STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010005-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 107
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2005
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1969
• Content Type: IS

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STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 13 NO. 1 WINTER 1969
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETURN TO
AGENCY ARCHIVES, BLDG. o
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
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The criterion for publication is whether or
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makes a contribution to the literature of in-
telligence.
DONALD F. CHAMBERLAIN
E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
25X1
EDITORIAL BOARD
ABBOT E. SMITH, Chairman
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
Page
The 1968 Studies in I
ntelligence Awards ........
...... faces
1
Policy and Intelligence
: The Arab-Israeli War . J. L
. Freshwater
1
Impact of a crisis. SECRET
The Anatomy of Cou
nterintelligence ...... A. C
. Wasemiller
9
The essentials of
CONFIDENTIAL
The Case of the SS-6
organizing a counterintellig
....................... M
ence service.
. C. Wonus
25
Growing pains in
DCI Hillenkoetter: S
astronautics intelligence. S
oft Sell and Stick .... Arthu
ECRET
r B. Darling
33
Central intelligence becomes an agency, still struggling
to establish its
Spotting Photo Faker
position and function. CON
y .................. Dino
FIDENTIAL
A. Brugioni
57
Brief guide to a c
Michael Collins and
ommon form of deception. C
Bloody Sunday .............
ONFIDENTIAL
...........
69
The war between
OFFICIAL USE
The Old Winsockie S
Martin C. Hartline & M.
the British and Irish intellige
yndrome ............. W.
M. Kaulbach
nce services.
B. Lavender
79
On the differe
nce between cover and
clandestinity.
SECRET
Communication to the Editors. CONFIDENTIAL ............. 83
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
The Courtney Case. CONFIDENTIAL ...................
Miscellaneous. OFFICIAL USE ........................
87
93
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No Foreign Dissem
Intelligence has an impact
during a major crisis.
POLICY AND INTELLIGENCE:
The Arab-Israeli War
J. L. Freshwater
Among the developments leading up to the outbreak of war be-
tween Israel and its Arab neighbors in June 1967, there were some
in Washington that provide one of those relatively rare instances in
which the visible impact of intelligence on national policy is specific
and clear cut.
A number of circumstances came together to make this possible.
First, the basic question which the policy makers asked-who will
win if the US stays out?-was sharply defined. Second, the duration
of the "crisis," as far as the production of premonitory intelligence
and short-term judgments were concerned, was only some three weeks,
from mid-May to dawn of 5 June. The basic issues thus had no
time to become fogged over. Third, the impact of the intelligence
judgment was the more explosive in that this judgment ran nearly
head-on into the initial impressions of some, at least, of the admin-
istration's top advisers.
This last point, which lends drama to the role of intelligence in
this episode, is not easy to document. At the time, however, it was
nonetheless reasonably clear that in fairly high quarters in Wash-
ington the first reaction to Nasir's opening moves in mid-May-the
mobilization of Egyptian forces and their deployment into Sinai, fol-
lowed by the withdrawal of the UN screening forces there-was to
assume that we were witnessing the unfolding of a calculated Soviet-
Arab plan to eliminate Israel (and ultimately the US) from the area.
Given this assumption, and the strength-at least on paper--of the
Soviet-backed Arab forces, it seemed likely that "little Israel" would
lose the war being prepared against it. Furthermore, given the extent
of the emotional attachment to Israel in this country developed over
twenty years in the form of moral if not political commitments, it
appeared to follow that the US ought to move tangibly and quickly
to Israel's support. Indeed, a number of US actions early in the crisis
appear to have sprung from these assumptions and this logic? Thus,
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the way was cleared for an emergency airlift to Israel of spare parts,
ammunition, and, because of the Egyptians' known use of chemical
agents in Yemen, chemical defense equipment.
The Intelligence View
The US intelligence community was virtually unanimous in re-
jecting these assumptions and judgments. Soviet and Arab-Israeli
experts were agreed that Nasir's initial moves must have been con-
ceived out of misinformation about immediate Israeli intentions, and
that this misinformation had reached Nasir because of miscalculation
somewhere in the Soviet apparatus. On the most critical point, it
was nearly unanimously agreed that if war came the Is:raelis would
be able to defeat Nasir and the other Arabs combined, and that
the Soviet military would not physically intervene. In short, the in-
telligence community saw no carefully calculated Arab-Soviet plan.
It saw instead a Soviet blunder being compounded, to Moscow's em-
barrassment, by the responses of Arab leaders ridden with the com-
pulsion to react against what they read as Israeli threats.
These contrasting views of the origin of the crisis and of the
likely outcome of hostilities first collided at the top policy level on
Tuesday, 23 May, the day after the Egyptians announced that the
Gulf of Aqaba was henceforth closed to Israeli shipping. On the
morning of that date, the President called the Director of Central In-
telligence out of a briefing session with the House Armed Services
Subcommittee to tell him that Ambassador Goldberg had telephoned
from New York, complaining that there had been no warning of a
Middle East crisis, and worrying over the possibility of a. war which
Israel, in Goldberg's opinion, could not win. The President asked the
Director for papers on these subjects.
The Director in turn levied these requirements on his deputy for
intelligence, asking that the responses be delivered to him before the
White House regular Tuesday lunch.' The papers-"US Knowledge
of Egyptian Alert," and "Overall Arab and Israeli Military Capa-
bilities"-were drafted by a task force z which had been brought into
'There were at that moment less than four hours remaining in which these
papers had to be finished, prayed over, and delivered.
2 A task force in current intelligence parlance is a peculiar invention, not entirely
dissimilar in conception from the Manhattan Project, the object of which is to
bring into organized relations all who can help the intelligence e:Tort during a
crisis.
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Policy aI Intelligence SECRET
being earlier the same morning. (The Egyptian announcement had
also triggered the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence
Board, which had been called into special session at 0030.)
The two memoranda, plus a general situation briefing for the
Director's own use, were delivered to him in the ground floor lobby
outside Walt Rostow's White House office. At the lunch, in addition to
the President and the DCI, were Secretaries Rusk and McNamara,
General Wheeler (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ), George
Christian (the White House press officer), and Walt Rostow.
The "who will win" memorandum was clearly crucial. It delivered
"the judgment of the intelligence community" that, on the ground,
Israel could "hold on any three fronts while mounting successfully
a major offensive on the fourth." 3 In the air, the Israelis "probably
could defeat the Egyptian air force if Israel's air facilities were not
damaged beyond repair." This memorandum concluded that, although
the Egyptian forces had "improved substantially" since 1956, neverthe-
less "we consider that the Israeli forces have retained an over-all
superiority." On the spot, the President asked Secretary McNamara
and General Wheeler whether they concurred in this judgment. After
they did so, he ordered both papers delivered to Ambassador Goldberg
in New York.
Second Round'
Wednesday, 24 May, was devoted by the intelligence community
and the policy people to digesting developments and refining their
appreciations. A regularly scheduled National Security Council meet-
ing took up problems of South Arabia, while on the intelligence level
the USIB Watch Committee met once again to sift the evidence bear-
ing on possible Soviet intervention in the crisis. The Watch Committee
concluded that "direct Soviet military involvement" was "highly un-
likely."
Next day (25 May), however, activity ste ed up. The Israelis
weighed in in Washington with
a written estimate o the situation which described Arab intentions
in most sinister terms. Israeli intelligence said it saw a well-orchestrated,
Soviet-backed Arab plan to attack Israel, using chemical agents in
addition to conventional weapons. On receiving this paper, the Director
asked the Office of National Estimates to comment. Their paper was
completed in five hours. Both the Israeli paper and ONE's commentary
'The fronts envisioned were the Sinai, Syrian, Jordanian, and Lebanese.
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were sent post haste to the White House to Bromley Smith, the NSC
Executive Secretary. The President himself had not yet returned from
a one-day trip to Montreal. At a meeting on the Vietnam problem
that afternoon in Undersecretary of State Katzenbach's office, the Di-
rector learned from Assistant Secretary of State Eugene P.ostow that
Israeli Foreign Minister Eban was making a pitch
and was even then talking to the See-
retary of State.
The Agency's comment on the Israeli document said flatly that "we
do not believe that the Israeli appreciation ... was a serious estimate
of the sort they would submit to their own high officials," and that
"it is probably a gambit intended to influence the US . . . ." The
Agency's paper judged that the Egyptian positions in Sinai were
essentially defensive, that the other Arabs' troop movements were
gestures for political effect, and that the possibility of the. Egyptians
using chemical warfare could be discounted since the local conditions
were most unfavorable. The paper took the position that "the Soviet
aim is still to avoid military involvement and to give the US a black
eye among the Arabs by identifying it with Israel." The paper con-
cluded that the Soviets "probably could not openly help the Arabs
because of lack of capability, and probably would not for fear of con-
frontation with the US."
Early on the evening of the 25th, a high-level group 4 assembled
in Walt Rostow's office at the White House. Secretary Rusk, having
seen Eban, asked if the Director agreed with ONE's comments on the
Israelis' paper. Told that the Director did indeed agree, the Secretary
commented: "Dick, there is only one thing I want to say-as La-
Guardia once remarked, if this is a mistake, it's a beaut." The group
then moved to the President's office.
The President had read the two papers, and again c1uizzed the
I)irector and General Wheeler-was the US assessment solid? The
President evidently had in mind both the question of Egyptian and
Soviet intentions and the "who would win" issue, which Goldberg
was still picking at. The Director replied, "we'll scrub it down again,"
and following the meeting threw the CIA machinery once again into
gear, to produce the next day what has a good claim to have been
the classic paper of the crisis, "Military Capabilities of Israel and the
Arab States."
`Rusk, Cyrus Vance (vice McNamara who was out of town), General Wheeler,
Eugene Rostow, and the Director.
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Policy and ntelligence
Reassessment and Reassertion
This paper, product of a coordinated effort by ONE, elements of
CIA's Directorate of Intelligence and the Defense Intelligence Agency,
considerably sharpened but did not in essence alter the assessment
given the President by the Director two days earlier. It estimated
that the Israelis could attain air superiority over Sinai in 24 hours
after taking the initiative or in two or three days if the Egyptians
struck first, and that Israeli armored forces could breach Egypt's for-
ward lines in Sinai within "several" days, although the paper foresaw
a need for the Israeli ground forces to regroup and resupply before they
could move to the Suez Canal .5
As for Syria and Jordan, this paper was even more prescient. It
judged that the Syrians had no capability for a successful attack and
said the Israelis could break the Syrian line, though with relatively
heavy casualties because of the terrain and the Syrians' fortifications.
Regarding Jordan, the paper estimated that if Jordan undertook more
than very limited operations, Israel could occupy most of the West
Bank in a few days once major fighting with Egypt had subsided.
This paper was disseminated about mid-afternoon on 26 May. Policy
makers therefore had not yet read it when they again convened in
the White House Cabinet room that day. They did have, however, an
ONE memorandum, "The Middle Eastern Crisis," which spelled out
at some length the view of the intelligence community in general
and of CIA in particular on how the crisis had come about and how
it might develop. The President asked the group, which on this oc-
casion included advisers Clark Clifford and Abe Fortas as well as the
officials responsible for national security affairs, to read the paper. Its
theses also contradicted the "little Israel under Red attack" view.
While ONE conceded that Moscow might have encouraged Nasir
to believe that his forces could stand off an Israeli offensive once they
were deployed in Sinai, the estimators did not believe that "the whole
operation is a Soviet plan, or that the Soviets urged him to his present
course of action." Indeed, ONE said it believed that the Soviets
would almost certainly advise Nasir against a military show-down
with Israel. Noting that Nasir had won the "first round" and appeared
to be standing pat, this paper clearly implied that Israel, facing
"dismaying choices," might well react dangerously. The Israelis had
s Original drafts had said "two to three" days would be needed by the Israelis
to break the Sinai defenses, and "seven to nine" days to reach the Canal, but
this precision was sacrificed in the debate of coordination.
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the choice of risking a military strike, or of acquiescing in the "per-
manent closing" of the Strait of Tiran. Specifying Israel's dilemma,
ONE was "inclined to believe that unless the US and other major
powers take whatever steps are necessary to reopen the Strait, the
Israelis will feel compelled to go to war." In discussing the Soviet role
and probable actions, ONE repeated its earlier judgment that the
Soviets would not intervene with their own combat forces, even
though Nasir's defeat by Israel would, by extension, be a "grave set-
back" for the USSR itself.
Although it is nowhere spelled out in the intelligence record, the
cumulative impact of these judgments over three successive days
evidently led to policy decisions limiting the US material commitment
in support of Israel to a fairly narrow range of "defensive" military
items. Perhaps more important, it was made clear to the Israelis
that, if they chose to take the military initiative, they would have
to go it alone. Rarely has the intelligence community spoken as clearly,
as rapidly, and with such unanimity. The result was early adoption
of a policy posture in consonance with the intelligence judgment.
This was of course not the end, nor by any means the whole, of
the story of the intelligence contribution to policy planning up to the
early hours of 5 June. Once the Israelis saw where the wind was
blowing, they ceased the rather obvious gambits of the pre-May 26
period and took the US more fully, though of course by no means
entirely, into their confidence. On 1 June, pursuant to an agreement
the President had reached with the Israeli Foreign Minister
admitted that Nasir
would not attack Israel on the ground for the moment, although he
claimed that, if Israel did not act, a surprise Egyptian air strike
was "very possible." =asserted flatly that Israel had erred in not
striking Egypt earlier, while Nasir's deployment to Sinai was going
on. But most important, arned that Israel was being "forced
to act because of the inaction o others," and it could not wait "longer
than a few days or a week." When, on the next day, was recalled
ig with Israeli Ambassador Harman, he
felt the moment of decision must have arrived, and
that the decision must be to strike. The Director immediately informed
the President of this sensitive warning.
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Directorate of Intelligence elements at CIA, configured in the so-
called Arab-Israel task force, had meanwhile come to essentially the
same conclusion. On 3 June the task force issued to the community
a self-initiated memorandum entitled. "The Current Focus of the
Near East Crisis," which warned that "all reporting from Israel shows
mounting pressure for a `decision'," while the Arabs, on their side
were "sniffing blood." In this situation, the task force emphasized the
dangers, physical as well as psychological, to US material and strategic
interests in the area, and observed that "the damage to the US
position in the area already appears serious." With these documents in
hand, the whistle of Israeli jets-and the crash of breaking embassy
windows-surely came as no surprise to those who were awakened
early on 5 June.
As indicated earlier, however, the story would be incomplete with-
out some reference to the flood of requests for memoranda which, in
addition to the requirements of the regular intelligence and estimative
media, inundated intelligence components during this period. The
records of the Arab-Israel task force give some of the flavor of those
days-and nights: titles included "Exercise of Overflight and Land-
ing Rights in Spain, Libya and Turkey to Deliver Materiel to :Israel";
"Nasir and a Future UN Presence Along the Israeli Border"; "Oil
Tanker Operations to Eilat" (the shipping people in CIA's Office
of Economic Research joined the Navy in scanning every ship about
which there was even a suggestion it might enter the Red Sea); "Es-
timated Costs of Crude Oil Imports to Israel"; "Egypt's Capacity to
Support a Sustained Mobilization"; "Reactions to the Forcing of the
Strait of Tiran"; "Implications in the Moslem World of Forcing the
Strait of Tiran." Nor, of course, did the intelligence community's
services to US policy on Arab-Israel questions end with the outbreak
of hostilities. But that is still another story.
The story told here is obviously one of a "success." The intelligence
community was "right," and the "right" answers reached the very
top quickly and in immediately usable form. Were we lucky? Did
we merely have on tap, for this occasion, a group of unusually percep-
tive analysts and capable drafters? In part, the answers are perhaps
yes. The present writer, having been one of them, is not inclined to
dismiss the idea that talented people were in fact involved. But he
is inclined to point out that the judgments were not concocted for the
occasion. On the contrary, the community had repeatedly addressed
itself to most of these very questions for a dozen years, through
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formal estimates and-at least as, if not more important in bringing
a body of experts to rub minds together-through the Arab-Israeli
Ad Hoc Working Group.
This group, which produced-and still produces-the "'Arab-Israeli
Handbook," had been meeting periodically under the aegis of CIA's
Office of Current Intelligence since before the 1956 Suez war. Origi-
nally focusing on deliveries of Soviet equipment to the Arab states,
the handbook had gradually expanded into a compendium, of political
and military facts and current military judgments. Moreover, over the
years, experts from CIA, State, DIA, and NSA had learned to know
each other, to work together, and to debate on the basis of a com-
monly-shared corpus of information. Thus, when Nasir made his move
and the Israelis reacted, the spadework on the central problems had
long since been done, and the policy makers could be presented with
informed judgments confidently arrived at.
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CONFIDENTIAL
No Foreign Dissem
The essentials of organizing
a counterintelligence service.
THE ANATOMY OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
A. C. Wasemiller
The first purpose of this study was to help the authorities in
emerging or young nations in which a counterintelligence capability is
lacking or deficient. Such countries are especially vulnerable in this
era, when Soviet skills in espionage, counterespionage, and subversion
have been refined for half a century.
Even within the US intelligence community, however, some con-
fusion and disagreement about counterintelligence persists. For ex-
ample, it is often misunderstood as another name for security. Because
the article strips away the flesh and reveals the bones of its subject,
it may be useful to us here as well as to others overseas.
The paper describes the basic structure and functions of a counter-
intelligence service in a free society. The subject is not, however, a
model CI service, if "model" is understood to mean an ideal or a
pattern of excellence, created to be imitated. In this sense of the
word, no model service exists. There are wide national variations in
such matters as laws governing espionage and security, in budgets
and manpower, and in the kind and intensity of threats. These differ-
ences are so great that a single model would not do for all countries,
so that each must develop its own CI organization specifically adapted
to its own environment and its own special requirements. It is possible,
on the other hand, to describe the essential or standard functions which
most such services share, and to show the kind of organization that
derives from these functions.
The inquirers should also be put on clear notice concerning the
gravity of the commitments they propose to undertake, and of the
eventual dimensions of the task. The fact is that a defensive service
usually must accept responsibilities which exceed the requirements of
security if security is construed, as it often is, to consist of passive
defenses against clandestine and covert attacks upon the installations,
personnel, and activities of official or semi-official bodies whose methods
and sources the government desires to protect against unauthorized
disclosure. Although it is possible to describe and even to create
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a security service concerned solely with these defenses, such an or-
ganization would soon find itself unequal to its task. Established intel-
ligence and counterintelligence services, especially those of the USSR,
are too competent and too strong to be defeated or even contained
by purely defensive tactics. The counterintelligence service must be
aggressive. It must learn all it can about its country's enemies. It must
learn their secrets and be privy to their councils. This essay is intended
as a short course in how these things can be done.
Fundamentals
Counterintelligence is both an activity and its product. The product
is reliable information about all those enemies of a country who attack
it by stealth. Some of these enemies are professional intelligence officers
and the agents who serve them. Others act under cover to promote
subversion or insurrection rather than espionage or counterintelligence.
Still others may be non-Communists or anti-Communists who employ
the same underground tactics to try to take by stealth and force what
they cannot gain through winning the open allegiance of a free people.
As an activity, counterintelligence consists of two matching halves,
security and counterespionage. Security consists basically of establish-
ing passive or static defenses against all hostile and concealed acts,
regardless of who carries them out. Counterespionage requires the
identification of a specific adversary, a knowledge of the specific opera-
tions that he is conducting, and a countering of those operations
through penetrating and manipulating them so that their thrust is
turned back against the aggressor.
Certain pre-conditions must exist if a domestic counterintelligence
service is to be effective. Once these prerequisites are at hand, the
service can develop a capability to carry out its functions. The func-
tions, in turn, determine the structure of the service.
The primary pre-condition is that the service must be established
by law as an element of the central government. If its existence is not
based on law, its opponents will attack it openly or clandestinely, and
eventually they will weaken and even destroy it. If it has a legal basis
but is not a governmental entity, its position is little better; it cannot
survive indefinitely.
The service must be an element or arm of the executive branch
of the government. The executive may, at its own discretion, permit
the legislature a degree of insight into the service and its work. But
it ought not to permit any measure of legislative control, because if
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Counterintelligence CONFIDENTIAL
does so, the service will be unable to protect the secrets which it is
legally charged with shielding. It will lose control of these secrets,
partly because too many will know them for effective security. In
addition, to the extent that they have control, legislators may try to
use it for factional rather than national purposes. The service will stand
in danger of becoming enmeshed in passing political struggles and of
suffering internal splits and dissensions which mirror the factionalism of
the political world.
The chief of the service must have direct access to the chief execu-
tive. The latter may interpose a person or group between himself and
the chief of service for the conduct of routine business. But if the
service is competent, it will from time to time obtain critical security
information which must go directly to the chief executive for reasons
of both efficiency and security. The need for direct access may arise
infrequently, and a wise chief of service will exercise prudence in
seeking it. The right to direct access, however, should be explicit and
unquestioned.
The central office, or headquarters, of the service will need regional
offices, except in a very small country. These regional offices should,
by law or service regulation, be subordinate to the headquarters. If
regional offices are autonomous or nearly so, the service can function
only through the slow process of coordination and persuasion. The
timing of counterintelligence operations is frequently dictated by
the initiatives of the adversary or prompted by anticipating these
initiatives. The delays which inevitably result from arguments about
jurisdiction and pleas for voluntary cooperation would result in so
many lost opportunities that the result would be a mounting heap of
failures. The degree of centralization is something else again. Demo-
cratic nations rightly distrust any domestic service which wields any-
thing even distantly approaching the power of a Gestapo or of the
KGB inside the USSR.
We are here primarily concerned with the kind of internal counter-
intelligence service which does not have police functions and. which
therefore conducts appropriate coordination with the police. Sometimes,
however, the two functions are blended. Many police forces have a
special branch employing much the same equipment and techniques
as those used by a counterintelligence service, and in some countries
the special branch is the sole counterintelligence service. Under such
circumstances, however, it is important that the special branch per-
sonnel be as adept in counterintelligence as in countering crime, and
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that they recognize the significant difference between the two. This
is a difference in targets and timing rather than methods.
