STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 13 No. 3, Summer 1969]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 157
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: IS

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STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 13 NO. 3 SUMMER 1969
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ARCHIVAL RECORD
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Materials in the Studies are in general to be reserved to US per-
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Permission to make use of individual articles for liaison purposes with
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man for liaison purposes will be altered from the Studies format before
being passed to foreign nationals or foreign liaison.
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
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This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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CONTENTS
The Unidentifieds ........................ Dino A. Brugioni
Contributions gratefully received in photographic interpre-
tation. SECRET
Page
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The Interpretation of Soviet Press Announcements of "Cosmos"
Satellite Launchings .................. Edward M. Hinman 21
Everyone his own Sputnik watcher. SECRET
The SS-8 Controversy .................. David. S. Brandwein 27
Presupposition clogs the intelligence analysis of a Soviet
missile system. SECRET
The Case Against Solzhenitsyn .......... Roger W. McGuffey 37
Notes from the literary underground. SECRET
The Rote Drei: Getting Behind the "Lucy" Myth ............ 51
Mark A. Tittenhofer
Latest authoritative treatment of an elusive problem.
SECRET
A Good Trip ................ Mary Evans O'Keefe Gravalos 91
Thoughts on travel not to be found in your Baedeker.
SECRET
Biographic Collection Programs .......... Charles E. Hablas 99
An important intelligence resource and how it works.
SECRET
The Standardization of Foreign Personal Names ............ 109
Viktor Y. Kamenev
What's in a name, and what's being done about it.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The President's Board: 1956-60 ........... Philip K. Edwards 113
Overseeing the intelligence community. SECRET
The Exploitation of Foreign Open Sources .. Herman L. Croom 129
A suggestion about the information explosion. SECRET
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature .................... 137
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No Foreign Dissem
Contributions gratefully
received in photographic
interpretation.
THE UNIDENTIFIEDS
Dino A. Brugioni
No matter how well-trained and experienced a photographic inter-
preter may be, there are frequent occasions when he simply cannot
identify some object, installation, or activity, and when initial research
efforts by collateral support personnel fail to provide an answer. In
such cases the target is labeled as an "Unidentified." The problem of
identifying the "unidentifieds" is the subject of this article.
Photographic interpretation has become highly complicated since
World War II. Only a modest number of military or industrial targets
had to be considered in the previous era, and interpretation was based
on an equally limited number of "indicators" and "signatures." In
the language of photographic interpretation, a feature or pattern of
features suggesting the presence or the function of a target or activity
is called an indicator, and a unique combination or pattern of indi-
cators which permits positive identification is called a signature.
Storage sites for weapons, for instance, may have many indicators in
common such as security fences and well-spaced, revetted storage
buildings, but a building with a specific type of roof and ventilators
may be the signature that confirms identification of chemical warfare
storage.
In today's world, the scope of the interpreter's responsibility has
expanded to include practically all the land surface of the globe, and
the number of indicators and signatures to be remembered. is far
greater than any one individual can possibly master.
Photographic coverage has increased because few land areas in our
day are without some relationship to modern weaponry. Deserts and
remote islands are missile, nuclear, and chemical warfare proving
grounds. Arctic wastelands are frontiers for electronics defenses.
Farmlands and forests are missile deployment areas. Airfields are
constructed in remote areas. Submarines and warships are found in MORI/H RP
from pg.
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isolated anchorages. Canyons and heavily eroded or strip-mined areas
are ideal for rocket, missile, and jet-engine testing, and mountains
are tunneled for weapons storage or testing of nuclear devices.
The number of indicators and signatures to be remembered has
also greatly increased because of the introduction of new weapons
systems in this age of atomic fission, electronics devices, jet engines,
and missiles. Our problems in this respect are further complicated
by the increased scope of photographic coverage. When scanning
photography, an interpreter is not only searching for new targets; he
is also concerned with discovering any unusual object, installation, or
activity at known complexes which may be related to a new weapons
system or which may otherwise attract attention as an item of potential
interest to intelligence. Sifting the unusual from the usual, however,
becomes a highly complicated task when the interpreter is dealing with
a part of the world with which he is unfamiliar. The process of inter-
pretation depends in part on immediate recognition of cultural features
peculiar to the locality under consideration. Cultural features are
manmade changes to the natural environment such as cultivated
areas, houses, roads, industrial establishments, religious structures,
and cemeteries. An analyst who was born and raised in rural America
immediately recognizes a barn, a silo, or a windmill on an Iowa
farmstead. His parameters for Iowa (and the United States in general)
are well-established, and he wastes no time on well-known cultural
features that have no bearing on his mission. The same analyst, how-
ever, might spend hours trying to identify fishnets drying on poles
in Thailand because they resemble antenna arrays at certain elec-
tronics sites in the west, even though drying fishnets are as common
in Thailand as windmills in Iowa. This is simply to state the obvious
fact that cultural patterns vary greatly in different parts of the world,
and parameters that apply to one culture often do not apply to an-
other. A domed building in a remote area of the western world is
at once suspect as a radar site, but a domed building in an area in-
habited by Moslems is usually a mosque. Radars are often built on
hilltops, but in the Orient a hilltop structure is often a Buddhist
shrine.
Through his training and from experience, the photographic inter-
preter has catalogued in his memory and reference files hundreds
of patterns of signatures that relate to specific weapons systems.
Many signatures consist of geometric patterns such as circles, triangles,
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ellipsoids, squares, trapezoids, or cones, and some are combinations
of several patterns such as a type of surface-to-air missile site which
appears on photography to be a Star of David within a circle.
A large and growing body of literature is available on the theory
and technique of pattern recognition, but no study is known to this
author dealing with the photographic interpreter's mental processes
of categorizing and retrieving pattern information.
Because of the many complexities of photographic interpretation,
the profession has become highly specialized. Individuals concentrate
on specific weapons systems, activities, and cultural features of limited
portions of the earth's surface and become highly trained and experi-
enced experts in limited fields. They are, in turn, supported by equally
specialized and experienced collateral research personnel. Now and
then, however, even the most experienced interpreter has no choice
but to report on some object, installation, or activity as "uniden-
tified."
Any unidentified image that provides the slightest evidence of being
significant from an intelligence standpoint becomes the subject of re-
search in depth. The photograph is circulated for study by a variety
of specialists, and the film is subjected to intensive technical analysis
by laboratory and photogrammetric technicians. In almost all cases an
identification is eventually made. Some turn out to be highly signifi-
cant. Many others are found to be innocuous and of no interest to
intelligence-except that the files gain another "pattern" which may
be of help to others in the future.
In many cases, a target long unidentified by the professionals and
their supporting personnel is finally identified by a person who has
some special knowledge gained from travel, from residence in a foreign
country, or perhaps from an interest in some esoteric branch of the
arts or sciences. Most of the people making up the intelligence com-
munity qualify in some of these respects as amateur interpreters of
the "unidentifieds," and any individual who can solve an identification
problem is urged to pass the word through appropriate channels. The
professional welcomes assistance from any amateur when confronted
by an unidentified object.
The rest of this article is devoted to discussions and illustrations of
selected cases of unidentified objects or installations which were
deemed significant enough to justify study in depth. All of these cases
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were solved, mostly by persevering research and the application of
scientific techniques, but in at least one case the solution came from
a person with special knowledge gained from travel. As it happened,
identification in these cases resulted in little that was of interest to
intelligence. In other instances, however, the same techniques have
also resulted in highly significant (and often highly classified) iden-
tifications.
When scanning aerial photography, the watchword could well be
"expect the unexpected." Atmospherics, soil conditions, mechanical
performance phenomena, aberrations, sun angles, winds, time of
exposure, image acquisition materials, and other factors often provide
information over and above that normally expected in the design
characteristics of the system. This phenomenon has been labeled
the "serendipity effect" by the Director, NPIC.
Modern transportation and communications have resulted in cul-
tural exchanges leaving unusual imprints even in the remotest parts
of the world. Every so often photographic interpreters are surprised
by finding something which appears out of place. Recently, while
scanning photography of East Germany an interpreter was surprised
to see Indian teepees, a covered wagon, and the gate of a western
cavalry fort. What he saw is shown on Figure 1. The photo interpreter
rechecked his location, since this was obviously a movie set. Despite
the initial disbelief that the East Germans were making western-type
films, supporting collateral researchers provided information that the
German Film Corporation, an East German government monopoly,
does in fact produce western films.
The first aerial photography of Tibet presented many enigmas.
None was more baffling than structures that appeared to be guard
posts situated on roads or trails at the tops of hills or on mountain
passes. These structures were usually flanked by mounds or ridges,
and at first it was assumed that these were military strong points
with attendant bunkers and protective revetments. A second guess was
that the structures were toll collection booths. Neither theory held
up when questions were raised as to why the posts were in such
remote areas and why they were exposed to the worst of the
Himalayan weather.
Research into Tibetan culture eventually paid off in the case of the
Himalayan "guard posts," and a ground photograph of one of the
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FIGURE 1. This shrine to Chenresik, god of travelers, resembles a military strong-
point on overhead photography.
structures shown on Figure 2, was found in a travel book. Vie posts
turned out to be religious shrines, each containing an image of
(:henresik, the god who protects travelers. In keeping with local
religious practice, a Tibetan traveler approaching a hill or pass
appeals for divine protection. by picking up a stone in the valley and
carrying it to the shrine. There the traveler makes the proper invoca-
tion to Chenresik and deposits the stone before the shrine. Over the
years large piles of stones have accumulated at the shrines along
heavily traveled routes, accounting for the military appearance of
the posts on aerial photography.
To a photographic interpreter, circular excavations seen from above
are
suspect as gun positions. If several excavations form a circular
pattern, an antiaircraft role may be indicated. Linear arrays of ex-
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cavations suggest a ground defense system. In and parts of the Middle
East, however, care must be taken to avoid interpreting a line of
excavations as a row of foxholes or gun positions since it may be
evidence of a centuries old yet ingenious system for tapping under-
ground water called a Banat. Such a system consists of an underground
conduit which brings water from a water-hearing bed or earth stratum
(acquifer) in the highlands to the surface at a, lower level where
the water is used in households and for irrigation. Shafts are in a
line at regular intervals, and the conduit is excavated from the bottom
of one shaft to the next, the spoil being dumped on the surface
around the top of the shaft. Seen on aerial photography, as on Figure
2, a series of parallel qanats resembles a defense-in-depths series of
fortifications. The inset on Figure 3 shows a ground view of the spoil
around the tops of a line of qanat shafts.
identifying the function of an installation during initial stages
of construction is often difficult. Clearings, ground scarring, exca-
vations, and foundations seldom provide enough indicators. The sig-
nature enabling identification is often slow in emerging, and in some
cases a known signature does not develop, even though familiar
indicators may be present. Periodic coverage of the target, perse-
verance, and attention to detail often provide an answer.
Cuba has been and is searched continually for new installations,
and special vigil is maintained to detect the construction of electronics
installations which could monitor missile activity at Cape Kennedy or
military activity in the United States. A large, circular installation ob-
served under construction in Cuba in 1964 attracted immediate and
continuing interest because a circular scar usually connotes the con-
strilction of a direction finder. Reported initially as an "unidentified,"
the progress of its construction was followed closely. Suspicion that
it would become an electronics installation was heightened when
holes were dug (for antenna masts?) at regular intervals within
the circle as seen on Figure 3A. This theory received a setback when
trees were planted in the holes. Weeks passed into months, when
suddenly animals appeared within the enclosure (Figure 3B). The
unidentified installation was simply a cattle feeding station.
Modern architecture with its dramatic departures from conven-
tional design often plagues interpreters in their attempt to make
identification. A case in point occurred in Cuba when four odd struc-
tures were constructed atop the highest elevations of the Sierra
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Vrcunr: 2. These long lines of excavations seen in Iran could be defense positions
in depth, but in parts of the Middle East they are evidence of underground
water conduit systems known as qanats.
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B'r(.rnru 3A. The circular configuration of the unidentified installation Sri Cuba
suggested that an electronics installation was under construction..
Vn.uin; 311. Subsequent coverage revealed that the installation is a catil, feed-
bug station.
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Maestra mountains. As seen on an aerial photograph (Figure 4),
these structures resembled large parabolic dish antennas. A missile or
satellite space tracking role was postulated, but the necessary power-
plant or electrical transmission lines for such an installation could not
be detected, and this facility was carried as unidentified for more than
a year. Suspicion that it was a military installation was heightened
when a helicopter was observed at the site. Great was the surprise,
therefore, when the Cubans, in a September 1963 issue of the periodical
Bohemia, unveiled the installation as Castro's Museum of the Revolu-
tion (see inset on Figure 4). Because of lack of water at the hilltop
location, the roofs of the buildings had been designed by the "revolu-
tionary" architect to trap rainwater and channel it to storage tanks.
An area where physical, cultural, and historical coherence exists
presents the fewest difficulties, once the parameters for the area
have been established. By the same token, areas where there is
extreme physical contrast, where cultures conflict, or where a wide
variety of religions are practiced, present greater difficulties, and the
search must be especially thorough and intense. China, a vast area
undergoing cultural and technological revolution, is unique, as are
the problems it presents to interpreters.
In the immediate environs of Peking and in several other Chinese
cities, large circular areas, each containing a tall tower, began to
appear in the early 1960s. This was of considerable concern to in-
telligence because it could mean that the Chinese were deploying a
sophisticated microwave communications system. On one aerial pho-
tograph, however, a white circular "glob" was discerned near the
tower, as shown on Figure 5. Photographic enhancement techniques,
detailed analysis, and a ground photograph (see inset, Figure 5) from
a newly acquired Chinese book, Peking Under Construction, revealed
the facilities to be parachute towers.
Photographic interpreters in the Washington area have an ad-
vantage over those in the field because a large variety of libraries,
both governmental and private, are available for research purposes.
