STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol. 12 No. 4, Fall 1968]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 125
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 26, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: IS

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STUDIES
~n
INTELLIGENCE
FALL 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
$CHIVAL RECORD
R M
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,ipr
IENCY ARCHIVES, BLDG.
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RET
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, oper-
ational, or historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Editorial
Board.
The criterion for publication is whether or
not, in the opinion of the Board, the article
makes a contribution to the literature of in-
telligence.
25X1
I
EDITORIAL BOARD
I OT E. SMITH, Chairman
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
25X1
SECRET
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CONTENTS
Page
Mission to Birch Woods .............. Henry S. Lowenhaupt
The U-2 first spies Soviet atomic sites. SECRET
1
Identifying the Future Threat ....... Herbert C. Rothenberg
From scientific advance to new Soviet weapon system.
SECRET
13
Microtechnology ............. Donald Reiser & Harry Wood
Vanishing bulk and power drain of electronic devices.
SECRET
View from the Hot Shop
23
Averill T. Stewart & Joseph O. Matthews
The CIA Operations Center in the service of evaluative
judgments. SECRET
39
Singapore's People's Association .......... Walter B. Kimball
47
A gimmick linking leaders and grass roots promotes political
stability. OFFICIAL USE
The Vietnamese as Operational Target ...... Titus Leidesdorf
57
Psychological peculiarities for exploitation. SECRET
With Vandenberg as DCI: Part II ........ Arthur B. Darling
73
Attempts at community coordination.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
CONFIDENTIAL
Classic Soviet networks. CONFIDENTIAL ................
95
Industrial intelligence and espionage. OFFICIAL USE ....
114
Miscellaneous. OFFICIAL USE ........................
119
25X1
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No Foreign Dissem
Targeting the first U-2 coverage
of Soviet nuclear facilities.
MISSION TO BIRCH WOODS
Via Seven Tents and New Siberia
Henry S. Lowenhaupt
I suppose I remember so distinctly working on nuclear targets for
the U-2 missions of late August 1957 because this was my first direct
experience with reconnaissance operations, and first impressions are
lasting. Besides, it .was a striking reminder of my 1944 mission from
a basic training camp in Alabama to a telephone number in Knoxville,
Tennessee, which turned out to be the secret atomic city of Oak
Ridge. Here in 1957 my prime target was a secret atomic city known
as the Post Box, Tomsk, in central Siberia.
There was also at the time an anticipatory feeling of self-vindication.
In 1945 I had been impressed with the accuracy of a wartime estimate
of the output from the famous Joachimsthal uranium mines of Czech-
oslovakia, an estimate based on aerial photographs taken a year apart.
So in 1949, after the first Soviet nuclear test, I had advocated photo-
reconnaissance of the nuclear production sites in the Urals. I actually
persuaded the Air Force member of the joint Atomic Energy Intelli-
gence Committee to submit a formal proposal for flying the Urals
in a B-25 which would take off from Iran and afterwards be ditched
beside an aircraft carrier in the Barents Sea off Novaya Zemlya.
We still have in the files Secretary of State Dean Acheson's reply,
through the DCI to the Chairman of JAEIC, denying as of 30
December 1949 permission to implement the scheme.
U-2 Against the Atom
I was convinced that satisfactory photographic coverage of a U-235
separation plant, or of a plutonium production reactor, would be
worth the proverbial thousand words, giving information "on electric
power consumption, cooling water consumption, plant arrangement
and size, new construction, and the physical details which, when
analyzed, should enable us to make a much better estimate of Soviet
critical material production." i I would have been shocked at the
Briefing of Joint Chiefs of Staff by General Charles P. Cabell, DDCI, MORI/HRP
28 August 1957.
from pg.
01-12
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Dodonovo
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Birch Woods SECRET
suggestion that it might take months of steady work by competent
photointerpreters aided by the best procurable consultants to work out
the real intelligence meaning of a picture. Yet this was to be the case.
The Russians, not being able to copy our atomic facilities, had had
to engineer and design their own from scratch. We were thus to
face a real cryptographic problem in trying to interpret the totally
foreign engineering shown in the U-2 photography.
The atomic sites near Tomsk, those to the east near Krasnoyarsk,
and the nuclear weapon proving ground known through seismic
measurements to be near Semipalatinsk had been selected on 27 May
1957 by interagency agreement in the Ad Hoc Requirements Com-
mittee as three prime objectives for flights over central Asia and
Siberia. Other major objectives than the atomic ones included what
is now the Tyura Tam missile test range east of the Aral Sea, the air-
craft industry in Omsk and Novosibirsk, and beyond the latter all of
Stalin's second industrial bastion, the Kuznetsk Basin. It was the
conjunction of all these targets with immediate bearing on weapon
systems that had persuaded first the ARC, and then eventually U-2
Project Director Richard M. Bissel and DCI Allen Dulles to cash in
the blue chips necessary to procure take-off bases along the southern
periphery of the USSR and China.
As an analyst in CIA's Office of Scientific Intelligence, I was there-
fore directed in July 1957 to work up target briefs, by priority, for
all atomic targets in the enormous geographical area of central Asia
and Siberia. The U-2 program was still being kept under extraordinary
security measures, and I did my targeting in the Blue Room, a small
centrally located secure area away from my normal desk. Psycho-
logically, we were prepared to be not only secure but devious: the
Blue Room was in fact painted light green.
The targets thus identified were to be used by the operational
side of the program in planning the actual flights or missions. The
procedure was to plan each specific mission around one or two of the
ARC's highest-priority targets but to cover as many lower-priority
targets as possible along the way. As targeteer, I became involved
in selecting the flight path because the best photography, that from
the vertical angle, covered a band only five miles wide: it was desirable
to orient this band lengthwise over an oblong target and adjust it in
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SECRET B,;rch Woods
other respects so as to counteract possible errors in target location
or in navigation.
