burned out. They also reported no casualties at the hotel."
1424-The British Forces radio in Cyprus broadcasts the following: "Here
is a message from the British High Commission: The convoy evacuating Brit-
ish and other nationals from Nicosia left successfully a short while ago. Evacuation
from Famagusta is also well under way. I should like to assure you all in the
Kyrenia area that we have not forgotten you. We are working as hard as we can
on plans to get you out and hope to organize something tomorrow."
142.5-(Bureau message)-"It is very uncomfortable typing from floor. We
continue to remain crouched in safehaven area of building. Firing picking up
again now. Chief says that we are in good spirits."
1444--A message from the Nicosia Embassy says the British High Com-
missioner has advised Ambassador Davies that a 1,000-car convoy carrying
between 4,000 and 5,000 persons of various nationalties, including about 300
Americans, has made it safely to a British base from Nicosia. According to the
message, the High Commissioner also told the Ambassador that the British now
will make an all-out effort to evacuate people from the north coast. "A British
frigate with an admiral aboard is enroute to Kyrenia to negotiate with Turks and
to survey the coastal area. The British are hopeful that they may actually begin
evacuating some personnel from this coast area some time tomorrow. Ambassador
replied that he too has initiated action with Sixth Fleet to begin evacuation
of American personnel in Karavas/Kyrenia area as soon as possible." Both
officials were to keep in constant touch to insure maximum results from a joint
British-American effort.
1502-(Bureau message) -"Rooftop observation by Marine guards indicates
that tonight may really be a bad one. There is an emplacement on a rooftop very
near, and it is certain to draw fire if it becomes active. The airstrikes have been
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000SOaeL-T4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
extremely accurate but the other weapons have been off target very badly. It
will be sundown here in about 90 minutes and then it will probably be a poor
night for sleeping, at best. Firing throughout the night last night prevented most
from getting more than a few minutes sleep."
1507-(Bureau message) -"Marines have seen artillery pieces being set up
and we feel confident there will be a real fight tonight."
1542-(Bureau message from the Chief)-"I was able to contact the Am-
bassador from the roof with radiophone which we have set up there. He told
me we should hang on tonight and gave us every encouragement. Told him
we were in good spirit and that we expected another fight tonight. Shelling
is continuing but is not close."
Ambassador Roger P. Davies, who had taken a very personal hand
in the efforts to secure the safety and evacuation of FBIS personnel, was
shot and killed at the embassy on 19 August 1974 during an anti-Ameri-
can demonstration by Greek Cypriots charging that the United States
had supported Turkey during the crisis.
1635-( Bureau message) -"Deputy and his people totaling 126 are going
to be moved to the beach tomorrow 2 to 12 miles cast of Kyrcnia. We have told
him to go ahead and have confirmed this with Ambassador. We have been in-
structed to listen to British Forces guidance as Ambassador is working closely
with British. After hearing about hits the compound received, he said that he
would contact Turkish Ambassador and UN and that he would attempt to see
if Ankara and Athens could be contacted to see if this area could be respected as
safehaven for civilians and refrain from heavy action in our vicinity. Our cars
have taken extensive hits and building pocked with shrapnel marks from near
misses. This stuff consists of an ounce or two of lead as sharp as a razor. We
are very grateful for this help and we feel more reassured now than we did
about two hours ago. There is distant light shelling to our south. An artillery
battery has been set up southeast of us, a Greek one, and this may bring us
more action but we hope and pray not."
1653-(Bureau message)-"Here is more on Zephyros disaster from an
employee who climbed over our fence. Shortly after the Turkish fleet came in,
the National Guard moved one truck with a machinegun and one small tank to the
hotel. When the eight soldiers found the task of defense impossible, they fled
the scene. The Turks, not knowing the weapons were no longer manned, bombed
the hotel and it is completely burned out, according to the employee."
1654-Immediately after receipt of the preceding message, the CYTA
circuit goes dead for good. All that remains for communications between the
bureau and Headquarters is the tenuous telephone/portamobile link between
bureau and Embassy and, from there, the already overburdened Embassy
circuit to Washington. In addition there is the one-way radioteletype link from
Headquarters via Athens to the bureau, set up by the Office of Communications
the day before.
StpRgxved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001000 4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
1720-The British Forces radio (BFBS) in Cyprus broadcasts the follow-
ing: "This is a clarification of the message that has been broadcast by BFBS
on the evacuation from Kyrenia. No ships will he available for the evacua-
tion of British subjects before tomorrow morning at the earliest. No one should
move to the coast until further instructions are issued. We are all doing our
best to secure your safety. Clear and precise details of evacuation arrange-
ments will be broadcast over this station."
1728-A message from Stuttgart says: "Military planning for evacuation north
Cypriot coast continues inhibited by lack of direction from JCS to do so."
"Also . . . consideration now being given to joint evacuation operations with
British vessel."
1816-The Director of FBIS sends a message to the bureau via the Athens
radioteletype link saying bureau personnel should follow evacuation instruc-
tions to be broadcast by BFBS Cyprus and that a British ship would approach
the coast east and west of Kyrenia early next morning. Evacuees were to form
groups on the beach and display British or American flags or other signs of
identification. The message had to be sent "in the blind," since there was no
immediate means of finding out whether the bureau had received it. Communica-
tors were instructed to keep repeating the message until the bureau had con-
firmed receipt. The confirmation came more than an hour later via the Embassy.
2244-The Deputy Director of FBIS, again using the one-way channel,
advises the bureau that the Nicosia Embassy is seeking to pinpoint the location of
FI31S personnel for the Sixth Fleet. The bureau is asked to provide the Embassy
precise geographic descriptions of possible helicopter landing zones. This is the
first of several instances in which the Embassy is unable to reach the bureau,
and FBIS in Washington, with its improvised Athens channel, serves as a relay
point for messages between Embassy and bureau. The two are less than 16
miles apart, but the messages have to travel nearly 20,000 miles.
By the end of the day, the evacuation picture hardly was any clearer than
it had been from the start. Would the Sixth Fleet come to the rescue or would the
British Navy, or would they do it in a joint operation? No one knew. Nor did
anyone know exactly how or where it was to be done or, for that matter, where the
evacuees were to be taken.
Sunday at the UN Camp
The people who had sought refuge at the UN camp above Kyrenia were
no better off than those at the bureau.
The dawn of 21 July, Sunday, brought renewed Turkish aerial attacks on
positions in the hills. There were further massive flights of troop-carrying
helicopters heading toward Nicosia. Heavy firing in the area lasted through-
out the day, and people began to realize that the expected move back to their
homes was not going to materialize that day.
They huddled together in small family groups. Most were beginning to
feel the first twinges of hunger and, as the day wore on, the 100-degree tem-
perature and the insects added to their discomfort. The water supply still was
adequate-but not for washing-and people became accustomed to drinking
in small sips to keep from dehydrating and to preserve the water supply.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194AO0040001gOCl 7E~
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
During the day, the UN contingent made a vain attempt to reach Kyrenia
to obtain a supply of food for the refugees. The fighting prevented it. But thanks
to the generosity of the UN forces and several British residents in the area,
there was an issue of bread and butter early in the day. Later, potato soup was
served. Most of those who had managed to bring small food supplies also
shared with their less well-prepared colleagues.
The fighting, meanwhile, was getting closer, and bullets began to sing
through the trees of the camp. Some groups moved to the shelter of a broad
ditch, a sunken Roman road.* It was a safer place, but what little breeze
managed to penetrate the woods did not make it into the ditch, and tempera-
tures rose well above 100 degrees.
That day the FBIS contingent took its only casualty, a minor one, but one
which pointed up the seriousness of their situation. One of the editors was lying
next to his young son, trying to keep the boy's mind off the fighting around
them. As a wave of C-47's passed overhead, the father was explaining what a
good jump plane the C-47 is. He raised his hand about six inches off the ground
to point at one of the planes, and a bullet passed through his hand. He was
tended to by UN medical personnel, and was soon to regain full use of his hand.
Forest fires which had been started by the firing were coming closer to
the camp, an additional worry as the refugees bedded down for a second night.
Heavy firing continued through the night, but it seemed that the firing from
the Greek-held ground was dwindling. At the same time, flares fired by Turkish
forces indicated to those in the camp that the Turks were getting close.
Filling in Coverage Gaps
The material appearing on the FBIS wire on 21 July clearly reflected the
desperate coverage situation that arose for FBIS as Medbureau ceased opera-
tions. Nearly 10,000 words less appeared on the wire Sunday than had appeared
on 20 July, when the bureau still was making a massive contribution. Of the
210 items that ran on 21 July, 150 dealt with Cyprus, but only 10 of these came
from Medbureau. The lone monitor in Tel Aviv and the small BBC team in
the British base were making small but important contributions to the file.
Most of the material came from the BBC/FBIS London Bureau and dealt
with reaction of other countries, Turkish broadcasts also were being monitored
there, and an FBIS Turkish monitor from Cyprus who happened to be on leave
in London was pressed into service.
The BBC Monitoring Service also quickly assumed emergency coverage of
Middle East sources that have transmitters strong enough to be monitored in
England. Notable among these were Cairo's domestic radio service and the
Middle East News Agency's international English-language service.
The Vienna Bureau, where some Athens broadcasts could be heard, was
feeding those casts directly to London through a voice communications link
for processing.
*The depression in which the FBIS group found shelter has been described in the various
accounts as a ditch, a sunken Roman road, a dry streambed, a firetrail, "an old road," or trench.
SEAP?Toved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010Q%7-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
Press agencies monitored in London, Panama, Okinawa and at FBIS Head-
quarters provided the bulk of reporting on developments in Cyprus itself. But
the press agencies, too, reported they were having serious communications
trouble and were having to depend more and more on radio broadcasts from
the island, Greece and Turkey.