Also, a large number of foreign service personnel, experts on countless
facts about foreign lands, are available for consultation and often pro-
vide the solution for unidentified problems. For instance, one such
officer who had lived in China solved the problem of identifying
the triangular patterns (see Figure 6) seen throughout an island off
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I'wuni i. This unidentified to',ver in a circle could have been a ChuGF ;e elec-
t-onics facility, but detailed analysis supported by a picture (inset) from a
Chinese publication led to identification as a parachute tower
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Vrcunr. 6. The triangles seen on this photograph of a Chinese island i lizzled
iutcrpreters but were quickly identified by a long-time resident in the East
as fishnets drying in the sun, as shown in the inset.
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the southern coast of China. The long-time resident of the Orient
easily recognized the triangles as fishnets drying in the sun.
Whenever new activity is observed at a deactivated military instal-
lation, the normal surmise is that the installation is being restored
for a military role. In the early 1960s, construction of buildings was
observed at four abandoned airfields in the vicinity of Canton, China.
These buildings, which appeared to be for storage purposes;, were
constructed on the runways, as shown on Figure 7. A detailed search
revealed no military activity. Nevertheless, the airfields were kept
under close surveillance, and research in open source materials at
various repositories was maintained. Eventually, a book published
in China and entitled Peoples Communes provided the answer. The
supposed storage buildings were hogpens, and the installations were
hog communes.
The world of the average Asian ends at the horizon. Except for
an occasional short trip or a rare pilgrimage, his interests are cen-
tered in the village or town where he lives. Life follows a routine
of stereotyped activities, mostly concerned with his quest for a
livelihood. These activities are reflected in cultural patterns visible
on aerial photography, and there is a similarity in the patterns of
villages, towns, and cultivated areas throughout large portions of
the earth's surface. When a new pattern emerges, it is studied in
depth. Such was the case when white, paddle-shaped pads were
observed in a small area south of the Plain of Jars in Laos. This
pattern, shown on Figure 8, has not been seen anywhere else. The
function of these pads has not yet been confirmed, but people who
have been in the area have suggested they are pits of wet lime used
by natives to catch birds. Allegedly, "Judas" birds are placed in cages
on or near the pads to call their wild friends. Birds landing on the
pads become mired in the mortar-like lime, and a native then appears
to catch the trapped birds. Another version is that nets are suspended
over the white pads. Birds are enticed with food and "Judas" birds
to come under the net. At appropriate times, the nets are dropped
and the birds captured.
The use of military equipment for civilian purposes at times
complicates identification. For instance, Quonset huts were originally
associated exclusively with the military, but since World War II
the huts have been put to a wide variety of civilian uses, both at
home and abroad. Many are still used for military purposes, however,
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FIGURE 7. Constriction on the runways of four inactive airfields near uoton,
Chuua, was suspect as renewed military activity, but pictures from a 'itinese
publication (see insets) showed the airfields are now "hog commun' r "'
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lirsc white pads ohscrvrd nc,ir the Plain of jars in 1,aos a- unigtu',
ants idrntilicatinn is still in doubt, Then, is reason to believe that tb; ~ ire Ails
of wet him, used to trap wild birds.
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P'rcuRE 9. This fence-secured area consists of Quonset huts arranged in a
military fashion, but it is actually a poultry farm.
and the criteria for determining which are used by the military are
based on factors such as location, number, arrangement, and upkeep
of the buts and the existence of security measures. One such Quonset
installation in the USSR, shown on Figure 9, met all the criteria for
identification of a military installation. The huts are laid out neatly in
military fashion and are surrounded by "security" fencing. Research,
however, revealed it to be a poultry farm.
Tents are like Quonset huts in that they are firmly associated with
the military but are also used for a variety of nonmilitary purposes.
This creates a problem in the Middle East where military tents have
been used in recent years in refugee and immigrant camps. Many of
the refugee tent camps are laid out in a haphazard fashion, but
those built under UN auspices have been planned to insure proper
spacing for sanitary and logistical purposes, and they bear a striking
resemblance to military tent camps. One such camp without col-
lateral information would probably be identified on photography
as a military installation is shown on Figure 10.
The large peoples communes in China which combine industry,
agriculture, education, and military affairs are relatively easy to
identify. The smaller communes in the Communist Far East, how-
ever, are a different story. Some 20 small complexes built in North
Korea since the Korean War give every appearance of being military
installations, such as the one shown on Figure 11. They consist of bar-
racks-like buildings, shops, and vehicle sheds, but other facilities nor-
mally found at a military installation such as firing ranges, parade
grounds, and training areas are missing. These installations were carried
as unidentified until a North Korean hook, Facts About Korea, provided
a photograph of a small North Korean commune. The identification
then became positive that their role was agricultural rather than
military.
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I zs' 41i mm.
..,#"I
Frcurce: IO. Tents erected in orderly row:; are normally associated with :c military
installation; however, the tent camp shown here is a UN refugee camp in the
Middle East.
rn
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^rar:sea~ .y
A _
r_ r~ e~-~rll w
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FIGURE 11. This small North Korean installation was thought to be associated
with the military until research revealed it to be an agricultural commune.
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As has been mentioned, the existence of security measures is an
indicator of a military installation, and security measures discernible
on aerial photography normally are items such as fences, walls, guard
posts, and strong points. In certain parts of the world, however,
photographic interpreters are presented with the problem of dis-
tinguishing between military and civilian security practices. In western
China, for instance, most of the farmsteads, villages, and towns
are walled for protection from marauders and wild animals, and
fenced enclosures for animals are often found on the open plains.
Much experience and study is needed by an interpreter before he can
distinguished civilian from military security patterns. For a time, certain
installations in the loess country of western China presented an in-
terpretation problem because their foundations apparantly were being
built within walled enclosures. Research eventually revealed that the
people of the loess country often live in cave dwellings such as are
shown on Figure 12, and overhead photography of groups of such
dwellings (see the inset on Figure 12) often presents deceptive or
illusory imagery to the viewer.
All the foregoing examples of installations or activities initially re-
ported as unidentified, and hundreds more, have been catalogued
by photographic interpretation organizations, and many have been
or will be incorporated in photographic interpretation keys dealing
either with regions or with specific objects, installations, weapons
systems, and activities. Such "keys" are basic manuals used by
photographic interpreters and are designed both to fulfill training
needs and to serve as quick reference tools. A solved U/I should. never
pose a problem in the future.
Because of the growing importance and scope of photographic
interpretation in the national and international intelligence program,
all personnel who serve in overseas posts are urged to photograph
where possible and report objects and installations that could be
confusing to interpreters of aerial photography. Also, those who scan
and review foreign literature are urged to keep the problem of the
"unidentifieds" in mind and to call the attention of photographic
interpreter organizations to illustrations and articles that might help
solve interpretation problems and further reduce the list of uniden-
tifieds.
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Everyone his own Sputnik
watcher.
THE INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET PRESS
ANNOUNCEMENTS OF "COSMOS"
SATELLITE LAUNCHINGS
Edward M. Hinman
In March, 1962, the Soviet Union announced the initial successful
launch in a new series of earth satellite vehicles, the so-called "Cos-
mos" series. A number of scientific fields were to be investigated by
these satellites. Very generally, they were said to have the purpose of
carrying out "a program of research in the upper layers of the at-
mosphere and cosmic space." It was stated that there would be a. series
of launches in the program from various Soviet cosmodromes? Thus
far,' 274 space vehicles have been placed in earth orbit by the Soviet
Union, all of which have been designated as Cosmos launches, and
which have been lumped together under the "program of research."
The format and content of the announcement by the Soviet news
agency, TASS, of the launch of the first vehicle, Cosmos-1, estab-
lished a pattern which has been repeated, by and large, in the an-
nouncements of all Cosmos vehicles launched since. For each sub-
sequent launch there has been a TASS announcement which, at
first glance, has seemed to conceal the real mission of the operation.
Despite the Soviet pretense of putting all the Cosmos launches in
a single scientific category, the fact is that different types of satellites
with various missions, scientific and military, have been launched
ostensibly as part of the program that began on 16 March 1962.
These have included reconnaissance satellites, recoverable and non-
recoverable scientific satellites, meteorological and navigation satel-
lites, a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), and others.
This analysis of the announcements of all 274 Cosmos launches
dwells on the variations among them in content and language with
a view of determining the significance to be derived from them. Most
of these events can be sorted into groups solely on the basis of the
MORI/HRP
from pg.
21-26
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similarities and differences noted in TASS announcements. These
groupings or types conform to conclusions derived from classified in-
formation with remarkable consistency. It is a fact, therefore, that
anyone who is interested, and who knows the hall-signs, can much
more often than not identify the type of any space vehicles the
Soviets have launched without benefit of additional information.
The standard TASS announcement of the launching of a Cosmos
satellite invariably includes the launch date, the Cosmos number,
and the following boiler-plate: "On board the sputnik scientific equip-
ment has been placed, intended to continue the investigation of cosmic
space in accordance with the program announced by TASS on 16
March 1962." 2 Finally, these statements give the orbital parameters,
usually including period, apogee, perigee, and inclination.
In a majority of cases, certain other elements are also present, in-
cluding a statement that the vehicle carries a radio transmitter operat-
ing on a certain frequency, specified in megahertz, as well as a state-
ment that a radio system is aboard to measure the orbital parameters.
The majority of announcements has stated that a radio telemetry
system was being used to transmit data to the earth on the operation
of the scientific equipment and instruments, and that "the equipment
on board the sputnik is working normally," as well as that "the co-
ordinating-computer center is processing the incoming information."
The presence or absence of these elements, and variations in or-
bital parameters, are the indicators identifying the category of satel-
lite launched.
Photoreconnaissance Satellites
There have been 121 photoreconnaissance vehicles designated by
TASS as "Cosmos" launches. The announcements for all of these events
except one 3 included a reference to the presence of a transmitter, a
radio system and a telemetry system. All of the transmitters referred to
The two exceptions were Cosmos 110, which carried two dogs (the only
Cosmos satellite ever to have had live animals on board), and Cosmos 261,
another unique operation in that it was the only one in which the allies of the
USSR were said to have participated.
'The one exception was Cosmos 45, which had a life of less than five days.
Although there is no evidence that this vehicle was unsuccessful, its abbreviated
mission does set it apart from the norm. Only the reference to a transmitter
was missing.
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in the announcements were said to be operating on a nominal fre-
quency of 19.995 MHz. (Two reconnaissance satellites launched re-
cently, Cosmos 251 and Cosmos 264, were said to have transmitters
on board operating on a frequency of 19.150 MHz. These two vehicles
were probably test flights of a new high-resolution reconnaissance
satellite being developed.) All the announcements of the reconnais-
sance satellites have contained the statement concerning the normal
operation of the equipment and the coordinating-computer center.
A final identifier for this group of satellites is the fact that in the
great majority of instances, the perigee has been in the 200-220 km
range and the apogee in the 200's or 300's.
SS-X-6 (FOBS)
There have been eleven tests of the SS-X-6 system announced by
TASS as Cosmos launches. These announcements have consistently
omitted any reference to the presence of a transmitter, radio system,
or a telemetry system on board, and have not included the usua'. state-
ment that the equipment was working normally, and have made
no reference to the coordinating-computer center. These have been
the only Cosmos announcements omitting all these elements. The
parameters also provide a clue. This is the only group of satellites
for which no "orbital period" is provided, and the announced perigee
is always below 150 km.
Recoverable Scientific Satellites
Ten recoverable scientific satellites have been launched given the
Cosmos designation by TASS. For half of these events, including
four of the last five, no problem of identification has arisen since the
TASS announcements have specifically referred to animals on board,
special equipment, development of new systems, or docking exercises.
Seven of the announcements, including one of the two satellites in
both docking operations, have included references to a transmitter,
radio system, and telemetry system. The announcements of four of
these seven events, and the announcement on Cosmos 238 (the only
one of the group not to refer to a transmitter) provide no clues as
to the type of vehicle involved. The scheduled use of a frequency of
20.008 MHz on three of the most recent operations, may serve as an
indicator for future events of this type. Another possible aid can be
found in the parameters which have both an apogee and perigee in the
175-300 km range.
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Navigation Satellites
Seven navigation satellites and three possibly related satellites with
unknown missions have been announced by TASS as Cosmos events.
The announcements all have included references to radio and telem-
etry systems, plus the elements normally associated with a standard
earth satellite vehicle. The parameters given by TASS provide the
tip-off for this group. These are the only satellites launched at the
announced inclination of 74 degrees, and hence can always be easily
identified. In addition, these satellites tend to take orbits that are
either circular or near-circular.
Nine maneuverable satellites have been launched by the USSR
and designated Cosmos vehicles. The first two used the SL-5 (SS-6
booster plus LUNIK third stage) launch configuration while the
remainder have used the SL-11 system (SS-9 first and second stages) .
All nine have included a telemetry system and radio equipment, ac-
cording to TASS. The first two were said to carry a transmitter as
well, operating on a frequency of 19.735 MHz. This unusual frequency
had been listed only once before, on Cosmos 27, which was apparently
a Venus probe that failed, and is the only distinguishing feature of
these announcements. Except for the four most recent, announcements
concerning the seven SL-11-launched maneuverable satellites have
shown no common distinguishing feature. Cosmos 248, 249, and 252,
which were launched as part of an exercise in the fall of 1968, had
one unique element in the announcements of their launchings. In-
stead of the customary radio system (sistyema), in all three instances
reference was made to the presence of radio facilities (sredstva). Al-
though the significance of this change is not clear, it is unique to these
three maneuverable satellites. In addition, the TASS announcements
concerning the two "active" vehicles in this operation, Cosmos 249
and 252, did not contain the usual statement on normal operation of
equipment nor on the coordinating-computer center. Instead, each was
described as having fulfilled its scientific research. It is of interest to
note that Cosmos 217, the maneuverable satellite immediately pre-
ceding the above three, also was not said to have been operating
normally, nor was there any reference made to the coordinating-
computer center. Thus, it may be that these omissions will be the
signs to look for in the future to identify this type of vehicle.
