STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 16 No. 3, Fall 1972]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010014-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 113
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2004
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: January 1, 1972
• Content Type: IS

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STUDIES
~n
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 16 NO. 3 FALL 1972
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
AR,GTiIVAL RECORD N~ 15 0 0
ALFA RI~TZJ'~t1~T TQ SECRET
C~' .ARCHIVES, BL
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SECURITY PRECAUTIONS
Materials in the Studies are in general to be reserved to US per-
sonnel holding appropriate clearances. The existence of this journal is
to be treated as information privy to the US official community. All
copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered serially and
subject to recall.
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National ]Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laves Title
18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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CONTRIBU 1 ORS TO THIS ISSUE
Dino Brugioni is a member of the National Photographic Interpreta-
tion Center.
Thomas Polgar at the time of the incident described was First
Secretary-Consul in the Political Section of the US Embassy
in Buenos Aires.
Henry S. Lowenhaupt participated in the research he describes.
Henry Rubenstein is an officer in CIA's
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CONTEN'T'S
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The Cuban iblissile Crisis-Phase I ...................... .. 1
VINO I3RUGIONI
Tlie PI story. SECR~.T
Assignment: Skyjacker ..................................... S3
THOMAS POLGAR
On, the importwlaee o f COrltactS, i?n f luence, and judgment.
CONFIDENTIAL
Ravelling Russia's Reactors ......... ...................... 6S
HENRY S. LOWENHAUPT?
7'he puzzle five years long. SECRET
llC Power and Cooling Towers ............................ 81
HENRY RUBENSI~IN
More orI the intelligence analysis o f the Soviet nuclear
lceapons program. SECRET
Notes and Comments ..... ....................... ...... S7
More Yet on "Lucy"
Intelligence iu Recent Public Literature : .................... SJ
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No Foreign Dissem
THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS-PHASE I
Dino A. Brugioni
.For history, iF it is Co reflect the past accurately, must first and forcmort be a
record of not only the acts but of the thoughts and feelings- the source and
explanation of those actsof the living men and women who peopled the
world at the time the historian is describing.
Much has been written about the Cuban Missile Crisis of October
1962, especially about the events that took place after the discovery
of Soviet missiles in Cuba and the decision-making process at t;he
presidential level. Little has been written about the men whose dis-
covery of the missiles touched off the crisis or the way the discovery
was made.
This brief account is an attempt to record those events, and the
names of some of the officers who participated, before memories
fade and while the participants and documents are still available.
It presents an account of the fateful photographic reconnaissance
mission that resulted in discovery of the missiles, including pertinent
background information. It chronicles events at the National Photo-
graphic Interpretation Center (NPIC) which culminated in the
information being taken to the President at the- White House by
General Marshall Carter, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence;
Ray S. Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence; Arthur C. Lundahl,
Director of NPIC; and Sidney Graybeal, Chief of the Offensive
Missile Division, Office of Scientific Intelligence.
The materials for this study have been drawn from the recollections
of the people in the intelligence community involved in the events,
from the records at NPIC and elsewhere, and in some cases :from
published accounts of the missile crisis.
*'f he author is indebted to the many intelligence officers who took considerable
time from busy schedules to relate their experiences during the Cuban Missile Crisis and
who provided invaluable documents and records.
I am also indebted to Urban Linehan, Tom Ilenley, and Doris Taylor for their
editorial review and suggestions, and to the CIA librarians.
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~ssi a rises
The chain of events leading to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 is
normally traced back to the visit of Soviet First Deputy Premier
Anastas Mikoyan to Cuba in February 1960. For the National
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), the story began with
the first U-2 mission over the island on 27 October 1960.
In early 1960, reports which could not be evaluated began warning
of missile sites in Cuba. From January to March 1960, the FBI and
covert sources reported persistent rumors in Cuba and in the Cuban
refugee community in the United States that the Russians were con-
structing amissile site in the Zapata swamps. Photography of the
area tailed to reveal any activity or equipment related to missiles.
As the stream of refugees from Cuba increased in the early sixties,
so did the number of reports about Cuba. Many refugees gave valuable
information; others gave unreliable reports or misinformation, some
unintentionally, others with the hope of inducing the United States to
strike or invade Cuba. Some information, too, was probably planted
by l"astro's agents.
No central interrogation or processing facility existed at the time.
1'he information came from covert sources, the military services, the
FBI, press and broadcast accounts, friendly foreign sources, and
businessmen. Many well-intentioned people wrote letters giving in-
formation to officials from the President on down. These reports were
sent to N PIC for photographic confirmation.
7`ho Director of Central Intelligence ordered NPIC to check every
report that could be checked of possible weapons in Cuba against
t7 2 photography, and to report its findings. Beginning in May 1962
and continuing throughout the crisis, the Center published aPhoto-
l~raphic Evaluation of Information on Cuba series, which attempted to
do this.
The range of interesting topics was wide, including, for example,
missile sightings; rumors of missile or rocket launching bases, loading
and unloading activities, property seizures, evacuation of families,
presence of tents, movements of military convoys, digging of trenches,
emplacements, and tunnels, road construction and many more. In
addition, all reports of fires and sabotage, and reported closings of
U.S.- and foreign-owned plants were carefully checked. The reported
closings of sugar mills and other industrial installations due to short-
ages of spare parts or equipment breakdowns were investigated.
Reports of newly constructed resorts and hotels were scrutinized. All
reports of Soviet-constructed plants and aid projects were investigated.
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A special chapter on the photographic surveillance of Cuba could be
written about the photographic coverage of ship movements. ~.s it
became evident that Soviet supplies and arms were flowing into Cuba
in increasing numbers, Soviet merchant shipping to Cuba came under
close scrutiny.
In late 1961, the Center requested and began receiving all photo-
graphs taken of ships going to Cuba. Taken under a variety of
circumstances-from the shore, from other ships, and from aircraft
flying at low, intermediate, and high altitudes-and with a variety of
cameras and focal lengths, this material came to the Center in many
sizes and formats.
The surveillance began when ships moving through the Bosporus
were photographed by both short and long focal length cameras by
the Navy, CIA, and Turkish elements. Ships transitting at night were
later photographed by the U.S. 6th Fleet and by photographic
squadrons stationed in Sicily and Spain.
Once ships passed Cxibraltar or left the Baltic, they were photo-
graphed by reconnaissance planes operating out of Kindley Naval Air
Station in Bermuda and the Naval Air Station at Jacksonville, Florida.
As the ships approached Cuba, they were photographed again by the
Marine photo squadron based at Guantanamo, Cuba, and by Coast
Guard planes from Miami.
Ships were photographed if they were declared to be of "special
interest" by the Office of Naval Intelligence. To be of special interest,
a ship had to meet one or more of the following criteria:
a. It was a known arms carrier.
b. It passed through the Bosporus at night.
c. It reported tonnage well below its capacity and rode high in the water
a normal indication of military cargoes.
d. It made a false declaration about its port of destination.
e. It had suspicious deck cargo.
F. It declared for Cuba.
g. It was the subject of pertinent COMINT information.
Military equipment and crates were frequently observed on the
decks of Soviet ships (Figure 1). Many photo interpreters worked. on
identifying the equipment and crates. Bill Crimmins, a YI aircraft
specialist, worked closely with several analysts from the Office of
Research and Reports and especially with Thaxter Goodell ~ in the
new art of "cratology." Cratology was to become awell-known term
as a result of studies begun at this time. It is basically the technique
~ Thaxter L. Goodell, "Cratology Pays Off," Studies in Inlellir~ence, Vol. H, No. 4,
ball 64, pp. 1-10 (SI;CRFT)
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of identifying military hardware by carefully studying and measuring
shipping crates. NPIC had been involved in this effort since the first
U-2 photography. Most aircraft shipping crates were delivered to
selected airfields and periodic photography over these fields made it
possible to observe the uncrating and removal of various aircraft
sections.
Most aircraft were assembled in open and therefore observable areas.
Aerial photos--notably those made by the Royal Air Force of selected
ports and airfields in the Middle East along with ground photos
permitted the identification of numerous military crates we were
seeing on the way to Cuba.
Between the first U-2 mission over Cuba in October 1960 and
Mission 3088 on 29 August 1962, 56 Flights had been flown. NPIC
photo interpreters had reported on these missions as they were received
in Washington. They also continued to back these "readouts" by
checking other photography and the numerous reports on activity
in Cuba.
Mission 3088 was to be a milestone in the Cuban missile crisis.
Although the flight covered the entire island (Figure 2), clouds
obscured most of the eastern portion. The areas that were clear
provided information which was to bring the intelligence community
to a fast boil. As one analyst stated after the mission, "The sirens
were on and the red lights were flashing."
Within minutes after the film was placed on the light tables, a PI
on a mission scan team shouted, "I've got a SAM site." Excitement
spread and other PIs gathered about to look at the find. Before the clay
was over, eight SAM sites in various stages of construction were
found in western Cuba.2 The Cuban situation had entered a new phase.
The SAM sites were located along Cuba's northern coast at Bahia
Ronda, fIavana, LaColoma, Mariel, Matanzas, San Julian, Cienfuegos,
Santa Lucia, and Santa Cruz del Norte. A SAM assembly area was
discovered near Santiago de Las Vegas. The geographic placement of
these sites strongly suggested an area defense of the island as a whole
rather than maximum protection of ]cey military targets or areas.
The Cuban SA-2 launch sites had the usual six launch positions
encircling a central guidance area. In most cases, they were joined
by a road network of the "Star of David" pattern. Photo and mensu-
ration analysis, along with electronic radiation later intercepted from
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('uba, indicated that the Fruit Set; radar (model "C"), the latest
guidance radar, was being used.
The discovery of the SAM Sites brought the USIB organization
into play the Air I~efcnsc 1Vorking (".roue of the Guided N'lissile
axed Aeronautics Intelligence Committee. In addition to noting the
locations and types of sites, the working group checked collat oral
i~iformation against confirmed sites and postulated where new onus
relight be found.
'I'bis recheck of the collateral on the area of SAM. deplo,y~ncut in
the light of the photography enabled us to cvalua,te much reporting
of tints, construction activity, military vehicles, land expropriation,
~.i,nd the like. Vlan,y of these i?eports had stated that Soviet milit?_~ry
personnel were present at the sites. It was now possible For officers
like Ronald Lcc Russell, thc~ SAM expert in the Office of Scientific
[ ntclligence, to make the rounds each morning at CIA headquarters
collecting the latest cabled interrogation reports and other pertinent
infoi?tnation for verification by the Pls.
In short, it was now abundantly clear that something extraordinary
was happening which involved an exceptionally large amount of Soviet
military hardware and manpower and that rnore SA-2s would be
found on subsequent missions.
At higher echelons, the SAMs wc~?e immediately regarded .u a
I;lircaa to our U 2 reconnaissance aircraft. The transfer of U 2 fli~~hte
from CIA to the military was considered. The Powers U 2 flight was
fresh in rnemor,y, and obviously the administration wanted no
repetition.
.lol~ui McC'one, i,bc llirector of Central Intelligence, commented to
several of his ranking officers that the SAMs rnigbi; well indicate that
Soviet offensive missiles were intended for Cuba. 1Ie demanded and
received assurances from Arthur Lundahl that everything possible was
being done to identify any surface-to-surface missiles.
Mission 308K also confirmed the presence of KO~VIAR-class guided-
missile boats in Cuba. `Phe "readout" from the 29 August mission on
Manic] Naval Port stated that l3 PT boats were moored north and
south of the airfield. Seven of the 13 were KOMARs, and another
was probably being converted. Previous photographic analysis of
unic{ue deck crates aboard Soviet ships indicated that the crates prob-
ahh contained KOMARs (I+'igurc 3). The Divinnles and the Sezu~rnles
had delivered two KOMARs cash, a.nd the Sovetskaya Gavan had
delivered four KOMARs. 'I'hc first sighting of a KOM.1R boat at
sea was reported by the Navy in the vicinity of Viariel on 29 Au~,~ust.
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Ray Cline, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, was briefed on the
mission finds. He, in turn, asked that Bill Harvey, the chief of '1.'ask
Force "W", be briefed so that covert collection personnel would be
aware of and concentrate on collecting information on the newly
identified sites. Lundahl and Bill Tidwell, an assistant to the Deputy
Director of Intelligence for planning, briefed Harvey, who responded
immediately that the White House should be informed.
A White House spokesman said that the President would noi; be
available that afternoon but that Attorney General Robert Kennedy
would be. The President was to fly to Quonset Naval Air Station in
Rhode Island to meet his family on their return from Italy.
On 31 August at 1600, Tidwell, Harvey, and Lundahl waited outside
the Attorney General's office.
After the group was ushered into Kennedy's office, Harvey made a
brief introductory statement and turned the briefing over to Lundahl
and Tidwell. Lundahl, laying the photographs and maps on the desk,
summarized the developments in Cuba. He particularly emphasized
the new SAM sites and KOMAR boats.
Kennedy was extremely interested. He asked many questions, said
he wanted to be kept up-to-date, and promised that the intellligence
would be conveyed to the President that night. He made it clear that
he or the President wanted to see any further evidence of a military
buildup. The briefing lasted about an hour. Lundahl and Tidwell left
a resume of the information with the Attorney General.
This was Lundahl's first detailed briefing of the Attorney General,
and he remembers him as:
. a very sharp fellow, very perceptivo, full of good questions. Ile
didn't like long, involved answers. ne cut through any wandering conversation
and got right to the things he wanted to know. However, when you. had
something worthwhile to say, he was a very good listener. In other words,
when he heard the things he wanted to hear, he soaked it up like a blotter.
13ut when you wandered off, he would jerk you back quickly to the subject
in which he was interested." a
Kennedy asked Nicholas Katzenbach, Deputy Attorney General, to
draft a warning statement to be issued by the White House making it
unequivocally clear that the United States would not tolerate the
introduction of offensive surface-to-surface missiles, or offensive
weapons of any kind, into Cuba.4
3Interview with Arthur C. Lundahl, 18 March 1970, Secret. NPIC Historical
Collection, p. 3.
4 Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Dugs, New Yorlc, New York, W.W. Norton Co., Inc,
1.969, p. 26, 27.
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~~ccording to historian Arthur Schlesinger, when the Attorney
General saw the draft he recommended:
. stiffening it with an explicit statement that we would not tolerate the
iruport of offensive weapons. 'fhe draft as revised read that while we had no
evidence of significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under
tinviet direction, should it be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.'
On 4 September, Pierre Bolinger, the White House Press Secretary,
read to news correspondents the following final version of the state-
ment by President Kennedy on Cuba:
;All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this Hemisphere, have been
concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Onion to bolster the military
power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has reached this Government
in the last Pour days from a variety of sources which establishes without a
doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number
of antiaircraft defense missiles with a slant range of twenty-five mites which
:arr, similar to early models of our Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets
are apparently providing the extonsive radar and other electronic oquipment
which is required for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of
sovera;l Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles
having a range of fifteen miles. The number of Soviet military technicians
now known to be in Cuba or en route approximately 3,500- is consistent
with assistance. in setting up and learning to use this equipment. As 1 stated
last weak, wo shall continue to make information available as fast as it is
obtained and properly verified.
'there is ne evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet
bloc country; of aiiiitary bases provided in Russia; of a violation of the ]934
treaty relating to C~uantanarno; of the presence of offensive ground to ground
missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or
under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it to be otherwise the gravest
i,auce would arise.
'rho Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge
posed by Communist threats to the pcac:u. It must be dealt with as a part of
that larger issue as well as in the context of the special relationships which
have long characterized the inter-American system.
It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will
not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force.