Semipalatinsk had been so named because seven trading companies
had maintained residencies there when it was an important crossroads
on the caravan trails to China and the fabled cities of Samarkand
and Bukhara to the south. Twenty-odd nuclear tests had occurred
near there in the last eight years, but the exact location of any test
was not known closer than within thirty miles. I had no idea how
big the test area was. Our own atomic test site at Frenchman's Flats
in Nevada, measured against a five-mile-wide camera swath, was
of astronomical size.
I finally asked Doctor Donald Rock of the Air Force Technical Ap-
plications Center (then AFOAT-1) 2 to average for me the seismic
epicenters of the five largest nuclear detonations at Semipalatinsk.
The geographic coordinates for this "centroid" turned out to designate
a spot in the featureless desert some seventy miles due west of Semi-
palatinsk, about one-third of the way to Karaganda. It was south
of the old caravan trail, and the only names on the map in. the vicinity
were those of seasonally dry salt lakes. This was an arbitrary pin-point
for a highest-priority target whose location was so poorly known that
it ought to be represented as a hand-sized blur on a standard aero-
nautical chart -a hardly realistic target in operational terms.
This difficulty in locating the Semipalatinsk nuclear proving ground
pointed up the essence of our dilemma: we needed and wanted U-2
flights in central Asia and Siberia because we knew so little about
what was going on there; yet unless we had precise knowledge of an
activity and where it was located, we would stand little chance of
photographing it. General Philip G. Strong, director of scientific
collection in CIA, who had had much World War II reconnaissance
experience, was on the side of precision in targeting and of detailed
justification for the collection priority given each target. He questioned
the accuracy of maps and suggested that targets be located relative
to major features that could be identified visually rather than by
coordinate systems of longitude and latitude. That we could not do
in this case.
'For the early history of AFOAT-1 see Northrup and Rock's "The Detection
of Joe 1" in Studies X 4, p. 23 ff.
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ircph Woos SECRET
Nearer Targets
Thus it was with renewed care that I assembled data on other
atomic targets in this area. I reviewed the atomic sites which had
been listed in 1955 for the Genetrix program, in which free balloons
bearing cameras were allowed to drift across the USSR on predeter-
mined paths. Lower-priority targets included the uranium concen-
tration plants of Combine 6 in the Fergana Valley, notably one just
south of Leninabad at Ispisar, one north of Leninabad near Taboshar,
and one a good many miles to the east near Andizhan. These had
already been located as well as possible: a 1947 Jewish refugee who
had driven a bread truck to each of them had been interrogated
exhaustively and then resettled with appreciation in Brazil. Inci-
dentally, there had been a curious problem with the maps he drew:
east of where the Syr Darya river turns north on its way to the Aral Sea
he had swapped north and south, but west of there his maps were
right side up. In several instances his reporting had been confirmed
by returned prisoners of war.
Other uranium concentration plants which belonged to Combine
8 lay east of these toward the Pamir Knot and south of Alma Ata,
but their locations were at best poorly known and targeting was
considered doubtful.
Krasnoyarsk
Ever since we had learned that Novosibirsk, Tomsk, and Krasnoyarsk,
deep in Siberia north and east from Semipalatinsk, were the location
of the second generation of Russian atomic sites fathered by those in
the Urals 3 we had maintained a special watch on these cities and the
countryside nearby. Krasnoyarsk had been made off limits to foreigners
by 1948, and information about the atomic site on the east bank of the
Yenisey river some 35 miles downstream (north) from the city had
been especially hard to come by. The defector Icarus reported in
early 1951 that many trainloads of mining equipment had been sent
there the year before from Wismut, A.G., the vast Russian uranium
mining enterprise in East Germany, so he believed the purpose of the
new enterprise at Krasnoyarsk to be the mining of uranium. By 1952
all administrative centers in the peninsula of land south of the con-
fluence of the Kan and Yenisey rivers and north of the Trans-Siberian
'For the Ural plants see the author's "The Decryption of a Picture" in Studies
XI 3, p. 41 if.
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SECRET Birch Woods
Railroad had disappeared from the annual editions of "Deleniye,"
the published MVD listing of administrative centers in the USSR.
Then a German prisoner of war had been returned to West Germany,
who, despite all the Russian rules and regulations, had actually spent
several years as a construction worker at the Krasnoyarsk atomic site.
He reported hearsay information about many kilometers of tunnels all
lined with concrete. His name for the associated town was Kom-
somolsk na Yenisey. In early 1957 a Genetrix balloon was recovered
from the Aleutian Islands with a number of aerial photographs of
Dodonovo, as the Krasnoyarsk site came to be known after an old
village there. These photographs showed an enormous construction
effort-a new city of apartment houses, laboratories, warehouses, and
machine shops-and a vast mining enterprise. There was every
reason to believe that higher-resolution photography would clarify
the functions of the large, complex, and possibly underground
installation.
The uranium metal plant northeast of Novosibirsk had also first been
identified by the defector Icarus. In 1956 Doctor Nikolaus Riehl and
other German scientists formerly engaged at Elektrostal, near Moscow,
in research on uranium metal manufacture 4 confirmed and updated
Icarus' testimony. Attaches had photographed it from the Trans-
Siberian Railroad in 1952 and 1954 because of its evident size and
importance, and George Monk, now State Department representative
on JAEIC, had identified it by comparing these photographs with
material filed in the old Industrial Register under the name "Stalin
Auto Works," apparently the local cover name for the enterprise. It
could be located within half a mile of permanent map features.
A uranium metal manufacturing facility was basically of second
priority as a U-2 mission objective, but across the Trans-Siberian
Railroad was the Novosibirsk Airframe Plant, an additional reason for
the U-2 to visit this northeast suburb of Novosibirsk.
