STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 112
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1968
• Content Type: IS

Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T0394 00300010001-1
SECRET
25X1
STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 12 NO. 1 WINTER 1968
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
App ;
05/05/1$~W-RDP EV03194Al( Di010001-1
Rtj[qn
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
Approved For Release 2005/0&gggiIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, oper-
ational, or historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or re-
jecting an article rests with the Editorial
Board.
The criterion for publication is whether or
not, in the opinion of the Board, the article
makes a contribution to the literature of in-
telligence.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Retiring Chairman
ABBOT E. SMITH, Succeeding
DONALD F. CHAMBERLAIN
E. DREXEL GODFREY, JR.
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
25X1
25X1
'SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET
CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may
come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon in-
vitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted
directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 1D .27 Langley
I land need not be coordinated or submitted through chan-
nels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original
on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text
following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be
classified through Secret.
DISTRIBUTION
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office
dissemination center or the responsible Central Reference Service desk,
71 For back issues and on other questions call the Office of the
Editor,
All copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered serially
and subject to recall.
App`Ac~W For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET
25X1
CONTENTS
Page
The 1967 Sherman Kent Award .................... faces 1
................
Valediction Sherman Kent 1
Parting reflections from the father of this journal.
CONFIDENTIAL
Interaction in Weapons R&D . .......... David S. Brandwein 13
Frustrating lags in military-scientific intelligence. SECRET
Foretesting a Soviet ABM System ............ Edward Tauss 21
Case for action on new weapon system findings before
details are clear. SECRET
How Three Estimates Went Wrong ...... Willard C. Matthias 27
Misjudgments in NI Es on Goa and Vietnam, and before
the Six Day War. SECRET
Insurgent Counterintelligence ........ Carlos Revilla Arango 39
Modus operandi against government intelligence and se-
curity, focused on Latin America. OFFICIAL USE
Central Intelligence Under Souers ........ Arthur B. Darling 55
Experimentation and growing pains in CIG. CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Ill Told Tales. SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL ................. 75
World War II. OFFICIAL USE ........................ 83
Spy fiction. OFFICIAL USE ........................... 88
Military intelligence. OFFICIAL USE ................... 91
Intelligence and policy. OFFICIAL. USE ................. 97
Miscellaneous. OFFICIAL USE ........................ 104
Cumulated Grouping of Articles ............................ 107
Volumes I through XI. SECRET
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
25X1
With this issue the Studies bids an offi-
cial farewell to Sherman Kent, who some-
what quixotically founded the journal in
1955 and has been its prime sustainer for a
dozen years. The infusions of his vigor
and polymath good judgment have been so
much the wellspring of its life that it has
reason to tremble a little at this severance.
Yet he has borne himself the wise father,
encouraging spontaneity and initiative,
nudging here and checking there but foster-
ing the independent child; and he has thus
brought it to a stature that can stand the
shock. It can take comfort, too, that he
will not be altogether out of its reach for fatherly advice. This is the
end of an era, but the era's works go on.
Succeeding Chairman Kent on the Studies editorial board, as on his
more history-making Board of National Estimates, is Abbot Li;. Smith,
long his deputy on the latter.
My colleagues on the Board of Editors have asked that I mark my
retirement from the Board with a backward glance at the beginnings
of the Studies in Intelligence and a drawing of some sort of balance
sheet. What follows is, I trust, a minimally autobiographical, but
nevertheless wholly personal appraisal of the journal's accomplishments
and disappointments.
First-about its establishment:
When the National War College convened in January i4)4; after
its Christmas recess, Bernard Brodie gave the morning lecture. His
CONFIDENTIAL
I
Approved For Release 2005/05/16
: CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 1-11
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL Valediction
topic was the Grand Strategy. To the surprise of everyone, and the
disquiet of some, his presentation was not about strategy but about
how few Americans had interested themselves in the study of it.
Citing the case of economics, he noted that a hundred and fifty years
of study had produced from scratch a large library of highly enlighten-
ing literature. What had our military produced in the way of a
literature regarding strategy, the heart of their profession? He
answered this question by referring to Alfred Mahan, whose contribu-
tion to this literature was unique in both senses of the word: out-
standing and lonesome. The speech came to a climax when Mr.
Brodie identified a couple of strategic decisions of World War II
which he held in low esteem and indicated that they might not have
been made if Americans had devoted more time to thinking and
writing about strategy. The moral was pointed and purposefully so:
strategy is your business, why don't you systematize your thinking
about it and perpetuate your reflections in a professional literature?
Sunday Before Christmas
One of the reasons I so vividly remember Mr. Brodie's remarks was
that I realized at the time that everything he was saying about strategy
could be said with equal force about intelligence. I had just com-
pleted almost five years in the business and was poised to begin work
on my book Strategic Intelligence. In the next few months all that I
had suspected regarding the absence of a literature of intelligence I
was pretty well able to prove. Calling upon the library resources of
the National War College and its able reference librarians, I believe
that I read practically every printed document which our military had
issued on the subject of intelligence and a number of typed student
articles from the services' war colleges. There was nothing from the
pen of a civilian intelligence practitioner. The collection was no
better than I had anticipated, and going through it was a pretty shat-
tering experience for an intelligence buff. Clearly the profession ought
to put the talent of a lot of its devotees to the creation of literature
of the trade.
I did nothing much about the matter except for occasional broodings
until one Sunday in December 1953. I had the morning duty in
Mr. Dulles's office and after reading the cables I still had time on
2 Co N pENT L
Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0319F~AQ0000010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Valediction CONFIDENTIAL
my hands. It was then that I wrote the memorandum that follows.
The cover sheet of transmittal looked like this:
(1) My general interest in the "Life."
(2) A sense of disquiet at the realization that Intelligence is a non-
cumulative discipline.
(3) A sense of outrage at the infantile imprecision of the language of
intelligence-I give you the NSCID's for a starter.
(4) A desire to give Uncle Matt a Christmas gift.
At the bottom of the copy I have is written, in Matt Baird's hand:
To OTR Staff and Division Chiefs
re parag. 4-I like to share my Christmas cheer; comments will be acceptable
in return!
SUBJECT: How a major flaw in the intelligence business (its lack of a
serious systematic literature) might be corrected.
1. Intelligence work in the US has become an important professional dis-
cipline.
2. It has developed theory, doctrine, a vocabulary, and a multitude of
techniques.
3. Unlike most other important professional disciplines, it has not developed
a literature worthy of the name.
4. Without a literature intelligence has little or no formal institutional memory.
What institutional memory it does possess exists in (a) fragments of
thousands of memoranda primarily devoted to discrete intelligence opera-
tions, not to the theory and practice of the calling, and in (b) the living
memories of people engaged in intelligence work.
What kind of a way is this to run a railroad? Where would the
sciences and social sciences be, if their students had not systematically
contributed to their literatures?
A literature is the best guarantee that the findings of a discipline
will be cumulative.
A disaster to our unlettered intelligence service such as occurred with
the budgetary cut-backs of 1946-7, or as might occur with an A-bomb
on Washington, could put US intelligence back to the stone age where
it so long dwelled.
'Matthew Baird, then CIA Director of Training
CONFIDENTIAL 3
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL Valediction
5. How do you produce a literature?
Some answers.
a. You pay for it. That is, you offer a livelihood to the man who wants
to write a book or an article during the time he requires to do the job.
b. You make sure that the man who wants to write a book or article has
something to say and a reasonable command of the art of verbal
expression.
c. You subsidize his publications. That is, you print at your own expense
what your critics and editors think will advance the discipline.
d. You circulate his publications and encourage comment thereon. You
may wish to publish the best written comment.
Some answers.
a. I would establish on a modest scale an "Institute for Advanced Study of
Intelligence."
h. I would have a Board of Admissions who would both (].) pass on the
suitability of applicants and (2) actually invite likely candidates who
did not apply.
c. I would have no one eligible for admission who had not had a sub-
stantial and varied experience in intelligence work and who was not
capable of systematic thoughtful research, analysis, and writing.
