STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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• Publication Date: January 1, 1970
• Content Type: IS

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STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETUPN TO
!`diCY ARCHIVES, BLDG. E)ECRET
N! 1548
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I- I
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
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ABBOT E. SMITH, Chairman
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CONTENTS
Beaumarchais and the American Revolution .... Streeter Bass 1
French intelligence assists at the birth of the United States.
UNCLASSIFIED
Soviet Deception in the Czechoslovak Crisis ................ 19
A study in perspective. SECRET Cynthia M. Grabo
Rapid Transit in Clandestine Intelligence .................. 35
George H. Montminny
Evolution of a system. SECRET
The Serendipity Effect .................. Dino A. Brugioni 43
On the frontiers of intelligence photography. SECRET
The Agency and the Future .......... Charles D. Cremeans 77
Time, change, and intelligence. CONFIDENTIAL
1: 1
Editorial Notes .......................................... 103
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature .................... 105
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE 1969 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARDS
The tenth annual Studies awards of $200 have been made to I
1there appeared little to choose in point
of significance to the literature of intelligence, and recognition is therefore
extended to all of them.
The Sherman Kent prize was not awarded in 1969.
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THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
AND SHERMAN KENT AWARDS
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribu?-
tion to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the
Studies. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles
submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if
no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional $500 is available
for other prizes.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles on
any subject within the range of the Studies' purview, as defined in its
masthead, will be considered for the awards. They will be judged primarily
on substantive originality and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities.
Members of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course excluded
from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter) of each
volume for articles published during the preceding calendar year. The
editorial board will welcome readers' nominations for awards but reserves
to itself exclusive competence in the decision.
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French intelligence
assists at the birth
of the United States.
BEAUMARCIIAIS AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
"The King of England has long done me the honor of hating me. For
my part, I have always done him the justice of despising him. The time
has come to decide which of the two has shown better judgment and on
which side the wind will cause the heads to fall."
It was September, 1775, the King of England was George III, and the
speaker of the bold words was John Wilkes, flamboyant pamphleteer,
demagogue, radical Whig, rabble-rouser, libertarian, and, since the
autumn of 1774, Lord Mayor of London. He was the center of a circle of
the most vociferous of His Majesty's not-so-loyal Opposition and a
lodestone for all those who hated the authoritarianism of George III. He
presided over a series of famous (or infamous, according to the point of
view) "libertarian suppers" which were attended by radical British
Whigs and equally radical Americans of strongly separatist persuasion.
Ile gave vent to this opinion of his and his King's mutual esteem at one
such supper and, on this particular occasion, one of his hearers was a
Frenchman, Pierre August Caron de Beaumarchais, who the next day
included it in an intelligence report he was sending to Versailles.
The King's Agent
This Beaumarchais was a remarkable man. He was well known in
France as a highly popular dramatist, and equally well known even
beyond the borders of France as the author of four pungent pamphlets in
which he had protested an unjust judgment delivered against him by the
infamous "Maupeou Parlement." His origins were humble but his talents
were enormous. Born to a watchmaker in the Rue St. Denis in Paris, he
was by the time he was twenty an accomplished musician, the possessor
of a brilliant wit and debonair personality, and an ingenious watchmaker
who had invented a new escapement mechanism which permitted the
manufacture of very small watches. He had ingratiated himself at the
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UNCLASSIFIED Beaumarchais
court in Versailles, had made a watch for Madame de Pompadour small
enough to fit in a finger ring, and was giving the daughters of Louis XV
music lessons. From this auspicious beginning he had progressed rapidly
into the ranks of the lesser nobility. He was ambitious and he took
advantage of every opportunity. He was trained by the financier Paris-
Duverney in the ways of the business world and, by the time he was
nearing forty, he had amassed a sizable fortune. He had a volatile
temperament which constantly involved him in acrimonious controversy
with prominent members of the nobility, some of whom resented his
rapid rise in the King's favor. His vivid wit and facile pen demolished
some enemies, created others, and made him, in a few short years,
notorious in Paris.
Psychologically, Beaumarchais was an incurable adolescent to whom
life was a continuous drama in which he played a succession of leading
roles. What made him extraordinarily successful was his ability to absorb
with his whole being whatever role he was playing at the moment, to the
exclusion of any other. This delight in role-playing made writing for the
stage the inevitable outlet for his creative urge and it provided as well the
natural means of sublimating his personal frustrations. After several
minor starts and two indifferent successes, he had, in the preceding
la ebruary, gotten a smash hit onto the boards: "The Barber of Seville."
The role Beaumarchais was playing in London in the summer of 1775
was that of secret agent for Louis XVI. He had played the role twice
before--once for the King's grandfather, Louis XV, who was always
getting into scrapes, and once before for Louis XVI. In each case his
mission had been to contact discreetly and neutralize on the best terms
possible a blackmailer who was threatening to publish scurrilous material
on private life among the French royalty. He had been eminently
successful, and now Louis XVI, who had to devote a good deal of time
and effort at the beginning of his reign sniffing out and cleaning up some
of the more noisome messes left behind by his grandfather, had sent him
to London to seek out and negotiate a settlement with a certain
Chevalier d'Eon. This man, himself one of the more colorful figures of a
flamboyant age, had been an agent of Louis XV and he was now hold-
ing the new King up for a comfortable financial settlement. His leverage
was the threat of revealing to the British his secret correspondence with
Louis XV on the possibility of avenging the Bourbon defeat of 1765 by
attacking England across the Channel! Beaumarchais was well known to
Antoine de Sartines, then Lieutenant General of Police, who with the
new Foreign Minister, the Comte de Vergennes, had recommended him
to the King for this assignment.
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eaum arc ais L I
Beaumarchais, whose delight in role-playing depended on getting
better and better roles in each new production, balked at first. He had
played this part before. But Vergennes won him over by promising him a
new part. A serious crisis was brewing between England and her North
American colonies. This quarrel was spilling over into British domestic
politics. The left-wing Whigs, and the anti-authoritarian party generally,
were becoming more vociferous and were attacking the King in daily
more strident terms. Vergennes needed to know what was going on. The
French ambassador in London, the Due de Guines, was reporting only
what the British government was passing to him in his official capacity
and this was hardly sufficient in the circumstances.
Possessed of one of the subtlest and keenest minds among the
statesmen of his era, Vergennes was a staunch royalist devoted to the
cause of restoring the greatness of the Bourbons. Since he was convinced
that this inevitably meant another trial of arms with England, it was vital
to him to know the nature and extent of Britain's differences with her
colonies and the repercussions in London. He therefore enhanced
Beaumarchais' role as low-level police agent in a blackmail case by
adding to it that of confidential political commentator and international
spy. Beaumarchais undertook the dual role with glee and performed it
admirably. He induced the Chevalier d'Eon to accept a settlement so far
below his expectations that he was thenceforth Beaumarchais' lifelong
bitter enemy, and he kept Vergennes informed in detail by voluminous
reporting on Britain's internal situation and her relations with her
recalcitrant colonies.
Beaumarchais had arrived in London in April, 1775. By the first of
May the news of Lexington and Concord had set London into a turmoil
of speculation and rumor. Lord Rochford, whom Beaumarchais had
known well in Spain some years previously, was still Lord North's
Foreign Minister. He was garrulous by nature and his free tongue kept
Beaumarchais well informed on the government's positions and plans. At
John Wilkes' house, which he frequented for over a year, he came into
close contact with the extreme left wing of the Whigs as well as with
many Americans. He thus had excellent access to both sides of the
question.
The Advocate of Intervention
Foremost among the liberal Americans with whom Beaumarchais
came in contact was Arthur Lee. He met Lee at Wilkes' house and
immediately found him a most congenial companion. He was witty,
impetuous, ambitious, and consumed with a passion for complete
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UNCLASSIFIED Beaumarchais
separation of the colonies from England. The two spent hours together
discussing the problems of American independence and Beaumarchais
became keenly aware of the depth of the rift between the colonies and
the mother country. He also became imbued with a conviction of the
essential rightness of the American cause. Gradually his reporting
became less objective and more biased in favor of the Americans. By the
autumn of 1775 he had become an outspoken advocate of the American
position and a persistent proponent of the desirability of French
intervention.
Vergennes agreed. But, where Beaumarchais, the volatile idealist, felt
in his heart the necessity for the liberation of a gallant people who ought
to be freed from tyranny, Vergennes, the political realist, felt in his head
that the most direct route to French ascendency in Europe lay in
England's military embroilment on the other side of the Atlantic. In
Beaumarchais' view, there was no reason for France to hesitate to support
the Americans. The more realistic Vergennes, however, saw two impedi-
merits blocking the way. One was the fact that France had not yet
recovered sufficiently, either financially or militarily, from the Seven
Years War to risk war with England for the present; the other was the
character of Louis XVI.
Louis had been brought up to take a rigid view of the Christian
admonition to love one's enemies. He stubbornly refused to take
advantage of England's embarrassment to further his own ends.
Vergennes, Foreign Minister for only about a year, was still cautious
about remonstrating with the King concerning his moral myopia. He
agreed that, if Beaumarchais would write a series of confidential
dispatches, addressed either to him or to Sartines, in which the pro-
American arguments would be pressed with enthusiasm and
persuasiveness, he would see that these reports came to the King's
attention. The fact that they had been submitted by the irrepressible
Beaumarchais would presumably shield Vergennes from any undesirable
consequences which might result if the same sentiments came directly
from one of the King's ministers.
Beaumarchais returned to London and launched a series of
impassioned dispatches imploring the King to abandon his inappropriate
religious scruples and to undertake acts which were in the obvious inter-
est, if not of himself, then surely of his subjects and nation. He contin-
ued his pleadings to Vergennes and the King on America's behalf
ceaselessly throughout the winter and spring of 1775-76. At the same
time he stepped up his activities among the Americans and British lib-
erals to the point where the British authorities began to suspect that the
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8eaurnarchais
d'Eon affair was not the real reason for his presence in London. A change
of cover seemed to be in order and, at Vergennes' request, the French
government gave him the assignment of purchasing on the London
market Spanish and Portuguese coin, then at a premium in the West
Indies trade.
In the meantime, relations between the colonies and Britain
deteriorated steadily. By the end of 1775 the Americans were irrevocably
engaged in an all-out struggle for complete independence. The
Continental Congress had set up the Committee of Secret
Correspondence, and the Committee had designated Arthur Lee as its
agent in London. Lee and Beaumarchais began serious discussion of the
possibilities for French aid.
The American need was certainly critical. George III had decided to
crush the rebellion with a quick and vigorous effort and, since Britain
was as usual unprepared for war, had hired mercenaries in Germany to
provide the necessary manpower. Most observers on both sides of the
Atlantic doubted that the Americans would be able to deal effectively
with a large expeditionary force of experienced European
troops-especially in view of their lack of artillery and engineers.
Throughout the spring of 1776, Beaumarchais deluged Vergennes and the
King with Lee's pleas for assistance, with his own pleas, and with rea-
soned and impassioned arguments for French interventions. By the end
of March most of the cabinet had been won over. Only Turgot, the Min-
ister of Finance, dissented. A short time thereafter Turgot resigned and
was replaced. It was agreed, however, that the decision should be kept
secret for the time being. Assistance would be given the Americans, but
until the French armed forces were strengthened to the point of being
able to deal effectively with the British in open warfare, France would
be careful to maintain a sufficient semblance of neutrality.
Because of this need for secrecy, Beaurnarchais was not informed of the
decision. He was left in London dealing with Arthur Lee, and a Dr.
Barbeu Dubourg-friend and correspondent of Benjamin Franklin and
translator of Franklin's in France-was picked by the government to be
the intermediary with the Americans. Barbeu Dubourg did not work out
well, however. He was too old, he lacked business acumen, and-naore
serious in a venture of this nature-he was insecure and garrulous.
Within a month Vergennes and Sartines, now Minister of the Navy,
decided that Beaumarchais would be a better bet. He was summoned
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UNCLASSIFIED Beaumarchais
from London and told to submit immediately a plan for the clandestine
assistance to the American cause.
Beaumarchais proposed that the Spanish and Portuguese coins he had
been buying in London be used for an immediate subsidy to Congress.
One million livres would he the initial amount, half of which would be
sent immediately to America to support the paper money being issued by
Congress and the other half used to buy arms and ammunition in the
Netherlands and other European countries. These purchases would be
handled by a cover firm for which Beaumarchais proposed the name
Roderigue Hortalez et Compagnie.
The French government did not accept this proposal. Direct subsidy in
support of the colonial currency came too close to overt violation of
France's neutrality and France, now committed to a course which would
inevitably lead to war with England, could not afford to spend money
buying arms outside her own borders. There was a better way.
Preparation for war with England meant the complete overhaul of the
French army which had had little attention for years. In particular the
artillery needed modernization. Large numbers of perfectly serviceable
guns had thus become surplus. As a matter of fact, a major of artillery
named 1)u Coudray had already been ordered to call the French arsenals
for guns and other military supplies which were to be made available to
Barbeu Dubourg. Vergennes, Sartines, and St. Germain, the Minister of
War, now saw a way to assist the Americans securely and replenish the
french treasury at the same time. The Hortalez firm would be set up as a
completely "black" operation. It would buy munitions from the French
government on credit, sell them to the Americans, and then reimburse
the government which would thus dispose of its surplus equipment at a
tidy profit.
The government, therefore, informed Beaumarchais that he should
proceed to organize his cover firm. As initial capital he would receive a
loan from the government of one million livres. The other Bourbon
crown, in Madrid, would supply another million. He would then raise
another two million by selling stock to his personal business
acquaintances and friends. The firm's raison d'etre would be trade with
the West Indies. It would purchase from French arsenals such
supplies-guns, powder, muskets, blankets, shoes, clothing-as might be
needed. The firm could pay outright for this materiel or replace it with
equivalent articles. Beaumarchais would charge Congress a reasonable
price for what he was able to deliver and accept payment in tobacco, rice,
indigo, and cotton which he would be able to market in Europe. The firm
would he completely self-supporting. Beyond repayment of the original
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loan and payment for the purchases from the arsenals, the government
would have no claim on any profits the firm might make. By the same
token, the firm would have to absorb any losses. It would acquire, by
purchase or charter, its own shipping and would deliver its goods to
transfer points in the West Indies where the Americans would pick them
up in exchange for cargos of tobacco, etc. As an added incentive,
Beaumarchais, who still stood under a sentence of "blame" (i.e. loss of
certain civil rights) at the hands of the Maupcou Parlement, was
promised full restoration by the Royal Council.
Beaumarchais, fired with enthusiasm for the American cause and
delighted with his new role, eagerly accepted the arrangement. On June
10, 1776 the Treasury paid him one million livres-in gold coin. With
typical theatricality, he received the money in canvas bags, had it placed
in his carriage, and drove with it to his house. There he called his whole
family together and, with a magician-like gesture, poured out the coins
into a shining golden heap on the floor!
Two months later, on August 11th, he received another million from
the Spanish Ambassador. From a group of French merchants he obtained
a third million and Roderigue Hortalez et Compagnie was in business.
He rented a large building in the Rue du Temple called the Hotel de
Hollande, since it had formerly been the Dutch Embassy. Here he set up
the firm's offices, moved his residence and family into the same building,
and waited for Vergennes to put him in touch with a responsible
American agent.
Enter Silas Deane
In March, 1776 the Committee of Secret Correspondence had named
Silas Deane to be the agent of Congress in Paris. This appointment was
made without the knowledge of Congress since Congress, as Franklin
wryly commented, "consists of too many members to keep secrets."
Deane arrived in Paris on July 5th under cover as a wealthy Bermuda
merchant whose business intent was trade with the Indies. Armed with a
letter of introduction from Franklin, he sought out Barbeu Dubourg and
asked to be taken to Versailles. The old doctor temporized. His relations
with Vergennes had, as we have seen, become somewhat strained and
he was now afraid of losing his importance as an intermediary if Deane
were introduced directly to Vergennes. Relying on his instructions from
Franklin, however, Deane persisted and on July 17th Dubourg finally
took him to Versailles where he had a two hour session with Vergennes.
Gerard de Reyvenal, First Secretary of the Ministry and later the first
French Ambassador to the United States, acted as interpreter. At the end
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UNCLASSIFIED Beaumarchais
of the interview Gerard mentioned Beaumarchais to Deane and
immediately thereafter informed Beaumarchais that a secret
representative of the American Congress had arrived.
On July 19th Beaumarchais and Deane met for the first time. They
became fast friends almost immediately and throughout their association
they worked smoothly together as a team. They had no trouble arriving
at mutually satisfactory terms for the delivery of the promised arms and a
firm contract was embodied in an exchange of letters dated July 20th and
22nd. The contract provided that Beaumarchais would make his goods
available to Congress on a one-year credit. Congress was free to pay
either the value of the goods on delivery on the purchase price at the
French arsenals plus insurance, shipping, and commission-whichever it
desired. Payment was to be made in kind: tobacco, indigo, and other
colonial goods, the shipment of which would commence immediately, as
soon as shipping could be found. Deane duly reported these
arrangements to the Committee of Secret Correspondence and awaited
confirmation. Beaumarchais embarked on a whirlwind of activity to
fulfill his end of the bargain.
For the remainder of 1776, Hortalez & Cie. functioned like one of
Beaumarchais' own well-oiled watches. Beaumarchais seemed to he in
Paris, Bordeaux, Nantes, Le Havre, and Marseilles simultaneously. Ships
were purchased or chartered, provisioned, supplied with officers and
crews. The weapons which Du Coudray had culled from the arsenals
began to flow toward the ports. Donatien le Rey de Chaumont, intendant
for supplying clothing to the French army, became one of Beaumarchais'
partners. He gave the firm a credit of one million livres and undertook to
supply enormous amounts of clothing. By the end of the year,
Beaumarchais had collected 200 field pieces, 300,000 muskets, 100 tons
of powder, 3,000 tents, and large amounts of ammunition. He also had a
blanket, a pair of shoes, and two pairs of wool stockings for each of 30,000
men along with such miscellaneous items as buttons, buckles, needles,
thread, pocket knives, and bolts of wool and silk for uniforms. Most of
this material had been collected at Le Havre and was being loaded for
shipment.
There were hitches, of course. For one thing, all this activity could not
possibly escape the notice of British intelligence. Reports regularly
reached Lord Stormont, the British Ambassador, of vast quantities of
martial materials moving on the roads of France, to and through French
ports, bound ostensibly for the French West Indies but in quantities
wholly inappropriate to any reasonable needs in the islands. Stormont
protested often and volubly to Vergennes, who at first professed complete
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ignorance. Vergennes also pointed out-conservative royalist that he
was-that he would be the last to furnish help to the American
insurgents: after all, revolution was a dangerous thing; a revolution here
inevitably begot a revolution there. Stormont, to whom the already
deteriorating internal French political situation was no secret, seemed
placated for the moment at least. This astute diplomat was, however, by
no means convinced of the innocence of the French government. In the
light of continued reporting from his agents indicating clandestine help
to the Americans, his protests to Vergennes became increasingly insistent
and the government finally felt constrained to issue ordinances against
the smuggling of war supplies.
Beaumarchais soon found himself running afoul of these regulations
and protested vehemently to Vergennes, who instructed him in what it
means to operate "black." He was told that the snags he was
encountering were unfortunate but inevitable. He would have to be more
careful and he was not to embarrass the government by getting caught in
any serious breach of the regulations.
Beaumarchais also began to have trouble with Major Du Coudray. At
first, Du Coudray was invaluable to Deane and Beaumarchais. In
addition to the excellent job he was doing in selecting the arms to be sent
to America, he also proved a valuable assistant to Deane who was
overwhelmed with a flood of volunteers seeking to enlist, or rather to
become officers, in Washington's army. The problem of sorting truly
useful officers from the mass of volunteers was a difficult one for Deane,
who was not accustomed to dealing with Europeans. Du Coudray was
particularly helpful in picking out good artillery officers and it was
decided that a contingent of these should accompany the first shipment
of cannon to America. By November Beaumarchais had three ships
loading at Le Havre: Le Romain, La Seine, and L'Amphitrite. At this
point Du Coudray decided that he had a golden opportunity to advance
his career. He too would go to America and he persuaded Deane to give
him a Major General's commission in the name of Congress. Because of
his energy, efficiency, and cooperative spirit up til then, both
Beaumarchais and Deane felt that they were lucky to obtain his services
for the Colonists. Unfortunately as soon as he had received his
commission, Du Coudray began to behave as if he were in charge of the
whole operation. Ile left Le Havre where the three ships, now fully
loaded, were awaiting only a favorable wind to sail, and went to Paris to
persuade St. Germain to send him to America under his personal orders
and as his personal representative.
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~N I Beaumarchais
Beaumarchais was frantic. The ships had been loaded ostensibly for
the West Indies. But the artillery officers, whiling away their time in the
Le Havre Cafes while waiting for the wind, were openly bragging that
they were going to America. Beaumarchais complained bitterly to
Vergennes. The wind at Le Havre might turn favorable at any time but
the ships could not sail without Du Coudray. Vergennes called on St.
Germain, and Du Coudray was sent packing back to Le Havre.
Beaumarchais followed him to be sure that nothing else went wrong. And
there, after all his efforts at maintaining security, after all his
complaining about security, after all his worry about the noise the
artillery officers were making, it remained for him to commit the most
damaging security breach of all.
In all his activity for Hortalez & Cie., Beaumarchais had used the
pseudonym "M. Durand." On arriving in Le Havre he found that a local
theater company was rehearsing his Barber of Seville. The temptation
was too much for "M. Durand's" theatrical sense, to say nothing of his
vanity. He attended the dress rehearsals, assisted the director, gave
instructions to the actors, and all with such an air of authority that it
didn't much matter what he called himself thereafter. Armed with this
evidence of the involvement of a known confidant of the King and the
Foreign Minister in an obvious traffic in contraband of war, Stormont
stormed in to Vergennes. His representations were so bitter and his
threats to break relations with France so obviously sincere that Vergennes
felt he had no alternative but to prohibit the sailing of the three ships.