It, will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action
against any part of the Western Hemisphore. The United States, in conjunction
with other hemisphere countries, will make sure that while increased Cuban
:a.rrnauients will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves,
Ltaey will be ^othing more"
~~ Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A 1'hous?nd L>rzys, Boston, ttought,ou, .Mifflin, 1965,
p. 665.
a~ U.ti. Uc,partment of State, Bulletin, Volume XLVll, No. 1213 (Septemba?r 34,
1962), p. 450.
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~ssi a ris-s
The SAM sites and the KOMARs were not the only significant finds
on Mission 3088. But it was not until 7 September that the President
learned of another startling discovery. The reason for the delay was
that a new site discovered near Banes did not closely resemble the
familiar SAM installations. Its identification as acruise-missile site
required several days of analysis. To explain this, it might be well to
describe some of the techniques NPIC photo interpreters use in
identifying a new and unusual site.
The identification of the Banes site was based primarily on work
then under way on a Chinese site photographed just a few weeks before.
By design, NPIC receives, exploits, and stores photography of strategic
geographic areas in the world. Through experience and computer data,
the PIs are able to relate intelligence finds in one area to fresh
evidence discovered in another. On 11 August 1962, a U-2 piloted by a
Chinese Nationalist photographed a unique installation near Len-
shan, China. The installation appeared to be missile-associated. Its
].oca,tion suggested that it was designed to protect the approaches to
the strategic Po IIai Gulf off Communist China's northeastern coast.
It was reported as follows:
4 nm SE of Chin-hsi. This installation is considered possibly missile-
associated. An area 2 x I nm contains at least 6radar-equipped vans, a possible
launch position, 9 possible missile transporters, 5 underground bunkers, 5
drive-through buildings, FAGOT/FRESCO aircraft, at least 2 motor pools,
approximately 75 structures consisting of warehouses, and maintenance,
administrativo, and barracks-type buildings. Area is served by awide-radius
turn road network and rail?
Now the new area east-northeast of Banes seen on the 29 August
Cuban mission was reported initially as follows:
Banes Area, SAM Equipment 2058N 07538 W.
5 nm ENIP of Banes at 20 58-50N 075-38-1OW. SAM launch and radar
equipment stored in open area adjacent to probable electronics facility.
I~:quipment8 missile transporters with canvas-covered trailers, 7 clec-
tronics vans, and 20 miscellaneous vehicles n
Later analysis showed that the site configuration and equipment
were not compatible with known surface-to-air missile systems. A
team of photo interpreters-Zane Meixner, Tom Hardy, Jim Holmes,
John Rooney, and Dale Heintzelman was assembled to study the
~ NPIC MCI Mission GRC 125, 11 Aug. 1962, Secret Noforn, NPICJR-103862,
Sep. 1962, pp. 3-4.
e NPIC, Situation Summary, Par. 763- 62, 5 Sept. 1962 SECRET NOFORN.
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site. When they compared the Banes installation with the site at Lien-
shan, certain similarities were obvious. Both sites and launch positions
were similar in size and configuration. Both commanded a view of the
sea. Both sites had ~'Phiff-type radars and inclined launchers. At both
sites, it appeared that missiles would be offloaded from the rear of the
transporter. 1'he Banes site, however, appeared to be field-deployed,
while the Lien-shan site was a permanent facility. Moreover, what
appeared to be a FAGOT~FRESCO aircraft was at the Lien-shan
facility.
'Che launch positions at Banes and Lien-shan were also compared to
those at SA-2 sites. They were different in configuration and arrange-
ment. 1'he SA-2 revetment is adrive-through revetment; those at
Banes and Lien-shan were not. To place a missile on the launcher at
Banes, the transporter would have to be backed up to the launcher.
The length of the missile transporters at Banes was about the same
as that for the SA-2, but otherwise the transporters were not similar.
The Banes transporter trailer was a "low-boy" type with a unique
humpback canvas cover rather than the sleek horizontal box of the
SA `L. The launcher was also different from that of the SA -2. It was
slightly longer-35 feet instead of 28. The support or rectangular box
effect seen under the SA-2 was not present at the Banes site. The
flame deflector was trapezoidal, not rectangular as in the SA-2. The
launcher consisted of two launching rails set 2.4 feet apart and
mounted, by an unseen support, on an elongated base. The base was
supported by two axles (four wheels), and an outrigger was at about
the midpoint at each side.
A coastal defense role was logical for the Banes site. The site was
situated on a hill with a commanding view of beaches and ports
suitable for large-scale amphibious operations. From existing charts,
the hilltop location was estimated to be 250 to 330 feet above the sea.
N PIC' photogrammetrists were asked to compute the straight line
of sight of the Banes installation for the above sea elevations of 250,
300, and 330 feet. They found that for 250 feet, the line of sight range
would be 20.87 miles; for 300 feet, the range would be 22.86 miles;
and for 330 feet, the range would be 23.98 miles.
The possibility that the FAGOT~FRESCO aircraft might be used
as a missile launched from such a site, as suggested by the Lien-shan
site, sent analysts scurrying for their background files. They had noted
previously the similarity of the MIG-15 to the KENNEL AS-1
air-to-surface missile.
'There were some differences, however. The KENNEL had a radome
housing the receiving antenna on top of the vertical stabilizer and a
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radome on the nose. It, of course, had no canopy. The overall length
of the KENNEL was 27 feet as compared to 33.4 feet for the MIG.
The KENNEL'S wing span was about 15.5 as compared to 33.2 feet
for the MIG, with a leading edge sweepback for the KENNEL, of
about 60 degrees against the MIG's 36 degrees. The stall fence
arrangement-two fences on each side-was seemingly the same
for both.
The KENNEL had not been seen before in a coastal defense role.
It was not until the 3 January 1963 parade in Havana that intelligence
analysts saw the surface-to-surface version of the KENNEL. 'rhe
development of the KENNEL was initially reported in the late 14140s
by German scientific returnees who worked on a beam rider guidance
system called KOMET. The missile was developed originally to~ be
used on the BULL; it was later adapted for the BADGER. The
KENNEL was first shown to the Western world at the Leningrad
Travel Air Show in July 1961. Launched from the BADGER, it had
ranges from 35 to about 55 nautical miles.
Two "ground" photographs of the KENNEL were used extensively
at the Center. The first, taken by attaches, showed it carried b~y a
BADGER; the second, a Soviet source photo, showed it prepared for
loading on a BADGER (Figure 4).
The PIs concluded that the Banes site was a probable coastal
defense cruise-missile site. This judgment was generally accepted. by
the intelligence analysts. But the analysts also considered three other
possibilities for the installation: the SS-N-1-a destroyer-launched
cruise anti-ship homing missile, launched from 30-foot inclined rails;
the SS-N-2-a KOMAR-class patrol craft-launched cruise anti-ship
homing missile, launched from inclined rails 25 to 30 feet long; and
the SS-C-1-the "missile-in-a-bottle" first shown in the 7 November
1961 Moscow parade. This missile would be launched from an inclined
ramp within a tube mounted on a large four-axle truck.
Although none of the known Soviet cruise-missile systems precisely
fit the facility at Banes, the analysts believed that the site was for a
short-range 20- to 40-nautical-mile missile system. The WHIFF-type
radar seen at the site had not boon noted with known cruise-missile
systems but could be used for target acquisition or guidance. Analysts
noted that if the missile had an inertial guidance system and a means
of target acquisition, the range of the missile at the Banes site could
be extended to as far as 130 nautical miles.
NPIC was under considerable pressure from the Defense Depart-
ment to publish information on the Banes site. Because the President
and his brother had shown such interest in new developments in Cuba,
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Cline asked that the new information not be released until after the
President had seen it.
After the PI reports were made and the analysts had been consulted,
the information was ready to be given to the President. A meeting was
set for 7 September. At 1550 hours, Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary
of Defense McNamara, Carter, Cline, Lundahl of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, and John McLauchlin of the Defense Intelligence
Agency were ushered into the Oval Room of the White House. The
Secretary of Defense had asked John Hughes, a special assistant to
the Director, DIA, to attend, but Hughes was unavailable. His
deputy, John McLauchlin, was then asked to represent the DIA.
McLauchlin laughs when he recalls how a GS-12 represented the
DIA at a White House meeting. Ile felt ill at ease when he saw the
nation's leaders and felt their inquiring glances directed at him. He is
sure they were wondering, "Who the hell is he?"
The President was seated in his rocking chair. McGeorge Bundy
stood at the .President's left.
Carter told the President that detailed analysis of the 28 August U-2
photography over Cuba-in addition to providing data on the SA-2
and KOMAR-had revealed surface-to-surface missiles in Cuba in-
tended for coastal defense. Ile said that Mr. Cline and Mr. Lundahl
would provide all the necessary details. Cline read a short prepared
statement. He said that we knew little about such a system, but felt
that it was a defensive missile system that would be employed to repel
an amphibious landing. He then asked Lundahl to describe the site.
Lundahl removed a briefing board labeled "Possible Tactical SSM
Launch Site under Construction near Banes, Cuba" from a leather
case and handed it to the President. He looked over the top of the
briefing board while explaining it.
Lundahl said the site was near the town of Banes in eastern Cuba
along the northern coast. It was three nautical miles inland but
could cover the seaward approaches to many of the beaches suitable
for large-scale amphibious landings. Describing the site in detail,
he said it contained revetted, inclined launchers with associated,
possible control revetments; canvas-covered missile transporters;
WHIFF-type radars; numerous vehicles and pieces of equipment; a
tent area; and open storage areas. Lundahl said that the site resembled
the missile site near Lien-shan, China. IIe added that we would
probably see refinements at the site. The President asked, "What,
for example?" Lundahl replied, "Revetting of the major pieces of
equipment," and added that the site could now be operational with
all the equipment present and properly emplaced. "Although we do
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not see missiles at this site, we presume it will fire something like a
drone aircraft," he said.
The President obviously was primarily concerned with whether the
newly discovered site was defensive or offensive. Only three days
earlier he had informed the nation "the gravest issues would arise" if
offensive weapons were introduced in Cuba. His anxiety was revealed
as he began to question Lundahl and Cline on this possibility.
"TTow far will this thing shoot?" he asked. "From 20 to 40 nautical
miles," Cline replied. The President seemed perturbed at such a wide
divergence in range. Cline explained that based on an assessment of
the radar's capability, a maximum range of 40 miles was estimated.
fIe said that the range was a function of the altitude of the site and
the height of the surface target and the missile's radar.
The President was not satisfied,- Lundahl explained that a key
feature of the system was the target illumination radar which was not
,y-et identified. Subsequent missions could refine the estimate. The
I'r~~sident then asked if it could hit our ships at sea. Cline replied
it could if they came within range. The President said, "That would
snake it an offensive weapon." Cline again explained that the site
seemed designed to defend possible landing beaches. "Yes," the
President snapped, "you've explained that before." Lundahl said
that we had previously seen several missile systems in the USSR and
China and that we would rescan and reanalyze the photography of
their coasts in hopes of discovering more information that would help
to explain the purpose and capability of the Cuban sites. Cline added
that CIA's office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) was conducting a
similar search for information and was seeking advice among the
technical experts employed by the Department of Defense. Cline
hoped to provide the President with more information at a later date.
The President listened impatiently. His brows were furrowed at a
sharp angle above his nose; his face reddened. He was becoming
visibly angry. His voice began to rise. "How sure are ,you that this
is not an offensive weapon designed to strike targets in Florida?" he
asked. Lundahl said that the site was located in the eastern area of
Cuba with the launchers oriented eastward, away from the United
States. "What do you know about the weapons?" the President asked.
Somewhat embarrassed, Cline admitted that we didn't know every-
thing about the system but felt that we had to report it. The President
stated he wanted no reporting until the missile system was com-
pletely evaluated.
[it that moment, Secretary McNamara said that there was little
need for speed of reporting, and that he would convey this feeling
to UoD officials.
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The President asked how widely the information would be cir-
culated. Lundahl replied that the NPIC's cables and reports were
disseminated to a rather large number of intelligence organizations
and military commands. Cline also indicated that multiple copies of
the film had been made and sent to military commands.
Obviously still angry, the President handed the briefing board back
to Lundahl. Speaking to Carter and Cline, he said, "We have to be
very careful about any evidence of offensive weapons in Cuba. If such
evidence should be found, it must be kept very restricted and I v,~ant
to be one of the first to know about it."
The President also made it very clear that if offensive missiles were
found in Cuba, special security systems must be involved to ensure
against any intelligence leaks or premature disclosures. IIe stated that
this must be an ironclad system. Only those who must know should
have access to such intelligence.
The President was determined to chart the course of events rather
than be dragged along in their wake. He wanted the time and freedom
to examine alternatives before deciding policy. He was especially
aware of political pressures, inside anal outside his party, that could
inhibit or encumber his decisions if there were a premature disclosure.
Still agitated, the President began to herd the group toward the
door. General Carter tarried and said, "Mr. President, we clearly
understand your wishes in the matter. But just to make sure that
we're all on the same wave length, may I. say you do want us to know
exactly what these things are so that we can report to you accurately?"
The President, considerably toned down, said, "By all means."
Carter said, "Then in order to arrive at these conclusions, it certainly
wouldn't be contrary to your wishes, or to your order, that we, the
analysts, talk back and forth with each other to compare our knowl-
edge and winnow out our conclusions, and to reject that which is
inconsistent." The President said, "Most certainly not; that's exactly
what I want to happen."
Carter continued, "I thought that's what you wanted, but others
might have felt that each of us was to stay in isolation and try
independently to arrive at a collectively agreed upon conclusion,
which would have been hard to do." The President then said, "No.
Those people who need to know--those specialists, those experts who
can talk to the photo interpreters, and with whom those photo
interpreters can talk-can collectively arrive at a decision. That's
what I want to happen."
The meeting broke up, and the group left the White House at about
1700 hours. Driving back to Langley headquarters in the CIA
limousine, Carter rather ruefully said that it seemed every time
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SECRET Missile Crisis
McCone went out of town some flap caught him on the bridge.
Inmdahl recalls, "Each of the group was rather grimly convinced
that we were dealing with a very serious situation and that it was
going to take our very best efforts not only to satisfy the President
but to satisfy the rest of the leadership in terms of what was
really there."
:1 great paradox existed in Washington. While there was no hard
intelligence confirming the introduction of offensive missiles-and
intelligence officers were confident that the Soviets would not be that
irrational-most analysts were sensitive to the possibility that such
missiles might be introduced. Extraordinary precautions, therefore,
were taken to assure the secrecy of such information should it be found.
When Carter returned to Langley he called Huntington Sheldon, the
Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, into his office. Sheldon
recalls these vents:
"('arter told me that as a result of a presidential directive, a security system
was to be established which would absolutely safeguard the dissemination of
highly sensitive information derived from Cuban overflights. He left it to me
to determine how this should be accomplished. And with that very broad and
general outline 1 proceeded to return to my office to formulate the kind of
system 1 thought would meet Ueneral Carter's specifications. Icould see that
.,n additional codeword was needed which would override. all other cndewords
and which should be so closely held as to require in most cases monolithical
dissemination."
I1 awing decided this Sheldon called Henry Thomas in the Office of Security
and asked him to send over a list of available code names so th;tit hr, might
select a proper name for this particular system. Thomas soon brought a list
of names and >heldon chose the word "NSALM."
"I told the responsible people that this word would be used for a
i~articuiarly sensitive operation. It was not difficult to set thE~ parameters
for such a system since I was instructed to devise one which was extremely
tii;ht. The only question which had to be decided was who would have access
and who would clear individuals for receipt of Ysa1m material."