Further I would accept no one who did not have a well-thought-out
project.
d. The project would have to be in the field of intelligence work, overt
and clandestine; not in the substantive findings of intelligence. Ap-
propriate sample projects might be:
(1) Strengths and weaknesses of intelligence dissemination tech-
niques.
(2) An examination of the "third agency" rule.
(3) The theory of indicators.
(4) The intelligence service of country X.
Inadmissible projects would be:
(1) The Red Army
(2) The Trieste situation
(3) The Outlook in Liberia, etc.
e. I would have no faculty as such. I would have a director who would
arrange for occasional meetings with outsiders and who would see to
it that the students spent a few hours per week together in seminars
at which the students would present papers and discuss them.
I. The greatest part of the student's time would be his own to pursue his
project through any means whatever with a view to publishing some-
thing at the end of his fellowship.
Appkved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03TY4a6IIU30 W0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0003000 01-1
Valediction CONFIDENT
g. I would establish a journal-probably a quarterly-which would be
devoted to intelligence theory and doctrine, and the techniques of the
discipline. I would have an editor who fully understood the limits of
his mandate. The journal could be Top Secret; its component articles
could be of any classification or unclassified. The editor would. provide
for the separate publication of "reprints" for separate circulation where
appropriate.
h. Along with the journal I would establish an "Intelligence Series" for
longer works.
7. Some dimensions.
a. As a starter I would have no more than 10 or 12 students.
b. They would receive their regular in-grade pay if they came from the
government; they would receive appropriate compensation if drawn
in from the outside. All would, of course, be fully cleared.
c. They would be expected to be "in residence" at least 50 percent of the
time; that is, at work in study or seminar rooms on the school premises.
d. Although my major interest is in positive intelligence, I would always
aim to have a few security intelligence students around.
e. The duration of the fellowships would normally be one year. If I
found a Mahan of intelligence I would keep him as long as he would
stay.
There are hundreds of details beyond this rough outline. If the idea were
accepted, they could be easily worked out.
What my school must never be is an intelligence equivalent of the higher
service schools. If you feel the need of a model, study Institute for Advanced
Study at Princeton-the Einstein school.
True to his penciled promise, Mr. Baird did discuss the memorandum
with his principal lieutenants in the Office of Training. I can only
surmise, for I was not present, that the founding of an Einstein school
for research in intelligence method, doctrine, and history was put
on a back burner and that my suggestion for the establishment of a
journal was fetched up front over moderate heat. There followed,
for example, a weekend conference at a country retreat sometime dur-
ing 1954 and a good bit of general conversation about a journal-
who should finance it, edit it, supervise it, and so on.
Some time later I was asked to set forth orally my thoughts about
the journal before an Agency gathering with the understanding that
CONFIDENTIAL 5
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL Valediction
the speech would be recorded and transcribed. This procedure was
Mr. Baird's artful way of inducing me to produce, in writing, the first
article of the new journal. When it appeared in print in September
1955 it bore the title "The Need for an Intelligence Literature: Articles
by Sherman Kent and the Editors." My contribution was no more
than an Englished version of the oral presentation, which in turn was
an elaboration of the thoughts touched upon in the first five paragraphs
of my Christmas memo to Matt Baird.
Before the appearance of the first number of the quarterly proper,
there were two other unperiodic issues with a couple of articles each,
the first including Abbot Smith's disquisition on the matter of capa-
bilities in intelligence publications. This gave rise in the second,
oddly enough, to a comment by the British intelligence officer then
representing the British Joint Intelligence Committee in Washington,
Alan Crick. I say oddly, because soon after the journal began to
appear in its present form, the Editors ruled that there should be no
dissemination to friendly foreign services. The main articles in the
last issue in slender format dealt with economic intelligence.
At the initiative of one of Matt Baird's able officers, James Lowe, the
journal became a quarterly with the Fall issue of 1957, and starting
in 1958 under the editorship of Philip Edwards it has come out four
times a year ever since.
Now for the balance sheet: what is there about the journal that we
can regard with pride and happiness and what with regret?
Let me begin with the good ones: our second five years of quarterly
existence has produced a larger number of contributions and a
larger number of good ones than did our first five. In recent times
there have often been many more pages of highly commendable
manuscript than the editors wished to commit to a single number.
It is not exactly that we are being lost in a blizzard of contributions,
but compared to the bleak years of the fifties, we feel that we are
doing very well indeed.
As to the quality, we should have to do no more than to
call the reader's attention to the list of winners of the annual $500
Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0C3 TUSI
TJ~10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Valediction CONFIDENTIAL
prize 2 and advise him to reflect again on what whacking good articles
they were and what a very substantial contribution to the lore of our
profession they made. That the Board has on two occasions been
unable to distinguish between the two or even three best essays and has
accordingly split the award is explicit testimony, at least, of the Boards
awareness that it has just passed through a bumper crop year.
That the Studies has in fact contributed to a richer understanding
of the bones and viscera of the intelligence calling is beyond argu-
ment. We have run dozens of articles on intelligence history, the
range of which can be sampled in those of Arthur Darling on the
early years of CIA, the half dozen on the early struggle between the
Russian revolutionaries and the Tsar's Okhrana, and William Harris's
two on the March 1948 Berlin crisis, in which intelligence played a
pivotal role. None of these articles required a high security classifi-
cation and all of them could have been disseminated widely as long
memos. But who would have sponsored them, reproduced and cir-
culated them if there had been no Studies to serve as a vehicle?
The contribution of the journal to an appreciation of some of the
aspects of intelligence theory and doctrine has been highly significant.
I cite as outstanding examples the succession of articles by W. E. Seidel,
George Ecklund, Clyde C. Wooten, and Julie D. Kerlin clarifying the
proper role of economic intelligence in defense planning, the many
articles that discuss problems of estimative intelligence,3 and the view
from the summit in Richard Helms's "Intelligence in American Society"
1960-Clyde R. Heffter
1961-Albert D. Wheelon and Sidney N. Graybeal (co-authors)
1962-F. M. Begoum
1963-(1) Paul R. Storm
(2) Lt. Col. William Hartness
1964-(1) Andrew J. Twiddy
(2) Theodore H. Tenniswood
(3) Thaxter L. Goodell
1965-John Whitman
1966-James Burke
1967-Henry S. Lowenhaupt
These are compiled conveniently under one cover in the new publication cited
on p. 74 of this issue. But already this is outdated by Jack Zlotnick's "A Theorem
for Prediction" in the last issue of the Studies, Willard Matthias's "How Three
Estimates Went Wrong" in this, and Keith Clark's "Notes on Estimating," Summer
1967.
CONFIDENTIAL 7
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL Valediction
Perhaps we have been at our best on intelligence method. Where
else could a wide audience of professionals gain insight into such tech-
niques as those illustrated in Thaxter L. Goodell's piece on cratology,
Paul R. Storm's on Soviet gold, and C. N. Geschwind's comments on
interrogation? Increasingly, as intelligence itself turns more and more
to science, we have featured new scientific methods, from David Brand-
wein's "Telemetry Analysis" three years ago4 to the new infrared re-
connaissance techniques recently explained by R. E. Lawrence and
Harry Woo.
The point is that as one looks back through a cumulative index
(which one should do5) he cannot escape the belief that: the intelli-
gence profession is indeed more professional and more durable
now that it has the beginnings, at least, of this tangible institutional
memory.
Another cheering aspect is inherent in the widening spectrum of
contributors. There is not a major component of CIA which has not
by now produced at least one author and an interesting article.
Furthermore we have had a good number of contributions from intelli-
gence officers not associated with the Agency in any way. One of our
prize winners, Colonel Hartness, four years back, was such a man.
Lastly, we have had a heart-warming reaction from our consumers.
The members of the Board are pretty well convinced that our fan
mail represents a genuine appreciation on the part of scores, perhaps
even hundreds, of readers scattered all over Washington, indeed all
over the world. As old intelligence officers, we are naturally suspicious
of a warm consumer reaction, for well we know how rare it is that
a consumer receiving a piece of substantive intelligence will ever
give anything except a "thank you." To be sure, some of the thanks
are a good bit less fervent than others. But what we have found
particularly pleasant have been the requests from men running small
intelligence units in large and small domestic and overseas commands
asking permission to incorporate this or that article into one of their
publications destined to circulate among their own people.