His government was not yet ready for a showdown with England and he
chose the prudent course.
When Vergennes' order arrived in Le Havre, Le Romain and La Seine
were still at anchor; L'Amphitrite, with Du Coudray on board, had
already sailed. The incredible Du Coudray, however, managed to make
Vergennes' order effective anyway. When a few days out, being
dissatisfied with his accommodations, he took command of the ship over
the captain's head and brought her back to Lorient on the pretext of
repairing storm damage. He left the ship there and returned to Versailles
in order to resume his efforts to enhance his military prestige.
For another month Beaumarchais' three ships remained in port.
Finally Vergennes decided that things had quieted sufficiently to allow
them to depart-discreetly and by night. Beaumarchais took a gamble.
Instead of sending them, as planned, to the West Indies where their
cargos would he transshipped, he ordered them to make for a mainland
port. His purposes were no doubt several: to confuse the British fleet; to
deliver the supplies as rapidly as possible to Washington's destitute
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Awroved Fha-or.s
army; and partly, we must assume, knowing Beaumarchais, to achieve
the maximum dramatic effect with the arrival of his first shipment. He
was lucky. All three vessels eluded the British and arrived safely at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in April.
The supplies were delivered to the northern army under Horatio Gates,
and there can be little doubt that they were vital to the success of his
campaign against Burgoyne the following autumn. Vergennes, who had
held off from overt intervention until there should be some clear-cut
indication that the American army could deal successfully with trained
European troops, delayed no longer after the news of Saratoga reached
Paris on December 4th. Thus it could be said that Beaumarchais, whose
constant urging had been instrumental in Vergennes' decision to support
the Americans secretly, had now provided the means to the victory which
brought France completely and overtly to the aid of the infant republic.
Beaumarchais continued to load and dispatch vessels throughout the
summer of 1777. In fact he continued to do so throughout the war,
although after overt French intervention, the importance of his
contribution became relatively minor. His usual route of delivery was
via the West Indies, the transfer points being either Cap Francais in
Haiti, Santo Domingo, or the Dutch island-colony of Statia. The
deliveries in 1777 and early 1778 constituted almost all of the military
goods reaching the Colonies during those critical months. It is perhaps
not too much to say that Beaumarchais and Deane, by their own efforts,
brought the infant United States through the most critical period of its
birth.
The Inspector General
Beaumarchais' assistance to Deane was not limited to the supply of
materiel. The volunteers who flocked to the American Commissioners in
Paris were, as has been noted, something of a problem. Those who came
in the fall of 1776 when the American cause was in perilous straits were
young and eager French officers filled with idealistic enthusiasm for the
birth of freedom in the New World. But many of these idealists became
problems in America. They insisted on high command positions; they
could speak little or no English; and they were unfamiliar with American
conditions as well as the personality and psychology of the American
soldier. Before long, Congress was sending frantic appeals to Paris to hold
down the number of commissions being granted.
In the spring of 1777 the military situation had altered considerably
from that prevailing in late 1776. Washington had succeeded in holding
his army together, and had won at Trenton and Princeton, and Howe
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had failed to take Philadelphia. France was beginning to show signs of
serious intent to intervene and all indications pointed to a long war. In
Europe no military events of significance had taken place since the end
of the Seven Years War and unemployed soldiers were everywhere in
evidence. Many offered their services to the Commission in Paris and
Beaumarchais was of invaluable assistance in sorting out the riff-raff
from the competent soldiers.
I [is most spectacular coup was von Steuben. Baron Friedrich Wilhelm
von Steuben had served as a captain of infantry in the Seven Years War.
After the war he had been discharged more or less under a cloud. He tried
to find service in Denmark where St. Germain-later to become Louis
XVI's Minister of War-was reorganizing the army. He failed to find a
suitable post. He became Hofmarschall to the Prince of Hohenzollern-
Hechingen who gave him the title of Baron but could afford him very
little pay. He tried unsuccessfully to achieve a career in the armies of
France and Austria and in the service of the Markgraf of Baden. In the
spring of 1777 he found himself in Paris where he renewed his acquaint-
ance with St. Germain who recommended him to Vergennes for service
in America. Vergennes sent him to Beaumarchais.
Beaumarchais liked him, gave him a room in the Hotel de Hollande,
and took him to Deane and Franklin who were impressed with his
credentials but were under strict instructions from Congress about hiring
any more foreign officers. If he would, like Lafayette, consent to serve as
a private and without pay, he could be accepted, otherwise not. Von
Steuben was not in a financial position to permit himself such a luxury.
He renewed his efforts to find a suitable post in Europe but again
without success. August of 1777 found him again in Paris and in even
more desperate straits. Again Beaumarchais took him into the Hotel de
Hollande and racked his brains as to what to do. He came up with a
typically Beaumarchaisian solution. He dressed von Steuben in the
uniform of a Prussian lieutenant general and launched him upon
Parisian society accompanied by an aide and a military secretary-both
paid by Beaumarchais. In due course Deane and Franklin were able to
write Washington: "The gentleman who will have the honor of waiting
on you with this letter is the Baron Steuben, Lieut. Genl. in the King of
Prussia's service." Beaumarchais then lent von Steuben sufficient money
for the trip and sent him off to America in one of his own ships. Later he
sent Steuben's two nephews to join him.
Beaumarchais had no regrets. In December, 1778 he wrote his
correspondent Francy: "Remember me often to my friend M. le Baron de
Steuben. I congratulate myself, from what I hear about him, on having
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given so great an officer to my friends, the free men, and having forced
him, in a way, to follow that noble career. I am not by any means uneasy
about the money I lent him for his voyage. Never did I make an
investment that gave me so much pleasure, for I put a man of honor in
the right place. I hear that he is Inspector General of all American troops.
Bravo! Tell him that his glory is the interest on his money and that I do
not doubt that, on these terms, he will repay me with usury." Von
Steuben's glory turned out to be not only interest but also principal as far
as any repayment to Beaumarchais was concerned. Among the unpaid
bills found in his files after his death was one: "A Steuben, pour avances
faites en particulier pour passer en Amerique, et a ses neveux pour alter le
joindre, 5997 francs, 2 sols, 7 deniers."
The Ineffable Arthur Lee
This debt was not, by any means, the only unpaid bill deriving from
Beaumarchais' assistance to his "friends, the free men." From the
beginning of the operations of Hortalez & Cie., until September 1777, he
sent five million livres worth of goods to America and received nothing
in return. This total lack of performance by his countrymen of the
contract he had made was a source of acute embarrassment to Deane vis-
a-vis Beaumarchais, and to Beaumarchais vis-a-vis his stockholders.
Three times in 1777 Beaumarchais had to appeal to the Foreign Ministry
for aid to avoid bankruptcy and three times Vergennes bailed him out
with loans totalling over a million livres. In September he sent a personal
emissary, Theveneau de Francy, to America to investigate the situation
firsthand and report directly to him.
The reasons for this unfortunate state of affairs were many and
complex. The new nation was in the kind of administrative turmoil which
could only result from an attempt to govern by legislature alone. Until
the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 the only authority was
Congress-a legislative body trying, with a predictable lack of success, to
perform simultaneously legislative, executive, and judiciary functions. It
was government by committee with a vengeance, and it did not work. In
the summer of 1777 Congress was financially and militarily near disaster.
There was no money in the treasury, Howe took Philadelphia and
Congress fled to Lancaster and then to York. Gates won at Saratoga, but
immediately thereafter the "Conway Cabal" plunged the army and
Congress into more confusion than ever. In the circumstances it is
perhaps not too surprising that Deane's appeals on behalf of Hortalez &
Cie. went unheeded.
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But far more damaging to the fortunes of Beaumarchais was the
behavior of Arthur Lee. Following his recall to Paris in May, 1776,
Beaumarchais drastically curtailed his contact with Lee. He did write
him in June that he was preparing to send materiel for "your friend" to
Cap Francais where the "friend" could pick it tip against cargos of
tobacco. However, the arrival of Deane, and Vergennes' demand for
secrecy, put a stop to any further dealing with Lee. In August Lee heard
that Deane had supplanted him as the chief agent of Congress for
soliciting aid in Europe and he rushed to Paris in a fury. He got nowhere.
Neither with Deane who treated him with a distant coldness, nor with
Beaumarchais who was cordial but evasive, nor with Vergennes who
refused to see him. He returned to London and immediately sent
Philadelphia a message to the effect that any supplies shipped to
America by the firm Hortalez & Cie., were really a free gift of the French
crown and that no reimbursement was expected! From then on Lee never
ceased to deliver, in letters and memoranda to his brothers and their
friends in the Lee-Adams faction of Congress, charges that the Hortalez
supplies were gifts, that the Hortalez firm was a blind behind which
Deane and Beaumarchais were engaging in illicit war-profiteering, and
that Congress was the victim of all sorts of undercover machinations at
their hands.
On September 26, 1776, Congress appointed Franklin, Deane, and
Thomas Jefferson Commissioners to try to negotiate a treaty of
recognition with France. Jefferson declined the appointment and Arthur
Lee was named in his place. Franklin arrived in Paris in mid-December,
informed Deane of his new status, and summoned Lee from London.
This was of no help to Beaumarchais whatever. Franklin resented
Beaumarchais' ascendency over his cher bon ami, Barbeu Dubourg, and,
while not actually hostile, was cold and distant. Lee, of course, was still
furious at Deane and Beaumarchais and threw all sorts of impediments
in their way. Deane remained friendly and cooperative but was totally
unable to enlist the other Commissioners in trying to get Congress to
honor its obligation to Hortalez & Cie.
In the midst of this state of affairs, Beaumarchais' agent, Francy,
arrived in America armed with documents intended to prove
Beaumarchais' good faith. He was referred to the newly-created
Committee of Commerce which carefully examined the documents,
decided that they were in order, and agreed to sign a definite contract.
This contract, duly signed, specified in detail how the Hortalez goods
were to be delivered and with equal detail the conditions of payment by
the United States. Francy wrote Beaumarchais that their troubles were
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Beaumarchais UNCLASSIFIED
over. Beaumarchais continued to ship his goods without interruption. But
they both had much to learn about the nature of the American Congress.
This body could still not bring itself to ratify the contract made in its
name by its own committee.
By the end of 1777 the discontent in the army over the commissions
granted to foreign officers by Deane, the confusion over the Hortalez
payments, and the insinuations of Arthur Lee regarding Deane's
competence and honesty culminated in a decision by Congress to recall
Deane and to send John Adams in his place. Deane returned to face
Congress in August, 1778. He felt the atmosphere loaded with
antagonism and responded by showing the worst aspects of his character:
haughtiness, aloofness, disdain. He brooded over his grievances, and the
association with Benedict Arnold which ruined the rest of his life began
at this time.
The controversy in Congress over Deane and Beaumarchais polarized
the Jay-Livingston and Lee-Adams factions into pro- and anti-French
groups-a fact which disturbed the new French Ambassador, Gerard de
Reyvenal. It also disturbed Vergennes and he authorized Gerard to
deliver officially, at a time which he thought most appropriate, a
statement of the true nature of the Hortalez firm to Congress. The storm
of public and private polemic raged throughout the autumn with now
one faction in the ascendency and now the other. The pro-Deane, pro-
French, faction achieved a victory on December 8th when it forced the
resignation of Henry Laurens as President of the Congress and replaced
him with John Jay. A week later Thomas Paine published a blast in
support of Arthur Lee. Finally, in early January, Gerard felt that the time
had come to intervene. He forwarded an official communication to
Congress in which he stated categorically that the supplies sent by
Beaumarchais had been sold to him by the King's Ministry of War and
that he had given his obligation to pay for them. They were not, in any
way, gifts of the King to the Americans.
Congress confessed itself abashed and authorized John Jay to write
Beaumarchais and apologize in its name and to promise fulfillment of
the contracts. With vast relief Beaumarchais received this official
acknowledgement of the justice of his claim from the highest quarter of
the American government and redoubled his efforts to send supplies. But,
then as now, politics was the order of the day in Congress; new problems
arose, new squabbles claimed the attention of the delegates, and
Beaumarchais was again forgotten. No remittances came.
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The War Profiteer
With the recognition of France of the United States on February 6,
1778 and the open outbreak of war with England, the contribution of
Iortalez & Cie. became a drop in the stream of troops and materiel which
poured across the Atlantic. But Beaumarchais was not merely an
adventurer looking for a quick profit. He was an idealist and he
continued to send his cargos even though they were now relatively
insignificant and even though there was no indication that he would ever
be reimbursed. He now undertook new measures to try to put his cover
company on a paying basis.
With the end of France's neutrality her ships became legal targets for
British warships and commerce raiders and soon the prices of sugar and
other products of the French West Indies were sky-rocketing.
Beaumarchais continued to send his supply ships to the United States
but, instead of trying to get cargos from Congress, he ordered them to
return via the West Indies and load sugar. This trade proved extremely
profitable for the first time since its inception, Hortalez & Cie. got itself
out of the red. Georges Lemaitre in his biography, Beaumarchais, gives
the following summary:
`I-rom its foundation in 1776 until its dissolution in 1753, the flnrtalez firm
+?ogaged in business transactions involving over forty-two million livres, a truly
,?norrnous sum in those days. A close study of the balance sheets shows a total of
21,095,515 livres received while in the same period the general outlay was
21,044,191 livres. Thus the profit amounted to 51,3241ivres-or only slightly more
than two-tenths of one percent. In other words, Beaumarchais just managed to
keep his enterprise on an even keel. His gains and losses, however, were very
unevenly distributed. While the firm's private trade account showed an extremely
favorable balance, the account with the United States was deeply in the red.
Would the United States ever pay their debt? If they did, Beaumarchais would be
u very rich man. If they did not, he would just about break even."
So in the end, Beaumarchais did become something of a war-profiteer,
although hardly in the sense nor to the extent that Arthur Lee had
claimed.
In 1783, as part of the negotiations for a loan by the French
government to the United States, a determination was made by the
American Consul General in Paris, Barclay, that the sum recommended
by Deane in 1780 was substantially correct. However, a suspicion arose
in Congress that Beaumarchais had been dishonest in that he had
apparently received one million livres from the French government as
initial capital without telling anybody. The idea that this might have
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been a loan that he was expected to repay seems not to have occurred to
Congress; in any case, payment was again deferred.
In 1787 Beaumarchais wrote Congress in stinging terms reminding it
of its obligations. Congress responded by appointing, of all people,
Arthur Lee to examine Beaumarchais' claims. Lee explored the matter
and came up with a stunner: Congress did not owe Beaumarchais
anything at all. Rather, Beaumarchais owed Congress 1,800,000 livres!
In 1793 Congress, impelled by some sort of guilty urge, gave Alexander
Hamilton the task of once more evaluating Bcaumarchais' claim.
Hamilton's results showed that America owed Beaumarchais 2,280,000
francs. Further investigation, however, revealed that what had been a
suspicion in 1780 was actually a fact: Beaumarchais had indeed received
one million livres as initial capital from the French treasury. Again., no
one bothered to point out that this was a loan. Congress decided that,
since Beaumarchais had received one million from the King, this should
be deducted from the amount Hamilton showed as due him. They further
decided that Beaumarchais owed the United States interest on this
million since it was, in effect, a gift to the United States and
Beaumarchais had held it all this time. Congress further decided that the
interest due it on the one million approximately equalled 1,280,000
francs-the amount still due Beaurnarchais-and that, therefore,
Beaumarchais and the United States were quits!
On April 10, 1795 Beaumarchais made a final effort. He wrote the
American people at large: "Americans, I have served you with
indefatigable zeal and I have received, throughout my life, only
bitterness as a reward for my services. I die your creditor. Allow me
therefore, now that I am dying, to bequeath you my daughter, that you
may endow her with a portion of what you owe me...." His last appeal
went, of course, unanswered.
A footnote of Lemaitre sums up the ending succinctly:
"America's debt to Bcaumarchais was finally settled, after protracted and
complicated negotiations, in 1835. That year, Congress gave Bcaumarchais' heirs
the choice of accepting 800,000 francs as full settlement of the claim or getting
nothing at all. The heirs took the 800,000 francs."
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Bibliography
1. AUGUR, Helen, The Secret War of Independence, New York and
Boston, 1955
2. COX, Cynthia, The Real Figaro, London, 1962
3. KITE, Elizabeth S., Beaumarchais and the War of American
Independence, Boston, 1918
4. LEMAITRE, Georges, Beaumarchais, New York, 1949
5. I'OI,LIT'ZER, Marcel, Beaumarchais, Le Pere de Figaro, Paris, 1957
6. RIVERS, John, Figaro: The Life of Beaumarchais, New York, 1922
7. BUSKIN, Ariane, Spy for Liberty, New York, 1965
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SEUT
No Foreign Dissem
A study in perspective.
SOVIET DECEPTION IN THE CZECHOSLOVAK
CRISIS
Cynthia M. Grabo
The various postmortems and retrospective analyses of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 have revealed a considerable
amount of disagreement among analysts concerning the deception
measures taken by the Soviet Union during that summer. Some analysts
believe that the USSR conducted a deliberate and fairly successful
political and military deception campaign at least from mid-July onward
(that is, from the start of major mobilization and deployment of the
invasion forces), which was intended to conceal the scale and purpose of
the military movements, and to deceive the Czechoslovaks and others
into believing that there would not be an invasion. On the other hand,
there are analysts who believe that the USSR did not engage in any
significant deception effort, and that if we or the Czechoslovaks were
misled at all it was a result of wishful thinking or self-deception. Aside
from those relatively few specialists who have examined all the evidence
in detail, most of us probably have a very inexact understanding of this
question and why there should be a difference of opinion in retrospect.
This article does not purport to provide a definitive solution. It is
intended rather to outline the problem and the evidence available and to
draw some tentative conclusions. Perhaps more usefully, it also attempts
to put the episode into perspective in relation to what we know of the
USSR's doctrine and past practice with respect to deception, and to
suggest what the USSR might be able to do to deceive us on another
occasion. In short, there are some lessons to be learned from our
experience during the summer of 1968.
Types of Deception
There are various kinds of measures which a nation bent on initiating
surprise military operations can undertake in an effort to conceal its
intentions. In all cases, standard security precautions would be taken.
These, of course, may involve a variety of means to prevent outsiders or
potential enemies from observing or otherwise detecting that military
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SECRET Soviet Deception
movements or logistic buildups are in progress, or at least to conceal the
full extent of the buildup, the units involved, etc. It is important to
understand, however, that such measures to achieve military secrecy do
not in themselves constitute an active deception effort, particularly in
nations which practice rigid military security as a matter of course, and
the sophisticated analyst will take care to distinguish the true deception
effort from conventional security measures. Nonetheless, the line
between deception and security is a narrow one; the two are often
confused, and an effective security program can do much to deceive the
intended victim even if no other measures are undertaken. Soviet security
measures therefore will be considered in this article.
The roost common and easiest to carry out of all types of deception, a
political deception program may involve a variety of measures. The
simplest of course is the direct falsehood. Through diplomatic channels,
public statements or by other means, the nation bent on military
aggression or some other venture it wishes to conceal merely states that it
has no such intention and that all such charges are false. Although such
tactics are by no means unheard of, particularly when the stakes are very
high, many nations will seek insofar as possible to avoid the direct lie in
favor of some type of indirect or slightly more subtle deception. Thus,
even in the Cuban missile crisis, in which Soviet spokesmen unques-
tionably directly misinformed the President of the United States,
an examination of public Soviet statements shows that nearly all of them
were indirect rather than absolute falsehoods. The USSR as a rule did not
Ilatly deny that it was putting IRBMs and MRBMs into Cuba. Rather it
said that all weapons being sent to Cuba were "designed exclusively for
defensive purposes," or that there was "no need" for the USSR to deploy
its missiles to any other country, etc. This type of statement, although
extremely misleading, is not totally untrue and thus permits the pre-
varicator to maintain some degree of credibility if or after he has been
caught in the act.
Among the more subtle means of political deception is the effort to
mislead by implying that the situation is not serious, that the nation does
not consider its vital interests at stake or that its relations with the
intended victim are really pretty good. Ordinarily such a deception effort
will be maintained only over a relatively short period, usually no more
than a few weeks, although in some cases it may last for several months.
Generally, it will involve the downplaying of the situation in propaganda
and diplomacy after political means at solution have failed and a
decision has been reached to conduct a surprise attack or at least to
prepare military forces for such attack. This type of situation may be
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net eception
marked by quite a sudden change in the tone and volume of propaganda,
particularly for foreign consumption, in an effort to lull suspicions.
Dictatorships, including the Soviet Union, are usually masters of this
type of political deception; their complete control of the press and secrecy
of the decision-making process make it relatively easy for them. For
example, in the weeks and even months before the Soviet attack on
Japanese forces in Manchuria in August 1945, the USSR undertook to
ease political tensions with Japan and to be "almost cordial" to the
Japanese Ambassador, as all the while it was building up its military
forces in the Far East for the attack.
Another facet of this type of political deception is to offer to enter into
negotiations in an ostensible effort to solve the matter at issue, when
there is actually no intention of reaching an agreement. The Soviet
Union also has been known to use this tactic. On the evening of 3
November 1956, less than 12 hours before Soviet forces struck throughout
Hungary to suppress the revolt, Soviet officers began negotiations in
Budapest with Hungarian defense officials on Soviet "troop
withdrawal." (The growing Chinese Communist concern with Soviet
intentions in late 1969 is said to have been attributable in part to
Peking's fear that the USSR had proposed the border talks as a deception
measure prior to attack.)