Post Box, Tomsk
The atomic site near Tomsk was a matter of more concern, though
the amount of information on its function and location was woefully
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sparse. Furthermore, it was at extreme range so that the aircraft could
not, in fact, spend time hunting for it even though we felt we could
justify such an effort as against a prime target. Our collection effort
against this site had been especially impeded by the 15 January 1952
Soviet order closing Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and other specific
areas to foreigners because Tomsk was not accessible, like Novosibirsk,
to attache photography from the Trans-Siberian Railway.
There had been a number of remarks in reporting about something
atomic or about a special post box in connection with Tomsk. These
had led to the location and interrogation of a few prisoners of war
who had at one time or other been in the area before returning to
West Germany in 1954 and of a few ethnic Germans who had been
returned in 1956. By now in 1957, however, the resulting evidence of
a kind one could put one's finger on was all contained in just three
reports and the analysis of a fur hat.
The latest of these reports was from an ethnic German who claimed
to have been employed in Tomsk in 1955 as a blacksmith. He told
his Army interrogator that local inhabitants had facetiously suggested
"Atomsk" would be a better name for the town. He knew of no clearly
atomic installation in particular but had heard of an underground
secret plant and settlement called "Kolonne [Labor Brigade] 5"
located northeast of the Tomsk II railroad station.
Another returned ethnic German told his British interrogator he had
heard of an industrial enterprise engaged "in manufacturing fillings for
atomic weapons locally known as the Post Box." In Tomsk II he had
seen a large building with barred windows on all floors and a. large
sign saying "Information Office, Personnel Department, Post Box."
He knew of two relatively small sites belonging to the enterprise, one
east and the other northeast of Tomsk.
On reinterrogation this man mentioned traveling north from Tomsk
II on a bus belonging to the Post Box when going to visit a friend
of his in a lunatic asylum located on the southern fringe of a prohibited
area. He reported seeing railway trains running into the prohibited
area carrying coal, wood, and building materials. He had also heard
that persons employed there were well paid and received preferential
treatment in the distribution of foodstuffs, etc. He mentioned seeing
at a distance of six to eight kilometers north of Tomsk II three large
chimneys which emitted black smoke.
The interrogator noted that the source had a very poor memory,
seemed to be suffering from some kind of mental disorder, and was
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preoccupied with his plans to emigrate to Canada. Clearly, neither
of these two reports tended to inspire confidence in the existence of a
major atomic installation in the Tomsk area, let alone its precise
location.
The story of a returned German prisoner of war who had been em-
ployed in 1949 as a tailor in a small factory northwest of B eloborodovo,
some twelve kilometers north of Tomsk city, seemed much more per-
suasive. Interrogated by the Air Force, he reported that within eight
days in April or May 1949 some 12,000 penal workers passed through
the bathing and delousing facilities of the Beloborodovo penal camp
and were put to work in a secure area fenced off between his factory
and the village of Iglakovo, several kilometers north and west down
the Tom river. The tailor, clearly proud of his professional ability
and reputation, said that many military officers of the construction
staff in charge of this project came to his tailor shop to get their uni-
forms fitted properly.
This military construction outfit had arrived, complete with families,
from Tallin where they had just completed another large job. In charge
was a Soviet general who had arrived in April with his staff. Interest-
ingly, from the point of view of MVD responsibility for nuclear fa-
cilities, the guard force was of a different subordination and neither
lived nor mingled with the construction staff officers. The tailor's
Russian supervisor had told him that the fenced-off area was to be
an atomic energy plant.
In an application of environmental sampling, CIA scientific officer
John R. Craig had obtained in the summer of 1956 a fur hat from
one of the ethnic Germans who had recently lived in Tomsk. Its
analysis, done by AFTAC with the aid of AEC laboratories, was at
last conclusive: its exterior surface contained 50 parts per billion of
uranium that was slightly, but definitely, enriched in the U -235 isotope.
Since no U-236 was detectable, the uranium was not from fall-out, nor
had it been through a reactor. Additional analyses fo.r plutonium,
radio-iodine, and separated lithium isotopes were all negative.
The U-235 enrichment was evidence of U-235 separation in the
Tomsk area. The fabrication of nuclear warhead components was an
alternative possibility, but the size of this atomic operation seemed
much too great for that. The evidence was against its being a reactor
with associated chemical plant or a lithium isotope separator. I made
my target a U-235 separation plant and centered it on the spot where
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the German tailor had seen 12,000 prisoners go to work. The die was
cast.
Luck at the Proving Ground
In late August 1957 the missions were flown-rapidly to minimize
possible counteraction, and many of them to cover as much useful area
as possible. Here we cannot review all the results but will cite some
of the outstanding ones.
One flight was planned around Stalinsk in the Kuznetsk Bassin and
Alma Ata in the Kirgiz SSR as prime targets. In between, the Semi-
palatinsk proving ground was a prime target, but confidence in its
location was so low that the cities of Semipalatinsk and Karaganda
were made way-stations and the flight path between them adjusted
to hit the latitude and longitude of my seismic centroid. Mention
of the proving ground was dropped from the flight plan for security
reasons ("Why give away knowledge if you don't have to?"). I doubt
that anyone thought seriously about the danger of flying into a nuclear
test.
The coordinates turned out to be good. The U-2 passed directly
over the proving ground on 22 August 1957, and the pilot got a. thrill.
He had many times flown over our Frenchman's Flats, and he recog-
nized what he saw. Moreover, he saw that the shot-zone had been
cleared and they were ready to fire.
It was actually four hours later that Joe 36 was detonated; it was
airdropped and went half a megaton. The pilot had photographed
it and its carrier aircraft on the ground when he had flown over the
Semipalatinsk airfield and associated nuclear weapon assembly facility.
The nuclear weapon "cab" he apprehensively spotted on the shot-
tower at the proving ground was for a low-yield device that was not
to be detonated until 13 September.