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Meteorological Satellites
Ten meteorological satellites have been successfully launched by
the USSR and designated as Cosmos events. The first five were
launched from Tyuratam and the remaining five from Plesetsk. A.11 ten
have had the usual elements of aTASS-announced earth satellite
vehicle (radio system and telemetry system) . The first two, Cosmos
44 and 58, also reportedly carried a transmitter operating on a fre-
quency of 19.002 MHz. As is the case with the navigation satellites,
the orbital parameters appear to be the only elements of the 'TASS
announcements that may point to the identification of this group.
The last five satellites of this group have been launched at an inclina-
tion of 81 degrees, with orbits that have been circular or near-circular.
The orbit tends to be in the 625-850 km range. These two items
jointly may permit identification of future "Meteor" satellites.
Non-Recoverable Scientific Satellites
Approximately seventy-five non-recoverable satellites have been
launched on many different missions. Over eighty percent of these
employed the SL-7 (SS-4 booster) configuration. This is the type of
satellite originally and legitimately covered by the announcement
of March, 1962. When these satellites were first launched, the 'TASS
announcements included all of the conventional elements, including
a transmitter operating on 20, 30, or 90 MHz. For the past three
years, however, there have been no references to a transmitter being
present. Thus, a Cosmos satellite announcement lacking any other
distinguishing clue, and which omits a reference to a transmitter
on board, is likely to refer to anon-recoverable scientific satellite
launched by the SL-7 configuration. If launched at an inclination of
48 degrees, the launch point was probably Kapustin Yar. If not,
Plesetsk is the more likely. Finally, in these instances there tends to
be a considerable difference between the announced apogee; and
the perigee, certainly more than for other Cosmos satellite types.
Word Order
There is one other feature of the TASS announcements which :seems
to provide an additional clue in the identification of some satellites,
although it is difficult to offer any acceptable explanation for the clue.
It involves the word order of the first sentence in the announcement.
The normal opening sentence reads as follows: "On - in
the Soviet Union there was another launch of a scientific earth satel-
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ov~e ate rtes
lite `Cosmos' ." However, in thirty-two instances the sen-
tence reads as follows: "On in the Soviet Union there was
a launch of another scientific earth satellite `Cosmos'
There is, of course, no essential difference in the meaning of the
two sentences, either in English or Russian. This variation in word
order may be purely accidental or arbitrary, in which case one would
not expect to find any consistency or pattern in the use of the second
version. On the other hand, it may reflect some stylistic habit of
the individual releasing the data to TASS, in which case one might
expect to find the altered wording in the announcements of all
satellites of direct concern to that person.
Six of the first seven non-recoverable satellites announcements had
the second word order, as have eight additional vehicles of similar
character. Since May 1966, all announcements of this group have used
the standard version. Five navigation-type satellite announcements
have used version two, as have all those for meteorological satellites.
This seems too regular to be coincidence. Almost without exception, the
launches that have been accompanied by the alternate word order
are events that are largely, if not exclusively, non-military. Only the
announcements of navigation and meteorological Cosmos satellites
have used this order of words since Cosmos 119, anon-recoverable
scientific satellite launched in May 1966.
Postscript
'l'he interesting question, of course, is why the Soviets for so long
have clung to formulae which, as we have seen, are after all not
very secure-if that object is what they have in mind. This contributor
has no ready answer to such a question, but would be happy to
entertain any and all suggestions.
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Presupposition clogs the
intelligence analysis o f a
Soviet missile system.
THE SS-8 CONTROVERSY
David S. Brandwein
On the second of February, 1961, the Soviets test-launched a rocket
on the Tyuratam range which was immediately identified as .a new
type. Subsequent launches in March and April made it clear that
a flight test program for a new intercontinental ballistic missilfe had
indeed begun. These events were observed with great interest lby the
small community of missile intelligence experts-but without tre-
mendous surprise.
After all, by then considerable knowledge had accumulated on
the first Soviet ICBM (now called the SS-6) . Although much remained
to be discovered about the SS-6, it was known to be a very large
missile, that it almost certainly was very expensive, that it used
difficult-to-handle liquid oxygen as one of its propellants, and that
the Soviets would in all likelihood find this monster next-to-impossible
to deploy in sufficient numbers to make it a major threat. The: com-
munity thus found it natural enough that the Russians should come
along with. a fresh design, one which was presumably smaller and
easier to transport and deploy than the SS-6, possibly even an :ICBM
capable of being launched from an underground silo.
At any rate, by the early spring of 1961 the missile analysis had
rolled up their sleeves and plunged into an examination of sill the
data on this new system. It was not long before there was general
agreement within the intelligence community that the new ICBM,
designated the SS-7, was indeed smaller and mare portable than the
SS-6, had a payload of about 4,500 pounds compared to one double
that size for the SS-6, and burned "storable" propellants rather than
liquid oxygen.
Any smugness on the part of the analysts was dissipated, ho`~vever,
soon after 9 April, 1961. On that day, and again 12 days later, and MORI/HRP
in the succeeding months, the Soviets launched ICBMs from Tyuratam from pg.
27-35
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which were neither the SS-6 nor the SS-7, but another new vehicle
of yet another design, later called the SS-8. Why were the Russians
doing this? Why had they started development programs on two
new ICBMs almost simultaneously? What was there about the third
ICBM that distinguished it and justified the expense of developing it?
One group of analysts came up with a plausible hypothesis. The
Soviets already had a large bird in the SS-6. The SS-7 was much
smaller. The SS-8 therefore must surely have been a move in the
opposite direction-to a booster larger still than the SS-6. It could
have a dual mission, to serve as a carrier for a truly huge nuclear
payload of tens of megatons, and as a booster for space payloads
larger than those which could be orbited by the SS-6. Some con-
firmation of this line of thought seemed to come from the fact that
the trajectory data obtained on a few early SS-8 shots were of very
good quality, and their backtracks ran very close to the known lo-
cation of the SS-6 launcher at Tyuratam. Photographs of this fa-
cility had shown a massive firing platform at the edge of a huge
excavation., and all experts agreed that the facility could probably
handle boosters considerably larger than the SS-6. So it all seemed
to make a pretty good story-here was a new big missile, a mission
for it to fulfill, and a facility large enough to handle it.
Z'he rest of the intelligence community, however, had reached no
firm conclusion. The major effort on the part of most analysts was
to examine the telemetry records to try to deduce the characteristics
of this new missile. Telemetry is of course essential in such an enter-
prise, but it is not easy to use it to determine the size of a missile.
The situation is analogous to trying to deduce information about
an automobile from readings of the instrument dials on the dashboard
and nothing else. Any competent engineer could determine from
these readings that the vehicle was powered by an internal combus-
tion engine and not by a reciprocating steam engine, but it would
be very difficult to decide whether the engine was Volkswagen-size
or Cadillac-size.
The next milestones in the SS-8 story were reached in the fall of
1961. In Uctober the Soviets fired two missiles to long ranges into
the Pacific Ocean. For one of these firings a brief span of optical
data was obtained during the time the incandescent re-entry vehicle
was dropping through the atmosphere. Shortly thereafter, during the
October revolution celebrations, Khrushchev started talking about
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his "global rocket" and Marshal Moskalenko said that "for the Pacific
trials, Soviet scientists have developed rockets that could deliver 100
million tons" (apparently referring to the yield of a nuclear warhead) .
Some scientists working under contract to the Air Force were able
to combine the optical data with data teleinetered during re-entry to
calculate the drag of the re-entry vehicle as well as other ballistic
parameters related to size and shape. The net results of these calcu-
lations indicated a nose cone weighing in the neighborhood oif 25,000
pounds. A re-entry vehicle that large could very nicely carry ,a bomb
in the 100 megaton class.
This conclusion seemed to support the "big missile" synthesis of
the available data on the SS-8. The Russians had started with an
ICBM too clumsy to be deployed (the SS-6). They needed a.nd had
developed a smaller missile, the SS-7. Now they needed a very large,
efficiently designed ICBM to carry very large bombs. Khrushchev and
Moskalenko had advertised that they had such an ICBM ahalf-year
after the start of the flight test program, presumably at about the
time the development program was seen to be a success. The optical
data gave a measurement of the re-entry vehicle size, and it looked
to be very large indeed.
Doubts about all this were beginning to emerge, however., in the
rest of the intelligence community. It was observed that there were
some remarkable similarities between the propulsion telemetry of
the second stage of the SS-8 and that for an upper stage of another
space vehicle, the so-called "Venik" stage, used by the Soviets in 1961
as part of an interplanetary vehicle which launched their Veni; probe.
The significance of this association was that the Venik-stage engine
was firmly estimated by the intelligence community to have a thrust
of about 65,000 pounds, and this was much too low a value to be
compatible with a payload in the neighborhood of 25,000 pounds.
Other analysts pointed out that the firing rate of the SS-8 seemed
to be too rapid to be compatible with a very large rocket. The in-
tervals between several of the tests seemed to be too short to be
reasonable for such arocket-in April, 1961, the third SS-8 launch
came only six days after the second launch, and in June the fifth
SS-8 came off the pad only three days after- the fourth onf;. Even
more perplexing was the fact that the first orbital flight by ~Gagarin
in Vostok I took place only three days after the first SS-8 launch
on the 9th of April. Was it after all reasonable to assume ghat the
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Soviets could prepare and launch this vehicle from the same pad
which had been used to launch a totally di$erent vehicle only three
days earlier?
Some scientists under contract also raised doubts about the validity
of the analysis of the re-entry vehicle data. They pointed out that the
analysis was based on the assumption that the re-entry vehicle was
conical in shape with a hemispherical tip. If the nose cone were in
reality more complex in form, such as the cone-cylinder-sphere shape
favored in this country, then the rest of the analysis could nat hold
water.
Battle Joined
By the winter of 1961 the controversy had started in earnest. In
some ways it came to resemble the sort of debate that peppers much
scientific and scholarly literature. "A" publishes a paper giving his
reconstruction of some little known event. "B" sends in a letter to the
journal applauding "A's" efforts, but nevertheless pointing out that
his reconstruction is somewhat naive in certain areas, and proceeding
in the politest possible way to demolish "A's" thesis completely. Stung,
"A" sends out a tart response attacking "B's" development. When "B"
receives this he gets pretty hot under the collar and determines to
squash "A", even if it means devoting all his time to the debate. By
this time, the argument has attracted "C", who proceeds to propose
a theory which is altogether different from those presented earlier.
Meanwhile "A" and "B" have long since lost their objectivity, and
have reached the point of considering the argument a personal crusade.
During 1962 each side performed exhaustive analyses of every scrap
of data concerning the SS-8, and each side kept finding bits of evi-
dence to reinforce its case or to negate that of the other side. Un-
fortunately, the volume of data available was too small to permit
any but very tentative conclusions after making a number of un-
verifiable assumptions. Nevertheless, as the year 1962 wore on, posi-
tions on each side hardened considerably, and the SS-8 sizing problem
became the focal point of a major analytical effort.
On one hand, it was argued that the Soviets had a requirement for
a very large ICBM, and that the analyses which came up with indica-
tions of a small SS-8 were based on unverifiable assumptions, were
subject to many errors, and could therefore be discounted. Opponents
of this view admitted the weaknesses of each of the analyses leading
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to a small SS-8 conclusion, but felt that there were enough dlifferent
indicators, all pointing the same way, to permit high confidence in
their judgment on the question.
Typical of the arguments which took place was the one which
centered about the examination of the pressure decay of the SS-8
second-stage engine. Contract analysts had observed that the time
it took for the pressure in an engine chamber to drop from its operat-
ing level to zero seemed to be proportional to the size andl thrust
of the engine. They collected data on a wide variety of US engines,
as well as on some Soviet engines whose thrusts were known, and
found that a plot of shut-down time against thrust showed a rela-
tively smooth curve, running from 0.09 seconds for the 16,000 pound
thrust Agena chamber to 0.54 seconds for the 1,500,000 pound thrust
Apollo booster engine. Now, numerous measurements from tellemetry
of the SS-8 second-stage engine shut-down time showed it to be always
between 0.16 and 0.18 seconds, and entering these values on the curve
gave a thrust range for the engine between 45 and 100 thousand
pounds, i.e., a small engine.
The advocates of the "big missile" hypothesis countered this one by
pointing out that there was no physical law which governed the
relationship between shut-off time and thrust, that it depended on the
design of the valves used to terminate propellant flow to the engine,
and that if one wanted to shut off a large engine rapidly one could do
so easily. As proof they displayed some actual captive test records of
an Atlas thrust chamber which had been shut down in a fraction of
the normal time by substitution of a new valve design. And so it went.
Various other points of view were put forward. Telemetry analysts
found a few very tenuous indicators that the SS-8 was a small missile.
Still another group was unconvinced by either side, and maintained
that the data were inadequate to support any conclusion. They pointed
to the fact that the SS-8 displayed certain anomalous characteristics
not typical of any ICBM seen hitherto. They felt that whether the
SS-8 was big or little, it was certainly a different kind of missiile, and
that if greater efforts were given to understanding the "wh " o:E these
anomalies, then perhaps the mystery would clear up ~ analysts
were
concerned about some of these same peculiarities, and kept suggesting
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in a very tentative way that the SS-8 was not really an ICBM, but
rather a new space launch vehicle, and only that!
Thus by early 1963, when the Board of National Estimates put out
a Memo to Holders of the previous Soviet strategic weapons estimate,
the community had reached a standoff, and the memo said in effect,
"We believe that the U.S.S.R. is developing ahigh-yield warhead
ICBM (the SS-8 ). Evidence is insufficient to resolve the question
whether the SS-8 is large or small. If it is small, the SS-8 has a gross
weight of about 160,000 pounds and its re-entry vehicle carries a war-
head of about 3,500 pounds. If it is large, then the gross weight is
about 660,000 pounds and the re-entry vehicle carries a warhead weigh-
ing about 17,500 pounds "
Arbdtration
Obviously, this was a terrible way to have to write an estimate, and
during 1963 pressure was applied to resolve the issue by convening
some high level panels which presumably could get all the facts laid
out, do some head-knocking, and reach a judgment. There were in
fact three major meetings at which the issue was debated. First there
was a meeting held under the auspices of the Guided Missile anal
Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) of the US Intelligence
Board. This took place in the spring of 1983 on "neutral ground" in
Huntsville, Alabama and involved athree-day debate between the
protagonists before the members of GMAIC. Nothing much was ac-
complished-neither side would give an inch.