Sheldon later discussed with Carter a memorandum he had prepared
which could be used as a basis for launching the system through
iJSTT3 channels.
"A.v usual when a system this rigid is adopted, there is always a series of
complaints from various people who fee( they were short changed. But by
placing the eystem under USIB and stating the President's determination to
keep such information tightly compartmented, the system was readily accepted
by the Community." s
Interview with Iluntington U. Sheldon, 9 June 1970, Secret. NPIC Historical
(",ollection, pp. 1-3.
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Over the weekend, most of the Agency's senior officers reflected on
the Banes briefing and the President's reaction. An additional concern
that weekend was a Chinese broadcast on 9 September that revealed
that a Chinese Nationalist U-2 had been shot down over eastern China.
The broadcast Icft unanswered how and where the plane was shot
down and the fate of the pilot. There was speculation in Washington
that the Chinese Communists had brought the aircraft down with an
SA-2 missile. Now the safety of the U-2s flying over Cuba would
surely have to be reassessed.
On 13 September, the President was told that the Banes site was
evaluated as a defensive short-range cruise-missile system with a
range of 25 to 30 nautical miles. The President was pleased. Later
that day, at his press conference, the President read a preliminary
statement on Cuba. He restated his warning:
F',ver since Communism moved on to Cuba in 1958, Soviet technical and
military personnel have moved steadily onto the islasad in increasing numbers
at the, invitation of the Cuban Government.
Now that movement has been increased. It is under our most careful
surveillance.
But I will repea~C the conclusion that I reported last week, bhat those new
shipments do not constitute a serious threat to any part of this hemisphere.
He added:
But let me make this clear once again If at any time the Communist buildup
in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including
our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and
space activities in Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this
country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by
force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere or become an
offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this
country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that
of its allics.~~~
An entirely different kind of reception was given to General Carter
and Arthur Lundahl the next time they appeared at the White House.
Phis came about through a briefing of General Dwight D. Eisenhower
and the President that took place a few days later.
Early on 10 September, General Carter called Lundahl and said that
the President would like a current briefing on photographic systems
for himself and Creneral Eisenhower.
General Eisenhower had recently returned from asix-week trip to
Western Europe and had been invited to lunch by :President Kennedy
10 Transcript of the President's News Conference on h'orcign and llomestic Matters,
Ncw York 'l'imes, Sept. 14, 192, p. 12.
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to discuss his trip impressions and to be briefed, in turn, on the latest
advances in photography and the recent photography of Cuba.
Carter said he would meet Lundahl at the White .House at 1000
hours, but the precise time of the briefing was not set. President
Kennedy had several things on the agenda for General L+;isenhower,
including a short tour of the White House to show him Mrs.
Kennedy's latest acquisitions of furniture and art.
The President was in a happy mood. He enjoyed playing host to
General liisenhower. He had admired the General's role in World
~~'ar 1:1 and all that he had done for his country. And now, as master
of the grand mansion, he had the opportunity to play host to its
previous occupant. President Kennedy had a warm smile and was
making sweeping motions with his arms as he walked about the 1~L'hite
F3ouse talking with General Eisenhower. Lundahl could not remember
when he had seen the President in a better mood. This was in
complete contrast to his mood of the previous N'riday.
After lunching at the White House, Carter, Col. llavis 5. Parker,
the Deputy J~irector of NPIC, and Lundahl set up their briefing
materials on an easel in the Oval Room. Just before 1400 hours,
President Kennedy and General Eisenhower entered the room. The
President said to General Eisenhower, "You must certainly know
these gentlemen." General Eisenhower said that he did, shook hands
with the briefers, and sat down at the President's right.
Carter made a few introductory remarks and then turned to Lundahl
who presented 15 substantive and technical briefing boards.
Lundahl had briefed President Kennedy many times and knew he
liked opening remarks that gave him an immediate option on the
presentation. When the President was pleased with a presentation, he
would nod and smile. When he thoroughly enjoyed a presentation,
he would often light a big, black cigar.
Lundahl showed, through photographic enlargements, the improve-
ments that had been made to the various camera systems. General
h;isenhower asked many questions about photographic systems in the
research and development stage. He especially wanted to hear details
on that "very, very high speed and high flying aircraft" (the SR-71).
Carter gave the latest information on the progress of this program.
The President, too, asked numerous questions. lluring the briefing
he Lit a black cigar. He seemed delighted with the General's questions
and the answers given by the participants. 'Che briefing lasted
approximately 30 minutes. Both President Kennedy and General
l~]isenhower expressed their thanks and departed.
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All agreed that the briefing was a success. Carter especially Felt
relieved and jokingly remarked, "At last, I can report some good news
from the White House to Mr. McCone."
On the 26 September U-2 coverage of the site, a 26-foot-long cruise-
missile with a wing span of 15 feet was identified on one of the Banes
launchers. The tie with the KENNEL-type missile was now complete.
The Ili October Mission
A CIA U-2 rolled down a runway at Edwards Air Force Base in
California on 14 October 1962. It gathered speed and began to rise.
The Strategic Air Command pilot, Maj. Richard S. Heyser, recorded
the take-off time as 07007. (Greenwich Mean Time or 0200 Eastern
Standard Time). This was the 63rd U-2 mission flown over Cuba
since the program began on 27 October 1960. The mission number
was G3101; the code name was "Victor." The pilot set his course for
Cuba and settled back for afive-hour flight.
Mission G3101 employed the "B" camera system, ahigh-resolution,
36-inch focal length, large-format, general coverage, reconnaissance
camera designed to provide detailed information over an extremely
large area (potentially one million square nautical miles per mission).
The camera was loaded with two rolls of film, each 9 inches wide and
about 6,000 feet long. The rolls of film were placed parallel to the
focal plane of the camera so that both rolls were exposed during each
action of the shutter. The combined film size was 18 by 18 inches.
The cameras provided for horizon-to-horizon coverage in the seven-
position mode (73.5?L, 49.0?L, 24.5?L, 0? or vertical, 24.5?R, 49.0?R
and 73.5?R). The supply of film in the camera made it possible to
receive about 4,000 paired aerial pictures i. e., to photograph a route
of about 3,500 kilometers. The high-sensitivity film in the 17-2
ensured aerial photography throughout the day. It was SO 1.188
(special order 1188), designed for photographic reconnaissance of
military, industrial, and topographic objects and for aerial surveys
from high altitudes. The definition of the film was remarkable for the
day. It recorded photography with an approximate 3-foot resolui~ion
at the nadir from altitudes of 65,000 to 70,000 feet.
Approaching the Isle of Pines, IIeyser made the following notation
on his chart: "On course 351?." And he noted the time as he flew over
Cape Frances on the Isle of Pines as being 1231 Z. When he made
land fall on the Island of Cuba, he noted his time again as being 1.2372.
He also recorded the altitude as being an average of 72,500 feet. The
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course line of 351? took hirn over Davaniguas, Los Palacios, San
Diego de Los Banos, and Los Pozos. The names Los Palacios and
San Diego de Los Banos would have fleeting moments of notoriety.
At 12432, he left the island and made a new course correction to
017? (Figure 5).
The resolution of the U-2 cameras was often exaggerated, probably
through confusion with the low-altitude systems later deployed in
Cuba. Even Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research
in the State Department, stated that:
"At heights well aver seventy thousand feet-almost fourteen miles
pictures were taken with a resolution of only two inches on a side, which means
that the painted lines of a parking lot could be distinguished, for example, or
i,he muzzle of a new kind of cannon peeping out of the wing of an airplane. In
the hands of skilled photographic interpreters, these pictures could produce
an unbelievable amount of extremely accurate information." u
When Heyser's U-2 touched down at McCoy Air Force Base at
Orlando, Florida, the two large rolls of film were removed, placed
in special shipping containers, and rushed to a waiting aircraft that
took the film to the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center
(NAVPIC) at Suitland, Maryland, for processing. The film was
developed under established quality and security controls by personnel
carefully selected for ability and security. The film was edited and
titled, and the duplicate positive off the processors rushed to NPIC.
The NPIC operations officer, Hans F. Scheufele, maintained constant
contact with the collection and processing site so that scheduling
information would be available to Center components and exploita-
tion teams would know the arrival time of the film. He maintained
this information on a large blackboard on his office wall. He also
issued daily bulletins, such as "Proposed Staffing and Time Comple-
tion Estimates," which listed the people who would exploit the
mission and noted the arrival time of the film.
The Missile Sites
In Washington, 15 October began in routine fashion. The NPIC
director had scheduled an 0930 meeting with his division chiefs to
discuss training (Figure 6). As he prepared for his meeting, Lundahl
glanced out his window overlooking 5th Street. With some annoyance,
he noted that a U.S. Navy truck parked in front of the building
entrance was blocking traffic. Two armed Marines had dismounted
and taken positions immediately behind the truck. An armed Navy
officer and an enlisted man entered the truck from the rear, lifted a
box from the truck, and entered the building. Every effort had been
____ __
tt To Move a Nation, (xarden City N.Y., lloubleday & Co., Inc., 1967, p. 168.
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made to keep the premises looking as innocuous as possible. Yet the
regulations for transporting U-2 film specified that its movement had
to be under armed guard. The Navy was following the rules to the
letter. But in doing so, it was revealing that personnel in the Steuart
Building at 5th and K, N.W., were engaged in some extremely sensi-
tive work (Figure 7).
Robert Kithcart, a businesslike reserve paratroop captain, who was
in charge of all the film and files in the building, received the box of
film from Mission 3101 in Room 402. Eight cans of film-464 frames
for each camera-were in the box. Kithcart duly recorded the receipt
time in the log: 0955. He checked the manifest, signed a copy to be
returned to the Naval Photographic Interpretation Center, and
assigned and affixed film library control numbers 11476 through
11483 to the cans of film. He then placed the film in a wire ba:;ket
to be delivered to Earl Shoemaker, the coordinator for this mission.
After being notified that Mission 3101 had been successfully flown
over Cuba, NPIC had been preparing to exploit the photography ;and
to report the findings in a "SITSUM" (situation summary for the
mission), which, when completed, would be cabled to watch offices
throughout the intelligence community. Somewhat later it would be
disseminated by courier in hard-copy form to a larger number of
intelligence analysts.
Several tasks had to be carried out before the film arrived. The
targets covered on the photography had to be anticipated. The PIs
had to be informed of the reporting requirement for each target. They
also had to be provided with a work sheet with the target identifiers
(installation name, location, geographic coordinates, target numbers,
and various sorting codes); a target brief (a computer printout; of
previous photographic coverages and readouts of the targets, as well
as a summary of the requirement and related collateral intelligence);
and a packet of collateral support materials for each target, includ'.ing
a map, photo chips, and intelligence documents. These preparatory
steps required speed and the use of a computer.
Marvin Michell, the collateral support specialist for the mission,
had performed these preparatory tasks for many missions. He be;;an
by plotting the mission flight track on a World Aeronautical Chart.
lie noted all the targets that should be covered on the photography.
He then requested a "machine run," and the IBM 1401 computer
began printing out the work sheets and target briefs. Knowing what
support materials would be required, he selected reference materials
on what might be seen: missiles, aircraft, airfields, ports, and indlus-
tries. Then he assembled the paper printouts from the computer with
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the target packets and sorted them according to the assigned teams of
photo interpreters. When word came that the film had arrived in the
building, Marv wheeled his library cart of materials to Room 704
where the PIs were waiting.
Karl Shoemaker had his photo interpretation teams ready. He had
checked the flight track; this would have been a short mission. The
film cans arrived and were distributed among the teams. The PIs
began cranking the film onto the light tables.
Normally, six PI stations scanned Cuban photography. But since
Mission 3101 was a short mission, with just eight cans of film, only
three stations were used. The three stations were manned by six
PIs three teams of two interpreters representing the CIA., Army,
Air Force, and Navy. Backup or special teams of photo interpreters
would be provided as needed. (Figure 8.)
Various types of photographic viewing equipment were used-
hand-held tube magnifiers ranging in magnification from 7 to 13
power, fixed stereoscopes with magnification of 2.4 or 7 power, zoom
stereo microscopes with magnification ranging from 10 to 60 power,
and roll film viewing tables with abuilt-in light source. Most of the
equipment had been designed and built for the Center to exploit
U-2 photography.
As they examined the film, the PIs wrote their observations on the
worksheets and passed the sheets to their team leaders for review. An
editor then checked the sheets for style and completeness and handed
the edited sheets to the mission coordinator for approval From him,
the worksheets flowed to a keypunch operator. One IBM card was
punched for each line of text. The cards were then fed to the computer.
Normally, after the last card, the computer printed out a proof run in
subject order (missiles, airfields, etc.). A corrected proof would then
be run, and the final version of the SITSUM would be ready to be
transmitted by cable and reproduced in hard-copy form. The SITSUM
for Mission 3101, however, was destined not to leave NPIC for
several days.
The two cans of film of the San Cristobal area were given to the
scan team of Genc Lydon, a CIA PI, and Jim Ilolmes, an Air Force PI.
Scanning the countryside, they spotted military vehicles and tents.
The equipment and tents along the fence rows were reminiscent of
preparatory work for developing SA-2 sites. The two PIs searched for
the Fruit Set guidance radar and the missile launchers to identify
another SAM site. None was found. Because cruise-missile sites
recently had been identified along Cuba's northern coast, their atten-
tion shifted for cruise-missile launchers and attendant guidance radars.
Again, none was found.
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Then the I'Is spotted six long canvas-covered objects. Lydon and
Holmes roughly measured the objects several tunes. Each time the
measurements were more than 60 feet long. It was then about noon,
and both men paused for lunch.
After lunch they resumed their efforts but still could not positively
identify what they saw. The equipment appeared to be missile asso-
ciated, so the film was labeled "possibly missile-associated installa-
tions" and handed to Shoemaker. Shoemaker gave the film to the
missile back-up team, which consisted of four men representing the
Air Force, Army, Navy, and CIA (Figure 9).
Jim Holmes, a civilian Air Force representative, was a soft spoken,
yet tough minded and intense, photo interpreter. A native of Pitts-
burgh, he was only 29 but a veteran of 12 years of government service.
He began his government career at 17 as a GS-2 cartographic
technician at the Army Map Service where his aunt was a training
officer. She made sure his training was especially thorough. This
thoroughness and his meticulous eye for detail were to pay off that
day. His training in map compilation work also made him aware of
unnatural features on aerial photography. An Army veteran, he was
also a night student at American University.
Twenty-two-year-old 2nd Lt. Richard Rininger was the Army
member of the team. Born in Laramie, Wyoming, he had a B.A. in
history from the University of Wyoming. He had graduated i.'rom
the U.S. Army Photo- Interpretation School at Ft. Holabird in June,
1961, and was assigned to the missile back-up team at the Center
the following May. Rininger was a tall, erect, and slender young
man with a stern face. He was affable but generally quiet. IIe had a
no-nonsense approach to problems and was painstaking at detail.
The subtle differences in the various models of Soviet equipment had
been stressed heavily at Ft. IIolabird. Dick was an expert on military
hardware and knew most of the equipment basic to Soviet line
divisions.
A native of Maine, Joe Sullivan, a civilian Navy representative,
was a puckish, attractive Irishman. At 50, he was the senior mernber
of the team, with 19 years experience with the stereoscope. He was
reserved, thoughtful, and extremely courteous. He was especially
appreciated for his sense of humor. Joe had served in World War II
as an aerial photo-topographer both in photo-reconnaissance squad-
rons and in engineering topographic companies in the Army Air
Corps. This background, combined with subsequent experience at
the Army Map Service and with the Navy, made him thoroughly
familiar with topography and mapping.