How serious the coverage situation was getting is best illustrated by the
fact on several occasions on 21 July the FBIS Wire Service used roundabout
reportage which editors under normal circumstances would have discarded
without a second look: The Vienna Bureau, able to hear some Jerusalem broad-
casts, was filing material in which Jerusalem was reporting on what it was
hearing from the Greek Cypriot radio.
Further Adventures of the Tel Aviv Team
The Tel Aviv team, still stuck in Rome, also was having a bad time on 21
July. From their hotel room they continued efforts to get reservations on the
next El Al flight to Tel Aviv, whenever that might be. The airline kept insisting
that it would fly even though all other carriers had canceled their flights. The
Embassy, too, was trying to book the group on a Sunday afternoon flight.
A little more certainty emerged later in the day, when El Al said a special
flight would leave at 0330 on Monday. To be sure not to miss it, the team went
to the airport at 2300-and ran into new problems.
Israeli security officers discovered that one team member was carrying a
transcriber and that he and most of the others were carrying tourist passports.
To complicate things further, the team made onward reservations in their in-
dividual names, while the Embassy had made six reservations in one name. The
Israeli officers took a dim view first of the transcriber and then of the fact that
six people obviously traveling together on some sort of mission to Israel involv-
ing electronic gear were apparently being passed off as tourists. Intensive searches
and confiscation of the transcriber resulted.
But the team at last was allowed aboard the plane, which took off for Tel
Aviv shortly after 0500 (Rome time) on 22 July, six hours after the team had
left the hotel and two days after it had left Washington. Soon after arrival in
Tel Aviv there were discussions with Embassy officers to review the team's
mission, which by now had changed somewhat because of the developments
in Cyprus. The team's chief insisted that they wanted to start operations
immediately.
A makeshift first-floor auditorium in the Embassy, measuring 20 by 36 feet
and normally used to show movies to personnel, had been made available to the
original monitor from Vienna and now was rapidly stocked with office supplies
and equipment, thanks to helpful Embassy officers cutting red tape. The team's
monitoring equipment at this point consisted only of the portable radio/recorder
the Vienna monitor had brought and another borrowed from an Embassy staffer.
A third, brought along by one of the team members as a gift for a relative
living in Tel Aviv, was pressed into service a little later.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001 %QQ
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
Within minutes after the discussion with Embassy officers, the team was
handcarrying the edited copy of its first monitored item to the fifth floor for
transmission. It was a Nicosia radio, report broadcast at 1130 GMT in which the
Cypriot foreign minister condemned the Turkish bombing of Kyrenia. Later in
the day, other monitors began looking for Arab radios that might be monitored.
They were able almost immediately to file an important report from the
Damascus radio.
Some members of the team had had no more than about eight hours of
sleep in three days.
Monday, 22 July
One of the first pieces of news to reach the UN camp in the pass above
Kyrenia on 22 July was that a cease-fire was being arranged for 1600 (Cyprus
time) the same day. Spirits among the FBIS refugees rose considerably, and
the morning was relatively quiet, but the heaviest and closest fighting yet broke
out about noon. The Turks above the camp were beginning their push down-
hill toward Kyrenia, while the Greeks below were returning the fire. All of the
civilians now had to seek the shelter of the ditch, with mortar rounds landing
around the camp. Low gunfire passed directly above the ditch.
Turkish troops finally appeared, heading down the ditch. At first they
looked startled, and some pointed their guns at the huddled group of civilians.
Then they went on their way, shooed on by UN troops. The latter had an ob-
vious interest in having the line of battle pass as quickly as possible. The
Turkish troops were smartly dressed, apparently fresh off the helicopters. In-
congruously, some of them saluted as they passed the group of civilians.
Whatever relief there was in knowing that the battle had passed on was
destroyed almost immediately by a new threat. A forest fire on the lower slopes
was racing uphill, directly toward the camp. The massed cars and their gaso-
line tanks became a huge potential bomb. The camp was evacuated within
minutes. Cars were driven a safe distance away toward the Turkish enclave.
Once the fire had passed through the camp, the cars and the people returned
to a lot at the entrance to the charred camp to establish their new headquarters.
The UN troops provided another issue of bread and butter, which they had
received from Nicosia. Later a UN convoy arrived from Nicosia, and the
refugees were offered safe conduct back with the convoy. But word had come
meanwhile that an evacuation finally was going to get under way from the north
coast the following day, 23 July. The refugees decided to stay put for one
more night.
Information Becomes Sketchy
After the breakdown in communications ended two days and nights of direct
bureau reporting, FBIS Headquarters was getting only infrequent and sketchy
information throughout 22 July on what was happening at the bureau and at
the UN camp.
S it ved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100 l-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
The Embassy in Nicosia, basing its reports on information it was receiving
from the bureau, cabled that exchanges of fire were continuing hot and heavy
in the bureau area as of 1100 GMT, three hours before the cease-fire was to go
into effect. Turkish ships offshore were exchanging fire with Greek artillery
units on land, with the bureau right between them.
Reuter reported shortly afterward that these exchanges had forced Brit-
ish authorities to postpone a planned evacuation of British and other foreigners
from the area.
Other bits of news came from the Associated Press, which had a reporter
holed up in a hotel close to the bureau. He had managed to telephone the
bureau and in a story at 1122 GMT quoted one of the bureau's Marines as saying:
"The Turks are trying to grab every inch of territory before the cease-fire.
The main Turkish force landed in the three-mile sector between your hotel
and the station (FBIS). They are fighting all around us." In an AP story filed
about three hours later the Marine was quoted as saying: "British Navy frigates
are lying offshore waiting for the cease-fire to begin so they can approach the
coast and send launches to pick up civilians who make it to the beaches. Wave
a white flag, wave anything, but attract their attention. Do not go onto the
road; jets have been bombing and strafing it for days. They have strafed again
this morning, and when there is no strafing, there is a hell of a lot of shooting
out there."
It was a novel way for FBIS to get information about one of its sites. But
it was information.
A very reassuring report came from Ambassador Davies shortly after 1200
GMT on 22 July. He had been in touch with the FBIS bureau and had been told
that all Americans, Cypriots and other nationals were safe. However, the
Ambassador's cable noted that information about the bureau's Chief Editor still
was lacking.
People who had been at the bureau reported after their evacuation that 22
July indeed had been a bad day.
The Bureau Chief recalled that the shelling was so heavy and so close he
felt sure the edge of the bureau compound was being shelled deliberately,
possibly to put the generator out of action. The Chief Engineer theorized that
the Turkish forces might have tuned in on the bureau's emergency radio link
with the Embassy and were objecting to the situation reports that were going out
over the link. With the consent of the Ambassador it was then decided to stop
these reports.
The employees continued to spend most of their time in the safehaven
hallway, where the Greek and Turkish monitors had set up a transistor radio and
and a typewriter to continue monitoring Cyprus stations for the information of
bureau personnel.
The four Turkish and two Greek monitors, who felt deeply about the events
in Cyprus, tried not to show their feelings. They worked together throughout
the crisis, as most of them had in previous crises on the strife-torn island, as
professionals loyal to FBIS.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001 War
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
According to the editor, the group was counting the minutes to the an-
nounced cease-fire-only to find it failed to take effect until about 2200 Cyprus
time, when night had come and another day had passed without evacuation.
Soon afterward a disconcerting piece of news came over BFBS: Cypriot
nationals would have to be excluded from any evacuation! What, then, was to
become of the Cypriot colleagues among them? The Ambassador, reached on
the telephone, said he would get in touch with the British High Commission
on the subject. But he could make no promises.
The Chief Editor's Adventures
Late in the afternoon of 22 July, the bureau's Chief Editor, his wife, and
their guests-still out of contact with the bureau-finally emerged unharmed
from their basement, where they had been sheltering throughout the fighting.
They immediately found themselves in the ludicrous situation of being asked to
accept the surrender of a 30-man Greek Cypriot National Guard contingent.
The soldiers, thinking the Chief Editor was a UN officer, turned up at the
house to request help, because they were afraid to surrender to the Turks. Still
armed, they asked to be let into the house. The occupants realized that this
would seriously jeopardize their own safety in the event Turkish troops should
show up. On the other hand, they also knew it might be unwise to argue with
a group of armed soldiers. The Chief Editor's wife then took matters into her
own hands. She flatly told the soldiers to throw their weapons into the street;
then they would be allowed to stay.
The soldiers hesitated. She approached the nearest one, took his rifle from
him, and threw it into the garden. The others then followed suit. The first Turkish
troops turned up about two hours later. They surrounded the house, searched
it, and marched off their National Guard prisoners. The original occupants also
had to go along to a nearby command post for interrogation. While it was in prog-
ress, the post came under fire, causing everyone to hit the ground. With the
firing continuing, Turkish soldiers at last escorted the group back to the house,
skipping from shelter to shelter as they went.
At the house, the Chief Editor discovered an 18-year-old Guardsman who
had evaded several searches by hiding in a clothes closet. He was told he would
be turned over to Turkish troops the following day.
It was evening, and the group bedded down for the night, still unable to
contact the bureau.
The Group at Tiger Bay
At about the same time that the Chief Editor's group was taking its
"prisoners," the people at the Tiger Bay cottage became prisoners themselves.
A Turkish patrol in search of National Guard stragglers hustled the group out
of the cottage and lined them up against the wall, where they remained under
guard for an hour and a half while the remainder of the patrol went about its
business.
S4 fxbved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100W-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
They were then taken to a nearby Turkish position, from where the Med-
bureau Administrative Officer and a Turkish-speaking monitor were taken by
jeep to a command post a few miles away.
There they were received by a Turkish Lieutenant who spoke excellent
English and who asked to be called "Tarzan." He appeared to be in charge of
civilian prisoners, and he said about 140 Greek Cypriots and 40 British na-
tionals were being held in the house next door. The others of the Tiger Bay group
were brought to the post by jeep. Tarzan seemed unhappy at having an American
official on his hands. But he tried to make the best of his dilemma. Ile asked
the Administrative Officer to call the bureau with the request that the entire
complement of prisoners, including three American newspapermen and three
seriously wounded Greeks, be taken to the bureau and placed in the charge of the
Chief. The Administrative Officer welcomed the chance to call the bureau.