The CI specialist is waging a secret war against hostile foreign
intelligence services and against concealed subversion, whether it is
directed by a foreign government, the international Communist move-
ment, a local Communist Party, or any other internal or external foe.
The specialist in police work is waging a war against crime. The two
specialties merge when hidden hostile activity is also criminal, or when
the criminal activity is concealed and directed against the country
itself. When this is not the case, when the criminal is not a clandestine
agent or the spy is not committing a crime, the differences between
counterintelligence and police work are sharper. The duty of the
police officer, for example, is to arrest a culprit as soon as possible.
The counterintelligence officer, on the contrary, will usually prefer
not to show his hand until he has all the information he can get.
Or he may conceal his knowledge, even when all relevant: facts have
been dug out, in order to mislead his adversaries, to manipulate them
with or without their knowledge, and thus to make their efforts serve
his ends.
Whether the counterintelligence service should have police powers,
as distinct from police duties, is moot. Generally it will not need them
unless and until the spies and subversives who constitute most of its
targets commit an illegal act, at which point the police can be called
in to act as the executive arm if the counterintelligence service so
chooses. Some executive powers are very useful to a counterintelligence
service. Among these are the rights to take evidence under oath, to
require citizens to give testimony which is not self-incriminatory, and
to subpoena witnesses. Obtaining and using such powers may, however,
arouse public resentment, and the price may be too high. A counter-
intelligence service in a free land needs the respect and support of the
citizenry, which will fear and hate any internal service that uses
dictatorial tactics or that acquires a reputation for doing so. Therefore,
even if the law of the land allocates certain police powers to the internal
service, they should be used very sparingly, never merely for con-
venience, and only when a failure to employ them would probably
have grave consequences for the national security.
The director of the service may or may not have arbitrary powers
of employment. The law may, for example, prescribe that the service
will employ civil service regulations or procedures, including those
governing hiring. The director may be barred from employing certain
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classes of personnel: known security risks, sexual deviates, criminals,
etc. All such restrictions would do no significant damage if applied
to the hiring of staff personnel. But the director must have the arbitrary
power to refuse employment to a seemingly qualified applicant and
to discharge an employee without publicly stating the cause. These
provisions are essential to the security of the service. The director also
needs the right to stipulate certain legally binding conditions not
ordinarily imposed. Among these are the obligations of the employee
to submit to physical search of his person or of objects which he wishes
to carry from the place of employment, to keep secret all information
about his duties even after employment ends, to submit to the service
for advance clearance the text of any speech or manuscript intended
for public release, and to report promptly and in detail any contacts,
official or personal, which are potentially or actually damaging to the
security of the service. It does not suffice to list such principles merely
in internal service regulations which lack legal force. The director
must have effective sanctions at his disposal.
If extant law does not include the equivalent of an official secrets
act, the director will be well-advised to consider the desirability
and feasibility of getting such legislation on the books. It is probable
that his charter will charge him with protecting classified informa-
tion, as well as methods and sources. But he may not be able to do
so if any journalist or other private person who comes into possession
of classified information can with impunity make it public.
The internal counterintelligence service should not be a military or-
ganization or part of one unless the principles of organization and
management outlined above can be followed. In most instances, it
would be difficult to do so because, in any military agency, the intel-
ligence and counterintelligence components are quite properly sub-
ordinate elements serving the purposes of command. The service, on
the other hand, should be solely and exclusively concerned with na-
tional counterintelligence. Its personnel should be professionals ex-
pected to devote their careers to the work.
Other departments and agencies of the government will also be
custodians of national secrets. The security of these other components
is therefore a matter of national counterintelligence concern, especially
if they have representatives abroad. However, the managerial and
operational responsibility for this kind of security should not lbe as-
signed to the internal CI service. Each government element should
be responsible for its own departmental security. One reason is that
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a department so charged is likely to maintain higher standards and
morale among its employees. Moreover, maintaining an effective watch
over the security of the installations, personnel, and activities of other
departments and agencies would be sure to exceed the capability of
even a very large internal service.
It does not follow, however, that the service has no part to play
here. On the contrary, it must try to establish high, uniform standards
of security for all. It must provide advice and training to others.
It should also keep them appropriately informed about hostile clan-
destine capabilities, personnel, and intentions. It ought to receive de-
tailed reports from any department or agency which suffers security
damage, collate this information, and draw conclusions. It should
maintain a central registry of all non-overt operatives used by other
departments and agencies, to prevent fraud and working at cross-
purposes. It should also establish and keep current another kind
of central file, containing information about known and suspected
spies and subversives in the service of adversaries and about their
superiors. In short, it needs to be kept fully informed about what
friend and foe are doing and to play a central, coordinating role
in the national intelligence community. But it does not play the part
of policeman for the community.
All the functions of counterintelligence derive from the nature and
resultant activities of the adversary. For an imaginary example, let
us suppose that country "X" is conducting espionage against country
"Y." The latter's counterintelligence service discovers that country "X"
has changed its system for communicating with its agents in country
"Y." Until recently it had done so through couriers who left and picked
up messages written in secret ink and concealed in dead drops. Now
most of the agents are sending and receiving coded radio messages.
The result will be the creation or sudden strengthening of a group
in the defending counterintelligence service which will intercept mes-
sages, conduct electronic direction finding, try to break codes, capture
radio operators and play them back, and so forth.
Generally speaking, the function of the internal counterintelligence
service is to protect the lawfully constituted government against con-
cealed attack. The government has other defenders to deal with open
aggression; the CI service is properly concerned only with hostile
clandestine and covert activity. Clandestine activity is that which
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the enemy tries to conceal totally. It usually takes the form of espionage,
counterespionage, subversion, or-much more rarely-sabotage.
Covert activity is not fully concealed; in fact, it is likely to take the
form of a newspaper article or radio broadcast, or even terrorism,
for which the widest possible publicity is sought. What the enemy
tries to hide in this type of action is his sponsorship or other involve-
ment. The goal of the CI service is to learn everything it can about
these two kinds of inimical action, and therefore about the people
carrying out the action, without letting these persons become aware
that the service is acquiring such information. Only by making avail-
able to the government information about its enemies which is com-
plete enough to include all essentials and which was acquired secretly,
so that the enemies remain unwarned, can the counterintelligence serv-
ice do the task for which it was created and designed.
No counterintelligence service can do its job alone. The Commu-
nist services and parties are world-wide organizations which operate
from Free Country "A" against Free Country "B," from "B" against
"C" (or "C," "D," and "E") moving so fluidly across and over national
borders that a defense which stops at the borders will lose its war.
Therefore the service must have a close working relationship with
other organizations, domestic and foreign, which can help it. The do-
mestic departments and agencies most likely to have functions of
counterintelligence significance are to be found in the executive and
legislative branches of the government and in the intelligence com-
ponents of the armed forces. The service also needs the cooperation
of the citizenry.
Within the legislative branch of government there may be various
committees also concerned with the country's security, and especially
with its defenses against subversion. The service will find it profitable
to maintain a liaison relationship with such groups.
The counterintelligence service will also need to maintain liaison
with other friendly services concerned with foreign collection as well
as counterintelligence. Collaboration with services in the former cate-
gory is useful because they sometimes acquire counterintelligence
as a by-product of positive operations. Moreover, their primary targets
in (and outside) the host country are representatives and installations
of Communist states. They thus share with the defenders of the coun-
try's security a solid common interest. The Communist services persist-
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ently use diplomatic, commercial, journalistic, and other representa-
tions for cover. By working with non-Communist espionage services
attacking these targets, the CI service affords the foreign service added
protection and acquires useful information in exchange.
The need for liaison with foreign counterintelligence services is
obvious. Exchanging counterintelligence information freely within the
wide limits imposed by national considerations is the only way in which
the Cl service can cope with an attack so varied, persistent, and in-
tense that no service could hope to deal with it in isolation. The infor-
mation that can be obtained about hostile case officer "X" during his
tour of duty is not likely to suffice for the purposes of negating his
efforts or, better, recruiting him. These goals require all the informa-
tion about him which has been obtained during his total time outside
his Communist homeland-in other words, the help of all other non-
Communist counterintelligence services. For these reasons the liaison
branch is an important part of the CI service. Its structure and its
place in the service as a whole are discussed below.
The service will nevertheless have to get most of the information
that it needs through its own resources and methods. Some countries
may from time to time be faced by a significant clandestine or covert
threat which is non-Communist in nature (for example, a hostile non-
Communist neighboring country, a Fascist group inside the country,
a non-Communist opposition plotting to seize control of the govern-
ment by force). The service then sets up a corresponding group or
branch which studies the nature of the threat, acquires expertise, and
uses it to infiltrate the opposition or otherwise negate cr control it.
But when we consider the Free World as a whole, the non-Communist
threat is dwarfed by the danger of Communist activity. So much of
the service's energy and time must be devoted to the principal
adversary that it would be wrong to set up a Communist intelligence
services branch or a Communist parties branch within the counter-
intelligence service. The service as a whole should be permeated with
knowledge, skill, and a determination focussing on the chief target.
The service will rely upon clandestine methods to obtain its infor-
mation about the adversary for the reason already given: to keep
him from knowing what it knows. It will therefore need an operations
branch, which consists of specialists in clandestine methods. One ele-
ment of the operations branch should be concerned with planning
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future operations. That part of counterintelligence which is essentially
security work will be timed, for the most part, in response to adversary
initiative. For example, a hostile service tries to recruit a local citizen
as an agent; a microphone is discovered in the foreign ministry; or
a pro-Communist radio broadcast is suspected of having been instigated
by the KGB. Responses to these kinds of challenge cannot be planned
in advance. Counterespionage, on the contrary, secures the initiative
for the Cl service and is therefore the activity with which the plans
group is chiefly concerned. It also plans for non-CE opportunities that
will inevitably arise from adversary initiative or by chance, from
deception operations, for example, or an unexpected walk-in. Finally,
the plans group should be available for consultation with any na-
tional service planning an espionage (or other non-CI) operation and
wishing to avail itself of counterintelligence expertise in planning for
the security of the operation at the outset.
Under the command of the chief of operations there should also be
a group concerned with technical services. Counterintelligence relies
heavily upon the various forms of surveillance. Foot surveillance teams
may need radio equipment, purchased or built by the technical services
group. The same is true for vehicular surveillance. All audio opera-
tions, microphone or transmitter, require equipment and expertise.
It may for instance be useful to have a double agent record. a con-
versation with an opposition case officer. Similarly, clandestine photog-
raphy is often used in counterintelligence work. A technical capability
to monitor all kinds of clandestine communications, including radio,
and to analyze suspicious documentation, is also essential. Moreover,
countering the technical attack of adversary services is a separate,
though closely related, specialty.
The CI service, accordingly, will need a group of scientific experts
capable of understanding all the technical equipment used in modern
CI, to the point of building such equipment if it is not available
or cannot be bought securely; of installing and maintaining it; of
training others in its use; and of anticipating needs through a re-
search and development program. An able technical services group
is just as important in an agrarian country as in a complex, highly
developed nation, because the adversary will press the technological
attack regardless of the environment. The group is logically subordi-
nate to the chief of operations because technology and operations
should go hand-in-hand. An independent technical group responsive
only to the chief of the service might too easily lose touch with prag-
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matic operational needs. Placing the chief of operations in charge of the
technical services group will ensure that this does not happen, and
that he becomes familiar with the help that science can provide and
stays abreast of current developments.
No national CI service can afford to be wholly dependent upon
cooperative foreign services for the acquisition of counterintelligence
abroad, nor can it wait until the enemy is inside the nation's frontiers
before it begins to study him. The solution is the recruitment of certain
carefully chosen citizens, from government or outside it, who spend
significant amounts of time in Communist countries. These persons are
likely to have contact with the CI services of such countries of tem-
porary residence: diplomats who have social contact, for example, or
industrialists in whom a Communist service might reasonably be ex-
pected to take an operational interest. Such persons must be care-
fully screened before recruitment. Normally, they are told to remain
passive, neither accepting nor rebuffing hostile offers on their own
but reporting approaches immediately and following instructions there-
after. The CI service may also arrange to have one of its members sta-
tioned in each of the main embassies of its country, as security officer
or in some other suitable post. Such representation is valuable for the
conduct of liaison with other counterintelligence services and also
for investigations conducted in areas where the home country is
especially vulnerable to clandestine attack. Direct representation
abroad will, however, create difficulties for an internal counterintel-
ligence service unless there is careful planning and meticulous prior
coordination with other national elements represented in the same
country-the foreign service, for example, and certainly the foreign
ministry. Care must also be taken not to offend the host service or
government.
Persons in the first category (recruits rather than staff members of
the service) should be important enough so that the adversary service
will take them seriously and assign senior personnel to recruiting and
managing them, but they should not usually have access to important
national secrets unless that access can be concealed indefinitely from
the adversary.
The operations branch should also have an operating group with
separate sub-groups allocated upon either a geographical or a func-
tional basis. This branch runs the operations: surveillance and counter-
surveillance, penetrations, provocations, double-agent operations, tech-
nical and counter-technical operations, counterintelligence interroga-
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9 CONFIDENTIAL
tions and debriefings, handling of walk-ins and defectors, joint opera-
tions with liaison, and so on. It is the largest component of the service.
If the country and its service are large, it is suggested that a geo-
graphic organization will prove preferable, because this kind of struc-
ture will permit appropriate grouping of language skills and area
knowledge.
If the service is small or has few language and area specialists at
its command, a functional arrangement may be better. In this event
the operations branch will need a minimum of four groups or sub-
groups, for counter-espionage, counter-subversion, counter-propaganda,
and operational security. Thus, counter-espionage conducts all opera-
tions directed against hostile foreign services engaging in positive or
counterintelligence activity in the country. Counter-subversion carries
out all operations aimed against subversive activity; its principal. target
will be the local Communist party and international Communism.
Counter-propaganda will monitor and control those propaganda ac-
tivities directed from concealment against the national interests by
foreign services or by local or foreign Communist parties. The key
words here are "from concealment." If the sponsorship of a propaganda
attack is openly acknowledged, the government can deal with it
openly. But if sponsorship is concealed, the government must depend
upon its CI service to ferret it out and expose it, suppress it, or
otherwise manipulate it so that it cannot harm the national interest.
Finally, operational security works closely with the plans group and
with other operational elements to ensure that the service's clandestine
activity is properly hidden from the outset and stays that way.
The second unit may be called Research, Records, and Reports
(RRR) . The Cl service must grow in knowledge and capability; it
is the function of the RRR component to see that it does so. As more
and more is learned about the adversaries, the information is funneled
into RRR, where it is organized, studied, recorded systematically,
filed and, retrieved, and used to produce the finished counterintelli-
gence which Operations needs in order to work intelligently. RRR
is not, however, restricted to close operational support. Operations
writes case reports; RRR writes summary reports based on case re-
porting, but it also writes strategic as well as tactical papers. It moves
from the KGB officer (who is the subject of operational reporting) to
the Soviet Embassy (tactical reporting) to a finished compilation of
what the service knows about the Soviet services (strategic reporting).
Moreover, as the result of such studies, RRR becomes the promulgator
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c~ oun erm a igence
of counterintelligence doctrine. Scrutinizing the enemy's successes and
failures, as well as the triumphs and mistakes of its own service, it is
in a position to discern and express underlying principles.
From this generalizing activity, additional functions flow in the
areas of training and regulations. Some services make training an
autonomous or semi-autonomous function, headed by a director who
reports more or less directly to the chief of the service. The disadvan-
tage is that under such an arrangement training tends to grow isolated
both from the operational context (that is, the living or recent opera-
tions conducted by the service) and the immediacy of doctrine (the
constant learning from experience). Incorporating training into RRR
creates an organic rather than an architectural structure. The life
blood of operations and the living bones of doctrine thus become
natural parts of the body of training.
The service needs internal rules, and these are best when they are
a codification of doctrine. It is possible to write up internal service
regulations abstractly, on a basis of what seems theoretically de-
sirable, but such regulations tend to be legalistic, bureaucratic, and
arbitrary. One desirable aim is to issue as few regulations as possible,
to keep them simple in both language and intent, and to derive them,
like laws, from experience and probabilities in the real world rather
than upon theories and remote possibilities. Placing the regulations
group in the RRR Branch will help to ensure an unblocked flow and
transformation from operational facts to collated facts to underlying
and unifying concepts to a body of coherent doctrine. RRR will, of
course, check out draft regulations with the office of the Legal Ad-
visor and other interested elements of the service.
the service will of course have a central collection of file; or archives.
If the service is large or growing, its holdings are also likely to be
large or growing. Deciding what raw information should be destroyed
and what kept, how it should be indexed and filed, :how best to
retrieve it, who shall have access to it, and all the related questions
are matters peculiarly within the province of the RRR Branch. Ac-
cordingly, it should have the files or central library group under its
jurisdiction.
The remaining parts of RRR, like certain elements of operations,
can be organized geographically or functionally. Whichever kind of
organization was chosen for operations, it is desirable to match it in
RRR. If the structure is geographic and there is a USSR group in
operations, it is helpful if there is also a USSR group in RRR. If
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the structure is functional, then only two more RRR groups may
suffice, a research and collation group and a studies group. The
former receives all raw and finished counterintelligence coming
from operations, from other elements of the service, from liaison, and
from any other sources. From this flow of mixed information it sorts
out the various subjects into separate holdings. It forwards to opera-
tions and other service elements useful counterintelligence which
those elements did not themselves produce. It also produces raw
or immediate CI reports of significance for the chief of service, for
other national services, other departments and agencies of the gov-
ernment, and for liaison exchange. It endeavors to assure that these
reports have a uniform format. Finally, the research group maintains
controls on dissemination and sources of its reports. The studies group
produces finished counterintelligence.
The third major component is the security branch. As has been
said, the security of operations is itself an operational function and is
therefore assigned to the operations unit. The remaining elements of
security are the responsibility of the security branch. These include
the security of methods and sources, physical security, and security of
personnel.
The Source Records and Control Group maintains the records of
all non-staff personnel formerly or currently employed by the service.
An officer of the service who plans the recruitment of a source submits
to this group all available information about the potential recruit,
and the group checks other service and governmental files as appro-
priate. It passes the results to the personnel security group if in-
vestigation of the prospective agent is indicated. If any other de-
partment or agency of the government, in addition to the national
counterintelligence service, recruits and directs clandestine or covert
assets, the personnel security group receives from the department or
agency concerned prior notification of intent to recruit. On this basis
it maintains an interdepartmental or government-wide roster of agents
and can thus give notice if one department plans recruitment of
a person already employed by another, of any derogatory infor-
mation, and of other contraindications.
The physical security group is responsible for fences, floodlights,
guards, passes, safes, and the like, and the personnel security group
conducts background investigations of potential staff and agent per-
sonnel. It also conducts investigations of any employee suspected
of serving a hostile service as a penetration or of otherwise jeopardiz-
ing the security of the service.
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The functions of the liaison branch were mentioned earlier. It may
be useful to divide it into two groups, one concerned with domestic
liaison (relationships with other elements of its own government), the
other with liaison with foreign services.
The service needs a minimum of four other offices: those of the
inspector general, the chief of administration and personnel, the legal
advisor, and the public affairs officer.
The inspector general has two main functions, in addition to routine
inspection. One is to prevent or detect abuse of the service by the
employee: theft, falsified reporting for personal gain, abuse of official
status for personal motives, and the like. The second is to prevent or
detect abuse of the employee by the service. Any staff employee who
believes that he has been treated unjustly and who has unsuccessfully
sought redress through normal channels should have the right of
access to the inspector general or a member of his office, and no
punitive action should result if he avails himself of this right. If this
avenue is not open, a frustrated employee can become highly dan-
gerous to the security of the service. The office of the inspector gen-
eral carries out its own investigations as necessary. The results are
made available to no one outside the office except the chief of the
service, who may at his discretion communicate them on a need-to-
know basis to another service component. For example, iF investiga-
tion undertaken by the inspector general on the basis of an employee's
complaint should reveal insecure or disloyal conduct by the: employee,
the IG will pass this information to the chief of the security branch,
who relays it to the chief of the personnel security group for action.
The office of the chief of administration and personnel handles
the payroll, assignment of vehicles, vacation rosters, office equip-
ment, promotions, and all similar matters.
The legal advisor and his staff maintain liaison with they legislative
branch of the government if the chief executive wants such liaison to
exist. The legal advisor's office reviews all service regulations before
promulgation to ensure compatibility with law. It drafts, or cooperates
in drafting, legislation not yet enacted but essential to the service.
The legal advisor counsels the chief of service on legal matters, in-
cluding the protection of sources and methods. He is also responsible
for ensuring that counterintelligence cases can be turned over to the
police without violation of the chain of evidence or other legal con-
siderations and without security hazard to the service itself.
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The public affairs officer is charged with maintaining essential public,
non-governmental relationships. Private citizens who seek contact
with the service because they believe that they have significant in-
formation-or for any other reason-are directed to this office. So
are journalists, businessmen, and all other persons seeking non-official
contact.
It is vital to national security that all significant counterintelligence
obtained by governmental components other than the service, such
as the armed forces, or by non-governmental groups or private indi-
viduals, be funneled into the service, either through the liaison branch
or through the public affairs office. This information is screened and
collated by the research, records, and reports branch and entered
into files as appropriate. In this way the central holdings become the
national counterintelligence repository. Each department or agency,
other than the service, which conducts liaison with one or more
foreign intelligence or security services should provide the national
CI service with enough information about each such liaison relationship
so that the service knows at all times who is doing business with whom.