Probably our nicest fan letter was one which Admiral B. E. Moore,
then of the Cinclant headquarters, wrote to Admiral D. L. McDonald,
the CNO, saying how he had come across our publication and sug-
' See also his article in the current issue.
'See the compilation at the end of this issue.
Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0?QWAMbW10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Valediction CONFIDENTIAL
gesting that the CNO ask that it be sent to a good number of flag
officers serving with major components of the Fleet. As a result we put
some 40 or 50 additional addressees on our distribution list.
A principal cause behind these good things has been our editor,
Philip Edwards, whom we know to be the best in the business.
When you read these words you must realize that he has been over-
come by the Board's exercise of force majeure, and that the paragraph
is appearing in print despite his efforts to kill it. Mr. Edwards
combines his great skill as a critic with a rare talent for writing, a
world of patience, and a great ability to help authors help them-
selves. The journal's successes owe more to him than any other
single person.
Minuses
And now for my regrets. The first has to do with the classification
of the quarterly. The Secret stamp on the outside and what it means
is obvious to all. The most melancholy implication is that it must
be given what we call Class A storage, something none of us has
in his home. Accordingly, one has had to read the journal on business
premises and perhaps in business hours. This means that it has been
competing for attention with urgent professional matters.
When I bespoke my hope for lots of unclassified articles in my first
essay, I was clearly whistling Dixie. What the Board swiftly came
to realize was that unclassified articles by people outside the govern-
ment or the intelligence community were by definition going to be
a great rarity-principally because we were not going to advertise
that we had a vehicle to publish such writings. Even if we had
successfully solicited, we would probably have had to reject most
offerings on the grounds of quality or lack of sophistication. There
are after all very few outsiders who have been able to keep abreast
of the extraordinary developments of the profession from the vantage
point of private life. And not many have chosen to do purely historical
pieces or notes of reminiscence.
On the other hand, the very fact that an insider wrote such and
such and that the Board thought it important enough to publish was
oftentimes the prima facie reason to put some sort of classification
stamp to it. In actual fact, the Board has upon many occasions
felt impelled to question sensitive topics discussed by an author and
even to do a bit of sanitizing to get the contribution by as Secret.
Appro ed'~ForReJease 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL Valediction
All this is the long way of saying that, regrettable as is the Secret
classification, it is the very best that can be done. We n re convinced
that there is no way by which our publication can be made into some-
thing which our readers can take home to read in the evening and
which, at the same time, will have a content worthy of their attention.
One reader wrote us a communication suggesting a common-sense
method by which copies of the Studies could be kept out of the safe
for an hour or so after close of business for people who wanted to
stay after work to read them. We thought he had something and
passed the idea along, but nothing came of it.
A second and last regret. No matter that, as noted above, the
quantity of contributions has increased and the quality improved, there
are by no means enough people in our vast community writing articles
and submitting them. The Board of Editors, at each of its weekend
meetings, spends several hours on Saturday night discussing subjects
which would make interesting articles and trying to figure out who
would he the best author to undertake them. Between meetings of
the Board, members put in a good amount of time dunning their
colleagues and acquaintances for an article of this or that :specification.
I should imagine that we receive in finished form one article for about
every ten we ask for. Some of the articles which have finally appeared
have required almost as much suasion or browbeating on the part
of a Board member as they did effort on the part of the composer.
On the other hand, the number of high-quality walk-ins has been low.
There are several reasons why this is so. To start with, the ideal
author or authors for such and such a piece are as a rule overextended
with the primary tasks of their job descriptions and cannot take on an
additional duty. Nor do their supervisors by and large feel able to
lighten their professional burdens for the two or three weeks which
they would have to have to do the article in question.
Not infrequently the right author could be given time, but just does
not want to take it. Maybe he has a quite understandable desire-to
this writer, at least-to avoid the pain of literary composition at all
costs. Maybe also the man or woman whose job keeps driving them
down into the present and forcing them to look into the murk of
the future can be pardoned for an indifferent concern about: that which
is over and done with. And many of the articles which we feel should
be written are essentially historical in nature. Some of these have
an added built-in repulsiveness. For example, who is naturally in-
AppIAved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0 tK~ bba0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO319 11~(~01-1
Valediction
clined to go back over the history of an intelligence blooper? The
fact that such a backward glance could be of immense professional
importance does little to alleviate its essential unattractiveness.
Though the so-called missile gap debate owed but little to the
shortcomings of intelligence, getting an article going on the subject has
so far been impossible. One reason-not the ruling one-has been
a reluctance on the part of knowledgeable analysts to return to the
agonies of our early estimating on the Soviet ICBM force and relive
those days of groping around in the uncertainties of Soviet ability to
build the missiles and the magnitude of the force which the Soviets
would probably wish to deploy.
No such Freudian explanation is applicable to our experience in
getting the article which we published in the autumn of 1966 on
"The Detection of Joe I," the first Soviet nuclear test. This piece, which
recounted one of our country's truly great intelligence successes,
required more effort in terms of false starts and carry-over from
year to year than any other we have printed. Here perhaps the
issues of security and delicacy were important inhibitors. Telling
the story orally in a safe place to an inside group possessed of
every clearance in the book would have been one thing, telling it in
writing at the Secret level for publication to the community at large
quite another. The stupid little mechanical difficulties of the latter
course could and probably did very rapidly build up into a mountainous
barrier.
Whatever the difficulties and however overcome, the Studies in
Intelligence venture has been eminently worth while. The Board's
celebration of its tenth anniversary a year ago presaged, I trust, not
so much a ceremony of self-congratulation for a decade of past per-
formance as an earnest of still other decades of good and useful work
to come.
CONFIDENTIAL 11
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A000 YM4001-1
No Foreign Dissem
Inevitable and some perhaps remediable
lags in the highest-priority scientific
intelligence.
INTERACTION IN WEAPONS R&D
David S. Brandwein i
Intelligence may be thought of as having two missions in relation
to military planning and weapon system development. The primary
mission is to provide information on the weapon systems of potential
enemies so that counterweapons may be developed. That is, if we
can gather valid and timely intelligence for projections of the capa-
bilities and vulnerabilities of the opponent's military systems, we can
develop weapons capable of penetrating his defense and blunting his
offense. A secondary mission is to furnish information on the :foreign
development of weapon system components which parallel our own
designs. Here, the objective is to take advantage of their R&D to
produce better weapons for ourselves, thus gaining time and reduc-
ing our own development costs.
In what follows I will examine the way these intelligence missions
are accomplished, primarily in the field of strategic attack and defense
systems, and how the results affect U.S. research and development.
I will try to point out the difficulties in generating satisfactory intelli-
gence hypotheses on the basis of thin data, validating them by inde-
pendent checkout on the part of the several analytic groups involved,
and then feeding them back to the R&D community, difficulties which
make the process less than ideally effective. A few illustrative case
histories will show just how it has or has not worked well and suggest
where it might be tinkered with.
Time and Pride
The problem is time. Too much time is usually consumed in gener-.
ating and validating intelligence on weapon R&D to feed it back into
U.S. planning effectively. True, the weapon-counterweapon process is
a sequential one, so that limited time lags in the feedback loop can be
1 Adapted frorn the author's presentation before the September 1966 Intelligence
II
CAE 13
Approves
o'r Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A00030 60 111 p PAGES 13-20
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Weapons R&D
tolerated. Intelligence output, however, is usually much too late to
cause the initiation of counterweapon developmental programs or to
affect them directly at their initiation. While it may be frustrating
to proponents of so-called interaction analyses, a look at the decision
dates for some of our existing systems proves that almost all strategic
counterweapons reflect recent advances in the state of the art rather
than reaction to a specific opposing system. They are designed ba-
sically against hypothetical threats founded upon broad assumptions
as to the capabilities of the adversary. Intelligence findings are more
likely to be used to refine developmental programs already well under
way, or sometimes as grounds for eliminating alternative lines of devel-
opment previously undertaken to "cover all bets."