But the Chief, after consulting with the Ambassador by phone, had to turn down
Tarzan's request. The bureau would have been unable to take care of such a
large group, particularly the wounded.
With darkness approaching, Tiger Bay group had little choice but to spend
the night as Tarzan's guests, even though Tarzan by now appeared really
eager to get rid of the whole lot. They were assigned a room and veranda and,
thanks to three small children in their group, were given some Turkish C-rations
and sufficient water.
Outlook for Evacuation
As it had been for two days, evacuation of the bureau personnel and those at
the UN camp remained the principal concern at FBIS Headquarters on 22 July.
Two things emerged as the day wore on: Failure of the cease-fire and continued
fighting on the north coast and most other places would make an evacuation by
sea impossible before dark. But there were growing signs at last that a definite
plan was in the works for the following day.
In a cable at 1150 GMT, Ambassador Davies already was concerning him-
self with the fact that provision must be made for evacuees with Israeli pass-
ports, should Beirut be designated the safehaven.
Shortly afterward, he reported that unless otherwise instructed he would
authorize abandoning the FBIS bureau and evacuating all personnel "as soon as
security conditions permit and evacuation capability in place." The State De-
partment, acting on FBIS request, replied that FBIS would perfer a small team of
essential personnel to stay behind if at all possible under the circumstances to
reestablish operations at the bureau. The decision was to be left to the Bureau
Chief.
The Ambassador cabled back: "Believe I must insist that entire FBIS unit
depart together for safehaven, which I assume will be Beirut." He added that
the Bureau Chief previously had indicated he advised total evacuation. In a
later message, the Ambassador again recommended a combined British-U.S.
operation, and he noted that the British Navy now had two frigates in the area
and was awaiting London's authorization to go ahead the next day.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001 g@Q
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
Late in the evening he reconfirmed that a plan for the evacuation was
under way, and he gave an accurate breakdown of FBIS numbers, including
foreign national employees and their dependents.
The day's most reassuring news came at 2306 GMT in a State Department
cable: The British Embassy in Washington had advised the Department that
four British ships, including the carrier HMS Hermes, would arrive in the Kyrenia
area between 0500 and 0700 Cyprus time on 23 July to evacuate British and
other nationals by helicopter or small craft. The British Embassy, in turn, had
been given numbers and locations of the FBIS people who would be involved.
A further State cable a little later put a damper on this, however. The British
Embassy had informed the Department that the Turkish Government was co-
operative but was unable to contact all military units concerned in the area by
the designated time, then only three to five hours away. The cable added: "Oper-
ation still possible for later time on 23 July."
Meanwhile, shortly after 2100 hours Washington time, the FBIS staff officer
at the CIA Operations Center had called FBIS Headquarters with the grimmest
report received throughout the three days of fighting: The Finnish UN camp
near Kyrenia had been shelled and set on fire. This was the camp, as everyone
knew, where the largest group of FBIS people, including most of the women
and children, had sought shelter. The report was reconfirmed later, with the addi-
tion that the refugees were spending the night in a field next to the camp, that
evacuation now had become a matter of great urgency, and that a number of
the evacuees would require medical attention.
As has been seen, the FBIS "family" had escaped the fire and was, in fact,
safe. But this was not yet known at FBIS Headquarters.
Tuesday, 23 July
The Turkish statement that 0500-0700 Cyprus time on 23 July was too early
to permit a safe evacuation from the north coast brought fast and unequivocal
reaction from British Foreign Secretary Callaghan in a cable to Turkish Prime
Minister Ecevit:
"On my return from Brussels I have learned of the problem which has
arisen in the humanitarian situation where British and other subjects are stranded
in the neighborhood of Kyrenia on the north coast of Cyprus. I understand that
we have requested the agreement of your government to this operation. The
only reply we have received at low level has been through our naval attache,
who has been informed that in the view of your naval authorities the operation
should not proceed. I regret this. The commander on the spot has been given
discretion to proceed with this rescue operation at the time and in the place
already notified to you. I expect him to receive full cooperation from your
people on the spot and shall have to hold your government responsible for any
incident involving your forces. I am sure you realize that the condition of those
stranded around Kyrenia, some of whom are wounded and many of whom have
had no food for sometime, time, is my only concern in authorizing this operation."
SEfk~5Foved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
Negotiations Continue
The State Department, which flashed the text of this message to the Embas-
sies in Athens, Ankara, Nicosia and London (State 159052, dated 230336),
appended the information that a British Naval force was scheduled to arrive
off Kyrenia at 0600 Cyprus time and that evacuation was to commence an hour
later. The Embassies in Athens and Ankara were told to inform their host
governments that 350 Americans on the north coast would seek evacuation by
the British force.
At 0529 GMT Ambassador Davies reported to Washington that there was
no sign of hostilities in the Kyrenia area and that he had been informed by the
British High Commissioner that the decision had been made to evacuate the
FBIS people on the north coast by helicopter. The only thing lacking was actual
confirmation from the British task force that evacuation had commenced.
The stage was set, or so it seemed. But then, literally at the last moment, the
problem of evacuating Cypriot citizens came up in earnest. The British gov-
ernment held that it would be improper and illegal to evacuate persons who
at least theoretically were a party to the conflict. FBIS and, infact, the U.S.
government felt a humane obligation to include these long-time employees.
And there was an immediate and crititical need for their skills to reconsti-
tute FBIS's Middle East coverage elsewhere. Since FBIS cooperates closely
with the BBC Monitoring Service, it could rightly be claimed that the British
government, too would benefit if the Cypriot employees were taken along.
The question raised a tremendous flurry of fast-paced diplomatic and other
official activity-while the Cypriot FBIS employees and their families pre-
sumably were standing on the beaches in Cyprus about to watch their American
and other colleagues take off for safety.
At 1054 GMT (nearly 1300 Cyprus time) the Embassy in London flashed
word that the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) had decided
against authorizing evacuation of Cypriots employed by FBIS since it had
decided against such employees of the British government. All arguments the
Embassy could offer had been rejected. The Embassy added this recom-
inendation for circumventing the FCO decision:
"We suggest Nicosia press UK High Commission and local British cooi-
inander as hard as possible to evacuate these FBIS employees quickly. There
should be two to three hours left before FCO makes its instructions known.
If operation cannot proceed that rapidly and FBIS people are stranded, we are
prepared to march in at higher level with effort to reverse this decision, diffi-
cult as it seems."
One minute after this cable was sent from London, Ambassador Davies
reported that FBIS employees were now on the beach near the bureau and that
the British on the scene were refusing to accept Cypriot employees. He said
he had been in touch with the Bureau Chief, who had told him that leaving
the employees on the beach "would be tantamount to a death sentence."
The Chief's estimate probably was not far off the mark. It still was unclear
to him and his staff wheather the bureau area was in Greek Cypriot or Turkish
Ap"oved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000106Ot1 T
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
hands. But whatever the case, either side could, and very likely would, have
considered as traitors or deserters those of their countrymen who had not taken
part in the fighting.
The Director of FBIS at 1141 GMT flashed instructions to the Chief of the
London Bureau to seek intervention "at the highest level possible" from the head
of the BBC Monitoring Service. His contacts, the Director pointed out, "may
help go around or through" the obstacle posed by the FCO. The Chief in London
replied at 1228 GMT that his BBC counterpart had made representations to
the Ministry of Defense and the FCO. "He is up against a sticky situation and
not highly optimistic."
This was followed by a more encouraging message from the London Bureau
at 1410. GMT: The FCO had ruled that 1) Cypriots would be picked up from
the beaches and taken to a British Sovereign Base Area, 2) for the present, no
exceptions could be made regarding evacuation of Cypriots from the island by
the British, 3) informally, there would be no British objection to FBIS Cypriots
being evacuated from the British base area by U.S. components.
The message at first appeared contradictory: The people would be taken
off the beaches but they would not be evacuated. What the message actually
said was that the British apparently had resolved their dilemma: So long as
the Cypriots remained at least in Cyprus waters, no one could claim that they
had been evacuated. If they then were turned over to U.S. "components," well,
what the Americans did with them was no British concern.
The Embassy in London was unaware of this development. It messaged
at 1421 that the responsible British minister had made the firm decision that
his government "must stick by its policy not to evacuate any Cypriots." It had
been suggested that FBIS employees "try to fade into hiding if possible." The
Embassy went on: "Our feeling is that only a personal intervention with Foreign
Secretary Callaghan (stressing humanitarian aspect) is likely to reverse this
ministerial decision." "Of course, if Sixth Fleet had capability undertake this
evacuation, that would appear to be a solution."
At 1610 GMT Ambassador Davies reported that the UN forces in Cyprus
could not override the British decision. But the UN people had given assurances
that they would take custody of the stranded Cypriots. He said he and the UN
forces meanwhile had lost contact with both FBIS evacuation parties.
The fact is that most of the diplomatic activity was purely academic. The
FBIS people who had been on the beaches, including the Cypriots, had been
safely aboard the HMS Hermes for hours. Some plain gall by the FBIS contingent
and some unofficial forebearance by a UK officer had done the trick.
The Evacuation Begins
At 0700 (Cyprus time) on 23 July a convoy formed on the road near the
burned-out UN camp and slowly made its way down to Kyrenia, following a
UN armored car. Little damage was to be seen in the town. Not far from the
shore the convoy turned east along the narrow and winding coast road to a
beach which for lack of a better name has always been known as Six Mile
Beach, simply because it is about six miles outside of town.
S roved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001001'97-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
A second and third convoy followed. Some Greek Cypriots who had been
in the camp unfortunately had to be left behind because a Turkish police officer
checking passports at the camp as the convoys were forming would not allow
them to leave. But they were safe in UN hands.