In the interests of preserving secrecy as to its real intentions, a nation
bent on surprise action also may attempt to deceive (or at least not
inform) its allies of its plans. There is reason to believe, for example, that
the USSR informed only the top leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries,
and probably belatedly at that, of its plans in Cuba in 1962. It almost
certainly did riot make its intentions known to the non-ruling Communist
parties. As is well-known, the reluctance by the US to believe that Great
Britain was preparing for attack against Egypt in 1956 was based in large
part on a confidence that one of our closest allies would not undertake
such action without informing us first.
We have coined the term "political-military deception" to denote a
type of attempted military deception which is carried out solely by
putting out false statements about the nature, scale, or purpose of a
military buildup. It is in effect a political deception effort designed to
camouflage or conceal the real intention behind the military buildup by
attributing it to something else. This type of deception, to be
distinguished from true military deception described below, proceeds
from the premise that since the enemy is likely to detect the military
movements, it is therefore desirable to offer him some seemingly
plausible explanation, other than planned aggression, for the activity.
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SECRET Soviet Deception
The most usual explanation is that the troops are "on maneuvers." It
may also he possible, on occasion, to find some other pretext for troop
movements, such as alleged internal disturbances in a border area. US
intelligence has long recognized that the Soviet Union would probably
seek to mask preparations for aggression under the guise of maneuvers.
Similarly, the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies are extremely suspicious
of major NATO exercises as potential covers for attack.
True military deception, as opposed to the various means described
above, is the most difficult and complex of all types of deception to
orchestrate, at least on a large scale. It is most commonly used when
hostilities are already in progress, when it may be used with other
deception measures to disguise the scale of a buildup, the date or place of
attack, and/or to lead the enemy to believe that an attack is planned in
one area when in fact it is not. It involves such techniques as permitting
seemingly valid, but actually false, military orders to fall into the hands
of the intended victim; the sending of invalid military messages in the
clear or in easily read ciphers, or the maintenance of completely spurious
radio nets; assignments of false designations to military units; setting up
of dummy aircraft or other equipment to suggest that units have not left
home stations; sending out false "defectors" with erroneous but plausible
reports, etc. Measures of this type call for very sophisticated and highly
coordinated planning, since the chance that an obvious slip would he
detected is great, and detection might betray the whole plan. Such
measures can, however, be highly effective in tactical situations in
leading the enemy to misdeploy his forces or to misjudge the timing or
area of the main thrust. Obviously, such tactics have a more limited use
when one is trying to conceal that an attack is planned at all.
The planting of false reports, through established intelligence channels
or the diplomatic service, may be used as a part of the political or
military deception methods described above. A military attache is a
useful channel for putting out a seemingly plausible explanation or
disclaimer concerning a troop buildup, as is a diplomat to provide a false
political story. These channels, along with the professional clandestine
services, also may be used simply to flood the market with a mass of
conflicting stories and reports. Particularly when reports are sensational
but otherwise appear to have some authenticity, they can he a
tremendous distraction. If the volume of such planted disinformation is
large enough, the analytical system can be so overwhelmed by it that the
truly reliable or useful intelligence may become lost in the mill. It is
difficult to overestimate the damage that this type of deception can do to
the process of assessing and evaluating information in a crisis situation.
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Actual Soviet Security and Deception Measures in the Summer of 1968
With this brief background, we shall attempt to analyze what the
USSR did and did not seek to do in the way of deception prior to the
invasion of Czechoslovakia. This requires that we also attempt to
determine whom it may have wished to deceive-the Czechoslovaks, the
US and NATO, or others, including other Communist parties.
The USSR's objective in Czechoslovakia was to reverse the course
toward liberalization and to restore orthodox Communist Party control
there. Insofar as possible, the USSR wished to achieve these aims through
the Communist apparatus in Czechoslovakia rather than by overt
military intervention. The objective was not to carry out a surprise
military operation, which was only the final means to the end. The USSR
and its Warsaw Pact allies decided on massive military invasion only
after a series of lesser political and military steps had not been successful.
It is thus obvious that the amount of deception which the USSR could
usefully employ against Czechoslovakia was limited. In order to induce
the Dubcek regime to comply with its wishes, the USSR clearly had to
insure that its political pressures were such that Czechoslovakia would
have no doubts concerning the seriousness of Soviet intent. To lend
added weight to the political effort, it was also desirable that
Czechoslovakia recognize the possibility of Soviet military action-and
indeed the first device used by the USSR to attempt to put troops into
Czechoslovakia was simply to request that Soviet units be stationed
there.
So far as the West was concerned, it was not in the USSR's interests to
attempt to mislead us unduly concerning its military movements lest
these be misinterpreted as a threat to NATO. And the future support of
other Communist parties was of importance to the USSR; it wished these
parties to understand its concern with and actions toward
Czechoslovakia. To deceive them unnecessarily would be counter-
productive.
Military Security Measures
As everyone knows, Soviet military security is extremely tight. As a
matter of normal practice, the USSR never identifies an active military
unit by its true designator in the open press, and never reports a buildup
of its military forces anywhere (except temporarily for exercises). Moscow
has occasionally reported a reduction of forces, although not necessarily
accurately, when it has seemed politically expedient to do so. It usually
identifies by position only a small group of top-ranking commanders, and
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the names and locations of its military districts, groups of forces, and
other major commands such as the fleets. It may or may not report the
whereabouts of top military officials, including the Minister of Defense,
as it chooses. It nearly always denies travel in the USSR to US and other
Western military attaches (and sometimes to all diplomats and tourists as
well) to any area in which significant military movements are under way;
it is most unusual for any Westerner to see a unit redeployment. The
same security restriction is carried out in East Germany by imposing
restricted areas, some permanent and some temporary, on the three
Allied Military Liaison Missions.
A review of the military security measures taken by the USSR from
early May (when the first deployments to the Czechoslovak border were
made) up to the date of the invasion on 20-21 August leads to the
conclusion that the steps taken were about normal for the USSR. Security
was not relaxed (at least not intentionally-there were a few slips), but
neither was it drastically tightened. There was no announcement of the
early May deployments in the Carpathian Military District, Poland, and
East Germany, and no announcement that a partial mobilization had
been carried out to bring these units up to strength where needed (we
learned this after the invasion from a defector). Throughout the summer,
the USSR denied most travel by military observers to areas of the Soviet
Union where the buildup had occurred, and in East Germany a
"temporary" restricted area was continuously reimposed throughout the
summer in the southern area near the Czechoslovak border. At least one
unusual security measure was taken in East Germany: in early August an
unprecedented ban on travel by virtually all foreigners was imposed in
the area of the military buildup along the Czechoslovak border.
In Poland, however, which was to be the major line of communication
for support of the invasion, there was only the most minor effort on
perhaps two occasions during the summer to restrict movements of
attaches, diplomats, tourists and newsmen. Only the actual
encampments of Soviet forces were ever placed off limits. There were any
number of observations by Western sources of the Soviet troops along the
Czechoslovak border, and the start of the massive movement into Poland
in late July of troops from the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts
was fortuitously witnessed and promptly reported to the US Embassy by
several US tourists and other travelers. Why this contrast with the
security measures in the USSR and East Germany? Did the Soviets want
us to learn about movements in Poland but not elsewhere? A more likely
explanation is that Poland traditionally does not impose major
restrictions on travelers, and that it either was not prepared to or did not
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wish to do so in the summer of 1968, particularly at the height of the
tourist season. Presumably the Soviets made no major issue over this
policy (although we do not know this for certain), but it would appear
unlikely that they really wanted us to learn about their troop movements.
We would judge that they would have preferred secrecy (there was a
report that the Poles had a public announcement ready in late July that
Soviet troops were entering the country, but never issued it), but that
secrecy was not considered of overriding importance.
In Hungary, the other area of pre-invasion deployments, partial but
not complete restrictions were imposed on attache movements. Western
attaches did observe the major deployments of Soviet units from their
garrisons toward the Czechoslovak border in late July.
Political Deception Measures
The USSR, from at least the time of the Dresden conference in late
March, repeatedly and progressively made it evident that it was most
gravely concerned with the course of events in Czechoslovakia. All
indications are that it used virtually every political device at its
command to bring pressure on the Dubcek regime to reverse the trend
toward liberalization. Thus it is evident that there was no political
deception in the strategic sense, no attempt by the Soviets to play down
the importance of the issues. And this message also came through loud
and clear to us.
More difficult and controversial is the question whether the USSR was
engaged in a political deception effort at the Cierna and Bratislava
conferences and in the succeeding days prior to the invasion. The theory
that the conferences were deception, convened at Soviet insistence to
mislead the Czechoslovaks and to gain time for the continuing military
buildup, rests largely on a presumption that the Soviet leadership took a
final decision in mid-July that any further political effort was useless and
that the only recourse was military invasion, that all developments from
that time forward were in preparation for that invasion, and that the
timing was determined solely by when the military forces were ready.
This hypothesis assumes that the Soviet leaders went through the motions
at Cierna and Bratislava only for political effect; they had already
decided to invade as soon as all military preparations were complete; and
that they concealed such an intention from the Dubcek regime.
A review of the military evidence alone yields much to support this
hypothesis, and a quite plausible case can be made that the date for the
invasion (or at least the date when the forces would be ready) was set well
in advance. The chain of military preparations from about 20 July
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onward appears almost unbroken, and a final review and inspection of
the deployed forces was apparently completed by the Soviet high
command on about 16 August (their visits to the forward area between
13-16 August were announced by the Communist press). It may be
conjectured that Marshal Grechko then returned to Moscow, informed
the political leadership that all was ready, whereupon the final military
orders were issued and the invasion proceeded on schedule.
The political evidence, however, is not so readily explained. From
what we know of the Cierna conference, it appears that the USSR was
compelled to expend a tremendous effort to get the Czechoslovak
leadership to hold the talks at all (finally agreeing to the border town as
the site after other proposed sites had been rejected), that a great deal of
hard bargaining went on at the talks, and that an agreement of sorts was
reached whereby Czechoslovakia undertook to carry out certain
measures to strengthen Party control and its relations with the Warsaw
Pact. A case therefore can be made, also with considerable plausibility,
that the talks were a genuine, albeit desperate, effort by the USSR to
reach some sort of political accommodation so that the invasion would
not be necessary. The reduction in Soviet polemics which followed the
talks was then part of the agreement, not just a deception to lull
Czechoslovak suspicions.
If this is correct, one cannot view the Cierna and Bratislava talks as
pure political deception. This, however, does not resolve the question of
what the Soviets actually told the Czechoslovaks and whether or not they
misled them-by omission, direct statements, half truths or
innuendoes-concerning their military buildup and intentions.
Unfortunately, on this crucial question, our evidence is far from
adequate. The contention, which appears logical to us-that the USSR
should have given Dubcek some unequivocal warning that Warsaw Pact
forces were prepared to invade unless he complied with the terms of the
agreements-may or may not be valid. It was reported in Budapest
following the invasion that the purpose of Kadar's meeting with Dubcek
on 16 August was to warn him that the USSR would invade unless its
demands were fulfilled, and it has been implied that others also warned
Dubcek of this. Charges have been made that Dubeek withheld from his
colleagues some of' the communications which he received from the
Soviet Union, including a letter from Brezhnev on 16 August and a letter
From the Politburo of the CPSU to the Czechoslovak Party on 17 August,
which in the view of Dubcek's opponents allegedly provided some
warning of impending Soviet action. Dubcek, on the other hand, is
reported to have denied to the Czechoslovak Central Committee plenum
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in September 1969 that Kadar had mentioned possible imminent
intervention, or that the letters from Brezhnev and the CPSU contained
warnings of impending armed action. Although Dubcek was of course
attempting to justify his actions and his statements therefore are suspect,
there is some evidence to support his denials. We do not know the content
of the Brezhnev letter, but we do have the reported text of the CPSU
letter of 17 August. While it called for immediate action to implement
the Cierna agreements and said that delays in this matter" are extremely
dangerous," there was no threat of military action in the letter. Also, it
must be noted that Soviet public commentaries were notably devoid of
saber-rattling and statements or even direct hints that massive Soviet
forces were capable of overrunning Czechoslovakia at any time.
In short, we lack sufficient evidence to make a firm judgment whether
or not the Soviets directly threatened Dubcek and his colleagues with
invasion and if so how convincing this was to the Czechoslovaks.
Similarly, we do not really know whether most of the Czechoslovak
leadership was as surprised by the final military action on the night of 20
August as it has appeared. It is probable that those who really had
understood the Soviet position did expect invasion sooner or later. They
may have been tactically, but not necessarily strategically, surprised. On
the other hand, those who did not understand the USSR's attitude and
tactics-foremost of whom was probably Dubcek himself-may have
been impervious to any kind of warning and hence genuinely surprised.
It is not unlikely that many Czechoslovaks, like ourselves, were the
victims of a good bit of wishful thinking-they just could not believe that
the Soviets would invade.
There is another type of Soviet political deception against the Dubcek
regime, which was quite likely considerable although we know little
about it. This would have involved an attempt to subvert the regime from
within using pro-Soviet elements in the Czechoslovak Party, the security
services and the armed forces. According to General Sejna, the
Czechoslovak party and governmental machinery was so well controlled
by the Soviets during the Novotny era that virtually nothing went on
without Moscow's knowledge and usually prior consent. Although there is
little direct evidence, there is some reason to suspect that the USSR
hoped in the spring to carry out some type of coup within the Party
whereby the conservative element would take over from Dubcek, but that
it was unable to effect this. We may be almost certain that the USSR
subsequently tried any number of devices, without success, to undermine
Dubcek's position and to promote the conservatives. On the night of the
invasion the USSR clearly had expected an overthrow of Dubcek and the
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installation of a new conservative leadership, but again the plan failed. It
has been suggested that one reason for this failure was that most of the
conservatives were not apprised of the timing of the invasion and
therefore were not ready to act. If this is so, the argument that the USSR
did not directly forewarn the Czechoslovaks-other than those agents
actually involved in the operation-gains considerable weight.
i n sum, the evidence which we have concerning Soviet political
deception of the Dubcek regime is certainly incomplete and in some
important respects inconclusive. These uncertainties, however, apply
more to the USSR's techniques than to any attempt to conceal its
objectives. On the fundamental issue, the USSR's intent to restore
orthodox Party control, there is no good reason to suspect that the USSR
ever sought to deceive the Czechoslovaks.
With regard to the West, and particularly the US, there is little
indication that the USSR conducted any long-term or elaborate political
deception effort-certainly nothing remotely comparable to what it
undertook in the Cuban missile buildup. But, since its objectives in
Czechoslovakia could hardly be kept secret from us as well, there was
comparatively little room for any deception. There may be some basis,
however, for believing that in the few days prior to the invasion the USSR
sought to lull US suspicions by reaching an agreement to open talks soon
on strategic arms limitation. Exactly what happened will have to be
revealed by a policy-level official of President Johnson's administration.
According to an article in the Washington Post on 23 August 1968, a
meeting between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin to discuss
strategic arms limitation was to have been announced by the White
House on the morning of 21 August. The article also noted that on the
evening of 20 August, while Ambassador Dobrynin was at the White
House informing President Johnson of the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
Secretary of State Rusk was telling the Democratic Platform Committee
in Washington that "we anticipate early and important talks with the
Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of offensive and defensive
strategic missiles."
A final note is in order on the CPSU's conversations with and
communications to non-ruling Communist parties. A substantial body of
evidence is available that the USSR did not attempt to deceive these
parties but in fact took steps to inform them between about 15 and 20
July that it might have to take drastic action, including invasion, to
control the situation. While we have little information on any subsequent
communications, the evidence is that these parties were forewarned
about a month before the invasion to prepare their membership for this
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contingency and that few if any of them were surprised. Many were
dismayed by the final action, but not surprised.
Political-Military Deception Measures
We shall now examine the nature and possible intent of the various
public statements made by the USSR relating to the buildup of its forces
against Czechoslovakia. As we have noted, consistent with its security
doctrine the USSR never announced that it was deploying any units to
the Czechoslovak border. Following the initial deployments in early
May, however, it prevailed upon Czechoslovakia, after considerable
pressure, to announce that Warsaw Pact exercises would be held in June
in Czechoslovakia and Poland. This "agreement" provided the pretext
for the subsequent introduction of Soviet forces into Czechoslovakia
under the guise of conducting Pact exercise "Sumava," which was held,
according to announcements, during the last ten days of June. The
announcement may also have been intended to provide a pretext for the
presence in Poland of the troops from the Carpathian Military District
which were introduced in early May, and whose movement had been
reported in the Western press. Although "Sumava" was concluded on 30
June, TASS immediately retracted its announcement of the termination,
and a series of subsequent statements from Prague made it evident both
that the USSR had introduced much larger forces than originally
announced and was seeking to keep them there. This was the first of the
USSR's efforts, and a transparently evident deception, to bring military
pressure on Czechoslovakia under the guise of "exercises."
On 23 July, the USSR announced that rear services exercises would. be
held in the western USSR until 10 August, would cover an area from
Latvia to the Ukraine and would involve the recall of reservists,
requisitioning of transport from the civilian economy and demothballing
of military equipment. Subsequent announcements outlined a scenario of
the "exercises," repeatedly described them as very large-scale, and stated
on 30 July that the exercises were being extended into Poland and East
Germany. The USSR also announced that a large antiaircraft defense
exercise was conducted in the USSR from 25-31 July. On 10 August, a
Soviet announcement implied that the rear services exercises had
terminated, but no announcement was made that any of the recalled
reservists or requisitioned transport were being released. Concurrent with
the start of the announced rear services "exercise," the USSR began the
major buildup of additional forces along the Czechoslovak border. By 31
July it was evident that substantial forces in East Germany had deployed
to the Czechoslovak border, that the bulk of Soviet troops in Hungary
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had moved into positions near the Czechoslovak border, and that large
numbers of additional Soviet troops, both combat and rear services, were
moving into Poland from the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts. It
was indisputably clear that a major deployment of forces was in progress.
It was less clear at the time whether exercises were also under way,
although there was no discernible indication that any of the deployed
forces were engaged in exercises.
What was the purpose of the announcements? Were they intended to
provide some ostensibly plausible reason for the forward deployments of
forces and supply columns? To lead us to believe that the only
mobilization was in the rear services? To deceive us and the Czecho-
slovaks as to the real purpose, or primarily to put more pressure on the
l)uhcek regime?
Much of the disagreement concerning Soviet deception is over this
issue. It has been argued, and with considerable reason, that the
Czechoslovaks (who would be familiar with Soviet deception tactics and
who already would have known the Pact training schedule for the year)
could not have been so naive as to believe that an exercise was under
way. Therefore, it is maintained, the primary purpose of the
announcements was to put more pressure on Czechoslovakia, to warn but
not to deceive. Perhaps so. We do not know how the Czechoslovaks
interpreted the announcements.
But what about the West? Were the announcements intended to
deceive us and NATO, or at least to confuse? To most observers, it would
seem that they were, and that in fact many were deceived. To judge from
current intelligence coverage at the time, it would appear that a majority
of analysts were reluctant to say that these were not exercises, or to draw
the conclusion that the only thing which was in progress was a
mobilization and deployment. Only a minority probably firmly believed
the latter at the time. And it may be noted that, even in retrospect, some
analyses have persisted in referring to the "exercises."
At the same time, however, the Soviet announcements provided us the
clearest indication which we had that a mobilization was actually in
progress. If they left unclear the extent of it, and whether combat as well
as rear services units were involved, they did serve to warn us, even
before the military movements became evident, that an extraordinary
Soviet military effort was under way. Thus the Soviet statements, if
intended to deceive, also were an asset both to analysts and collectors.
Active Military Deception Measures
There is reason to believe that the USSR engaged in some active
military deception against Czechoslovakia at least as early as June when
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it began moving forces into that country ostensibly for exercise
"Sumava." Numerous Czechoslovak statements both then and later
suggest that the Soviets brought in much larger forces than the
Czechoslovaks had agreed to, and possibly attempted to conceal the
identity and size of these forces as well. Because there was so little
Western observation of these movements, it has been suspected that the
USSR moved forces covertly at night, or in small contingents over
secondary roads to conceal the extent of this peaceful invasion during
June. This may be partially true, particularly of the first elements which
were introduced. A Soviet defector from a regiment which entered
Czechoslovakia from the Carpathian Military District at the start of the
exercise has stated, however, that his unit moved on main roads with no
unusual attempt at concealment, although it did travel at night.
We are not sure whether the USSR finally agreed to withdraw its forces
from Czechoslovakia during July (the withdrawal was not finally
completed until 3 August) as part of a deception plan in connection with
the buildup of the invasion forces, or because it really saw no practicable
alternative at the time. Similarly, we know relatively little about any
deception measures which may have been taken before the invasion to
mislead the Czechoslovaks as to its timing. The USSR did employ some
active deception against the Czechoslovaks during the invasion, perhaps
more than we know. The best-known example was the flight into Prague
shortly before the invasion of ostensibly civil aircraft carrying the
military personnel who seized the Prague control tower to vector in the
military transports. It is likely that other measures also were employed.
For the most part, however, the USSR appears to have relied on security
and speed of movement to insure tactical surprise.
So far as the West and NATO are concerned, there is virtually no
indication that the USSR attempted any active military deception
measures designed to mislead us as to the scale, location or purpose of the
military buildup or the possible timing of the invasion. The Soviet
military leadership had ample time to plan and complete its military
buildup, and presumably could have undertaken a more elaborate and
sophisticated deception effort than it in fact did. Such a plan would
logically have been put into effect as soon as the major military
deployments were begun in late July. The argument has been advanced
that, if Soviet leaders did not decide to invade until mid-August, they
had little time to devise and carry out any active deception measures.