This paper has attempted to lay out the functions and structure
of the internal counterintelligence service. The problems that the
service faces are, of course, another matter: these will vary with the
size of the country and its population, the amount of support accorded
the service by its government and citizenry, the qualitative level of
the service's personnel and equipment, the intensity and skill of the
concealed attack by Communist intelligence services and parties, the
effectiveness of liaison and liaison exchange conducted with other
governmental departments and agencies and with foreign services,
the legal mandate of the service, and many lesser factors. The counter-
intelligence service of a stable country with few disloyal citizens is
plainly in a far more advantageous position than is a service in a
land in which revolutionary sentiment is widespread, the government
is unpopular, and the opposition is nearly strong enough to resort
to force or has already launched guerrilla war. Whatever the problems
and their gravity, any counterintelligence service can deal with
them more effectively if it manages to combine two seemingly antithet-
ical qualities: patience and aggressiveness.
CI work is laborious and involves frustrations which, if not met
patiently, will incline the service to hasty action, such as an abrupt
declaration that a Soviet intelligence officer is persona non grata,
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or the quick arrest of a single spy. The service which has identified
a spy or his handler has taken the first big step. If it patiently studies
such people, it may in time be able to control them, not merely sup-
press their activity, which is then resumed by unidentified successors.
But patience by itself leads to the acquisition of counterintelligence
for its own sake, a grave error. All counterintelligence, in principle,
should be used as a basis for counteraction. The questions are, what
kind of action and when? Neither question can be answered until
the last piece of pertinent information is at hand.
The effectiveness of counterintelligence in the free world is cru-
cially important to all of us. As in the past, intelligence and CI serv-
ices properly continue to serve national ends. Yet the skilled coopera-
tion of the non-Communist services in all areas of common interest
is of growing importance. It is hoped that the facts and. ideas dis-
cussed in this paper will contribute in some small measure both to
internal or national capabilities and to our capacity for international
cooperation.
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SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
Growing pains in
astronautics intelligence.
THE CASE OF THE SS-6
M. C. Wonus
The public display of a Soviet SS-6 rocket at the Paris Air Show
in 1967 jolted the US scientific astronautics intelligence community
into awareness of many weaknesses in its evaluative processes. These
revelations were of much greater intelligence significance than the
factual information gleaned from inspection of the missile itself.
The space rocket is one of the new intelligence targets to emerge
in the past decade, and its unique character has necessitated the
invention of new and comparatively sophisticated collection and
analysis devices. To insure the effective operation of these extremely
complex and expensive mechanisms, the results of their employment
require continuous evaluation. A variety of intelligence inputs including
telemetry and radar signature information had been available for a
number of years on the Soviet SS-6 system, but it was not until the
display of the SS-6 that the US intelligence community had a chance
to assess Soviet rocket technology directly and extensively. Its appear-
ance thus afforded the first real opportunity to evaluate the effective-
ness of the collection and analysis efforts which had been directed
against Soviet missile and space programs for a decade.
As a result it became possible to identify many shortcomings in the
analytical phase of the intelligence cycle. Successful attempts have
now been made to remedy most of these. The primary benefit to in-
telligence of the appearance of the SS-6 in Paris is thus not to be
measured by what it revealed about the technical characteristics of
the system, but rather by the subsequent improvements in our ana-
lytical processes.
In retrospect, it is clear that the principal shortcomings of our
analytical cycle did not result from mistakes in the interpretation
of the available data, nor from deficiencies in the quality or quantity
of the data. Instead, error most frequently arose from attempts to
relate Soviet technology directly to that of the United States,. It is
now evident that this approach involves a dangerous assumption, and
that Soviet technological approaches in the field of astronautics often
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MORI/HRP PAGES 25-31
 Apprgy ci.For Release 2005/04/28: CIA-RDP78TO3194AO0he 0 6 005-7 SS-
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The
differ significantly from those of the United States. Erroneous judg-
ments reached by ignoring available intelligence because it gives
answers seemingly inconsistent with "our way of doing things" have
unfortunately been common in the scientific intelligence field.
Initial firings of the SS-6 occurred in late 1957. Although conceived
as an ICBM, it was immediately adapted to serve as a space booster,
and as such has been the workhorse of the Soviet space program for
the past decade, being flown with a variety of upper stages on several
different kinds of space missions. The frequency of its utilization
afforded opportunities to collect a wealth of intelligence information
about it during all phases of its flight. For example, telemetry was
available on the ICBM version from a period well before lift-off until
impact. It should have been possible to reconstruct the detailed
anatomy of the launch vehicle with considerable accuracy. The intel-
ligence assessment of the system, however, was disappointingly wide
of the mark.
The Specific Analytical Illnesses
In particular, the specific propellant combination employed by the
system was incorrectly determined because the volumetric ratio of the
bi-liquid was derived from a telemetry interpretation which assumed
the sustainer tanks were of the same diameter.
The most surprising feature of the SS-6, the use of multi-chambered
engines, was not recognized. This was due to an adverse influence of
US design practice on the thinking of intelligence analysts.
The specific impulse 1 of the first stage of the system, and the overall
energy capability of the stage, were incorrectly derived; both because
of the assumption that the area ratio of the first stage engines should be
related to the area ratio of the sustainer engine in about the same
manner as in engines of US design of the same type. Many intelligence
officers within the community were correct in their assessment of the
specific combination employed, but unfortunately their adversaries,
guided by the "divine righteousness of domestic design concepts,"
overruled their superior technical judgments.
The weight and thrust of the system were incorrectly derived, first
of all because of the error made in deriving the specific impulse of
1 Specific impulse is a measurement of the energy potential of a given mix of
propellant. Numerically, it is equal to the number of pounds of thrust developed
per pound of propellant burned per second.
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SECRET The SS-6
the first stage, and secondly, because structure factors, or structure
weights, were assumed, based on comparable US state-of-the-art in
vehicle fabrication and handling.
The detailed configuration of the four boosters was improperly
interpreted, principally because of the erroneous assumption that liquid
propellant tanks for large rocket vehicles would logically be formed
from right circular cylinders. Additionally, the general configuration
(parallel, or partial), was misinterpreted by many. This argument,
incidentally, grew into one of the major intelligence controversies of the
decade. Those who turned out to be wrong on this issue based their
decisions upon "domestic logic" rather than objectively interpreting
available intelligence information such as intercepted radio telemetry.
The basic Soviet philosophy of building and handling large rocket
vehicles was therefore misunderstood because of the foregoing errors.
On the other hand, there were some outstanding analytical achieve-
ments in the interpretation of the intelligence information collected
from the SS-6. Although a number of errors were made in the overall
assessment of the vehicle, the most important parameter, the payload
weight capability, was, however, derived correctly. This was possible
because the energy capability and major performance parameters
of the second stage were interpreted correctly. There was some
support for the view that the SS-6 employed a kerosene-base fuel,
but the majority view that the oxidizer was liquid oxygen turned out
to be correct. Although the number of combustion chambers was
incorrectly derived, the presence of four engines in the first stage
and one engine in the sustainer stage was correctly derived. The
detailed plumbing of the propulsion system and the positioning of the
propellant tanks were also correctly deduced.
The Diagnosis and Recommended Cure
An extensive investigation was undertaken into why inco:rrect results
were achieved in our initial assessment of this rocket vehicle. It was
first of all determined that the quality and quantity of the data which
were collected on the system were indeed adequate to permit the
analytical entities to accurately derive the performance, characteristics,
and configuration of the vehicle. The mistakes were almost entirely
the result of poor judgment.
First of all, the incorrect interpretation of the propellant combina-
tion employed in the second stage of the system gave our planners
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The SS-6 SECRET
a false impression of the Soviet state-of-the-art in propulsion and
propellants. The Soviet test engineers telemetered an instrumentation
device from both tanks of the sustainer stage which gave a time history
of the level of the propellant in each of the two tanks. Therefore,
if the diameters of the tanks were the same, the relative rates at
which the liquid surfaces were dropping in the tanks, as propellants
were burned, would represent the volumetric ratio at which the
propellants were being burned. The volumetric ratio of the propellants
is thus a very important input in the determination of the specific
propellant combination employed in a given missile. Considering the
general characteristics of the SS-6 sustainer stage, and using US tech-
nology as a standard, the intelligence community assumed that the
tanks were the same diameter. Unfortunately they were not. A mixture
ratio of about 1:1 was derived from this assumption, and when con-
sidered with other pertinent inputs such as specific impulse, the
specific combination was determined to be an amine-base fuel with
liquid oxygen as the oxidizer.
It was immediately obvious upon seeing the vehicle in Paris that
the lower tank of the sustainer had a significantly smaller diameter
than the upper tank, as a consequence of the manner in which the
first stage sections were faired into the sustainer section. Because
of this, the volumetric ratio of the propellants was really about :1.60:1,
in contrast to the 1:1 ratio which had been derived from telemetry. The
propellant combination in the case of the 1.60:1 ratio would logically
be kerosene for fuel and liquid oxygen as the oxidizer, consistent with
the Soviet announcements at the time. Thus, an erroneous assumption
overemphasizing the importance of comparable US practices, led the
community astray. This was the first lesson learned from the reassess-
ment, and an important one to consider in future efforts of this type.
Since we were absolutely confident of the scale factor of the ac-
celerometer telemetered from the sustainer stage of the SS-6, deter-
mined through a study of on-pad telemetry, we were certain of the
derived specific impulse of the second stage. Although a great deal
of acceleration information was available on the operation of the
first stage of the vehicle, from which a specific impulse value of that
stage could have been independently derived, deficiencies in our
analytical methodology limited this direct derivation. In the absence
of a direct computation of the first stage specific impulse, the intelli-
gence community again turned to US technology for an indirect deriva-
tion of this energy value. It was correctly assumed that the first and
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SECRET The SS-6
sustainer stages of the SS-6 employed the same propellant combina-
tions. Thus, by "scaling down" the sustainer specific impulse value,
according to US optimum design, the SS-6 first stage value was
determined.
Again, we went astray. As is typical of the Soviets, they adapted
a single rocket engine for use on both the first and sustainer stages
of the vehicle. Consequently, the area ratios and the vacuum specific
impulse values were nearly the same in both stages. Intercepted
telemetry from engine parameters gave this indication of common
engines in both stages. However, rather than believe this direct
evidence, the community once again erroneously relied too heavily on
US design precepts. Thus, lesson number two was that the Soviet
approach to rocket engine design can be radically different from that
of the US, and that a direct comparison of the type made above can be
dangerously misleading. The community should have attempted to
remedy the deficiency in its analytical capability, in order to solve
for the specific impulse of the first stage directly.
The failure of the intelligence community to recognize that a multi-
chambered engine was employed in the SS-6 was embarrassing. In
this instance a lack of telemetry from the early firings of the system
contributed significantly to the failure. Considering the other indicators
available, however, the engine configuration should have been recog-
nized. When the Soviets fly multi-chambered engines they generally
employ special instrumentation to monitor the pressure trail-offs
of the individual chambers. This special monitoring is easily recog-
nizable, but is generally carried only on the earlier flight tests of a
system. The community was denied this initial indicator because
powered flight telemetry was not intercepted from these early firings
of the SS-6.
A combination of the comparatively high specific impulse and
thrust level of the SS-6 engine, considering the 1957 time frame when
it was being initially flown, however, should have alerted analysts
to the fact that something was amiss. In addition, the strategic system
which preceded the SS-6 in research and development flight testing,
the SS-4, as well as systems which immediately followed it, such as
the SS-5 and SS-7, incorporated multi-chambered engines. Analysts
within the community were reluctant to accept the multi-chambered
engine configurations of both the SS-4 and SS-5, even ir. the light of
evidence that such was the case. Although the tendency was not as
clear as in the case of the SS-6, it seems rather certain that the analysts
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were reluctant to accept these indications because of the radical dis-
agreement with US design philosophies.
The error made in the derivation of first stage specific impulse,
combined with the failure to recognize that the same engine was
used in both powered stages, resulted in a poor assessment of the struc-
ture weight of the first stage of the system. Although this was not
of serious consequence to intelligence consumers, a more accurate
assessment would have been of considerable help to analysts in their
overall interpretation of the vehicle. The vehicle also turned out to be
much more rigid than had been deduced by relating it to comparable
US vehicles. Other incorrect findings in the analysis of the SS-6, in-
cluding the thrusts and weights of the stages and the true configuration
of the booster stage, were also principally prompted by undue stress
on analogies in US rocket technology.
The combination of several incorrect results thus gave planners an
erroneous concept of this highly significant Soviet system. In matters
of space research, this may not be considered wholly intolerable. If
the intelligence target in this instance had been an intercontinental
missile delivery system, however, the consumers might not have been
disposed to be so charitable.
The episode of the SS-6 thus illustrates the familiar tendency of the
constituents of our analytical machine to get locked into inflexible de-
partmental attitudes. It shows that these can be mistaken, and it
shows the difficulty of making corrections. From the point of view
of the individual analyst, the lesson is clear. He should by all means
be very much aware of domestic technology associated with his assign-
ment, but he should never feel safe in assuming that the Soviets are
necessarily taking the same route as the US in their solution of related
technological problems. Assumptions which must be made in the in-
terpretation of the data should be based upon previous design phi-
losophies of the target nation, or upon general indications available
from the data base, and seldom, if ever, upon domestic philosophies.
And finally it goes without saying that the analyst should also :remain
aware of his grave responsibility for being objective in his interpreta-
tion of the data, particularly in his dealings with counterparts in other
analytical entities of the government.
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No Foreign Dissem
Central intelligence becomes an
agency, still struggling to estab-
lish its position and function.
DCI HILLENKOETTER: SOFT SELL AND STICK
Arthur B. Darling 1
The man to succeed General Vandenberg at the head of the Presi-
dent's information service had been under consideration for some
time. Though often credited with the choice, Admiral Souers took
no part in selecting Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter. Another per-
sonal representative of the President, Admiral Leahy, did.
While Ambassador at Vichy from 1940 to 1942, Admiral Leahy had
formed a high regard for his naval attache
's skill in working with the
French underground. Hillenkoetter was expert at helping patriots
escape into Africa and acquiring information from both French and
German sources. "He never got caught." Earlier, he had been so
successful with Ambassador Bullitt in Moscow and in Paris that the
State Department wished to keep him; the Navy, according to Leahy,
had had to recall him into service so that he might learn something
about ships.
In 1942 Hillenkoetter organized an Intelligence Center at Pearl
Harbor for Admiral Nimitz and won his commendation. Then General
Donovan tried to get him to take charge of OSS operations in the
Pacific, but the Navy would not release him. After the war he returned
to Paris, where he was engaged in collecting intelligence when he
was ordered, against his wishes, to Washington to become Director
of Central Intelligence.
Admiral Leahy and Navy Secretary Forrestal recommended Hil-
lenkoetter to their fellow members of the National Intelligence Au-
thority 2 when the Army asked to have Vandenberg returned for high
' Adapted from a history of central intelligence to 1951 prepared by the author
in 1953. For previous portions see Studies VIII 3 p. 55 if, X 2 p. 1 if, XII 1. p. 55 If,
XII 3 p. 79 if, and XII 4 p. 73 if.
2 Predecessor of the National Security Council.
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WUART~ PAGES 33-56
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CONFIDENTIAL DCI Hlillenkoetter
command in the nascent USAF. It was on February 17, 1947, that
the NIA and the President approved this assignment for the recently
promoted Rear Admiral, effective when Vandenberg should leave.
The date is to be noted. It was but five days after Vandenberg had
been named, as DCI, executive agent for the Secretaries of State,
War, and the Navy in intelligence matters, an event which was to
have a decided effect upon Hillenkoetter's administration of the
Central Intelligence Group and its successor Agency.
From the point of view of central intelligence, it may well be
said that General Vandenberg should not have been called back into
military service at that time. He had been in charge of the CIG
for less than a year; its new offices were not in full working order.
He had just established in the minds of the departmental secretaries
that the DCI ought to be their executive agent. He had not convinced
the departmental chiefs of intelligence that he was an officer above
[hem, not under their control. They were not accepting the distinc-
tion between advice and consent. They were still, as Vandenberg
left and Hillenkoetter came in the spring of 1947, endeavoring to
have the business of the DCI come before them, constituting the Intel-
ligence Advisory Board, for consent or dissent on its way to the Na-
tional Intelligence Authority.
General Eisenhower, responsible in large part for the recall of
Vandenberg to the Air Force, may have known little or nothing of
these matters. But he readily agreed, testifying on the pending CIA
legislation that May, that frequent change was wrong; there should
be stability in the office of Director of Central Intelligence. Three
years, Eisenhower then thought, should be the least term of service,
subject of course to exigencies.
One may wonder why the third DCI was not drawn from the
Department of State. It was, so to speak, the State Department's
turn after one each from the Navy and the Army. There was in fact
a plan fostered in the State Department to make Allen W. Dulles
the first civilian DCI. Robert Lovett had mentioned him to the
secretaries in November 1945; his effective work for OSS in Switzer-
land had attracted attention. He was publishing a book on his ex-
periences. His views had been sought on scientific intelligence by
the Technical Advisors of the Joint Research and Development Board.
Ile was soon to give testimony before Congress on the need for
central intelligence and its possibilities as a civilian career.
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No answer to the question can be final. There were personalities in-
volved. President Truman's own ideas and opinions of men had been
at work when he abandoned the Office of Strategic Services, let Dono-
van return to his law practice, and established the Central Intelli-
gence Group; then in the first days of CIG Secretary Byrnes raised
objections which led Truman to emphasize that this was his per-
sonal information service and Admirals Leahy and Souers his personal
representatives.3 Congressional antipathies toward the Department of
State were endemic for many reasons, including the suspicion that
it was infested by radicals. But the most important factor may have
been the influence of the Army and the Navy, supported by Admiral
Leahy, who were uneasy at the prospect of a preponderant central
intelligence organization now moving from the basis of executive
order to institution by law.
Legal Status and Practical Problems
The Central Intelligence Agency would be created by the Na-
tional Security Act of July 26, 1947, whose main purposes were the
establishment of an independent Air Force and the unification of the
military departments under a Secretary of Defense. Much work had
gone into drafting an enabling act for the CIA, but it was decided
that the time was not ripe for so complete and detailed a measure.
Some of its provisions were too controversial and subject to attack
by other agencies; objections would at least delay the passage of the
unification act.
In the draft National Security Act proposed by the President, the
brief section devoted to the Central Intelligence Agency provided
essentially only that such an agency, under a DCI, should take over
from the CIG the functions it was performing under executive di-
rection and should be responsible to the National Security Council,
replacing the National Intelligence Authority. The Congress, how-
ever, because of fears that such a carte blanche to the Executive might
some day be abused, added amendments in which some functions,
prerogatives, and limitations of the new Agency and the DCI were
spelled out.
Headed by a DCI who might be drawn from either military
or civilian life, the Agency, according to the Act now before Congress
in final form, was to advise the NSC on the policies and objectives
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DCI Iiillenkoetter
of the national intelligence mission and make recommendations for
the correlation of departmental intelligence activities. It would cor-
relate, evaluate, and disseminate the national intelligence product.
It would have no police powers and would not infringe on the in-
ternal security functions of the FBI. All intelligence relating to the
national security should be open to the inspection of the DCI, and
he was responsible for safeguarding the sources and methods of in-
telligence. He could terminate any CIA employee at his discretion.
The Agency should perform such services of common concern as
the NSC might judge to be most efficiently so centralized, and it
should have other functions and duties related to intelligence that
the NSC might assign.
These stipulations followed generally those of the President's Di-
rective of January 22, 1946, which had set up the CIG. There were
slight modifications and differences in emphasis. There was now less
distinction made between the functions of the Agency and those
of the DCI with respect to the departmental intelligence agencies,
and the DCI was no longer empowered to inspect the activities of
the latter. His right to fire employees at discretion was new; strictly,
in CIG he had no employees of his own. A significant omission from
the Act was any provision for an Intelligence Advisory Board com-
posed of the departmental intelligence chiefs to work with the DCI.
He was empowered to appoint an advisory committee if he wished.
But the departmental chiefs were determined that the IAB should
he perpetuated and should have governing functions. They had
been annoyed that Vandenberg insisted upon being in a sense their
superior, certainly not their servant. Now Hillenkoetter, a newcomer
among the admirals and generals, was made at once sharply aware
of the animus toward Vandenberg for getting himself designated the
executive agent of the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. The
military men let Hillenkoetter know that the Army and. Navy had
been in existence a long time while he was merely head of a civilian
agency but recently established.
Vandenberg had urged that the DCI be designated Advisor to
the NSC in the National Security Act. This suggestion was too con-
troversial, but the concept remained in the CIA function of advising
the NSC on intelligence matters pertaining to the national security.
Admiral Hillenkoetter thus had authority from Congress to advise
the National Security Council if he chose without first consulting a
board of departmental intelligence chiefs-unless of course the NSC
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should direct him so to consult. This direction the members of the
expiring Intelligence Advisory Board were determined to obtain.
The new DCI furthermore inherited complicated relationships with
the joint Chiefs of Staff and the Research and Development Board
in the national military establishment, and with the Atomic Energy
Commission quite apart from the latter.4 The production and delivery
of scientific intelligence-vital to all three, the joint Chiefs, the RDB,
and the AEC-would have been difficult enough to accomplish had
there been complete cooperation among the departmental intelligence
services and the central intelligence organization, as there was not.
Matters were still to be arranged in detail with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, particularly with regard to the coordination of counter-
espionage activities. The problem would trouble the CIA Office of
Special Operations for some time to come.
Admiral Hillenkoetter had also to contend with internal turbulence
and disagreement due to ceaseless rows among the ambitious or
pertinacious or zealous men who are found in any young and growing
enterprise. There was friction between the Interdepartmental Coordi-
nating and Planning Staff and the Office of Reports and Estimates.
Within ORE, the conflict between its Branches and Intelligence Staff
had brought about a reorganization in less than a year after its estab-
lishment to replace the Central Reports Staff.' Boundaries between
the Office of Operations and the Office of Special Operations were still
to be marked at every point. Within OSO, just completing the absorp-
tion of the Strategic Services Unit which had preserved some wartime
assets of the OSS, there were plans to shift secret operations from a
functional to a geographic organization.