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Vince 1~i11enzo was the C[A representative on the teem. I~`rom
Shenandoah, Nennsvlvania, he was 32 and ~~ fi~rmcr marine. Ile.
joined i,he Agency in 1956 fresh from the Gradnatc SChoo~ of
Geography at Clark L'nieersii:y. llis abilities were as bright, a~~, the
shine. he constantly maintained on his shoes. lfc was affable rind
possessed ~~, good eensc of humor. Joe Sullivan made constant fun o1'
~e'inec's Crooks and Marsh ~~~hccling cigars. Vince, too, was meticulous.
llc a.nd his branch chief, Bob Boyd, tiad performed detailed support
for covert operations. Vince had also reviewed Berlin corridor phot,og-
iaphy and had carefully categorized and prepared an excellent
file of stereo pairs of all S~1 2 support equipment and of the other
pieces of military hardware observed i,hcre.
I~;arl Shoemaker gave the duplicate positives t,o Uiltenzo, the learn
leader. After scanning the photography, DiRenzo determined l,hat
:several Lasks had to be emnpleted before the function of the site
could be identified. 'Phc location had to be established, the can~.as-
covered objects measured and identified, the support equipment
ronnt.ed and categorized, a,nd ~~ negation date established to deter~uine
~evhcn Y,he equipment was not present.
The team began a systcrnatic analysis of the photography. ltininger
xne.~sueed the canvas-covered objects, DiRcnzo and ~lolmes idcr7l~ficd
~ he support equipment, and Sullivan determined the site location and
aagation date. After analyzing and cornplet,cly checking all informa-
i_ion, Lhc t'Is determined that the six objects were missile transpor~~ers.
The measurcrnents, computed manually by all members of the I ~~ are,
kept coming up in the 65- t-o 7O-foot range.
Scanning the target area, l7il~cnzo identified 11 trucks and l:i dents
in Lhe immediate vicinity of the missile transporters and 2R termined, in full control of his faculties, insistent on having his
demands complied with, and demanding the presence of the
Ambassador of Algeria. Throughout this period, from the Braniff
office, and through the dedicated services of Jose Alvarez Tovar and
the chief mechanic, Oswald Madonia, Jackson was being kept
occupied with conversations about the conditions of the plane, the
flight plan to Algiers, comparison of the characteristics of the Boeing
707 with a possibly available DC 8 and so forth. (These talks were
rnonitored by the press and by the police and-apart from their news
value-provided us with valuable information about Jackson's actual
state of mind and psychology.)
The minutes and the hours were passing, and tension was building.
Braniff was proceeding on the assumption that once the note was
delivered to the Argentine authorities, the takeoff would only be a
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ssrgnment: S~y~ac er
question of refueling and technical preparation. Therefore, in addition
to consultations and examination of the possibilities concerning the
long over-water flight of the 707 to Algiers, an alternate DC 8 was
being readied, and a special crew was being flown in from Rio de
Janeiro, inasmuch as no Braniff relief crew was available in Buenos
Aires. While Braniff was proceeding in good faith with plans for a
possible change of aircraft, the police authorities were planning mea-
sures to capture or kill Jackson during the process of transfer from
one aircraft to another. (Although he made no statements to the
effect, General Caceres Monie was obviously anticipating a negative
decision by the GOA on the U.S, request to permit the plane to
proceed. )
At about 1930, Braniff notified General Caceres Monie that the
ground generator supplying power to the plane was about to run out
of gasoline and requested authority to change generators. Caceres
Monie first denied this request, but upon hearing arguments from
Mr. Marples and from me-to the effect that providing anoi;her
generator would simply maintain the status quo, but that the
discontinuation of electric power would unnecessarily provoke
Jackson and might also limit our future options-he agreed. To effect
the change in generator connections, Mr. Robert Williams, Flight
Engineer, descended from the plane, was interrogated by Braniff and
by the police and subsequently talked on the telephone with
Ambassador Lodge, who by that time was at the Presidential
Residence in Olivos.
Request from the plane to empty the chemical toilets was refused
by General Caceres Monie.
At around 2145 the scheduled Braniff non-stop to New York was
cancelled to have the plane available for a possible flight to Algiers.
At around midnight Braniff communications passed several mes-
sages to the hijacker originating with his family in the United States.
Jackson appeared to be moved by the content of these messages and
requested written confirmation.
The Governments Disagree
Word was beginning to spread that President Lanusse had decided
not to comply with the request in the U.S. note, but official word was
not received until about 0100 on 4 July that the Argentine Government
demanded the unconditional surrender of the hijacker. (Although not
stated, this implied definitively that the takeoff for Algiers would not
be authorized. Accordingly, the stand-by crew was sent to bed, and
the DC 8 was reserviced for a passenger flight to New York.)
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9 Y1
~1 dramatic turn in the events came at around 0300 hours, when
Captain Schroeder of the hijacked 707 was permitted by Jackson to
leave the aircraft to mediate between the hijacker and the authorities.
Schroeder said that Jackson appeared to be nearing the end of his
resources and had concluded from the long delay that the plane would
not be permitted to take off. Jackson was ready to negotiate. Schroeder
urged that we send "Joe" Alvarez-the Braniff flight supervisor-to
discuss personally Jackson's demands, but this suggestion was
rejected by General Caceres Monie, who repeated the Argentine
demand for unconditional surrender. The general also rejected
suggestions that he negotiate directly with the hijacker because of
the "no negotiations" policy of the GOA, but agreed to put to
President Lanusse the possibility that anon-Argentine personality
talk to the hijacker face to face.
At about 0335 General Caceres Monie asked to speak to me alone.
'['he general said that President Lanusse agreed that anon-Argentine
should negotiate with Jackson with a view to bring about his
surrender and that Lanusse had asked that I undertake that
mission. I said that I would be pleased to do so, but would have to
check with my embassy. I telephoned Mr. Sowash, explained the
circumstances and obtained his authorization to board the plane.
(In the meanwhile, the Braniff Security Officer, Mr. Pfizer, took an
adamant position that Captain Schroeder should not return to the
plane and invoked the authority of Dallas, which also ordered
Schroeder not to return. Schroeder took the position that he gave his
word of honor that he would return, that he wanted to be with his
crew and that his refusal to return, i.e., violation of his word of
honor, could not but prejudice my mission. After Marples and I
supported Schroeder's position, Commissioner Inspector Colotto of
the Federal Police overruled the objections of Mr. Pfizer.)
Through Braniff communications, Jackson was notified that
Schroeder accompanied by an Embassy official would return to the
plane. Jackson said he did not not wish any traps, that he first wished
to talk with Schroeder alone and that the Embassy officer should
board the plane exactly five minutes after Schroeder.
Chat With a Skyjacker
Shortly before 0400 hours, 4 July, I boarded the aircraft, in
accordance with the time specifications made by Jackson. I found
Jackson in the co-pilot seat and Schroeder in the pilot's seat. I sat
directly behind Schroeder and talked with Jackson, who turned
around in his chair for the purpose. (Jackson already consumed some
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of the beer which Captain Schroeder took- on board. We obtained
clearance for the beer from General Caceres Monie after explaining
to him that the beer should not be considered as support to Jackson,
but, on the contrary, a weapon which would help to defeat him.
This was stated on basis of medical advice received from Braniff,
Dallas, that beer on top of pep pills would act as a depressive agent.)
I opened discussion with Jackson by stating that he could take it
from me, if he had not already so concluded from the long delay, that
the plane would not be allowed to take off. I assured him that, on the
basis of my knowledge of the Argentine generals' psychology, it would
be unrealistic to expect a reversal of that position; that while -his
position was unfavorable in that sense, it was relatively favorable in
another sense, i.e., he had not yet committed any major crimes under
the jurisdiction of Argentina; and, while he should certainly expect
to be tried and sentenced, I could guarantee that his life would be
saved. I said that I could not offer him any deal but I wanted to hear
his side of the story; I would relay his proposals to the appropriate
authorities, and I was prepared to provide counsel to him, both
personally on the spot, and legal counsel to assist him with the
Argentine authorities. I said that while what he had done was not
right, it could have been far worse, that I knew that he had treated
the crew decently, that we all rejoiced that so far no lives had been
lost, and that the time had come to start acting reasonably.
The above remarks started a long discussion with Jackson, which
need not be reproduced in detail. He was coherent enough but with an
astonishing lack of logic and an obvious failure to realize the gravity
of his deeds or the consequences thereof. He did show great
susceptibility to flattery, a certain warmth of personality and a
sense of humor, perhaps exaggerated by his many hours of
wakefulness and the effect of pep pills. Our conversation resulted in
Jackson putting down on paper the following points andfor requests
on which he wanted clarification:
a. A copy of the extradition treaty between Argentina and the United
States;
b. The nature of the charges which he would have to face in Argentina;
c. 'Phe bail system in Argentina;
d. The future of his children; specifically, in exchange for the safety of the
crew, he wished to have his children brought to Argentina;
c. Safe conduct from Argentina for his girl friend, Ligia Lucrecia Sanchez,
to whatever place she wished to go from Argentina;
f. Co-determination with Braniff on the disposal of the X100,000 which he
obtained in Monterey. FIc did not expoct to keep that sttm, but wished thai
part of the sum be used for his legal defense, for the transportation and
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maintenance of his children in Argentina, and the rest hr. wished to donate to
a suitable charity, such as a children's home. He said he disliked the word
"orphanage."
g. If and when he decided to surrender, he wished to do this to the senior
officer present, without newspaper representatives witnessing the act, and he
asked not to have handcuffs put on him.
I explained to Jackson the broad outlines of the extradition treaty
between Argentina and the United States, dated 1898, on which I
had previously been briefed by Mr. Wachter. The mosi important
feature of this treaty-from Jackson's point of view-was that it
contained no provisions for hijacking, there being~no planes in 1898.
.Iackson insisted nn seeing a copy of the treaty. I said it would take
at least two hours to obtain it from the Embassy, assuming we could
locate it at this time on a Sunday morning. He said he had plenty
of time.
T explained the Argentine bail system to him, but added that
this was a matter for judicial decision. We discussed all the other
points, but I stated that these were all within the jurisdiction of the
Argentine authorities and/or Braniff, and I could not speak on
their behalf. I would, however, relay his words faithfully. I said that I
acted in good faith in coming to see him alone and unarmed at this
hour and in a pouring rain; that he had inconvenienced a great many
people and that it was time for him to show some good faith by
releasing the crew members, particularly the two Peruvian stew-
ardesses. Jackson said that he was willing to release the crew, except
the Captain. He accepted that the plane was not going to take off
and that he dial not need a crew at this point, but he wished to keep a
hostage to prevent the plane being rushed by the police. However,
the crew could not go until I gave him a binding answer on points
"a" and "b" above. As for the stewardesses, they were now asleep.
There was no point in waking them to go out in the driving rain in the
dark. When they woke up, they would be free to go. I then asked for a
car to come pick me up, which was accomplished at 0450, I had spent
about 50 minutes talking with Jackson.
Back at the terminal, I reported my findings to General Caceres
Nlonie. 1 said that in my opinion Jackson was ready to surrender, the
only real question was the timing. We should not push him too
much at this point but keep him busy talking details until we could
obtain a copy of the extradition treaty, at which time I would go
back to talk with ,Jackson again. This was accepted by the general,
who wrote out in long hand the charges which Jackson would have to
face in Argentina: deprivation of liberty, illegal entry, and illegal
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carrying of weapon. He asked me to read these to Jackson over the
radio, which I did from the Braniff communications room.
In the meanwhile Mr. Wachter took steps to obtain from the
Embassy the text of the Extradition :treaty of 1898 and have it sent
to the airport. After being assured by Mr. Sowash, Polii;ical
Counsellor, who was at the Embassy, that the treaty was on its way,
I contacted Jackson on the radio again at around 0600 hours to advise
him that the treaty should be available in a matter of minutes. He
-then permitted the stewardesses and all the crew except Captain Al
Schroeder to get off. With the Extradition Treaty and a can of beer
in my hands I again boarded the plane around 0700 hours. I told
Jackson that I was prepared to spend all the time necessary with him
in reviewing the treaty and to discuss his personal problems, but I
wanted to start out by suggesting that he let Captain Schroeder off
the plane. I was as good a hostage as Schroeder, the Captain was not
a young man, he was dead tired, needed to go to the toilet but all
toilets were overflowing (true! ), and his presence now served no useful
purpose. Jackson agreed and Captain Schroeder left. I was now on
board alone with Jackson and his girl friend. I said we did not need
her either, and we called for another car to pick her up. She started to
pack her two suitcases and took off as soon as the car came. I was left
alone with Jackson in the plane with an unexpected emergency on our
hands. After the Captain left, there was nobody to open the plane door
for Miss Sanchez except Jackson. He did so, and he had to open it
wide to permit her passage with the suitcases. After that he could not
get the door closed and struggled with it to no avail. (He tried to
wrench the door free with both hands, giving a perfect target with his
chest against the metal door to all the police below. They showed
commendable discipline by not opening fire.) It was cold outside and
rain, driven by the high wind, started to pour into the plane and
Jackson started to worry about the carpeting of the plane as well as
about the drop of temperature for which he was not dressed. So we
had to call for a mechanic to come to fix the door.
With the door securely closed, I went over the details of the
extradition treaty with Jackson, who by this time was getting visibly
more tired and submissive. To make a long story short, after about 40
minutes of discussion he said that he agreed, in principle, to surrender
to the highest-ranking officer at the airport, Major General Caceres
Movie, but that he needed a little more time to think over his
situation. He said the general would also feel better after some
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breakfast and he, Jackson, wanted to drink his last can of beer in
peace. He said to tell the general that he wanted to keep his pistol
as a souvenir, without the bullets, of course.
I returned to the terminal in the car of the chief mechanic, who
had waited for me at plane-side after fixing the door. I told Caceres
Monie that the affair was about to end and to give Mr. Jackson
maybe another hour, beyond which I did not think he could last. I
said that for the first time he was really alone in the plane and while
this would seem an ideal opportunity to commit suicide, I was certain
that .lackson had no such intentions as he was very concerned with
the fate of his children. Caceres Monie agreed with this reasoning,
which I then repeated for the benefit of a police psychiatrist.
[n the meanwhile Mr. Wachter kept the Embassy informed of
developments and followed proceedings from the Braniff communi-
cations room, where Mr. Pfizer, the Braniff Security Officer, was
getting increasingly restless, aggressive and generally objectionable,
insisting that the plane now should be taken by force. He was finally
told by Colonel Alberto Vallejos, Chief of Federal Police, to desist
from interfering with the proceedings or he would be ejected from
the premises.
At a few minutes before 0900 hours I again contacted Jackson on
the plane via Braniff radio and advised him that General Caceres
Monie had an important family engagement, that he could not wait
much longer, and that unless Jackson wished to surrender im-
rnediately he would have to surrender later to glower-ranking officer.
We got no immediate answer to this message, giving rise to thought
that Jackson might haven fallen asleep or, according to the pessimists,
even committed suicide. However, a few minutes later Jackson came
on the air, acknowledged the message, and said that he wished to
change his clothes for the surrender ceremony. I then went to
General Caceres Monie to advise him that the time was ripe. The
general asked that I accompany him to interpret during the act of
surrender. We set off in the general's car at about 0905 and were met
at the foot of the stairs of the plane by Jackson, already in the
custody of Inspector General Alberto Villar and Commissioner Jorge
Colotto. General Caceres Morrie and I got out of the car into the
pouring rain and faced the hijacker, now subdued. I introduced the
general to Jackson; the general bowed stiffly from the waist, we
shook hands all around, and the show was over.