It was a ragged, tired, hungry but happy bunch of people that gathered
on the beach. To their surprise, after days and nights of fear, confusion and
uncertainty, the evacuation itself took place so quickly and efficiently that it
was almost an anticlimax. British helicopters were ferrying people to the HMS
Hermes three miles offshore almost as fast as the people could get on. It was
rare for anyone to have to spend more than 15 minutes waiting before he was
airborne. By about 0900, all were aboard the carrier. Some already were taking
showers.
The Strays are Rounded Up
The Chief Editor and his party learned of the evacuation plans from an
early morning newscast. It took them some time to ascertain from Turkish soldiers
that the road from their house to Kyrenia was open and that it would be safe
to go. They turned over their last National Guard "captive" to a Turkish patrol
and then cautiously drove to Kyrenia. From the Dome Hotel, the Chief Editor
at last was able to telephone the bureau. He learned from the duty editor that
an evacuation was under way at Six Mile Beach. They made their way there
and were safely aboard the HMS Hermes soon afterward.
At about 0700, two Marines at the bureau lashed a U.S. flag to a bureau
bus and set out to find the Administrative Officer and his party, who still were
in Tarzan's care. Everyone else was getting organized for the short busride to
a hotel beach near the bureau for the expected helicopter pickup.
By 0930, the duty editor was on the telephone with the Embassy, giving a
blow-by-blow account of what was going on at the bureau and asking that the
information be passed on to Washington. He was able to report that the
evacuation was in progress at Six Mile Beach. He also had just received the
telephone call from the Chief Editor and had directed him to Six Mile Beach.
The bus with the two Marines and the Administrative Officer's group just then
came tearing into the bureau compound, horns blaring.
And at that point a helicopter could be heard circling overhead. Before
he hung up the telephone, he reported: "Update as of 0800 GMT (1000 Cyprus
time) : Evacuation at bureau now in progress by chopper. No time for details."
The editor rushed into the hallway to tell his colleagues that the Chief
Editor was safe. The hallway was empty. Outside, the bureau buses were gone.
There was no one in sight. For a brief moment the editor felt panic, thinking
he had been forgotten. But then the Chief Engineer called from the roof to
reassure him that a bus would be back for them soon; the other personnel already
had been taken to the beach. The helicopters had not yet started picking up the
evacuees; they had merely been circling the area to survey the situation. On
one of those runs, a helicopter drew small arms fire from a lemon grove at the
bureau.
4proved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000'uBQLJK-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
Cypriot Nationals Problem
A British UN major was in charge on the beach. He told the bureau Chief
flatly that Cypriot nationals would not be permitted aboard the helicopters.
From a nearby telephone the Bureau Chief called the Embassy to ask for
assistance, pointing out that the Cypriot FBIS employees would be in grave
danger if left behind.
As the helicopters touched down, the British major, having made his point,
walked along with the Bureau Chief without taking a direct hand in checking
identities of those who boarded. The bureau's Americans meanwhile were busy
shoving their Cypriot colleagues into the helicopters. The Chief was the last
to step aboard. No more was said about Cypriot nationals.
From the helicopters the employees got a last saddening view of Medbureau.
Minutes later they set foot on the deck of HMS Hermes to be reunited with their
families and their colleagues.
A few hours later, FBIS Headquarters received a commercial cable from
HMS Hermes advising that both FBIS parties were aboard. The ship was sailing
toward a British base area on the south side of Cyprus, where the evacuees
were to be transferred to an American ship for the trip to Beirut. Evacuees
with Israeli passports would be taken from the base area to Israel by way of
England.
Wednesday, 24 July
Early on 24 July it became certain that Turkish forces were in control of
the area around the FBIS bureau. A State Department cable instructed the
Embassies in Ankara and Nicosia to ask the Turkish Government and the Turkish
forces in Cyprus to provide the bureau compound with protection against looting
and vandalism.
An FBIS administrative officer at the same time was on his way to Beirut
from Washington to assist with the many problems that would have to be
handled when the FBIS evacuees arrived.
By 1000 (Cyprus time) on 24 July the FBIS people had been transferred
to the USS Trenton of the Sixth Fleet. The Bureau Chief sent a message to
Ambassador Davies: "Entire U.S. party which evacuated Karavas and Kyrenia
aboard Trenton, including Cypriot nationals. Grateful your assistance that made
this possible. Sailing Beirut."
At 0735 on Thursday, 25 July, FBIS Headquarters received a brief message
from the Embassy in Beirut announcing that the FBIS party had arrived.
The FBIS Director replied with a message to the Bureau Chief, care of the
Embassy: "Congratulations on your successful evacuation and superb bureau per-
formance under the most difficult and hazardous circumstances. Please extend our
highest regards and best wishes to every member of the FBIS party. We know
there will be many difficulties yet to overcome, but be assured we at Headquarters
will do everything we can to support you. Your families have been kept informed
daily."
S For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100 -4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET FBIS Cyprus
From the Bureau Chief's report:
Although the evacuation was a shattering affair, and sometimes
was pushed to the brink of chaos by forces beyond our control, FBIS
arrived in Beirut with its tail riding high. Ambassador Godley said we
arrived with an internal discipline and an intact organization.
The Aftermath
There remained the massive problems of pay and allowances, relocating
and housing personnel, recovering government and private property from Cyprus,
and reconstituting the lost FBIS coverage.
An early return to the Karavas bureau to resume operations had to be ruled
out from the start. It would be months, possibly years, before the necessary
communications and support would become available again. With the north
coast, including the bureau area, in Turkish hands and the Embassy and com-
munications facilities-even the power supply-in Greek parts of Nicosia, it
would he necessary to deal with two sets of authorities. Would Greeks and
Turks be able to work at the bureau and live in the area? Where would American
and third country national children go to school? Would the Turks or Greeks
allow the bureau to operate to begin with? These and many other questions
remain unanswered even at this writing.
The evacuees had not yet landed in Beirut, when the Chief of the FBIS
London Bureau began to anticipate an influx of refugees. Some families would
not wish to remain in Beirut, while others would be needed in London to help
absorb at least some of the Middle East coverage that had been lost. Negotiating
with the Air Force, the bureau succeeded in having part of a standby airbase
near London opened to house FBIS people. More than 40 of them eventually
took up residence there until their relocation in mid-September.
The Tel Aviv unit received its equipment package from Washington by the
end of the first week of the operation. Coverage and operations began to settle
into a normal routine. The unit was able to monitor substantial portions of the
Middle East, and its production continued to expand.
By early August, personnel were changed as Cyprus bureau evacuees began
to arrive in Tel Aviv and original team members were rotated home. The unit
by then had standardized editorial and office procedures. The original plan
called for up to 19 employees and a "lease" of about six months.
A small unit was established in Athens and began operating on 8 August.
For the moment the unit, consisting of nine employees, is covering only Greek
radios and newspapers. But this coverage quickly proved to be better than had
ever been possible in Cyprus.
Two Arabic monitors from Cyprus were dispatched to the BBC's monitoring
site in Nairobi, Kenya, to take up some of the lost Arabic coverage.
& proved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A0004000SOCQET4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
FBIS Cyprus SECRET
Beirut, which originally received the Cyprus evacuees, was the most logical
place to take up the remaining coverage of the Arab Middle East. Initial State
Department objections to an FBIS presence at the Embassy were overcome in
high-level negotiations, and a unit began operations there on 16 August. The
unit's staff was limited to 13, however, and its 'lifespan to 90 days.
By the middle of September, FBIS was able to report that it had ro'consti-
tuted nearly 100 percent of its Cyprus bureau coverage. No significant coverage
was lost. Plans for further relocation are in the works.
An eventual return to Cyprus also remains under consideration, although
no FBIS operation on the island would ever again be as large or as important
as in the past. Plainly, neither Cyprus nor any other Middle East location is the
kind of basket to hold all of FBIS's eggs.
Expenditures resulting from the loss of the Cyprus operation amounted to
an estimated $250,000 a month for the first two months. Personal claims for loss
of possessions could run as high as $600,000.
In the Turkish quarter of Kyrenia, there is a man named Sabri.
He has an incredibly shabby office with a sign announcing that he is
an "estate agent." Sabri seems always to have been there; he even
figures prominently in Lawrence Durrell's Bitter Lemons. Every Ameri-
can who has served a tour of duty with FBIS in Cyprus knows Sabri-
and has probably done business with him.
Most remember Sabri as an operator of some standing who would
buy or sell almost anything and who could get almost anything done or
undone-for a price. He drove a ramshackle pickup truck to deliver fire-
wood or bottled gas to your house. You could get a pretty decent meal
at Sabri's restaurant, or you could arrange your vacation trip through
Sabri's travel service.
Being a Turkish Cypriot, however, he had never figured in public
life. During times of strife Sabri had to keep a very -low profile indeed.
A few days after the situation in Kyrenia stabilized, Sabri became
the mayor.
S~Qgved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100($74
 Approved For Reldfase 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
CONFIDENTIAL
Another recollection of the
1960 Summit Conference
GENERAL de GAULLE IN ACTION
On 14 May 1960 I left the United States with President Eisenhower to attend
the Four Power Meeting in Paris between the USSR, France, Great Britain and
the United States. This conference had been scheduled for some time, but its con-
vening had been in doubt following the crash of the U-2 in the Soviet Union and
the capture of its pilot, Gary Powers. After a period of doubt, General de Gaulle
had announced that the conference would be held as scheduled and the other
Chiefs of Government had successively announced that they would attend. When
Khrushchev announced he would attend, a worldwide sigh of relief went up.
Shortly after arriving in Paris on 15 May, I accompanied President Eisenhower
on his call on President de Gaulle. As always, the meeting between the two was
most cordial, almost affectionate. I have accompanied a number of American
dignitaries to see General de Gaulle; the two he did not really talk down to were
General Eisenhower and Governor Harriman. But only to Eisenhower did he show
real warmth.