Other Findings
The same mission photographed a well-planned, modern community
of 20,000 people not previously known of on the north shore of Lake
Balkhash. This turned out to be the headquarters of the Sary Shagan
antimissile test range, a real find. It also covered the uranium mill
at Kadzhi-Say near the west end (not the east end as I had thought)
of Lake Issyk Ku15 south of Alma Ata, proving that the Russians had
"`Warm Water," so named because its salinity kept it from freezing.
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large modem uranium mills. The uranium mines of Bystrovka were
covered but not found in the film for another year.
The flight that was to cover the Dodonovo mining site near Kras-
noyarsk failed with respect to this target because of heavy cloud cover,
an all too familiar occurrence in the reconnaissance business.
The uranium metal plant at Novosibirsk turned out to be quite a
large installation, including what is probably a large litFium isotope
separation plant then under construction between its raw uranium
ore facility and its thermal power plant.
The outstanding target, the Tomsk atomic site, was covered on 21
August in clear vertical photography. The tailor's location for it
proved correct. Allen Dulles is said to have exclaimed jubilantly,
when he heard the news, "You mean you really did know that some-
thing atomic was going on 'way out there in the wilds of Siberial"
As summarized in the mission report, the installation
covers an irregular shaped area of about 40 square miles on the right
bank of the Tom River. No single atomic energy complex in the western
world includes the range of processes taking place here. The villages of
Iglakovo and Beloborodovo are encompassed in the housing and adminis-
tration area along the river. On the west edge of the area, a large thermal
power plant with an estimated capacity of 400 megawatts is undergoing
further expansion. Further power is provided by Gres II in Tomsk and by
tie-ins to the Kuzbas Grid. East of this plant is located the feed and proc-
essing section and gaseous diffusion plants. One gaseous diffusion building
is uncompleted. On the east edge is located the reactor area. One of the
two reactors appears to be in the final stage of construction. A maintenance
and construction area is just north of these areas. On the northeast edge,
a plutonium chemical separation area is uncompleted. A mud lake dump
area is on the north edge of the complex outside of the fence which encom-
passes the whole installation. It is rail served by a spur line from Tomsk.
Actually, one reactor was already in operation, and two more were
under construction. These latter would eventually turn out by-product
electric power. The gaseous diffusion U-235 separation facility, with
its four operating buildings and a fifth under construction, was about
one-sixth the size of that at Oak Ridge, which drew about 2000 mega-
watts of electric power.
The photograph could not tell us, of course, for the purpose of pro-
duction estimates just how long each installation had been operating
or would begin, nor what the Russians called them. Fortunately, we
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irch 'oods
were able in the spring of 1958 to talk to a defector who had been
a soldier in a military construction brigade working there from. July
1955 to February 1956. He solved many of our time schedule prob-
lems and supplied names and identities. The general address of the
whole installation was Post Box 5, Tomsk. The new city was named
Berezki, Birch Woods, and the birch forest was still preserved around
the city then, for the Russians love such forests. Beloborodovo had
apparently been expanded to become the construction workers' town
of Chekist (Tomsk 19), presumably in honor of their connection with
the MVD, and Iglakovo had become Kuzminka (Tomsk 17). The
man in charge was Major General Tzarevskiy, who had built the steel
town of Nizhniy Tagil in the Urals in the 1930's.
This was the important atomic installation that now took shape
out of mere indications and the vague rumors given substance by a fur
hat and location by a tailor.
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No Foreign Dissem
Patterns of basic research as indicators
of possible new enemy weapon systems.
IDENTIFYING THE FUTURE THREAT
Herbert C. Rothenberg
Although threats to the position or security of the United States
include all conditions disruptive of world peace, such as political
instability, hunger, and disease, we shall be concerned here only
with threats of a predominantly military nature which derive from
advances in the physical sciences and engineering, and we shall
analyze the problem of projecting such threats from the research
done to achieve the advances. Experience of the recent past with
complex modern weapon systems has shown that in general a period
of 10 to 15 years is required to bring a new system from the research
stage to utilization. This is then the outer limit in time of such
projection. At the near end, minor improvements which can be
effected in periods of 5 years or less can generally be predicted by
fairly straightforward extrapolation from current capabilities. The
critical period in our anticipation of new enemy weapon systems
therefore lies from 5 to 15 years ahead.
In order to be useful our projections must meet other criteria be-
sides that of the future time they span. The first and foremost
requirement is credibility: our data base and rationale must be sound
and open to independent verification. Another important require-
ment is for sufficient detail and specificity to meet the operational
needs of the consumer. At the highest levels of policy, details on
how the projected weapon system may operate are not so important
as its general characteristics and capabilities and a fairly precise time
scale. At a somewhat lower level of management, more detail is
required in order to make decisions concerning the allocation of
intelligence resources to confirm the threat and development re-
sources to counter it. At the research and development level, finally,
even greater detail is required to enable our scientists and engineers
to devise specific countermeasures.
Perhaps the most difficult constraint is the need to work with the
kinds of information that are obtainable. The availability of in-
formation during the development of a weapon system follows a
MORI/HRP
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SECRET The Future Threat
"bathtub" curve with time: during the early phases publication of
basic research in the open literature is quite common; then as the
applicability of this work to the weapon system becomes more
immediate, the publication rate drops until information is almost
nonexistent; finally, when the test and evaluation stage is reached,
information can again be obtained through observation and techni-
cal collection. By this latter stage, of course, the time available for
taking effective counteraction is short. It is in the early research
phase, when open publication is still permitted and when there are
still 10 to 15 years left in which to take counteraction, that an
accurate prediction of the resulting system is both vitally important
and extremely difficult.
An obvious approach to such prediction is by induction or syn-
thesis: one examines current R&D activities, identifies advances they
are likely to lead to in basic science and technology, and then
attempts to build up from these advances successively higher levels
of development leading to new weapons. In this way one goes from
new phenomena or properties of materials to new devices, compo-
nents, subsystems, and finally a complete new weapon system. This
is a logical and necessary method for the projection of future threats.