For the second major meeting, held in the summer of 1963 in Los
Angeles, a group of six eminent civilian scientists was empaneled under
the chairmanship of Dr. Marvin Stern, then a Vice President at North
American Aviation Corporation. This group heard all the evidence
during aweek-long session, and came out with some conclusions
which pleased neither side, but which at least made a start in the
direction of resolving the argument. The Stern Panel said, in effect,
that they did not believe the SS-8 was as large as the Air Force
suggested, even though they agreed that a Soviet requirement for a
vehicle that large probably existed. They also cited indications that
the second-stage engine was small, probably in the Venik class, and
if so, the payload weight of the SS-8 could only be four to five
thousand pounds.
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A sidelight of the Stern Panel session was that they looked at SS-7
information as well, and they decided that the data on this ICBM
was really not much better qualitatively or quantitatively than that
which was available on the SS-8, and there was no strong basis for
being so sure the SS-7 was small. However, the intelligence: com-
munity had been expecting to see a small ICBM when the SS-7 test
program was begun, and therefore no debate occurred on the point.
Indeed, if the SS-S test program had started before the SS-i', then
there might very well have been a great debate on the size of the SS-7.
The third major meeting of 1963 was a meeting of the Hyland. Panel
in September. Chaired by Lawrence Hyland, the General Manager of
the Hughes Aircraft Co., this group had been acting in an advisory
capacity to the USIB for a number of years. The meeting was timed
to take place a little before formal consideration of a new Soviet
strategic weapons estimate by USIB. Although other subject> were
discussed, the major focal point was the SS-8. Dr. Stern participated
and presented the prior findings of his panel, and briefers from Air
Force, CIA, and other agencies ventilated all the old arguments ass well.
The result was that the Hyland Panel concurred in the previous
finding that the SS-8 was small. By this time, the Army had allso de-
cided that the SS-8 was small, and the new estimate draft reflected
these judgments.
Thus, in mid-October 1963 the USIB approved a new Soviet strategic
weapons estimate in which the SS-8 was described as having about
the same payload capability as the SS-7 (i.e., a small missile ). T'he Air
Force and DIA took exception to this in a footnote, insisting that the
evidence did nat exclude the possibility that the SS-8 carried a nose
cone weighing 10,000 pounds or a little more-in effect, a retreat,
but not total surrender by the proponents of a big SS-8.
From this point on, the SS-8 controversy gradually died down. It
had become apparent by the end of 1963 that the SS-8 was being
deployed by the Soviets in only token numbers compared to the; num-
bers of SS-7 ICBMs being fielded, and this meant that the question
of the size of the SS-8 was becoming somewhat academic. Further-
more, in November, 1963, and April, 1964, the Soviets began flight
testing two new ICBMs, the SS-9 and the SS-10, and the study of
these new systems naturally preoccupied the analysts.
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The 5S-8 unveiled. Moscow, November, 1964.
7"he final episode came in November, 1964. For their annual Octo-
ber Revolution Parade, the Soviets introduced a new missile which
they described as an ICBM (See photograph) and which was given
the name "S.ASIN" by NATO. A comparison of the size and shape
of the SASIN with the estimated characteristics of every known Soviet
ICBM made it perfectly clear that the SASIN con d only be the SS-8,
and that its re-entry vehicle weight had to be between 3,000 and 4,000
pounds. The "big missile" advocates threw in the towel at last, and
estimates written in 1965 and since have indicated no disagreement
on the SS-8.
Postscript
Two observations suggest themselves about the SS-8 story, one con-
cerning the analysis process, and the other the use of high-level panels.
Reduced to essentials, the argument was between one group which
insisted that the most important consideration was the Soviet rcrrniire-
ment for a new weapon system, and a second group for which indica-
tions from the data without regard to a presumed requirement were
t:he most important factors. In this instance, the latter approach was
clearly the better one, and this author is inclined to think this is
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generally the case. Even if the data seem to point in a direction con-
trary to preconceived notion, the analyst usually is better off to pursue
his leads from the data as objectively as he can.
Second, here was a case in which an outside panel performed a
definite service. When two strong-willed groups divide over an issue
and debate it over a long period of time, it is too much to expect that
either side is going to be converted easily by reviews of its own or
the other side's arguments. An objective group needs to be called in to
arbitrate. Such a group should be composed of individuals whose
judgments will command respect. It is equally as important to give
such a panel enough time to allow it to dig into the data. This is not
possible in a session lasting only a day or two. Moreover, the panel
members should be shielded from distraction by other matters during
their deliberation. This was the situation for the panel headed by Dr.
Stern-they stayed in session for a whole week, and all the members
dropped virtually all "outside" activities during this time. And the
deadlock was broken.
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Notes from the literary
underground.
THE CASE AGAINST SOLZHENITSYN
Roger W. McGuffey
The Russian terms "intelligentsia" and "opposition" have long been
synonymous. Under both tsarist and Soviet rule, the intelligentsia
has therefore been an object of repression aimed at eliminatinf; real
or fancied threats to the authoritarian order. Yet the call far an end
to injustice, censorship, and the deprivation of rights has never been
entirely stilled in the pages of Russia's literary classics and under-
ground journals. Dostoevsky, Talstoy, and Pasternak were the chroni-
clers of the evils of an oppressed society. Often, their message was
cloaked in allegory, but they wrote about Russia for Russians,, and
no Russian could fail to understand what they had to say. During
Khrushchev's years another Russian literary giant emerged to assume
the mantle of Tolstoy and Pasternak, and is today acknowledged
as Russia's only living "classic:' His name is Aleksandr Isayevich
Solzhenitsyn.
Downfall and Rehabilitation
Solzhenitsyn's literary genius was forged in Stalin's camps. After
graduating from the University of Rostov in 1941 with a degree in
mathematics and physics, he joined the Soviet Army, was sf;nt to
military school, and eventually rose to the rank of captain at the front.
Decorated twice for bravery, Solzhenitsyn made the grave error of
criticizing Stalin in a letter to a comrade. The letter was intercepted,
Solzhenitsyn was denounced, and in 1945 was sentenced to eight years
at hard labor. He completed his term, but was sentenced without trial
to an additional three years of Siberian exile. Solzhenitsyn is quite sure
that his imprisonment would have continued forever had he noi: been
granted amnesty (along with thousands of others) after the Twentieth
Party Congress in 1956.
Solzhenitsyn experienced a personal catharsis in the camps: he
witnessed how human beings could be stripped of integrity, moral
code, and hope, yet find their souls. He emerged from the hell of
MORI/HRP
from pg.
37-49
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o1z enifsyn
the camps with an obsessive need to tell the truth as he had seen
it, to reveal the horror to its full extent, and to paint a picture so
terrible yet so real that the Russian people would never allow
Stalinism to be resurrected. Rehabilitated in 1957, he settled in Ryazan
and found a position as a teacher of mathematics. Until quite recently
he continued to live there, in a small flat above a garage which he
himself converted into living quarters. There he began to set down
the words of his first novel, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,
words he had memorized while in the camps and carried with him
ever since. Ivan Denisovich is a short novel about everyday life in
atypical Stalinist labor camp of the late forties. It is also the portrait
of the simple Russian fool caught helplessly in the machinery of cor-
rupt power, who through his own eternal innocence, manages to find
happiness in being allotted an extra slice of bread on one sunny day.
Solzhenitsyn's manuscript was submitted to Alexander Tvardovsky,
editor-in-chief of the most liberal of sanctioned Soviet journals, Novy
Mir. Tvardovsky has the ability to sense the limits of what will be
tolerated, and he has championed the works of some of the most
talented writers in the Soviet Union. During the freeze and thaw of
Khrushchev's cultural policy after the Twentieth Congress, Tvardovsky
managed to introduce such now-famous figures as Yevtushenko by
publishing their works at propitious periods. Tvardovsky has caused
sensations by printing unorthodox stories and essays in Novy Mir,
reportedly without submitting them to the official organ of Soviet
censorship, Glavlit.l
Tvardovsky knew at once that he had read a modern Russian classic
in Ivan Denisovich. He also knew that Khrushehev was then fighting
a battle in the party against opponents of his de-Stalinization program.
Tvardovsky sent Solzhenitsyn's manuscript to Khrushchev himself,
who sensed an opportunity to further his own political aims, and per-
sonally authorized the publication of Ivan Denisovich in the Novem-
ber, 1962 issue of Novy Mir. It caused an immediate sensation, and
the original printing was sold out within days. For the first time, a
novel describing actual conditions in Stalin's camps had been pub-
lished in the Soviet Union.
1 According to awell-informed source, Tvardovsky has done this on several
occasions, including the case of Kardin's expose of the Aurora incident, Legendy t
Fakty (Legends and Facts ), in 1965.
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For a time after the appearance of Ivan Denisovich, Solzhenitsyn's
lot improved. Several of his short stories were printed. Ivan De~niso-
vich was published in the West in many translations, and he even
received foreign royalties on the book. Yet Solzhenitsyn cannot have
been deceived by the sudden improvement in his fortunes; he of all
people had reason to know all too well the reactionary nature of the
Soviet party and government hierarchy. He must have realized that
powerful forces within the country, particularly the organs of state
security, had immediately recognized the dangerous consequences
of the publication of Ivan Denisovich and had singled him out as a
target for repression. His camp experience had acquainted him with
the basic modus operandi employed by the KGB against intellectu,als-
the network of informers, provocateurs, surveillants, and plants. More-
over, many of the men who had served Stalin's terror still served in high
positions. The mail censor during the forties who had denounced
Solzhenitsyn and caused his imprisonment, Aleksey Romanov, now
headed the State Committee for Cinematography.
The Gathering Storm
After 1962, conditions for Soviet intellectuals became worse and
worse. Khrushchev's failures in the Cuban missile crisis and the virgin
lands program helped persuade him to reverse his cultural policies
once again, and he denounced many of the liberal writers and artists
he had earlier endorsed. Within two years after Khrushchev's ouster
in 1964, it became apparent that the regime of Brezhnev and Ko:sygin
intended to repress entirely the liberalism that 1956 had touched off.
In 1965, Brezhnev made a positive reference to Stalin in a speech.
Histories, fictional works, and ideological treatises which cited Stalin
unfavorably were suppressed. Many frightened intellectuals, among
them prominent cultural and scientific figures such as Maya Plisetskaya
and academician A. D. Sakharav, appealed to the Politburo on the
eve of the 23rd Party Congress in 1966 against any rehabilitation
of Stalin.
The Soviet intelligentsia reacted to increased waves of repressions
and reprisals with creative vigor and talent. They discovered ]loop-
holes in the supposedly impenetrable wall of official censorship.
Writers found they could get articles published in Central Asian
literary journals which would never have gotten past the Moscow
censors. Since unauthorized reproduction of literary materiaIl on
presses or mimeographs was forbidden, intellectuals reproduced their
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SECRET Solzhenitsyn
unpublished manuscripts on typewriters or even by hand, a process
which came to be known as Samizdat. Trustworthy individuals col-
lected stories of Samizdat manuscripts, harbored them in secret rooms,
and permitted friends to visit these "libraries" for short periods of
time each day.a Realizing that their mail was opened, their telephones
tapped, and their movements constantly watched, some of the most
active dissident intellectuals developed open codes by which to com-
municate news of recent manuscripts, arrests of friends, and messages
from abroad to their compatriots.
Solzhenitsyn has had nothing published in his homeland since 1964,
but he remains by far the most important writer in the Soviet Union.
Though his latest works remain unpublished at home, they are widely
read, and are the most frequently reproduced works of Samizdat.
His novels, Cancer Ward and The F-first Circle, circulate in hundreds
of typewritten copies and are avidly sought after by Soviets of all
classes and callings. Both were published in the West in 1968. In
Cancer Ward, completed in 1967, Solzhenitsyn describes the fates of
the patients in a Central Asian hospital society. The novel, like all
of Solzhenitsyn's work, is intensely autobiographical, and is based
on the author's own experiences in a Tashkent cancer hospital after
his Siberian exile.4
Tlee First Circle, believed to have been completed in 1964, is an
acknowledged masterpiece, a realistic novel by a writer who possesses
rare insight into the minds and souls of his fellow men. The myriad
characters of The First Circle reflect most of the prototypes of the
Stalin era-the Communist whose unjust arrest fails to dim his ardor
for Marxism-Leninism; the party official who serves the terror only
to he swallowed up by it; the intellectual who finds his spiritual free-
dom only after he has been deprived of personal freedoms; the in-
former; the girl camp-employee, who falls in love with a prisoner
because he represents humanity in a dehumanized world; the list
goes nn and on. The scene of the novel is a special camp, a "sharashka,"
z T,iterally, self-publishing; a play on the official term Gosizdat, or State Pub-
lishing House.
One of the largest of the Samizdat libraries is said to be in the apartment of
Korney Chukovsky, one of the oldest and most respected liberal Soviet writers.
" Reports concerning Solzhenitsyn's cancer are conflicting. Some sources claim
he was cured at Tashkent; others maintain that the tumor was not completely
arrested, and that Solzhenitsyn still suffers from the disease.
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o z ens syn
where political prisoners possessing technical skills are put to work
developing special devices for the MGB (now the KGB) . The system
is self-serving; the prisoners earn the right to the privileges a~f the
sharashka, e.g., better clothing, more nourishing food, by developing
means to catch more prisoners for the camp apparatus. The camp,
as described by Solzhenitsyn, closely resembles the MGB technical
laboratories at Pushkino near Moscow, which were described by a
CIA source who had been imprisoned there.5 Solzhenitsyn hiimself
served the first part of his sentence in such a camp, and all of the
characters in his novel are drawn from life. The character Rubin, for
example, was modeled on Lev Kopelev, Soviet literary critic; and
Germanist, who was ousted from Party membership in 1968 when
the Austrian Communist journal Tagebuch published his letter attack-
ing the signs of resurgent Stalinism in the USSR.