De Gaulle said Khrushchev had been to see him and was highly excited about
the U-2 overflights. He had read to De Gaulle a long statement denouncing the
overflights and demanding an apology from President Eisenhower. De Gaulle, who
had with him only his superb English and Russian interpreter Constantin Androni-
kof, added, "Obviously you cannot apologize but you must decide how you wish
to handle this. I will do everything I can to be helpful without being openly par-
tisan."
He said he had asked Khrushchev whether under these circumstances they
should go ahead with the Conference. He had had his Ambassador in Moscow put
this question to Khrushchev before he left Moscow, and Khrushchev had said that
they should. He had repeated the question to Khrushchev after his arrival in Paris
and again he had said that they should go ahead. Dc Gaulle had indicated to
Khrushchev that he could not seriously expect that the U.S. President would
apologize to him. This sort of thing was not done among serious Chiefs of Govern-
ment. But Khrushchev had been adamant that Eisenhower must apologize for the
U-2 flight. Dc Gaulle felt that Khrushchev's readiness to go ahead with the con-
ference after he had told him that Eisenhower could not be expected to apologize
was a hopeful sign, but he added, "We shall see."
The U.S. delegation was clearly embarrassed by the shoot-down and Powers'
confession, but it was determined that Khrushchev would not be allowed to
use this for public humiliation of the United States. President Eisenhower clearly
felt that in the discharge of his responsibilities to the United States he must
ascertain the measure of the threat against it, and with a closed society such as
the Soviet one we faced, there was no other way than by such imaginative
~QOPWt-Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78TO3194A00040001000fl4
MORI/HRP PAGES 39-44
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
CONFIDENTIAL De Gaulle
methods as the U-2. After all, Soviet satellites had already overflown the United
States and the Soviets had published pictures taken by cameras aboard such
satellites.
The conference was held in the Elysee Palace, the traditional residence of
the Presidents of France. It was held in a large high-ceilinged room on the
second floor of the Elysee, only a few rooms removed from General de Gaulle's
office. The windows looked out to the south and west over the gardens of the
Elysee. In the center of the room was a large table in the form of a square. General
de Gaulle and the French delegation sat on the cast side, nearest to De Gaulle's
office. Opposite him sat the U.S. delegation (I was seated at the far right of
the U.S. delegation, closest to the Soviets). On the right of the U.S. were the
Soviets, and facing them were the British.
As I entered the room with President Eisenhower and General de Gaulle,
who had met him at the top of the stairs, the Russians were already there,
standing around talking together. Eisenhower greeted the other French delegates
and the British, but the Russians kept talking among themselves, and so Eisen-
hower walked around to his own side of the table and sat down with the Secre-
tary of State beside him. After a few minutes General de Gaulle called the
meeting to order, and all who were still standing sat down.
General de Gaulle then greeted the Chiefs of Delegation, thanked them
for coming, and expressed the hope that the meeting which was about to begin
would be fruitful and contribute to world peace. He then said that inasmuch
as President Eisenhower was the only other Chief of Delegation who was also
a Chief of State, he would give him the floor first. Khrushchev, obviously agi-
tated, stood up and said that he had asked to speak first and that as Chiefs
of Delegation they were all equal. He demanded the right to read a prepared
statement first. De Gaulle, when this outburst was translated, raised his eye-
brows and looked questioningly at General Eisenhower, who nodded. De Gaulle
then gave the floor to Khrushchev. Khrushchev stood up and began to read
from a prepared statement in a very loud voice. This was clearly the same state-
ment he had read to De Gaulle previously. De Gaulle assumed a pained but
patient expression as Khrushchev rumbled on. From time to time he would
pause for translation and take a drink of water.
I had been strongly enjoined by the State Department not to wear my uni-
form as this was a "peace conference." Notwithstanding this, Soviet Defense
Minister Marshal Rodion Malinovsky was there glowering in full uniform. As
Khrushchev thundered on, I fell to counting the ribbons on Malinovsky's chest.
There were 54, including, as I noted with some interest, the U.S. Legion of
Merit. At one point as Khrushchev read (and I noticed that his hands trembled
as he held the piece of paper he was reading-whether from agitation, anxiety
or anger, I do not know), he raised his voice even louder. De Gaulle interrupted,
turned to the Soviet interpreter, rather than his own, and said, "The acoustics in
this room are excellent. We can all hear the Chairman. There is no need for
him to raise his voice." The Russian interpreter blanched, turned to Khrushchev
with a faltering voice and translated. Khrushchev paused, looked over the top
of his glasses and cast a furious glance at General de Gaulle and then continued
reading in a somewhat less loud voice.
approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194AQ"Aft6 MXt4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
De Gaulle CONFIDENTIAL
As Khrushchev read, he was clearly lashing himself into an even greater
frenzy, and as he denounced the U.S. overflights, he pointed at the ceiling as
though a U-2 were overhead at that moment. De Gaulle interrupted to say that
he too had been overflown. "By your American allies?" asked Khrushchev. "No,"
said General de Gaulle, "by you. Yesterday that satellite you launched just before
you left Moscow to impress us overflew the sky of France 18 times without my
permission. How do I know you do not have cameras aboard which are taking
pictures of my country?" De Gaulle crossed his arms and looked at Khrushchev
questioningly. Khrushchev's jaw dropped. Then an almost beatific expression
came over his face. He raised both hands above his head and said clearly, "Bog
menya videt. Moi ruki chisti. (God sees me. My hands are clean.) You don't
think I would do a thing like that?" "Well," said General de Gaulle, "how did
you take those pictures of the far side of the moon which you showed us with
such justifiable pride?" "Ah," said Khrushchev, "in that one I had cameras."
"Ah," said General de Gaulle, "in that one you had cameras. Pray, continue."
This exchange had upset Khrushchev, and his hands trembled even more
as he continued reading his long statement. While he was talking, State ' De-
partment Counselor and former Ambassador to Moscow Chip Bohlen kept
grumbling, "We can't sit still for this. We've got to answer." Eisenhower sat
silently listening to the original and its translation. He doodled impatiently with
a pencil. (I still have the doodle, as I picked it up when he left the table.) His
face and neck were flushed, however, and I could tell he was extremely angry.
I had worked for General Eisenhower for a number of years closely, and I had
never seen an outburst of temper, but long experience had taught me the signs
of anger on his part, and they were all present here. Once or twice he looked
at Dc Gaulle, who was sitting there with a slightly bored expression. He had
already heard all of this from Khrushchev. The British Prime Minister was un-
easy as he looked at the angry Khrushchev, the flushed Eisenhower, and the
bored De Gaulle.
At one point Khrushchev exclaimed, "What devil made the Americans do
this?" De Gaulle observed that there were devils everywhere, on both sides, that
this was a matter of espionage such as went on all the time and was not worthy
of the consideration of Chiefs of Government to whom the peoples of the world
were looking for hopes of peace. Khrushchev shook his head like a bull and went
on reading. He finally ended his long diatribe by announcing that unless Presi-
dent Eisenhower apologized he would not attend the conference.
President Eisenhower then made a mollifying statement containing many
of the justifications used publicly for the U-2 flights and said that U.S. aircraft
would not overfly the USSR again. Khrushchev angrily repeated that he would
not attend any further meetings of the conference if Eisenhower did not apologize.
De Gaulle said, "Chairman Khrushchev, you have imposed conditions that
are obviously impossible for General Eisenhower to accept. Before you left Mos-
cow and after the U-2 was shot down, I sent my Ambassador to see you to ask
whether this meeting should be held or should be postponed. You knew every-
thing then that you know now. You told my Ambassador that this conference
should be held and that it would be fruitful. I repeated this question to you when
I saw you alone before this meeting, and once again you said it should be held.
Now, by imposing conditions that cannot be met by the American President,
Ci F&6ld' Ak Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78TO3194A00040001000V!-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
CONFIDENTIAL De Gaulle
you make it impossible to go further. You have brought Mr. MacMillan here
from London, General Eisenhower from the United States and have put me
to serious inconvenience to attend a meeting which your intransigence would
make impossible. We should all reflect on this and on the hopes that the people
of the world have placed in this meeting and meet again here tomorrow at the
same time."
Khrushchev jumped to his feet and said that unless Eisenhower apologized
he would not come. De Gaulle looked at him as one would look at a naughty
child and announced that the conference would meet on the following day.
Khrushchev, accompanied by his whole delegation, strode out of the room and
down the stairs. The other delegations looked at one another. De Gaulle said
that he would stay in touch with the Russians. All then rose and started out of
the room. De Gaulle came over to Eisenhower and took him by the arm. He
took me also by the elbow and, taking us a little apart, he said to Eisenhower,
"I do not know what Khrushchev is going to do, nor what is going to happen,
but whatever he does, I want you to know that I am with you to the end." I
was astounded at this statement and Eisenhower was clearly moved by his un-
expected expression of unconditional support. Only the three of us heard it, but
it remains vivid in my mind to this day 15 years later. Eisenhower thanked
De Gaulle who walked down the stairs with him to his car. As we entered the
car, Eisenhower, still upset by the whole episode, looked at me and said of
De Gaulle, "He's quite a guy." We drove the short distance to the U.S. Embassy
Residence, then on Avenue d'Iena, where the U.S. delegation went into a meet-
ing to decide what to do next.
I was not privy to this discussion and do not know what was decided, but
President Eisenhower's mollifying stafement and promise that the U-2's would
not overfly the Soviet Union had evidently not done the job of bringing Khru-
shchev back to the conference table, and Eisenhower's pending invitation to visit
the USSR was obviously withdrawn.