Something had to be done to stop the Intelligence Advisory Board's
interminable bickering and delay over every issue. The Interdepart-
mental Coordinating and Planning Staff which General Vandenberg
had established to work for him with the IAB had been effectively
thwarted in that purpose by the interposition of successive ad hoc
IAB committees. This battle continued as Hillenkoetter took up the
task of revising the directives of the old NIA and CIG for the new
National Security Council. In view of the great amount of work done
on them through the previous year, this should have been a relatively
simple task. It proved to be far from that.
`See Studies XII 4 pp. 86-94.
See Studies XII 4 pp. 75-78.
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DCI Hillenkoetter
Three Anti-Centralization Thrusts
When Admiral Hillenkoetter took responsibility as DC'I and head
of CIG on May 1, 1947, Admiral Inglis with close support from
General Chamberlin was pressing measures in the Intelligence Ad-
visory Board which General Vandenberg had opposed. One of these
would disperse the production of intelligence among the departments
according to their dominant interests, as had been done for collection.6
To complicate the issue, controversy over air intelligence was rising
between the Navy and the Air Forces which were about to become a
separate department under the National Security Act. The Navy
wished to keep its own air intelligence.
Another measure called for redefining "strategic and national policy
intelligence" notwithstanding the fact that an explicit formula had just
been established by the National Intelligence Authority.? The produc-
tion of this final intelligence-coordinated national estimates for the
makers of policy-was the responsibility of the Director of Central
Intelligence. Admiral Inglis, however, would have it made clear that
the control of "operational" intelligence was still reserved to the armed
services. In other words, the DCI would have to produce his national
estimates without access to items of military information, however
pertinent to those estimates, if the service chose to withhold that knowl-
edge from his estimating staff. Inglis maintained that "strategic" intel-
ligence and "national policy" intelligence were separate and distinct,
not the unitary concept of General Donovan, who had originated the
phrase, and others who had followed him in central intelligence.
The third measure to greet Admiral Hillenkoetter as he came to his
first meeting with the IAB on May 15, 1947, was Admiral :[nglis' plan,
first submitted the preceding February 20, to have all recommenda-
tions of the DCI to his superiors pass through the IAB. The agenda
for a meeting of the NIA should be referred beforehand to the IAB
together with copies of all papers to be considered. IA]3 members
should either informally express concurrence or furnish comments to
the DCI for transmission to the NIA. On important matters any mem-
ber might request a formal IAB meeting to discuss proposals before
they were submitted to the NIA.
The counterpart paper prepared in CIG on behalf of the DCI em-
phasized that the IAB was advisory to him. He was not responsible
'Ibid. pp. 80-83.
'Ibid. p. 86.
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DCI Hillenkoetter CONFIDENTI
to it but to the NIA. He was not at liberty to reveal to the IAB all
recommendations which the NIA requested of him. This of course
was so true with respect to budgeting and expenditure that the de-
partmental intelligence chiefs, though curious, never sought to interfere
in these matters, thus prejudicing their right with regard to others.
On the first of the three measures, decentralization of production,
the new DCI endeavored to maintain the position of his predecessor
that he should have supervision over the production of intelligence by
the several agencies. The IAB, however, agreed to successive phrasings
of a directive which left out all specific reference to the DCI and
stipulated merely that the production work should be done. The
minutes of the meeting do not state that Admiral Hillenkoetter ex-
pressed disapproval, but neither do they record his assent. Although
he let the action of the IAB pass for the moment without disapproval,
he still had the right to recommend his own ideas to the NIA along
with the IAB proposal.
The hope had been that there would be few split opinions in the
IAB, that differences would be removed in its deliberations so that the
NIA would receive from the DCI and his advisers considered and
concerted judgments, the result of true coordination. It was ideal to
talk of thus resolving problems and reconciling opposite views. But
the right of decision had to belong either to the DCI or to a majority
of the Board. In terms of political science, sovereignty must reside
somewhere, either in the will of an individual or the tyranny of a
majority.
The issue was clearly drawn. Admiral Hillenkoetter inherited from
General Vandenberg the view that the position of the DCI was the
official central intelligence position regardless of dissents. Admiral
Inglis, General Chamberlin, and other chiefs of intelligence in the
departments clung to the opinion that they had inherent right to make
the IAB a working staff of the National Intelligence Authority which
their secretaries constituted with Admiral Leahy, personal representa-
tive of the President. In accordance with this theory, the IAB was
entitled to know the agenda of the NIA in advance. Navy Secretary
Forrestal had come to this conclusion by June 26, 1947, when the
NIA met for the last time.
Agent of the Secretaries
The theory had been given some support by Admiral Leahy. In the
preceding July he had admonished Vandenberg that the President held
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CONFIDENTIAL DCI Fllenkoetter
the departmental secretaries primarily responsible for coordinating in-
telligence activities. He had advised Vandenberg to drop the word
"agent" and put in its place the phrase "act for" the NIA." Since then,
however, he had modified his position to endorse Vandenberg's desig-
nation as executive agent of the secretaries." Now in the NIA meeting
of June 26, 1947, Leahy stood by this position, and when interviewed
on the subject in 1952 he still favored the idea that the DCI should
be individually responsible. There should be room for dissent, he said;
the policy-makers had the right to accept the dissenting view. But-
and he made no distinction between estimates and other questions
in this respect-the DCI alone was responsible for the central intelli-
gence opinion, in questions of coordination as well as other matters.
In the historic final meeting of the National Intelligence Authority
on June 26, 1947, however, Admiral Hillenkoetter declared before
Secretaries Marshall, Patterson, and Forrestal and Admira! Leahy that
the DCI did not need the authority which they had given to General
Vandenberg on February 12, to act as the executive agent of the
Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy. Its revocation, Hillenkoetter
said, would create better feeling with the agencies represented on the
Intelligence Advisory Board. If he should need the authority in the
future he would he the first to request its reinstatement. Both General
Chamberlin and Admiral Inglis were present to hear this abnegation.
Secretary Patterson, who had favored the grant modified by the
right of an aggrieved agency to appeal through its secretary, would
offer no objection to the withdrawal if the authority were no longer
needed. Admiral Leahy remarked that he saw no reason for withdraw-
ing it though he would agree if Hillenkoetter wished to have it re-
voked. Secretary of State Marshall was concerned to know if the with-
drawal would adversely affect the relationship between the central or-
ganization and the departmental agencies; Hillenkoetter replied that
on the contrary he expected the relationship to improve, and Marshall
appeared to be satisfied. Secretary Forrestal, whose assent j:n February
had been fairly reticent, came out now with a definite stanE; the DCI's
authority to issue orders in the names of the secretaries, he said, made
CIG look like a Gestapo and caused unnecessary friction. Further dis-
cussion was not recorded. It was agreed to withdraw the authority.
'Studies XII 3 pp. 83, 88.
0 Studies XII 4 p. 86.
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DO Hillenkoetter
Last NIA Directive
Admiral Inglis followed up the advantage which Admiral Hillen-
koetter had given him. He argued at length his plan for IAB control
of DCI recommendations in Hillenkoetter's second meeting with the
IAB on July 17, 1947. There were present the usual representatives
of the intelligence services and the aides who served on their ad hoc
committees. Mr. Eddy, for the State Department, took the side of the
DCI. But General Chamberlin, along with General McDonald for the
Air Forces, supported Admiral Inglis. The IAB was intended to be
something more than an advisory council, they said: it had authority
to commit the departments to action; it brought their intelligence serv-
ices into cooperation with the central agency.
The success of intelligence in government, declared Chamberlin, was
dependent entirely on cooperation. He called for an ad hoc committee
to draft a new paper. General McDonald supported him, and so an
ad hoc committee of the familiar persons took over once more the job
of trying to reconcile the fixed views of the intelligence chiefs and
the concepts of the DCI.
There was much discussion in the same meeting on the origin of
the concept "strategic and national policy intelligence." Admiral. Inglis
made clear that he was willing to accept the concept so long as control
over "operational" intelligence was not taken from the armed services.
It was finally agreed that his view should prevail until the joint Chiefs
of Staff had finished reorganizing their joint Intelligence Committee.
At that time the definition of "national" as distinct from "departmen-
tal" and of "strategic" as distinguished from "operational" intelligence
might be agreed upon among most if not all interested parties.
At the next meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board-on July
31, five days after the President approved the National Security Act-
it agreed to ask that the National Security Council, when formed,
should continue all of the directives under which CIG and the IAB
were functioning until it could make such changes as it saw fit. Ac-
cording to the Act, its provisions should go into effect one day after
the Secretary of Defense took office or the sixtieth day after it became
law, whichever came earlier. This gave time for the IAB and its
ad hoc committee to finish up the business of gaining control of the
DCI. The result was one more NIA directive under the old. setup
before Forrestal became Secretary of Defense-on September 17, 1947,
in the midst of rising tension over Russian activity against the Marshall
Plan.
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The report of the ad hoc committee reconciled the views of the
DCI and the TAB by finding for the most part in favor of the latter.
It should have some governing power. All recommendations from the
DCI to the National Intelligence Authority and its successor, the
National Security Council, should be submitted to the TAB in writing,
with the necessary attachments and with voting slips denoting con-
currence, dissent, or the request for an TAB meeting. Its members
should have seven working days to consider each subject. Any recom-
mendations, proposals, or other papers which any TAB member might
originate should similarly be sent to the others. A recommendation by
two or more members would be submitted to the NIA or NSC along
with the opinion of the DCI.
A suggestion of the ad hoc committee for incorporating that part
of the Fifth NIA Directive which authorized the DCI to act for the
NIA "in coordinating all Federal foreign intelligence activities related
to the national security" met resistance from both the Army and the
Air Forces. It involved control over matters of espionage and counter-
espionage which the Army was not yet willing to concede in any form
to the Central Intelligence Agency. This part of the ad hoc committee's
plan for control by the TAB was therefore deleted.
Admiral Hillenkoetter allowed the report of the ad hoc committee
on Admiral Inglis' original proposal, thus modified, to become the
Eleventh NIA Directive on September 11, 1947. It was but nine days
before he took office under the provisions of the Act of Congress, when
the National Intelligence Authority ceased to exist. Why he did not
withhold his approval of a measure placing him under the restrictions
of his Advisory Board is not to be explained by a desire to reverse
Vandenberg's policy. He had under consideration at the time a pro-
gram for continuing the essentials of that policy. He stood ready to
accept advice and to safeguard the right of dissent but would not
yield his independent right of making recommendations to his supe-
riors in the National Security Council.
Perhaps it would have been to his ultimate advantage if Hillen-
koetter had settled the issue then and there. But he found tempers
so high and feelings so hard that, as he put it later, he preferred to
indulge in a little "chicanery" and let the Eleventh Directive go through.
After all, he said, both sides must have known that it would not remain
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DCI Hillenkoetter CONFIDENTIAL
determining. He hoped that in time everybody would cool. Whether
or not the DCI was called the executive agent of the secretaries was
not of great consequence.
On the same September 11, 1947, Admiral Hillenkoetter sent to the
Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy and Admiral Leahy a memo-
randum of suggestions for the first meeting of the National Security
Council which they were about to constitute, with a copy for Admiral
Souers who had been named Executive Secretary of the NSC on Au-
gust 17. Hillenkoetter suggested that he and his associates in CIA
should prepare papers on. a set of new NSC directives within sixty days
following the establishment of the NSC. This administrative detail
had not been discussed with the IAB in accordance with the provisions
of the Eleventh NIA Directive. Moreover, Hillenkoetter went on to
suggestions of policy which also had not been discussed with the IAB.
At least we have yet to find evidence that they had.
One was that there should be a subcommittee of the National
Security Council to act as the NIA had acted in control and supervision
of the DCI and CIG. The idea had been discussed in the congressional
hearings, where Allen Dulles especially had advocated a small govern-
ing authority over the DCI and CIA and where Donovan of course
still insisted upon having only one responsible officer, the Secretary
of Defense, between the DCI and the President. Hillenkoetter sug-
gested that the subcommittee to furnish "the active direction" might
be merely the Secretaries of State and Defense. His alternative was
to add the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but he pre-
ferred not to, so that the Department of State would not be over-
shadowed by the military establishment. And then he proposed that
the Director of Central Intelligence should sit with the National
Security Council as "observer, counsel, or advisor," to keep in touch
with the thoughts of the NSC and to answer its direct questions.
In August there was some uncertainty whether Hillenkoetter would
continue the Intelligence Advisory Board. By September 19, however,
its members had been informed that he intended to use his authority
under the National Security Act and have an advisory committee to
help him carry out his functions and those of his Agency. He told them
that he wished also to readjust the interdepartmental Coordinating
and Planning Staff so that it might work with a standing committee of
the new Intelligence Advisory Committee. This one standing committee
for the departmental intelligence chiefs would take the place of the
successive ad hoc committees they had been using. Members of the
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CONFIDENTIAL DCI Hillenkoetter
Standing Committee would remain in their respective agencies but be
ready on occasion to go over to CIA and confer with ICAPS. ICAPS
too would be composed of representatives from the departments, but
these men, as officers in CIA, would not always be able to vote accord-
ing to the wishes of their departments. The hope was that the Standing
Committee for the IAC and ICAPS for the DCI would somehow be
able to reconcile differences and reach coordinated recommendations.
But it did not work out as Hillenkoetter hoped. The Standing Com-
mittee was to behave like its predecessors, the ad hoc committees of the
old JAB.
On September 19 Hillenkoetter sent formal recommendations to the
National Security Council for its first meeting on September 26: all
of the NIA and CIG directives should continue in full force until
changed; CIA should have sixty days in which to submit revisions.
He presented his plan for the new Intelligence Advisory Committee
in a separate memorandum. Then on the following day, September 20,
1947, he took office as the Director of Central Intelligence under the
National Security Act.
Ilillenkoetter's General Counsel advised him on July 29, 1947, that
under the National Security Act, just approved by President Truman,
the DCI as head of CIA was "solely responsible for the performance of
the Agency's duties." He therefore could go to the NSC without wait-
ing upon advice from a committee. Any committee which he chose
to have would be his own. Its membership might be supplied from
the respective intelligence services, but they would sit at his request.
They might take adverse opinions to their own departmental heads,
who constituted the NSC with other appointees of the President. But
his advisory committee would in no sense be a governing board to
control his thought or action. There was no idea that its members had
first to give their consent before he could proceed.
Admiral Hillenkoetter, in his memorandum of September 19 to the
NSC, accordingly pointed out that he was not obligated to continue the
old Intelligence Advisory Board. He might have a committee which
for all intents and purposes would continue the Board, but it would be
more subject to his control. He requested therefore that the National
Security Council should authorize participation by members from the
several departments in what he named "the Director of Central In-
telligence's Intelligence Advisory Committee." He would have repre-
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DCI Hillenkoetter CONFIDENTIAL
sentatives of the State Department, of the Army, Navy, and Air Force,
and of the Atomic Energy Commission to serve as the permanent
members of the committee. Others would come at his invitation.
The DCI would supply the secretariat for the committee. It would
meet on his call as chairman. Any dissent by a member of the com-
mittee would be formally recorded so that it would accompany the
DCI recommendation to the NSC. The DCI would avoid discussion
of any matters on which members had not yet studied the related
papers and obtained if possible the opinions held in their respective
departments. He wanted a concerted opinion before making a recom-
mendation to the NSC. In deference to the wishes of Admiral Inglis
and General Chamberlin, Hillenkoetter's proposal provided also that
recommendations from two or more members of the committee would
be presented to the Council.
The first response to Hillenkoetter's suggestions of which we have
record came on September 23 from Robert A. Lovett, Acting Secretary
of State. (Secretary Marshall was attending the Assembly of the
United Nations in New York.) The proposal for a subcommittee of
the Secretaries of State and Defense to handle CIA affairs for the
NSC found favor with Lovett, but he wished to add the personal rep-
resentative of the President in order to make it an authority com-
parable to the old NIA. The DCI should attend as a non-voting
member. It would be desirable also to have him present in the meet-
ings of the full NSC.
Lovett wrote that the DCI should consult with an advisory board
to insure "prior consideration by the chiefs of the intelligence services"
of matters which should come before the NSC. This made clear that
the Department of State wished there to be an advisory board for
coordination at the so-called working level; the secretaries ought to
have the benefit of its deliberations when they discussed intelligence
matters in the NSC. There was no implication, however, that the DCI
should be subject to a governing board of the departmental intelli-
gence officers.
The second reaction to Admiral Hillenkoetter's program came in the
National Security Council on September 26. It adopted his recom-
mendations that the old directives remain in full force and that sixty
days be allowed in which to submit any necessary revisions. The In-
telligence Advisory Board, therefore, continued to have legal stand-
ing until it should be replaced by a new directive. It was decided that
the DCI should attend all NSC meetings as observer and adviser.
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CONFIDENTIAL DCI Flillenkoetter
He was authorized to submit the CIA budget for 1949 to the Bureau
of the Budget.
No action was taken at this meeting with regard to establishing a
subcommittee to direct the Agency, nor is there record of opinion on
Hillenkoetter's proposal for an advisory committee. But there is evi-
dence elsewhere that there could have been considerab'.'.e discussion
of these DCI suggestions in the first meeting of the NSC. Secretary
Royall of the Army wrote on October 6 that the subcommittee was in-
compatible in his view with the purpose of the National Security
Council, which was supposed to operate as an entity on all matters
within its cognizance, giving broad directives to the DCI.
This statement might have been construed as an invitation to Admiral
Hillenkoetter to manage the CIA as he saw fit, looking to the NSC
only for guidance in large matters of policy. But it was quite apparent
that the Secretary of the Army did not so intend. Royall was taking
exception to the suggestion of a small governing board consisting of
the Secretaries of State and Defense to the exclusion of the Secretaries
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. His demurrer was closely related
to other things to come. Admiral Souers knew this well, and prevailed
upon Admiral Hillenkoetter to withdraw the suggestion or. October 17.
Hillenkoetter's suggestion of a new advisory committee came under
revision in the office of the NSC's Executive Secretary. Both Admiral
Souers and his assistant, James S. Lay, had been in the Central Intelli-
gence Group from its beginning. Together they changed the wording
in several places with Admiral Hillenkoetter's consent. The DCI was
made to recommend rather than request. His proprietary emphasis on
the DCI's advisory committee was softened-"the Intelligence Ad-
visory Committee proposed by the Director of Central Intelligence."
Souers eliminated the provision that recommendations from two or
more members of the IAC were to be sent by the DCI to the National
Security Council. He did this on his own responsibility as Executive
Secretary, on the grounds that the chiefs of intelligence already had
proper access to the NSC through their superiors, the secretaries of
the departments. This provision, drawn from the Inglis plan, is not to
be confused with the stipulation that the dissents of IAC members be
submitted to the NSC along with the opinion of the DCI. The DCI
might properly report disagreements with his own position that came
out in the deliberations of his advisory committee; but :here was no
reason he should be used as a vehicle for the initiatives cf the depart-
mental chiefs of intelligence. As Hillenkoetter remembered it, after
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some discussion he flatly refused to relay to the NSC their proposals
that he opposed.
Approvals of the plan for the advisory committee as modified by
Souers and Lay came back to the Executive Secretary from Secretary
of Defense Forrestal on October 10, from Secretary of the Air Force
Symington on October 17, and from Acting Secretary of State Lovett
and Chairman of the National Security Resources Board Hill on Oc-
tober 20. No replies from the Secretaries of the Army and Navy are
filed with these, but a memorandum from the Secretary of the Army
for the Executive Secretary was sent on November 26, 1947, through
the office of the Secretary of Defense. Forrestal's Special Assistant kept
a copy in forwarding it before the Secretary had yet seen it.
Secretary Royall opposed Hillenkoetter's plan. He declared that the
DCI had been required by the first NIA directive to refer all recom-
mendations through the intelligence Advisory Board, which therefore
not only performed the service of advising the DCI but also insured
that there would be full departmental coordination of all matters before
they were submitted to the NIA. He insisted that the new Intelligence
Advisory Committee should have a mandatory review of the same
nature. It was due notice that in the NSC the Army would support
General Chamberlin and Admiral Inglis rather than Admiral Hillen-
koetter.
On Wednesday, December 3, a formal communication from the
National Security Council to the DCI enclosed Secretary Royall's
memorandum and requested DCI comment on it for "concurrent
consideration." Hillenkoetter did comment within the week, orally
before the departmental secretaries and chiefs of intelligence, Souers,
and Forrestal in the office of the Secretary of Defense. Hillenkoetter
remembered this conference vividly, he said, as one of the dramatic
moments in his life. He could recall the words almost as they were
spoken. But let us bring to the same point the parallel story of the
NSC directives before we enter into the historic occasion.
The NSCID Battleground
It was evident by this time in another quarter that the intelligence
services of the armed forces were entrenching against Hillenkoetter
as they had in the preceding fall against Vandenberg. Members of the
Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning Staff and representatives
of CIA operating offices had gone systematically to work revising and
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DCI Hillenkoetter
consolidating the old NIA and CIG directives according to the Sep-
tember 26 instruction of the National Security Council. The NSC direc-
tives "NSCIDs," were to lay down the principles, and directives issued
by the DCI, "DCIDs," would carry the relevant administrative orders.
Drafts of the new measures were ready by October 16 and circulated
for discussion within the Agency on October 20. Three days later
revisions had been completed and forwarded to the DCI's deputies,
assistants, and legal counsel for further suggestion. The directives were
practically in order for submission to the Intelligence Advisory Board,
as Acting Secretary Lovett had advised be done. There had been no
concealment of this activity within the Agency. The Director had sent
a memorandum about the undertaking to the departments on October 9.
The only reply to the October 9 memorandum came from W. Park
Armstrong, Jr., Acting Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and
representative of the Department on the IAB, and it reflected indirectly
the displeasure of the departments at this activity in the Agency. It
gave also a direct view of the tension between the State Department
and the members of the military establishment. It proposed that the
new directives should define intelligence in conformity with the con-
cept of national intelligence which Vandenberg had got approved on
February 12, 1947 by the National Intelligence Authority."" This would
hardly please Admiral Inglis.