With respect to the secondary intelligence objective, our parallel
weapons development program has benefited only to a trivial extent
from intelligence because of the truly crippling effect of the time lag
coupled with a fundamental human barrier-"Thanks, but we are
doing it better." Generally, two systems being developed. in parallel
by two countries, given about equal capabilities in both, are likely to
mature at the same rate. By the time Country A has discovered
that some feature of Country B's system is superior to the correspond-
ing one in its own, it has paid out its development money and concludes
that it cannot make changes. Convincing researchers that someone
else has solved a problem in a better way is not easy; there is fre-
quently the necessity to overcome an inborn chauvinism, or at least
pride of invention, which blunts the feedback mechanism.
Collection Difficulties
The first problem is to collect the intelligence. Ideally, we would
like to know as soon as research and development starts on a new
weapon system. The fact is, however, that information is inadequate
on Soviet military R&D programs and almost totally nonexistent on
Communist Chinese programs. While general information showing
large increases in Soviet technical capability is available, as well as
evidence of an expanding scope of military R&D, specifics are too
fragmentary to allow a precise definition of the future threat. Basic
research can be followed in some detail through analysis of scientific
papers published in the technical journals, but the possible final uses
of the research in terms of weapon systems are many and nonspecific,
and only trends can be detected. The end result is a lack of sufficient
accurate intelligence on R&D projects in their early stages.
14
Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0 388b10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
Weapons R&D SECRET
In the face of these uncertainties, we usually credit the Soviets with
the ability to solve many scientific or technological problems without
specific evidence of this ability. This may often be reasonable; the
Soviets have the advantage of getting much information on Western
advances, and their progress may well parallel ours in many instances.
Nevertheless, there is a tendency to estimate greater Soviet progress
as the West becomes more certain of success in the solution of corre-
sponding scientific problems. Our assessments of the status of specific
R&D programs thus may be uncertain in the near term and increas-
ingly tenuous as estimates are projected into the future. The loss of
lead time for U.S. planning of counterweapon development and an
inability to present unanticipated alternatives to the U.S. R&D commu-
nity is a serious consequence of these perpetual intelligence problems.
Once the adversary has made a decision to capitalize on the results
of basic research and build a specific new weapon system, he goes
underground with the entire process of preliminary design, labora-
tory test, and prototype construction up to flight (or other equivalent
final) test, which is therefore secure from most forms of intelligence
collection. Indeed, a study of the technical literature to see when
reporting on some particular area of basic research suddenly stops
is advocated as a way of learning that a military development pro-
gram has been started in that area. Proving an exclusion theorem
is always a difficult matter, however, and even its proof would hardly
be a clear signal as to exactly what was going on.
In the development of some key weapons the final flight test phase
is open to intelligence collection, but this is likely to take place three
to five years after the start of preliminary design. This is the lag for
long-range ballistic missiles and space systems. ABM systems, on
the other hand, could well be flight-tested over a period of years
without our knowledge.
Analysis, Consensus, Feedback
Let us assume that in spite of these difficulties we have finally
collected a body of raw data on a new weapon system. The next
step, the analysis of the data, is likely to consume a large amount of
time because it is a difficult process. This is particularly true when
the opponent has developed a system fundamentally different from
our home-grown variety. There is generally a lack of background
data for the intelligence findings and a reluctance on the part of
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00030001-UV01-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Weapons R&D
analysts and consultants to accept the idea that someo:ae else was
able to solve the problem differently from our solution. A short-
circuit sometimes removes this obstacle when actual hardware is
collected, but unfortunately this happens only very rarely, and when it
does it seldom involves a major weapons system.
After the analytic efforts seem to have generated satisfactory hypo-
thetical conclusions, we still need to validate these by having inde-
pendent researchers check them out. The intelligence community
needs to reach a consensus on their validity. Different analysts working
separately on the same data are quite likely to come up with differing
answers, particularly when the data base is thin to begin with. While
we would all probably agree on the desirability of having more than
a single individual or a single group take a crack at the problem, we
would also hope that they communicate with each other at frequent
intervals. I am encouraged by what seems to be a better rapport
nowadays among the various analytical groups in the community and
a greater speed in coming to an agreed conclusion than heretofore.
Even so, the validation process still takes a significant length of time,
in some instances as long or longer than the analysis p:rocess itself.
Now let us engage the problem of feedback. There are many
channels through which this takes place. The CIA and DIA put out
reports and estimates to consumers on a regular basis, many of which
contain details of weapon system developments. These agencies also
routinely brief officials in Defense, NASA, the Bureau of the Budget,
and the White House, along with many other decision-making ele-
ments of the government. There are a number of key members of
the scientific establishment, both industrial and academic, who par-
ticipate in a variety of government-sponsored panels and committees
and receive intelligence briefings in their fields of cognizance. These
people, however, are at the policy and top management: level; it is
likely that little direct intelligence-derived guidance filters through
them to the laboratories.
Security restrictions inhibit wide dissemination of intelligence down
to the scientists and engineers at the design level, but perhaps little is
lost, as the briefings at the policy level are seldom detailed. They are
usually condensed to a point that a consumer would have difficulty
detecting, say, a significant breakthrough in the development of a
subsystem. For instance, we are prone to tell policy-level audiences
that a missile has a particular accuracy but are less likely to tell them
App~6ved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A000?0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Weapons R&D SECRET
why. Finally, even if we could get around the security restrictions
in our contacts with industry, we still need to be circumspect. In
our capitalistic society we lay ourselves open to severe criticism if
we provide information to industry in a way that gives one company
a competitive advantage over others.
Case History: ICBM Guidance
Having reached the end of the process thus still beset with diffi-
culties, I would now like to summarize briefly some case histories
which illustrate them. The first one is of parallel development work
in the United States and the USSR on the same problem, the guidance
system for an ICBM.
Solving this problem is one of the most difficult ingredients of an
ICBM development program. It is clear now that we and the Soviets
started in parallel, in about 1955, and arrived at strikingly different
solutions. The U.S. systems use a simple rocket engine operating at
a fixed thrust but couple with this a very complex guidance system
containing an airborne digital computer. During powered flight the
guidance system continuously computes the proper burnout position
for the rocket so that the warhead will impact acceptably close to
the target. The Soviets, on the other hand, fly their missiles on a pre-
calculated trajectory with a somewhat more elaborate variable-thrust
engine but a very much simpler guidance system having virtually
no on-board computation capability.
Both systems work fine; but we would probably now admit that
the advantages inherent in the Soviet system, simplicity and quick
achievement of satisfactory reliability, would have been very appealing
to us had we considered such a system during the design phase. The
fact is that we did not begin to collect useful flight test data on the
Soviet system until 1959, that we did not really perform enough
analysis work to understand it until 1963, and that the results of this
analysis did not begin to be disseminated outside the intelligence
community until 1965. By this time, of course, the U.S. ICBM guidance
design had long since been completed. It may be said in all candor
that this particular intelligence program had no effect at all on parallel
systems at home.
An interesting sidelight illustrative of our problems is that analysis
of one aspect of the Soviet data showed that whereas all U.S. missiles
use rate gyros or angular accelerometers to keep the control system
SE,UET 17
For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Approved
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Weapons R&D
stable, the Soviets devised a much simpler system that dispenses with
these fragile and expensive instruments. The analyst whc made this
determination was successful in getting a Soviet-style system in-
corporated into a proposal to NASA for a new launch vehicle-only
to have the feature rejected by that agency with the comment that
although the scheme looked quite feasible, there hadn't been enough
test experience to justify its adoption. The NASA people were not
aware of the fact that the Soviets had been testing it for many years
because they had never received feedback in the detail required and
at the right level in their organization.
An interesting case history in the weapon-counterweapon field is
the intelligence analysis of a large Soviet radar and its effect on the
U.S. program for developing penetration aids. When thought first
turned in the United States to the problem of penetrating Soviet
radar defenses with ICBM warheads, there immediately arose the
question of the operating characteristics of these radars. About the
only contribution intelligence could make were some excellent U-2
photographs taken in 1960 of some very large radars in the Sary
Shagan area which seemed to be logical candidates for the role of
spotting ballistic missiles as ABM targets.