By itself, however, it is an extremely difficult one. While it may
be possible to guess at advances in the basic sciences that will be
made within a reasonable time ahead-say the next: 5 years-
the way these advances could be utilized in the construction of new
weapon systems is a matter of much greater difficulty. Each basic ad-
vance can proliferate into many different applications, and to identify
the most likely ones demands both knowledge of a vas: number of
applied scientific and technological fields and a great imagination
and inventiveness. This is not to say that the approach should be
discarded; the weapon systems that may emerge from new scientific
advances are precisely the ones most likely to surprise us. It re-
quires, however, that we learn how to handle problems having such
uncertainty in data and so many different possible directions of
development. Both the mathematical techniques and the intelligence
sources needed will have to have considerable more study than has
thus far been applied to them.
The second possible method of attack is the deductive. It proceeds
from the postulation of possible or desirable objectives, in the eyes
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of the enemy, to the weapon systems, subsystems, components, devices,
and basic R&D required to reach those objectives. This approach
has the advantage that once a potential system has been identified the
determination of its pyramid of required supporting activities is a
more easily soluble problem than the reverse. Problems of this na-
ture have been attacked with some success, notably for purposes of
industrial planning. The procedure requires that at each descending
level of complexity decisions be made as to the appropriateness of
each of the possible means of building up to that level. When there
are many different levels of complexity, as in a modern weapon system,
the number of decisions and appropriateness factors becomes exceed-
ingly large. They are manageable, however, by modem mathematical
techniques, and in principle this procedure can be used to identify
and label all the scientific and technological activities that would
be required to carry out the whole development program.
Since the number of potential threats that could be postulated
is very large, it is desirable to assign priorities among them in order
to concentrate analysis on the most likely. This can be done on
the basis of probable mission requirements as seen by the government
of the country in question, say the USSR. Most broadly, one must
determine first what the Soviet leaders believe the world locks like
now and will look like 10 to 20 years in the future, then project
missions which they might consider required to further their po-
litical, ideological, social, economic, and military objectives, then
derive systems for the accomplishment of these missions, including
weapon systems for military missions. This process provides a set
of reasonable criteria for an initial assignment of priorities. It does
not constitute a means of making final judgments as to the probability
that a threat will actually be developed.
An alternative means of identifying potential threats for deductive
purposes is to determine what the military posture and capabilities
of the United States will be in the period under consideration. One
may then propose that any Soviet system, defensive or offensive, ca-
pable of degrading our planned military capabilities would con-
stitute a threat. The assignment of priorities among the systems
so identified can now proceed on the basis of a priori probability or,
as above, according to how they appear to fit in with Soviet philosophy
or needs.
SECRET is
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SECRET he Future Threat
Problems of Induction
Let us return for a more detailed discussion and comparison of the
two proposed methods. In the inductive approach the starting point
was a large number of scientific and technological advances postu-
lated to have arisen out of essentially undirected research. At least
it is assumed that the reasons for engaging in this research are ir-
relevant to any weapon system that might.be based on the advances.
Addressing oneself to these advances with ingenuity, inventiveness,
and a broad familiarity with the state of the art, one attempts to
apply them through various levels of increasing complexity to create
a new weapon system. Four such levels can be distinguished: crea-
tion of new devices or materials capable of performing either new
functions or old ones significantly better; the combination of these
devices or materials into components which perform more complex
functions; the assembling of such components into subsystems, each
of which contributes some major independent activity to the overall
performance of the projected weapon system; finally this system itself,
performing the mission assigned to it.
Since we are presupposing that the initial scientific and technological
advances were made without the motivation of specific projected ap-
plications, there is no certain way of deciding in which of the many
possible ways they might actually be applied to create new devices.
Clearly, even inventing the various possible devices on the basis of
a scientific advance which has not yet occurred is a very difficult
step. Further, each of these possible devices might be used in
many different combinations with other new or old devices to yield
components with advanced or considerably different capabilities than
previously available. And these components, again, could be as-
sembled in various ways into subsystems with different capabilities.
The characteristics of the ultimate system can then vary enormously,
depending on the choices made all along this complex path.
There are various ways to try to thread this maze. One could
give each alternative an equal probability and use statistical pro-
cedures such as the "random walk" or "Monte Carlo" methods which
have proved useful in similar problems. Or one could use something
like the PERT technique which has been successfully applied to
systems development and management.' These approaches are being
'The Program Evaluation and Review Technique, developed for the Polaris
missile program, performs a probabilistic analysis on uncertain input data and
time relationships and calculates the probabilities for time or cos: factors in a
complete project.
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examined, but it appears that a major simplification of the problem
would result from an initial exercise of judgment in assigning proba-
bility weightings to the various alternatives at each level in the
hierarchy.
Despite these major difficulties with the inductive approach, it can
provide one with a view of totally new weapon systems that might
arise from scientific and technological advances made during the
next several years-threats of which the present-day state of science
and technology is not an adequate base for prediction. The product
of the inductive approach would be a set of predictions of develop-
mental activities based on the probable uses of the postulated scien-
tific advances. A number of different templates of such developmen-
tal activities would be produced, and actual activities subsequently
observed would be compared with these templates in order to de-
termine which of the several possible paths through the systems de-
velopment maze the USSR had chosen.
We have passed rather casually over the matter of identifying
the scientific and technological advances likely to occur in the next
few years. Certainly precise identification of the details of an advance
would presuppose sufficient knowledge to effect the advance immedi-
ately, something of a self-contradiction. It appears, however, that
the general nature of the advances in any field of science can prob-
ably be foreseen through the use of such criteria as the current ac-
tivity in the field, the need for a solution to particular problems,
the absence of any fundamental laws prohibiting an advance, and
the like. Consultation with scientists and engineers active in the
various fields probably constitutes the best method of identifying the
likely advances. Several groups concerned with technological. fore-
casting have engaged in such consultations and manipulated the results
in various ways trying to achieve some degree of unanimity among the
expert consultants.