With Jackson being driven off in one car, the general and I
proceeded to the Airport Detachment of the Federal Police, from
where General Caceres Monie telephoned the President (with me at
62 CONFIDENTIAL
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his side) to report that the mission was completed with full success.
Mr. Wachter then took over the U.S. representation at the police
station, and I left Ezeiza Airport at 1000 hours, just about 20 hours
after arriving on the scene.
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No Foreign Dissem
The puzzle five years
long.
RAVELLING RUSSIA'S REACTORS
Henry S. Lowenhaupt
The U-2 flight in late August 1957 to Russia's second uranium
isotope separation plant north of Tomsk in Central Siberia ~ had
surprised us by disclosing a plutonium producing reactor area, and a
plutonium chemical separation facility in mid-construction phase,
all in addition to the U-235 plant. It faced us with the problem of
how to unravel a foreign technology with which we were quite
unfamiliar. It demanded that we do our learning in the atomic energy
field, a discipline so fraught with secrecy in Stalin's Russia that
almost no scientific papers on practical aspects of atomic subjects
had been published between 1943 and 1955.
This is the story of how the reactor area at Tomsk was analyzed
and explains how an initial answer was derived in five months of
concentrated work, and why the more definitive analysis took five
years. It highlights the very great impact of the 1958 pictures of the
Siberian Nuclear Power Plant released at the Second Geneva Con-
ference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, and it note:; in
passing how we used heavily censored Russian scientific and technical
literature in this endeavor.
Experts with considerable experience in the atomic field were
brought in as consultants almost immediately after our receipt of the
U-2 photography. Their reactions varied; some felt the reactors at
the Tomsk Site were large production reactors; others, that they
could only be research reactors. Their statements were subjective and
not especially helpful. We needed some way of presenting the data
to them in balanced form, .highlighting the pertinent features-a
photointerpretation, in fact, emphasizing engineering factors pre-
sumed likely to be useful in further analysis.
Richard Kroeck, of what is now the National Photographic
Interpretation Center (NPIC), was given the task of producing a
full photointerpretation of the site. This he did by working at forced
draft for the five months between late August 1957 and the
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publication of his work in February 1958 for a special consultants'
rneeting sponsored by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Com-
mittee (JAEIC). Wallace F. Howard of CIA's Office of Scientific
Intelligence was given the task of organizing the engineering analysis,
which was to proceed in conjunction with photointerpretation, and
as fast as llick Kroeck could uncover relevant facts. Charles V.
Reeves ~ assisted him in unravelling the facts on electric power
production and distribution at the 'Pomsk Site, for it soon became
apparent that understanding electric power was a key to understanding
the site.
As Kroeck's photointerpretation finally emerged, the Tomsk
Reactor area contained in August 1957 one complete plutonium
production reactor building with associated stack and irradiated fuel
handling structure on its south side. A reactor building and associated
turbine hall containing a dual purpose reactor designed to produce
both plutonium and electric power was under construction on the
northern side. The foundation hole for a second dual purpose reactor
site was being dug at the extreme north end. Also in the area were
water treatment facilities, fuel rod assembly facilities, a transformer
sub-station, and many smaller unidentified structures.
Both Howard and Reeves were familiar with the ti.S. AEC's
Hanford Engineering Works near Richland on the Columbia River
in the state of 1~~ashington, where the U.S. had constructed a. number
of graphite-moderated, water-cooled plutonium production reactors.
]n the fall of 1957, they both revisited Hanford to refresh their
memories on those engineering factors useful in the estimation of
detailed function and output at plutonium production reactors. From
csorrelation of what they knew about Hanford with what they saw
at 'Tomsk, they came to realize that the second key to the Tomsk site
was the water works there. Indeed, if they could determine both the
water flow through the plutonium production reactor and the
temperature rise of that water in going through the reactor, they
would learn the power output of the reactor in megawatts-and its
production in kilograms of plutonium per year.
Water for the whole Tomsk site was drawn from the Tom River
through a large intake structure designed to operate successfully
even at 40? below zero. From this structure, located a mile or so
southwest of the reactor area, water was lift-pumped into a canal
which terminated in a weir near the gaseous diffusion uranium-235
isotope separation plant. Here the water was divided, part flowing
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directly to the coal-fired, large electric power plant, the remainder to
two pump houses by canal. One pumphouse served the U-235 plant,
the other pumped water half a mile or so through six underground
pipes to a water treatment building 800 feet long in the reactor area.
Three of the six underground pipes had been laid recently and were
obviously not yet in use. There was evidence in the form of visible
pipes and underground pipe traces that half the water from the
associated pumphouse still went to the U-235 plant. The long water
treatment building also was visibly half-new. At right angles to it
were duplicate structures 360 feet long and 50 feet high. These
were believed to contain water storage tanks.
Because the first two reactor buildings were essentially identical
and the water treatment facilities for the first reactor had been
almost exactly duplicated for the second reactor installation, it was
assumed that the initial design called for the second reactor to be a
duplicate of the first. The addition of the turbine hall and other visible
features necessary to make a dual purpose reactor out of the second
one was believed to have occurred as a modification of the original
plans. The explanation for the difference between the two high-
pressure pumphouses located between the water storage and the
reactor buildings was that the dual purpose reactor had a capability
for recirculating hot water under pressure, a function not required in
the first reactor. Indeed, an underground pipeline trace had been
observed from the below-grade steam generator bays next to the
turbine hall of the dual purpose reactor back to the associated
pumphouse, while no evidence for a recirculating system was apparent
at the first reactor. Thus, all the evidence pointed toward a marked
similarity between the first and second reactors.
Both reactors had effluent lines to a covered concrete trench that
ran from the reactor area around to the north of the U-235 plant t;o a
long narrow pond that had been formed by damming a small stream.
The pond emptied via the old stream bed into the Tom River a:Fter
passing to the north of the electric power plant. The power plant cool-
ing water effluent reached the Tom River through a separate channel
dug parallel to the old stream. The reactor effluent discharge sysi;em
thus had many of the characteristics of reactor hold-up basins or
cooling ponds, so-called because they were designed to allow radio-
active cooling of short-lived radioisotopes present in the thermally hot
water discharged from the reactor.
A bypass line to a separately fenced mud lake in a swamp several
miles to the north of the reactor area, near a large plutonium chemical
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separation building then under construction, suggested that the mud
lake was a disposal area for high-order radioactivity should there be
a failure.
'{'he existence of radioactive holdup basins in reactor cooling water
effluent channels is characteristic of Hanford-type graphite-moderated
reactors, where the cooling water is first treated to make it as pure as
possible, then pumped through the interior of the reactor. Other types
of reactors, such as those moderated by heavy water at our Savannah
River plant, where the cooling water cools a radioactive primary loop
in a heat exchanger, do not have radioactivity in their effluent water
and do not need holdup basins.
To everyone's amazement, Howard and Reeves were able to reach
some judgments on the probable amount of water flowing through the
first reactor. Their reasoning was as follows: the effluent channel for
cooling water from the U-235 separation plant was the same width as
that for the other reactor, and emptied into the cooling water feed
channel to the thermal power plant. Thus, the system was designed so
that under appropriate circumstances, presumably on hottest days,
the U-235 Separation Plant cooling water would just equal that needed
by the electric power plant for its cooling. Reeves had calculated from
Russian specifications that the 400 MW power plant, with its eight
50 M W" turbines, would require a maximum of 350,000 gallons per
minute of cooling water under the worst conditions. Since the two
pumphouses appeared to feed three pipes to the reactor area and the
equivalent of six pipes to the U-235 plant as of August 1957, then
175,000 gallons per minute would be sent through the original three
pipes from the second pumphouse to the reactor area. One pipe and one
set of pumps were allowed for standby for either the reactor area or the
U-235 Plant, a design feature consistent with the single-failure-proof
design of the whole Tomsk site. Allotting 10 percent for filter backwash
water, total flow would be about 100,000 gallons per minute through
the reactor.
A short, exposed length of one of the six pipelines to the water
treatment plant was estimated to be 4 to 5 feet in diameter. This
rough measurement, consistent with water flows of from 15,000 to
60,000 gallons per minute per pipe, seemed to confirm the preceding
estimate.
Assuming input and output water temperature values we had
achieved at Hanford in the wintertime, a maximum likely output of
the reactor of 1660 MW was calculated. The reactor was not in opera-
tion at the time of photography, and indeed must have been under-
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ussia s eac ors
going repairs for the exit water flume 'was dry, so no estimate could
be made from visual evidence (such as steam visible on the holdup
pond) of the actual effluent water temperatures achieved. A minimum
estimate of 850 MW was arrived at, assuming early Hanford input-
output water temperatures.
It must not be assumed that because the explanation is now so glib
that the late 1957-early 1958 work of Howard, Kroeck and Reeves
came all that easy. No one lead ever before tried to estimate plant
water flows from aerial photography, and especially aerial photography
of super-secret Russian atomic installations in the middle of Siberia.
Simple questions might go completely unanswered, or be answered
only after a week's intermittent work. F'or instance, how does one prove
Howard's question: are there really large pipes in the visible traces
from the possible pumphouse to the long building of some kind in the
reactor area? The answer was for both Howard and Kroeck to keep
staring at the U-2 photography in stereo until Dick Kroeck realized
that those funny little regularly spaced dots along the traces were
little concrete valve houses whose outlines one could see amongst the
brush-once one knew what to look for.
The pitfalls and false leads were many. I remember once helping
out. It was about 8 P.M., and we had been at it for hours. Charlie
Reeves simply could not make his check calculations on water flow
come out. A 20 percent difference kept showing up. Then the answer
dawned: the values for Russian power plant water flows were in cubic
meters per hour. U.S. data on pumphouses, U--235 plant water flows,
flow in channels, etc., were in gallons per minute. Charlie had looked
up the conversion factor to go from cubic meters per hour to gallons
per minute in a Russian book, and. the Russians had chosen to use
5-quart Imperial gallons while the U.S. data was in 4-quart 1J.S.
gallons!
I remember that the JAIJIC Consultants' Meeting held in February
1958 seemed anticlimatic. Actually they (and others) had done the
real. work piecemeal by answering the myriad questions posed by
Howard, Kroeck and Reeves (and myself for that matter) during the
long analysis. The consultants generally agreed with Kroeck's photo-
interpretative report and Howard's analysis based thereon, but their
comments tended to sharpen both detail and conclusions. They pointed
out specifically that the temporary construction shed and enclosed
___ -
s Asign that all the uranium fuel had been removed from the reactor. Normal re-
fueling is done with only part of the total fuel reloaded at any one time, and the
remaining partially burned fuel must continue to be water-cooled or it would melt from
the heat of its own radioactivity.
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Russia's Reactors
walkway to the east of the dual-purpose reactor in August 1957 was
markedly similar to temporary sheds connected with the graphite
reactors at Hanford during their construction phase. Sheds at Hanford
had a controlled atmosphere and were used for machining and fitting
the graphite prior to its being stacked in the reactors themselves. The
consultants felt this added needed confirmation to the conclusion that
the 'Tomsk reactors were graphite-moderated.
The formal estimate at the end of the Consultants' Meeting gave
the first reactor likely power levels between 850 and 1650 MW, with a
probable value of around 1400 MW.
Recognizing that this analysis did not use a single bit of data on
1t,ussian reactor technology, although the Russians had started to
publish scientific and technical papers in this discipline starting with
the Moscow Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in
1955, the Office of Scientific Intelligence contracted with a reactor
engineering firm for a survey of the published Russian data for
information bearing on plutonium production reactors. Simultane-
ously, the JAFIC levied requirements on our representatives for the
forthcoming Second Geneva Conference on the Peaceful IIses of Atomic
Energy to emphasize the collection of data on all those kinds of Rus-
sian reactors the Russians seemed willing to talk about.
Both programs had an almost immediate payoff at the September
1958 Geneva Conference. Engineers from the reactor engineering
firm took photographs during the running of the Russians' movie
about their new Siberian atomic power plant. Francis J. McKeon,
an OSI analyst who had been a wartime procurement expediter in
the Manhattan District for the Hanford reactor establishment, was
given the task of continuing the analysis of the Tomsk reactor area
in the light of the photographs and other data from the Geneva
Conference.
McKeon, who was basically an engineer and who understood
pumps, instrumentation, engineering layouts, etc., chose a two-
pronged attack. One course of action was to study the pictures from
Geneva and to lay out in engineering fashion the graphite-moderated
Siberian dual purpose power reactor in the Reactor Building 2 at
'Comsk. This he accomplished, as has been told elsewhere.4
1-iis other course of action was to review the analytic work previ-
ously done by Howard and Reeves. He soon came to realize that the
only "solid" number was the one derived from maximum power plant
cooling water flow. All the elaborate logic was good and made good
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engineering sense, but it depended on this one figure corroborated
only by a virtual guess about the diameter of a poorly seen pipe
and on estimates for flows along canals. We desperately needed
sizing data on Russian river-side water intakes, "standard" canals,
pumps, pumphouses, pipes, water treatment plants and cooling
towers. The real problem Frank faced was how to find such data in
thousands of Russian technical books and journals in the stack.; of
the Library of Congress and other repositories of technical journals-
and get them into English which he could read.
Once he had settled on what needed doing and had reduced it to
a human problem, Frank's wartime experience as an equipment
expediter stood him in good stead. He went to his old friends at one
of the great sanitation engineering firms in the U.S. They did indeed
have a sanitation engineer who was fluent in Russian, and they were
quite willing to undertake on a contractual basis to locate the required
data in American libraries. With Frank's guidance, the Russian-
speaking engineer produced some six inches of reports entitled
"Industrial Water Supply in the USSR" by the end of 1961.
The wisdom of Frank's choice to obtain data on all the water
handling steps can be seen in retrospect: Photointerpreters usually
work with positive paper prints or positive transparencies. The
original negative is sacrosant; only the photolaboratory may handle
it. Thus the photointerpreter is at the mercy of the state of photo-
laboratory techniques when it comes to small or poorly seen objects.
Three years ago new transparencies of the Tomsk site were made
using modern duplicating films and modern enlarging equipment.
Lo, two of the 50 MW turbogenerators became 25 MW thermifica-
tion turbines putting out both heating steam and electricity. Total
1957 electric power generation capacity dropped from 400 M W to
350 MW. Specifications in Gersimov's "Thermal Engineering Hand-
book," Moscow 1957 and in Zhilin's "Components of Thermoelectric
Stations," Moscow 1961 for cooling water requirements for i;he
correct turbines indicated the power plant would, in summer,
require 254,000 gallons per minute compared to the 355,000 gallons
per minute originally estimated. Clearly the early 1958 estimates of
possible reactor power levels for the first reactor must have been high
by 40 percent based on the revised data.
In late 1961 Jack Lundin,5 a physical chemist with reactor physics
training who had been the responsible officer in handling the contract
initiated in 1958 with the reactor engineering firm, assumed total
~~ Sec "Red Nautilus Under Way," Studies, Vol. XI~2.
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SECRET Russia's Reactors
responsibility for the Tomsk Reactor Area. h'rank McKeon was
transferred to the growing atomic energy problem in China. Jack
proceeded to study systematically the capacities of each section of
the water supply system item by item from the Tom Diver intake to
the reactor effluent channel. Leaving aside the tremendous complica-
tions to his analysis caused by the fact that in 1957 the whole site
and all its water works were in the early phases of being more than
doubled, he found in "Industrial Water Supply in the USSR," a
reference to a 1957 book by N. S. Makerov on the "Construction and
Operation of Water Intake Installations on Siberian Rivers" in which
there was a cross sectional diagram of the Tom River at 13eloborodovo,
the name of an ancient village just south of the atomic site, and the
name used in open publications as an euphemism for the atomic
site. 'Phis reference showed a water depth of 10 feet and indicated it
was sufficient to handle any sludging and frazil ice that might occur
to inhibit flow in the depth of winter.