Unfortunately, deriving a radar's characteristics from a photograph
of it is rather difficult. Various analytical groups looking at the same
photos came up with different answers. The consensus seemed to be
that the largest radar-nicknamed Hen House-was the keystone of
the defensive system, and that it would operate in a UHF frequency
band, at about 1,000 MHz; after all, our developers were working
on radars in the 1,000-2,000 MHz region in our equivalent programs
at the time. This was the word that went out to U.S. agencies engaged
in devising penetration schemes.
Then in 1962 the Russians tested some nuclear warheads at high
altitudes in the Sary Shagan region. Nature was kind, and we received
radar signals reflected from the ionized cloud. These included a new
train of signals in the much lower VHF band, which it soon developed
must have come from a very high-power radar in the Sary Shagan
area.
For a long time, however, there was a singular lack of interest in the
peculiarity of these signals. It may be that too many analysts had
Ap -oved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0 3?6610001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Weapons R&D SECRET
already decided that the Hen House frequency would be much :higher.
It seems they had convinced themselves that there was no merit in
a long-range radar operating at VHF because such a radar would
be blacked out by a nuclear cloud. Nevertheless, analysis efforts did
go forward, and two things became increasingly clear: first, the VHF
signal characteristics were such as to prove that they could have
emanated only from a radar with the physical dimensions and orienta-
tion of Hen House; and second, that our work on nuclear blackout
effects was based on tests in the tropics, whereas the Soviets were
likely to deploy radars such as these in the Arctic, where the black-
out problem was not nearly so severe.2
A final impediment to the fast functioning of the system was the
fact that the validation step took an unconscionably long time. Al-
though by late 1964 most of the various analytical groups had arrived
at the correct solution, there was one that was still unconvinced, and its
opposition prevented the firm feedback of this information to the
R&D community. As a result, another two years went by before
the message got back to the laboratories in an effective way.
We are now finally on the tracks. A serious review of our offensive
capabilities against VHF radars is now under way. A VHF` radar
has been built at White Sands to allow us to see what the Soviet
radars will see. Our own Nike ABM program is at the same time
looking at ways of using VHF radars for our defensive systems.
However, I would not begin to estimate the millions of dollars which
could have been saved by a more speedy functioning of the intelligence
process.
To recapitulate, I have presented so far a rather pessimistic picture
of our capability to influence weapons research and development, and
I have given two examples illustrating how the long times needed to
collect, analyze, validate, and feed back information serve to make
our efforts ineffective. Ideally, this would now be the proper place
to unveil a blueprint for the future, in which clear solutions to these
problems are presented.
I have no such blueprint. I know of no way to collect intelligence
on weapon systems at the early R&D phase except by clandestine deep
'For a more detailed account of this case history see the next following article
in this issue.
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Weapons R&D
penetrations of the adversary's laboratories and design bureaus. Those
responsible for clandestine operations know this as well as we on
the technical side do, and presumably they are doing the best they
can. Similarly, I see no easy way of speeding up the analysis process.
Massive infusions of people or computing machines are not likely to
expedite the process. Key analytic breakthroughs will generally come
from the application of brainpower by a few gifted and dedicated
individuals working at their own pace.
The last two steps in the process, validation and feedback, seem
to me to be the places where we should focus our attention. The
effectiveness of these steps depends wholly on how we structure the
setup so as to allow people to communicate and interact with one
another. Perhaps it is time to take a fresh look at the mechanisms
by which intelligence information is provided to researchers, particu-
larly in the final phases. This, it seems to me, is an area where no new
inventions are required, no multimillion dollar expenditures are called
for, and yet where there is promise both of improving our defensive
and offensive capabilities and of saving millions of dollars.
App6ved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A00 0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
Snatches of Flint, together with a
few facts and a lot of logic, silhou-
ette an embryo antimissile system.
FORETESTING A SOVIET ABM SYSTEM
Edward Tauss i
The summary presentation of this particular case history in induc-
tive analysis will show how a slim amount of data may give a basis
for determining the general characteristics and net capabilities of a
new Soviet system before the Soviets themselves have a firm prototype
of it. Such an accomplishment would not be noteworthy when U.S.
R&D has already broken trail along the line of development in ques-
tion, but when it is the USSR that is doing the pioneering it is much
more controversial and difficult to foresee the outcome. The advan-
tages of doing so, of course, are that it gives the U.S. developers a
critical lead time in which to take countermeasures and a basis for
objective planning-no small matters in the race toward Armageddon.
Apparent Soviet Anomalies
At first the theory of ICBM interception called for destruction of
the incoming missile as far away as possible, while it was still out-
side the atmosphere. Then the development of chaff and decoys in
increasing numbers and complexity led to a need for waiting until
the atmospheric drag on reentry provided a way to distinguish the
real warhead from the false images. Endo-atmospheric interception
thus became firm U.S. doctrine, absorbing an enormous investment
in the development of terminal defense radars, exotic computers,
new high-performance missiles, and solutions for the complex prob-
lems of reentry physics. For it was natural to assume that the
Soviet defense system would be based on similar endo-atmospheric
reasoning, in fact would be a mirror image of our own. In con-
sequence, U.S. ICBMs were designed to reenter and penetrate the
1 The author, who suffered a fatal heart attack a few weeks after submitting this
manuscript, had devoted most of his last years to the work therein described. His
thesis has aroused considerable dissent in the intelligence community, and reasoned
counterargument is invited.
SECRET 22
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 21-26
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Soviet AEIM System
atmosphere as rapidly as possible, leaving a minimum of time after
target discrimination for the enemy's anti-ballistic-missiles to reach
them.
In the fall of 1961 and 1962, however, the Soviets performed exo-
atmospheric nuclear experiments at their ABM research center near
Sary Shagan. There were never any atmospheric tests there. U.S.
intelligence had been aware of two new research radars, code-named
lien House and Hen Roost, at Sary Shagan, but the first signals from
either were intercepted only when some Hen House pulses were re-
flected from the ionized cloud generated by a nuclear explosion during
these tests.
The intercepted Hen House signals had peculiar characteristics.
Most notably, their carrier frequencies were in the VHF range, a very
low frequency relative to the L and S bands normally used for U.S.
long-range radars. The Soviets had other VHF radars, for example
the newly deployed Tall Kings for early antiaircraft warning; but
the Hen House signals turned out to have much more :information
content than is needed for mere early warning. For ABM use the
low frequency should have serious disadvantages, not only in track-
ing ICBMs but even in their early detection. Theoretically, uncer-
tainties in propagation, both in the lower troposphere near the earth
and in penetrating the ionosphere to the target vehicle, might create
such errors in measurement as were thought to render VHF quite un-
suitable for U.S. tracking applications. Furthermore, it might be
presumed that any nuclear explosion in the radar path would blind
a VHF system.
The longer wavelength does have its own virtues, however. It is
harder to jam or deceive with decoys, and it makes for a cheaper
system. It would maximize the radar cross-section of target U.S.
[CBMs. Such a system would be a natural extrapolation from previ-
ous Soviet radar technology. The logical interpretation of the Sary
Shagan tests was that the Soviets were in fact exploring the feasibility
of a new exo-atmospheric intercept system, using VHF radar, in de-
fiance of our endo-atmospheric doctrine.
Postulated Soviet System
In 1963 the U.S. Army's missile electronic warfare organization at
White Sands, under the stimulation of inductive argument from a
CIA liaison officer (this reporter), became convinced that Soviet re-
searchers had found, or were finding, ways to get around the diffi-
ApRved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0c% T10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Soviet ABM System SECRET
culties both of exo-atmospheric target discrimination and of VHF
radar in ABM systems. Late that year, at about the same time that
a "probable Hen House" signal from Sary Shagan was first intercepted
via moon bounce,2 an Army contract was signed with Data Dy-
namics, Inc., to study the potential of a broadly-postulated exo-
atmospheric-kill ABM system based on such a radar. The contractor
was given intelligence support from both White Sands and CIA.