While this approach is the most promising one for the prediction
of scientific/technological advances, there is one major pitfall that must
be taken into account in using as one of the criteria for an area of
probable advance the level of activity in that area. Since scientific
research is largely supported by government funds, decisions by gov-
ernment administrators determine to a large extent the level of re-
search activity in any area; and the decisions of these administrators
are frequently weighted heavily toward areas considered important
to particular objectives rather than having intrinsic importance in
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SECRET The Future Threat
the scientific field. The inductive approach is thus contaminated by
a priori decisions which must be analyzed deductively.
Problerw of Deduction
In contrast to the inductive approach which works its way up from
the simplest elements to the full complex system, the deductive ap-
proach requires the postulation of the full-blown weapon system and
then attempts to work down to the individual advances in science
or technology needed to achieve it. Although it is in principle pos-
sible to start with a list of all conceivable weapon systems and
analyze each of these into the required subassemblies and elementary
advances, this would require an enormous expenditure of manpower
and time. We pointed out above how the list can be narrowed by
giving first consideration to systems designed to perform various
alternative missions contributing to the achievement of Soviet goals.
Each of these systems can then be analyzed into progressively simpler
component levels until the elementary R&D requirements are iden-
tified.
At each level in this procedural sequence the various alternatives
must be examined and ranked in terms of desirability, feasibility, cost,
etc. In other words, a series of criteria for selection among the
alternatives must be established. One thus arrives at a matrix of al-
ternatives versus criteria for each of the levels. The over-all pro-
cedure, commonly and understandably referred to as a "decision tree,"
is fairly widely used for developmental planning. In adapting it
for use in the intelligence field, however, there are a number of prob-
lems to be solved.
The first problem is that the intelligence user is not planning a
development program for himself but attempting to determine what
the Soviets have done. Hence it becomes necessary for :him to think
at all times like a Soviet planner. This requires that the historical
and cultural backgrounds of the Soviet planners be incorporated into
the decision matrix; they will show up particularly in the criteria used
for evaluation.
A second problem is to determine the extent to which such a
logical and carefully worked out decision process is applicable to So-
viet planning. The primary reason for using the procedure in plan-
ning is that when the number of factors entering into a decision
becomes larger than 25 to 50 it is almost impossible for one individual
to make a knowledgeable decision. Since a major weapon system
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The Future Threat
contains some millions of such factors, knowledgeable decisions about
it are impossible unless assistance of some sort is provided. The de-
cision tree provides this assistance by breaking down the complex
problem into a number of decisions each small enough to be made
knowledgeably, keeping account of all such decisions, factoring in
their relative weight, and summing them all up. It is clear, however,
that many major decisions are not made in this country in this way,
and we have no real evidence that the Soviets make their major
decisions in such a manner. If they do not, then we must be pre-
pared for the decisions to show characteristics of illogic by the stand-
ards of the decision tree process. This is a problem not fully encom-
passed by the phrase, "Thinking like a Soviet."
Pattern Recognition
Assuming for the moment that these problems can be solved, our
analysis will have provided us with a list of R&D areas that need to
be emphasized in order to achieve a given weapon system. It will
also have told us the intensity of effort required in each area rela-
tive to other areas, so that we have a sort of spectrum or template
of needed R&D that will vary with time. This is the indicator which
the analyst will then seek to identify in the all-source information
available on current Soviet activities. The template might consist of
a single unique area of R&D which would be a dead giveaway;
alternatively it might be the over-all shape of the spectrum and its
time-dependence.
As long as only one weapon system is being considered, it might
not be especially difficult to identify the corresponding R&D pattern
in the available information. If two or more systems are concur-
rently under development, each will have generated requirements for
R&D and the spectra will then be superimposed. If these spectra
were totally independent of one another their identification, though
considerably more difficult than that of a single system, would still
be amenable to fairly straightforward procedures, especially since
the time element provides a useful filter. A complication is intro-
duced, however, by the "commonality" factor: if systems x and y both
require R&D in a certain area, it is reasonable to assume that the
total effort applied will be less than the sum of the two requirements,
allowing for a measure of efficiency in the combination. It therefore
becomes necessary to estimate the extent to which the R&D require-
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SECRET The Future Threat
ments for any system are modified by the codevelopment of other
systems with similar needs.
Having predicted through this process the pattern of R&D needed
for the several high-priority weapon systems which it is estimated the
Soviets might logically wish to develop, the analyst will. look at the
information on their current activities and compare it with his pre-
dictions. This process, analogous to what is usually called "pattern
recognition," requires that the available information first be corrected
for various disturbances. First there is the background "noise" of
R&D that would be in process regardless of the needs of any par-
ticular system, the work being done for pure scientific o:r technologi-
cal purposes. Second, there may be deliberate distortion, as by sup-
pression through classification, although it is hoped that the early
research phases will not suffer significantly from suppression.
The comparison of predicted pattern with actuality then proceeds
and yields an estimate with the following kind of wording:
There is a q percent probability that the Soviets have made the decision
to develop weapon system x which will have such and such characteristics
and capability and could be completed by the year blank.
Note that this estimate addresses only the decision to develop and
does not attempt to wrestle with the decision to deploy or utilize.
Just as the inductive approach could not be totally stripped of
deductive elements, so is the converse true. In working our way
down a decision tree from the highest levels of national goals and
policy through missions, weapon systems, etc., to the required R&D,
we have thus far ignored any effect that research carried out for one
system may have on another, unrelated system. Yet it is clear that
scientific advances, no matter how generated or for what purpose,
may significantly affect any system. In other words, any scientific
advance acquires a life and influence of its own and can make pos-
sible new and different systems and capabilities which can be iden-
tified only by the application of inductive logic. At all times, then,
these two methodologies must be carefully examined for their inter-
relationships and the effect each can have on the other.