'1'he photometrically measured width of the intake bay operating
in 1957 at the Tomsk site was 19.5 meters. Jack calculated from this
width, using Russian design criteria for intakes of this general shape,
that the designed flow rate was 178,000 gallons per minute in winter
and 355,000 gallons per minute in summer. f?'rank 1VIcKeon had
guessed that the description of the Tom River "right bank water
intake bay No. 5 with downstream inflow opening, and with a water
flow capacity up to 175,000 gallons per minute" described in 1961
by Kuzhovlev and Merzon in Vodosnabzhenie i ~Sanitarnaya Tekhnika,
Vo. 3 was actually the one at the 'Tomsk atomic site. However, even
t;he coincidence of general shape, general location and calculated
winter flow rate was not really sufficient proof of his guess. We now
know from Col. Yenkovskiy what we had then guessed, that all
published Soviet scientific and technical articles, and especially those
on militarily important subjects such as atomic energy, have been
censored carefully prior to publication for any obvious clues to
"information of intelligence value to a foreign country." This is
why Jack Lundin used the data supplied by the sanitary engineering
firm as a basis for calculation against photometric data, rather than
spending a lot of time trying to prove directly the pertinence of
censored articles.
The maximum calculated summer flow through the intake was,
of course, coincident with Charlie lheeves' 1958 estimate of power
plant requirements, leaving no water for the reactor area. As the
later downward revision of power plant cooling water requirements
had not yet occurred, Jack could only note there was a problem and
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proceed onward with good couragel The canal was of the right gen-
eral size for the intake. He could not size the pumphouses independ-
ently-there were too many possibilities all about the same physical
size.
Continuing along the water circuit;, the sanitary engineering firm's
report stated that the largest size steel conduit manufactured in the
USSR in 1957 had a diameter of 4.6 feet, thus being in the 4 5 foot
range estimated by Dick Kroeck for the exposed section of pipe near
the water treatment building at the Tomsk site. The older design
maximum water velocity in the USSR for this size pipe was
equivalent to 72,800 gallons per minute for two pipes, significantly
less than the 100,000 gallons per minute estimated in 1958.
The long water treatment building was re-identified as a water
clarifier building. Prior to 1957 normal Soviet water treatment
practice used horizontal sedimentation basins for large water puri-
fication plants. With normal coagulants, a unit flow of 84.5 m3 per
day per m2 of building was considered standard practice. So the
clarifiers of the sedimentation building had been designed to handle
60,000 gallons per minute.
The associated long, high buildings could only be filter buildings
with water hold-tanks in the upper portion. Up to 1949, conventional
rapid sand filters were the only ones used. By 1956, after experimenta-
tion with several new types, the two-layer rapid filters became the
recommended standard for industrial as well as municipal water
supply stations. Applying appropriate engineering factors, the i'ilter-
water holding building would have handled 56,000 gallons per minute
before 1956 and, if a change in filter systems had then been introduced,
up to possibly 95,400 gallons per minute at a later date.
Thus Lundin had shown that up to 1957 Reactor No. i, a purely
plutonium producing reactor, could have been cooled with a maximum
of 56,000 gallons per minute, rather than the 100,000 gallons per
minute value originally derived in the absence of detailed knowledge
on Russian water treatment practice. Jack could only conclude that
our original judgment of the range of likely power levels for the first
reactor must have been at least 40 percent too high.
The technical literature also indicated that some time after 1957,
the Russians could have increased reactor flow to 90,000-100,000
gallons per minute based on technical advances in a variety of water
purification and handling equipment culminating in that year. How-
ever, there was no direct evidence in terms of observable building
changes that water flows were indeed being increased in 1957, and
prudence on the part of the Russians would have suggested a delay
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in their implementing plans for increased flow until they were certain
there were no engineering difficulties in long-term application.
Receipt, in early 1959 of a Clandestine Service report from a defector
who had been an enlisted man in a military construction battalion
at the Tomsk site had reinforced the view that the water cooled the
first reactor at Tomsk by passing directly through it, as in the
llanford reactors. He had reported a covered effluent line passing to
the north of the U-235 plant eastwards to "Malaya Ploshchadka"
(the reactor area) along the course followed by the rea.etor effluent
line in the photography. He had stated that the "polluted water in
this canal. was hot in the winter and (inexplicably) had a strong
phosphorus-like smell... Even when the temperature was minus
30?C to 35?C and the snow was one meter deep, the snow on the
canal covers melted." Also he reported that "a special order pro-
hibiting the use of water from a tributary northwest of the U-235
separation plant was read to all personnel stationed nn the site.
The use of this water for washing floors or laundry or for drinking
purposes was forbidden. It was also forbidden to shoot wild fowl
which had been in the vicinity of this stream." The last prohibition
is characteristic of radioactivity-contaminated water, because poison
in amounts dangerous to humans would be expected to be ingested
by the wild fowl before they could be shot.
'Chic report lent substance to the earlier conclusion that the first re-
actor was inoperative and being repaired at the time of the August 1957
photography. Jack was aware of the indication in the technical
literature that a change in the fuel element structure for some
reactors had occurred in 1957. He felt this might well be the immediate
reason for the major repairs to Reactor 1, rather than a change to
accommodate greater water flow. Of course, there could have been
a straightforward failure of some kind which had no relations to
water f Low or reactor power levels.
As has been previously mentioned, Jack had been the contracting
officer from the very beginning in 1958 with the reactor engineering
firm which was assessing Russian plutonium production reactor
technology from a review of the published literature. As the officer
now responsible for the analysis of the Tomsk reactor area, his next
task was to obtain a detailed correlation between what the aerial
photography showed at Tomsk and what the reactor engineering
firm had learned about Russian reactor technology.
In the initial period of the contract (1958-61), one of his main
tasks had been locating pertinent Russian literature for them and
getting it translated, if it were not in English.
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Early in their association, they had decided on the important
subjects to cover, including graphite stacking technology; fuel rod
fabrication; physics of graphite moderated and heavy water moderated
reactors-to name a few. As data were found, the engineers would
discuss with Jack the still missing pieces and where such information
might be found. Finally, after the sources had been exhausted, the
material was reviewed and the salient technical facts extracted.
Many of these facts were of the type that, when known, indicate
the specific problem areas that have been satisfactorily solved for that
state of technology. The engineers could then ignore them in further
technical assessments.
Other facts were basic to any appreciation of specific technologies,
and their true import could only be discovered by making elaborate
reactor physics calculations to determine limiting factors. This was
especially true in that literally no information was found on fuel rods
for plutonium production reactors.
An exasperating problem was the dating of the work reported, since
the date normally given was the date of publication. Practically
nothing nuclear had been published before Stalin's death. Then, from
1955 on, it came out in considerable quantity, but only after passing a
declassification or censorship board. Sometimes early work would be
identified as such because it mentioned one of the early research
reactors, such as the Fursov Reactor, the first one on Russian soil.
Other times a scientist might be a contributor when it was known he
had died in the early fifties. Frequently one could only tell when a
specific bit of research had been done by placing the article in a
subjectively ordered chronology of Russian technical advancement.
Fortunately much of the early research work (and scientific articles
about it) had been aimed at the first plutonium production reactors,
for there had not in those days been enough competent research
workers in the nuclear field for the Russians to handle more than a few
major projects at a time. Nevertheless, it was a truism that not a
single scientific article ever said the work had been performed for a
plutonium production reactor.
Jack got his first real break by assuming provisionally that several
articles published in the minutes of the July 1955 Moscow Conference
on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy were early works aimed at
production reactors. These discussed small graphite-uranium three-
dimensional arrays, the so-called exponential piles, work necessary to
understanding how to put together the fuel eletnents and graphite
moderator in between them so that a f ull-scale array would work. One
of these, "A study of the parameters of uranium graphite heterogenous
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systems by the prism method," written by a Who's Who of younger
Russian nuclear physicists (Groshev, Kosinets, Lazareva, Tolstov,
Feinberg, Frank, Shapiro, Stranikh) stated the optimum lattice
spacing was 20 cm, the optimum uranium to graphite atomic ratio was
0.013, and the optimum water annulus around a cylindrical piece of
uranium fuel was 2 mm. The 20 cm was, of course, the familiar 8-inch
lattice spacing in a graphite reactor; the fuel-to-graphite ratio came
out to a fuel diameter of 34 mm. These values agreed well with ones
actually used in our early Hanford reactors; and a 2 mm annular space
with 1 mm of aluminum cladding around the chemically active ura-
nium appeared in a number of articles. Jack had recognized the key
article.
As summarized by the engineering firm, the fuel elements of all early
Russian research reactors were described as solid cylinders of varying
diameters, clad with 1 mm of aluminum and cooled by varying sizes
of water flow spaces around the outside. Some later fuel elements had
distinctly larger coolant spaces than 2 mm. xy the mid-fifties, mention
is made of annular fuel elements cooled by water flowing both through
a cylindrical hole in the center and around the outside. 1'he heavy wa-
ter research reactor at the Institute of Experimental and 'Theoretical
Physics in Moscow originally used a solid uranium rod clad in
aluminum but changed in June 1957 to an annular type fuel element.
Petrov, in his book on power reactors prepared in 1956-57, cites
annular fuel elements as "typical." So both Jack and the reactor
engineers felt it reasonable to assume the Siberian dual purpose reactor
had annular fuel elements, even as reported by a DCS source.
The kinds of cladding or canning materials were metioned fre-
quently, for uranium reacts pyrotechnically with hot water and must
be kept from the water by a metal coating or can. 'These changed from
nearly pure aluminum in all the early reactors to tests described at the
1958 Geneva Conference by R. S. Ambartsumyan and co-workers on
AISi alloy containing 90 percent aluminum, 9 percent silicon and 1
percent nickel: "The tests were carried out in the 180 atmosphere loop
of the RPT (research) reactor. The water temperature at the channel
outlet was 220?C. .The fuel assembly was tested in the channel
during 6337 hours without any damage...." Even as reported by a
DCS source, the technical specifications down in the text of the article
indicate the article discusses the fuel element of the dual purpose
reactor described at Geneva and gives the maximum temperature it
could stand, even though the scientific article definitely does not say
anything about usage.
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The literature indicated that in early reactors the Russians kept the
maximum cooling water temperature 18?C below the boiling point,
and the average temperature below 70?C. By 1955 Russian graphite-
moderated research reactors were still operating with coolant tempera-
ture rises to a maximum of 70?C, indicating the original stricture was
still in force. Research about this time on fuel elements which could
stand temperatures (under pressure) up to 220?C, as Ambartsumyan's
work referred to earlier, implied that average cooling water tempera-
tures of up to 90-95?C could have been expected in plutonium produc-
tion reactors by 1957-58.
Incidentally, as found out in the U.S. quite early in reactor opera-
tions, the alpha-beta phase transformation of uranium at 660?C with
the swelling resulting from this change in crystalline structure causes a
maximum permissible temperature at the center of solid fuel elements.
Swelling can stop water flow and cause melting of the fuel elements in
a reactor, or even worse problems. This provided another specific
limit which the reactor engineers had indeed to take into account in
their reactor calculations.
A reactor is a leaky box or bucket as far as neutrons are concerned..
This means that the nuclear reaction is more vigorous (because there
are more neutrons) in the center than it is at the edges of a reactor.
Indeed the rate of reaction across a reactor follows the mathematical
function known as the cosine. Little can usually be done with changing
the form of reaction rate or flux between the two ends of the reactor
core cylinder, but much can be done in mal~ing the flux "flatter"
across the reactor core. Our Hanford reactors, and apparently the Rus-
sian reactors, were originally operated without any flattening. Special
ways were developed at Hanford to dampen the reaction in the center
of the reactor and permit greater reaction near the edge. There was
some evidence of a similar progression of events in Russia.
With these facts the reactor engineers had sufficient data to make
reactor calculations, and to deduce with good reliability reactor
power levels and how these changed with time, provided they
assumed the size and configuration of the standard Russian plutonium
production reactor. Here was the real worth of the "in cinema"
pictures from Geneva. Without the pictures all calculations would
have been made on "models" based on American (Hanford) design;
the spread of possibilities for actual Russian practice would have
been so large as to make results almost meaningless. From the
C,~eneva pictures they knew the Tomsk dual purpose reactor in
Reactor Building #2 had a cylindrical core 37 feet in diameter and
24 feet long, contained 2100 fuel elements, each 32 mm in diameter
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unclad and weighing 95.3 Kg. No other data reliably attributable to
Russian production reactors existed.
`T'heir reactor calculations, based on their knowledge of the Russian
scientific literature, then indicated that for Tomsk type reactors the
earliest (1952?) configurations used a solid fuel element about 34 mm
in diameter clad with 1 mm of aluminum and cooled with 2 mm of
flowing water. The reactor was judged to be unflattened, and must
have been cooled with about 45,000 gallons per minute of water, for
more could not be reasonably forced through the 2 mm annuli. ~%irith
the 70?C maximum water temperature, it was estimated to have
developed 700 MW.
'['his reactor would have been designed with a 60,000-gallon-per-
minute water treatment plant (as actually found at Tomsk) to allow
for unforeseen usages, a standard engineering practice with water
treatment plants. This extra capacity would allow a simple change
by, say, early 1957 to a 32 mm solid uranium cylinder with a 3 mm
water gap fvr a fuel element. With considerable reactor flattening,
this could have operated on the 60,000 gallons per minute of water
available and have produced about 950 MW, a 250 MW increase
from the original 700 MW.
The refurbishing of the first reactor at Tomsk in August 1957 is
timewise consistent with the development of annular fuel elements
and with the expectation of later being able to increase the capacity
of the original part of the water works to 95,000 gallons per minute.
If an annular fuel element is chosen with a 10.5 mm hole in the center
and a uranium diameter of 35.5 mm, compared to the 32 mm deduced
by Frank McKeon, the reactor can operate up to 2100 M~1' if an
increase in the water flow in the early sixties to 95,000 gallons per
minute value is accepted.
`T'he dual purpose reactor, the calculations showed, would not work
properly without the annular fuel element. With it, it could be
operated at 700 MW giving 1.00 MW of by-product electricity as
suggested by the Russians in Ueneva. Alternatively, the site was
clearly arranged to send treated water through the reactor, passing
through the steam generators to make by-product steam for electricity
production, and then dumping the hot water into the exit flume.
The latter set-up would produce 1700 total thermal. MW, a correspond-
ingly larger amount of plutonium, and 100 MVV of electricity.
This then was good evidence that the Russians intended in 1957
for the two dual purpose reactors under construction to operate on
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the second half of the water treatment plant at a rate of 90,000
gallons per minute. By 1960- 61 estimated water usage for all three
reactors would have required the capacity of the water treatment
plant to be increased 50 percent, yet because of increases in water
treatment plant efficiency, would not require additional water
treatment plant construction.
The analysis of all available data thus produced aself-consistent,
gradually increasing estimate of Russian plutonium production
reactor capabilities firmly based on photography and the careful
directed study of the pertinent Russian scientific and technical
literature. The results covered a period from 1952 into the early
sixties and could be applied to other Russian reactor sites than
Tomsk whenever data became available. Further, comparison of the
limitations in Russian reactor technology in the early sixties with
that in the US would provide a basis for future estimates. It took
five years, but it was a definitive job well done.