As a novelist, Solzhenitsyn presents a special danger to the :Forces
of repression. More than any other writer in today's Russia, Sol-
zhenitsyn "tells it like it was" and is. His novels, though set in the
late forties, and early fifties, reveal that the virus of Stalinism diid not
perish with Stalin's death, but infects the whole of Soviet society itoday.
People resembling the most despicable characters in his novels can be
found in the highest organs of Soviet party and government. There
is hardly a Russian family today that did not lose a husband, son, ar
brother to the camps. Countless Russians can identify and empathize
with Solzhenitsyn's characters, reliving the agonies of an era. they
might otherwise wish to forget. This is in fact Solzhenitsyn's crusade-
to reveal the tnith about Stalinism, to arouse the Soviet masses from
their torpor, and alert them to the growing dangers that today's trials,
arrests, and imprisonments portend. As Solzhenitsyn stated in a letter
to the Writers Union in November 1967, every Russian to some degree
must bear responsibility for the Stalin era.
Solzhenitsyn presumably realizes, of course, that in order to further
his cause his works must be published. At present, however, and prob-
ably for years to come it is unlikely that any of his works w-ill be
published in the Soviet Union. It is not only the subject matter of his
novels that has forced the authorities to proscribe his books;. Sol-
zhenitsyn is the champion of the dissident intelligentsia, the restless
youth, and the literary underground. College students risk arrest in
s Among Pushkino's many prisoners of note was Alexander Rado, one of the key
Soviet agents in pre-World War II Europe. See Studies XII, 3, p. 41.
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Solzhenitsyn
order to reproduce and disseminate his novels. Thousands of good
wishes were mailed to him on his 50th birthday. After Literary
Gazette attacked him in June 1968, over 5,000 protest letters were
written in his behalf.
Moreover, the leadership of the USSR Union of Writers is still in
the hands of party hacks like Fedin, Surkov, and Korneychuk. These
reactionaries support the policy of socialist realism because it is the
approved orthodoxy. Moreover, they were personally involved in wreck-
ing the careers of fellow writers, causing them to be sent to labor
camps and possibly to their deaths. A man such as Solzhenitsyn, who
has never compromised his principles, who will not bend either to
disease or repression, and who possesses genius, deflates their self-
importance. They fear him and they will not permit his works to
appear in print. As Surkov stated in a meeting of the Writers Union
Secretariat in September 1967: if Solzhenitsyn's novels were to be
published, "they would be used against us, and (they) would be
more dangerous than Svetlana's memoirs. the works of Sol-
zhenitsyn are more dangerous to us than those of Pasternak; Pasternak
was a man divorced from life, while Solzhenitsyn, with his animated,
militant, ideological temperament, is a man of principle: '
In order to discredit Solzhenitsyn, the regime has set the KGB
against him. Since 1964, Solzhenitsyn has been subjected to a cam-
paign of slander, harassment, fabrication, and even physical threats.
In 1965, KGB agents entered the Moscow apartment of a friend of
Solzhenitsyn's named Teysh, and confiscated manuscripts which the
author had entrusted to Teysh for safekeeping. Among the manu-
scripts was a copy of The First Circle and the only extant copy of a
play Solzhenitsyn had written in the camps in 1949, Feast o f the
Conquerors. The play was a work Solzhenitsyn had long disclaimed,
and which he described as "bearing no relationship whatsoever to my
present works.... this play was not written by Solzhenitsyn, but by
nameless prisoner SH-232 in those distant years when there was no
return to freedom for those arrested under the political article.. . .
(it) bears the stamp of the desperation of the camps." Nevertheless,
despite Solzhenitsyn's repudiation of the play, copies of the manuscript
were reproduced and submitted to the board of the Union of Writers.
The board members later used the anti-Soviet content of Feast of the
Conquerors (criticism of the Soviet Army's performance in World
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War II, for example) to condemn Solzhenitsyn at a meeting ir.~ 1967.
Some members used the play as a basis to demand the author's expul-
sion from the Union. Publication of The First Circle was prevented
by confiscation.
Rumors and lies about Solzhenitsyn were spread by KGB plants.
His war record was questioned; he was branded a coward; l;ie was
said to have betrayed his country in a German POW camp. High offi-
cials slandered Solzhenitsyn publicly. Zimyanin, editor of Pravda, called
him a "schizophrenic who was taking out his revenge upon the gov-
ernment through his literary works." Former KGB Minister Semi-
chastny himself made a statement against him, asserting thatt "Sol-
zhenitsyn is materially supporting the capitalist world; elsE: why
doesn't he claim. his rights (i.e., collect his royalties) from someone
or other for his well-known book?" Solzhenitsyn replied: "This is a
farce; whoever collects fees from the West has sold out to the capi-
talists; whoever does not take the fees is materially supporting them.
And the third alternative? To fly into the sky:'
Despite his jocular remark in response to Semichastny's statement,
Solzhenitsyn obviously knows full well the dangers to which V~~estern
publication of his novels has exposed him. Solzhenitsyn's works are
hot properties in Western publishing circles, and the KGB has tried to
exploit this fact to its own advantage. The KGB's experience in the
case of Svetlana's memoirs, when they released an unauthorized ver-
sion in the West and succeeded in rushing its publication there to
prevent the book's appearance at the time of the 50th anniversary
of the Revolution, had showed them that they could inhibit publication
by creating copyright disputes.
The Tangled Story o f Cancer Ward
In the case of Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward, the KGB initially hoped
to prevent publication of the novel in the Soviet Union. By causing it
to be published first in the West by a publisher claiming to have the
author's permission, the KGB hoped to build an emotional case charg-
ing "disloyalty" on Solzhenitsyn's part in preferring foreign publica-
tion. These charges, combined with the threat of prosecution for
"slander" of Soviet society as in the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial, could be
expected to deter both potential publishers and readers in the Soviet
Union. Solzhenitsyn was aware of the game the KGB was playing, and
knew how to play it himself. lie had learned that a certain Yuriy
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Krayskiy, an Italian of Russian descent, had obtained a Samizdat copy
of Cancer Ward and was taking it to Italy. Solzhenitsyn did not trust
Krayskiy and feared he was working with the KGB. Solzhenitsyn sent
a letter to the Board of the Writers Union urging the immediate pub-
lication of Cancer Ward in the Soviet Union: (The book) "has already
appeared in hundreds of typewritten copies.... I apprised the Board
that we should make haste to publish the novel if we wish to see it
appear first in Russian, that under the circumstances we cannot prevent
its unauthorized appearance in the West."
Novy Mir editor Tvardovsky, himself a member of the Board of the
Union of Writers, urged the publication of Cancer Ward in his own
journal. After much haggling, authorization was obtained from the
Central Committee to set Cancer Ward in print for the December
1967 issue. At the last minute, however, after the galley proofs were
finished, Fedin appealed to Brezhnev, stating that if Cancer Ward
were to be published, his awn authority to enforce orthodoxy within
the Writers Union would he undermined. The December issue of
Novy Mir was postponed and Cancer Ward was eliminated from its
pages. The printed pages containing the novel were piled in the court-
yard of Pravda's printing plant and set ablaze.
Within a month after Novy Mir's December issue appeared without
Cancer Ward, Solzhenitsyn's prediction that the novel would be pub-
lished in the West came true. Il Sag~,iatore, a subsidiary of the repu-
table Italian firm Mondadori, published the first part of Cancer Ward
in a limited Russian-language edition, attributing it to an anonymous
author. Mondadori's Russian edition was the first in a series of pub-
lications of Solzhenitsyn's novels by Western publishing houses at-
tempting to establish copyrights without producing proof of Sol-
zhenitsyn's authorization. All of these attempts were unsuccessful, and
Solzhenitsyn himself publicly repudiated any Western claims to his
authorization. In April 1968, Solzhenitsyn sent the following message
to Literary Gazette: "I would like to state that no foreign publisher
has received from me either the manuscript of this novel or permis-
sion to publish it. Thus I do not recognize as legal any publication of
this novel without my authorization in present or in future, and I do
not grant the copyright to anyone."
It is not certain whether Mondadori obtained its copy of the manuscript from
Krayskiy or whether it obtained a copy of the Novy Mir galley proofs.
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At about the time that the Mondadori Russian edition appeared,
another manuscript of the first part of Cancer Ward was acquired by
a British publisher from Alexander Dolberg, who writes for Thse Sun-
day Times of London under the name David Burg. Dolberg is a Soviet
defector of the mid-nineteen fifties, who is considered by maxiy spe-
cialists in Soviet affairs to be responsive to KGB influence. Dolberg
claimed to have received the manuscript from a Slovak literary critic,
Pavel Licko, who had written an article about Solzhenitsyn in a
Bratislava periodical which later published excerpts from Cancer Ward.
Licko's complimentary story about Solzhenitsyn helped to establish
his credentials in the eyes of certain Western publishers. However,
three unrelated CIA sources have alleged that Licko, who hard been
a political officer in the Soviet Army during World War II, was in
fact a Soviet agent. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Licko at-
tempted to get a Western publication to print a fabricated stor}~ about
Solzhenitsyn which, had it been published, could have been used by
the Soviet government to charge Solzhenitsyn with high treason.
Among other things, Licka claimed that Solzhenitsyn was the leader
of an organized and armed political conspiracy to overthrow the
Soviet government?
In February 1968, a copy of the entire Cancer Ward manuscript
(including parts one and two) arrived in France via a channel involy-
ing Westerners and Soviets believed to be completely reliable. l:n view
of the other, unauthorized Western editions of Cancer Ward (several
possibly engineered by KGB operatives) it may be that either Sol-
zhenitsyn or his friends intended a complete, uncut version of the
novel to be published in the Russian language by a reputable V'Vestern
firm. In contrast to the British publisher, wha had obtained Cancer
Ward from Dolberg and Licko, the French publisher made no claim
to having been granted Solzhenitsyn's permission to publish.8
In April 1968, the Russian emigre organization NTS, via its journal
Grani, mounted one of the most e$ective countermoves to thwart the
KGB's efforts to use Western publication of Cancer Ward against
Solzhenitsyn. Grani sent the following telegram to Tvardovsky: "THIS
IS TO INFORM YOU THAT TH.E COMMITTEE OF STA7:'E SE-
? In February and March 1968, over twenty students and professors at Leningrad
University were convicted of high treason. Interestingly enough, the charges
against them were quite similar to those levelled by Licko against Solzhenitsyn.
"This is the edition published by YMCA Press in Paris.
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o z en-tsyn
CURITY, ACTING THROUGH VICTOR LOUIS, HAS SENT ONE
MORE COPY OF CANCER WARD TO THE WEST, IN ORDER
THUS TO BLOCK ITS PUBLICATION IN NOVY MIR. A000RD-
INGLY WE DAVE DECIDED TO PUBLISH THIS WORK IMME-
DIATELY."The telegram evoked a stinging response from Solzhenitsyn
who wrote still another letter to the Writers Union Board; demanding
that they clarify the role played by the KGB in the foreign dissemina-
tion of Cancer Ward, identify Victor Louis, and indicate whether the
telegram was in fact sent by the editors of Grani. Added Solzhenitsyn:
"This episode compels us to reflect on the terrible and dark avenues
by which the manuscripts of Soviet writers can reach the West. It
constitutes an extreme reminder to us that literature must not be
brought to such a state where literary works become a profitable com-
modity for any scoundrel who happens to have a travel visa. The work
of our authors must be printed in their own country and must not
become the plunder of foreign publishing houses."
In the end, the fact that a plethora of Cancer Ward manuscripts
had reached the West probably thwarted the KGB's efforts. The one
publisher to claim that it had the author's permission was the British
house which had obtained its manuscript via Dolberg and Licko. The
British edition, however, originally contained only the first part of
Cancer Ward, a fact which tended to undermine the claim to au-
thorization. Other publishers in various Western nations were more
sensitive to Solzhenitsyn's precarious position, and declined to claim
his permission to publish. The British publisher, however, attempted
to bring suit against a competing English-language edition published
in the United States. The suit was disallowed in a British court for
lack of jurisdiction.
The First Circle, which is a much more specific indictment of the
Soviet system than is Cancer Ward, was never considered for publica-
tion in the Soviet Union, although it continues to circulate by Samizdat.
As far as is known, only two manuscripts of First Circle reached the
West. Both were published by firms sincerely interested in the author's
welfare, who handled their respective publications with great discre-
tion. Neither firm appears to have acquired its manuscript via a chan-
nel controlled by the KGB. The principal publisher, Harper and Row,
succeeded in keeping the fact of its forthcoming edition secret until
the translation was virtually complete. This allowed the firm time to
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discourage other publishers from making competing translations. It
may well be that the KGB did not know in advance of the plans to
publish The First Circle in the West and thus was unable to attempt
to confound it. In any event, no complications similar to those involving
Cancer Ward occurred.
In addition to the machinations employed by the KGB to impede
or otherwise confound publication of Solzhenitsyn's works, it has
since June 1968 increased its efforts to discredit him publicly and
harass him privately. Licko's activities have already been described.
In June 1968, Literary Gazette, the newspaper of the USSR Union of
Writers, denounced Solzhenitsyn in a full page editorial. Solzhexiitsyn's
assertions that his house in Ryazan had been searched were dismissed
as lies, and he was accused of allowing his name to be used against
the Soviet Union by its enemies. The newspaper charged hinn with
"attacking the px7nciples which guide Soviet literature," violating; "gen-
eral norms of behavior" by circulating his works privately, and refusing
"to declare openly his decision to break all relations with the provoca-
teurs, enemies of our country:' The newspaper made quite clear that
Solzhenitsyn's latest works would not be published in the Soviet Union.