Armstrong urged moreover that the DCI's right of inspection over
the operations of the intelligence agencies as well as their materials
be restored, as provided in the President's Directive of January 22, 1946.
But Armstrong would go farther and specify that the DCI should
determine the causes of omissions, inadequacies, or duplication and
propose corrective measures to the NSC. The suggestion may not have
been just a broadside aimed at the chiefs of intelligence in the armed
services. There were suspicions in CIA that Armstrong was thinking
of his own Department, where the chiefs of geographical areas op-
posed his work in research and intelligence just as they had McCor-
mack's.""
Armstrong's letter, however, was trained on yet another target. The
State Department had in common with the armed services antipathies
toward the Central Intelligence Agency. The proposal in regard to
the DC Xs right of inspection carried with it a repeal of the section
Ibid. p. 86.
"Studies XII 1 p. 72.
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in the Fifth Directive authorizing the CIG to undertake research and
analyses.12 Armstrong would have "centralization of functions" only
when, by agreement among the departments and CIA, such functions
could be "most beneficially and effectively accomplished on a central
basis." His contention was. that the intelligence agencies of the depart-
ments should each produce finished intelligence in the fields of their
dominant interests, and the DCI should perform the inspection to see
to it that they did. CIA would not produce national intelligence from
source materials which it had processed for itself but from the finished
departmental intelligence.
Along the same line of reasoning, Armstrong proposed to abandon
the directive of February 12, 1947, in which CIG had laid down the
national requirements for the collection of intelligence on China.13
These, classified as economic, social, political, scientific, and military,
were matters of primary interest to the respective departments and
not the immediate concern of the central agency. With this sug-
gestion, Armstrong could count upon entire agreement from General
Chamberlin.
The CIA reply to Armstrong on November 3 was lacking somewhat
in candor. It said that almost everything he desired had been in-
corporated in the drafts which would be complete and ready for
delivery to the departmental chiefs of intelligence on November 10.
Actually, there was no provision in the drafts for CIA's abandoning
research and analysis on "source materials" and depending on finished
intelligence from the departments for the construction of national
estimates. The directive with regard to the national requirements for
collection in China, too, was to be incorporated in a new NSCID. But
then Armstrong was to have another chance in the IAB and, as it
proved, in yet another ad hoc committee if he wished to press his case.
Telephone calls went out to the members of the IAB by November
13, inviting them to a meeting with the DCI on November 20, 1947,
to discuss the proposed NSC and DCI directives. These were to go to
the NSC on November 26, as it had directed in its first meeting two
months before.
Stalling in the IAB
The conference of the intelligence chiefs with Admiral Hillerikoetter
on November 20 was notable, but not for analysis and criticism of
'a Studies XII 3 p. 81 f.
1' Studies XII 4 p. 83 if,
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CONFIDENTIAL DCI Hillenkoetter
the proposed directives. The chiefs spent time arguing whether or not
they were the Intelligence Advisory Board. It was idle discussion. The
IAB continued to exist so long as. the First and Eleventh NIA Direc-
tives remained in effect, and the NSC had decided on September 26
that the old directives should continue in full force at least sixty days.
Admiral Hillenkoetter may have befogged the issue by pointing to the
fact that there no longer was an NIA to which the Board might report,
but he himself accepted the IAB as. such when he accepted its request
that the proposed NSCIDs and DCIDs be referred to an ad hoc com-
mittee for discussion with ICAPS.
The meeting of the IAB on November 20 was notable, then, for the
demeanor of its members. The naive observer might have thought
that they were relatively uninformed and so piqued at being taken by
surprise, that being conscientious men who did not like to be un-
prepared for their duty, they were provoked because they were not
ready. We have followed these men and their aides, however, through
a year of meeting and maneuvering over the duties and responsibilities
of the Director of Central Intelligence, the facilities and functions of
the central intelligence organization, and the relationship which the
DCI was supposed to have with the departmental intelligence agencies.
The thought is hard to resist that the IAB members were present
on this occasion not to cooperate in an enterprise of common concern
but to take exception to this, to be hesitant over that, in a word to
stall and delay. They had had not just the ten days since receipt of the
November 10 memorandum to consider the proposals. They had been
engaged with almost all of these matters as members either of the
TAB or of its ad hoc committees. for more than ten months.
Instead of pressing his case for a quite different concept of
central intelligence Armstrong announced that the State Department
had not been able to arrive at a firm position on the directives. Secretary
Marshall was leaving for London; Mr. Lovett had the matter in hand,
but the Department could not be committed as yet. Hillenkoetter
hoped that the members of the Board, as heads of the intelligence
agencies, might be able at least to get through the first four directives,
having to do respectively with the duties and responsibilities of the
DCI, with collection, with production, and with the objectives of na-
tional intelligence. But Armstrong insisted that as these matters were
coming before the National Security Council, the head of each intel-
ligence agency must have the position of his department established
before he could speak finally.
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This was turning the function of the advisory committee upside down.
If this were the true interpretation, the DCI could not seek the advice
of his advisory committee with regard to his recommendations to the
secretaries in the NSC until they themselves had made up their minds
on what they wished their intelligence officers to advise the DCI to
advise them. Admiral Inglis cut straight to the point. As chief of Naval
Intelligence, he said, he was not the "mouthpiece of the Secretary."
What Inglis had to say in the meetings was his own opinion.
But Admiral Inglis did not like the present situation. The Agency
had produced these papers "on its own initiative and its own author-
ity"; they should have been considered by the IAB while being formu-
lated. Had they been new papers, there would have been more strength
in his argument. But they were revisions of things with which Inglis
himself had been conversant for much more than a year.
General Chamberlin concurred that the procedure being used by
CIA here was difficult for them. Chamberlin had other things to do
as chief of intelligence for the Army; he could not turn his responsibility
off or on "at somebody else's command." As far as he himself was
concerned, he said, he had come "unprepared to discuss these papers,"
but his subordinates had worked on them and found many things to
challenge. There were "important differences of principle," he said,
that had never been approached, nor included in past directives.,
What those principles were he did not specify.
Later on, however, he revealed a marked difference in principle
between Admiral Inglis and himself over the propriety of expressing
their own views in the advisory committee. General Chamberlin ob-
jected to a procedure in the committee which might "drive a wedge"
between the chief of intelligence in a department and his superior
the secretary; this completely destroyed "command principles." He
would be inclined, he said, "to keep quiet at all times" because he
would be afraid that an action in the committee would be appealed
over his head.
General McDonald for the Air Force then unleashed his statement.
Analysis of the proposed directives had revealed to him, he said, that
it was going to be necessary for him to recommend many changes. It
would be impossible to cover the directives that afternoon; no attempt
therefore should be made to go into either their philosophy or their
composition. There should be an ad hoc committee "for the purpose
of reconciling views." And so there was another such committee, made
up of the familiar aides who by now must have been expert on the
CONFIDENTIAL 5
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philosophies, the details, and most assuredly the conflicting views. This
was to become known as the Ad Hoc Committee.
Admiral Gingrich, who was relatively new, having come on the IAB
to represent the Atomic Energy Commission, went to the heart of
the situation. "One point I might mention, Hilly," he said, "there
doesn't appear to be any provision in these first two directives here
for an intelligence Advisory Committee, or Board, such as is executed
under our old setup." Hillenkoetter replied that the law gave him the
power to appoint an advisory committee. All present must have known
that he had submitted his plan to do so on September 19. The mem-
bers of the IAB in any case were not to be diverted from their intention
to have the NSC direct him to establish such a committee as they
wished. The matter went to the Ad Hoc Committee.
No one could have been surprised at the revisions of the drafts by
that group. The changes, often small in detail, were persistently
designed to restrict the DCI, to make him defer to the Intelligence
Advisory Committee, and to remove his supervisory authority over the
departmental intelligence agencies. The new draft of NSCID 1 out-
lined the duties of the DCI and his relations with the IAC: The IAC,
consisting of the intelligence chiefs from the Departments of State,
Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Atomic
Energy Commission, was to advise the DCI on "all recommendations
and advice" to the NSC and upon his own directives or administrative
orders for carrying out the NSC directives. He should act for the
National Security Council "through the Intelligence Advisory Com-
mittee." The coordination of intelligence activities should be accom-
plished "by recognizing primary departmental requirements and by
supporting the intelligence agencies."
The DCI was to disseminate intelligence subject to the security
regulations of the agency in which the information had originated.
He was to perform services of common concern as determined with
the TAC. He was to obtain personnel from the departmental agencies
in agreement with their intelligence chiefs. He was to arrange with
the latter for "surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence
activities."
Here the Ad Hoc Committee had made a slip, but it was soon
corrected. Though Armstrong for the Department of State recom-
mended DCI inspection of departmental intelligence activities, the
chiefs of intelligence for the armed services could not contemplate
such interference with their operations. When the measure came from
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the meeting of the IAB on December 8, the words "intelligence
activities" had given way to "intelligence material," and control of
even such inspection by the department concerned was restored
before NSCID 1 was issued by the NSC on December 12.
Admiral Hillenkoetter notified the Ad Hoc Committee on November
25 that he could not accept as a whole its revisions in the drafts of
the NSCIDs. He called another meeting of the intelligence chiefs
for December 8 to consider the changes which he would make in the
committee's proposals, and he sent those changes to them on December
1 so that they might bring to the meeting whatever statements of
nonconcurrence they chose to submit.
Records are not available for all of the determining events between
the action of the Ad Hoc Committee on November 24 and the meeting
of the IAB with Hillenkoetter on December 8. But memories of some
who participated are still keen. There is recorded evidence to show
why the chiefs of intelligence were in a different mood from that of
November 20. And the minutes of the meeting on December 8, steno-
typed but never circulated, have come to light.
When Hillenkoetter learned on November 26 of Secretary Royall's
opposition to his plan for the new Intelligence Advisory Committee,
he went to Forrestal. Forrestal had approved the plan in October.
There followed some days of telephoning and conversation, and then
Forrestal called a meeting of the armed service secretaries and their
chiefs of intelligence, a representative of the State Department, and
Souers. Hillenkoetter was there to explain his plan for the operation
of the Central Intelligence Agency under the National Security Act.
Forrestal had declared to Congress in the preceding spring that the
Agency, after the Security Council, would be the most important
institution in the forthcoming Act.
As Hillenkoetter recalled the scene in the office of the Secretary
of Defense, Forrestal asked for no opinions when Hillenkoetter had
finished his statement but turned to Admiral Inglis and General
Chamberlin on one side of the table. Forrestal did not include the
representative of the State Department in his glance. Nor, apparently,
was the representative of the Air Force in his line of fire. He spoke
directly to Inglis and Chamberlin: "You are not going to interfere with
this thing," he said. "It is going to run as Hillenkoetter says. Do you
both understand that now?" Hillenkoetter was quite sure of that last
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~ DCI Hillenkoetter
question and of the remark to him later by Admiral Inglis: "He talked
to us like a couple of plebes. I guess that makes us your servants now."
The record is not yet clear whether this meeting came before or after
Forrestal received a note written on Friday, December 5, by Van-
nevar Bush, head of the Research and Development Board. It seems
likely that Bush's letter arrived shortly after he had told the military
and naval chiefs of intelligence what they were not to do. In any event,
the statements by Bush, chief adviser to the Secretary of :Defense on
scientific matters, added weight to Hillenkoetter's authority when he
met with the chiefs of intelligence again on Monday, December 8, to
discuss their differences over the NSCIDs.
Bush declared with effectively restrained language that the Central
Intelligence Agency was not in a good position to provide scientific
intelligence to the Atomic Energy Commission, and Mr. Souers should
be warned of the situation. To amplify his statement, Bush included
memoranda from officers in his organization who were in direct touch
with events. His chief of intelligence reported that under the leadership
of the State Department's representative the Ad Hoc Committee was
seeking more authority for the Intelligence Advisory Committee. The
director of his program division reported that the intelligence chiefs
wanted an executive order, apart from the NSC directive, to establish
the IAC as the "governing committee" of the CIA. In this situation
the officer responsible for scientific intelligence in the Agency was
"completely stymied." Bush urged that someone "at the highest level"
determine the relationships between CIA and the "operating" services
so that the production of "information, detailed intelligence, and
integrated strategic intelligence" could proceed.
Hillenkoetter read this statement in the meeting of December 8.
The response of General Chamberlin was that he was not conscious
there was any question whether the Intelligence Advisory Committee
was to be a controlling or an advisory body. "I frankly adm:.t," he said,
"it is an advisory body"; others might have a different opinion. He
felt that he had authority to commit his own department "on certain
things" in agreement with other members of the IAC and carry out
the decisions "loyally without any command to do so." Thus the IAC
could eliminate a lot of "minutiae" but would still be an advisory
committee.
The position was tenable, and it was logical after the admonition
from the Secretary of Defense that CIA was going to :run as the
Director of Central Intelligence said. But there had been some evolution
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DCI Hillenkoetter CONFIDENTIAL
in the thinking of the Army representative since the meeting on
July 17 when he had called the IAB "a little more than an advisory
body," and that on November 20 in which he maintained that the
DCI's right of appeal to the secretary of a department over the head
of its chief of intelligence destroyed "command principles."
There was action in the meeting of December 8 which the steno-
typist could not record. The memory of Hillenkoetter's General
Counsel, who was present, is certain on that score. Although the rec-
ord is one of friendly words in half-finished sentences, Hillenkoetter's
demeanor was as strong as Lawrence Houston ever saw him use.
Houston sat where he could observe faces and catch fleeting expres-
sions. As General Chamberlin's overtones conveyed his acknowledge-
ment that "Hilly" was the boss, Houston saw an aide of the General
"turn white." Admiral Inglis sat shaking his head in an unmistakable
no.
The representative of the Navy had attended nearly every meeting
of the IAB from its beginning under Souers in February, 1946. Ad-
miral Inglis had insisted all along that in most respects CIG, and
then CIA, should be a cooperative interdepartmental activity. To
the statement by Vannevar Bush that the Agency had to be either
"almost completely self-sufficient" or "a small coordinating body"
surrounded by strong departmental agencies, his response was now
that there could be a "middle ground" for the Agency. As an "in-
tegrated operating agency," he said, it should have as little interference
from the Advisory Committee as possible; the IAC should be "purely
advisory, and absolutely nothing more." But in the relationships be-
tween the central agency and the departmental intelligence agencies,
it should go beyond advisory capacity; it had something to do with
"liaison, coordination and implementation." That was his "philosophy,"
he said, "for whatever it was worth."
There was further discussion in general terms. But the remainder
of the meeting on December 8 was given for the most part to ex-
amining in detail revisions which the Ad Hoc Committee had made
in the NSCIDs. For the time being the Director of Central Intelligence
had his way. With the exception of the change regarding inspection
of "intelligence material" and the inclusion of a phrase regarding
"national policy" intelligence that was later deleted, NSCID 1 went to
the NSC practically as it had been recast in CIA on December
1. Hillenkoetter sent with it on December 9 the suggestion that
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CONFIDENTIAL DCI Hillenkoetter
the NSC might name the DCI chairman of the IAC to emphasize
that it was an advisory body to help him and not a "Board of Di-
rectors or Board of Management," but the NSC approved it on Decem-
ber 12 without this addition.
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COA
No Foreign tDissem
Brief guide to a common
form of deception.
SPOTTING PHOTO FAKERY
Dino A. Brugioni
When Soviet troops moved into Czechoslovakia in August 1968,
television viewers in Poland were shown film apparently depicting
the enthusiastic welcome the invaders received from the Czechoslovaks.
The Polish audience was not told that it was in fact seeing a re-run
of a film strip dating from 1945. This simple deception was an ex-
ample of "photo fakery." Here we will look at other, somewhat more
subtle photographic methods often employed. Although an expert
job of fakery may defy detection even by another expert, there are
some telltale signs anyone should look for.
Photo fakery as practiced by the Communists is usually employed
to display their actions in a pleasing light, and to portray their
countries and their leaders to the best advantage. It is also used as
a form of propaganda support for the ongoing campaign against
the United States and its allies. In any specific case, the intention is
often revealed by detection of what may have been hidden, elimi-
nated, or altered.
Visual Evidence
Photography has long been recognized as an important source of
intelligence. Like other kinds of sources, however, photographs can
be forged, faked, or otherwise altered to suit the purposes of the
originator. Notwithstanding, the notion is still fairly widespread that a
photograph of a given item is sufficient proof that the item in fact
existed in the state shown by the photograph. This simple view can
no longer be accepted. As a matter of fact, the art of faking pho-
tographs is as old as photography itself. Thus, portrait photographers
discovered many years ago that removal of wrinkles and skin blem-
ishes pleased customers. Although the public has perhaps become
more skeptical than it used to be of "before and after" pictures or
other photographic gimmicks employed in advertising, these devices
have certainly not entirely disappeared.
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CONFIDENTIAL Photo Fakery
Early techniques for altering photographs were relatively simple,
but recent advances in optics, in the manufacture of film, and in
laboratory processing have permitted great refinement of old tech-
niques, and provided versatile and effective tools to propaganda, psy-
chological warfare, and intelligence agencies. Some attempts at photo
fakery are still amateurish and obvious, but the best work these days
is subtle and sophisticated.
Properly used, a faked photograph can be a more effective and
subtle weapon than a forged document. In propaganda or intelli-
gence work, it can lead an adversary to wrong conclusions or cause
him to dissipate his energies. The fact is that the veracity of pho-
tographs is rarely questioned. Intelligence analysts are accustomed to
being critical of documentary intelligence, and as a matter of course
attempt to establish its veracity and the credibility o:E its sources.
Unfortunately, no similar critical attitude is generally applied in the
appraisal of photography. Indeed, most analysts would probably not
consider themselves qualified to make technical judgments of this
nature. No manual on faking photography is known to this author,
and manuals that treat the art of altering or retouching photography
are concerned almost exclusively with techniques for enhancing the
artistic or purely technical values of photography, and not with de-
tecting alteration of the original negative or other manipulations for
purposes of deception.
The purpose of this article is to warn intelligence analysts against
accepting photographic evidence of Communist origin uncritically
and to provide a few practical suggestions on how those lacking
technical expertise can detect fakery in photography. The examples
here presented have been selected from those collected in the course
of research over the years by the National Photographic Interpreta-
tion Center, and other U.S. intelligence components. It is worth noting
that Communist photographic forgeries were brought to the attention
of the U.S. Senate as recently as 1961, and have been the object of
continuing interest on the part of successive Directors of Central In-
telligence.
Kinds of Faked Photographs
There are four kinds of faked photographs, distinguished by differing
techniques: montages; retouched photographs; and retouched mon-
tages. The fourth category-false captioning-differs from these in
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that tampering with the photograph itself is not a necessary ingredient
of the fake.
A montage can be made either with photographic prints, resulting
in what is known as a "paste-up" montage, or it can be made with
negatives. The negative montage is the more effective of the two.
Montages are widely used commercially for producing trick or ar-
tistic effects, assembling murals, and for advertising purposes. Ex-
tensive use is made of montages for portraying, and generally exag-
gerating, the industrial and scientific accomplishments and the mili-
tary might of the Soviet Union and its allies-and others-as well as
for many other propaganda and deception purposes. On occasion,
photographs are altered for security reasons.
A retouched photograph differs from a montage in that only
one photograph is used. By applying airbrushed paint or solvents, or
by scraping, and by a variety of other techniques, the technician alters
details, or obliterates portions of a photographic image. It is pos-
sible to tone down or disfigure images, and even to create an image
that was not on the original negative. Since a hand brush or an
airbrush is frequently used for this purpose, the terms "brushed-in"
and "brushed-out" are often used in connection with retouching, even
though many other artistic and laboratory techniques are used.
The third and most common type of fake photograph combines
retouching and montage. In this type of photograph, an attempt is
made by means of retouching techniques to soften the sharp edges
of the cutouts usually apparent in a montage and to blend the varying
tones and textures of the cutouts into a unified whole.
The falsely captioned photograph differs from the other groups
of fake photographs in that the photograph usually is not altered.
Proper captioning of a photograph normally includes descriptive
data regarding the "who-what-where-when" of the subject. Photographs
in Communist publications, however, are frequently printed with
misleading or completely false captions, and the date of the photog-
raphy is often omitted entirely. About the ,only way to unmask this
kind of deception is to compare suspect examples with prints of
known veracity. Where a date has been provided, however, close
scrutiny of details will sometimes detect anachronisms that give the
show away.
In Figure 1, the photographs on the left appeared in a Czechoslovak
aircraft journal with captions indicating that they were scenes in a
Czechoslovak jet engine factory. Actually, at least one is a retouched
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TIAL Photo Fakery
FIGURE 1. False Captioning and Retouching
photograph of a factory in the United States. An artist has provided
the technician on the right with coveralls, and a Czechoslovak "no
smoking" sign has been added'., but note the different tone and texture
of these added items.
Faking Techniques
Many technical factors have to be considered in the difficult task
of creating a successful fake photograph. Details, perspective, and the
relative sizes of objects and the distances between them mist be
kept in scale to produce a convincing result. Because of the inherent
limitations of the camera lens, objects at different distances from
the camera are in varying degrees of focus and have different tones
and textures. Tone is the tint, shade, or hue of an object. In black-and-
white photography, tone is the relative lightness or darkness of
the shades of gray in the scene, Texture is the arrangement, size,
and quality of the constituent parts of an object; it is the quality by
which one determines that an object is rough or smooth, firm or loose.
Since retouching or the creation of a montage usually results in
inconsistent variations of tone and texture, the technician will fre-
quently reproduce a fake by the halftone process. This is a technique
of representing shadings by dots produced by photographing an ob-
ject (or, for instance, a montage) through a fine screen. By subjecting
retouched photographs and montages to the halftone process, dots are
substituted for continuous tone imagery, and this more or less climi-
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Photo Fakery CONFIDENTIAL
nates break lines and variations in tone and texture. Most newspaper
reproductions of photographs are produced by this process, and
practically everyone is aware that the sharpest lines and strongest
contrasts of a glossy print are softened and blurred in newspaper
reproductions.