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More on the intelligence analysis
of the Soviet nuclear weapons program
DC POWER AND COOLING TOWERS
Henry Rubenstein
In October, 1962, the tensions of the Cuban missile crisis were
increasing with each U-2 photograph, and with each fresh bit of
intelligence from Cuba. At the same time, the last big series of the 65
Soviet nuclear weapons tests which had started on 1 August 1962
was being conducted on and over the mountains of Semipalatinsk
and the ice of Novaya 7,emlya. Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev's
moves were under intense scrutiny. We knew the number of ICBMs
available to him. Compared to U.S. capabilities, his were wanting.
Consequently the CIA position was that he was bluffing.
There was, however, little doubt, that the USSR had thermonuclear
(TN) warheads. These dated back to the Soviet nuclear detonation
on 12 August 1953, the Soviets' fourth, of a device designated JOE 4
by the U.S. Although Soviet propaganda built up this accomplishment
as implying a great military threat, the Russians had no TN warhead
suitable for ICBM delivery until at least 1957-58, and that probably
was deployed no earlier than 1960. By the end of the tests on
Christmas Day, 1962, there was ample evidence that a number of
well-designed families of Soviet TN devices and weapons were available
to the Soviets. Early in 1963 they signed the Test Ban Treaty, and
their testing program went underground. The big question became,
"What of the future?"
The Requirerreent
Two key materials upon which a TN weapon program is based are
tritium and lithium. We had quite a bit of qualitative information on
Soviet lithium technology including its isotope, lithium-6, but almost
none on tritium, a hydrogen isotope usually produced by exposing
lithium-6 to neutrons in a nuclear reactor. We needed quantitative
information on Soviet production, raw materials, and patterns of use
as well as future applications and trends. This also meant pinning
down the laboratories, plants, processes, personalities, and organiza-
tions involved. Of special importance was the amount of electric power
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ower and Towers
and ether utilities available to the production plants we thought
might be involved.
Hunt for the Lithium Plants
A great deal of good analysis had been done with respect to the
Soviet lithium problem long before the author's arrival on the scene,
and there was a general consensus that the isotope separation process
the Soviets were using was similar to the one which the U.S. Atomic
Energy Commission had set up at the Y-12 plant at Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. That, process consists of using direct current to make a
liquid mercury alloy (called an amalgam) with lithium metal enriched
in the Lithium-isotope. The amalgam is then brought in contact with a
water solution of lithium hydroxide having a natural isotopic ratio of
1.2.5 p~Lrts lithium-7 to one part lithium-6. The lithium-6, having a
greater affinity for the amalgam, gradually replaces the lithium-7.
As a result, a more highly enriched lithium in a number of forms can
then be obtained by treating the mixture with water. The process has
one characteristic which it shares with other isotope separations--the
amount of heat it emits is approximately equal to the electric power
input. E'.ach plant under study had a large supply of direct current
and of steam, and except for Nizhnyaya Tura, a ventilation system
suitable for handling large amounts of mercury safely by Soviet
standards. U- 2 photography helped to provide us with two candiate
production-scale plants for lithium isotope separation by the amalgam
process. 'Phe first was in the remotely situated Area 1 of the Nizhnyaya
'Pura Atomic Energy (AE) Complex near Sverdlovsk, in the Urals.
The other was in the AF Complex along the northeastern outskirts of
ovosibirsk in Siberia. The Novosibirsk plant was directly along the
main line of the Transiberian Railroad.
Ry the middle of 1963 ,Tack Lundin, Bob Vasey and I had quite a
few new questions seeking answers. Jack had succeeded in getting the
classification of some of the U--2 photographs downgraded, and
descended upon John Cxrogin and some of the other Union Carbide
people at the Y-12 plant. After a long but stimulating session, includ-
ing atour of the amalgam plant, then on standby status, we had a
much better feel for the lithium amalgam process.
Roth Area 1 at Nizhnyaya Tura and the Novosibirsk plant are
part of AF, nuclear complexes which are functionally and organiza-
tionally correct for lithium-6 separation plants. Moreover, the neces-
sary administrative and technical support are present, and operation
in an A E complex permits use of existing security facilities as well as
the health, safety, and other functions peculiar to AI+, operations.
82
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Area 1 has two connected buildings which could adequately contain
an isotope separation process and a supporting chemical or ore process-
ing operation. The west building because of the height of its probable
bay area would contain the isotope separation process. We noted a
strong resemblance between this building (22) and a US electro-
magnetic separation building at Y-12. Since several articles pertinent
to electromagnetic separation of lithium had been published by the
Soviets, it was considered quite possible that the Soviets used this
expensive process in the early 1950's to prepare small amounts of
lithium for use in development of nuclear devices.
We estimated that electric power available at Area 1 was limited to
2 and 3 MW, judging by the relatively small size of a probable rectifier
building situated between the 50 to 100 MW capacity substation and
building 22. Since 2 to 3 MW would be sufficient to support a produc-
tion of only modest size, we concluded that an additional 16-MW DC
of motor generator capacity might be obtained from within the lower
sections of building 22. A 40-MW cooling tower which was available
was more than adequate to dissipate the byproduct (heat) from de-
composition of the amalgam. The tower's location, however-a quarter
of a mile from building 22-was not consistent with good plant layout,
although it could have been used. Moreover, we had never been able to
detect the steaming which normally comes from operating cooling
towers. Nevertheless, there was cooling water available for pumping
from the Tura River 1 to 11/4 nautical miles from the site, or from the
Nizhhe-Turinskiy Pond within 3 nautical miles. According to John
Grogin, water from a nearby lake is often used at Y-12 for cooling
without steaming towers. The general lack of steam and vapor from the
postulated process buildings also continued to bother us.
The ventilation system appeared to be very diversified -a factor
we had considered inconsistent if the facility was actually planned
for the amalgam process we believed existed at Novosibirsk. Once
again, however, the visit to Oak Ridge paid off by reminding tts
that perfectly satisfactory ventilation can be obtained by blowing
the air contaminated by mercury vapor out through a hole in one
end of the building while clean air is drawn in through an opening in
the other end wall. In summary, therefore, we concluded that Area 1
of Nizhnyaya Tura was quite possibly an atnalgam process plant
rated at 16- to 18-MW DC, where production-scale operations might
have started between 1951 and 1955.
~Ve believed that a portion of the Novosibirsk AE Complex between
the uranium metal plant and thermal power plant contained the
separation facility. U-2 coverage, supplemented by collateral photog-
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ower an owers
raphy, enabled us to conclude that this was probably a lithium isotope
separation facility. It appeared to fulfill the requirement that power
input should approximately equal the heat rejected: 42 Mwe
(Megawatts electric) of AC and DC electricity plus 25 Mwt (Mega-
watts thermal) of hot steam, balanced against two 35 Mwt cooling
towers. Phis was supported by the large amount of energy available
per square foot of roof space (about 0.5 kw~ft 2) in buildings 15 and
16, which was of the same magnitude as that in Soviet gaseous diffu-
sion plants. Production was believed to have started between August
1.957 and April 1959, with about 31 megawatts of DC power.
Although the Novosibirsk facility is almost classic in pattern, we
have yet to confirm its function. We have kept our eyes open for
other locations possibly associated with lithium production. One such
possibility is a uranium gaseous diffusion building belonging to the
AE program, which would meet the requirements of organization,
security and personnel. Adequate ventilation, power and many
cooling towers are available.
The Analysis
Converting our megawatts of direct current power to kilograms
of weapon-grade lithium-6 was quite a task. It was possible only with
support from the Office of Reports and Research (later the Office of
Economic Research) on the supply of mercury, and of lithium
minerals and concentrates available to the Soviets domestically and
from Communist China. The evidence showed that the Chinese had
supplied half of the Soviet requirements, and it indicated that without
such Chinese assistance or some new sources, the Soviet lithium-6
program was limited by available ore supplies. In light of this conclu-
sion, and some use patterns we observed, we estimated that there was
r~rrly a 15 percent diversion of concentrates from TN weapons.
Important assistance was provided by AFTAC and by Y'-12 so that
we could make logical deductions about the percentage of lithium-6
available to the Soviets that could be considered of weapon grade.
't'his varied with time as shown by debris analysis and by the mention
in collateral reports of highly enriched samples with lithium-6
contents. 'these mentioned samples of 91.7 per cent being used in
physics, and 92.5 per cent in chemical experiments; as available for
sale in the form of metal and chemicals at 95 per cent; and in a piece of
analytical apparatus at 99.8 per cent. In August 196U a sample was
bought from the Soviets which assayed 92.16 per cent. 'Phis also
contained mercury in a quantity that could only be explained by
contact with that metal during exchange processing.
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John Jennings of SOVMAT (now FORMAT) helped us to set up
and operate a sampling program to keep watch for items in the Soviet
economy that would be likely to contain lithium amalgam process
tailings. In June of 1964, he turned up several packing cases of. a
Soviet diuretic medicine called "Urodan," labelled as having been
manufactured on 11 February 1964. This variety of medicine h.ad
been chosen with the assistance of the Agency Medical Staff as
being likely to contain lithium. Analysis indicated 3.08 percent
lithium-6 (or a depletion of 58.5 percent from the normal content of
7.42 per cent), which matched Y-12's suggestions fairly well. We
concluded that this tailings assay was the most probable value to
have been used throughout the Soviet program.
It was necessary to use some somewhat unorthodox techniques in
order to get a true grasp of the large range of much of our basic data.
This resulted in carrying three separate calculations, the probable
value, and the probable maximum and minimum values. The i'inal
results of our analyses were published with a spread of plus or minus
62.5 percent, which was an order of magnitude higher than most
engineers like to see or report on. Nevertheless, these results have
had some utility for making estimates of the number of TN weapons
available to the USSR.
Tritium, which is vital to advanced and compact nuclear weapons,
has continued to be an enigma, although AFTAC has been able to
detect its use in the weapons program by the Soviets. Soviet scientific
writings on matters related to the subject of tritium production
technology have been traceable to U.S, experience or practice. U-2
photography has not provided us with direct answers on processing
techniques and production quantities. Except for very small quantities
that can be made by strong isotopic neutron sources or in accelerators,
production of tritium requires a nuclear reactor. The Soviet reactors
possessing sufficient reactivity to handle any tritium production, and
which also were available (prior to 1954) at the right time to have
contributed to the Soviet program, are the TVR heavy water reactor
in Moscow, the IR isotope reactor suspected to be at Kyshtym, and
the plutonium production reactors at Kyshtym. The TVR could have
yielded enough for R&D only starting in 1949 or early 1950. The IR
at Kyshtym could have contributed about 20 grams and the produc-
tion reactors at that site could have contributed about 2100 more
grams if operated for maximum tritium production, which was con-
sidered unlikely.
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(",alculations for tritium production were made by assuming that
l.(- percent of plutonium-equivalent was diverted to tritium and
consequently the result was based on fairly good numbers. Fortu-
nately, this result agreed with the maximum requirement for tritium
derived from OSI's estimate of the Soviet nuclear weapon stockpile.
Despite our problems in obtaining hard data on tritium, we thus had
been on the right track.
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In pp. 109-111 of Vol. 16, No. 2, of Studies in Intelligence Mr.
Andrew K. Megaris offers some observations about an article of mine
called "The Rote Drei: Getting Behind the Lucy Myth". Some of
these observations require a reply.
First, Mr. Megaris challenges the statement that Lucy had four
important sources in Germany. He lists as perhaps naive the assump-
tions that Lucy had sources, that he knew their identities, and that
he divulged them truthfully.
Admittedly, the word had is far from exact. It is more accurate to
say that a large number of Rote Drei messages are sourced to
"Werther", "Teddy", "Olga", and "Anna". The traffic shows that
Moscow believed that these sources were people.* The traffic also
shows that the Center, like Rado and Rachel Duebendorfer, considered
these sources Lucy's.
I agree that Moscow may well have been wrong and that the
information supplied by the unidentified sources in Germany probably
reached the Swiss General Staff first, then Lucy, and not the other
way around. In fact, as Mr. Megaris was kind enough to note, I said
so near the end of the article. I gather that he feels that I did not say
so loudly enough.
1Vlr. Megaris attributes to me an assumption that the four persons
named by Roessler were identical with Werther et al. I did "assume"
that the sources were human individuals, and the facts continue to
support that assumption. But I did not equate Werther, Teddy,
Olga, and Anna with Oster, Gisevius, Cxoerdeler, and Boelitz, the men
Roessler named. I said (p. 71), "VVe have no basis for matching true
and cover names, although Oster seems the likeliest candidate for
Werther."
Mr. Megaris observes that Roessler remained silent in an era of
war-time reminiscences, must have had strong motives for silence,
and may have thrown out red herrings. I certainly agree about the
strong motives for silence: he had twice been jailed for spying. To
have come out with his memoirs would have been a bit naive. As for
red herrings, those who throw them make sure that they are seen.
*It is important to note that the Soviets sing a different song today. In the recent
Russian and Hungarian versions of Alexander Rado's Dora Jelenti (Dora Reports)
the claim is made that Werther et al were not individuals but offices, components of
the German military structure. Soviet views during the war, which we know through
intercepts, deserve full weight. Their published views in 1~J72 do too- as disinformation.
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Il,oessler had no reason to think that a statement made in strict confi-
dence to a friend would ever be relayed to American intelligence.
1~~1r. Megaris proposes what he considers a promising but neglected
lead: that the communication channel from Germany to Switzerland
may have been Swiss General Staff rather than Abwehr. This possi-
bility was not ignored. I found no evidence to support it-though
that's not much of an argument. I found some evidence to the
contrary. 'There was German censorship of official and unofficial
Swiss communications during the war, though I do not know how
thorough it was. If the Werther, Teddy, etc. messages had been
transmitted as Mr. Megaris suggests, the Germans might well have
found out about it. It was a risk that Switzerland, in a precarious
position and very afraid of a German assault, would be quite unlikely
to run. Where was the commensurate gain? The Rote Drei sources in
Germany were providing information of great value to the USSR,
not Switzerland. The argument for Abwehr channels is bolstered by
the fact that they were much less susceptible to monitoring by the
RS H A. Otherwise the 20th of July conspirators would have been
arrested long before they were.
Since the article in question was printed, more than three ,years ago,
we have learned a good deal more about Soviet espionage in Europe
before, during, and after World War II. We are still far from having
all the answers. But as the article said, the traffic itself remains
the best foundation for analysis. The source line of a message of
20 April 1943, Dora to Director, reads as follows: "Durch hier
angekommenen Generaldirektor...Buergermeister Goerdeler aus.. .
Bendlerstrasse". (From the general director and [former] mayor
Goerdeler, who has come here from the Bendlerstrasse.) Rado's
book cites part of the text that followed. It omits any reference to
Karl Goerdeler. `1'he Soviets, unable to make a case for the old
argument that Lucy's sources in Germany were Communists, now
assert that those sources were not people. If forced to face the fact
that all the evidence suggests that they were living individuals, they
seem determined to suppress the possibility that those individuals may
have been members of the 20th of July group, as Lucy said they
were, because the dominant wing of that group--the wing that
included Oster, Gisevius, and Goerdeler-was pro-Western, not pro-
Soviet. The fact that the Soviets seek to preclude consideration of
these men as Lucy's sources means nothing in terms of the validity of
the theory. But it does mean that we should not join them in such a
preclusion until the weight of facts tips the balance that way.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
THE SERVICE: THE MEMOIRS OF GENERAL REINHARD
GEHLEN. By Reinhard Gehlen. (World Publishers, New York,
1972. 386 pages.)
THE GENERAL WAS A SPY: THE TRUTH ABOUT GENERAL
GEHLEN AND HIS SPY RING. By Heinz Hoehne and Herman
Lolling. (Coward, McCann and Geoghegan, New York, 1972.