A question frequently asked with respect to prediction is "How
about the breakthrough?" The question points to a vulnerability in
all prediction but involves an inherent contradiction. If a break-
through is a major scientific achievement leading to totally new con-
cepts which could not have been anticipated, it is unpredictable by
definition and so cannot be factored into our projections in advance.
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e u for reg.
All one can hope to do is maintain a high state of awareness of ac-
tivities in all scientific fields so that immediately upon the occurrence
of such a breakthrough, or rather its recognition, steps can be taken
to evaluate and factor in its influence upon our entire threat analysis,
using the approaches which have been described above.
Over the past decade and more, various attempts have been made
to provide credible estimates of long-range threats, but without any
consistent success. Within the past year a formal long-term attack
on the problem has been mounted in CIA's scientific intelligence or-
ganization. Believing that a major impediment in the past has been
the failure to develop a sound methodology before trying to come
up with a quick answer, we have concentrated our principal efforts
thus far on method. The foregoing discussion reviewing the kinds
of approach that have been considered describes in particular, with
some generality, the deductive technique, the one that has been
selected for initial application. In spite of its acknowledged difficul-
ties and limitations, this method is believed to offer the greatest promise
of any thus far found. It is hoped that the difficulties can be over-
come although it is not yet certain just how.
During the methodological study support has been sought and
obtained from within the intelligence community and from external
sources. As time goes on and the methodology is refined to a point
where there is some confidence in its validity, the next step will be
to begin to apply it and produce specific projections. For this it will
be necessary to draw on the combined scientific and engineering
knowledge of the government and the industrial and academic worlds.
Large numbers of people will have to be consulted and vast amounts
of information and open literature screened and evaluated. Suitable
formats, computer programs, and data-handling capabilities will have
to be developed. Steps in these directions are already being taken.
It is hoped that such a program may one day provide U.S. planners
with credible predictions on the basis of which they can make maxi-
mum use of intelligence community findings to reach the decisions
necessary for the security of the nation.
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No Foreign Dissem
Intelligence needs impel giant advances
in micropowered microelectronic systems.
MICROTECHNOLOGY
Donald Reiser
and
Harry Wood
It can be said that in general ideal intelligence collection systems
perform best when placed as close to the target as possible. This
certainly was the principle adopted by the ancients in their liberal use
of harlots as informers. But in the absence of a desire on the part
of the target to have it in close proximity, the collection system needs
a completely different set of qualifications. To list but a few of the
more obvious, it must operate in a hostile environment, be as undetect-
able as possible, have an extremely long life, and provide reliable,
high-quality information. These general requirements apply to audio,
video, optical, and electronic intelligence gathering systems. A com-
mon need among all such systems is for minimum size and weight.
And the satisfaction of this need often entails a requirement for micro-
power as well.
Micropower, as the term implies, is the operation of equipment with
greatly reduced power drain.' Minimizing power needs vastly sim-
plifies the size and weight problem by eliminating bulky power supply
components. It is also possible to turn the coin over and say that for
a given power supply a greatly enhanced capability and reliability can
be obtained from micropower operation; more functions can be per-
formed and redundancy provided by the same amount of energy.
Thus micropower operation will improve any system, whether airborne,
animal- or man-borne, or permanently installed, whether the power
source is a battery, a generator, or a solar cell.
Intelligence Initiative
In mid-1965 the authors made a survey of eighteen top U.S. micro-
electronic firms to determine the current status of micropower tech-
nology. The results were of sufficient interest to warrant a staff paper
on micropower and microelectronics in handbook form. The cover
'The prefix micro is appropriate both in its general sense of "very small" and
in its precise scientific usage as one of the series micro=a millionth, nano=a
thousandth of a millionth, and pico=a millionth of a millionth. Some have sug- MORI/H RP
from pg.
23-38
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SECRET Microtechnology
MICROPONIER
ELECTRONICS
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
YEAR
SECRET
Figure 1.
Projected power drain of
VHF superheterodyne receiver
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of that handbook is reproduced in Figure 1. It shows the power
drain in milliwatts of a VHF superheterodyne receiver projected from
1965 to a date in 1970. The rapidly falling curve was based on esti-
mates of the improvement that could be made in industrial technology
over this span of time if the effort received sufficient emphasis. Up
to 1968 it indicated a reduction in the power required for this rep-
resentative complex receiver from as much as 50 mw to as little as
0.5 mw, two orders of magnitude. It is extremely gratifying to be able
to state that this. is in fact the nature of the progress that has been made.
On the basis of the 1965 findings CIA approached the Advanced
Research Projects Agency with a proposal to sponsor accelerated micro-
power development, and ARPA agreed to divert substantial funding
to the program. An arrangement was established with three selected
contractors under which the government would contribute fifty per-
cent of the costs. Calculations at that time showed that power effi-
ciency could theoretically be improved by seven or eight orders of
magnitude, while only three to five were necessary for the results
desired in many advanced intelligence devices. Improvement by
five orders of magnitude would permit important systems to operate
on ambient power, that is on the light, heat, radiation at radio fre-
quencies, etc. available in the environment.
One of the keys to microtechnology is the practice of building elec-
tronic devices and circuits with thin deposits or diffusions of conduct-
ing or semiconducting material on the surface of wafers, but progress
in minimizing the size of these requires a corresponding maximizing
of precision in the fabrication. We shall not treat here the details
of improvements in the industrial processes-photo-etching, controlled
deposition, surface cleanliness control, etc.-that are being achieved.
Broadly, the requirement is for advances in the following fields of
solid-state technology:
Fabrication of very small active devices (notably transistors)
through improved topography, masking, etc.
Low-parasitic isolation and interconnection (the elimination of un-
wanted by-product frequencies in the circuits)
Surface characteristics
Structure control
Ultimately, development of new materials.