Shadows of objects arc present in most photographs, and in creating
a convincing fake, the technician must make all shadows fall in the
same direction and be consistent in relative size and shape with the
objects photographed. The technician must also account for any mo-
tion or action and corresponding reaction represented on the photo-
graph, and all elements of the photograph must be consistent in this
respect. Obviously, smoke does not blow in different directions from
the stacks of adjacent factories. Finally, the creator of the fake must
make sure that his masterpiece as a whole is all of a piece. He must
insure, that is, that elements added to or deleted from the photograph
do not result in incongruity; a soldier does not wear naval insignia,
nor does a watchmaker have pipe wrenches on his workbench.
The means of detecting a. fake as described here are effective only
when the faker has been careless or in the occasional instances when
the original unchanged photograph is available for comparison. As
noted, however, a good fake photograph is remarkably difficult to
make, and the alert intelligence officer armed with a knowledge of
what to look for can often avoid being taken in.
Clues to the Detection of Fake Photographs
The first and most obvious clue to fake photography is its source.
The intelligence officer should have the same ingrained skepticism
of photographs that he has of other documentation from Communist
sources. Imbued with this basic skepticism, he should look for the
following clues.
Clues to a montage. Since the final product of a montage made from
prints is another photograph, the result cannot possess quite the same
textures and tones of objects as depicted in the originals. Thus, such
a "paste-up" montage will often appear flat and gray as compared with
an original photograph. The montage made with negatives, while
retaining much of the quality of the originals, still presents problems
to the technician when he attempts to blend tones and combine
textures. Hence, on negative montages, certain images tend to stand
out from other images in the photograph. To detect either type of
montage, the intelligence officer should look for identical images
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Photo Fakery CONFIDENTIAL
in the photograph. He should also look at the corners of images for
match or join lines, the result of improper illumination at the time
the montage was photo copied. The artist often fails to remove crop
lines which indicate the presence of two or more photographs.
Combining two or more photographs in a montage often results in
incongruities violating principles of action and reaction or technical
consistency. This is the clue! to the fake in Figure 2: not one person
in the large crowd depicted is looking up at three helicopters flying
a few feet over their heads, nor does there appear to be any prop
wash.
Clues to retouching. To detect this type of fake, the intelligence
officer should look for flat unbroken lines where objects appear to
have been removed from the picture. In doing this, the artist often
fails to remove parts of objects and to add an appropriate texture
to the area. Such clues are visible in the retouched photograph of a
hangar shown on Figure 3. The uncluttered. gray area in the depth of
the hangar on the right is in sharp contrast to the clutter in the rest of
the hangar and is a clue to "brush-out" retouching, possibly to delete
items for security purposes. A careless technician has provided positive
evidence of retouching here by failing to brush out the stabilizers
of two aircraft that have otherwise been deleted.
Placing a retouched photograph under magnification often reveals
the marks of the artist's brush or artificial discoloration. When some-
thing is added to this type of photograph, the telltale features may be
abrupt texture breaks and a flat, painted appearance. The perpetrators
of photographic fakery often forget the shadows in retouching or in
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o fflry
montages, and the tip-off to the intelligence officer can be an object
which does not cast a shadow, shadows falling in different: directions,
abnormal tonal contrasts in shadows, or shadow-object ratios which
do not match. Shadows falling in opposite directions are a Clue to
deception on Figure 4. In this photograph of an alleged Communist
Chinese amphibious exercise, shadows from the door of the landing
ship in the left background fall to the right, but shadows on the
amphibious tank in the foreground fall to the left.
Scale and proportion. Scale is the ratio of image size to the actual
size of an object.. If the size of one object in a photograph is known,
the relative sizes of other objects can be determined by photogram-
metric methods. When the size of one object appears to be out of
proportion to the sizes of surrounding objects, the photograph should
be suspect as a fake. Faulty proportion is the tip-off to the fake shown
on Figure 5. The missiles in this photograph are identified as SA-2
surface-to-air missiles known to be 35.6 feet in length. If scale and
proportion in this montage were correct, the marching men on the
right would have to be pygmies. A crop line, characteristic of a
montage, is apparent along the top of the shrubbery partially concealing
the missiles.
Depth of focus. The terms depth of focus, depth of field, and depth
of definition refer to the characteristics of lenses, and relate to size
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Photo Fakery CONFIDEN IAL
of the area within which details are sharply defined in front of and
beyond an object focused on. Notice that the aircraft and the peasant
shown on Figure 6 are some distance apart but in the same sharp
focus. At the lens setting which would give this depth of focus, the
distant foliage should also be sharply defined. The fact that the
foliage is instead blurred indicates that more than one negative was
used to make this print. The intelligence officer should compare the
sharpness of objects in the foreground and background of photographs
for indications of fakery.
1talation as a clue. Halation is the fog or halo in a photograph
around the image of a highly reflective surface or light source. It is
caused by lights in a night photograph or by reflectors or curved
surfaces in bright sunlight. A faked photograph may show halation
around one object and not around similar objects oriented in the same
direction with respect to the sun. In the case of a night scene, halation
may appear around some lights but not others. Thus in Figure 7, the
tip-off is duplicate halation montaged to make this Chinese oil field
appear larger. Perspective and scale are also faulty since the sup-
posedly more distant items in the top half of the picture are the same
size as those in the lower half.
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Photo Fakery
Conclusions
Every intelligence officer should be aware that photography can be,
and sometimes is, faked before its dissemination. Viewing Communist-
source photographs with a critical eye, the analyst can detect and take
steps to neutralize a good deal of this kind of deception. A basic
knowledge of the concepts and mechanics of faking photography as
presented here can thus pay worthwhile dividends to our total
intelligence effort.
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The intelligence war between the
British and Irish Intelligence Services.
MICHAEL COLLINS AND BLOODY SUNDAY
Martin C. Hartline
and
M. M. Kaulbach
Until Easter Week 1966, the statue of Lord Nelson stood peacefully
on its column in Dublin Square. It was blown up on the eve of the
50th anniversary of the Easter Rebellion, which the British had finally
subdued on that very spot. Although the figurative decapitation of the
hero of Trafalgar made the front page of The New York Times, the
event was but a footnote to history, recalling one of the most news-
worthy stories of the early 1900's, The Irish Revolt.
For nearly four hundred years prior to the Easter Rebellion of 1916,
Irish nationalists had been fighting British colonialism without success.
The most striking difference between the Easter Rebellion and the
uprisings of the past was that this new Irish revolt occurred at a most
unpropitious moment for the British. The war against Germany had
strained and exhausted the economy of Great Britain. Resources to
arrest the growing insurgency in Ireland were not available.
Despite the disruptive effects of World War I on Great Britain, it
would have been unrealistic, even in the land of the leprechaun, for
the Irish to expect to defeat by conventional military tactics the world's
foremost military power. In fact, most of the leaders of the Irish na-
tionalists felt that the opportunity for success rested squarely on their
capability to exploit Great Britain's lack of will to continue a costly
and domestically unpopular war. Their eventual success in doing so
constitutes a classic example of the effectiveness of unconventional
warfare in forcing a powerful adversary to the negotiating table.'
The Irish intelligence service was one of the architects of the victory.
The Director of Intelligence of the Irish Republican Army during
the last act of the drama was Michael Collins, already a legendary
figure when he was appointed in the summer of 1919. He had been
' On 5 December 1921 a treaty was signed granting Ireland, less the six counties
of Ulster (Northern Ireland) Home Rule. Under Home Rule, although Ireland
remained within the British Empire, the Irish were given primary responsibility
for domestic affairs with Britain retaining control over defense and foreign affairs.
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in the movement since early 1916, and had earned the cachet attached
to deportation and imprisonment for a year in a British jail. By 1919,
the Crown was offering # 10,000 in rewards for Collins "dead or alive."
Despite this tempting offer and hard times in Ireland, very few
dared to offer assistance which would aid the British in capturing him.
The few who were tempted met a quick end. The familiar [RA calling
card found on the bodies of informers, "Convicted Spy Executed by
Order of the IRA," proved to be a sufficient deterrent. Frequently,
informers were tried in absentia. It is sufficient to recall Co1P.ins' remark
regarding the accused to guess at the outcome of these trials: "For
the future the rule should be guilty until proven innocent."
Collins has often been described by both friends and foe,; as a cold-
blooded character. His remarks after the bloody execution of a number
of British intelligence officers and informants bring out this aspect
of his character.
My one intention was the destruction of the undesirables who continued to
make miserable the lives of ordinary decent citizens.
I have proof enough to assure myself of the atrocities which this gang of
spies and informers have committed. Perjury and torture are words too easily
known to them. If I had a second motive it was no more than a feeling such
as I might have for a dangerous reptile.
By their destruction the very air is made sweeter. That should be the future's
judgment on this particular event. For myself, my conscience is clear. There
is no crime in detecting and destroying, in war-time, the spy and the informer.
They have destroyed without trial. I have paid them back in their own coin.'
Although informers were dealt with ruthlessly, Collins came close
to capture a number of times. On one occasion a Black and Tan 3 raid-
ing party besieged a house where Collins was present. He calmly
walked down the stairs, brushed the intruders aside, and bolted out the
door before they knew what had happened.
Soon after this incident, Collins had a master builder named Batt
O'Connor construct a secret room, with sleeping quarters, on the
same premises. O'Connor succeeded so well that the next time
the Black and Tans staged a raid, Collins was able to continue a
meeting then in progress without interruption.
'Rex Taylor, Michael Collins, London, 1958.
'The Black and Tans were not members of the British regular army but a
new force recruited for service in Ireland. They were drawn heavily from the
unemployed and received their name from their attire-khaki coats, black trousers
and caps.
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The Collins Organization
Collins surrounded himself with a small group of counterintel-
ligence operatives-soon labelled the Inner Circle-who directed the
penetration of various British installations. Their network eventually
extended from Ireland to America, England, and Egypt. It penetrated
prisons, postal facilities, and government departments from the British
headquarters in Dublin Castle to Whitehall itself. Sympathetic postal
officials in London, Dublin and generally throughout all of "Ireland,
enabled the Irish service to intercept, and decode many of the
oppositions' cipher messages.
Recognizing the need to compile information on their opposition,
the Inner Circle very early in the struggle established a central
records center, eventually called the Brain Center, within 200' yards
of Dublin Castle. A lawyer's office provided the cover, and although
its unusual clientele increased in number, this dual-purpose estab-
lishment went undetected.
Presumably the IIS established its "Brain Center" so dangerously
close to Dublin Castle to hasten the dissemination of reports received
from Broy, Kavanagh, Neligan and MacNamara, all trusted em-
ployees of the British, but agents of the IIS. This records center
contained dossiers on personalities of security or operational interest
including military leaders and government officials, as well as cap-
tured and stolen documents and extensive ciphering and deciphering
material.
The British Intelligence Service (BIS) apparently lacked detailed
information about the Inner Circle and the Brain Center, although
it certainly felt their presence and Michael Collins' influence. In
consequence, the BIS set out to capture Collins, hoping thereby to
neutralize the Irish apparatus. One of the BIS' earliest efforts in
this direction was turned into a propaganda extravaganza by the
IIS. A convicted forger in a London prison, one F. Digby Hardy,
mailed a letter to Lord French, Governor General of Ireland, offer-
ing his services as a spy. Lord French accepted the proposition.. Hardy
was to travel to Ireland and establish contact with the IIS.
Hardy's letter, however, had been intercepted and transmitted
to IIS Headquarters, where Irish operatives began to amass a dossier
of incriminating information concerning Hardy's past. Collins per-
mitted Hardy to make contact with the HS, and shortly there-
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after arranged what Hardy had been led to believe was a confer-
ence with IIS officers. Those present were in fact American and
British journalists anticipating the scoop that Hardy was shortly to
provide.
During this meeting the leaders of the IIS confronted Hardy with
his infamous past, his letter to Lord French, and his mission to
penetrate the ITS. When Digby learned the true identity and pur-
pose of his host, he made a full confession, hoping thereby to ob-
tain leniency from his inquisitors. Because of Digby's cooperation,
the IIS spared his life and gave him until the next morning to be
out of Ireland. The story made international news headlines, and
the BIS suffered a humiliating reversal before world opinion.
Not all British efforts were as transparent as the Hardy fiasco.
An experienced BIS officer named Burn, alias Jameson, succeeded
in penetrating the "Inner Circle" of the IIS and in winning for a
short time the confidence of Michael Collins. Jameson had come
to the attention of the IIS while feigning Bolshevism as a member
of British Labor circles, all the while performing in the role of agent-
provocateur. Jameson impressed Collins with schemes to obtain arms
and money from the Soviet Government.
An unsubstantiated report from Dublin Castle, and the near cap-
ture of Collins while engaged in a clandestine meeting with Jameson,
provoked suspicions and the IIS prepared a plan to test Jameson's
loyalties. With deliberate carelessness Collins permitted Jameson
to see parts of a bogus document which referred to important papers
held in the home of a pro-British ex-mayor of Dublin. Jameson in
turn relayed this information to Dublin Castle and soon afterward
the Black and Tans raided the ex-mayor's home. Predictably, perhaps,
shortly after the raid Jameson's body riddled with bullets was found
bearing the familiar IRA execution card.
In their penetration efforts IIS operatives were considerably more
successful than the British. Early in the conflict, the IIS recruited
and ran-in-place four Dublin Castle officials: Ned Broy, James Mac-
Namara, Joe Kavanagh, and Dave Neligan. During their weekly de-
briefings, these agents passed valuable information to Collins at a
Dublin safehouse owned by Tom Gay, an inconspicuous librarian.
One of these agents, Ned Broy, who had access to the headquarters
of the Dublin Detective Force, arranged to be on duty alone one night
during which Collins was able to make a midnight visit and spend
several hours of the early morning there reading secret documents
and gathering valuable information.
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Although Broy, Kavanagh, Neligan and MacNamara provided
Collins with extremely useful information, the most valuable of all
Collins' penetrations was the mysterious Lt. G., a member of British
military intelligence and one of Collins' chief agents and confidants.
Not only was Lt. G. able to pass information concerning troop
movements, order of battle and military plans that enabled the IRA
to ambush British troops and supply convoys, but he also provided
Collins with advance warning of British plans to raid suspected
IIS installations.
In Collins' personal notebook-diary, there appear seventeen notes
initialed "G," of which the following is but one example:
"Don't overdo. The road to Parnell Square is too well trod.
Fifteen men, including you, went there (to Vaughn's Hotel) last
night between 9 and 11 p.m." 4
Little else is known of Lt. G. but his case demonstrated the abili-
ties of the IIS to recruit and run-in-place an unusually valuable
and well-placed British military intelligence officer.
The Cairo Group
Despite the efforts of Dublin Castle to stymie the IIS, the British
position in Ireland in 1919 had so deteriorated that the British au-
thorities in Whitehall decided that radical measures were required.
Heretofore the British had been concentrating on controlling the
general public and only sporadically fighting the IIS. But Irish suc-
cesses had nevertheless mounted. A major assault was in order. Ac-
cordingly, certain of the most experienced British deep-cover CI
officers were called to Ireland and directed to seek out and assassi-
nate the Inner Circle of the IIS.
At the time of the Irish Revolt most of these operatives were
stationed in Cairo. One by one, they arrived in Ireland, travelling
under aliases and using commercial cover, several taking jobs as
shop assistants or garage hands to avoid suspicion.
The so-called -Cairo Group was directed by two men, Peter Aimes
and George Bennet. These individuals maintained liaison with three
veterans of the campaign, Lt. Angliss, alias McMahon, who, had
been recalled from Russia to organize intelligence in South Dublin,
an Irishman by the name of Peel, and D. L. McLean, the chief
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of intelligence at Dublin Castle. Besides being more experienced
intelligence operatives than those earlier working in Ireland, the
members of the Cairo Group increased the threat to the Irish be-
cause they immediately reorganized the British intelligence effort,
which until their arrival had been decentralized and uncoordinated.
They moved quickly to correct weaknesses. Their accomplishments
led ultimately to the events of "Bloody Sunday."
Although the IIS was aware that changes were taking place on the
British side, it was some time before it ascertained the identities of the
Cairo Group. Their first break came following the execution of
John Lynch, an Irish Treasury Official, by the Group. After this
episode, Lt. Angliss, drunk and despondent, divulged his participa-
tion in the execution to a girl who inadvertently passed this in-
formation to an IIS informant. The remaining members of the group
were identified after an unwitting landlady revealed to another IIS
informant that several of her British guests regularly went out very
late in the evening. At the time Dublin was under a very strict
curfew, and only authorized personnel were allowed on the streets.
The individuals in question were taken under observation by the
surveillance and enforcement arm of the IIS-called the Twelve
Apostles 5-which determined that they were in contact with pre-
viously identified members of the Cairo Group. To the Twelve
Apostles, this meant that they were instrumentally involved with
the Cairo Group.
In addition to the information provided by these sources, a com-
paratively low-level technical operation revealed the identity of an-
other key participant in the Cairo Group. Shortly after the new
British team arrived in Ireland, Michael Collins had received a type-
written death notice reading:
"An eye for an eye
A tooth for a tooth
Therefore a life for a life." 6
Collins ignored the message but filed the letter, as he did all cor-
respondence bearing upon his intelligence and related activities.
'The Twelve Apostles were responsible for surveillance and executions. Because
they operated in friendly circumstances and enjoyed popular support, they
were efficient and effective.
'Jacqueline Van Voris, Constance de .Markievicz in the Cause of Ireland,
Amherst, Mass., 1967.
'Zd
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Bloody Sunday OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Soon afterward, the IIS intercepted the following letter from Capt.
YZ addressed to Capt. X, War Office, Whitehall, England:
Dear X,
Have duly reported and found things in a fearful mess, but think will
be able to make a good show. Have been given a free hand to carry on and
everyone has been charming re our little stunt. I see no prospect until I have
got things on a firmer basis, but still hope and believe there are possi-
bilities . . .'
The IIS hurriedly recruited a typewriter expert, who determined
that the typeface of the Captain YZ letter matched that of the death
notice sent earlier to Michael Collins. Captain YZ was therefore
linked to the Cairo Group and thereafter was the object of special
investigation. In the end, by intercepting correspondence, examin-
ing contents of wastebaskets, tracing laundry markings, duplicating
hotel room keys, and similar efforts, all members of the Cairo Group
were identified and placed under surveillance.
Before all this had been accomplished, however, the Cairo Group
had begun to close in. Three IIS senior officers, Frank Thornton,
one of the Twelve Apostles and the man responsible for maintaining
the surveillance of the Cairo Group, Liam Tobin, the senior officer
in charge of the IIS "Brain Center," and Tom Cullen, his assistant,
were arrested. Unable to break the cover stories of Thornton,
Tobin, and Cullen, the British interrogators released them. Tobin
and Cullen were detained only a few hours. Thornton, however,
underwent a gruelling interrogation for ten days.
These arrests understandably alarmed the IIS. Shortly after Thorn-
ton's release, Collins received information that the Cairo Group was
planning more arrests. Fearful that additional interrogations would
be successful and reveal IIS personnel and installations, Collins
met with his staff and formulated the plans for "Bloody Sunday."
On 17 November Collins had written to Dick McKee, Com-
mander of the Dublin Brigade:
Dick . . . have established addresses of the particular ones. Arrangements
should now be made about the matter. Lt. G. is aware of things. He suggested
the 21st. A most suitable date and day I think. "M"'
Early Sunday morning, November 21, 1920, while most of Dublin
slept, eight groups of IIS officers including the Twelve Apostles
went into action. They executed eleven British intelligence offi-
' Piaras Beaslai, Michael Collins, Soldier and Statesman, Dublin, 1937.
'Rex Taylor, Michael Collins, London, 1958.
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cers. As many more marked for extinction escaped. McMahon and
McLean were among those executed. Of the leaders of the Cairo
Group, only Peel escaped. Most of the others who escaped had
not been direct participants in the British plan.
The British reaction to "Bloody Sunday" was quick. Carloads of
Auxiliaries s were almost immediately dispatched to Croke Park, Dub-
lin where a large crowd had assembled to watch a football game.
Accounts of what followed are conflicting, but one of the most widely
reported stated that the Auxiliaries fired into the crowd, killing four-
teen and wounding many others. Despite the confusion, Dick McKee
and Peadar Clancy, who both had participated in the liquidation
of Bloody Sunday, along with an innocent visitor to Dublin were
arrested and taken to Dublin Castle, where shortly thereafter they
were executed.
Bloody Sunday remains a day of infamy in British history: and
the day after remains equally infamous in Irish history. But once the
violence of the two days is dismissed, it seems clear that the British
plan to destroy the Irish service failed. By acting first the IIS had
delivered the coup de main to the British intelligence network in
Dublin.
Cathal Brugha, then Irish minister of defense and chief of staff,
later assessed the outcome as follows, in words which were perhaps
applicable to the conflict between the intelligence services:
"We proved for all time that no nation however great, can either govern or
destroy a little country if the will of the little country be set. We proved it by
'The Invisible Army."' 10
Books
Barry, Tom B. Guerrilla Days in Ireland. New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1956.
Beaslai, Piaras. Michael Collins, Soldier and Statesman. Dublin: The Talbot
Press Ltd., 1937.
Beaslai, Piaras. Michael Collins and the Making of a New Ireland. Dublin: The
Talbot Press Ltd., 1927.
'In addition to the Black and Tans the Auxiliaries were recruited in England
to serve in Ireland with the police. The men were ex-officers of the army, qualified
for no pension, and were not under military discipline.
10 Shaw Desmond, The Drama of Sinn Fein, London. 1923.
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Bennett, Richard Lawrence. The Black and Tans. Boston: Houghton Muffin
Company, 1960.
Brady, Edward Mark. Ireland's Secret Service in England. Dublin: The Talbot
Press Ltd.
Carty, James. Ireland from the Great Famine to the Treaty. Dublin: C. J.
Fallon Ltd., 1951.
Collins, Michael. The Path to Freedom. Dublin: The Talbot Press Ltd., 1922.