347 pages.)
GEHLEN, SPY OF THE CENTURY. By E. H. Cookridge. (Hodder
and Stoughton, London, 1971. 402 pages.)
NICHT LAENGER GEHEIM: ENTWICKLUNG, SYSTEM
UND ARBEITSWEISE DES IMPERIALISTISCHEN DEUTS-
CHEN GEHEIMDIENSTES. By Albrecht Charisius and Julius
Mader. (Secret No Longer: Development, Organization and Methods
of the Imperialistic German Secret Service. Deutscher Militaer-
verlag, [East] Berlin, 1969. 632 pages.)
In April 1968, after some 22 years as chief of the West German
intelligence service and 48 years altogether of public service, Lieu-
tenant General Reinhard Gehlen retired as President of the Federal
Intelligence Service (BND).'~ He was accurately described as the
doyen of western intelligence chiefs. Whatever was thought of
Gehlen-and he had many enemies-he was by this time quite well
known throughout the world, so it is not surprising that his retirement
has occasioned no less than four books.
The first to appear, in May 1969, was the East German effort
Nicht Laenger Geheim. The other three were published in their German
editions within a few weeks of each other during the fall of 1971.
Nicht Laenger Geheim and The General Was a Spy are tendentious and
inaccurate; the Cookridge book is inaccurate; none of them is worth
reading. Gehlen's book The Service has many faults, a lot of which
are inherent in such a book, but for any officer assigned to Germany
*From 1942 until 1945 Gehlen was theater G-2 for the Russian front. As the war
ended, he assembled his people and his files and, after capture by the U.S. Army,
offered his organization to the U. S. Since the Army knew very little about the iJSSR
and since the Cold War had begun, his offer was accepted. After some months of delay
the Gehlen Organization, as it was called, was sponsored by the U.S. Army as an
intelligence collection and evaluation organization against Communist targets, princi-
pally Lhe Soviet forces in East Germany. The U. S. Army retained this trusteeship
until 1949, when CIA asswned it. In 1956 the Bonn government took over and the
Gehlen. Organization became the 13Nll.
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SECRET ecen oo s
it is worthwhile reading, and for anyone assigned to liaison duties
with the BND it is a must.
While I approached Gehlen's book, The Service, with the keenest
interest, 1 had not expected too much of it. For one thing, I was
afraid that it would be written in field manual style. Secondly, in-
telligence chiefs may not, and do not, tell all; therefore many of the
most interesting points are missing, and the picture which emerges
is of necessity incomplete and distorted. I was wrong on the first point
and right on the second. So far as style goes, the book reads easily.
My overall rating of the book is a gentleman's C plus. The reader
should not expect too much in the way of excitement. And this word
excitement brings up a point which must be discussed. There is a
segment of opinion in German public life and in the ranks of CIA
where the people seem unable to talk about Gehlen-they simply
splutter. I have experienced this phenomenon in the ranks of CIA on
many occasions during the past 15 ,years or more, and some of the
articles and reviews on the book which appeared in the Cxerman press
bear out the point about the Germans.
W e know, incidentally, that the book was not reviewed by anyone in
the BND prior to publication.
Th,e Service opens its American edition with Gehlen an board a
flight to the United States to begin his cooperation with us, then turns
back to his earlier career. The German original was more chronologi-
cally arranged in three parts. One deals with Gehlen's experiences as
chief of Foreign Armies East (Russian Theater G-2) from early 1942
until the end of the war. The second part deals with the postwar
Gehlen Organization, first under U.S. Army and later CIA trustee-
ship, then accepted by Bonn as the BND. This second part also dis-
cusses the successes and failures from 1946 to 1968, the types of
persons who worked for the BND, relationships with other services-
in other words, the whole gamut of intelligence activities. The third
part consists of three chapters on Soviet ideology, Soviet tactics, and
the outlook for the world in the face of Soviet imperialism.
it should be borne in mind, particularly when reading the last part
but also for the book as a whole, that Gehlen is a Cold Warrior. He
always was and always will be; he makes no bones about it, he says
that history will be the judge, and he has no doubts about that judg-
ment. Of course, during most of Gehlen's years, the U S Government
and CIA in particular were heavily oriented in that- direction too.
Gehlen's attitude almost certainly does not sit well with some of the
present political leaders in Bonn who are pursuing Ustpolitik (no
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criticism intended), but in light of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the
Brezhnev Doctrine he certainly feels he has a point.
The section on Foreign Armies East is perhaps the best part of the
book, although it is of interest primarily to military historians. From
all accounts, Gehlen did an excellent job as chief of an Order-of-Battle
analysis organization. All commentators-from the U.S. Army (in a
1946 study) to Zolling and Hoehne in 1971-agree on this. It was
during the latter part of this period, i.e., during 1943, that Gehlen
decided to keep his people and files together and turn his organization
over to the Americans. The Service does not tell us much that we did
nat already know about this period, but Gehlen's description of the
spring and summer of 1945 makes interesting reading. There are some
fascinating anecdotes.
The Bundespost (the mail service), the Bundesbahn (the railroads,
formerly called the Reichsbahn), and the German intelligence service
are the only three national German organizations which carried on
with a pause of only a few weeks when the war ended. Gehlen for his
part, although betrayal to the Nazis of his post-defeat-plans would
have meant death, was most concerned to legalize his position as
much as possible. Therefore in April 1945 (before the end of the war)
he disclosed his intentions to General Winter, Chief of the Operations
Section of the Armed Forces High Command and received his
"sanction." I imagine that was about as high an authority as Gehlen
dared to go at the time. Then, several weeks later in June 1945, after
VE Day, Gehlen met Admiral Karl Doenitz, who had been appointed
by Hitler as his successor during the last days of the Third Reich.
Gehlen and the Admiral were now in a U.S. Army VIP prison camp
in Wiesbaden; Gehlen sought and received approval from Doenitz
too!
It is in May and June 1945 that the Americans first appear in this
book and here I must say that neither. the Americans in general, nor
CIA in particular, have any reason to complain about what Gehlen
has to say about us. IIe mentions very few personalities and for most
of these he uses an alias or a similar device. Awell-known figure such
as Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, then G-2 of the European
Theater, is mentioned by name, and in a very favorable way. 'Phe
other Army officers are either given aliases or are referred to as
Colonel D., Colonel L., or Colonel Rusty (a nickname).
The only CIA personality mentioned by true name is Allen Dulles,
whom he describes as being, along with the Admiral Canaris, the best
of the intelligence chiefs he met. The only other CIA personality is
"Herr M," (the first Chief of I'ullach Base, who was Gehlen's opposite
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number for nearly eight years); Herr M gets only brief mention, but
in the most, favorable terms. CIA is at one point gently chided for
being overly bureaucratic; there is a heavily disguised reference to one
of our OPC flaps; but that is about as far as the criticism goes. He
discloses nothing which should not be disclosed and washes none of our
dirty linen in public. Heaven knows there were some first class rows
and hard feelings between Gehlen and us, and while he was often at
fault, there was one time in particular when, largely through bureau-
cratic inertia, we were definitely the culprits, and where Gehlen on
both official and personal grounds had every reason to be aggrieved
and angry (he was, but only in private). The book shows him to be
both a decent man and a big enough one to forgive, if not forget, these
slights from the past. It is an old-fashioned way of putting it, but
Gehlen is a gentleman and behaves like one.
There are many faults in this book, but before discussing them let
us look at his towering achievement, the biggest item on the credit
side of his ledger. The idea of the BND was Gehlen's. Whether he
envisaged such an organization in 1943 is doubtful and unimportant,
but by 1946 he was definitely thinking in terms of a national
intelligence organization. He showed political skill of the highest
order in pushing through his concept in the face of considerable
opposition from other embryonic services in Bonn, various German
politicians, allied intelligence services, and hostile services. He
describes this process with modesty. The BND has today the most
powerful and broadest charter of any western service. When one
considers the duplication which abounds in other western intelligence
communities, the position of the BND is both desirable and enviable.
This does not mean to say that the BND is a first class intelligence
service; it is not (more on this later), but it is in a position to become
one.
Now for the debit side of the ledger. Here the reviewer must read
carefully. I am writing a classified review and can say things which
Cxehlen, in his book, obviously could not say. Tempered criticism is
in order, however. In the first place, Gehlen was never a good
clandestine operator, nor was he a particularly good administrator.
And therein lay his failures. The Gehlen OrganizationJBND always
had a good record in the collection of military and economic intelli-
gence on East Germany and the Soviet forces there. But this informa-
tion, for the most part, came from observation and not from
clandestine penetration. As far as we know (and we know a great
deal] the Germans never had a good political penetration in East
Germany or anywhere else in the Soviet Bloc. Thus Gehlen's descrip-
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tions of most of his so-called successes in the political intelligence
field are, in my opinion, either wishful thinking or self-delusion.
While one might have expected the German service to be capable of
staff penetrations within the East German government, the extent
of its greatest success seems to have been the recruitment of the
boyfriend of a secretary (Elli B--Operation Gaensebluemchen,
mentioned by Gehlen) in East German Prime Minister Otto Grote-
wohl's office; the boyfriend was able to debrief the unwitting Elli B
on what went on in the office. The unfortunate woman paid for her
indiscretion with her life. Similarly, when Gehlen states that he
received "two reliable reports" in the 1950's that Martin Bormann
was living in the USSR, I can only wonder and point out that he
never informed us, although that case and others like it were dis-
cussed in great detail by CIA and the BND. Incidentally last year's
uproar in Germany about Gehlen's Bormann revelation is unwar-
ranted. That Gehlen and Canaris had a conversation about a Soviet
penetration of Hitler's entourage, and that they considered Bormann
the most likely candidate, is entirely credible. Furthermore, although
there is no evidence one way or the other, I accept the possibility
that an unprincipled villain such as Bormann would have been very
receptive to a Soviet recruitment pitch by, say 1943, when all could
see that the war was lost. Bormann's being ared-hot Nazi was no
bar to such an alliance. Any real Nazi despised democracy and
admired dictatorships.
To get back to Gehlen's descriptions of world events and his cases
found in Chapters 5 and 9, I consider the picture to be too rosy,
far too rosy.
Gehlen makes much of the struggle between his organization and
the East German intelligence service under Ernst Wollweber. This
ended with the dismissal of Wollweber and one infers that the Nest
Germans "won" this one. Perhaps they did in a certain sense. But the
very real and crushing defeat of the BND came at the hands of the
KGB and is best personified by the Felfe case. * Again Gehlen is
severely limited in what he may say, but the fact of the matter is that
staff security, while a horrendously difficult problem in Germany in
the early post-war years, was also the well-nigh fatal weakness of the
*Heinz Felfe, formerly a lieutenant in the intelligence arm of the SS (a fact which he
concealed from the BND), was a member of the BNll's CI staff. For the ten years of
his employment by Gehlen, he was an agent of the .KCB. IIe was arrested in 1961,
sentenced to I4 years, and exchanged in 1969. IIe is now completing his Ph. D. studies
at the Humboldt University in East Berlin. IIis field is criminology and he will be
given a teaching position at Humboldt ho~v nice.
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German service. He could have dwelt on these very real difficulties,
for there are at least ten reasons why West Germans were, in the early
days at least, peculiarly susceptible to Communist blandishments.
The West German government has been, and doubtless still is,
thoroughly penetrated, and more frankness on Gehlen's part with
respect to this problem would have been in order. His two and a half
pages on Felfe make poor reading.
Gehlen's critics have made much of the ring of informants which he
is said to have woven through West Germany. This question of domes-
tic operations is a difficult subject to evaluate. Consider the following
points: there was no national security organization in West Germany
until 1950, and not much on the state level before then; Gehlen was,
with justification, desperately concerned about Communist penetra-
tion and in running CI cases naturally became involved with West
German citizens; West Germany swarmed with Communist spies,
literally thousands; Gehlen operated a lobbying apparatus aimed at
paving the way for his organization to become the BND; Gehlen did
make some accusations about West German citizens, some of which
were ,justified and some absurd; some West Germans genuinely thought
they were being investigated by Gehlen's people- --sometimes they
were, sometimes they were not; Gehlen's many enemies were quick
to turn any of his mistakes to their advantage. I do not consider that
Gchlen's activities in this field, while sometimes ill-advised, were
nearly as sinister as some of his critics make them out to be. Gehlen
does not discuss this aspect in his book, but his reviewers do, so it is
worth mentioning.
Gehlen is bedeviled by one of the problems which beset the intelli-
gence business. The problem is that people will believe almost any-
thing you tell them about it. As one senior CIA official put it: "Talking
to people about intelligence is the same as talking to young people
about sex. The more improbable you make it, the more they believe
it." I+'or ,years Gehlen was the Master Spy, the Man of Mystery, Spy
of the Century. His whole career as a General Staff officer, then the
secrecy of the U.S. Army and CIA trusteeship, the mystery surround-
ing Lhe Pullach headquarters compound, and particularly, because of
a genuine fear of Communist reprisals (such things frequently occurred
during the Cold War days), the fact that he never allowed himself to
be photographed all this built up a legend far in excess of the reality.
This comes out very clearly in The General Was a Spy and Cookridge's
book. To those in the know, however, this legend, while harmless,
was known for what it was, just a legend. But now his book provides
his critics with a perfect peg on which to hang their criticism. A review
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in the West German news magazine Der Spiegel by a former high-
ranking German security officer entitled "A Well-Deserved Sel.f-
IZevelation" is a case in point; the theme is that Gehlen has at last
revealed himself as a straw man. In point of fact, if you do not know
the full inside story and accept Gehlen's book, he does not reveal
himself as such. However the review has many excellent points
(spoiled, let it be said, by the critic's intemperance) and viewed against
the overblown legend, the denouement is quite shattering.
Cxehlen might have made more of one aspect of his service which is
generally rated quite high. I refer to his intelligence analysis depart-
ment, which from its beginnings has turned out a lot of sound work.
But Gehlen, although not an operator, loved operations for operations'
sake, and tended to see the success or failure of his organization
in these.
As I said, an intelligence chief should not write a book on his own
organization; the forbidden subjects are too numerous and too re-
straining, and a stunted picture is bound to emerge. But for better or
worse Gehlen wrote one, and it mares interesting reading, at least for
the specialist. I have thought of raising that C plus to a B minus, but I
think I'll leave it as it is.
The General Was a Spy, while a poor book, has an interesting back-
ground. Both 7,olling* and Hoehne were staff writers for Der Spiegel
and the book first appeared in serial form in that magazine in the
summer of 1971. Spiegel tends to be quite nihilistic, particularly when
it comes to anything to do with the state, the establishment, the
U.S., and so on. As Conrad Ahlers, one of the Bonn Government Press
Secretaries said, on the occasion of the start of this serialization,
"Spiegel is singing its old song: alles ist Mist was der Staat maclit."
And Ahlers is quite right. But at the same time the "line" of the book
zigs and zags. The first part has a powerful attack on General Wesel,
Gehlen's successor; then the part which describes Gehlen's G-2 career
in the German Army is very laudatory; then the description of the
Gehlen Organization's battle with the East German service under
Wollweber is laudatory (it has to be since it is based squarely on a
cover story on Gehlen which Spiegel had published in 1954); then it
turns anti-Gehlen. Granted that the 1950's were Gehlen's salad days
and the 1960's his time of troubles, it is quite obvious that Spiegel
attacks him and Wessel as part of a calculated policy.
One of the most flagrant examples of anti-BND writing by the
Spiegel occurs in Chapter 9 which has the title "The IIunt for Enemies
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