Micro Transistors
The field of microelectronics was born with the advent of the
transistor in the early 1950's. Operating voltages dropped, the size of
devices became significantly smaller, and there was motivation to re-
duce the over-all size of most passive electronic components also.
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26
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Appro
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tartu~~; with very modest beginnings by researchers at 13(11 Labs,
transistor technology progressed from the crude audio-fre quen y de-
vices of that era to the high-frequency transistors of the early D's.
Along with this growth in transistor technology, an industric com-
piex based on a concept of ,ail-solid-state electronics came into Wing.
A I 'mi'ner of electronic components were redesigned, the ne c ? liffer-
ing radically from the old primarily in size. See Figure 2. y,, mber
/I .,ire (20 thousandths of an inch in diameter) gave war ti one
,(!if ine alization (a metal layer one thousandth of an inch tlri, ) for
nterconnection het sccn devices. One no longer manipulates reuits
rv hand but packaged then complete in containers such as t i "flat
pack" and the "TO-18 can." Figure 3 illustrates such pacL=tc,ng.
iqure 3. Various packages each holding a complete electronic: circni Flat
packs are at upper left, the TO-18 at upper right.
his new technology had immediate applications in intellgence;
izc reduction obviously satisfied. a pressing need to make survs Ilance
rlcvii:~es much more unobtrusive.. As solid-state, technology 1>0z,vided
circuit Junctions which could be packaged in increasingly high ~Icnsity
microminiature form, the projection of a million components pi cubic
inch was not out of the question from a size point of view But if
cea.ch oiF these components used a milliwatt of power there vvould be
(I ,jp:oed a. kilowatt of heat in that same cubic inch--a :iiiation
Jaia(lcsirablc to say the lead. Heat dissipation per unit vohaurc was
what limited the useful application of microminiaturizatio't Thus
the development of microelectronics led directly to that et micro-
SEC
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~cro ec no ogy
Figure 4. Early measurement shows micropower transistor performing as
well at less than 100 nanoamperes as its commercial counterpart at about
12 milliamps.
power-or, to group the two together under a single designation, to
microtechnology.
The development of micropower systems was approached by work-
ing first on their basic components, above all the transistors. Figure
4, which appeared in the orginal micropower handbook, foreshadowed
the drop in power consumption that might be achieved in advanced
transistors. These early results were obtained only at very low fre-
z 100
M
r-7-C i1L
SMT 807
2N3493
Figure 5. Performance of micropower transistor at 100 microamperes equals
that of commercial counterpart at 2,milliamps.
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icror'ec no o,gy SECRET
Figure 6. Micro-T packages compared with TO-18 can.
I )ISP7.ACEMENT VOLUME
(cu. in.)
Excluding Including
leads leads
Micro- I' Package ...... .00030 .00033
'CO-18 package ....... _ .0058 .0063
Ratio: '1'0-18 to Micro-1, 19:1 19:1.
PLAN AREA
(Sq. ill.)
Excluding Including
leads Icxds
.0057 .a 107
.044 .044
8:1 4 I
quency, but constant development efforts over the past two years have
now produced a high-performance high-frequency micropower tran-
sistor. Figure 5 shows its gain-bandwidth product-a measure of per-
formance-versus bias current (a function of power) compared with
that of a commercially available counterpart. The special micropower
device:; are already available in quantity to the intelligence community.
T110 reduction in operating power and increase in frequency brought
a further reduction in size. Figure 6 shows a half dozen of the
Micro-T packages surrounding a TO-18 can. The reduction in size
and power is not limited to a particular type of transistor but applies
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in general to an entire family. Four complementary devices suitable
for both digital and analog applications. are presently available.
Transistors, though the key active elements, are not the whole story,
and progress with them led to further, and continuing, developmental
work in circuit design and fabrication. Circuits of progressively in-
creasing complexity were chosen to challenge the developing tech-
nology. Results in this area have also been quite dramatic.
M
N
VO= -LOV
Pp = 100 p W (one
hundred microwa A 11).
Figure 7. Performance of micropower RF amplifier.
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Microtethnology SECRET
(A) E ICHED INTERCONNECT
PATTERN ON EPOXY
LAMINATE BASE BOARL,
(B) MICRODISCRETE ACTIVE
AND PASSIVE COMPON-N -S
ASSEMBLED ON BASE HeARD
(D) FULLY ASSEMBLED AML..IFIER
WI--H INPUT & OIJTPU"r
CONNECTION PINS
I )using the first year the efforts of the program were devoted to
designing and fabricating two representative circuits, a radio-ire r.fuency
aruliliiicr and a digital logic function. In the amplifier a redo ltion in
power drain of two orders of magnitude as compared to the bent avail-
able commercial circuit was achieved, and size was also rednc~-d by a
):actor of 100. The curve in Figure 7 shows its gain of 11 decibels,
almost flat over 16 megahertz (thousand kilocycles per second), with
.i power input of 100 microwatts.
Aur equally impressive improvement was made in the digital circuit,
whose power drain was reduced by a factor of 1000. Thns after a
Tears effort the power reduction achieved was at least 1.00-fold while
other parameters of both circuits were maintained at the original
level or improved. These accomplishments rested on careful and
clever circuit design and utilization of the new micropower transistor
I'aroily. The prospect of further advances along these lines continued
lo he extremely good when the first year's program was assess-,d at its
conclusion.
`I'he next logical step was to push on to more complicated circuits
and subsystems, and the results were again highly favorable. The
)%oSalr. were accordingly expanded to include all the basic Ibuilding
crocks of radio receivers and transmitters. Figure 8 shows the Iabrica-
9ir.m details of a inicropower intermediate-frequency amplifier, the
Approeffbr Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00030001404-8
 Appa-&r For Release 2005/01/26: CIA-RDP78T03I.94A09,~0390010004-8
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heart of any good superheterodyne receiver. The power consumption
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