In the meantime Khrushchev had been holding a stormy and furious press
conference making veiled threats and inveighing against the treacherous nature
of the U.S. Next day at the time appointed De Gaulle, MacMillan and Eisenhower
met in the same room in the Elysee where the meeting had taken place the
previous day. The three delegations sat looking slightly sheepishly at one another
and General de Gaulle said that he had had no word from Khrushchev, but
he was out "kissing babies on the street and generally electioneering for the
French Communist Party." Marshal Malinovsky was out near Verdun where
Malinovsky had been a sergeant in the two Russian divisions fighting in France
in WW I, and "where he had attempted to subvert the Russian troops from
fighting with the Allies." After some wait, General de Gaulle gave an order
to contact Khrushchev and ask him whether or not he would attend the meet-
ing. After a further delay, an assistant came into the room to say that Khrushchev
had sent word he would not attend the meeting unless President Eisenhower
appologized. De Gaulle looked furious, MacMillan, crushed by the news, and
Eisenhower, torn between embarrassment and anger. De Gaulle turned to
the assistant and said that Khrushchev had been invited in writing; therefore,
he should reply in writing. A few minutes later the aide came back in to say
that Khrushchev had answered that he would not answer in writing. De Gaulle
Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A0QQAQ90LQQ@17A4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
De Gaulle CONFIDENTIAL
said to the aid, "Tell him it is the usage between civilized nations to reply to
written communications by written communications." The aide departed to
return a few minutes later to announce that Khrushchev would answer in writing
but would not come.
De Gaulle, who appeared pleased to have won this minor point, adjourned
the conference. To my surprise neither De Gaulle, who did not seem unduly
shaken, nor MacMillian, who was clearly staggered by the whole business, ever
suggested, even indirectly, that Eisenhower should apologize.
Adenauer, who was still in Paris, appeared relieved that at least Germany
would not pay the cost of a four-power agreement.
President Eisenhower then left for Portugal where he was given a most
warm welcome by President Tomas and Prime Minister Salazar.
It seemed to me that the Soviets had gambled on a capitulation by Eisen-
hower and were disoriented when it was not forthcoming. They had counted
on both Dc Gaulle and MacMillan to pressure Eisenhower for some form of
apology, and this had not happened.
I have often been irritated and antagonized by some of the things General
de Gaulle has said publicly where he sometimes appeared to equate the USSR
and the U.S. as threats to the grandeur and independence of France. But I have
not forgotten the statement he made at this crucial time-"Whatever happens
or whatever he does, we will be with you to the end."
Seven years later I returned to Paris as the U.S. Military Attache, shortly after
General de Gaulle had taken France out of the integrated military structure
of NATO and had requested the U.S. to remove its military presence from
France. I could not help but wonder what had led us from the first statement
of unconditional support to the second situation. During the years between
1967 and my departure from France in 1972, I tried as a matter of personal
curiosity as well as of national interest to ascertain what had led General de Gaulle
to undergo such a change. I never asked General de Gaulle point blank, but I
did talk to him about his philosophy of the defense of France. I talked to
many of his closest military and naval aides, some of whom I had known for
more than 20 years, and I came to the following conclusion, based not just on
what they told me but also on what I remembered of the discussions between
General de Gaulle and General Eisenhower on nuclear weapons and their use.
In 1962 when President Kennedy had sent Dean Acheson and Sherman Kent
to see General de Gaulle and to show him the photographs of the Soviet nuclear-
tipped rockets in Cuba,* General de Gaulle, unlike many of the European leaders,
had accepted that it might be necessary for the U.S. to take pre-emptive military
action against Cuba. Ile was a man who understood the uses of power, and
he watched carefully to sec what we would do. When he saw that instead of
taking such action, we appeared to him to have made an agreement with
Khrushchev by which we took our missiles out of Greece and Turkey in return
for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, he felt that we had not really
won the Cuban missile confrontation. One of his closest aides said to me that
*See "The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Presenting the Photographic Evidence Abroad,"
Studies XVI/2, pp. 29-36.
CQW1e6 I r Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A0004000100t'-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
CONFIDENTIAL De Gaulle
De Gaulle had told his entourage, "If the Americans will not fight for Cuba
90 miles from the U.S., they will not fight for Europe 3,500 miles away. I must
draw the conclusions from this that affect France's independence and defense."
I cannot prove this, but nearly all my contacts close to De Gaulle reflected
something very like this.
I remembered sitting before the fire at Rambouillet Castle in 1959 between
General Eisenhower and General de Gaulle in bathrobes after dinner and
De Gaulle saying, "You, Eisenhower, would go to nuclear war for Europe because
you know what its loss would mean and you are bound to us by special ties.
As the Soviet Union develops the capability to strike with nuclear rockets the
cities of North America, one of your unknown successors will decide to go to
nuclear war only if there is a nuclear strike against North America. When that
day comes, I or my unknown successor must have in hand the nuclear means
to turn what the Soviets may want to be a conventional war into a nuclear war.
I do not seek to compete with SAC or the Long Range Air Army, but I wish
France to have the means of some tactical and strategic strike against the Soviet
Union. The addition of another center of nuclear decision will multiply the
uncertainties of the Soviet planners. You Americans could survive-for a short
time-the loss of Western Europe. We Europeans could not."
Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194AOO,06 IM
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
Can information science techniques
help the intelligence analyst?
DECISION TREES
Edwin Greenlaw Sapp
It has become popular to speak of an "information explosion" as the prime
cause of present-day indecision, delay, and error. One Soviet military leader*
has observed that
Soviet Armed Forces are now so well equipped with modern weapons
and technology that fundamental changes are taking place in the
military art. The number and variety of tasks being planned by
commanders, consequently, are tremendously increased. . . . The time
to gather a complexity of data, analyze it, and react to changes is con-
stantly shortened.
What is true of Soviet military, tactical, and policy decision making is equally
true in the environment of the American Intelligence Community: the analyst
and the policy maker are surrounded by a tremendous volume of information,
they control sophisticated collection and reaction systems, and the time in which
they may safely make the most profound decisions is being constantly shortened.
Neither the policy maker nor the analyst can afford the luxury of unassisted
intuitive decision making in a world of dwindling resources and awesome instant
power.
Several thousand years ago the Greek discovered the concept of modeling
when they noted that, while the content of a problem may vary, the form remains
a constant. So it is possible, as one management analyst proposed, to express
management problems in eight forms: inventory, queueing,** routing, competi-
tion, allocation, sequencing, replacement, and search. And it is possible to carry
the process a step farther to observe that in the intelligence environment the
rules of inventory analysis apply equally well to Order of Battle, queueing to
enemy force resupply, and so on. In short, models can be constructed to assist
the analyst and policy maker in an intelligence environment in making more
accurate, more scientific decision, because while the content of intelligence
problems varies greatly, their forms are few and constant.
To illustrate: intelligence requirements fall into four major categories:
1) places (geographic locations, physical resources) ;
2) people (their strength and attitudes) ;
*Lt. Gen. C. Zavision of the Armored Forces, in his introduction to P. G. Skachko,
G. T. Volkov, and V. M. Kulikov, The Planning of Combat Operations and Troop Control Using
Network Techniques.
**"Queueing" is an information-handling technique seeking the proper alignment of data
to produce a solution of maximum effectiveness; for example, how many check-out lines
should a supermarket have?
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010d0~T-4
MORI/HRP PAGES 45-57
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
3) organizations (that people form and belong to-an indication of
their power) ; and
4) objects (that people make and possess-for example, cities or
weapons systems.)
A nation gathers intelligence in these categories to help the policy makers
in formulating tactical (timely) and strategic (long-range) decisions. The
decision-making processes of both the national policy maker and the intelligence
analyst require projections of possible outcomes based on knowledge of present
factors. In short, intelligence deals with forecasting and is a creature of un-
certainty.
Consequently, the goal of the analyst is to produce his study within a frame-
work of as much precision as uncertainty will allow, Caution often leads, how-
ever, to the overuse of what Sherman Kent called "words of estimative prob-
ability" (or "weasel words") such as probable, possible, or suggests. All of these
can spell disaster, both for the analyst who uses them, and for the policy maker
who ventures to rely on an assessment so framed. Not only is there uncertainty
as to the degree of conviction such words connote, but the complete range of
alternatives is not presented. What would be useful under such circumstances
would be a model that would serve bath to organize sizable amounts of data,
and to communicate the degree of certainty relating to possible outcomes or the
likelihood of the occurrence of specific events at some given time in the future.
Fortunately, there is such a model available to the intelligence analyst and
the policy maker; it is called the decision tree. John F. Magee has claimed that
Using the decision tree, management can consider various courses of
action with greater ease and clarity. The interactions between present
decision alternatives, uncertain events, and future-choices and their
results become more visible.*
Logic diagramming is an information-handling technique used for graphic
display of sequences, interrelationships, and the time-phased logic of a problem
situation. The decision tree is a prototype for the preponderance of logic dia-
grams. It is a linear means of representing the alternatives, objectives, and con-
sequences of a series of decisions. The decision tree, essentially, is an algorithm
for the analysis of complex sequential decision problems.
Decision trees can be used to depict a series of true-false sequences, i.e.,
in a deterministic way; or to display subjective likelihoods and their relation-
ships-a probabilistic use. The technique is deceptively simple:
1. Identify the strategies available to you, and the possible states of
nature (chance events) that might occur.
2. Draw the tree skeleton.
3. If probabilities are being expressed, enter the economic or statistical
data and associated (subjective) probabilities.
4. Finally, analyze the tree to determine the best course of action.
For a rudimentary example, suppose you would prefer to hold a party
on your patio, but there is a 40 percent chance of rain and the party can not
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
be moved once the decision has been made. You have only two strategies: outside
and inside. The chance event is rain or no rain. The tree would look like this:
;Chart.1
Inside Outside
yo; Rain Rain No Rain Rain
Discomfort Discomfort Comfort
(and regrets) (but happy)
Note a few formalities: decisions are normally rendered as squares, and
chance events as circles. The connecting lines, called branches, depict alterna-
tives- Trees are normally drawn from left to right on the long axis, but where
necessary have been rendered from top to bottom for easier presentation in
this publication.