The Hen House proved to be a large planar array of emitting ele-
ments scanning electronically and having extremely high transmitted
power. Not only its peak power but also its average power was
extraordinarily high, with a capability for a very high data rate. Such
a radar may be called range-dominant, in that it measures range more
accurately than azimuth or altitude. It had to be assumed that the
Soviets were not trying to develop it for continuous tracking of
ICBMs from the point of detection on the horizon to the point of
interdiction; at high look angles in a wartime nuclear environment
a VHF blackout would be virtually certain. The Hen House would
have to get its position-prediction data quickly at long range, near
the horizon, and that would be the reason for its high power and
data rate.
At maximum range, however, it was calculated that no single
range-dominant radar could determine target positions with suffi-
cient accuracy. Measurements of altitude, in particular, circum-
scribed by the limited vertical dimension of the planar array, could
not be made fine enough. To make the postulated system credible
one had to assume a Soviet solution for this inadequacy, and one solu-
tion might be the operation of several radars from different locations
against the same targets to pinpoint them by the intersection of their
fixes, a sort of continuous triangulation. This would require reliable
instantaneous communication among the several locations, along with
computers to correlate in real time the multiple reception of target-
reflected signals; and the Soviets had in fact installed microwave fa-
cilities at Sary Shagan as though possibly in fulfillment of this need.
A modificaton of the multiple-radar system so conceived would
avoid the obviously inordinate expense of a large number of high-
performance instruments like Hen House: several distant receivers
could be grouped with each Hen House transmitter, all interlocked
by real-time communications. (For experimental purposes the Soviets
'See Frank Eliot's "Moon Bounce Elint" in Studies XI 2, p. 59 if.
SEC ET
R
Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A0003000401-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Soviet ABM System
could use the deployed Tall Kings as receiving sites in order to check
out the feasibility of this idea.) Such a multistatic radar system
would have distinct advantages against the enemy's electronic counter-
measures because of the difficulty of targeting the wide:.y dispersed
receivers. This model of an ABM radar system requires a reasonably
high level of sophistication in processing data for long-range predic-
tion, but one not inconsonant with known Soviet capabilities. The
important thing was that the range-dominant system model could be
simulated and legitimately exercised to investigate its potentials and
general vulnerabilities, even if the Soviets would not in the final
analysis construct it to operate in quite this manner.
From these basic postulates the contractor, who had earlier done
work for the Air Force on the prediction of future positions for orbital
vehicles, developed the technical details and worked out i:he complex
equations for the multistatic system. The mathematical simulations
showed that such a system could have an accuracy in average target
location within one nautical mile. Maximum effective range from
the transmitter could be increased, say from 600 n.m. to more than
1,000 n.m., by forward location of the receivers. Though not in-
vulnerable, the VHF radar was in many ways not so vulnerable as
conventional systems. The enemy would have difficulty in horizon-
to-horizon electronic jamming of a dispersed-receiver system, and
requirements for high jammer power in the VHF frequency region
would exact weight and size penalties. VHF chaff dipoles, to be
effective, would have to be more than 40 inches in length and rela-
tively heavy. The radar might not even register small objects, greatly
easing the problem of target discrimination.
Blackout from nuclear explosions in the radar path could be to
some degree avoided by locating at least the receivers well to the
side of likely ICBM targets. Enemy interference with the radar by
a nuclear detonation at a conjugate point on the earths magnetic
lines of force would not be possible across the Arctic horizon. The
prognosticated degradation of the beam from low-angle anomalies
turned out not to be prohibitive at long range. The powerful VHF
beam may even have the advantage of a "knife edge" effect, curving
over the horizon for useful increases in unambiguous :range. The
USSR seemed to be about ten years ahead of the United States in
developing such a VHF-oriented system, and it was reasonable to as-
App oved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A0065 6T0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Soviet ABM System SECRET
sume that their optimization of it through experimental development
might be even better than any model we could conceptually imagine.
A partial answer to the problem of discriminating between war-
heads and decoys before reentry could be to design the ABM warhead
to be effective, exo-atmospherically, against whole swarms of incom-
ing targets, say by making its yield large enough to kill ICBMs at
great distances. Was it the Soviet premise that the problem of decoys
is not a serious one if the ABM warhead has a large enough lethal
radius? The intelligence-based postulate of a Soviet system which
encompassed this possibility appeared to have been vindicated on
7 November 1964 by the revelation of the large Soviet Galosh missile,
which appeared capable of carrying a megaton-range warhead to
fire at exo-atmospheric altitudes.
Prospects
Even if the Soviets had withheld the parading of the Galosh, it
had been possible as early as the spring of 1964 to have, in the con-
tracted study, a basis for ignoring the implications of their display,
on 7 November 1963, of the aerodynamically-designed Griffon missile
which did not fit the requirement for a long-range, high-altitude ABM.
By that spring it had been possible to formulate computer sub-
routines by which the contractor could continuously update simulated
long-range Soviet ABM systems on the basis of the latest intelligence
data. In mid-1964 operational and planned U.S. attack models were
"flown" (by the same contractor under different sponsorship) against
the defensive model in mathematical simulation for purposes of net
evaluation.
Such very early postulation and analysis on the basis of scant data,
something of a rarity in the intelligence community, may be viewed
as a likely necessity now, at least in the electronic warfare field, to
provide objective grounds for developmental decisions. In this case,
recognition of the feasibility of an ABM system using VHF radars
established a need for electronic countermeasures in the VHF region
and was followed by formal military requirements for new chaff and
decoys, for high-powered jamming tubes with new long-term fuel and
power supplies, and for horizon-to-horizon antenna pattern develop-
ments. It led the White Sands missile electronic warfare organiza-
tion to build the first VHF measurements radar in the United States.
And the projection of a possible exo-atmospheric, area-kill ABM
system which the Soviets could deploy in conjunction with their de-
App MvC Tor Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300( 001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
SECRET Soviet ABM System
ployment of a "finite deterrent" ICBM system aided in advance recog-
nition of a potential strategic threat against the United States.
The U.S.-USSR R&D contest, hopefully, will get beyond the ABM-
ICBM confrontation. The posture of all military, naval, air, and
space forces will feel the impact of new strategic modes in which
electronic warfare and net evaluations are controlling factors. The
moral of this case history is that countermeasures and counter-
countermeasures must keep pace in real time with the development
of the opponent's threat. In order to achieve this, the intelligence
community must commit itself, as indicated in the accompanying
diagram, to designating the broad parameters of a threat at the earliest
possible time. Research and Development must then use these broad
parameters to initiate immediately the development of generally neces-
sary counter-components and so at least move in the direction of
readiness for the future threat. It is not necessary to foresee just how
the enemy will optimize his developmental designs, to flesh out our
model in ultimate detail, or to obtain community agreement on all
the refinements in order to institute these timely measures.
DEFINE & STUDY
A CREDIBLE
MODEL OF
SYSTEM
RECOGNITION
OF AN
UNANTICIPATED
SYSTEM
EARLY POSTULA-
TIONS ON GROSS
PARAMETERS OF
SYSTEM
INITIATE R&D ON
COUNTERMEASURES
REQUIREMENTS
ApprZ&ed For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A000c3??6p6001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
Some lessons from case
histories of misjudgment
in the NIEs.
HOW THREE ESTIMATES WENT WRONG
Willard C. Matthias
The procedure by which National Intelligence Estimates are pre-
pared is designed to ensure that those responsible for policy decisions
receive an agreed intelligence judgment (or a carefully delineated dis-
agreement) based upon the best information and most thorough re-
view possible. But the procedures only provide the framework within
which people function, and the estimates are only as good as they are
made by those who operate the machinery.
The Estimative Process
In this machinery the Board of National Estimates plays the most
important managerial and intellectual role. The draft of the estimate
is prepared by the Estimates Staff under the Board's direction; it
is discussed with representatives of the USIB agencies and CIA com-
ponents under the chairmanship of a Board member; and it is pre-
sented by this Board member to the USIB. The Staff member who
prepares the initial draft also plays an important part: he is more
familiar with the information than most Board members are, and if
he is a skillful writer and convincing defender of his views he puts
an ineradicable stamp on the estimate. The Board chairman-par-
ticularly if he has had a long familiarity with the subject and is
temperamentally inclined to play a leading role-will likewise put
a strong stamp on it.