Coogan, Timothy Patrick. Ireland Since the Rising. New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1966.
Denieffe, Joseph. A Personal Narrative of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood.
Cambridge: Houghton, Mifflin and Co., 1906.
Desmond, Shaw. The Drama of Sinn Fein. London: W. Collins Sons & Company
Ltd., 1923.
Gleason, James Joseph. Bloody Sunday. London: Peter Davies Ltd., 1962.
Gwynn, Denis Rolleston. The Life of John Redmond. London: G. G. Karrap
and Co., 1932.
Lieberson, Goddard. The Irish Uprising 1916-1922. New York: Hinkhouse Inc.,
1964.
Lyons, Francis S. L. The Fall of Parnell. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1960.
Macardle, Dorothy. The Irish Republic. Dublin: Irish Press Ltd., 1951.
O'Callaghan, Sean. The Easter Lily: The Story of the IRA. New York: Roy
Publishers, 1938.
O'Leary, John. Recollections of Fenians and Fenianism. London: D. Appleton
and Co., 1896.
Phillips, Walter Alison. The Revolution in Ireland, 1906-1923. London: Long-
mans, Green and Co., 1927.
Pollard, H. B. C. The Secret Societies of Ireland. London: Philip Allan and Co.,
1922.
Tansill, Charles Callan. America and the Fight for Irish Freedom. New York:
The Devin-Adair Co., 1957.
Taylor, Rex. Michael Collins. London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1958.
Van Voris, Jacqueline. Constance de Markievicz in the Cause of Ireland. Am-
herst, Mass.: The University of Mass. Press, 1967.
Williams, Desmond. The Irish Struggle. London: Routledge and Kogan, 1966.
Articles
Dilnot, F. "Ireland Under Sinn Fein." Outlook, January 1919.
Harding, John W. "Ireland's Reign of Terror and Why." Current History,
September 1920.
Macdonald, W. "Underground Ireland." Nation, June 1960.
MacNeill, J. G. S. "Agent Provocateur in Ireland." Contemporary, November
1918.
Marriott, J. A. R. "Heel of Achilles." Nineteenth Century, June 1920.
Plunkett, H. "Irish Question." Living Age, March 1919.
Turner, E. R. "Sinn Fein and Ireland." World's Work, November 1920.
Contemporary Reports
"The Crises in the British Empire: India, Egypt, Ireland." Current Opinion,
June 1919.
"Defence of the Irish Executions." Nation, August 1916.
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"England's Iron Hand on Ireland." Literary Digest, September 1919.
"Insurrection in Dublin." New Republic, November 1918.
"Ireland From a Scotland Yard Notebook." Atlantic, June 1922.
"Irish Executions." Nation, June 1916.
"Michael Collins, Most Terrifying of all Sinn Feiners." Current Opinion,
December 1921.
"Those Irish Executions." Literary Digest, May 1916.
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No Foreign Dissem
On the difference
between cover and
clandestinity.
THE OLD WINSOCKIE SYNDROME
W. B. Lavender
Several years ago a station succeeded in placing a clandestine
microphone and transmitter in the office of the local chief of a hostile
intelligence service. The audio quality was excellent, the LP was
conveniently located and the translator routinely produced tran-
scriptions within 48 hours. Over a period of time the installation,
combined with other activities, produced considerable information
about the activities of the hostile service: among other things, it was
busily attempting to penetrate the local trade unions.
One summer while the audio operation was active, a headquarters-
controlled contract agent was sent to the area to spend several
weeks in each of a number of the capitals in the area. His mission
was to spot, assess, and develop trade union officials for use in an
area-wide international trade union operation. The contract agent
was utilizing impeccable-indeed, legitimate-academic cover. He
was well-known as a specialist in the area and he had produced a
number of scholarly works dealing with the development of trade
unions. For his visit to this particular station, a case officer was as-
signed to handle the contract agent and clandestine contact arrange-
ments were made by cable.
The contract agent arrived on schedule, contact was duly made,
and the following day the case officer reported to his chief. After
making the previously arranged clandestine contact, the case officer
and agent had gone together to the coffee shop of the agent's hotel,
where they drank coffee together while discussing the operation. The
case officer reported with considerable amusement that at one point
the chief of the hostile intelligence service, accompanied by one of
his known agents, had come into the coffee shop. When it was ob-
jected that the contact with the contract agent was supposed to be
clandestine and the case officer was upbraided for meeting publicly
in the coffee shop, the case officer had a triumphant reply: "But
we have natural, legitimate cover for meeting openly. I actually took
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SECRET Old Winsockie Syndrome
a course from the agent at Old Winsockie University a few years
ago, so there is nothing at all unusual about my meeting with my
old professor."
The case officer's confidence was shaken, however, when 48 hours
later the transcript from the audio operation became available. The
chief of the hostile intelligence service had returned to his office
from the coffee shop and for over an hour, in a discussion with a
colleague, he had berated American intelligence and its activities
in the labor field; his particular anger was directed toward the
newly discovered fact that the academician was an American in-
telligence agent, an obvious conclusion to be drawn From his as-
sociation with the station case officer so shortly after the professor's
arrival.
It should be noted that up to this point the station had no reason
to believe that the case officer himself was known or suspected to
be intelligence connected; but he obviously was, and his public
association with the agent, no matter how casual it appeared, im-
mediately led the Opposition to correct conclusions concerning the
agent.
The incidents related above graphically illustrate a fallacy which
became known to a small group at the station involved as the "Old
Winsockie University Syndrome"-the mistaken belief that, as long
as a cover story is on tap, clandestine relationships can be success-
fully carried out through overt contacts. The case officer and the
agent had perfect cover for meeting-a legitimate professor/ student
relationship. However, the Opposition neglected to ask why the two
were together and jumped immediately to correct conclusions; while
the cover story retained the perfection of truth, unused, and known
only to the two people involved.
The case cited above is unusual only because, due to unique cir-
cumstances at that particular station, the fallacy was so thoroughly
and promptly exposed. The "Old Winsockie University Syndrome"
is unfortunately to be found in a great number of operations, in
which "social cover" or "business cover" or some other plausible
reason is adduced for overtly meeting individuals with whom our
relationship is, or should be, clandestine. The Syndrome is so firmly
ingrained that one case officer, who had taken over from his prede-
cessor a recruited agent and had continued to handle him in clandes-
tine meetings, recently reported that he was actively attempting to
arrange an overt acquaintance with the agent so the two could then
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meet overtly-the purpose being to "increase the security" of the
relationship.
Officers seem to be particularly prone to meet staff agents with
unofficial status under "social cover." The usual pattern is that the
case officer in an official installation and the staff agent outside be-
come close friends; one or the other drops in casually for a drink
after work, the two families invite one another to dinner, and with
one thing and another the two get together at least once a week
and frequently more often. They conduct their business in the privacy
and comfort of home, and are "secure" in the knowledge that their
relationship is so obviously innocent and overt that no one could
possibly suspect any clandestine activity. This is, usually, rationali-
zation pure and simple. Case officers who take the trouble ob-
jectively and honestly to assess such "social cover" will more often
than not realize that the only people they see "socially" so frequently
over a long period of time are those with whom they have an opera-
tional relationship. If one or the other of the participants is known
or suspected by the Opposition of being intelligence-and it should
be remembered that official cover is usually pretty thin-the other
will automatically become suspect merely because of the association.
It is instructive to look at our own operational reporting to note
how often we have classified people as "probably IS" because we
have noted them in the company of known or suspected intelligence
officers. The Opposition does the same, and the effectiveness of an
agent may be reduced just as much if his status is suspected as it
would be if the Opposition had positive proof. Particularly in the
case of staff agents, who usually are put in place under a cover ar-
rangement with considerable difficulty and expense, it behooves all
operators to make an extra effort to avoid suspicion.
As indicated above, the Old Winsockie University Syndrome is
not used exclusively to rationalize "social cover," but to rationalize
any open operational contact with agents. In one case reported re-
cently the agent in question is a tradesman, with whom the case
officer would normally have no social relationship at all. The Syn-
drome explains the weekly evening visits to the case officer's home in
terms of repairing electric appliances which keep breaking down. Thus
a ready answer is available should someone ask about the visits; but
no one has asked and no one is likely to do so. The Soviets or the
local service, if they have noticed the visits, draw their own con-
clusions and are not interested in explanations.
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SECRET Old Winsockie Syndrome
The necessary ingredient for clandestine relationships is not cover,
but clandestinity. Such relationships should be hidden through use of
tradecraft, not flaunted in the hope that observers will assume the
truth of whatever legend we have chosen to explain the situation.
This is not meant to imply that there can be no secure overt re-
lationship with agents. Indeed, there are areas where the US com-
munity is so small that deliberate avoidance of such a relationship
between, for instance, two US nationals would be, if not impossible,
at least highly unusual. However, if there is to be an overt rela-
tionship it should be kept completely natural and separate from the
clandestine one; e.g., a social relationship should be kept just that,
and clandestine business should be conducted in clandestine meet-
ings. A social relationship carried on for operational reasons will
not appear natural for the very good reason that it is in fact not
natural; meetings will invariably be too frequent and tco exclusive,
since clandestine business must be carried on. If operational busi-
ness is carried out clandestinely, however, purely social meetings are
likely to attract no attention. The frequency of social meetings will be
normal; and usually there will be other people present tc chaperone,
and by their presence emphasize the innocent nature of the con-
tact.
The operational climate in no two locations is precisely the same,
and tradecraft must be adapted to local conditions rather than ap-
plied blindly. Too many stations, unfortunately, get into the habit
of "adapting" tradecraft right out of existence, using the specious
reasoning that "here" things are different, and that it is not necessary
to be clandestine "because we went to Old Winsockie University
together." It is admittedly a lot easier to run operations on that
basis; but it is not very professional and not very secure. It would
be profitable for all case officers to take an honest look at present and
future operations to make certain that we are keeping them clan-
destine; and that we are not merely putting our faith in "cover," in
the blind hope that relationships will be interpreted as we wish.
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COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS
Dear Sirs:
In the Winter, 1968 issue of Studies in Intelligence, Sherman Kent
shared with us his reminiscences of how the Studies came to be
founded, and drew up a balance sheet evaluating the first dozen
years of its publication. The founders had in mind a journal which
would serve to develop the methodology of intelligence as a discipline,
and Mr. Kent classes the articles which have been published as falling
into the categories of intelligence history, theory and doctrine, and
method.
Few would argue with Mr. Kent's favorable assessment of the
contribution that Studies in Intelligence has made to the intelligence
profession, but there is something to be said for starting a periodical
devoted to the content of intelligence. According to virtually every
criterion intelligence is a scholarly discipline, just as sociology,
chemistry and English literature are. Although each field of study
has its own characteristics, they all share many attributes: the for-
mulation of problems, the gathering of evidence, testing hypotheses,
scrupulous impartiality and the drawing of conclusions in conformity
with the available information.
The requirements of security impose limitations on the intelligence
scholar but do not significantly alter the similarity between his
work and that of other scholars. Research workers in this as in
all fields are plagued by gaps in information, inadequate conceptual
frameworks, personal deficiencies in training and knowledge, loss of
information due to faulty memory and bad filing, insufficient ex-
changes of views with others working in the same and related
fields, and excessive conservatism in enunciating and testing new
hypotheses.
Each field of study has peculiarities that make it especially vul-
nerable to these difficulties in proportions differing from those of
other fields. The last two items on the above list seem to be especially
pertinent to intelligence. While members of the intelligence com-
munity work together in close physical proximity compared to, say,
anthropologists, this advantage is more than offset by organizational
divisions and the lack of' communication which tends to be imposed
by a secure environment.
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To The Editors
More serious is the conservatism which naturally follows from
the deadly seriousness of the subject matter with which intelligence
officers deal. In an academic environment, mistakes are accepted
as part of the price that must be paid for advances in knowledge,
or, at worst, result in a diminution of personal reputation. In the
field of national intelligence, however, the possible consequences of
wrong conclusions extend to the very worst catastrophes. The new
intelligence analyst quickly learns that the most unprofessional pos-
ture he can assume in a given case is an extreme one; the unforgiv-
able sin is to be "alarmist." Previously coordinated judgments tend
to be repeated since this obviates the necessity for breaking new
ground. The avoidance of appearing to make errors at times seems
a higher virtue than the publication of accurate and timely intelli-
gence. While the killing of intelligence between the analyst and the
policy-maker is the most serious potential consequence of these
circumstances, the actual danger of this is not great. Especially in
critical situations, professionalism is likely to triumph over bureaucra-
tic timidity.
However, the ability to transmit finished intelligence to its ultimate
consumer is no guarantee that the analytic process is being carried
out under the most productive circumstances. Indeed, the need to
be "right" in producing finished intelligence is probably the most
serious barrier to the stimulation of creative thinking. While informal
discussions and the coordination process do provide some oppor-
tunities for exchanging ideas, this is pretty much a hit-or-miss propo-
sition.
Intelligence analysts need a periodical comparable to, say, the
American Political Science Review or the American Historical Review,
journals which have counterparts in other scholarly disciplines. There
does not appear to be any publication at this time which fulfills this
need. Studies in Intelligence deals only incidentally with substantive
analysis and, moreover, its classification is too low. But it serves a
valuable function and probably should not be tampered with in any
major way. Other publications, such as monthly reviews, are produced
through the usual administrative channels and therefore do not pro-
vide the necessary outlet.
The editing of a scholarly intelligence journal of the type here
advocated involves special problems. The quality check provided by
supervisors and the coordination process would be absent, thus im-
posing a greater burden on the editor. To make the project work as
intended, only the loosest sort of control should be placed on the
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0
editor. He should be responsible for the logic of argument, the
presence of evidence, the clarity of the writing-in other words, the
general quality-but not for the correctness of the conclusions. He
would have to exercise careful judgment to encourage the free ex-
change of ideas while avoiding half-baked and cranky material
simply not good enough for publication in other forms.
To be successful, such a project would have to possess recognized
priority. Corners could easily be cut in the production (by mimeo-
graphing the final product, for example) but not in the substantive
work leading to the final product. The importance of the project
should be emphasized by its placement in the organization-the
editor, for example, might be responsible directly to a principal offi-
cer. The editor should not be burdened with time-consuming outside
responsibilities which would prevent him from doing his job effec-
tively and he should be given adequate secretarial support. It goes
almost without saying that he should be an experienced intelligence
officer capable of doing the job as well as commanding the respect
necessary to generate the widest possible participation.
The periodical here envisioned ought to have certain characteristics
not common to most other intelligence publications. Since the purpose
is to encourage the writing and dissemination of new ideas, bureaucratic
roadblocks which might frustrate this should be eliminated. The most
obvious way to accomplish this is to bypass the usual chain of com-
mand. Authors should be able to submit articles directly to the editor
of the publication without reference to superiors or to any coordina-
tion process.
Articles published in this way might include material that is in-
correct, or only partly valid. The publication therefore ought to be
restricted in its circulation and bear any notation that might be neces-
sary to discourage the indiscriminate use of its contents in finished
intelligence. The circulation of the periodical should, however, be
broad enough to reach virtually all analysts who are responsible for
finished intelligence, but not so broad as to require an unnecessarily
low level of classification. Moreover, there should be a section devoted
to lengthy letters to the editor, or a policy of publishing articles in
rebuttal-which would encourage healthy controversy.
Herbert Schlossberg
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No Foreign Dissem
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
SAILOR IN A RUSSIAN FRAME. By Cdr. Anthony Courtney.
(London: Johnson. 1968. 256 pp. 35s.)
"I'm not a Profumo, but ..." was the title on the illustrated hand-
bill, with photos to match, which was sent to the British press and the
wife and political friends and enemies of retired Royal Navy Com-
mander Anthony Courtney, Conservative Member of Parliament for
Harrow East, in August of 1965. Before a year had passed, Courtney
had lost his wife, his seat, and most of his business as a result of a
KGB political action operation in the heart of London. His book is
the story of why the Soviets "framed" him and how he fought back, and
almost won. The episode vividly exemplifies how the Soviets employ
assiduous data collection and personal provocation in political action.
Courtney's father had exported machine tools to Russia during World
War One and became a Russophile, leading his son to practice one-
upmanship among his schoolmates with assiduous study of Hugo's
Russian Course, Part 1. A tour with the China Station in the late 20's
as Sub Lieutenant of H.M.S. Cornwall gave the younger Courtney
practical experience, particularly with the "many delightful girls in
the White Russian clubs and cabarets" of Shanghai, and probably pro-
vided the first entries in RIS files. In 1933 he had been awarded nine
months' leave to study Russian in Rumania. In 1935 he spent his sum-
mer leave in the USSR. Subsequently he was assigned to the Naval
Intelligence Division of the Admiralty in London to re-write the "Rus-
sian Intelligence Report." This gave him a chance to meet Soviet
military officers in London, including Marshal Tukhachevsky. Back
to ships by 1937 and married in 1938, he was not involved with Russia
again until he was assigned as Deputy Head of the British Naval
Mission to Moscow in October of 1941. By his own account he made
the most of his year there to get close to the natives, and after the
war he was placed in charge of the Russian Section of the Naval In-
telligence Division for almost three years. At the end of 1948 he was
assigned as Chief of Intelligence Staff to the Flag Officer, Germany.
In 1951 he returned to the Admiralty and retired in 1953 with a small
pension, no capital, but ". . . three assets: a naval training, a good
knowledge of three languages and the best wife a man has ever been
blessed with." During the next five years he sought election to Parlia-
ment, finally succeeding in 1959.
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During the same five years, he also sought with some success to
re-establish his father's commercial trade with Russia and other eastern
countries, and broadcast a weekly talk in Russian on the BBC. He
exhibited at the Poznan fair in 1955, 1956, and 1957; in the last year,
after a property dispute, he was escorted out by the UB, never to
return. He therefore turned to Moscow, where he renewed old acquaint-
anceships and made new ones, so that by early 1961 he was on top
of the wave commercially, politically and socially, having made his
maiden speech in Commons on the hope for improved Anglo-Soviet
relations through commerce and adding China to his list of Commu-
nist trading posts. Two years of negotiations had resulted in that rarity
of east-west trade, a successful contract with the Russians. In March,
however, Courtney s wife of 23 years, "the first Elisabeth," died of a
heart attack, and here his fortunes changed.
In the summer of 1959, while staying at the Hotel Ukraina, Courtney
had met "a pleasant woman" on the INTOURIST staff, Zinaida
Grigoryevna Volkova. By the following year, "Zina" had accepted an
invitation to the theater. In May of 1961, there was held in Moscow
the first British Industrial Exhibition since the Revolution, with which
Courtney had much to do. Despite meetings with the Khrushchevs and
Suslov, Courtney found life rather boring, since many of his friends
were away from Moscow on vacation. Not so Zina, however; she had
given up part of her annual holiday from INTOURIST to work at the
exhibition.
"Since Elisabeth's death her attitude towards me had been notice-
ably warmer, and she knew full well how desolate life had be-
come, now that there was no wife waiting for me on my return to
England . . . . Just how it occurred, I have no idea, except that it
-was certainly on her initiative, but it is a fact that for the first and
last time in our acquaintance she came up to my [hotel] bedroom
after dinner and stayed there with me for several hours. Our affair
was not a success. It was therefore not altogether surprising that on
the next occasion when we met she expressed some distress at having
behaved in the way she had, saying she knew now that it was not really
what I had wanted ... In June, 1961, rightly or wrongly, the thought
never entered my head that a successful operation might in fact have
been mounted by the KGB against myself."
A year after Elisabeth's death, Courtney married another Elizabeth
(with "z" this time), the widowed Lady Trefgarne, in the Crypt
Chapel of the House of Commons. His new wife, a Director of the
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family firm of machine-tool manufacturers, was quickly accepted as
both a commercial and political asset, and in 1962 travelled with him
on a trip to Moscow, Leningrad and China. Zina took her sight-seeing.
Despite his increasing dependence on the Soviets for his business
success (or perhaps because of it, in that he may have feared to be
charged With a conflict of interest), his speeches in Commons often
criticized the Government for failure to protest KGB harassment of
British Embassy personnel in Moscow. In the light of the Vassall and
Blake cases, he also spoke to the House on what he considered Foreign
Office incompetence in the security field. (He had personal knowledge
of Blake since he had arranged Blake's naval cover to attend a special
Russian course at Downing College, Cambridge, just after World
War II.)
He also made an increasing number of trips to the Soviet Union,
and it was there that he received at his hotel a letter which had come
through the British Embassy, from his wife. "The letter was very much
to the point. My wife had decided to leave me, as our marriage had not
turned out the success she had hoped: no more specific reason was
given . . . I duly telephoned my wife at home and managed to per-
suade her to change her mind. But great damage had been done.
The telephone call, which I was forced to make on an open line from
my hotel, had undoubtedly let the KGB discover that there was a
weak link in the Courtney armour." The file was growing swiftly.
Courtney survived the general election of 1964 but lost half his ma-
jority in the general trend toward Labour. In November an incident
occurred which he does not describe in detail but which seems to have
involved a fortnight's indiscretion on the part of his wife, and in Jan-
uary Courtney's eldest stepson, the leader of the Conservative Party
(then Sir Alec Douglas-Home), and he all received anonymous letters
"from a source or sources which appeared to be very well-informed
about my wife's private life," suggesting he resign "as our M.P." Then,
his critical review of a Soviet book on the naval history of World War
II for the Evening Standard was attacked in Red Star. By March, 1965,
when he was next to visit Moscow, he realized that he might be in
danger there, and wrote a letter to the Foreign Secretary for his wife
to mail in case anything happened to him. Although his business efforts
seemed to go better than ever, one old friend of 23 years' standing
refused to accept a call or a visit, which Courtney could only interpret
as an urgent warning.
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He nevertheless continued his criticism of Foreign Office security
and his efforts to get the Soviets to agree to the first chartered Anglo-
Soviet commercial concern with three British and three Soviet directors.