Now assess the subjective value of the ultimate alternatives: there are four,
so on an ascending scale, outside-no rain-comfort would rate "4," while outside-
rain-disaster is last and least.
You also have a quantified probability to crank into the chance event-if
you believe your weather bureau, it's 60-40 against rain. When you have multi-
plied the subjective value by the probability of the alternative, the completed
tree looks like this:
.6x2=1.2 .6x4=2.4
.4x3=1.2 .4x1=0.4
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
There is, then, a slight quantified edge (2.8 vs. 2.4) to holding the party
outdoors. You, as decision maker, have been told something subjective by
me as an analyst. By means of a simple graphic device, you not only know
where I have been subjective, but what impact that subjectivity has had on
the recommended outcome. In short, you have no misunderstanding about my
reasoning and weighting processes.
Now let's consider a relatively complex intelligence situation in terms of
some practical applications of the technique, both to understand the situation,
and to outline the alternatives in priority order in a situation involving stress
and a great deal of danger.
In the year 1290 B.C., a Jewish military leader, Moses, made two decisions
which had far-reaching consequences, both in fact, and predictably before they
were made. I use a historical precedent because there is a danger of bogging
down in detail in current examples, and because the decisions of Moses afford
multiple applications both to the practice of intelligence and the technique of
the decision tree.
In about 1370 B.C., a three-month old boy, Moses, was adopted by the
daughter of the Pharaoh, Seti I. He was given the best Egyptian education-
presumably including diplomatic and military training. Ile spent his first 40
years in the house of Pharaoh. But political tensions in Egypt in those days
differed little from those of the 20th century, and Moses spent his next 40 years
in exile in the grazing lands of Midian (near the Gulf of Aqaba) because of
his involvement in a minority racial issue. In his 80th year, he returned, de-
scribed as faithful, reluctant, slow of speech, and "the meekest man in Israel,"
to confront the new Pharaoh, and to lead the Israelites to freedom.
The key resource available to Moses was personnel, but the people of
Israel had just achieved a freedom not all of them had necessarily sought; they
were
=possibly not yet united in faith or motivation;
=untried in battle;
= untrained;
not used to freedom or its responsibilities;
= superstitious;
= uneducated;
=poorly clothed;
=in need of basic necessities;
=the aggressors in a military situation in which they would not be assisted
by any other nation;
=but-and possibly the only plus factor-they were used to an inde-
pendent struggle for survival.
The Israelites spent two months traveling from the Egyptian treasure city
of Raamses to Mount Sinai, where superstition and factionalism interfered with
the efforts of Moses to unify them. He confronted the people and asked who
would follow him. Ile had the Levites kill the 3,000 who refused. Within the
year after their release from captivity, the Israelites-now instructed in both
spiritual and secular law-were in the Wilderness of Paran (see map), just
Ap4a oved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
MOSES
IN THE
WILDERNESS
Raamses
(Tanis)
EGYPT
Jerusalem
Jericho
Beersheba
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010047-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
south of their goal. Moses prepared to move against the southern border of
Canaan-"flowing with milk and honey"-the Promised Land from which Joseph
had been taken generations earlier.
In the Wilderness of Paran, Moses arrayed 12 family-grouped units, or
tribes, with some 603,550 adult Israeli males, and an additional 22;,300 Levites,
or priests, of all ages. The Scriptures give us their Order of Battle: (1290 B.C.)
TRIBE STRENGTH
LEADER
(males over 20)
Reuben .................................
46,500
Shammua
Simeon ..................................
59,300
Shaphat
Gad ....................................
45,650
Geuel
Judah ..................................
74,600
Caleb
Issachar ................................
54,400
Igal
Zebulun ................................
57,400
Cadiel
Ephraim ................................
40,500
Joshua
Manessah ...............................
32,200
Gaddi
Benjamin ...............................
35,400
Palti
Dan ....................................
62,700
Ammiel
Asher ...................................
41,500
Sethur
Naphtali ................................
53,400
Nahbi
603,550
Levi .................................... 22,300 (males over one month)
It was here in the Wilderness of Paran, at Kadesh Barnea, that the Israelites
refused to follow Moses into the Promised Land until he had the land and the
situation checked out-the first recorded instance of a user-originated collection
requirement!
The Intelligence Cycle
In response to user requirements of this nature, the process we call the
Intelligence Cycle begins. For this analysis, the steps will be termed tasking,
collection, processing, dissemination, and evaluation. A sixth (sometimes labelled
estimation) precedes the tasking step, but need not be considered separately
in this study.
Policy makers normally drive the cycle, setting it in motion. A request for
data (intelligence information) necessary to make an assessment which would
be couched in policy terms ("Is it wise to invade the Promised Land?") was
met by management with a political response-the selection of representatives
(spies) from each of the 12 tribes to collect the required data.
In this case study, the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of
government, together with the reins of military and spiritual leadership, rested
upon Moses and his tightly structured management organization. In the wilderness
he had introduced the "modern" concept of span of control by designating
captains over 10s, 50s, 100s, and 1000s. The people were the ultimate consumer-
the user of intelligence information, the means of action, and the deciding vote
50
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
on policy proposals. To win this vote, Moses selected the spies and the Intelligence
Cycle began. We have a rather specific account* of what happened next:
Get you up this way southward,
and go up into the mountain:
And sec the land, what it is;
And the people that dwelleth therein,
whether they be strong or weak,
few or many;
And what the land is that they dwell in,
Whether it be good or bad;
And what cities they be that they dwell in,
whether in tents,
or in strongholds;
And what the land is,
whether it be fat or lean,
whether there be wood in it or not.
And be ye of good courage,
And bring of the fruit of the land.
Note that good tasking is succinct and unambiguous. Note also that although
the Promised Land was to the north, Moses first had the spies go south up the
mountain for a birds-eye view (overhead collection) of whether the Promised
Land was worth the effort. This instruction produced the most yield at the
least risk for his 12 valued leaders. Having satisfied the basic question of the
land's overall worth, the spies came down and entered Canaan.
Now the time was the time of the firstripe grapes.
So they went up, and searched the land
from the wilderness of Zin unto Rehob,
as men come to Hamcth.**
And they ascended by the south,
and came unto Hebron;
where A-himan, Sheshai, and Tulmai,***
the children of ANAK, were. . . .
And they came unto the brook of Eshcol,
and cut down from thence a branch
with one cluster of grapes,
and they bare it between two upon a staff;
*The Bible, (King James Version), Numbers 13:1-33. In the following passages I have
made no changes in sequence, context or phrasing, but I have used indentation to emphasize
contextual order, and have inserted the appropriate Intelligence Cycle headings.
**A storehouse city of later Israel. The connotation is that of a hungry traveller chancing
upon a supermarket offering free wares.
***I have put Anak's name in capitals and his three sons' in italics for emphasis-the
reason will become apparent shortly.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001000 -4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78T03194A0040Q010007-4
ec:sion rees
and they brought of the pomegranates,
and of the figs... .
And they returned from searching of the land
after forty days.
Even without a decision tree, the tasking as set forth by Moses was virtually
perfect. It is perhaps shortsighted, however, to count on matching his perfection
every time without recourse to modern techniques, and we can reconstruct
his decision tree ex post facto to show how the tree helps the Intelligence Cycle.
(See Chart 3.) This tree would have graphically linked each of the collection
requirements to the specific decisions that the resultant data would affect. It
also would have ensured at a glance that the essential "need-to-know" questions
were being raised ahead of the secondary "nice-to-know" questions.
This particular tree and this Intelligence Cycle, incidentally, deal only
with the state of affairs in the Promised Land. As we shall see, for a net assessment
Moses would require yet another tree when disunity among his people placed the
entire venture in question.
And they went and came to Moses,
and to Aaron,
and to all the congregation
of the children of Israel.
Unto the wilderness of Paran,
to Kadesh;
And brought back word unto them,
and unto all the congregation,
And showed them the fruit of the land.
And they told him, and said,
We came unto the land whither thou sentest,
and surely it floweth with milk and honey;
and this is the fruit of it.
Nevertheless
the people be strong that dwell in the land,
and the cities are walled,
and very great:
And moreover
we saw the children of ANAK* there.
The Amalekites dwell in the land of the south.
and the Hittites,
and the Jebusites, dwell in the mountains:
and the Amorites,
And the Canaanites dwell by the sea,
and by the coast of Jordan.
(Numbers 13:26-29)
52
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Arovedfor Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
ppcision rees
Promised Land Decision Tree
Land Okay
Chart3
Number
All Over Yes All Yes
Over
Return Return Return
with Samples
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001000A
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
The last six lines, obviously, are Order of Battle data. Note the "moreover"
reference to Anak's children, unqualified by any precise number they claimed
to have seen. Note also that the processing step of the Intelligence Cycle has
been omitted. I feel the omission was deliberate, as I shall suggest in more
detail.
Once a collection requirement has set the Intelligence Cycle in motion, we
really can't be sure of how successful the effort has been without some measure
of user reaction. It is often user reaction, in fact, that causes the most measurable
changes in our activity in support of the cycle. In this regard the Israelites were
no exception. After the initial report, just cited, they became considerably
exercised; it took both Caleb and Joshua to calm them down.
EVALUATION
(User Reaction)
And Caleb stilled the people before Moses, and said,
let us go up at once and possess it;
for we are well able to overcome it.
This is the leader of the largest tribe speaking-a man who had been
to the Promised Land and returned. He and Joshua, to the consternation of
the other 10 spies who did not share their optimism, apparently were making
some headway with the Israelites.
But the men that went up with him said,
we be not able to go up against the people;
for they are stronger than we.
And they brought up an evil report
of the land which they had searched
unto the children of Israel, saying,
The land, through which we have gone to search it,
is a land that cateth up the inhabitants thereof;
And all .the people that we saw in it
are men of great stature.
And there we saw the giants,
the sons of ANAK, which come of the giants:
And we were in our own sight as grasshoppers,
and so we were in their sight.