Cancer Ward was dismissed as "requiring serious revision in the
ideological sense." The First Circle was branded "a malicious libel
on our system."
Rumors about Solzhenitsyn continued to be spread. He was reported
at various times to have defected to England and to have fled on a
tourist visa to the United Arab Republic. To make matters worse, he
lost his teaching job in Ryazan. His wife, Natal'ya, whose iincome
supported them after Solzhenitsyn's dismissal, lost her job as well and
was stricken with an extreme case of arthritis. Reliable sources in the
West received word that Solzhenitsyn was in dire straits. Western pub-
lishers, however, fortunately have not attempted to send him royalties
from publication of his forbidden novels. To do so would be ito pro-
vide the KGB a pretext for charging Solzhenitsyn as a paid agent of
Western provocateurs. Solzhenitsyn himself has refused countless gifts
and packages sent from abroad. According to one source, the post
office in Ryazan has an entire room filled with packages addressed
to him.
In December 1968, word reached the West that friends of Sol-
zhenitsyn feared for his life. They said that bands of toughs con-
stantly gathered around Solzhenitsyn's home, taunted and harassed
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o z en-tsyn
him, and even made threats against his life. Solzhenitsyn's friends
feared he would be cut down and the crime dismissed as an incident
of hooliganism. Soon afterward, Solzhenitsyn moved to a village within
50 kilometers of Moscow.
Despite its evidently considerable efforts, the KGB has been unable
~o discredit Solzhenitsyn's reputation in the eyes of his fellow Soviet
intellectuals. The publication of his novels in the West has brought
Solzhenitsyn worldwide fame. If he were now to be arrested, a great
spontaneous protest from Western intellectuals, scholars, and even
Communists would be directed against the Soviet authorities. Thus,
in the fall of 1968, the KGB brought out another trump card, their
most notorious covert action agent, the ubiquitous Victor Louis.
Victor Louis is the man who in 1967 attempted to peddle an un-
authorized edition of Svetlana's memoirs, complete with pornographic
photographs, to various Western publishers. Under cover as a jour-
nalistic stringer for a London newspaper, Louis travels throughout the
world, to countries another Soviet could never dream of visiting. In
October 1968, for instance, Louis was the first Soviet visitor to Taiwan
in twenty years. While on the island he was granted private audiences
with the Generalissimo and his son, and reportedly made non-official
overtures to the Nationalist Chinese from the Soviet government.
Louis was arrested for blackmarketeering in the fifties (after Stalin's
death) and served several years in labor camps. CIA sources who knew
him in the camps say he has been, and is, an informer, scoundrel,
rind homosexual. It may very well be that Solzhenitsyn met him in
a camp in Kazakhstan, for the despicable character Siromakha in The
1%irst Circle appears to be almost a portrait of Victor Louis.
Given the assignment of smearing Solzhenitsyn. Louis traveled to
Ryazan in September 1968, on the heels of a Time magazine crew
preparing a cover story on the author. When Solzhenitsyn discovered
l~ouis' identity, he kicked him out and refused to talk to him. Unper-
1 urbed, Louis fabricated an interview with Solzhenitsyn and attempted
to peddle it to British and American newspapers. Louis also offered
photographs of Solzhenitsyn (obviously taken with a telephoto lens )
which showed the author in several embarrassing situations. The "inter-
view" itself is a clever, yet ill-disguised attempt to discredit Sol-
ihenitsyn's reputation as a writer and a champion of human rights.
1:.ouis portrays Solzhenitsyn as a man obsessed with the camps, a sub-
ject Louis says he believes is better forgotten as an unfortunate aber-
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ration belonging to the past. Louis cleverly seconds Literary Ga.zette's
accusation that Solzhenitsyn has refiised to protest the use of his name
by Western propagandists. Moreover, Louis suggests that Solzhenitsyn's
works have no great literary value, that their literary appeal is strictly
sensationalistic, and that their author is a whining, chronic com-
plainer with a martyr complex.
Despite his efforts, Louis' interview remained unsold for six nnonths
until the Washington Post fell for it and published it in its 16 March
1969 issue. The interview has not, however, received significant r~e-play
worldwide. Moreover, most readers with a basic knowledge of the
situation confronting Soviet intellectuals will not be fooled by Louis'
veiled slanders.
Like the Russian novelists before him who represented the con-
science of their people, Solzhenitsyn continues to write despite ad-
versity, persecution, and ill health. There are rumors he has completed
another novel, Arkhi.pelag Gulag, reportedly the third work of a trilogy
begun with Cancer Ward and The First Circle. If a copy of the manu-
script reaches the West, its appearance will be greeted with still
another wild publishing skirmish on the part of Western firms. Soviets
will read it surreptitiously, in private Samizdat libraries and under
their pillows at night; for it will not be published officially in the USSR.
It is impossible even to surmise what fate awaits Solzhenitsyn. A
careless statement by a Western publisher claiming his authorization,
a plot based on circumstantial evidence alleging his participation in
a treasonous conspiracy, a hooligan's "accident,"-any of these could
mean imprisonment or even. death for Solzhenitsyn. Yet whatever his
future, Solzhenitsyn's place in Russian literature is assured; h.e may
came to be regarded as the greatest writer the Soviet Union has pro-
duced. Ironically, he was produced not by the USSR's progress, but by
its reaction. Solzhenitsyn himself outlined his course in life in a letter
to the Writers Union in May 1967: "I am confident that I wily fulfill
my duty as a writer under all circumstances-even more success-
fully and unchallenged from the grave than in my lifetime. P1o one
can bar the road to truth, and to advance its cause I am prepared to
accept even death. But may it be that repeated lessons will finally
teach us not to stop the writer's pen during his lifetime?"
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Afresh look at an oft-told story.
THE ROTE DREI: GETTING BEHIND
THE "LUCY" MYTH
Mark A. Tittenhofer
The reasons for re-examining the 25 years old matter of the Rote
Drei and Rudolph Roessler-the "Lucy" of the Soviet espionage op-
eration in Switzerland during World War II-are not simple.* 'To be
sure, Studies reviewers have pointed out that much of the public
literature on the subject is unreliable. Concern for historical rectitude
alone, however, would not justify the expenditure of our time and
effort. The profession of intelligence may owe some duty to Clio, but
it cannot be said to be the general one of cleansing all confusiaris and
deliberate disinformation from the public record about intelligence
matters.
Apart from the possible substantive benefits of clearing up the: story
of the Red Three and its members, however, there are certain concrete
circumstances surrounding it that ought to attract our notice. 'Th.e first
is that it continues to be treated as a matter of some contemporary
concern in certain interesting quarters. The second is that the Soviets
evidently think it is important. With regard to the first point, it is
perhaps sufficient to recall that the 20th of July movement against
Hitler-from which much of the Rote Drei's best information ema-
nated-remains the object of deeply divided public feelings in both
Germanies to this day. Moreover, for different reasons the Rotes Drei
is, as we shall see, regarded with considerable sensitivity elsewhere
on the Continent, particularly in Switzerland.
Yet it is Moscow's attitude that is most striking. Readers of Studies
in Intelligence will recall Louis Thomas' recent essay on the career
of the Hungarian collector of cartographic intelligence, Alexander
Rado,l in which we were reminded that Rado was resident director
*Editor's Note. This article is an abridgement of a longer study of the Rote Drei.
The portions omitted in this version mainly concern biographical and other details
relating to the sources and sub-sources of the principals in the organization. MOR~~FiRP
1 Studies XII, 3, p. 41. from pg.
51-90
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e uc yt
of the Soviet apparatus in Switzerland while the Rote Drei was operat-
ing. Rado has publicly indicated the intention to publish a personal
memoir that will lay to rest the "stab in the back" theory of the Nazi
debacle. Thomas correctly infers that this curious announcement must
have had some direct relationship to thinking in Moscow. We are
therefore surely right to believe that we are to hear more about
the Rote llrei, and that we would be wise to equip ourselves in ad-
vance with the appropriate intellectual baggage. Whatever Rado
places on the record is likely to be elaborately confusing.
The Radio Messages Examined
Any useful, accurate account of the Rote Drei must start with the
radio traffic exchanged between the Center in Moscow and the net-
work in Switzerland. The first question is quantitative: how many mes-
sages did the traffic contain? 2 Wilhelm F. Flicke, a German crypt-
analyst who worked on the traffic during the war, estimated the total
at some 5,500, about five a day for three years. This estimate is not
unreasonable. When Edmond and Olga Hamel, two of the Rote Drei
operators, were arrested by the Swiss police ~on 9 October 1943, a
total of 129 messages was found in their flat. A comparison of these
with those in other holdings has shown that 40 appear elsewhere and
89 are unique. The 40 matching messages were all transmitted be-
tween 3 September and 5 October 1943. If it is assumed that the
remaining 89 were also sent to Moscow during the same period,
as seems probable, then it can also be surmised that 129 is the average
number of transmissions per month. There have been a number of
claims that the Red Three network was functioning before the war,
and that Lucy, as Rudolf Roessler was called, gave Moscow advance
warning of Hitler's attack. The traffic proves, however, that Sissy
(Rachel Duebendorfer) did not establish a clandestine association
with 'T'aylor (Christian Schneider) and Lucy until the late summer
of 1942. Our best estimate of the life-span of the Rote Drei operatian-
that is, the period during which the Swiss net exchanged W/T com-
munications with Moscow-is 33 months, from August 1941 to May
1944. If 129 was a typical month's total, the sum of all messages sent
=There, is some difficulty with the term message, because some holdings present.
as one unit what others treat as two or more.
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was about 4,250.3 For the reasons given in the footnote below, 5,000
seems an acceptable estimate of the total volume.
From various sources we have pulled together 437 messages that
appear authentic.4 This collection, unfortunately, contains only 8 per
cent of the presumed total. For this reason we are obliged to be
circumspect: when drawing from the traffic any quantitative conclu-
sions. What is. more important, the riddles resolved by the 8 peer cent
are cause to believe that the remaining mysteries, or most of them,
could be solved with the aid of the missing 92 per cent.
This account of the Rote Drei is drawn chiefly from the radio mes-
sages. Supplementary research in classified files has yielded additional
information. Although there are still gaps in our knowledge, we can
at least present the first account of the Red Three that is not based
chiefly on speculation, fantasy, and falsification.
Our collection of messages contains references to 55 sources. Most
of them, of course, are listed only by a cover name. Of these ?i5 we
can identify 15 with certainty and make educated guesses about 16
more. The remaining 24 appear rarely and inconspicuously. We also
know the identities of some persons associated with the Rote Drei
who do not appear in the traffic.
Digging out the facts and telling the story would have been decidedly
easier if so much misinformation about the subject had not been. pub-
lished in the past. Even the name "The Red Three," a German appella-
tion based on the number of transmitters or operators serving the net-
work, is misleading, because at times there were four and even. five.
a Our holdings indicate that September 1943 was a busier month than most for
the Rote Drei transmitters; if the traffic had been all one way, the figure of 4,250
would be high. On the other hand, no messages from Moscow to Switzerland
were found at the Hamels'. An analysis of all traffic presently available has sug-
gested that about two-fifths originated in Moscow. If therefore we add 1,700
to our projection (40 per cent of 4,250) the total becomes 5,950.
' In his Agenten Funken nach Moskau, 1957 edition, Neptun Verlag, Kreuzlingen,
Switzerland, Flicke presents 68 messages, of which 57 are snatched in our holdings
and 5 more are partial matches (Flicke's versions being incomplete) . It is sus-
pected that the remaining 6 messages are spurious, the creations of Flicke or some-
one else. These messages differ from those known to be authentic in certain minor
ways but consistently. All of these messages, if they were genuine, would have
been transmitted before the sending ;late of the earliest authenticated message.
One of them is the early warning of IIitler's attack, a message that later com-
mentators accepted as genuine.
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SECRET The "Lucy" Myth
Vera and the Beginnings of the Red Three
The story of the Rote Drei begins with Maria Josefovna Poliakova, a
highly intelligent Russian Jewess and a dedicated Communist, born
about 1910. When she was 21, she was a very active member of the
central committee of the Komsomol. She was recruited at that time
by the IVth Department of the Soviet General Staff. Her aliases were
Mildred, Gisela, and Vera. She was fluent in German, French, and
English. Her brother, father, and husband were all executed in Com-
munist purges; yet her devotion to the cause was unshaken.
In 1936-1937 she headed the Soviet military intelligence network in
Switzerland. She made a quick trip back in 1941, when she ordered
certain changes in the command structure of the Rote Drei. But mostly
she spend the war years in Moscow, where she specialized on the
Rote Drei operation. (She was not the "Director," however. All of the
messages from Moscow to Switzerland were signed "Director," an
indicator showing that they came from the Center. It is probable that
Poliakova was the originator of many of these; her informal, fervent,
Marxian style is distinctive. But this tone is often replaced by that
of superiors who are much more authoritative and brusque.) At the
end of 1944, when the Swiss operation had ended, Poliakova, then a
major, became chief of the GRU's Spanish section. Foote suggests that
she was purged less than two years later. "The Director and Vera
were removed from their posts and replaced in about May 1946. I
never saw them again, nor were they ever mentioned. The Centre
has only one penalty for failure:' s
Foote also recounts that in Switzerland he was first directed by a
lady whom he calls "Sonia." Her true name was Ursula Maria Ham-
burger, nee Kuczynski. She was born on 15 May 1907 in Berlin, one
of four sisters.e She also had a brother, Professor Juergin Kuczynski,
who introduced Klaus Fuchs to Soviet intelligence officers. Ursula
and Rudolf Hamburger were Red Army espionage agents in Shanghai
in 1930-1935. She went to Switzerland in the latter 1930's, travelling
? Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies, Museum Press, Ltd., London, second
edition, 1964, p. 161.
?Another of whom was Brigette Lewis (Long).
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alone because her husband had been ordered to stay in China. In
1939 her position was jeopardized by the arrest of Franz Obermianns,
a German Communist with false Finnish documents and a transmitter.