This argument appears both unconvincing and unrealistic. It presumes
that the Soviet political leadership had not taken any fundamental
decisions on possible military action until a few days before the invasion.
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A far more realistic assessment is that the Soviet leadership in mid-July
initiated the massive military buildup because it then believed that a
solution by political means was unlikely and that the probabilities were
that military invasion would be required to bring the situation under
control. Or, to put it another way, the Soviet leadership reached the basic
decision in mid-July to carry out an invasion unless a political solution
could be reached, but deferred a final decision on whether military
action would inevitably be required and hence also a decision on its
timing.
Apart from this, however, it is in large part irrelevant to the military
deception program just when the political leadership reached the final
decision to invade, since the military leaders clearly were directed in mid-
July to make all necessary preparations as if invasion were to be carried
out, and they did so. Active deception measures would have been an
integral part of the military preparations, not something reserved for the
last few days.
The apparent lack of major military deception measures may indicate
that the USSR saw no need for them against the Czechoslovak forces or
did not wish to reveal its more sophisticated war plans and capabilities.
It would be optimistic to suppose that more elaborate deception efforts
would not be employed in event of attack against the West.
Confusion and Disinformation Measures
Possibly the most conspicuous missing element in the picture was the
almost total absence of deliberately planted false reports by the Soviet
intelligence services, whose disinformation capabilities are well
recognized. There was almost no apparent effort to distract and confuse
us with this type of material. Again the USSR may have seen no need for
this type of effort in the circumstances. It may have preferred not to
release a flood of misleading reports which might cause alarm in the
West and raise suspicions that the Soviet buildup might be directed at
some nation other than Czechoslovakia. Indeed, one of the most notable
features of the entire Soviet military and political effort in the summer of
1968 is that it was so clearly directed at Czechoslovakia that there was no
cause for any undue alarm in the West, despite the scale of the military
buildup. It appears likely that this was a consequence of a deliberate
decision by the USSR to keep the temperature in Europe as low as
possible.
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Implications of the Soviet Effort
The predilection of Soviet leaders for secrecy, security, and surprise
makes it almost impossible to conceive that they could have carried out
an operation such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia without employing
some of their traditional deception tactics. So deeply ingrained is the
concept of deception that there is reason to suspect that the USSR has
sometimes employed such tactics when there was no evident political or
military necessity to do so. In the case of the invasion of Czechoslovakia,
it was probably also very important to the Soviets that the actual timing
of the invasion and the details of the military plans be concealed in order
to achieve tactical surprise and reduce the likelihood of any
Czechoslovak resistance and loss of life on both sides.
The scope of actual deception measures employed by the USSR was
probably far less than might be expected under other circumstances. The
security measures were less than we would normally expect to see during
a major redeployment, and the buildup was quite evident to us, and
presumably to the Czechoslovaks as well. The amount of political
deception, although somewhat debatable as regards Czechoslovakia,
does not appear to have been very extensive or elaborate. There seems to
have been very little active military deception, except possibly during the
actual invasion phase. We were spared a disinformation effort by the
KGB. About the only significant Soviet effort at deception, at least as far
as the West was concerned, appears to have been the attempt to portray
the logistic buildup and troop deployments as "exercises," and even here
some observers suspect that the USSR never expected us to be deceived.
This effort certainly would have been more effective had it been
accompanied by drastic security measures to deny US observation of the
troop movements and logistic preparations in Eastern Europe. In short,
the situation was unusual and should not be regarded as a typical Soviet
performance or as an illustration of what the USSR could do in
circumstances calling for maximum security and surprise-particularly
in an attack against the West.
Even the limited Soviet deception effort, however, serves as a useful
reminder that we should always be watchful for the possibility of
deception, and that we must continually look behind what the enemy
says to what he is actually doing. This becomes even more essential when
it is evident that a crisis situation exists in which the use of deception
should be anticipated. The fact that any US analysts were taken in by the
Soviet announcements on "exercises" is cause for considerable concern
that intelligence analysts also might fail to recognize a deception effort
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when it might he vital to US security to detect it. Our experience in the
invasion of Czechoslovakia has reinforced the opinion long held by
warning analysts that the US, at both its intelligence and policy levels, is
extremely vulnerable to deception. The intelligence community has
profited greatly in other respects from the Soviet invasion, which
provided us with valuable data on Soviet mobilization, logistics, and
operational concepts. It is to be hoped that the lessons learned with
regard to deception will also be the subject of further study. Perhaps
there should he more provision in the intelligence schools and in
publications such as this journal for study and analysis of this kind of
problem.
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Evolution of a system.
RAPID TRANSIT IN CLANDESTINE INTELLIGENCE
Substance, security, presentation, authentication, speed-these are the
watchwords in the handling of clandestine intelligence information
reports. Substance, of course, is the sine qua non in all forms of reporting.
Security, always important, is a peculiarly vexatious problem in
reporting from clandestine sources. Presentation is the packaging of the
information in a clear, concise, readable, usable form. Authentication
tells the reader, within operational security limits, what is known or
believed about the authenticity of the information. And speed is-speed.
Each of these words stands for a value, a problem, and a goal. In the
past twenty years the Clandestine Service of CIA has taken many steps to
get better information, to protect sources, to improve presentation and
authentication, and to accelerate transmission from collector to
consumer.
The problems are inextricably interwoven. Obviously they involve
some inherent conflicts: speed vs. presentation, authentication vs.
security. Since none of the values can acceptably be sacrificed, they must
somehow be harmonized or compromised. But conflict, with its corollary
compromise, is not the whole story. Measures taken to promote one value
have redounded surprisingly to the benefit of another. In particular,
actions taken for the sake of speed have yielded unexpected dividends in
appearance, organization, and clarity.
This paper focuses on the story of speed-how it has been achieved,
and what some of its by-products have been.
In the forties and early fifties Washington was a daytime intelligence
production arena. The hot intelligence was digested during the daylight
hours, and the summaries went to policy-makers at the end of the clay.
With the creation of round-the-clock analytical facilities, this began to
change. During the Korean war, current intelligence officers began the
practice of drifting into their respective agencies well before dawn., in
order to be ready early with up-to-the-minute briefings. The community
was like a city which has grown large enough for a morning paper as well
as an evening edition. It has never been the same again.
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These changes in Washington reached out and affected the movement
of clandestine intelligence information from the field. From its
beginnings, the Clandestine Service had had a serious problem in
moving information rapidly from field station to consumer. The problem
was rooted not only in human fallibility but in the very nature of
clandestinity. The identities of sources must be zealously protected, yet
the reader must be given an adequate idea of their access, qualifications,
and reliability. To make possible the discharge of these obligations,
cabled intelligence was often interlarded with operational and
semioperational information requiring thorough sifting by the
II eadquarters desk. In the matter of presentation, Headquarters reports
officers sat in judgment on the field collector-interpreting, rewriting,
converting what was merely a "cable" into something that could
properly be called a "report." If they sometimes overdid the
interpretation, annotation, and editing, that was an inescapable hazard
of the system. All this took time.
For some years it was thought that the only alternative to this method
was that of the Foreign Service, whose field reports went directly to
Washington consumers without prior review by the Department of State.
This alternative was considered impracticable for the Clandestine
Service, primarily because a Headquarters review was deemed essential
on security grounds and also because field stations, knowing their cables
would he rewritten, often did not attempt to turn out a finished product.
At its worst this practice developed into a vicious circle: sloppiness in the
field provoked fussiness at Headquarters, and vice versa. At its best, it
enabled the field to concentrate on operating without editorial
distraction.
Under the pressures of the fifties, a program was adopted which
greatly reduced reporting time from agent to consumer. Its essence was to
reduce drastically the time spent in Headquarters review and
"processing," and to make this reduction possible by improving the
quality and presentability of field reporting. This last was done partly by
training and exhortation, but primarily by means of a device which
became known as the "INTEL format cable."
The INTEL Format Cable
There was nothing particularly mysterious or complicated about the
"INTEL, format cable." INTEL format was nothing more than a
standard format which separated operational data from intelligence and
which contained mandatory entries in sequence: the country the report
dealt with; the date of the information; the subject; the place and date
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the information was acquired; the field report symbol and report
number; the source authentication statement; the text of the message;
and finally a record of the field dissemination given the report. At the top
and bottom of the intelligence portion it was necessary to insert
classification and controls. These required entries insured that all
essential elements enabling Headquarters to pass rapid judgment on the
information would always be present. It guaranteed that cabled
intelligence would be received in Headquarters in something
approximating disseminable form.
In a short time the station-to-consumer span was reduced from days to
hours-an average of thirty-six hours. This was better but still not good
enough. Fortunately, the state of the communications art improved but
there were still unacceptable delays-about eighteen hours time-in the
action divisions while specialists edited, checked references, added
Headquarters comments, and sometimes rewrote the whole report.
The INTEL format, instituted in October 1957, was the first major
breakthrough in the search for speed and paved the way for a serious
attack on the problem of too much time between case officer and
consumer.
Proposal for a Clandestine Service Intelligence Watch
On March 4, 1959 a proposal was approved for the establishment of a
team of Intelligence Watch Officers who would work around the clock
and would be responsible for the immediate processing and the fastest
possible dissemination of the more urgent intelligence cables. Initially
this group would consist of a Chief, an intelligence and administrative
assistant, and six Watch Officers, and would act only during non-duty
hours. The hope was expressed that after a period of trial the hours might
be extended and the unit might be able to handle an increasing number
of intelligence cables. The original proposal recommended that the
Intelligence Watch (IW) should handle cables bearing the precedence
IMMEDIATE and PRIORITY, and, where time permitted, selected
routine cables.
The centralization of Washington dissemination of cabled field
intelligence in a small group of officers who could not be experts on every
country required a further improvement in the caliber of field reporting.
The Office of Training included solid blocks of reports instruction in
operational courses, and a new course in Intelligence Reporting, Reports
and Requirements was established. To date there have been more than
eighty runnings of this latter course, and more than six hundred persons
have been trained in it.
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There was an understandable reluctance on the part of the area
Divisions to accept the principle that a group of officers, centrally located
and not attached to a specific Division, could master the intricacies of
reporting from all corners of the globe. But the Deputy Director for Plans
had approved the establishment of the Intelligence Watch, and all
concerned realized that the need for speed was paramount even if in the
early stages the quality of the product might suffer.
At midnight on February 5, 1960, IW went into operation fully staffed.
Organizationally, it was a branch within the Foreign Intelligence Staff,
but its duties were to he much more in the nature of a service of common
concern, than those of a Staff element. Its principal responsibility was to
:wt after hours in behalf of the responsible area division in disseminating
cabled intelligence information to the Washington Intelligence
community. The men chosen to serve in IW were experienced operations
Officers, but none was selected solely on the basis of area specialization,
since each in the course of his duties would have to handle intelligence
cables from any and all areas.
After two months of after-hours operation, approval was given for the
full-time operation of the Watch' around the clock. On May 2, 1960 the
Clandestine Service Intelligence Watch assumed total responsibility for
the screening of all cables received in INTEL format.
Relationship oj" IW with Signal Center and Cable Secretariat
The handling and rapid processing of cabled field intelligence at
I leadquarters is a cooperative venture. The first point of entry for cabled
intelligence is, of course, the Signal Center which rapidly passes a mat to
the Cable Secretariat. The Cable Secretary, responsible for internal CIA
distribution of all cables, is in a position to discharge his obligations
quickly by determining distribution, reproducing copies and slotting
them for Divisions and Staffs. However, in recognition of the
responsibility of the Clandestine Service to effect prompt external
dissemination of the intelligence which it collects to those officials of the
government who have a need to know, the Cable Secretariat defers
processing of INTEL cables till they have been reviewed by IW.
Physically located within the confines of the Cable Secretariat but
actually an element of the Clandestine Service, the Intelligence Watch
'I'hc Clandestine Service Intelligence Watch is not to be confused with the Operations
Center, frequently referred to as "The CIA Watch," nor the Clandestine Service Duty
Office which is physically located in the Center. See "Studies in Intelligence," Vol. 12, No.
4, Fall 1968, "View from the Hot Shop," pp 39-45.
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receives the cable and examines it as a candidate for rapid dissemination
to the intelligence Community.
Responsibilities of the Intelligence Watch
The Watch Officer can do one of two things. He can disseminate the
information, identified for community reference as a "TDCS" (Telegram
Dissemination, Clandestine Service); or he can refer the cable to the
responsible area division within the Clandestine Service for a decision as
to whether, and how, the information should be disseminated to the
Intelligence Community. He cannot kill the report. He cannot decide
that the information is not worth a Headquarters dissemination. He can
and must in many cases decide that the information will not be
disseminated outside the Agency by IW. If he reaches the latter
conclusion he takes care of a few clerical details and returns the cable to
the Cable Secretariat. This action must be taken promptly in order to
enable the Cable Secretary to fulfill his responsibilities for the rapid
dissemination of cabled information within the Agency. If the IW Officer
decides that he should not disseminate the information as a TDCS, it is
still made available promptly to the CIA Operations Center as a cable.
This action enables the analytical side of the Agency to have quick access
to the information. Should it feel strongly that the information needs to
be disseminated in spite of certain problems with it, a call from the
Senior Duty Officer to IW will re-start the dissemination machinery. In
such a case the Watch Officer will call in an area division Reports Officer
after hours, or call him at his desk during normal working hours. It may
be that the entire report will have to be rewritten, or that with minor
changes the information can be made available quickly to the
Intelligence Community.
The decision to disseminate or refer is not reached blindly. The Watch
Officer has certain "supplementary data" which accompany the
intelligence portion of the cable before him. These data might give a clue
which will assist his judgment. He also has a safe full of source cards,
provided by the area division, which tell him quite a bit about the source
and which give him a disseminable source description. He checks what
the field station says about the source in the authentication statement
and compares that with what the division has provided on the source
card. If the field source authentication statement is too vague or too
revealing he will probably change it to conform with what the division
has supplied. If in doubt he will consult the responsible division. The
source description should include a basic designation of the individual,
show his access to the information, and testify as to his reliability. On the
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other hand, it must not be so specific that there is grave risk of
pinpointing the source.
What has just been described is the procedure followed on the large
majority of INTEL cables. There are, however, occasions-usually
involving exceptional source sensitivity or delicate policy
implications-when considerations not obvious to IM may necessitate
referral to, or at least consultation with, the responsible area division. For
these situations the field station has at its disposition an indicator which
requires I W to consult the division before taking action.
Advantages to the Intelligence Community
The presence of responsible senior officers on duty in IW has enabled
the Clandestine Service to be in touch with other twenty-four hour
components on dissemination matters at all times. There are other
specific advantages which accrue to the Agency and to the intelligence
Community because the doors of IW never close. These include the
clearance function, electrical transmission of high precedence traffic to
the White House, State Department, Department of Defense and other
agencies, and conversion of extremely important and timely information
into a CRITIC report.
Since the Central Intelligence Bulletin and the DIA Intsum must
contain up-to-the-minute information they go to press before dawn.
During the night I W is able to grant clearances for the use of Clandestine
Service information in these publications in a manner denied by the
controls.
During fast-moving situations such as the Arab-Israeli June War, the
Viet Cong Tet Offensive, or a Presidential trip, IW in its strategic
location close to the Cable Secretariat and the Signal Center was able to
effect electrical relays of high precedence traffic to key government
agencies in a matter of minutes.
Similarly, there have been occasions when 1W, recognizing the
urgency of information which should have been, but had not been,
slugged CRITIC by the field station, converted the message to a CRITIC
and sent it electrically to NSA which controls the CRITICOM network.
Within the Clandestine Service the activities of IW have removed a
heavy burden from the shoulders of the Divisional Reports Officers. Since
four out of five intelligence cables are disseminated to the community by
1W, these Reports Officers are enabled to devote more time and attention
to professional guidance of field collection efforts.
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The Watch Officer
Of all the assets found in IW to assist in the proper handling of cabled
field intelligence, none is more important than the informed judgment of
experienced officers. Although the volume of cabled traffic received in
IW has doubled since 1961, the job has been done by increasing the staff
by only two officers. The background and training of these officers
instinctively come to their assistance. The Watch Officer's sense of
security tells him that a source description is too revealing. His
knowledge that information must be used by analysts and policy-makers
lets him know that another description is too bland and unenlightening.
His sense of urgency tells him when information is of such a critical
nature that it must be relayed electrically, or that a Division officer must
be called regardless of the hour.
Although none of the officers was chosen as an area specialist, the
current staff includes men who have served on all continents in eighteen
countries.
For a man of mature years with the outgoing personality usually
associated with an operations officer, assignment to the chair-borne life
of a Watch Officer comes as a bit of a shock, yet most officers have found
the adjustment not too difficult to make. IW gives the Watch Officer a
picture window on the world where he formerly gazed through a narrow
port hole. In a matter of weeks the rotating shifts which often involve
daytime sleeping along with the night work, become a matter of routine.
One newly assigned Watch Officer, after finishing his first stint on the
midnight shift, reported that on arrival at home at 0830 his wife asked
what he would have for breakfast. To this he replied scornfully,
"Breakfast!!!!, my day is done. I want a martini."
The work of the Watch Officer is confining and many officers have
reported that their friends in the Agency think they are still overseas since
they seem to have dropped out of circulation in the Washington area.
The swing shift keeps an officer away from many a cocktail party. It also
gets him out of attending a PTA meeting or of getting trapped into
becoming scout master. The eyestrain is severe and so is the strain on the
back. But there are bright spots in the working day. These are usually
caused by sun spots or other activities of the gremlins and grohms. The
motto of the Watch Officer is, "We never make mistakes, but those errors
do creep in." It behooves him to catch these errors because many of the
garbles result in unprintable language. Here are a few printable
examples:
"He was awarded the Lenin Peach Prize."
In Laos "Sex Battalions were observed."
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In Africa "A courier was carrying a dipsomanic pouch."
I n Pakistan "An attempt will be made to obtain a Haneas Morpus
writ for Bhutto."
"The Saigon government has a dipity prime minister."
"The Mekong jungle area contained 2000 Bribesmen."
A report from Yemen referred to "The Gulp of Yemen."
A Middle East report described a local rogue as "The Scarlet
i'umpernickl."
A report on the United Nations referred to" The Untied Nations."
in Pakistan an airport has a rumway.
A report from Sierra Leone said that "A female police corporal
retired for misbehavior has now been rehired."
Paris has a source with expensive far eastern experience.
Rumors are ripe.
Finally, in the spirit of George Washington's farewell address, to show
that we do not wish to get involved in foreign entanglements there is the
report with the slightly garbled control "No Foreign Kissem."
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No Foreign Dissem
On the frontiers of
intelligence photography.
Although the word serendipity is coming to have various meanings to
people engaged in such diverse occupations as music and medicine, its
present dictionary-limited meaning ("an apparent attribute for making
fortunate discoveries accidentally") is applicable in an exciting sense to
photo interpreters engaged in producing intelligence. These PI's, who are
for the most part highly trained and skilled in interpretation related to
weaponry, daily demonstrate an uncanny talent for discovering
important information accidentally. That is, the discoveries are
accidental in the sense of being unsought and not necessarily related to
prime intelligence objectives.
Interpretation of aerial photography is often hampered by the
presence of clouds, snow, shadows, haze, darkness, or obliquity, not to
mention equipment failure. On. the other hand, there are missions when
all equipment works, the weather is ideal, and the resulting photography
is nearly perfect for interpretation. There are also times when optimum
conditions occur as if by accident to produce bonus intelligence not
anticipated. In still other instances, the result unaccountably exceeds
that which the designed characteristics of the camera system are
supposed to produce. There are yet other times when the information
obtained is not of specific interest to the intelligence community but
is of great interest to other branches of the government or of
society in general. Arthur C. Lundahl, Director of the National
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) has termed this the
"serendipity effect."
The justification for what are called overhead reconnaissance missions
is, of course, the gathering of intelligence. Here, however, I want to
emphasize that through serendipity we have provided bonus information
which has proved to have great value in such diverse fields as geology,
hydrology, meteorology, oceanography, agriculture, and forestry. A great
quantity and variety of data is obtained in each photographic mission.
The information acquired for intelligence purposes alone often falls into
several groupings. Missions are normally flown to satisfy intelligence
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needs, but there are also empirical byproducts of the latter. Data
obtained for military mapping purposes are perhaps the easiest to
understand. All other information derived from aerial photography may
be grouped into a gigantic basket labeled "peaceful uses." The
categories involved are not well-defined, and are subject to change
without notice. Innovations in photographic systems or techniques of
exploitation can and do alter categories, or cause a given subject to
subsist simultaneously in several categories of reference. For example, if
an accurate system of crop forecasting by means of aerial photography
could be developed, the result would fall into both the "peaceful uses"
and the "intelligence" groupings, since it would be a valuable tool riot
only to the economic intelligence analyst but to the agriculturalist as
well. All of which is to say that the serendipity effect is important, and
that its consequences deserve serious study.
This is beginning to happen. An important effect of discoveries of the
various uses of photography is that various scientific disciplines are
conducting discussions. This discourse has resulted in close cooperation
between the intelligence and the "peaceful uses" groupings, thereby
enabling the various "peaceful users" to reap the benefits of techniques,
experience, and equipment developed at NPIC.
The revolutionary breakthroughs in aerial reconnaissance and
photographic interpretation in the past 20 years, have produced a host of
serendipity effects. The increase in speed and altitude of photo-taking
vehicles has made it possible to survey larger and larger areas. Advances
in the design and manufacture of optics and in the chemistry of film have
permitted the use of cameras with longer focal lengths, resulting in better
resolution as well as greater loads of film per reconnaissance mission.
Improvement in processing and viewing equipment has enabled the
extraction of more information from the images captured in each
exposure. Most importantly, personnel engaged in this work have gained
extensive experience and skill, with the result that more and more
serendipity effects are being recognized and exploited.