In July 1965 he was to visit the Soviet Union again, but three days
before his departure Sir Alec Douglas-Home resigned from the Leader-
ship of the Conservative Party and Courtney could not leave London.
Ten days later, two days before the Summer recess, members of the
press and Parliament received copies of an illustrated handbill which
"contained six photographs, five of them being of myself-with ap-
propriate captions .... Two of the photographs represented me in
company with a woman (or women) in circumstances which plainly
indicated sexual intimacy." The impact of a special mailing to his wife
was apparently not lessened by the fact that he had told her about the
incident with Zina in 1961 soon after their marriage in 1962.
The remainder of the book is an engrossing picture of Courtney's
fight to retain his political position in the face of his Party's unseemly
haste to dump him as a candidate, his winning of his constituency's
support and overthrowing the local Conservative leadership, and his
subsequent, heartbreaking loss of his seat by 378 votes while the
former leadership sat on its hands. Ten weeks later hi;; wife was
granted a divorce, and March 1967 saw a special party meeting packed
with Young Conservatives choose one of their number to be the
prospective conservative candidate for Harrow East. "For me the deci-
sion was a blow that seemed politically mortal. The process set in
train by the KGB in August 1965 had been completed."
It must be admitted that Courtney probably gave the Soviets even
more cause for enmity-and perhaps hope for success-than he makes
explicit in the book. In 1947 or 1948, he had had "certain ideas in-
volving the use of fast surface craft and submarines in cooperation
with the SIS," and after he contacted "C," I "discussions took place
about the feasibility of obtaining information from the Black Sea
area" using such craft. Unfortunately the man SIS assigned to the dis-
cussion was Kim Philby, who "listened to my proposals with interest,
for he had a wide knowledge of Turkish affairs and his support was
essential if Naval Intelligence was to make any contribution to the
common effort in the Black Sea." Yes, indeed. "But nothing whatsoever
emerged from this meeting ... Nothing daunted, in 1949 or 1950,
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when assigned as Chief of Intelligence Staff to the Flag Officer at
Hamburg,
"Once again I found myself working closely with the Secret Intelligence
Service, and at last I had the opportunity to put some of my ideas into
practice by providing the SIS with direct naval assistance in the Baltic .. .
I was struck by the potential capabilities of stripped-down ex-Kriegsmarine
'E' boat hulls, powered by the incomparable twin Mercedes-Benz 518 diesel
engines. With my assistants . .. at Hamburg and Kiel I was frequently at
Lubeck and Flensburg and other smaller harbours such as Eckernforde and
Kappeln, from which we mounted our operations. Little did I know that the
penetration of the Foreign Office and SIS by the Russian Intelligence Service
must have not only doomed our efforts from the start, but had involved me
personally in sending many a brave man into the jaws of a Soviet trap."
Not only that but, as the press has reported for years now, the boat
crews and even. the teams themselves were penetrated, in both the
Baltic and Black Seas and probably in the Far East as well.
It is amazing that Courtney's post-war commercial enterprises got
as far with the Soviet Union as they did, and in fact his success only
becomes plausible in the light of his deduction that it was leading him
into an elaborate trap. He believes that trap was to have been sprung
on him in Moscow in July 1965; that he was to be held to exchange
for Soviet spies such as the Krogers or George Blake, then in jail in
England; that he escaped the trap only when he had to cancel the
trip at the last minute because of a Party crisis; and that the handbill,
originally designed to discredit him and render him defenseless while
in a Soviet dungeon, was simply too far along to be stopped by the
bureaucracy when the KGB realized he had not arrived on schedule
in Moscow.
Perhaps, but it seems more likely to this reviewer that the KGB
planned to recruit him-or perhaps even tried just before the trip-
and that the publication of the handbill was a vindictive substitute
for the original plot. Courtney naturally does not want to admit that
perhaps the Soviets had reason to believe he would be vulnerable to
recruitment, but by then his publicly expressed "weakness for blondes"
had been documented in his KGB dossier for 35 years. It may in fact
have figured in the UB action against him in 1957. As he put it later
to the press, "I knew the danger of microphones but never thought of
cameras. This was before James Bond and ... the idea never occurred
to me." He obviously thought he could have his cake without paying
the baker, and probably had been doing so for some years.
Courtney's writing is excellent, his index professional, and his ap-
proach, considering the subject, dignified. Above all, however, we must
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respect his political and personal courage in this matter, even though
it was described in some quarters as "cheek," since the KGB's role
was never proven. The subject matter must have been a'most irresist-
ible to the British press in the wake of the Profumo affair, but it was
relatively restrained, perhaps influenced as much by libel laws as by
a sense of fair play and anger at Soviet high-handedness.
But worse was to come than is mentioned in the book: in March,
1968, Courtney won a suit against his former friend, the out-voted
ex-head of the Harrow East Association, Sir Theo Constantine, for
repeating Courtney's estranged wife's statement that the incident
depicted in the photographs must have occurred in 1963 after their
marriage, rather than in 1961 before it, because in 1961 he did not yet
wear that kind of "underpants." This must have seemed to Courtney
the lowest blow of all and it apparently undermined the Party's faith
in him beyond recall. Whatever the facts of the affair, we can only
wish with Courtney that the Conservative voters of Harrow East had
risen to the occasion and cast their votes, if not for Courtney, at least
against the KGB.
R. H. Sheepshanks
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THE OKHRANA: The Russian Department of Police. A Bibliography
by Edward Ellis Smith. (The Hoover Institution Bibliographical
Series XXXIII. Stanford University. 1967. 280 pp. $10,00.)
The Russian imperial secret service, the Okhrana, is the only major
security establishment of the twentieth century about which a com-
prehensive bibliography, including material from its own files and
interrogations of its leaders, could possibly appear as an open pub-
lication. It went out of existence in 1917, when the provisional regime
took over and the revolutionary mobs destroyed most of the centrally
and provincially kept records. The Bolsheviks promptly established
their own Cheka, but in no way as a continuation of the Okhrana.
Instead of safeguarding the secrets of the predecessor agency, the
Cheka of the Soviets publicized and exploited them to serve their
purposes.
Despite the voluminous Soviet writings about the Okhrana, how-
ever, nothing has as yet come out of the USSR in the form of bibliog-
raphy on this important agency of the old regime. The present volume
coming from the Hoover Institution is therefore unique, perhaps the
only publication of the kind in the West. It is also logical that such a
book was prepared at the Hoover Institution, well-known as the most
comprehensive repository of the Okhrana materials. Its holdings in-
clude the nearly intact archive of the Paris headquarters, which du-
plicated the records kept at the home office in Petrograd, as well as
voluminous data on international intelligence operations which were
not as fully recorded at the capital.
The author points out in his introduction that "no general work
exists encompassing the Russian security-intelligence organizations
for the period from 1881 to 1917," the Okhrana's span of life. Various
authors have written about it, but "narrowness of treatment and bias
mark most works on the Okhrana," so that the resulting tracts on the
subject are notably subjective. He is entirely correct in this respect,
and his own analysis of the titles and contents does not entirely escape
the taint of the partiality of the authors.
Some of the writings discuss the Okhrana's antecedents with cen-
turies-old origins, dating back to Ivan the Terrible and his Oprichnina,
and follow stages of evolution as landmarked in imperial decrees and
statutes. For an understanding of the Okhrana, and the subsequent
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Soviet security establishments, such historic factors and mores under-
lying the whole system of Russian counterintelligence and counter-
espionage, past and present, are of cardinal significance. The Okhrana,
as sponsored by the imperial decrees, and as described by some of its
former top officials in exile, was an essentially humane agency for the
preservation of law and order. Its task was to safeguard the existing
regime and specifically to neutralize or eliminate the elements that
threatened it: the anarchists (nihilists), assassins, revolutionaries, and
other political troublemakers. In contrast, the writers on the revolution-
ary side universally dubbed it as a tyrannical and brutal police state
within the state. Their flood of propaganda precluded any objective
writing about it at home or abroad.
No matter how wild the accusations or distortions, the Okhrana
itself, or the government behind it, could not and would not commit
itself in its defense. Because of the imperative secrecy about the agency,
it could not reveal facts. It consistently chose not to deny any ac-
cusations. It could not make public that it was perennially under-
staffed, with an average of a few dozen officers and employees in each
major city and province, while propaganda had raised the figure into
tens of thousands of officials and spies in every gubernia. It chose not
to explain that the Okhrana was not in charge of the gendarmes and
the city police, or that the prison administration and the Siberian exile
camps were in no way under its control. The Okhrana was essentially
an investigative agency targeting at subversives at home and abroad
and using any available methods to penetrate their groups and control
their activities. Its plans and operations could never be publicly con-
firmed or denied even when the adverse propaganda contained ele-
ments of truth. As a result, the literature about the Okh:rana has re-
mained to this date essentially one-sided, all contra, with only an
occasional morsel of pro and, therefore, hardly anything objective
in-between.
Smith's Okhrana bibliography epitomizes this situation. He has a
total of 909 entries of books, pamphlets, articles, compendiums of
reminiscences, some isolated rosters of police and Okhrana personnel,
circulars, and the like. Over two-thirds of the bibliography refers to
newspaper articles and editorials which, in turn, are almost exclu-
sively from the revolutionary and post-revolutionary Communist and
other leftist press. Although the writers of articles draw on reminis-
cences or post-revolutionary discoveries of certain Okhrana acts, bias
is seldom concealed. The post-revolutionary, officially approved
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writer, likewise, could not depict the old security service as anything
but a beastly conspiracy against the Russian nation. Also included are
the works of two Okhrana defectors, Leonid Menshchikov and Mikhail
Bakai. Smith describes them as valuable in illustrating modus operandi,
but these authors were disputed by other revolutionary writers as in-
correct. Smith considers Valerian Agafonov's book Zagranichnaia
Okhranka (Okhrana Abroad - Kniga, Petrograd, 1918) as probably the
best available work on the Paris Okhrana. He analyzes it chapter by
chapter. Agafonov served as a member of the commission sent to Paris
by Kerensky's :regime to investigate Okhrana archives. As a revolu-
tionary (Agafonov was once engaged in Burtzev's counterintelligence),
he wrote about the Okhrana only what was acceptable to the new
rulers. For instance, he was fully informed about Paris Okhrana's
counterintelligence operations against Germany after August 1914,
yet his book made no mention of that substantial achievement against
the enemy at war. Works like Agafonov's, praised by the compiler of
the Bibliography, should instead be marked as partisan and overly
subjective.
The major part of the present compilation is given the general title
of "Operational Methodology" which, in turn, is subdivided by sub-
headings on "Internal Security" and "Operations Against Revolution-
aries" and "Other Organizations and Movements," at home and abroad.
A professional counterintelligence analyst would no doubt use a dif-
ferent approach. The titles under "Internal Security" are a mixture
of writings that could be classified under other chapters. Some are
treatises on government policy and regulations; others, articles on in-
dividuals and their experiences with Czarist authorities; but none add
up to a definitive description of how the internal security service was
organized and how it functioned. The longest chapter, on "Operations
Against Revolutionaries," is perplexing. It contains an analysis of 217
titles, but these deal almost exclusively with reminiscences about
arrests, police brutality, life in prisons, court trials and exiles in
Siberia. The Okhrana, although a special section within the Depart-
ment of Gendarmes, could have played only a secondary, if any, role
in making arrests and trying or exiling people; by law it was not a
punitive agency. This section also refers to one interesting pamphlet
containing instructions on how the revolutionaries are to behave in in-
terrogations. These instructions, published in 1900, are in no way dif-
ferent from current day guidebooks for subversives caught by the
authorities.
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The chapter heading "Intelligence Against Other Nations" is espe-
cially unfortunate since none of the writings included under it are
concerned with this subject. Only works dealing with Russian revolu-
tionists abroad are listed. The Okhrana's operations were limited in
peacetime to the pursuit of Russian revolutionaries, anarchists, and
other troublemakers. This was the assurance the Czarist government
gave to thirteen other nations which in the decade before World
War I signed a pact to cooperate in such pursuits. Russia strictly
adhered to this pact as long as there was no war. In the conflict with
Japan, however, the Okhrana in Paris placed a strong team of opera-
tives into Belgium who succeeded in intercepting and decoding mes-
sages of the Japanese military attache there. That complex operation
was fully described by Ivan Manasevich-Manuilov, the staff officer
in charge. A copy of his notes is among the Okhrana files al: the Hoover
Institution.
Okhrana officials abroad themselves protested against Okhrana op-
erations against other nations. For example, the archive at the Hoover
Institution contains a set of dispatches to the home office objecting
to an indirect assignment for gathering intelligence on the Austro-
Hungarian navy and the ports of Trieste, Fiume and the Dalmatian
coast. Bound by law, the Okhrana staff abroad refused to comply with
such requests in time of peace.
With the outbreak of World War I, the Paris Okhrana soon con-
verted its activities to counterintelligence and counterespionage tasks
against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Some ingenious op-
erations were mounted, and the Okhrana records at the institution
give a comprehensive account of the methods of handling the respective
double agents, of the network stretching into a third country (Switzer-
land to Germany), of disinformation to confuse the enemy, and the
like. Assuming that Mr. Smith had access to the Okhrana files, one
would ask why that material is omitted from his Bibliography.
Other data at the Hoover Institution should not have been omitted.
The archive contains reams of printed regulations and circulars from
the home office dealing with the agentura structure, its functions and
legal restrictions. Folders of circular letters show how various officials
and agents were dismissed from the agentura because they failed to
comply with regulations. Other printed materials, some of which are
in the Okhrana archive and others of which may be available in
libraries elsewhere, deal with statutes and imperial decrees regulating
internal security agencies. A bibliographer cannot disregard that phase
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of literature, for that would look as if he had adopted the slogans of
the revolutionists forever proclaiming that the Okhrana officialdom
disregarded its own laws. Mr. Smith included only N. T. Volkov's com-
pilation Zakony politsii (Police Laws), but that work, published in
1901, was superseded by volumes of other legislation, much more perti-
nent to the Okhrana structure and tasks.
Still other materials, some well-known, could have been included.
The Duma's stenographic records of the sessions discussing Okhrana
scandals merit inclusion in this bibliography. From the standpoint of
operations abroad, the Okhrana recruitment of foreign agents, organi-
zation of teams, liaison with foreign services, penetration of post offices
of host countries, live surveillance, and other such topics were occa-
sionally on the agenda of the parliaments in Paris and Rome. As a
result of interpellations, the press of the two countries was able to
disclose the names and activities of most of the Okhrana agents in
France and Italy who were nationals of the two countries. The parlia-
mentary debates often went into such details from agent revelations
that mention in this bibliography would seem appropriate.
In his introduction, Mr. Smith set the question of how it happened
that perhaps the first and best modern security-intelligence agency,
at the height of its efficiency, failed in its mission to protect tsarism.
He refers to historians who blamed it upon Russia's military defeats
in World War I. That, no doubt, was the paramount cause, but the
implied Okhrana efficiency or strength to combat the underground
no longer existed in 1914-1917. The efforts of the agentura at home and
abroad at that time were turned away from the revolutionists. Mr.
Smith's bibliography does not show this, but the fact stands out that
all major Okhrana agent assets abroad and most of its operators, espe-
cially after 1915, were harnessed to the Allied war effort. The Okhrana
archive attests to that fully. It contains accounts of how three or four
staff members operating from all Allied capitals mounted a double
agent network to mislead the German general staff, as illustrated by
the case of agent Dolin. It includes reams of materials which show
daily liaison on counterespionage with the Allied Command in Paris
and coordination with the British through an Okhrana outpost at
Newcastle, England. Several key men among the Okhrana detectives
were converted into deep cover agents, as for instance Henri Bint
and his team, for third country espionage operations, for example from
Switzerland into Germany, and the Jollivet family of Okhrana agents,
and other minor operatives.
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I Al SE ONLY Recent Books: Miscellaneous
These shortcomings do not diminish the worth of Mr. Smith's book
in a broader sense. To say the least, it shows how the ;-evolutionary
writers distorted the true picture of the Okhrana and how and why
the few apologists for it failed so utterly. It should be of greater value
to the historian than to the intelligencer, to the sociologist rather than
the student of law enforcement. And the intelligence official, too, in
this broader sense, should find the book worthwhile for reference.
With few exceptions, the book is properly and well indexed, and has
a glossary of terms and a roster of periodicals consulted. The notations
on each volume are adequate. Nuisances are the endless recurrence of
typographical errors, mistakes in dates, too casual translations of Rus-
sian titles into English, and unexplained abbreviations. These may be
considered as minor faults, but more consistency in transliterating
proper names would normally be expected in an academic publication.
Thomas G. Ther'.celsen
THE ZINOVIEV LETTER. By Lewis Chester, Stephen Fay, and Hugo
Young. (London: Heinemann. Philadelphia: Lippincott. 1968.
218 pp. $5.95.)
The intelligence officer who vaguely remembers the Zinoviev letter
only as a relatively minor incident in British politics during the
'20s will do well to reflect on this book. Its publication is an indica-
tion that the matter is far from dead these forty-five years later. At
the minimum, the book demonstrates that the episode of the Zinoviev
letter was incredibly complicated, and that it was as many have long
suspected and the Soviets have long insisted, a black pra.:)aganda op-
eration, one with massive repercussions unforeseen.
The bare public facts, it will be recalled, were that the London press
published the text of an inspirational letter to the British Commu-
nists bearing the signature of Zinoviev, Chief of the Comintern, only
days before the General Election of 1924, in which one of the main
issues was Labourite Ramsay MacDonald's allegedly pro-Bolshevik
policy. Labour lost the election, and the trade treaty with the Rus-
sians which had been awaiting ratification by Parliament withered on
the vine. British relations with Moscow were blighted for years there-
after.
The authors demonstrate that the letter was almost certainly forged
by a small group of White Russian conspirators in Berlin, who were,
we are told, astounded by the results. The details of how the letter
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ecent ~oo s~ Miscellaneous
was surfaced in London, and by whom, are also reasonably well estab-
lished as a result of what must have been a major effort in journalistic
detection. With regard to the question of how the letter found its way
to London, the authors resort to ingenious but not entirely convincing
speculation. They themselves point out, however, that the moment
the forgery left the hand of its contrivers, the European intelligence
services came on the scene, so that it ought not be surprising that the
trail grew dim.
The wonder is rather that so much can be reconstructed from public
or non-official sources. The authors make a point of emphasizing that
they received no assistance in their researches from the British :Foreign
Office or intelligence services. Their expressions on this point betray
a certain ambivalence with respect to the desirability of official help.
"It is tiresome," they say, "to find the Foreign Office of today sitting
pat on the departmental errors of nearly half a century ago." They go
on to make the generalization that reliance on unofficial sources "is
the way in which any unauthorized history involving the intelligence
services must be written; and on the whole it tends to be a more fruit-
ful exercise than the rehearsal of romantic escapades doctored to
satisfy the present controllers of M15 and MI6." On the other hand,
they do not say whether they sought assistance from the Soviet au-
thorities. One wonders what they might have thought fitting to record
in the way of obiter dicta had they done so.
All of which brings this reviewer to raise perhaps an unfair com-
plaint about this otherwise exhaustive reconstruction of a long-past,
fateful series of events. The authors invite acceptance of their finding
that the British press, Conservative party, Foreign Office, intelligence
services, and individuals of distinguished report were all in one way
or another co-conspirators in a colossal fraud. By implication, they
also invite acceptance that the Soviet intelligence services stood idly
by throughout the perpetration of a most damaging covert attack on
essential Soviet interests. This really will not do. It may be that the
Soviet side of the story can never be told. It may be that it would take
another book to explain why not. In any case, it does seem that the
authors ought to have displayed some awareness-as they do not-
that the question of the role of Soviet intelligence in this extraordinary
episode does in fact arise from their own analysis.
With that reservation, The Zinoviev Letter can be recommended,
not perhaps as bedside reading, but as a fascinating, indeed tantaliz-
ing document. It ought to be very useful in the training syllabus.
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MORI/HI
Unravelling the tangled threads of the story, and deciphering the au-
thors' innuendoes would unquestionably be excellent exercise. For the
less energetic, The Zinoviev Letter will still be good value, even for
those who think they have no illusions about the technique of black
propaganda as a weapon of calculable or controllable effects.
Joseph O. Matthews
BAY OF PIGS. By Albert C. Persons. (Birmingham, Alabama: Kings-
ton Press. 1968. 96 pp. $1.50.)
For once a book concerning the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Bay of Pigs has received little publicity. The author is a journalist and
flier who was recruited with a number of other American pilots to
perform support missions for the Brigade of Cuban Freedom Fighters
who went ashore at the Bay of Pigs. Of primary interest is his account
of what he personally saw or was involved with which comprises the
main part of the book. He also speculates on other aspects of the
episode and allocates blame and praise as he sees fit. On the whole,
however, his account is not by any means hostile.
P. O. W. By Douglas Collins. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
1968. 310 pp. $5.95. )
This interesting work relates World War II escape and evasion
experiences in a corner of Europe (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Rumania) that has been touched only lightly by comparable narratives.
If it suffers in detail for having been written 20-odd years after the
fact, it gains in perspective.
Captured at Dunkirk, the author, Douglas Collins, spent the next
four years trying to escape. Altogether he broke from custody 10 times.
Starting from the heart of Germany, he gradually worked his way
south and southeastward. His seventh escape was from Hungary. The
eighth and ninth efforts in Rumania took him to the Bulgarian frontier,
as close as he ever got to Turkey, his goal. When the Red Army oc-
cupied Rumania in 1944, Collins was flown to England, thus, he
shortened his captivity by months and had the satisfaction of being
back in Europe with the British Army when Germany surrendered.
The specifics on how and why Collins was recaptured while at-
tempting to cross Hitler's Europe would make good evidence for any
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ecen oo s: isce aneous
text on evasion. The boldness that made him a great escaper seems,
in the wisdom of hindsight, to have been his undoing as an evader.
Collins' accounts of some of his experiences have value as general
World War II history, particularly his data on the Ploesti air raid of
August 1943 and his portrayal of the German retreat from the Wal-
lachian plain.
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