On 23 February 1940 she married Leon Charles Beurton, an English-
man whom Foote called "Bill Philips." Beurton, a veteran of the
Spanish Civil War, was recruited for Soviet espionage by Brigette
Lewis, who turned him over to her sister Ursula on 13 February 1939.
Ursula Hamburger trained bath Beurton and Foote in W/T. The
marriage to Beurton gave Ursula British citizenship, and she left
Switzerland for England in December 1940. Her husband remained
in Switzerland, where he trained Edmond Hamel in operating a W/T
set. In July 1942, provided with a British passport in the name of
Miller and the blessings of the Red Army Staff, Beurton went via
Portugal to England and his Ursula. In 1947 the Beurtons left England
hurriedly for East Berlin.
Sissy and Paul
A third person of importance in the swaddling days of they Red
Three was also a woman, Rachel Duebendorfer. Born on 18 July .1901
in Danzig, she became an active Soviet agent in 1920. Soon thereafter
she married one Curt Caspari, and on 8 July 1922 she gave birth to
a daughter, Tamara, who eventually married a Frenchman andl who
helped her mother with the housework, as did her husband, by serving
as a Rote Drei courier. In the late 1930's Rachel contracted a marriage
of convenience with a Swiss citizen named Duebendorfer.' Shea took
up residence in Bern, where she lived as the common-law wifE; of a
German Communist named Paul Boettcher, alias Paul, alias Hans
Saalbach. Boettcher was born on 2 May 1891 in Leipzig. Before fleeing
Germany he had been a member of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party, Minister of Finance in Leipzig, and editor-in-chief
of the Arbeiterzeitung in Leipzig. Escaping to Switzerland from Ger-
many after the Nazis came to power, he was twice expelled from Swiss
territory, in 1941 and 1944, but managed to survive. Sissy not onhT took
him into her flat but also gave him the papers of her Swiss husband,
whose identity Boettcher assumed. Boettcher, Duebendorfer, Tamara
Vigier (nee Caspari ), Roessler, and Christian Schneider were all
Our notes fail to reflect what happened to Caspari.
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SECRET The "Lucy" Myth
arrested in May 1944.8 Neither Sissy nor Paul was present in the court-
room on 22-23 October, 1945, when a Swiss military court sentenced
each to two years. Both had escaped to France in July of that year.
Boettcher went back to Saxony and in 1947 became editor of the
#,eipziger Volkszeitung. For a time he was a professor of Russian in
Halle. By 1958 he was again an editor in Leipzig. Sissy's fate is not
known to us.
In our collection of W/T messages Sissy appears 28 times between
8 October 1942 and 28 November 1943. These are the highlights:
8 October 1942, Director to Dora (Alexander Rado) for Sissy:
"Xou must learn a code and receive additional instruction... .Your new
people Marius and Taylor are not bad workers, but one must always control
them and keep them busy."
Two characteristics of this message are interesting. The first is that
Sissy is the only one of Rado's sources to whom the Center directed
messages by name and through Rado. Later, as is noted below, Moscow
even eliminated Rado, the resident director, from the communications
channel for certain messages, which were sent to Sissy in her own
code. The second important element in this message is its reference
to Taylor (Christian Schneider) as a new source. As we shall see,
Taylor was first recruited by Sissy in the summer of 1942. Because
Lucy reported only through Taylor, this fact means that Moscow
received no messages from Lucy and his sub-sources until that time.
(Foote claimed that Lucy's material began going to the Center in
early 1941 and that he warned the Russians of Hitler's impending
attack some two weeks in advance. Others, including Accoce and
Quet,g have copied the claim. But the traffic proves it false. )
20 November 1942. The Director instructed Dora to have Sissy
determine and report the identities of the sources in the Lucy-Taylor
group.
12 January 1943. Before this date Sissy had sent her first message in
her own code, because the Center answered, "We greet your first
telegram. Try to work attentively and to be careful when working.
Destroy immediately all notes and working papers: '
e Foote, op. cit., p. 133. Although Foote says of Boettcher, "I cannot speak for
the British, but he certainly was not connected with our network" (p. 87 ), he is
as wrong here as at many other points. The traffic leaves no doubt that Moscow
regarded Sissy and Paul Boettcher as a team and often addressed them jointly.
a A Man Called Lucy, Coward-McCann Inc., New York, 1966.
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The ordinary traffic continued to be channeled through Rado. But
on 23 April 1943 Moscow sent its second message in Sissy's code, this
one addressed to her and to Paul.10 It read as follows:
"1. Dear friends, since the summer of 1942 yott have worked wiith the
Taylor-Lucy group, which has provided us with a great deal of varied
material, some of it valuable. But despite the long cooperation this group
remains wholly unclarified for us. .
"2. Determine and inform us by radio: exact reports on Taylor, Lucy,
Werther, Anna, Olga. Especially important is a personality sketch of Lucy.
Who is he, what is his name, what were his circumstances earlier and what
are they now, for what motives does he work for others and for us? .
" 3. Answer this telegram in your own code. You do not need to inform
Albert of our telegram or of yotu? answer. He has received directions, as well
as telegrams coming directly from Sissy, wi#hout sending queries back
[i.e., to Moscow]. .
"4. To Sissy only. We send you the title of a new book for your code; buy
it; we shall give you instructions about how to work according to thc~ book.
Albert is not to know about the new book. It is called `Tempete sur la
Maison'. .. .
"5. How are you? What is Mara doing? Greetings to her and both of you
from Gisela: '
Although Sissy and Paul had their own code, it appears that they
did not have their own radio operator at this time and had to go
through Rado; hence Moscow's assurances that Rado was not being
curious or testy but rather was accepting this traffic, in a code that
he could not read, without demur. Gisela was one of three code names
for Maria Josefovna Poliakova, the other two being Vera and Miildred.
Mara was Sissy's daughter, Tamara Vigier.rr
18 May 1943, Dora to Director:
"Sissy has just reported that Maurice has been arrested by Gern;an au-
thorities. She fears that the Gestapo will thus come across her trail. Maurice
knows Sissy's true name. I have initiated discrete inquiries and shall report
further."
10 Moscow did not usually use the true first name of an agent as his radio
cover name, but evidence in the traffic itself makes it plain that "Paul" was Sissy's
common-law husband Paul Boettcher.
" Tamara had her own code name, Vita, and one may wonder at Poliakova's
indiscretion in not using it; but such Tapses were not rare. On 6 December 1943
a message from Dora informed Moscow that Foote had been arrested. I3e was
named openly as Foote instead of being designated as Jim.
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24 May 1943, Director to Dora:
"Sissy is to let us know immediately: how did she learn of Maurice's
arrest and to what extent can his arrest be dangerous for her?
4 July 1943, Director to Dora:
"We have been able to determine, just in the past few days, that the
courier from France, who was supposed to pick up the money from Jim,
was arrested; and in his place a Gestapo agent came to Jim and, it appears,
followed him to his apartment and in this way was able to learn his name.
At the same time but independently in this event, Maurice was arrested in
France... .For the time being, you must break off your connection with
Sissy completely. ...She can be persuaded that it is in Taylor's interest
to have a connection with someone else for a while.. .Try to convince
Sissy. Tell that it will be for only three months.. .Sissy could say it is
because of Paul, who is under observation.. .She should keep her apart-
ment absolutely clean and, above all else, not say a word too much.. It
is best that Paul not sleep in the aparimenk"
It has been suggested that "Maurice" was Maurice Emile Aenis-
Haenslin, born 20 September 1893 in St. Denis, France. Aenis-Haenslin,
a Swiss citizen and an engineer, was a member of the Central Com-
mittee of the Swiss Communist Party and later joined the French CP.
He was involved in courier and funding activity on behalf of Soviet
intelligence during World War II. There are conflicting reports about
the date of Maurice's arrest by the Germans, one account dating it
1943, another 1942. The latter is both more detailed and less derivative.
It is therefore concluded that the Maurice who knew Sissy and whom
the Germans arrested in France may have been someone other than
Aenis-Haenslin, who was released from a German concentration camp
in Brandenburg in response to a Swiss demand.
At any rate, the traffic continued to mention Maurice and to reveal
conflicting views about his arrest. On 8 July 1943 Poliakova repeated
to Sissy, in the Tatter's code, some of the instructions radioed to Dora
four days earlier.12 She directed Sissy to leave Bern and go to Tessin
(Ticino) or a spa for two or three months. Taylor and Lucy were to
be turned over to someone else.
'a In so doing Poliakova referred not to Maurice but to Marius, so that there is
a possibility that the two were identical. It has also been suggested, however,
that Marius was Marius Mouttet, a Frenchman and former Socialist Minister.
Foote (. op. cit., p. 92) mentions him but says nothing of an arrest.
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Sissy's Fight with Moscow
Sissy's reaction was unambiguous. On 8 July 1943 Dora sent Director
the following:
"Sissy and her man do not believe that the story has anything to do with
Maurice and the Gestapo. They believe that the man who asked about them
came from the Center and just handled himself clumsily. They assume that
the Center wants in this way to take away the Taylor group, and in such a
manner that I too shall know nothing about it:'
Presumably there were further exchanges, with Moscow insisting
that Sissy identify Lucy and his sources and that she turn them over
to Dora or someone else and with Sissy adamantly refusing, but these
are not in our collection. On 16 August 1943, however, the Center sent
Sissy, via Dora, a stern message which substituted the formal second
person for the intimate and which appears to have been dravrn up
not by Poliakova but by her superiors:
"Dear Sissy,
"We, the Center, which has its people everywhere and can determine what
is happening in other countries and around you, have told you clearly and
explicitly that we have hard evidence that the Gestapo knows that you work
for us and will try to uncover your connections into Germany. You, however,
deny this possibility and interpret it as an attempt to take the Taylor group
away from you. You must understand, inasmuch as you assume this position,
that you know nothing of the danger which threatens you and Taylor's
people, especially those in Germany. Your behavior is frivolous and in?espon-
sible. We demand that you recognize the seriousness of the situation and
place full confidence in our statements. We repeat: the Gestapo knovvs that
you have or had a connection with us and will attempt all possible provo-
cations. .
But Sissy stayed tough. On 22 September 1943 Dora radioed to
Director,
"In answer to your No. 157 and No. 158. Many thanks for your advice.
I am myself convinced that much more could be gotten out of the; Lucy
group. However, I have no direct contact with this group, as you know, and
every time that I #ry to intensify the group's activity I encounter in Sissy
and her man ~ a resistance that I do riot understand. I remind you that when
I noted the possibilities of this group a year ago, I had to hold with Sissy
discussions that continued for months before she was prepared to take it over
and use it. ..Sissy and her man .say that they cannot transmiit criti-
cisms to Taylor and Lucy because both would consider it an insult and
"This literal interpretation of Mann has been used because Sissy at this time
was still married to Duebendorfer, a Swiss citizen.
SEC R~~
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SECRET The "Lucy" Myth
would stop working. In accordance with your advice, I wrote Lucy a very
friendly letter, but Sissy declared that Taylor could not pass it on because
Lucy, beyond doubt, is already doing everything that he can. Apparently
Sissy and her man view the letter as an attempt by the Center or by me
to set up a direct contact with the Lucy group. .Your telegram was
handed over to Paul. .Again he boasted in such a way that I had a
hard time of it controlling myself. He refuses to come to Geneva for meet-
ings. .Again I beg you to release me from further contact with
Paul. [who] tried to establish contact for the transmission of his mate-
rial through Pierre and Ignatz. .
In other words, Sissy and Paul still had no radio operator of their
own but did not want to turn over their encoded messages to Dora
for transmission by Edward (Edmond Hamel) and Maud (Edmond's
wife Olga ), by Rosa (Margarete Bolli ), or by Jim (Alexander Foote) .
One report identifies Pierre as Roger Vauthey of Lausanne, supposedly
a courier or cut-out between Rado and "Mario" in France. Foote,
however, in a private interview held in 1953, said that Pierre and Vita
were Pierre Nicole and his wife. Our own view is that Pierre was in-
deed Pierre Nicole but that Vita was Tamara Vigier. Pierre Nicole,
born in 1911, served as a cut-out between the Rote Drei and the Swiss
Labor Party, which was extremely left-wing though not officially
Communist. The head of this party was Pierre's father, Leon, born
in 1897 in Montcherend, Vaud. Leon Nicole had recruited several
members of the Rote Drei on behalf of the GRU. He and Pierre were
in touch with Dora, Sissy, and Jim. The identity of Ignatz is not
known. He could hate been Leon Nicole or any one of several other
Swiss Communists.
By 5 November 1943 the danger signs had multiplied, and Moscow
feared that Rado might be arrested, leaving the Center cut off from
Lucy's information. It therefore repeated the proposal that Sissy and
Jim be placed in direct contact, so that if anything happened to Dora,
Jim could still maintain the flow of intelligence. On 10 November Dora
replied that Jim was in serious danger. The reason, although the cited
message does not say so, was that Edmond and Olga Hamel had been
arrested by the Swiss police on or about 8 October 1943, as had another
W/T operator, Margarete Bolli.14
On 28 November 1943 the Director instructed Dora to tell Sissy and
Pakbo to work independently for a time. The most important informa-
tion was to go through Jim. What Moscow obviously did not know
was that Jim had been arrested eight days earlier.
i' Sissy, Paul, and Vita were arrested later, in May 1944.
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The fourth key personality in the Red Three was Alexande~? Rado,
the Hungarian cartographer who took over the direction of the net
from Maria Poliakova and who assumed contact with Ursula Ham-
burger's sources after she left Switzerland for England at the end of
1940. Rado's story is well-known and is retold here only in the barest
outline. He was born 1 September 1899 in Upjest, Hungary. It is almost
certain that he was already working for Soviet military intelligence
when he left Pains for Geneva in 1936. Rado and Ursula Hamburger
worked independently of each other until the fall of France :in June
1940 because Rado had been able until then to send his reports to
Moscow via microfilm carried by couriers to Paris. When the Germans
occupied France, Moscow ordered Hamburger to make contact with
Rado and place the transmitter of her new husband, Leon Charles
Beurton, at Rado's disposal. Hamburger had trained both Foote and
Beurton in operating a transmitter, and they in turn trained the
Hamels and Margarete Bolli. In 1941 Moscow resolved a struggle for
power by subordinating Duebendorfer to Rado. (One report has
Poliakova going to Switzerland for the purpose.) But Rado's authority
was not absolute, and the fact that the Center gave Duebendorfer
a code of her own and sometimes by-passed Rado when communicating
with Sissy shows that the Soviets did not intend to let Raclo con-
solidate his position completely.