The route between recognition and exploitation of the serendipity
effect can be long and sometimes arduous. First, there must be vision to
recognize serendipity effects; then there must be support and
encouragement, and finally there must be leadership and management
to exploit the effects. We all know that in the vast vineyard of
intelligence there are more tasks than we can dispose of in the normal
(lay's work. It often happens in PI work that a supervisor is called upon to
look over an interpreter's shoulder and observe some new phenomenon.
Success or failure in discovering a new "effect" is often determined at
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such moments of creative insight. Knowing this, and recognizing that
NPIC does not have a charter for "peaceful uses" work, NPIC has
nevertheless encouraged all hands to report their findings which, in turn,
can be discussed with other agencies and organizations.
The following pages will demonstrate some of the ways in which the
serendipity aspects of photographic interpretation have affected
intelligence as well as other fields of activity. We will examine some of
the recent advances in photographic interpretation techniques and
equipment as well as in other sensory systems discussed, and discuss the
effects they have had on the requirements of the user community.
Synoptic Observation
In photographic interpretation, synoptic observation-the observation
of all parts of a large area simultaneously-is necessary for the analysis of
situations that fluctuate over time, such as an order of battle or traffic
patterns. Heretofore, such analysis could at best produce only an
estimate derived from the coverage from several missions (and times),
postulating assumptions as to how a situation would change in the
intervals of coverage, and by extrapolating from the analysis of the
covered areas to account for the areas not covered. Now, however, the
speed of the SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft provides near-synoptic
observations of large areas. Several flights of the SR-71 can furnish
information that previously required many missions to supply.
Prior to the flight of the first SR-71 missions in 1967, for example, the
North Vietnamese had constructed almost 200 surface-to-air missile
(SAM) sites. After the first site was identified in April 1965, the North
Vietnamese began to play a kind of shell game, moving the missiles and
launchers from site to site. Each low-level reconnaissance mission
covered only some 10 sites, of which two or three were occupied. This
partial coverage combined with the shuffling of SAM equipment made a
total equipment inventory impossible. Estimates of the North
Vietnamese inventory of SAM equipment were based on sampling
techniques (counting the times the observed sites were occupied
combined with the times and places missiles were fired at our
reconnaissance craft) and on logic (postulating the number of SAM sites
that would be required to defend an area of targets adequately).
The first clear photography from an SR-71 mission covered the major
portion of North Vietnam and revealed 133 SAM sites, of which 20 were
occupied. A later SR-71 mission revealed that 29 sites contained SAM
equipment. Since that time, the North Vietnam SAM pattern has been
shifted from time to time, but the number of occupied sites has remained
4
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essentially the same, and most of the occupied sites have consistently
been defending the Hanoi-Haiphong area. This synoptic look at the
North Vietnamese SAM defense system thus has enabled photographic
interpreters to make an accurate count of SAM equipment. Their
findings are no longer estimates, but more and more hard fact.
The synoptic capability of the new systems, however, is not the only
consideration affecting our chances of obtaining serendipity effects. We
will now look at some of the other circumstances, some technical, some
natural or physical, bearing on the problem.
I)ate and Time of* Exposure
The optimum yield of photographic intelligence is derived from
photographic missions flown in the springtime after snow has melted and
before leaves have appeared on trees, and at or near noon when there is
little or no shadow. This timing is not always possible in intelligence
operations because missions must be conducted throughout the year.
However, certain advantages may be obtained from missions flown at
other seasons of the year, or days of the week, or times of day. Moreover,
there are conditions when it is not advantageous to fly a mission at the
normally ideal times of noon and in spring. For example, during a typical
day in the tropics, clouds build up in the morning to release rainfall at
noon. In China, spring is the monsoon period and clouds cover the land
mass for weeks at a time.
Missions in winter when snow is on the ground often provide unique
insights in interpretation. By observing snow melt on buildings
(buildings that are heated), an interpreter can readily identify areas of
habitation and work. Further, by noting areas where the snow has been
removed or plowed, the importance of a facility can often he established.
Snow also aids in the identification of camouflaged areas. Snow
obliterates painted disruptive patterns (Figure 1) and highlights those
areas where camouflage netting (Figure 2) or plastic sheathing is
employed.
Tall, very slender structures, such as communication towers and
electronic installations, are difficult to discern in the absence of shadow,
but on photography taken in early morning or late afternoon they cast
long shadows which allow their identification and measurement. They
are easily identified on winter photography in which snow and low sun
angles cause long shadows and produce high contrast of black shadow on
smooth white backgrounds.
I'lu tography from missions flown in the spring over permafrost areas
reveals buildings under construction, thereby yielding details of the
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i,.It w I Now You `Iee It, Now You Don't. The cisruptive pattern I sting
e'er in July ore concealed b',' ,now in January at the Ladebu' Sam
',uppoi t facility, Eo st Germany.
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e re
Figure 2. Like a Sore Thumb. This missile site was effectively camouflaged
by netting until snow starkly revealed the surface-to-air missile on its
launcher
buildings' interiors, while coverage in the fall will reveal completed
buildings or the results of the year's construction activity.
The best military order of battle information is normally obtained on
Sunday morning when most military equipment is in garrison, parked or
stowed. A count of private planes can best be obtained on weekdays
rather than weekends, because private planes are more frequently flown
on weekends.
Iron and steel plants in normal operation are nearly always partially
obscured by smoke, steam, and dust. The best time, therefore, to
photograph such a plant is during a strike or when the plant is shut down
for renovation or repair.
The movement of the tide can have a direct effect on what is seen or is
not seen on photography. For example, a photograph taken at high tide
of a boat repair facility in Hatou, North Vietnam, reveals two patrol boat
combatants under repair. The exact number of boats the facility can
handle cannot be determined from that photograph. However,
photography taken at low tide reveals eight boat cradles (Figure 3).
48
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Figure 3. Time and Tide. On the upper, two motor torpedo boats are seen at
high tide at this boat repair facility in North Vietnam. On the lower, low tide
reveals that the facility has a total of eight cradles for repair purposes.
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Instant of Exposure
The instant of exposure is that fraction of time when the shutter clicked
or film moved to record an event on photography. If the event lasted long
enough to be recorded on several frames of photography, then
photogrammetric calculations taking account of elapsed time can yield
technical data on the event that often is not obtainable from other
sources. It may happen, moreover, that the reconnaisance vehicle is over
a target at a particularly opportune time, or its very presence may elicit a
reaction that its cameras catch on film.
Thus, attempts by the North Vietnamese to bring down US
reconnaisance vehicles have provided unique information on the SA-2
missile system. Detailed studies of SA-2s in flight and their subsequent
bursts have provided information on the type of explosion, number and
speed of fragments, and warhead arming. This information has been
used by the military to determine the probable size of the SA-2's lethal
area (Figures 4 and 5). Trails of missiles fired at reconnaissance vehicles
have been analyzed and have provided information on the SA-2's flight
characteristics and performance. Limitations on its turn and climb
characteristics have been noted, and this, along with other information,
has made it possible to devise evasion maneuvers.
Periodic Coverage
Periodic coverage is a valuable tool in intelligence operations and
countless examples could be cited where it has solved intelligence
problems. Its full potential in the "peaceful uses" arena, however, has
not been realized or exploited. Normally one thinks of periodic coverage
as extending over a period of days, but it could just as well occur at
various hours of a single day.
Pi's of the British Joint Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Center
(JARIC), who are exchanging their techniques and experiences with
NPIC personnel, have noted many serendipitous effects on RAF
photography flown over Africa and Asia. Their photography of wildlife in
Africa at different times on a single day illustrates the potential
usefulness of periodic coverage.
The British were called upon by one of their former African colonies to
produce a series of large-scale maps on areas of potential mineral
resources. The contract stipulated that the British were to aid in training
to conduct the necessary photographic missions, the photogrammetric
efforts, the map compilations, and production efforts. To demonstrate
that in each geographic area there is an optimum time of day and season
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for conducting photographic mapping missions because of the effects of
weather, shadows, foliage, and other variables, the British overflew a
prescribed area every hour on the hour from shortly after daybreak until
dusk.
Upon seeing the processed films, the host officials were duly impressed
with the problems of shadows, clouds, and the like. The British officer in
charge happened to have a degree in zoology, and was astonished at the
catalogue of detail on wildlife that was found in the photography. He
could inventory not only the wildlife, but could do it by age and sex. He
could determine the ranging of various species, the plant life that
supported them, their feeding and watering times, their nursing and rest
periods, and the relationship of one species with others. He was able to
observe several rare species of antelope and to observe elephant poachers
in action.
The British officer filed a preliminary report on his findings, which was
duly filed in Britain, suggesting among other things that such a study
based on photography could allow naturalists to select the time and place
to trap, snare, or tranquilize wildlife prior to their removal to safe havens
in the event man wished to use the land inhabited by animals for other
purposes. Had his findings and recommendations been heeded, the
wildlife tragedy of gigantic proportions that occurred in Rhodesia in
1958-60 might have been averted.
There, it will be recalled, after completion of the Kariba dam on the
mighty Zambesi River, a lake some 110 miles long formed behind it.
Although the tribesmen who lived in the valleys were moved to higher
ground, no consideration was given to the wildlife in what once was one
of the world's richest game sanctuaries. As the seasonal floodwater hit the
dam and the water level began to rise, hundreds of hills became islands,
crowded with hungry and panic-stricken beasts.
When naturalists of the world learned that thousands of animals were
doomed to starve or drown in a dammed-up lake, they censured the
Rhodesian Government for its lack of concern for the animals. The
Southern Rhodesians responded by sending three game wardens and
eight native trackers to rescue the starving and dying animals. The
Northern Rhodesian government sent one game warden who, upon
seeing the conditions of the animals, slaughtered them at random.
Although the Rhodesian government and the Royal Society for
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals continued their feeble rescue effort for
several months, only a tiny fraction of the valley wildlife was saved.
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Increased Altitude
As the operating altitude of photographic vehicles has increased, the
amount of land area that can be covered by a single exposure has also
significantly increased, thus making it possible to observe larger ground
patterns. As a result, military mapping and charting organizations have
developed more efficient means of map compilation and production. The
larger areas observed require fewer controls and the tedious process of
making print mosaics is reduced to a minimum.
Experts have said that to open new lands for development. for mineral
exploration, land cultivation, water resources, and so on, topographic
maps at the scale of 1:100,000 are needed. A recent survey by the United
Nations revealed, however, that only 15 to 20 percent of the world has
been mapped at this scale. Present mapping methods used by civilian
organizations are much too slow, cumbersome, and expensive. At the
present rate of progress, the gigantic task of mapping the remaining 75 to
80 percent of the world at this scale would require 100 to 150 years. This
estimate does not consider the revisions that will be necessary to update
previously produced maps.
In less than 30 years, the world's population will double, and experts
generally agree that urbanization will occur faster than the world can be
mapped. It can be readily seen that the present cartographic effort is
much too slow. Yet, by increasing the altitude of the photo taking vehicle,
by improving the resolution of the system, and by using more modern
automated techniques, map and chart production can be speeded up and
this cartographic backlog substantially reduced.
The U-2 camera systems were designed for intelligence purposes, i.e.,
to achieve maximum coverage (horizon to horizon) and continuous
coverage over the entire flight track. The cameras were also designed to
use thin base film and permit complete stereoscopic overlap. These
cameras were of a unique configuration, and the resultant photography
presented horrendous problems of rectification, mosaicing, and
computation required for map and chart production.
In late 1959, a requirement for reliable topographic maps at
1:1,(x)0,000 and 1:500,000 scale of selected areas along and north of the
Tibet-India border was levied on NPIC, the Cartographic Division of the
then called Office of Research and Reports (ORR), at CIA and the
Aeronautical Chart and Information Center (ACIC). The requirement
called for four maps to be produced covering an area of 65,000 square
miles with shaded relief delineating the topography, spot elevations,
hydrography, roads, bridges, and place names. Existing maps of these
areas were incomplete, unreliable, and badly out of date. They proved to
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contain gross errors, and there was little or no geodetic control. By
combining the talents of the Center, the Cartographic Division, and
ACIC, the four 1:1,000,000 maps were completed in a period of four
months, a job which normally would have required one to two years.
Based on this effort, which employed some of the best talents in the
US Government in photogrammetry, cartography, geodesy, and
photographic science, recommendations were soon made for new
methods, techniques, and equipment to exploit U-2 photography to
produce much-needed maps and charts of denied areas. The traditional
instruments and methods used in map compilation, including field
surveys to establish geodetic control, elevations, and accuracy checks,
could not be applied to this type of photography. Many new methods and
techniques were developed and tested. Rigorous demands for both
accuracy (essential in targeting) and speed (maps were also needed of
vast areas in the USSR and China) inspired a major effort. As in many
crisis situations, when the best talent is assembled and all-out effort put
forth, technological advances occur in rapid succession that would
normally take many years to evolve.
Probably the greatest assist came from the computer. NPIC was one of
the first government agencies to utilize a computer (an ALWAC III-E
vacuum tube first-generation computer) for computation and data
processing services for photographic intelligence exploitation. From this
initial experience, photogrammetric equipment was designed that
revolutionized the exploitation of metrical intelligence from
reconnaissance photography and permitted mass production of reliable
maps and charts of denied areas.
Advances in equipment and techniques in map making resulting from
these early efforts have greatly reduced map and chart production time.
Instruments such as UNIMACE (Universal Automatic Map Compilation
Equipment), developed by the US Army Topographic Command,
produce orthophotos and topographic contour maps from stereo photos.
The photographs are scanned electronically and the conjugated images
are correlated. Ground positions are determined by a computer and
photographically printed in their true position. Other instruments are
being developed which promise even greater speed and efficiency.
The capabilities of some collection systems being studied go far
beyond the talent and money presently available to exploit them
completely. For example, it is well within present capabilities to produce
"time lapse" or "cyclical" charts to show snow cover and melt, ice flows,
river flows and floods, crop planting and harvest, and urban changes. It
is now possible to view the traffic problems on the Eastern seaboard of
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the US in a near-synoptic manner. It is within the realm of possibility to
prepare new types of graphics utilizing time lapse methods to show the
movement of automobiles to and from metropolitan areas during work
periods. Hundreds of other such ideas have been proposed. What the
future will bring is open to the imagination, but one thing is certain-we
have just begun to explore the possibilities.
Sun glint is a word not recorded in ordinary dictionaries, but it can
mean a great deal to a photo interpreter. Sun glint is the term photo
interpreters give the phenomenon which occurs when sunlight or other
light strikes a surface or object at such an angle that the surface or object
takes on a new perspective. For example, sunlight striking a body of
water at a relatively low angle gives the water a mirrorlike quality and
mapping and charting becomes easier because the lines of the banks
become more clearly delineated.
From an intelligence viewpoint, serendipity effects from sun glint have
provided valuable information, for sun glint can make possible the
identification of objects far smaller than would normally he visible on
photography from a given system. Sun glint aided our photo interpreters
in tracing a telephone line being constructed in Laos by the North
Vietnamese to support their infiltrating troops (Figure 6). In this case,
evert the thin telephone wires and the insulators on the cross arms
become visible because of this phenomena.
Similarly, sun glint made possible the detection of the so-called cable
bridges in North Vietnam. In order to avoid new bombing of their
bridges, the North Vietnamese replaced bombed out decks with cables
which were covered at night with planking so they could carry traffic
(Figure 7). Before dawn, the planking was removed and the bridge once
again appeared destroyed.
Early morning or late evening sun reflecting off canvas or metal parts
have often revealed ships or other objects carefully hidden to avoid
detection (Figure 8).
Effect of Winds
Data on bottom contours under shallow waters, beach and river
erosion, and harbor siltation are difficult to obtain. For the past nine
years, the US Coast and Geodetic Survey has used color film in high-
resolution cameras for water penetration in its shoreline mapping
projects. Color and advanced photogrammetric techniques have
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Figure 6. Streak of Light. A telephone wire reflecting the sun gives (away
yet another secret. Seeing a telephone wire is well beyond the design (ripa -
bilities of camera system.
EGRET 57
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t iqure $. tarty in the Morning, Early in the Evening. Low sun r,-ogles
cause reflections which permit identification of North Vietnamese patrol
boats hidden along streams north of Haiphong.
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permitted the portrayal of bottom features in many areas to depths of 20
Feet. Color work, however, is tricky. Sun angle, clouds, turbulence, and
haze can all affect results drastically. Color photography missions are
normally flown at low or medium altitudes only under nearly ideal
conditions. Even under ideal conditions, it is often difficult to determine
the hydrography of certain areas because of the presence and motion of
kelp and other subsurface sea plants.
The U-2's and SR-71's, however, can often fly high above areas
experiencing gale winds. Consequently, the Center has noted a
serendipitous effect recently that may aid in shoreline mapping projects.
Flying over denied areas, we noted that high winds blowing across rivers
and lakes exposed areas normally inundated. This, of course, permits
better definition of islands, sand bars, and vegetation. High winds
blowing away from shore at low tide have exposed as much as a mile of
ocean shoreline. The kelp and other sea plants normally extended and
moving are then prostrate, permitting detailed hydrography.
Perhaps hydrology studies could be aided and expedited by flying the
U-2's or SR-71's with both color and black and white film over shoreline
areas when gale-force winds are blowing at the surface. The resultant
photography could then be correlated with existing photography, maps,
charts, and hydrographic data to yield more accurate presentations than
in many instances presently exist.
Sensor Discoveries
In January-February 1963, the Center and the US Geological Survey
combined forces for an aerial infrared survey' of Hawaii. The Center's
interest was to determine whether the system could detect heat emitting
sources in caves. We hoped to use such a system in the reconnaissance of
Cuba where, after the 1962 missile crisis, reports persisted that missiles
had been hidden in caves scattered throughout the island.
The study of caves yielded some information, but none applicable to
the missile/cave storage problem. The US Geological Survey wanted to
study thermal patterns and structural features of active and inactive
volcanoes. The infrared study of the active volcano Kilauea revealed the
relative intensity of the thermal features of the caldera. Many of the
anomalies present were correlated with the visible steaming and transfer
of heat to the surface from subterranean sources. More important,
however, the infrared missions allowed scientists to "take the
'Infrared photography employs materials sensitive to the rays lying just beyond the red
end of the visible spectrum.
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temperature" (energy emission) of a volcano through successive days of
coverage and to determine if the volcano was "running a fever."
Continued increases in temperatures of the volcano were noted and this
data gave more accurate warnings of impending eruptions than previous
methods.2
The new Icelandic volcano "Surtsey,"3 which exploded out of the sea
in 1963, was monitored from its inception with the IR techniques
developed in Hawaii with outstanding results.
While scanning the infrared imagery for caves near the Hawaiian
coastline, large images of pronouncedly cool areas adjacent to the shores
were observed. IR imagery interpreters soon recognized the significance
of these areas as discharges of cool, fresh ground water into the sea. This
discovery led to an order for an IR aerial survey of the entire coastline of
Hawaii. Infrared interpretation revealed 219 shore areas that had
varying degrees of seepage of fresh water into the sea. The greatest area
of ground water discharge was discovered at the outlet of Waiahea Pond,
where more than 100 million gallons of fresh water per day flowed into
Hilo Bay (Figure 9). The discovery of these sources of water was
significant since 13 billion gallons of rain fell on Hawaii every day
during the survey but only three percent of this rainfall was retained by
the land. The remainder seeped rapidly through porous soils into the sea.
Little was known as to how, when, or where this valuable source of water
flowed to the sea.
The results of this survey, along with a map pinpointing the locations
of the underground sources of water, were published by the US
Geological Survey.`
As a result of the survey, wells were drilled and water found in several
remote and previously uninhabited areas, and construction of
communities commenced.
Considering that five percent of the world's fresh water runoff is under
the seas, and therefore goes to waste, this discovery could go a long way
in alleviating water shortages in water-hungary coastal areas. The
infrared method of seeking fresh water in such areas is fast becoming a
standard practice. The benefits derived from the Hawaiian coastline
'W. A. Fischer, R. A. Mokham, F. Polcyn, G. A. Landis. "Infrared Surveys of Hawaiian
Volcanoes." Science Magazine, November 6, 1964, pp. 733-742.
'United States Department of the Interior, Geological Survey, "Infrared Techniques
Help Probe Surtsey's Fiery Mantle." Feature Material Release, July 30, 1967.
"William A. Fischer, Dan A. Davis, and Theresa M. Sousa, Department of the Interior.
"Fresh Water Springs of Hawaii from Infrared Images." Washington, U.S. Geological
Survey, 1966. (Hydrological Investigations Atlas HA-218)
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survey alone has paid for the cost of the infrared experiment several
hundred times over.
Aerial photography, a by-product of the intelligence effort, is being
used to monitor other changes in the environment. Much has been
written about the pollution of our streams, rivers, and lakes by foreign
substances such as sewage, refuse, detergents, and silt. An even greater
threat, "thermal pollution," is emerging. Either willfully or
inadvertently, man is changing the water/heat balance of our
waterways. The increase in the use of fresh water sources for industrial
cooling presents a real threat to fish and other organisms. Fish, which are
cold blooded animals, are unable to regulate their body temperature and
are particularly sensitive to changes in their thermal environment. Each
one is conditioned to the temperature of the water in which it lives and
cannot adjust to the shock of an abrupt change in temperature. If the
temperature of the water increases excessively, the fish will die. The
aquatic ecosystem generally is even more sensitive to temperature than
the individual fish. Fish depend on a food chain system involving smaller
fish, invertebrates, plants, and dissolved nutrients. Any change in the
heat environment will seriously affect the proliferation of any link in the
chain which in turn, can affect the harvest of fish.
The principal contributor of "thermal pollution" is at present the
electric power industry. The present rate of heat discharge is now critical
only in certain areas, but ecologists are showing great concern about the
planned tenfold increase in electric power production in the near future.