Nevertheless, it is the Board as a corporate entity which bears re-
sponsibility to the DCI for the form and substance of the estimates.
It is his Board, an instrument to formulate his views and to take account
for him of the information and judgments applicable to the subject
in question. While he personally may rely upon some Board mem-
bers more than others, in his official capacity he must have a Board
sufficiently competent and balanced in composition and experience
that he can be confident that all significant aspects of the subject
have been weighed judiciously.
Approved or Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A000300pJ 1
86H- RP PAGES 27-38
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
SECRET Three Estimates
One cannot generalize about the method or technique Board mem-
bers use in arriving at estimative judgments. Each estimative situa-
tion is unique, and the estimator must lean upon a variety of sup-
ports: the amount and persuasiveness of the evidence; the methods of
analysis used by the contributors; the judgment of others in whom he
has special confidence, whether because of their study, experience, or
sharpness of mind; his own background in the subject; and, for want
of a better word, his hunches.
By dictionary definition a hunch is a feeling or suspicion not based
upon evidence but upon premonition. 1. do not believe in premoni-
tions, but I admit of the hunch in some sense. It must be compounded
of something-a sense of the logic of a situation, a ring of authenticity
in certain evidence, an uneasiness because some factor in a situation
is unexplained or prima facie unexplainable, a sense of the general
weight of evidence though no individual piece of it is sufficiently per-
suasive, a feeling that some leader or group is likely to act in a certain
way because of emotional or ideological predilections, however ir-
rational or illogical the course. Such factors enter in most Frequently
when there is no solid factual base for conclusions or when the evi-
dence is contradictory. A most notable case of correct hunch oc-
curred in 1962, when Director John McCone kept worrying the pos-
sibility that the Soviets might put strategic missiles into Cuba despite
the absence of reliable evidence to this effect and despite his Board's
judgment that they would not do anything so foolish.
In some ways the estimative job is easier than it was ten or fifteen
years ago. We have, for example, much more and better evidence
on many aspects of Soviet military capabilities than we did then;
collection methods have improved and analytical skills developed.
But there are still many problems which strain the estimator's
capacity. Some which cause the severest trouble are those predicting
likely courses of events (a) in unstable areas or situations of tension,
(b) in situations where the strengths of competing forces appear
evenly balanced or are difficult to assess, and (c) where the evidence
is contradictory, often through deliberate deception. In each of
these types of problems the Board of National Estimates has made
misjudgments in which this estimator has participated. I would
like to describe as best I can recall how three estimates over which
I presided came to render-if not explicitly, at least implicitly-
judgments that were wrong.
Ai*oved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194AO 55710001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Three Estimates SECRET
Arab-Israeli Tensions
Estimates of future developments in category a, in situations of
instability or tension, are both the most challenging and the most
discouraging kind. The first reaction is that one is being asked to do
the impossible, yet this kind of task can be the most rewarding if
done successfully (and although I speak here of a failure, it often
is done successfully). Actually, it is impossible to predict the course
of events; but one can describe how the parties involved apparently
think about a situation, how they have so far acted toward it, and
how they might act toward hypothetical changes. The case I have
in mind is that of an estimate entitled "The Arab-Israeli Dispute:
Current Phase," published 13 April 1967.
This estimate was undertaken in the context of an increase in tensions
in the Palestine dispute and in the wake of an Israeli raid on Samu
in Jordan in late 1966 which shook the monarchy in Amman. These
developments raised the question of whether the modus vivendi that
had prevailed between Israel and its Arab neighbors since 1957 was
coming to an end. Most of what the estimate said was right:
a. Rivalries and disputes among the Arabs reduce their chances of doing
anything significant about their quarrel with Israel; these rivalries also create
some danger of precipitating crises from which large-scale Arab-Israeli hos-
tilities could develop.
b. The Israelis seem likely to continue existing policies, including occasional
retaliatory action; they would resort to force on a large scale only if they
felt their security seriously endangered.
c. [The Israelis] could best any one of their neighbors and probably all of
them collectively. Arab cooperation being what it is, Israel probably would
not be obliged to take them on all at once.
d. The Soviet leaders almost certainly view the Arab-Israeli dispute as
promoting their interests. ... But the Soviets do not want an outbreak of
large-scale conflict in the area, since this would carry serious risk of a US-
Soviet confrontation and thus threaten the positions which the Soviets have
already won in the area.
But the estimate had one final conclusion which, though it was
technically correct, conveyed a sense of reassurance and was, in light
of the events of May and June 1967, misleading.
Although periods of increased tension in the Arab-Israeli dispute will occur
from time to time, both sides appear to appreciate that large-scale :military
action involves considerable risk and no assurance of leading to a solution.
In any event, the chances are good that the threat of great power intervention
will prevent an attempt by either side to resolve the problem by military force.
Apprt &S Tor Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0003000?&001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
SECRET Three Estimates
I say that this last conclusion was technically correct because the
Six Day War was not an attempt to "resolve" the Arab-Israeli problem
by military force. It fits under the rubric of the conclusion (see a
above) that rivalries among the Arabs created the danger of "pre-
cipitating crises from which large-scale Arab-Israeli hostilities could
develop" and that (in d above) "the Soviet leaders almost certainly
view the Arab-Israeli dispute as promoting their interests." A review
of the available information shows that the Soviets had a role in
precipitating the crisis by passing intelligence information about Israeli
plans for a punitive expedition against Syria to the Syrians and
Egyptians. Nasser, who had been accused in the past by his Arab
rivals of hiding behind the skirts of the UN, this time sought to avoid
the charge. His mobilization and the events which followed then
led the Israeli leaders to conclude that their security was "seriously
endangered" (b above). Quite clearly, both the Soviets and the
Egyptians made some miscalculations about the consequences of their
actions.
One can thus exculpate oneself by this kind of textual exegesis.
But there was in the estimate a serious lacuna: we did not sufficiently
treat the possibilities arising out of terrorist activities, border raids,
troop movements, propaganda, political warfare, and the psychological
effects of these in Israel and the Arab world. Had we understood
these better, we should have ended the estimate by noting the danger
that they could lead to an explosion rather than asserting the unlikeli-
hood of a deliberate resort to force.
Why did we make this error? I think we were under two mis-
apprehensions. The first was that we overestimated the Soviets'
good sense, something we have done before (e.g., when The question
was whether they would deploy missiles to Cuba, in 1962). It is,
1 think, a safe judgment that if the Soviets had thought in mid-May
what they knew on 5 June, they would have kept that provocative
intelligence information to themselves. The moral is that how the
Soviets may think about a particular area and what they may do
tactically may not be entirely consistent. We as estimators must
recognize more frequently (as we often do in observing the tactical
moves of governments regarding which we have more complete
knowledge) that specific actions taken by the agents of a government
do not always flow from the general policy objectives or posture of
the leadership.
AppOOved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A009'IT0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0003ff401-1
Three Estimates
The other misapprehension, I believe, was a failure to keep up
with dynamic aspects of Near East politics. We did not realize how
much more confident in themselves both the Israelis and Egyptians had
become. We did not therefore realize how much lower was the
threshold of Nasser's readiness to expose himself to danger, and how
much lower was the threshold of Israel's readiness to fight against
creeping threats to its existence. I cannot say whether this was
a failure in intelligence reporting or in analysis; I suspect it was
a bit of both. U.S. personnel abroad are often too much absorbed
in the day-to-day business of their operations to detect a growing
change of mood; analysts in Washington are too often cynically prone
to think their foreign charges are the same feckless (or scheming)
fellows they always were and that nothing much changes. I, for one,
am prepared to be a bit more cynical myself about area specialists.
Prospects in Vietnam
The estimate illustrating misjudgment in category b, when the
strengths of competing forces appear to be evenly balanced or are
difficult to assess, is one which had a long and tortuous 'history.