Dora, a simple anagram for Rado, is the sender or recipient of
almost all the Rote Drei messages. The only exceptions are those sent
or received directly by Sissy and those sent by Albert or by the Center
but mentioning Albert in the text. There is no doubt that Albert, like
Dora, is Rado; but efforts to find a pattern or significance in Rado's
choice of cover name for a particular message have not been successful.
Albert, like Dora, sends standard OB messages. The shift in names
does not indicate a parallel shift in transmitters, because both "Dora"
and "Albert" messages were found at their flat when the Hame~ls were
arrested. The possibility that "Dora" is Rado as chief of the Rate Drei
and "Albert" is Rado as an individual disintegrates when ehecked
against the traffic. Flicke postulated a secretary who as Albert signed
messages for Rado when he was away; but no one else ever heard of
such. a secretary, and Dora and Albert messages were sometimes trans-
mitted an the same day. So the mystery is unsolved.
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All concerned should be aware that Foote-who disliked Rado-
ininimized his role in the Rate Drei, attacked his personal integrity
on dubious grounds, and erroneously believed him executed in the
USSR, whereas in fact Rado is flourishing as a cartographer in Hun-
gary and Foote is dead.
By the beginning of 1941, then, Ursula Beurton, nee Hamburger,
was in England; the desk chief for the operation, Poliakova, was in
Moscow; Rado was in Geneva as the chief Red Three member in
Switzerland; and Sissy and her friend Paul were in Bern (not Geneva,
where Foote ie erroneously places them).
Dora had two other key sources who, like Sissy, provided him with
intelligence from sub-sources. But Sissy was more important than either
of them, for one reason only: Lucy and his sub-sources.
The cut-out between Lucy and Sissy was Taylor, whose true name
was Christian Schneider.
Lucy and Taylor
The Center thought highly of Taylor, chiefly because Moscow mis-
imderstood his role. The first reference to him in our holdings is in
a message sent by the Director to Dora on 8 October 1942. The message
terms him a new source, although in fact he was merely a go-between.
On 20 October 1942 the Director told Dora to identify Taylor's sources,
not knowing that the sources `belonged" to Lucy, not Taylor. Another
Moscow to Dora message, sent the same day, refers to "Taylor's infor-
mation" about OKW (German High Command) plans. A week later
Moscow again asked for the identities of Taylor's sources. In December
1942 and January 1943 the Center began to speak of Taylor and Lucy
jointly. By February 1943 the Center's follow-up questions were di-
rected to Lucy, with scant mention of Taylor. That the Soviets con-
tinued to overestimate Taylor's importance is nevertheless evident in
a Director-to-Dora message of 6 October 1943 which suggested that
the work of the Lucy-Taylor group might be continued after the
war ended and which promised Taylor an income for life if he agreed.
Perhaps Sissy misrepresented to Moscow the insignificant role that
Taylor actually had, perhaps she merely kept stubbornly silent about
such facts, or perhaps she misunderstood the true situation because
she was in touch only with Taylor and not with Lucy.
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In only one sense was Lucy important. If Rudolf Roessler had not
been living in Switzerland during the second world war, his ;sources
in Germany might have found it troublesome or even impossible to
get their reports into Soviet hands. In fact, they might not have cared
much one way or the other about Soviet reception of their material,
as long as it went to the Western allies. But as was pointed out in
the recent review of Accoce and Quet,16 the widely accepted story
that Lucy was a master spy is nothing but a myth. As we have seen,
the Center tried to eliminate Sissy and put Dora in direct contact with
Taylor and Lucy. If this maneuver had succeeded, it is probable that
Dora would have been instructed to pressure Lucy to divulge his
sources, whose identities Moscow had already requested again and
again. And if Lucy had yielded, then the truth would have been ap-
parent: Lucy's true function was no different from that of Taylor.
Both were mere cut-outs. What made Lucy and Taylor important and
what made Sissy important was a small band of Germans, Lucy's
sources.
Lucy's Sources in World War II
The record clearly shows that Lucy had four important sources: i7
Werther, Teddy, Olga, and Anna. Of the 332 messages from Dora to
Director of which there are copies in our holdings, Werther? is the
source of 69 (21 percent ), Teddy of 31 (10 percent ), Olga of 26
(8 percent) , and Anna of 11 (3i/z percent) . These four were probably
not the only sources reporting to Lucy; Lucy was not the only source
reporting to Sissy; and Sissy was not the only principal agent funneling
reports from a network to Rado. Yet these four persons produced 42i/z
percent of the total traffic from Switzerland to Moscow.r$
We do not know the identities of any of them. We can, however,
dismiss the theory of Foote and some later writers that these cover
names merely referred to the source's access rather than his identity,
so that Werther stood for Wehrmacht, Olga for Oberkommando der
Luftwaffe, Anna for the Auswertige Amt (Foreign Office ), etc. There
16 Studies XII 4, p. 104.
17 Others who might have supplied Lucy with information but might also have
been otherwise linked to the Rote Drei were Bill, Bircher, Fanny, Fernand,
Schwerin, and Stefan. None of them appear often in the traffic; none reported
high-level information.
18 Assuming, as we do, that our holdings are large enough so that projections are
mathematically sound.
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is nothing in the traffic to support this theory, which seems to be based
on speculation only. All Rote Drei code names for which true identities
have been established were designators of individuals per se, not of
types of cover or access.
Despite the printed assertions to the contrary, Rudolf Roessler did
divulge the identity of his sources, or at least of some of them. Three
and a half years before his death he provided identifying information
about four of his chief sources to a trusted friend, They were, said
Lucy, (1) a German major (whom he did not name) who had been
the chief of the Abwehr before Admiral. Wilhelm Canaris assumed
command; (2) Hans Bernd Gisevius; (3) Carl Goerdeler; and (4 )
"General Boelitz, deceased."
Lucy's confidant garbled the first identification and may have done
the same with the fourth. Canaris took charge of the Abwehr on 1
January 1935. His predecessor was not a major but another admiral,
Conrad Patzig. But Hans Oster was a major in the Abwehr at that
time, and he remained in the service, in which he served as the
chief of staff and also as the heart of the 20th of July group which
conspired to overthrow and assassinate Hitler.
Hans Bernd Gisevius 18 said that he first met Oster sometime be-
tween August 1933 and April 1934. "At that time he was ...setting
up the war ministry's counter-intelligence organization ...known ... as
the Abwehr."
A number of commentators have noted how well-informed Oster
was. His knowledge of state secrets extended even to those held by
the bitterest enemies of the Abwehr, the Gestapo and the Nazi
security service, called the SD (for Sicherheitsdienst) .
"Oster was able, generally speaking through his contacts with Graf
[Wolf Heinrich von] Helldorf, the Berlin Prefect of Police, and with
[Arthur] Nebe, the Reichskriminaldirektor ... to learn quickly what
was going on in the entourage of Hitler and Goering and also in the
Gestapo headquarters in the Prinz-Albrecht-Strasse." 20
19 To the Bitter End, Houghton Mi$iin Co., New York, 1947, p. 142.
~? Karl Heinz Abshagen, Canaris, English edition, Hutchinson and Co., Ltd.,
T.ondon, 1958, p. 122.
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The fact that Oster was prepared to provide Germany's enemies
with information which was of crucial importance, even thougl;i they
lacked the power to make full use of it, is also well-established. Even
Accoce and Quet,21 despite their denigration of the 20th of July ?;roup,
concede that Oster told Colonel J. G. Sas, the Dutch military a1ttache
in Berlin, that Germany intended to invade Norway. Abshagen 22 re-
ported that Oster gave Sas this warning on 3 April 1940 for relay
to Norway and also told Sas of the invasion of Holland before the
event. In fact, Oster had begun to send specific, factual warnings
to the West as early as 1938.
The man who had become a major in 1929, a lieutenant colonel in
1935, a colonel in 1939, and a major general in 1942 was unswerving
in his detestation of German fascism and in his conviction that
morality necessitated action. As time passed and Hitler's power grew,
Oster became convinced that the plots to eradicate the Nazis through
the internal intervention of German armed forces would fail because
of the waverings of the German generals. He warned the West be-
cause he recognized that Hitler could not be brought down inside
the Reich until he had been defeated on the battlefields.
Most contemporary German historians boggle at this point. They
write in detail about the 20th of July conspiracy but gloss over the
fact that from 1938 until his discharge from the Abwehr on 31 March
1944,23 when he was placed under house arrest in Schnaditz;, near
Leipzig, Oster was furnishing vital information to Germany's foes
and was therefore-at least in Nazi eyes-engaged in high tt~eason.
~` op. cit., p. 89.
Za cp. cit., pp. 176-177.
a3 Wilhelm Ritter von Schramm (Verrat im Zweiten Weltkrieg, Econ Verlag,
Dusseldorf-Vienna, 1967, p. 223) and others have made the same curious mistake
about Oster and have drawn the same conclusion. They state that he vvas sus-
pended from Abwehr duty on 5 April 1943. But a number of reliable sources
have reported that on this date, when Hans von Dohnanyi, Josef Muellfer, and
Dietrich Bonhoeffer were arrested, Oster merely came under initial suspicion.
He was transferred to a reserve status on 19 June 1943 but was not placed under
surveillance (or house arrest) until March of the following year. The lass: known
message from Dora which cites Werther or any other possible source of Lucy
as the source of the message is dated October 1943. Accordingly, there is no
basis in fact for the argument that Lucy's messages continued to flow to Moscow
after 20 July 1944, as Accoce and Quet have maintained, or that General Oster
could not have been one of Lucy's sources, as von Schramm has maintained.
SECRET 65
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Y Yh
How did Oster obtain information? Gisevius z4 said, "Oster ...had
formed a circle around himself ... he utilized the potentialities of
the Ahwelir so cannily that he was able to establish a whole network
of confidential agents.... Oster seemed to be organizing an intelli-
gence service of his own, within the counter-intelligence service... .
One of the most important of his activities was to install his own con-
fidential agents in the mast diverse positions." And Oster was on
intimate conspiratorial terms with such persons as General Ludwig
Beck (who, with Oster, sent Dr. Josef Mueller to the Vatican for
peace negotiations with the British, negotiations at which the Pope
presided); General Georg Thomas, head of the Economics and Arma-
ments Branch of the OKW; Generals Fritz Thiele and Erich Fellgiebel,
respectively chiefs of communications for the Army and the OKW;
and General Friedrich Olbricht, chief of the Allgemeine Heeresamt
and permanent deputy to the commander-in-chief of the Home Army.
These men, and others like them, were active members of the con-
spiracy; most of them were executed by the Nazis. And they were
in a position to have direct access to precisely the kind of information
reported by Lucy's sources.
How did the information reach Lucy? Here too we can only specu-
late. Abiographic summary of Oster in the International Biographic
Archives 2s includes the fallowing: "In addition to his military duties
Oster was simultaneously the technical center of the anti-Hitler
resistance in the Army. He spared neither effort nor risk to set up
connections between military and civilian resistance groups."
Gisevius 2s adds, "He once described to me in one sentence his own
conception of his function within the Resistance movement. He was
standing at his desk looking down pensively at the four or five tele-
phones whose secret circuits connected him with the most diverse
authorities. `This is what I am,' he said. `I facilitate communications for
everyone everywhere."'
Oster had the entire communications network of the Abwehr at his
disposal, and he used it to support the anti-Nazi cause. Abshagen 27
comments, "The so-called `A-net' (consisting of independent lines of
~` ap. cit., pp. 421-422.
~ Anonymous, Munziger Archives, "ME-O: (Oster) 8.12.1962, 1128, Hans
Oster (former German general) : '
~? op. cit., p. 424.
~` op. cit., p. 122.
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communication at the disposal of the Abwehr only) would ensure
that the `conspirators' only would be able to transmit news and orders."
He adds, "The Abwehr organization was the nerve-centre from which
lines led to the General Staff, to General [Erwin] von Witzleben ... to
Schacht, to Goerdeler, to Beck .. to [Baron Ernst von] Weizs~aecker
[then Under-Secretary of State and formerly Minister in Bern.] and
through him to a group of diplomats abroad...." 28
As was noted earlier in this study, the timing of Rote Drei messages
would have permitted sending almost all of the traffic through Abwehr
courier channels from Germany to Switzerland. We know that Gisevius
had access at least twice and sometimes three times a week to a courier
pouch from the Foreign Office in Berlin to the German Embassy in
Bern. At least every other day Gisevius was also served by an OKW
courier as the result of a procedure instituted by Oster. And for iurgent
messages Oster or a cohort could safely use an Abwehr telephone.
Haw the Abwehr's lines were shielded against Gestapo and SD
monitoring is not known, at least by this writer; but that they were
so shielded is demonstrated by the conspirators' uninhibited ruse of
telephones and the survival of the group until 20 July 1944.
In brief, even if Lucy had not listed "Canaris' predecessor," Gisevius,
and Carl Goerdeler, all key figures in the 20th of July group, as Having
been among his sources, the characteristics of the Lucy messages and
of their transmission from Germany to Switzerland suggest that
Werther and the others probably had Abwehr communications chan-
nels at their disposal. There seems to be no plausible alternative theory.
Gisevius has told much of his own story in To the Bitter End, but
like other Germans he stresses the resistance activity of the under-
ground and says little about espionage. (There are a few exceptions.
Speaking of the 20th of July conspiracy, Gisevius says, "We h