Most of the proposed plants will use water from rivers and lakes as
coolants. The ecologists will use IR to monitor thermal pollution. This
tool, as we have seen, was originally developed for intelligence purposes.
It was assumed prior to the existence of infrared imagery that the
heated effluent from power plants was quickly dissipated and that its
damage to aquatic life was therefore slight. Even though the resolving
power of the early IR systems was poor, the large effluent plumes shown
to ecologists sent them scurrying to check their "ground truth" data. The
infrared data was correct and much of the "ground truth" data proved
inadequate, poorly collected, or erroneous (Figure 10). Those who
experimented with IR systems in the early days raised the possibility that
two thermal power plants discharging effluents on opposite banks of the
river could create a "thermal barrier" keeping fish and other river or sea
life from reaching their spawning or feeding grounds. These and many
more finds regarding thermal effluents have been passed to the US
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Geological Survey's Water Resources Division. Prototype work performed
by the military services and the CIA for reconnaissance purposes is now a
valuable monitor for the temperature of our streams, lakes, rivers, and
oceans.
Clouds and Weather
"An opportunist," said philosopher Elbert Hubbard, "is a man who
takes the lemons fate has handed him and opens up a lemonade stand."
The lemons of aerial photographic exploitation are clouds.
In the early days of aerial photographic exploitation, that which
obscured the target area, such as heavy clouds, haze, darkness, was often
removed from the original negative prior to duplication in quantity for
dissemination.
In the 1955-1957 period, the U-2's were flying a number of test
missions within the continental limits of the United States and in Europe.
Photography from the test missions contained cloud formations from a
vantage point never seen before by meteorologists. The latter were
appalled, however, that frames of complete cloud cover (which to them
displayed valuable meteorological information) were being removed
before exploitation. Their complaints led to the establishment of a policy,
still adhered to, that all original negatives be kept intact.
Cloud forms are the most obvious feature of weather, yet little was
known in the early 1950's of the significance and climatic distribution of
cloud forms. Most observations were from ground stations reported In a
crude code, or from aircraft flying through cloud formations.
The meteorologists working at the Center prepared a study which
revealed much about the bottom layer of the atmosphere-the interface
of land-atmosphere, sea-atmosphere, vegetation-atmosphere, and cloud-
top-atmosphere. Most importantly, the study showed that a single U-2
mission could cover large storm areas, and suggested using the U-2 as a
hurricane hunter.
The first such mission was flown on 14 November 1956. The orders
were relatively simple: Conduct reconnaissance from above and inside
the eye of a storm. The storm selected was Typhoon Kit (Figure 11), and
the photography which resulted from overflying it marked a significant
advance in meteorology.'
For the first time in history a typhoon had been photographed. The
bowl-shaped eye of Typhoon Kit, the first ever seen in its entirety, was
approximately 30 miles in diameter. By photogrammetric methods, the
'Lt. Col. Robert C. Bungaard, "The First Flyover of a Tropical Cyclone," Weatherwise,
June 1958.
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figure 11. One of a Kind - The first photo of a typhoon. The U 2 is verti -
ally above the center of Typhoon Kit. Horizontal streamline analysis of
Typhoon Kit revealed nine cyclonic swirls.
lops of the clouds in the upper middle of the picture were fonrnd to be
18,000 feet high. Photo interpretation and meteorological analysis
revealed that 't'yphoon Kit contained nine cyclonic swirls (rnarked by C's
in the sketch).
A survey of damage from 't'yphoon Kit revealed that the Sturm had
claimed the lives of 39 persons, rendered over 58,000 persons homeless,
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and caused over $5,000,000 in property damage. To the men of the
weather groups, a new means of tracking violent storms, and increasing
our understanding of them, had been achieved.
The U-2's were to fly over more cyclones and hurricanes (Figure 12),
and the findings in these experiments were published in professional
journals.6
Data obtained from these experiments was used in planning the orbital
parameters and specifying the cameras to be used for the Tiros and
'Robert D. Fletcher, James R. Smith, Robert C. Bungaard, "Superior Photographic
Reconnaissance of Tropical Cyclones," Weatherwise, June 1961.
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Figure 12. Wound up Tight. Typhoon Ida on 25 Sept 1968 had maximum
surface winds of 240 knots with an average of 145 knots. This photograph
was taken an hour after the record wind velocity was reached
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Nimbus satellites. The locating, tracking, and monitoring of storms from
outer space is now a routine affair. The advance warning that can now be
given has saved countless lives and millions of dollars in property.
Urban Planning
The foregoing examples invite the reflection that the essence of aerial
imagery lies in its unique ability to record in minute detail the elements
of broad natural and human processes, and that it may in time render a
substantial contribution in the study of the latter. The case of the Santa
Barbara oil problem in the spring of 1968 is illuminating in this respect.
It will be recalled that a leak in an offshore oil well in California's
Santa Barbara channel unleashed an ecological disaster upon the bird
and sea life of the area. On request, CIA conducted a special U-2 mission
over the oil slick area. The U-2 has a two-camera system. For this
mission, the forward camera contained black and white film; the aft,
color. The proposed flight track was similar to that of an operational
search mission: i.e., the track would overlap and be crisscrossed at right
angles so that the resultant mission would look like a tick-tack-toe
schematic. The Center was to do a preliminary assessment, attempt to
track the movements of the oil, and check the damage being wrought on
the beaches.
The initial scan was accomplished on the higher resolution black and
white imagery. Although the oil rig, beaches, marinas, and coastal
features were observed on this imagery of good interpretability, the
damaged areas and the oil slick were not readily distinguishable from
natural features such as kelp beds, normal beach clutter, and wind
streaking in the channel.
Analysis of the color photography, with resolution considerably less
than that of the black and white film, revealed the extent of the oil slick
and showed the saturated beaches and marinas. The progress of the clean-
up operation, involving the spreading of straw and powders on the
affected areas, was easily determined. The slick was visible in feather-
shaped patterns broken by the movement of the waves and wind. The
damage from the slick was extensive in the marinas where the
breakwaters trapped and kept the oil from flowing out to sea with the low
tide. After preliminary assessment at NPIC, the mission photography was
given to the US Geological Survey for further study and was used to make
recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior.
More important than coverage of the slick, however, was the overview
of the coastal areas of California. We were especially impressed by the
damage done by the heavy rains which fell in January and February, and
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by the heavy silting of streams, lakes, and reservoirs (Figure 13). Most of
the silting and damage was caused by man's poor urban planning-gross
land exploitation. By tracing the streams to the hills, we could see the
reason for the disaster-new and old housing developments built on fill
dirt taken from terraced hills. When the rains came, the fill dirt began to
slide, damaging millions of dollars worth of property, and clogging
streams, lakes, and reservoirs with silt. We were puzzled that the
extremely poor urban planning in the hills was not noticed earlier by
state and local authorities, or, even more curiously, by insurance
companies. By looking at aerial photography, this damage could have
been predicted. In an earlier case, in 1958, more than 100 homes slid
toward the Pacific Ocean at Portuguese Bend, California. A geologist for
the city's engineering department said that "every engineer and.
geologist in the state knew that the project was in a slide area and the
developer did or should have known it too."7 In spite of this knowledge,
the project was built.
The rapidly changing phenomenon of world urbanism is revealed on
aerial photography. All too often, the myriad factors of
urbanism-including road and highway construction, land use, home
construction, water requirements, factories, power lines-are thought of
as separate entities. The authority for control of these factors is vested
with a department, often parochial in its views, certainly limited in
budgetary resources, and concerned with a limited geographical area
(such as a township, city, or county). This department usually cannot
impose its views on its area, but rather must work through urban
planners, budget officers, legislators, and other officials. In this process
there are pitfalls which often deflect action into the path of least
resistance, the most politically palatable, or the cheapest course. The
problems associated with the increasing urbanization in some areas are
acute, and the ability to create and maintain a reasonable degree of
human comfort will depend significantly on actions taken in the future
which may be unpopular with the populace. The relationship between
the entities must be studied and understood in each city, and the
interrelationships between cities must be considered.
By the end of this century, the population of the United States will
have increased by an additional 100 million people. Most of this
development will come in the nation's rapidly expanding urban areas.
Unless urban planning is conducted carefully, considering the interplay
of water, traffic, construction, and pollution, our hope of coming to grips
with megalopolis will indeed be hampered.
7"Ilomebuycrs Ignore Slides," Washington Post, June 7, 1969, p. E1.
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The synoptic view of the coastal areas of California, the serendipity
view of silting, and flying missions in both black and white and color
were revelations to the US Geological Survey, which normally flies
photographic missions at lower altitudes for specific purposes.
Undoubtedly, there will be further requests to use the U-2 for disaster
assessments. Possibly, the U-2 also may be used on a periodic or routine
basis to note changes which could have considerable bearing upon future
generations.
The prime purpose of the aerial photograph today is reconnaissance,
but its greatest role in the future could be as the principal record of
history. Even now, it could serve as a vital aid to historical accuracy and
provide a dramatic, visual testimony of truth.
The technical and scientific revolution of the past 50 years has meant
the destruction of countless visible remains of history, and the future
portends even greater destruction. The US Government is seemingly
unaware that it has become the possessor of the finest record of world
history over the past 30 years, but that it is destroying this record at an
unprecedented rate.
Most US Government agencies use and, therefore, must store aerial
photography. The storage facilities are limited, The criteria for
destruction of film for most organizations is the frequency of use rather
than the historical value of the film. A variety of means, some of them
crude, are used to control and record the use of film from manual
means-such as date stamping a can of photography each time it is
used-through machine control methods. One organization uses the
"dust control" method, determining which cans of film are least used by
the amount of dust collected on the tops of the cans. Periodically, at
intervals set by records management personnel or whenever the vaults
become full, orders are given to destroy some of the film. The film that is
the oldest, is duplicative, or is the least used is generally destroyed. Little
or no concern is shown for the content of the film. One should not be too
harsh, however, on personnel who handle film. Management, generally,
is too preoccupied with the present and the future to care about the past.
't'here are no national film archives. Security considerations preclude
giving the film to colleges or universities. Private research organizations
have raised no clamor to receive it, and the national professional
associations are oblivious to its potential use or prefer to remain with the
traditional approaches to recording history. Yet, those of us who have
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studied aerial photography over historically denied areas are amazed at
what could be added to existing historical records.
The study of the past through photography is fascinating. Who has not
seen the Civil War through the lens of Matthew Brady's camera or World
War II through the film documentary "Victory at Sea"? Yet the
records of nations and people on an immediate scale are frozen on
today's aerial photography grows larger and the resolution becomes
better, our ability to recognize the patterns of the past will become more
acute. We will be able to compare these patterns with the present and the
future and enjoy the intellectual pleasure of seeing ourselves in the vast
perspective and panorama of history.
There is a great need, therefore, to compare observations in the same
locations as much as several decades or centuries apart. The advantages
of seeing life forms and tasks performed at a single point in time or as a
background against which plot changes are obvious. We know, for
instance, that many tasks are performed today in the same fashion as
they have been for centuries. Periodic coverage of a relatively large area
can provide an infinite number of details on a variety of subjects such as
transhumance, migratory phenomena, and the routes and tracks man has
taken through the years. On a large scale, it will show how and where
man lived, his standard of living, and his cultural development. It will
also record his spiritual resources as well as his divisions and
destructiveness.
Hundreds of examples can be cited of historical facts gleaned or
strengthened from aerial photography. At one time for example, our
concern was focused on Lop Nor in Sinkiang for indications that China
was building a nuclear weapons capability. The number of written
descriptions of the area available to us was meager and most of the data
was rather old. We compared, however, the data from the written record
with what we observed on Genetrix balloon photography; it was amazing
how we could confirm observations made decades and centuries ago.
In 1934, the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin in his book, The Wandering
Lake,' described the Lop Nor area in detail. Through his descriptive
text, sketches, and ground photography, we were able to follow his jour-
ney and pinpoint the areas of his archeological discoveries. Similarly, we
could follow the travels of Sir Mark Aurel Stein9 through Central Asia
and the Lop Desert in 1907. We saw not only the trail that he followed,
but also hundreds of others that linked the centers of civilizations in
Central Asia. Going back to the earliest traveler in the area on record,
8Hedin, Sven. The Wandering Lake. New York, Dutton, 1940.
'Stein, Sir Mark Aurel. On Ancient Central Asian Tracks. New York, Pantheon, 1964
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Marco Polo, we find that his description10 "Of the city of Lop and the
Great Desert" was amazingly accurate.
The Desert of Lop as it existed for Messrs. Polo, Stein, and Hedin
remained unchanged for centuries. Then, abruptly, China entered the
nuclear age, and Lop Nor began changing. Trails became roads,
watering holes became towns, obstacles were bridged, and electricity and
gasoline powered the tools that changed several large desert areas.
Science and technology had changed an area and in the process had
erased a number of identifiable points in a chapter of history and
mankind. But we still have a record from photography as to how Lop Nor
looked to Messrs. Polo, Stein, and Hedin. One dreads to think that some
25 years hence someone in search of film vault space will thoughtlessly
destroy this priceless historical record.
Many questions are asked that could be answered from a historical
record of photography: How was a country invaded? How does an
invasion change the invaded country? What is the impact on the invaded
country if there is a clash of cultures? The questions are endless.
Prior to our first coverage of Tibet, we asked our librarians to assemble
all the books on this country that were in the Library of Congress. There
was a total of 22 books, all of them written before the Chinese
Communist invasion and occupation. U-2 photography revealed that the
military invasion and occupation, making great use of motor and air
transport, were carried out swiftly and efficiently. After the roads were
constructed, land development, the construction of a military
establishment, and the exploration for mineral resources began in
earnest. All of these activities were new to Tibet and, therefore, easy to
spot and identify. Subsequent coverage indicated further sinicization of
the country. The few millions of the indigenous population that
remained were faced with overwhelming and brutal power and by an
ever-increasing influx of Chinese immigrants who dispossessed them of
their land. Tibet as it existed for 1.3 centuries with its tiny, peaceful
population and its geographical and cultural remoteness is fast
disappearing (Figure 14). Authors who had written books subsequent to
the invasion and occupation of Tibet have been hampered by the severe
censorship imposed by the Chinese Communists, and the only
information coming from the country is riddled with propaganda.
Obviously, aerial photography is a vital historical record. Unless we
act now to preserve it, someone in the future on receiving newer photog-
raphy of increased resolution and quality may thoughtlessly decide that
Polo, Marco. The Travels of Marco Polo. New York, Modern Library_ 1931.
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Serendipity SE RET
t}ec older photography is no longer of value arid destroy it. 't'his de ti ac-
tion would rncart the loss of the most significant records of this p-iod
and it would be through serendipity!
iqure f4. the Old and the New The Lhasa that most of us know with the
D-rlai Lama's Place (the Potala) and the individual homes with walled
courtyards are being surrounded by Chinese military installations.
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Time, Change, and
Intelligence.
The Central Intelligence Agency is twenty-two years old-old enough
for Parkinson's law to have gone into operation and for its original
missions to lose some of their crispness and relevance to the needs of the
country and of its policy-makers.
It is clear that the world in which we operate today is strikingly
different from that of the Second World War and the Korean war. The
Soviet Union, China, and International Communism are much changed,
and the threats and problems they pose are different from those of the
late forties and early fifties. The character and dimensions of war have
changed dramatically, as have the political uses of military power. A
whole crowd of new nations has elbowed its way into international
politics, an endeavor in which the great powers have been most
cooperative. The world of science and technology has expanded vastly
during this period, spreading affluence and expectation of greater
affluence around the world, and making possible interaction-
psychological, social, economic, and political-among countries on
an entirely new scale.
Responsible Agency officers have, over the years, had reason to ask
themselves whether we were not too often chasing Communists in
situations where new forms of revolution were the problem, or concerning
ourselves with the question of stability in countries in which change was
inevitable and, in fact, desirable. Many thoughtful officers have asked
themselves and their colleagues whether, indeed, the Agency has not
been too busy fighting the last war and performing missions that were
conceived in its aftermath to comprehend that our opponents, and
indeed we ourselves, have changed out of all recognition.
The answers to these questions, important though it is that they be
asked, are not gloomy. The Agency has changed almost continuously
from the time of its inception and has taken on new areas of
responsibility in response to the changes in the world situation as well as
to technical developments that opened up new means of collecting and
evaluating intelligence. One of the most dramatic areas of change has
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CON FID N IAL The Future
been that of intelligence on strategic weapons and in the whole field of
science and technology. Not quite so dramatic, but equally important as
an indicator of the Agency's capacity to respond to new interests and
needs of the policy-maker, has been the development of resources for
collecting and evaluating intelligence on the Afro-Asian countries and
Latin America. The Office of Economic Research was originally charged
with economic research on Communist countries; for some time it has
taken the rest of the world into its purview. The Office of Current
Intelligence has put itself in a position to deal with developments in
every country of the world and to consider the pertinence to American
interest of social and economic change in these countries, as well as
questions of Communist influence and political stability. National
Intelligence Estimates have dealt with matters outside the context of
great power confrontation with increasing frequency. Whereas in the
early years of the Agency a substantial proportion of NIEs tended to be
on the subject of Communist prospects in this or that country, or on the
question of the chances for survival of the regime in power, more and
more estimates deal with such matters as "The Potential for Revolution
in Latin America" (NIE 80/90-1-69) and "Black Africa's Prospects for
Modernization" (NIE 60/70-1-69).
Equally impressive has been the resourcefulness of the Agency in
finding ways of doing its business more efficiently. The vast
improvements in scientific means of collection of intelligence and in the
evaluation of such intelligence are notable. The establishment of the
Office of Computer Services, the use of computers to handle specialized
problems throughout the Agency, and the assignment of a senior officer
to study the long range prospects for the use of automatic data processing
in the evaluation of intelligence, demonstrate a readiness to change and
alertness to opportunity for useful change.
Before we over-indulge in self-congratulation, however, it might be
useful to use the old question-asking technique again. The question this
time is what kind of situation we are likely to have to operate in during
the next twenty-one years and whether we might not need to think about
ways in which to extend our capacity for flexibility and inventiveness. It
may be that the proven disposition of the Agency to respond to new
opportunities, even the systematic review by the Plans, Programs and
Budgeting machinery of the relevance and effectiveness of our present
efforts and projection of programs into the future, will prove inadequate
to the conditions of the next generation.
Seeing the future as wildly different from the present, full of wonders
and terrors, bearing little resemblance to the solid and known world of
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e
the present, seems to be the natural tendency of those who these days try
to look more than a year or two ahead. It is wise for one who
contemplates the future to remind himself that one of the clearest lessons
of history is the continuity of human ideas and institutions, the way in
which change evolves out of that which already exists. It is also well to
remind one's self that there has been a considerable amount of change in
our own lifetime, not to mention that of the elders who have seen the
world modified by the motor car, electronic communications, the
airplane, antibiotics, nuclear fission, and space flight, to give an
incomplete list. Like all older generations they have asked themselves
what the world is coming to, but they-most of them-have adjusted
nicely, thank you, and are basically more like their parents than unlike.
Still and all, there is something different about the future today. It
probably always seemed to be rushing at one; today it seems to be
rushing at an accelerating pace. Younger and younger people are asking
what the world is coming to. The imminence of the year 2,000, magic
millenial figure, probably has something to do with it. Still, there must be
more reason than that for the tremendous growth of active interest in
looking ahead. A European society for the study of the future-with Ford
Foundation money-called "Futuribles," has been at work for some
years now. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has set up a
Commission on the Year 2,000 with an impressive array of talent among
its membership. One of its members, Herman Kahn of the Hudson
Institute, a "think tank" that usually concerns itself with strategic
weapons and the like, and a colleague, Anthony Wiener, have written a
widely read book entitled The Year 2,000, An Inquiry ... New books on
the shape of the future appear at frequent intervals. There is somewhere
an Institute for the Future. Studies of current situations and problems
projected ten and twenty years ahead are now commonplace in
government and in the many foundations and research organizations. At
every learned society convention that met at the turn of the year, papers
on the future, usually with a warning of impending disaster, filled a large
part of the program.
Is all this interest and activity different in kind from the work of
Edward Bellamy, who wrote Looking Backward in 1887, or H. G. Wells,
who wrote The War of the Worlds in 1889? Perhaps not. Perhaps it is just
a contemporary manifestation of the same natural human curiosity about
what is around the corner. Each man must judge for himself. It is possible
to argue impressively that the basic dimensions of change are much as
they have been. One has only to try to sketch out what Herman Kahn
calls a "surprise free" picture of the world a generation hence to provide
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CONFIDENTIAL The Future
one's self plentiful food for thought. A "surprise free" world is, of course,
one arrived at by projecting present trends. Each individual would
choose different trends and find that he expected them to develop
differently than his neighbor, but it is striking that it is quite difficult to
carry out the exercise without positing a world very different from that in
which we live today.
Just as a sample: it could be argued that people in their thirties today
can look forward with some assurance to a world with twice the present
population, with real time communications-with access to vast stores of
information-which are likely not only to change the role of information
in human life but to give those in command of the central machinery a
kind of control over individuals never before exercised by anyone, a
world in which the problems before the decision-makers in many
countries are of such technical complexity as to make real public
participation in their resolution impossible, and in which the majority of
the world's people will not have real, i.e. productive, jobs to keep them
occupied and out of mischief.
It is not the purpose of this paper to try to sketch out a scenario or
scenarios for the future. What we want to do here is talk about what
change is likely to mean to intelligence, and content ourselves with a
"surprise free" projection rather than go into all the most likely
alternatives and permutations.