Under any objective form of processing whatsoever, it is highly dubious that
from the initial three known and observed "giants," the final report could arrive
at an entire population "of great stature." We will pass over the concept that
a competent processor might have pressed the spies for more precise specifi-
cations-say, in cubits or in axehandles-rather than accepting the grasshopper
ratio.
There was also a bald appeal to superstition: with Moses the only Israelite
of the past few generations who had ever been outside Egypt before, there was
no experience to disprove the spies' claim that the land ate up its inhabitants.
If true, however, there should have been no inhabitants left, giant or normal,
and the spies themselves should never have returned.
U.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
The reaction to this gloomy follow-up report, however, was predictable.
The Israelites were in virtual panic; when the dust had settled, they refused
to move into the Promised Land, and it fell to Caleb and Joshua, 39 years later,
to lead the next generation into the land these people had refused to seize.
Managers are faced with both repetitive and non-repetitive situations. The
repetitive ones are generally susceptible to "standard operating procedures" which
both resolve specific recurring problems and contribute to the development of
behavior patterns in an organization. It is the non-repetitive situation that causes
problems-and it was such a situation that Moses faced. Non-repetitive situations
involve new and significant incidents, changes in policies or procedures affecting
probable outcomes, and usually emphasize the fact that no body of past experience
is directly or comprehensively applicable. Stereotyped problem-solving procedures
are recognizably inappropriate; the new situation is often ill-structured, and
reliable information regarding it is often scarce. In such cases the conventional
problem-solving approach (curing symptoms with readily available expedients)
usually results in a new and completely unexpected symptom arising. It is in
such situations that a workable model of the entire problem should be con-
structed and then manipulated as a substitute for costly trial-and-error experi-
mentation with the actual resources. These, in other words, are cases for the
decision tree.
A deterministic use of the decision tree as a problem-solving device can be
effectively demonstrated by examining Moses' tasking of the spies. They were to
discover a series of states of affairs-states that either existed or did not-with
no probability associated. (See Chart 3 again.)
In this particular tree I included an assumed instruction to return to camp
if the initial observation from the mountaintop showed the land to be worth-
less. I also inserted a key decision the Israelites had to face-could the resident
peoples in the Promised Land be overcome?-and a suggestion of the conver-
sion of the tree into a similar device to help in the probabilistic assessment of
an invasion's success.
As I mentioned earlier, another and quite powerful use of the decision
tree is as a probabilistic tool in the decision process. One key question facing
Moses as the leader of his people was whether they had sufficient unity and
cohesiveness as a nation to accomplish the difficult task of invading occupied
territory by force of arms to carry out "the will of the Lord." In retrospect, the
decision that Moses was compelled to make in regard to that unity can be
depicted as a probabilistic decision tree. (See Chart 4.)
The branches of this tree are easy to construct after the fact, and they again
enable the student of the management of non-repetitive situations to obtain a
clear perspective of the factors and possible consequences of alternate courses
of action.
The development of such a tree before the fact is much more desirable,
but correspondingly more difficult. There are few cut and dried means of
assuring the inclusion of all alternatives, and the best advice seems to be to
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001000-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
Unity Decision Tree
Tribes ?errand
Evidence, ..
Follow P~ngel
to Promised Land
Total.
Lens,tl #rt,
` d &(representation
All Over for this Years-,
Try Adam in 3 Years
Unity
people United
AllrOyer Happiness
Control l,Qat
All Over Allover
n0 unity)
All Over
(no unity)
build a likely model and then study the results, seeking the impact of certain
alternatives and the relationship among alternative courses of action. If it is
possible to assign appropriate probabilities to the various branches, the result
is both a decision-making tool and an effective vehicle for the communication
of analysis.
It is possible that an alternative not previously considered might suddenly
rear its head. Return, for example, to that slightly dampened patio a few hours
before the guests are due to arrive for the party. You might suddenly have the
inspiration to call a local rental firm or funeral parlor to provide a canopy for
the evening. At such times the original analysis reels with some shock, but you
56
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Decision Trees
have demonstrated that a single course of action and its implications can have
a profound effect on the weighting of the alternatives as to their attractiveness.
With or without the canopy, you have actually succeeded in using the tree as
a decision-making tool, for the modification is nothing more than an updated
model.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78TO3194A0004000100( 4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040001200k7-4
0o s
THE PORTUGUESE CONNECTION. By Air Commodore Roland Eugene
Vintras, CBE. Bachman & Turner, London, 1974.
The Portuguese Connection is an interesting anecdotal book that serves
admirably to illustrate the unique 600-year treaty relationship between Great
Britain and Portugal and the good use made of that relationship in 1943 to
obtain essential base rights for Allied Naval and Air Forces in the Azores.
A 70-page appendix sets forth the original 1373 Treaty of Alliance and
Friendship and the changes wrought in a half-dozen revisions by 1703. It is
interesting, however, that the British in 1943 maintained that their request was
still based on the principles set forth in 1373.
That treaty stipulated that if one signatory should find itself at war, the
other should furnish such aid as was requested "in as far as is compatible with
the danger threatening himself or his Kingdom." The Portuguese government,
in fact, offered in 1941 to declare war on Germany in accordance with the
treaty, but the United Kingdom at that time would have been hard-pressed to
offer any reciprocal aid, and asked the Portuguese to stay neutral. As one by-
product, the Portuguese were to upgrade Azores air facilities to handle heavy
aircraft such as Fortresses and Liberators, but the British would afford only
long-range advice and send no personnel to the Azores.
The Battle of the Atlantic made the difference. In less than two years, the
British came to realize that Azores bases were essential to extend air cover over
the mid-Atlantic "gaps" where U-boat wolfpacks could tear at the convoys with-
out interference.
The rest of the book concerns primarily the pulling and hauling within the
British government over the proper approach: what guarantees could be offered
to Lisbon and when? Was President Salazar pro-Nazi? And should it be a request,
or an ultimatum, and should it be followed up by armed seizure if necessary?
Ironically, the documents show that on June 18* the British Ambassador
handed Salazar a mild communication asking for the desired collaboration, and
Salazar replied warmly on June 23 agreeing in principle, with details to be ham-
mered out. A British force disembarked in the Azores on Oct. 8 to complete
the preparations, and by Nov. 9 the aircraft had their first U-boat kill.
Except for a few scattered paragraphs, the intelligence reader has to dig
for intelligence value in this book. It has to do primarily with the successful
effort to conceal the negotiations from the Germans, who had a pervasive es-
pionage system in Lisbon at the time.
Vintras, of course, is not the disinterested reporter here. A career RAF
officer, he was a member of the joint Planning Staff of the British Chiefs of
Staff, subordinate to the War Cabinet, from 1940 through most of 1943, and
played a major role in the negotiations with Portugal. He finished the war as
*Apparently the request was conveyed to Salazar on June 16, followed by the Aide-
Memoire two days later. Vintras with obvious carelessness refers to a request on June 16 and
an answer "the next day-17th August." Vintras also has the British Military Mission to
implement the agreement arriving at Lisbon on June 10.
Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00040QQ wdHH 4P PAGES 59-60
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
Books
Director of Intelligence in the Air Ministry, and then served three years in the
Joint Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Defense before retiring.
In Vintras' book there is little, if any, mention of U.S. activities to help
convince the Portuguese to make the Azores available to the Allies. In April
1943 I accompanied Lt. Colonel Craveiro Lopes and Major Costa Macedo on
a two-month trip around the United States, showing them U.S. military instal-
lations and industrial power. (The U.S. entry into the war was, of course, the
single greatest element in the ultimate Portuguese decision.) When initially I
saw the schedule for the Portuguese visitors, I asked whether we were really
going to show them all this-Lockheed at Fort Worth, building four-engine
bombers on a visibly moving assembly line; Higgins, building landing craft
at New Orleans; Kaiser, launching ships in California at an incredible rate; and
Chrysler, building tanks in Detroit, I was told that we had reached the point
where we no longer wanted to hide; we wanted to show.
When Craveiro Lopes and Costa Macedo arrived, they had recently visited
the Eastern Front and were enormously impressed by the effectiveness of the
German Armed Forces. Craveiro Lopes told me early in his visit that we could
not invade Europe through the Atlantic wall. Before the end of his visit, standing
in the Curtiss-Wright factory in Buffalo and looking at the long line of C-46
aircraft under construction, all of which had hooks on the tail to tow gliders,
he looked at me, startled, and said, "Now I see you are going over the Atlantic
wall." "Over and through," I replied. These hooks greatly impressed him, and
he never again challenged the fact that we would land in Europe. Costa Macedo
was staggered by the aircraft factories and tank production lines.
Diplomatically, the State Department was pressing the Portuguese Minister
to the U.S., Joao de Bianchi, in support of the British efforts to get base rights.
I recall one conversation with Bianchi in which he told me confidentially that
he was in favor of granting the Allies the bases, but Lisbon feared a German
attack in the islands. I pointed out to him that the Azores were beyond the range
of almost every aircraft in the German Air Force. The Germans could strike at
metropolitan Portugal only through Spain, and they would not want to get
into an additional war at this stage.
Contrary to what Vintras says, the U.S. did recognize the importance of the
Anglo-Portuguese Treaty relationship and it was made clear to me in 1943 that
this was the umbrella under which we intended to slide into the Azores as sub-
tenants of the British.
There are minor inconsistencies. Vintras says that English was the lingua
franca in Portugal in 1943, not French. That is nonsense. To this day far more
people in Portugal speak French than English. It is just much easier for them
than English.
The book is an interesting account of the British efforts to obtain base rights
from the Portuguese. It simply omits any reference to the significant part played
by the U.S. and even Brazil which was prepared to conduct the Azores takeover
if it became necessary.
LIEUTENANT GENERAL VERNON A. WALTERS
00
A
pproved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
 Approved For Release 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000400010007-4
SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Releas4 2005/04/28 : CIA-RDP78TO3094A000400010007-4
25X1