In the military field, generally speaking, circumstances seem less likely
to change in ways affecting in our present methods of collecting and
analyzing intelligence than in other fields. Weapons seem likely to
become more sophisticated and complex and to be developed for use in
areas hitherto inviolate-the sea bed and outer space, but the problems
for intelligence seem likely to remain essentially the same. The biggest
change in the nature of the problem of military intelligence would come
about in the event of the achievement of firm disarmament or arms
limitation agreements among the larger powers. The problems of
inspection and monitoring of development and test programs would
become of paramount importance in such a situation. Whether
disarmament or arms limitation becomes a reality or not, intelligence on
the acquisition of sophisticated weapons by small countries, particularly
the less stable and balanced small countries and those involved in bitter
feuds, seem likely to become both more important and more difficult to
acquire.
Recent experience has made it abundantly clear to intelligence officers
that the traditional methods of collecting and presenting intelligence on
conventional land warfare are of limited validity in situations like that in
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Vietnam. The order of battle concept has been very difficult to apply
meaningfully where organized combat units have played only one of
several complementary roles. Collection and presentation of meaningful
statistics on manpower gains and losses and assessments of enemy
capabilities have evaded traditional methods and concepts. The impact
of the Vietnam war on concepts of resistance and rebellion all over the
world seems certain to be tremendous in coming years. The emergence of
new patterns of rebellion among youth and student groups and in
situations where the racial issue is important seems likely to give rise to
new forms of insurgency that will require a major effort on the part of
intelligence, first to comprehend what is going on in various
revolutionary situations and then to develop means of collecting useful
intelligence.
Another problem of military and defense-related intelligence that
seems likely to demand more attention is that of anticipating and
detecting methods of taking advantage of the complexities of advanced
societies to provoke breakdowns of essential services or otherwise bring
about chaotic situations. Interference with water supplies, the
development of transmission of power, communications-including
computer banks of records, personnel data, programs for use by the
national automatic data system in the event of specific emergency
situations, and the like-all provide kinds of opportunities for bringing a
society to a standstill that did not exist when individuals and
communities operated in a relatively independent fashion.
Scientific and technical not directly related to military intelligence is
probably also likely to have a relatively easy problem of adjustment in a
rapidly changing situation. S and T personnel and resources are already
focussed on the future and on areas likely to be of continuing intelligence
interest. It is intelligence with a focus on human beings and their
institutions that is likely to face the most difficult problems, both with
respect to determining what they should be collecting and how they
should go about making what they collect meaningful to the decision
makers.
In a world of unprecedentedly rapid change the essential mission of
intelligence will remain the same: to tell the policymaker what is going
on in the world and to warn him of specific threats to the safety and the
interests of the United States. Performance of this mission requires,
among other things, an agreed concept of the general pattern of
international relations and its implications for the welfare of the United
States. Even the most modest piece of intelligence collection depends
upon some kind of judgment as to what is of interest to the intelligence
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CONFIDENTIAL The future
community, and ultimately to its customers. Many changes have been
made in the simplistic concept of the Cold War once so widely used to
determine what was relevant to the intelligence mission. One of the most
important tasks that faces us now is that of adjusting our overall
understanding of the world situation to take into account the effects of
the major engines of change: population, communications, technology in
general, and the breakdown of traditional social and political
institutions.
One of the most important and difficult tasks of the intelligence
analyst, as of the political analyst, has always been that of determining
the real goals and priorities of foreign nations. Whether the leaders of a
nation were willing to sacrifice domestic goals for military has in the past
been generally determinable by examination of indicators as to what
they were spending in each field. As lead times for the development and
deployment of weapons systems have stretched out, however, and as
government involvement in long-range domestic development has
increased, it has become both easier and more difficult to determine the
direction in which a given nation is going. On the one hand, the
intelligence officer can see what another nation is doing in certain areas
long before the activity in question produces an end result in its military
capability or in its wealth and stability. On the other, as commitments
become more complicated and longer-range, it will be increasingly
difficult to determine just what their eventual consequence will he.
As in the past, one of the main questions before the intelligence officer
will he that of the intentions of another country's leadership.
Determining what another country's intentions are has always depended
heavily upon understanding its governmental system as well as upon
understanding the men who control it. One of the big problems for the
intelligence officer over the next decade or two seems likely to he to
comprehend changes in other political systems. All the newly
independent countries in the period since World War II have gone
through complicated, and usually agonizing, searches for forms of
government suitable to their new situation. Intelligence officers like
everybody else, have had a hard time understanding what was going on,
politically, in Uganda, in Syria, and in Burma, for example. The problem
has usually been approached by watching the man or men who seemed to
wield authority, a method which would have been less satisfactory if
what was happening in most of these countries-not China or India, of
course-had been more important to the US.
Without making the estimate that it will be so, it seems worthwhile to
consider that over the next generation it may be the advanced nations
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and, in particular, the large and important nations that will be going
through changes which will make it most difficult for the intelligence
officer concerned with overall political analysis and estimates to
determine what is going on and, indeed, who is in charge.
All the advanced nations are faced with problems that are the
consequence of population growth and the advance of technology;
problems which manifest themselves in urban crises, the breakdown of
transportation and other services in the face of escalating demand, and
pollution of the environment. These problems tend to confront
governments with unprecedented requirements for investment of
resources. All produce and are, in turn, stimulated by dissatisfactions,
antagonisms, and demands that have, or develop, a strong political
content and lead to aggressive action, eventually in some cases to
rebellion, against the powers that be-the establishment.
All these factors have the effect of eroding the system-the social,
economic, and political. Another factor, not noted above, is the role of
technology, which is changing the lives of ordinary people at an
unprecedented rate, with the ultimate effect of making the rules and
inhibitions that once governed the conduct of most people seem less and
less relevant. Perhaps the most important contribution of
technology-including that of economic organization-has been to
remove from over the heads of many people the once controlling
certainty in their lives: the knowledge that their survival depended on
their willingness to work-usually to work according to the rules of the
system. Today, in every advanced country in the world, more and more
people-mostly youths-are indicating that if given a choice between a
job with its material rewards, but also with its obligations and
disciplines, and an uninhibited, undisciplined life supported by handouts
from society or parents, they will choose the latter-for a time, at least.
All governments in advanced nations face the problems of internal
crises plus the breakdown of traditional attitudes and institutions.
Democratic governments face still another kind of crisis which challenges
the basic assumptions on which their system depends. The most
advanced nations are already at a point at which it is extremely difficult
even to keep up the appearance of free public discussion of many of the
issues which face the policy-makers. This is particularly true where
highly sophisticated technology is involved, as in decisions with respect
to transportation systems, use of natural resources, and acceptance of
public responsibility for the welfare of the individual. The essence of the
point being made here is that many governments are likely in the next
several years to face problems which cannot be solved by the political
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CONFIDENTIAL e uture
methods of the past. Some will improvise for a long time; others may
carry out quiet revolutions among the elite which will change the nature
and the uses of power as much as democratic forms changed the
absolutisms which they succeeded.
One thing that makes the concentration of power in the hands of small
elite groups seem a likely development in some countries over the next
decade or two is the fact that the instruments by which such an elite
might exercise its control lie readily at hand.
As the machinery of life gets more and more complicated and
centralized, opportunities for central control are multiplied. It can be
argued that it is easier to control a closely knit urban community than a
dispersed rural society, though history records many despotisms holding
sway over peasant societies and failing to subdue the citizens of
urbanized societies. Quite clearly, the kind of government a people has
depends upon a great many factors, most of them rooted in the past.
Nevertheless, it seems worthwhile for the intelligence officer with an
interest in the future to ponder the implications for government of the
following:
(a) Centralized, interlinked, computerized banks containing all (repeat
all) information in the country's libraries, government records (including
intelligence, FBI, and police files), credit records, financial records, etc.
(b) A system whereby all funds, personal and corporate, are kept in a
central, or inter-linked system, of repositories. Personal income would be
paid into individual accounts by computer and drawn out by
presentation of a credit cum identity card, cum passport, or, more likely,
by pressing the thumb-with its unique print-against a sensitive plate.
A host of other science-fiction horrors could be postulated for the
computerized world of twenty years, or less, from now. (For one,
computer consoles could provide employment at home for a large part of
the working population-which would mean that no one would know
whether he was really working or simply being kept out of mischief....)
For our purposes the two developments sketched out above-
computerized records and computerized money-carry enough impli-
cations to make the point that government may soon have means of
control of the population quite unlike anything that has existed in the
past.
First, let us look at a few of the implications of computerized storage
and retrieval of information. Such a facility will, indeed, make it possible
for junior to do his homework without reference to books, his mother to
do her family budget with astonishing ease and accuracy (maybe), and
father to check the "facts" on almost anything. The question is, what
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does it do for the people who control the selection, organization, and
content of the information banks, as well as access to it, once stored, In
the first place, everyone will have to have a security clearance rating his
level of access-in itself a means of exercising control over the individual
citizen. There is also the' matter of access to credit and business
information, a possible source of influence and profit.
Centralized personal records-scholastic, medical, credit policy,
,security, etc.-on each and every person also suggests possibilities for the
exercise of controls over individuals of a sort never before possible. If you
have to present your thumbprint every time you buy something-in order
to assure that the proper sum is deducted from your central account-you
will be querying the computer for a record of your personal file. What an
opportunity for a solicitous, or venal, or sadistic, or managing
government authority to tell the computer that certain individuals
mustn't have cigarettes, alcohol, certain drugs or books, or go to certain
places.
A proper reaction to all this is that it is farfetched-admittedly-and
that human beings would never put up with this sort of thing. Maybe. On
the other hand, we are talking about a new dimension of relations
between men and society, and between the individual and those in
charge. For the intelligence officer to understand and interpret what goes
on in other nations, hostile or friendly, he must be prepared to anticipate
the temptations that confront their governors and to spot the indicators if
they do decide to try something outlandish.
Not at all outlandish is the prospect that Communist dictatorships and
some of the authoritarian rulers in the less developed countries of Africa
and Asia, will try to exploit the new ways of controlling and
manipulating their people. It goes without saying that changes in the
governmental system in Communist nations will be a matter of
continuing concern to intelligence analysts. As in the past those countries
seem likely to lag behind the more advanced countries of Europe and
North America in their response to many of the major stimulants to
change in the contemporary world. It is difficult, however, to
contemplate the Communist states retaining their past degree of
immunity to the outside world, particularly to the world that one projects
on a surprise free trend over the next generation.
The intelligence analyst who is primarily concerned with the less
developed countries can probably look forward to as exciting and
demanding a time over the next several years as his colleagues who are
assigned to the advanced countries. Most of the new states have gone
through a post-independence period in which the veterans of the fight for
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independence, most of them still much under the cultural and political
influence of their former "imperialist" mentors, have tried and generally
failed to realize the promises they believed were implicit in the fact of
independence. Most have gone through a period of planned
`development- in which they used up reserves left over from the colonial
period, plus the generous foreign aid available from Fast and West
during the period of their most active competition. Many of these new
countries seem to be returning to the obscurity from whence they came.
Many have accepted a less important place on the world stage than they
thought their due when they became independent. There are reasons for
believing that the Afro-Asian and Latin American world will he less
important in world affairs and demand less of intelligence officers in the
next decade or so than it has since World War H.
The Great Powers may, of course, be less concerned in the years ahead
about instability and change in the Afro-Asian and Latin American
states than they have been. It seems highly unlikely, however, that they
can long consider it possible to remain indifferent to turmoil or human
suffering on a large scale in places like India, Egypt, or Brazil. Afro-Asia
and Latin America in general show no signs of greater stability over the
coming years than they have in the past. With the accumulation of
conventional weapons and the spread of sophisticated weapons, security
problems are likely to continue to be of major importance to the
intelligence officer concerned with these areas.
The development and application of technology seems likely to have a
great influence on the future of the less developed countries. In many of
them, technological backwardness has made local products-even when
made with local materials and cheap local labor-more expensive than
imported mass-produced products, dependence upon which not only
creates critical balance of payments problems but also unemployment
and the decline of local crafts and skills. In other ways technology and
the worldwide spread of investment and enterprise by the larger
companies in the more advanced countries links the economies of many
less advanced states to the world economy. Whatever the scenario, the
less developed states seem likely to he more a part of the world, its
problems and its changes, than they have in the past and to require
adjustments and new perceptions on the part of the intelligence analyst
who would explain it to the policy-maker.
The traditional bureaucratic response to the kinds of challenges noted
here would he to create an Office of Population Research, then, perhaps
an Office of Revolutionary Intelligence. With two such important new
offices in existence, the next step would naturally be a Directorate of
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e uture
Long-Range Intelligence. Fortunately, we have generally been able to
resist such devices and the Agency has avoided much tinkering with the
division, direction, and organization of effort. The central importance of
the man with the yellow pad-his quality, his preparation and training,
his support-has been and should continue to be the main emphasis in
the Agency's approach to its job.
But is the average intelligence officer, in present circumstances, able to
do his day to day job and to prepare for the future as well? In many
areas, given the support he gets from administration and planners, he
probably is. This is particularly true of officers who are concerned with
keeping up with the technology which will enable them to do present jobs
faster and more efficient. It is also true of officers in Scientific and
Technical areas where the emphasis is naturally on development and
change. It is in the areas where intelligence is primarily concerned with
men, their motives, and the consequences of their actions that the outlook
seems less assured. If we can't solve these problems by setting up an
Office of Development Research, or the like, what should we do?
This article proposes no solution, only a suggestion, and it is, indeed,
the classic non-solution: a committee. The most important requirement
here, it is submitted, is a heightened consciousness on the part of Agency
officers of the impending problems for intelligence imposed by rapid,
world-wide change. More discussion, more thought, more analysis, more
attention to the problem of understanding the processes of change and
their implications for intelligence cannot but be desirable for an Agency
whose purpose in being is to tell the US Government not just what has
happened and is happening, but what is likely to happen. A seminar run
by the Office of Training, a Committee on the Future intended to
coordinate and direct debate and discussion, these and other activities
designed to concentrate our minds on what is surely going to be a bigger
and bigger problem for the Agency would certainly be worth a try.
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EDITORIAL NOTES
Holders of the Studies in Intelligence may wish to note that the Winter
edition, 1970, was omitted because of a shortage of contributions deemed
publishable at the time.
103
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC
LITERATURE
THE SUPER SPIES. By Andrew Tully. (New York, 1969)
In case you are curious as to just who the Super Spies are, they are the
USIB agencies (including the three service intelligence organizations),
less CIA. The Super Spy masters, as listed on one of the book's prefatory
pages, are the chiefs of these agencies, less Mr. Helms. Four of the eight
names on the list have changed since the printer set this page; and two
more of the eight ought not to be represented as personally associated
with the limited foreign intelligence operations of their agencies. Mr.
Tully is thus only about 25 per cent correct within his own bizarre frame
of reference. This score is, however, well above expectation.
In the main text itself there are lots of little pieces of a good many
things; an alleged Damon-Pythias relationship between DIA and INR;
things about NSA; about how Congress ought to watch intelligence more
closely; about the Pueblo and. the SAMOS; about the peculations of
William Godell and the travels of Stokely Carmichael; about the
defections, some eight-plus years back, of Martin and Mitchell; plus
some spy fiction which we are supposed to accept as fact.
A great deal of all this is ill-informed or wrong. A good part of it
(except Mr. Tully's new fabrications) is a further mutilation of what had
already been bowdlerized in the public literature.
In short, this is another dismal Tully book about the intelligence
business. One perceives but a single improvement over an earlier work:'
this time, someone saw to the correct rendering of proper names.
Otherwise, it is the same lengthy display of Mr. Tully's innocence, nay,
towering ignorance, of intelligence and the world within which
intelligence has its being. For example, behind the cover of its
intelligence research mission, INR (the Bureau of Intelligence Research
of the Department of State) is supposed to run one of the best espionage
services there is (this outrageous allegation runs through the whole book);
the Soviet fractional orbit bombardment system utilizes full orbit
(although Mr. Tully knows what the "F" in FOBS stands for):
mechanical translation is doing its job at 35,000 words per hour. Mr.
'CIA, The Inside Story (N.Y., 1961).
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Tully has not heard of changes in the attache system made several years
back, nor does he know the role of the service intelligence chiefs in the
USI B; he thinks the headquarters of the Institute for Defense Analyses
are on the Princeton campus (which they are not); he thinks Camelot was
a (,-2 enterprise (it was sponsored by the Army's operations division); he
even thinks the US, which had no diplomatic relations with Cambodia at
the time, had an operating embassy (with a safe house) in Phnom Penh in
1967.
This sort of error which reveals the incompetence of the author more
than it may affront his audience is well within the Tully tradition. So is
the threadbare dodge of reading something in the public domain and
pretending that it was learned via a privileged interview. In the case of
the quotations from Allen Evans, they came from Mr. Evans all right, but
from an unclassified brochure he once wrote about intelligence in the
State Department. Likewise the seeming quotations from Thomas
Hughes are taken from the transcript of unclassified testimony that Mr.
Hughes presented to a Congressional committee. Where Mr. Tully got
the story about how INR was correct all along in its view that the Soviets
were engaged in putting long range missiles within Cuba is anybody's
guess. Elie Abel's remarkable hook about the missile crisis and Roger
Hilsman's both have the story straight. Yet Mr. Tully with a feigned
inside source puts Hilsman in conflict with John McCone on the matter.
It will not he forgotten, I hope, that Mr. McCone was the only USIB
member, indeed probably the only senior intelligence officer in the US,
who called Soviet intentions correctly in those tense weeks.
There are a number of other supposed live sources who are reputed to
have told Mr. Tully how secret Soviet intentions to move into
Czechoslovakia were penetrated, how espionage really laid bare the
secrets of recent events in Greece and the coming of the Tet offensive in
Vietnam. Whoever the source is in fact, if there ever was one, he would
not now recognize his story; the author modestly states that he has to
change names and scenes in the interests of security. In these instances
Mr. 'Gully's observance of the security of his country's secrets is
impeccable.
On NSA matters no one talked except the notorious defectors, Martin
and Mitchell, and their talk to the Soviets was printed in The New York
Times in 1961. What Tully did not get from this sort of source he seems to
have borrowed-almost verbatim and without attribution-from David
Kahn's hook, The Codebreakers.
Throughout the book Tully studiedly omits CIA except to dart
waspishly at it now and then. This should not upset any devotee of the
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Agency which, after all, once basked solo in the full majesty of Mr.
Tully's ineptitude. But serious outside critics may wonder why a book
bearing this title is so reticent about the one agency of government
popularly supposed to have a considerable capability in the spy business.
A reason that is sure to leap to the mind of such a critical reader will
derive from his realization that no CIA officer is cited as the source of any
of Mr. Tully's allegations. Since CIA was obviously cool in its relations
with him, he is endeavoring in his own inimitable way to square the
account. With respect to this sort of tit for tat I perceive few moist eyes in
the house.
THE GAME OF NATIONS, THE AMORALITY OF POWER
POLITICS. By Miles Copeland. (Weidenfeld and Nicol-
son, London, 1969)
Miles Copeland's book on the life and philosophy of a "crypto-
diplomat," consultant to the mighty, and player in the "game of
nations" quickly sold out its first printing in England and has prompted
varied reactions.
The Arab press and radio and the "anti-imperialist" press and radio
elsewhere have noted it, more or less hysterically, as another evidence of
the deviousness of American methods and purposes.
C. L. Sulzberger, in the New York Times of 10 August 1969, wrote that
the degree of involvement" of the US in the Middle East plots and
counterplots and the "specific details" are "now for the first time
exposed."
The reviewer for The Economist (6-12 September 1969) observed that
books like this must be "looked at warily," because "one has to wonder if
there is, embedded in this elegant compound of reminiscence and
didacticism, somewhere something that some higher personage than Mr.
Copeland actually wants exposed to the light of day."
Indeed, there are things of which to be wary and things which cause
one to wonder, even if one has some knowledge of the events described
and long acquaintance with their narrator and interpreter. This review is
not intended to set the record straight, a much too lengthy and
complicated task, if not an impossible one. It is offered simply as an
account and an evaluation of this book from the perspective of an
intelligence professional.
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The reviewer must begin by stating that he thinks the book violates the
confidences of a great many people who did not and do not look on
politics or intelligence as a "game" and did not consider that they were
playing games with Miles Copeland. The reviewer is aware that his harsh
judgments on the book, which pari passu reflect inevitably on the
character of the author of so personal a document, may, by some, be
interpreted as a violation of confidence on his part. He can only say that
Copeland, by writing the book, put it and himself up for public
discussion, and certainly ought to have known that it would arouse
interest and comment by former colleagues.
The Game of Nations is a readable, though often confused, and
ultimately incomprehensible book. It reflects Miles Copeland's fabled
charm and nimbleness of mind. It is also replete with his special brand of
jargon which has so often beguiled and disarmed both colleagues and
antagonists. Despite the many curious turns of language and thought,
the book gives a memorable picture of the world of Miles Copeland.
't'here has seldom been so revealing a title: The Game of Nations, The
Amorality of Power Politics. The author means every word of it. His basic
proposition is that international politics is a game in which morality and
principle are stupidities and which only the devious and unprincipled
can win.
Ile explains his own role in the game by quoting Edmund Wilson to
the effect that F. Scott Fitzgerald was once inspired by Emily Post's
Etiquette "to write a play wherein the dramatic conflict would arise from
stalemates between Gentle People all trying to do the Right Thing. The
conflict would only he resolved by the intervention of a cad who would
bound on to the scene and set things right by behavior such as is totally
outlawed by Mrs. Post." (p. 11). Miles is the cad, and proud of it-or at
least so he insists almost but not quite to the last.
The villains of the piece are the "goo-goos," i.e., those "who believe
that, even in a country like Syria, Good Government is not only desirable
but possible." (p. 43) There are also harsh words for those who follow the
"High Road of Statesmanship and Diplomacy," which Copeland informs
us was known in the Pentagon and CIA as "HORSESHIP." (p. 126)
Toward the end of the book Copeland expresses a growing
disillusionment with those who make and influence US policy overseas.
He refers to a distressing "distaste for violence" which became evident in
the US business community and Government about the time of the
Lebanese crisis of 1958 (p. 198) and says that the ability of the US to play
the game was curtailed by the fact that "high morality" became the "in
thing" in the State Department in the early sixties. (p. 222).
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Throughout the book Copeland harps on the subject of amorality,
which he advocates, and morality, which he regards as foolishness.
Moralists in the State Department and elsewhere, he explains, are always
thwarting the efforts of the hard-headed realists in international politics.
However, he says in one of the most revealing passages of the book, we
Americans can "sleep more easily at night from knowing that behind this
front (of high morality) we are in fact capable of matching the Soviets
perfidy for perfidy." We "do indeed believe in honesty," says Copeland,
"although not so much as a great moral principle as because, as
Benjamin Franklin said, it `is the best policy'." (p. 13).
It is presumably to help Americans sleep more soundly that this book
has been written, though this reviewer is uncertain whether the overall
effect will be more sleep for Americans and their friends and less sleep for
their enemies, or the other way around. Any reader who approaches this
book cold is going to have a difficult time figuring out who the author is
and how to evaluate what he says. His principal problem will be to
decide whether the book itself is not a ploy in some game, the limits and
rules of which are unknown to him.
It is worth noting briefly here how the author does represent himself.
He says he "helped set up CIA." Later he was a "crypto-diplomat" in the
US mission in Syria involved in activities which included bringing about
a change of government. Except for these acknowledgements of an
intelligence connection, an effort is made throughout the book to
establish the author's identity as a private citizen with "companies" and
business interests around the world. This private citizen is, however, said
to have been in constant demand to play war games in Washington, and
to serve on task forces and special committees set up by Dean Acheson,
John Foster Dulles, and others of their eminence. A number of
diplomats-Jefferson Caffrey,' for example-are said to have called on
him for advice and service from time to time. No mention is made of
employment by CIA, and Allen Dulles is referred to only once; care is
taken in the mention of names of active intelligence officers; and it is
suggested that the CIA men the author worked with were on detached
duty. The CIA and CIA attitudes, policies, etc., are, however, referred to
with an insider's seeming familiarity, on almost every page.
What does all this add up to? The uninformed reader can assume that
the author was a CIA officer who thinks his cover story will hold water, or
that-as most of the Arab commentators and the reviewer in The
'The book, incidentally, is dedicated to Caffrey, Hare, and Wadsworth, three
"ambassadors of the old school" whom Copeland apparently believes were gamesmen, not
moralists, a judgment which these gentlemen might not have considered complimentary.
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Lconornist appear to think-he is a CIA officer whose superiors have
some devious purpose in allowing the book to see the light of day. Some
uninformed readers have also demonstrated that it is possible to read this
book and conclude that Copeland has explained his role exactly as it was,
difficult though that seems to this reviewer. The explanation that
Copeland wrote this hook without official approval or collaboration
seems unlikely to occur to many readers.
It is hard to say what the message of this hook will be for most
uninitiated but believing readers. One of the strongest impressions will
probably be of a US Government straight out of science fiction and some
of the wilder mail order courses on management. One gets an impression
of foreign policy being made and implemented the way P & G makes and
sells soap. One sees the Secretary of State and the President waiting with
bated breath to find out what the oldest continuing floating war game in
Washington has made of some new hit of intelligence before they order
that formula so-and-so be fed into the computers, which will then tell
them what to do.
'T'here is a considerable amount of circumstantial detail cited to
support this picture of the government. The first chapter begins with a
colorful account of a Games Center in operation in Washington which
fed its results directly into the policy-making process. There is also an
account of a team set up to fight the Cold War which developed
intelligence assets, decided that since it had them they ought to be used,
and then, by a process of elimination, decided on Syria as the best
available practice ground. (pp. 35-36). The same formula is repeated in
account of a highly secret committee of specialists set up in 1951 by Dean
Acheson to study the Arab world, which "when we thought ourselves
ready for a major operation," decided that "Egypt was the place to
start." (pp. 48-49).
Another strong impression on the reader is certain to he made by
Copeland's solemn lucubrations on his political philosophy and his
system for successful gamesmanships in a very restricted area of
international politics. At the end of the first chapter he says he wants to
"dispel any remaining notion that this is a book about Nasser. Rather it
is a case history-hopefully teaching lessons of general applicability-of
relations between the United States and a `non-Western' leader of a
particular kind which is likely to become increasingly prominent in
international relations of the future. Although I have devoted much
space to Nasser, I have tried to concentrate on aspects of his behavior
which might he expected of any Afro-Asian leader, to the extent that he is
the Nasser type...... (pp. 26-27).
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It is just possible that if a reader discovered another non-Western
leader who was enough of the Nasser type to suit Copeland's definition
he might find something in the book that would further application, but
only just.
Urgent insistence is made throughout the book that the reader is being
given the most succinct and practical instructions for playing the game of
nations. Rules of the game appear at the chapter heads. For example:
"The first prerequisite for winning the game is to know that you're in on
it; if you can't change the board, change the players ... but settle for a
true player, not a pawn; the strategy of the weak player is to play off the
strong players against one another ...," and so on. When Chairman Mao
produced these sayings, or whether it was Chairman Mao or another, is
not made clear, but the message to the reader is obviously intended to be
that this is choice stuff and, more impressive, that this kind of stuff is
taken seriously at high levels in Washington.
It is possible that a few readers will react as John Crosby did in his
column in the London Observer (21 December 1969). His comment was:
"I have always felt strongly that you can't beat a man at tennis by tying
your shoelaces at crucial points.... I can't escape the conviction that if
you play war ... you are going to lose." They may, however, make this
judgment on the validity of Copeland's approach to international
politics and still, as Crosby apparently does, accept his picture of the way
things are done in the US Government as an accurate one.
Miles Copeland's book will make a lot of serious and devoted US
Government servants wince, particularly those who are already nervous
about this kind of thing making headway in Washington. It will frighten
a lot of outsiders, friends of the US and of the US Government, who have
on occasion suspected that things inside the Government might be as
weird as Copeland says they are.
On the other hand there may be some little consolation in the
knowledge that Copeland's book is going to confuse the dickens out of
the real enemies of the US. They will make some obvious propaganda use
of it, but surely most of them will hold back, fearing that they are being
put on, that some ingenious trap has been laid for them.
What must the professional intelligence officer's judgement on this
book be? He cannot ignore the fact that the book is not an entirely
fanciful description of Miles Copeland's world. One of the most inter-
esting things about the book is Miles' acknowledgement of disillusion
with the whole business of the intelligence game as he has played it.
One is reminded of something he says Nasser said to him: "The genius
of you Americans is that you never make clear-cut stupid moves, only
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complicated stupid moves...." (p. 138) In the reviewer's opinion he was
saying this to the right man. Not that Copeland isn't a man with a great
natural talent for dealing with people, but, as The Game of Nations
shows, he has tried to rationalize and solemnize his role and his formulae
for international politics to the point that they became exactly as Nasser
said, a complicated nonsense. Miles Copeland has dealt a mortal blow to
the theory that gamesmanship is the key to success in international
politics. And a good thing, too. For his own sake, and for the sake of those
of his former associates who are still active intelligence officers, however,
it would have been better if he had not written this book.
I)IF KOMMUNISTISCHEN PARTEIEN DER WELT. (The Communist
Parties of the World.) Edited by C. D. Kernig. (Herder, Freiburg-
Basel-Vienna, 1969. 583 pp.)
The old and respected Herder publishing house, whose reputation
derives in part from its encyclopedias, is in the process of putting out an
ambitious, five volume comparative encyclopedia entitled Soviet System
and Democratic Society, two volumes of which have already appeared.
The present hook was prepared as part of that project, but has been
issued to stand by itself. The publisher's consultants and editorial board
listings contain a number of established authorities, e.g., Z. K.
Brzezinski, M. Fainsod, A. Inkeles, A. Brumberg. This hook is in two
parts: general and specific. The general part treats the world movement
as a whole, including the Comintern, Cominform, and international
fronts. The specific part contains individual articles on each of the world
CPs, including the CPSU; because of special situations, some areas are
treated regionally rather than by country. Each article has been written
by an authority with an established reputation. Not necessarily for the
true specialist, this is nevertheless a useful and well done reference work
for the generalist.
LA I)EUXIEMEMORTDE RAMON MERCADER. (The Second Death
of Ramon Mercader.) By Jorge Semprun. (Gallimard Paris, 1969.
432 pp.)
This novel, which was awarded the 1969 Prix Femina, should be of
some interest to intelligence officers for two reasons: its author, and its
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plot. Jorge Semprun, until 1965, was a leading official of the Spanish
Communist Party, under the nom de guerre Federico Sanchez; he was
expelled from the Party in that year after a bitter dispute with Party
leader Santiago Carrillo over policy. He did the film scenario for the
controversial motion picture about Greece, "Z," and is presently at work
on the scenario for a film to be made of Arthur London's book, "L'Aveu"
(The Confession), the story of his arrest, trial, and imprisonment in the
context of the Slansky purge in Czechoslovakia. "The Second Death" is
the story of a Soviet KGB "illegal" who is placed in Spain under the
identity of a Spanish"Nion" who died in the Soviet Union, whose career
is haunted from the outset by his notorious namesake, the killer of
Trotsky. He is pursued around Western Europe by CIA officers, one of
whom in turn is being pursued by the East German State Security
Service, who in turn are pursued by the Dutch police-all in all, one
could probably call it an espionage western. Some idea of Semprun's
style can be had from his prefatory note at the beginning of the book:
"The events with which this tale is concerned are completely imaginary.
Even more than that: any coincidence with reality would be not only
fortuitous, but downright scandalous." Worth reading, if you have good
French.
THE SECRET ROAD TO WORLD WAR TWO: SOVIET VERSUS
WESTERN INTELLIGENCE, 1921-1939. By Paul W. Blackstock.
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969. 384 pp.)
This book has grave defects. For the most part they result from two of
the author's characteristics. The first of these is that he is insufficiently
grounded in intelligence, or insufficiently critical, to make
discriminating judgments about his sources. The second is that he
artificially equates the USSR and the democratic West in comparing
their governments and their intelligence services.
The Secret Road to World War Two is really an amalgam of what
might better have been two books, one dealing with clever and sinister
deception and penetration operations conducted by Soviet intelligence
against anti-Soviet Russian emigres abroad, the other with the inept
policies and miscalculations of the great powers, the blunders that led to
the tragedy of the Second World War. The contrived joining of these two
subjects contribute neither to lucidity nor to unity. This reader was left
with the impression that Blackstock tried to make these dramatic spy
stories more impressive through his references to the political and
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historical dynamics of the time. His views as an historian are those of
Robert "fucker, of John Erickson, and in part George F. Kennan.
Roth the title and the sub-title are misleading. The word road implies
that the contest between the secret services of East and West led to war;
yet the author fails to produce any evidence supporting this view. As for
the sub-title, "Moscow's Allegations about Soviet versus Western
Intelligence" would have been more accurate. And the title itself might
more appropriately have suggested Soviet ingenuity in such operational
specialities as disinformation, provocation, and liquidation. The real
struggle, moreover, was not a contest of equals, a hidden conflict between
intelligence antagonists, but a ruthless campaign by the Soviet services to
destroy the Russian emigre groups abroad, viewed by the Stalinists as
a nuisance and potential threat, as well as the internal enemies, real
and imaginary, of the Communist regime.
The work is divided into four major sections, each of which includes a
string of episodes attributed by the author to a Soviet-Western war of
wits between their services of intelligence and counterintelligence during
the 1920's and 1930's. In each of the four parts Blackstock tries to holster
his thesis by data drawn from other Western writers and from official
Soviet interpretations, with only an occasional note of skepticism about
the latter. (This approach to the subject reminded this reader of the
grossly disinformational book by Sayers and Kahn, The Great Conspir-
acy, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1946, in which the putative authors
chose from a mass of Western documentation those accounts best suited
to support and "prove" the Soviet version and justification of their
Operations.)
Blackstock has carried out extensive research, in the course of which he
examined all the materials available in libraries of several countries and
in the archives of anti-Soviet organizations that plotted indefatigably but
ineptly the overthrow of the Bolshevik regime. He personally interviewed
sonic of the last surviving emigres who participated in the confused,
tumultuous events of the era, and he discovered hidden papers and
diaries left behind by participants long since dead. But digging up facts
is less important than understanding them and interpreting them
correctly. Here Blackstock falls short. He does not know enough of the
history of revolutionary Russia or of the realities of power in the USSR.
I Ie does not understand Russian psychology. He accepts uncritically both
authorized Soviet versions of events and the opinions of emigres who
were completely disoriented by the crushing defeats inflicted on them.
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The book also contains occasional distortions and half-truths that seem
to have originated with the author, not his sources. For instance,
Blackstock alleges that most of the roughly one million Russian refugees
and emigres bowed to the reality of the Bolshevik regime and began in
their adopted lands the process of assimilation. A minority even joined
the Communist Party. He finds that 75 per cent of the Party's member-
ship in Chicago, for example, was of Russian origin, and creates an
impression that these members were refugees from Bolshevism, whereas
in fact they were predominantly pre-1917 Jewish immigrants from
Russia, people who had never lived under Communist power.
Other less obvious inaccuracies result from the author's tendency to
generalize and oversimplify. He says, for example, that after 1925 the
"European world" (meaning the West) was polarized spiritually and
politically into a Communist, anti-fascist left and a pro-fascist right that
was ready to appease Hitler at almost any price in the hope that he could
be turned against the Soviet state (p. 195). He argues that the free-
floating political violence of right-wing and left-wing European mobs
was matched in the United States by the cold-blooded violence of
organized crime under gangster overlords (p. 196). He asserts that bloody
purges in the Soviet Union in 1937 were paralleled by the epidemic of
denunciations in the United States during the McCarthy period (p. 225).
This kind of recurring generalization awakens an impression that the
writer wants to disarm any reader who may be skeptical of Soviet
explanations of their secret operations and their excesses. After all, he
argues, America had its corresponding hysteria. And the British
reactionaries, responsible for the Arcos raid and the break in diplomatic
relations, precipitated the war scare in the Soviet Union. The threat of
war-whether in fact it was real or merely invented by the Kremlin for
purposes of propaganda-was the basis for an abrupt increase in OGPU
arrests of Western intelligence agents inside the USSR in the summer of
1927, as shown in Blackstock's table (p. 166). Of 192 spies arrested in that
year, 167 were seized in May and June. Soviet propaganda denounced
almost all of them as agents controlled by the British SIS (p. 166).
Blackstock's conclusion is that the traumatic events of that year made the
Soviets realize the urgency of doing battle with the Western intelligence
services.
The author's failure to distinguish among the various Soviet services
pitted against the West is a defect that is not uncommon among
nonprofessional writers on the subject. David Dallin's Soviet Espionage
(Yale University Press, 1955) talks almost exclusively about the GB
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(Gossudarstvennaia Bezopasnost, or State Security), for example,
whether in fact he meant the Cheka and its many successors, together
with their branches and subdivisions, or the GRU and its military and
positive intelligence subgroups and affiliates. Such lack of precision
about the identities and structural positions of the Soviet agencies is
disconcerting to a reader interested in counterintelligence. Blackstock
either has nothing to tell such readers or he confuses the issues.
Much of Blackstock's account concerns aggressive Soviet operations
against counterrevolutionary groups of emigres abroad as well as real
and imaginary traitors at home. Such activities were predominantly, if
not exclusively, the responsibility of the Cheka, OGPU, and NKVD. But
Blackstock does not clarify or even suggest the role that the GRU or any
other military intelligence element played in the contest or in the
cooperation with the German military and the rapprochement with
Hitler that Stalin avidly sought. Thus it is far from clear who the
principals were and what units were engaged in the numerous
operations. When the Trust operation collapsed in 1927, the OGPU
foreign section speedily rebuilt networks of agents in all the capitals of
Kurope (p. 195). Walter Krivitsky, according to Blackstock, was among
the OGPU professionals who directed the work. Yet it is known from
Krivitsky's own depositions as well as other accounts that he was a GRU
officer and had no dealings with OGPU until 1935. In one passage
Blackstock expresses annoyance with writers who lump together the
various Nazi intelligence services, labelling all of them as Gestapo. Here
he commits the same offense.
The author quotes the dictum of Boris Nikolaevsky, by now almost a
cliche, that to understand the real motives behind foreign policy one
must study the battle of the secret services, a war waged constantly
beneath the surface of history. In the prewar era of Stalin, however, the
activities of the OGPU and the NKVD, at home and abroad, reflected
Soviet domestic concerns rather than foreign policy, i.e., they were de-
signed to support the conspiracy at the top that guaranteed the abso-
lutism of Stalin's rule. Blackstock's entire book, despite its inaccurate
title, is proof of the point.
The first of the four sections of the hook takes up one hundred pages. It
is the story of the Trust; the monumental exercise in deception and
provocation contrived by the chiefs of OGPU counterintelligence and
directed against the emigration abroad from 1922 to 1927. The legend
contrived by the Soviet specialists was the story of a secret monarchist
organization which, they claimed, had come into being in Petrograd by
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1921. This network had supposedly succeeded in banding together the
patriotic elements of the old capital into units determined to liberate
Mother Russia from Bolshevism. The OGPU ensured that the electrifying
news reached the ears of the leaders of the White Russian emigration,
which consisted of monarchists, former high officials of the Tsar,
expropriated industrialists, and tens of thousands of exasperated tsarist
officers. Most of these people lived in poverty and longed for the day
when they, together with the armies of the great powers, would march
into Russia, overthrow the regime and resume their rightful posts in a
liberated homeland.
Alexander Yakushev had been a high official of the Tsar's Civil
Service. An unprincipled and promiscuous man, he agreed to play the
OGPU's game. He went to Germany and reported to the High
Monarchist Council in Berlin about the development of the conspiracy by
the Monarchist Organization of Central Russia, MOCK. He was well
received by the leading emigres and by the Grand Duke Nikolai
Nikolayevich, the pretender to the Russian throne. Later two more
"conspirators" were sent abroad with the same tale. Both were well-
known tsarist generals who had thrown in their lot with the red regime.
Through Russian emigre channels, the Polish, French, and English
services soon began to receive disinformation, fabricated by the OGPU.
With the "help" of the Trust, the anti-Soviet organizations abroad
began to send spies and terrorists into the USSR. Some were executed,
but others were allowed to survive and leave the country for the purpose
of maintaining the confidence of the emigres and the Western services
in the MOCK.
Blackstock is right when he says that the Trust was one of the OGPU's
most successful foreign ventures, although he is by no means the first to
recognize this fact. He disagrees with Richard Wraga and others who
have maintained, correctly, that the MOCR was an OGPU hoax from the
outset. Blackstock supports instead the official Soviet version, which
maintains that the OGPU penetrated the MOCR, the Trust, after its
establishment, and that the OGPU recruited key monarchists abroad,
such as Yakushev and General Zayonchkovskiy. Blackstock admits that
the official Soviet chronicler, Lev Nikulin (Mertvaia Zyb, Moscow, 1965,
The Deadly Swell, usually translated in English as The Swell of the Sea)
had to make radical revisions in each of his three consecutive editions,
but he follows the Nikulin line nevertheless. The result is that the smell of
provocation and deception is obliterated by the less acrid odor of
penetration.
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The ideology of the Soviet-controlled Trust operatives was tailored to
please Western tastes. They were anti-interventionists. They propagated
the deception that the Bolshevik regime was becoming more and more
like the capitalistic West and added that it would soon collapse anyway.
They opposed terror as an unproductive tactic potentially harmful to the
Trust, which needed only moral and financial support to remain a steady
and good source of intelligence, i.e., disinformation.
hlackstock's account tells us of the famous revolutionary Boris
Savinkov, who before the revolution had organized the assassination of
the Grand Duke Sergei, the uncle of the Tsar, and of Minister of the
Interior Plehve, and who later, fighting against the Bolshevik revolution,
seized three cities on the Volga in 1918. Savinkov was duped by the Trust
and was persuaded in 1924 to cross into Russia illegally in the
expectation of leading the secret army, which had never existed, against
the Kremlin. Despite his entrapment and death, his co-conspirator, the
British intelligence officer Sidney Reilly, who had been under a death
sentence in the Soviet Union since 1918, let himself be lured in 1925 to
Moscow, where he was executed.
Blackstock recognizes that neither Savinkov nor Reilly represented a
serious threat to Soviet security and that their liquidation first cast doubt
upon the Trust. The author expresses the opinion that the OGPU became
overconfident because of its initial successes. "They thought they could
deceive the Western intelligence agencies indefinitely." He appears
unaware, however, of the study put out by the Soviets in 1967.'
The author maintains that in 1927 the combined Western intelligence
agencies conducted a major offensive against the USSR. To support this
unconvincing assertion, he quotes largely from the Moscow press and
reproduces its statistics on the arrests of Western spies. He provides
practically no details about the alleged offensive except for the story of
what he describes as "vest-pocket terrorist raids" conducted by the
Combat Corps of General Kutyepov. The general was supposedly
suspicious of the Trust from the very beginning. In 1927, acting without
the Trust's knowledge, he sponsored a few (and for the most part
unsuccessful) teams that entered Russia for purposes of espionage and
terrorism. By then, however, the Trust had collapsed, mainly because of
the apparent defection of one of the principal OGPU agents,
"Opperput," whose real name was Edward Ottovich Staunits.
'Vasiliv Ardamatskv, Vozrnezdiye (Retribution), Neva Nos. 8-11 (August-November
1967). This material emerged later as a book. Extensive, accurate, and in many instances
hitherto unpublished OGPU documentation is appended to each chapter.
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