Initiated in October 1962, it was finally cleared by the USIB only in
April 1963; it was entitled "Prospects in South Vietnam." At that
time Diem was still president of South Vietnam and Madame Nhu
was riding high. The U.S. commitment was still in the form of
advisers and logistical support. The estimate was to assess how things
were going, what problems there were, what the prospects were. I
will not examine here all the conclusions of the paper, but only its
general statements about how the war was going and what the pros-
pects were for South Vietnam in the kind of struggle that was going
on then. I quote from some of the conclusions of the draft finally
approved by the USIB:
a. We believe Communist progress has been blunted and that the situation
is improving. Strengthened South Vietnamese capabilities and effectiveness,
and particularly US involvement, are causing the Viet Cong increased diffi-
culty, although there are as yet no persuasive indications that the Communists
have been grievously hurt.
b. Assuming no great increase in external support to the Viet Cong, changes
and improvements which have occurred during the past year now indicate that
the Viet Cong can be contained militarily. . . . However, we do not believe
that it is possible at this time to project the future of the war with any
confidence. Decisive campaigns have yet to be fought and no quick and easy
end to the war is in sight. .. .
ApprSECRET vr Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
SECRET Three Estimates
c. Developments during the last year or two also show some promise of
resolving the political weaknesses, particularly that of insecurity in the country-
side, upon which the insurgency has fed. However, the government's capacity
to translate military success into lasting political stability is questionable.
The estimate thus rang no tocsin. To put it in simpler language:
things are not going to hell; we don't know how it will all come out,
but the South Vietnamese are not doing so badly; Diem is improving,
he might win the military struggle, though even if he does, don't
think the political troubles of South Vietnam will be over. Half a
year later Diem was ousted, and the political and military situation
degenerated to critical proportions by the end of 1964. What made
the estimate so wrong?
In this case the draft originally prepared by the Estimates Staff
was essentially correct, but it was fatally weakened during, the process
of review and coordination. This was a long and painful process for
me as chairman, since I had helped the Staff prepare this draft. Let
me quote some of the original conclusions, c below being the final one:
a. There is no satisfactory objective means of determining hz)w the war is
going. The increased US involvement has apparently enabled the South Viet-
namese regime to check Communist progress and perhaps even to improve the
situation in some areas; however, it is impossible to say whether the tide is
running one way or the other .. .
b. On the South Vietnamese side, new strategic concepts, such as the
fortified hamlet, and shifts in military and security organization, training, and
tactics have strengthened the counter-guerrilla effort. However, very great
weaknesses remain and will be difficult to surmount. Among these are lack
of aggressive and firm leadership at all levels of command, poor morale among
the troops, lack of trust between peasant and soldier, poor tactical use of
available forces, a very inadequate intelligence system, and obvious Com-
munist penetration of the South Vietnamese military organization.
c. The struggle in South Vietnam at best will be protracted and costly.
The Communists are determined to win control, and the South Vietnamese
alone lack the present capacity to prevent their own eventual destruction.
Containment of the Communists and reestablishment of a modicum of security
in the countryside might be possible with great US effort iri the present
political context of South Vietnam, but substantial progress toward Vietnamese
self-dependence cannot occur unless there are radical changes in the methods
and personnel of the South Vietnamese Government. Even should these take
place without mishap, this would only be a beginning; the Communists retain
capabilities and support which will require years of constructive effort to
dissipate.
Some of the process of dilution began in the Board itself. The
Board did not change the main thrust of the paper, or alter essentially
App ived For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A006F36T0001-1
 Approv For &
2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
ree s ima es SECRET
the wording of the conclusions cited in a and b above. But it did
eliminate some of the prescient words both from the text and from
the final conclusions cited in c. The final conclusion now read simply:
With US help, the South Vietnamese regime stands a good chance of at
least containing the Communists militarily. However, the modus operandi
of the Diem government, and particularly its measures to prevent the rise
of contenders for political power, have reduced the government's effectiveness,
both politically and militarily. We believe that unless radical changes are
made in these methods of government, there is little hope that the US in-
volvement can be substantially curtailed or that there will be a material and
lasting reduction in the Communist threat.
The serious weakness of this change was that it shifted the emphasis
from the inherent difficulty and long-term character of the problem
(to which Diem contributed) to an indictment of the Diem. regime.
This led us into trouble at the coordination meeting with departmental
representatives.
Some of the military representatives at the coordination meeting had
served in South Vietnam and had been appalled at the South Vietnam-
ese military performance. The emphasis in the paper on political weak-
nesses as a major cause of the military failures quite naturally appealed
to their professional instincts as well as confirmed their own observa-
tions. The indictment of the Diem regime, however, no doubt because
it called into question the existing U.S. policy of working with Diem,
caused the State Department representative to reserve his position
on this aspect of the paper. He also thought the estimate underesti-
mated the prospects for gains through an improved military effort,
although we had gone so far as to say, "With US help, South 'Vietnam
stands a good chance of at least containing the Communists militarily."
Thus the DCI and the USIB members were presented with a paper
which, although the Estimates Board had eliminated reference to the
gloomy long-term prospects, was still a fairly dolorous document.
But it was encumbered with a departmental reservation, and this
obliged the USIB to look at it carefully. The DCI, then John
McCone, was particularly uneasy about it, since it seemed to con-
tradict the more optimistic judgments reached by those in policy
circles who had been sent to Vietnam to make on-the-spot appraisals
and recommendations. He therefore decided to postpone USIB con-
sideration and asked the Board of National Estimates to consult with
some of those who had been on such missions. The Board proceeded
SECRET 33
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Three Estimates
to meet with two high-ranking military officers and two civilians
in key policy-making positions.
None of these four consultations was particularly helpful. The
witnesses seemed reluctant to make a frontal assault on the judg-
ments of the paper but equally reluctant to endorse it. They showed
a general tendency to take issue with a particular sentence purport-
ing to state a fact, rather than an estimative judgment. This or that
was "too pessimistic," but there was no clear line of argument why.
All four held forth some degree of optimism, largely based upon the
belief that things were better than they had been. This indeed may
have been true, but it was not established how badly things had
been going before or how this degree of improvement stood up to
the task, namely to deal with a determined and resourceful op-
ponent who was immeasurably helped by the profound underlying
political weaknesses of South Vietnam. None of the consultants was
attempting to mislead, but the simple fact was that each of them in
some way and to some degree was committed to the existing U.S.
policy, and none of them was intellectually free at that point or in
those circumstances to stand back and look at the situation in its
broadest aspects.
The drafters then returned to their desks and prepared a revised
draft. The Staff members, although increasingly weary of the con-
troversy, were nevertheless much inclined to stick to their guns. I,
however, had become inclined to shade the estimate in a more op-
timistic direction. I began to think that perhaps we had. been too
gloomy; and at the same time I had to get an estimate through to
meet the DCI's new deadline. If we stuck to the original draft, the
DCI and other CIA components might not go along with it; even if
they did, this draft might now evoke still greater departmental dis-
sent than it had the first time (since high-ranking personnel had now
become engaged) ; in short, if we were so rigid that we invited debate
and amendment at the USIB, we might find ourselves with a paper
more offensive to our judgment than one which moved slightly to-
ward a less pessimistic view. What we now wrote, in spite of some
staff objection, embodied approximately the conclusion first cited
above. The estimate rode easily through the USIB with the DCI's
full concurrence.
Even so, this estimate was not calculated to give anyone a sense
of comfort. Indeed, very recently a senior official closely associated
with Vietnamese affairs, who had most likely seen only the finished
AppMved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194AO&% OT10001-1
 Appr ed For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Three Istimates SECRET
product, remarked that it was too bad policy-makers had not paid
more attention to it. Nevertheless, it did not sound the alarm which
it should have and would have if the first draft conclusions had been
kept intact. A year or so after the date of the estimate, Mr. McCone
openly expressed regret for his own part in weakening what had been
"right the first time."
The lesson provided by this experience is to shun the advice of
those who in one way or another are committed to or responsible for
a particular line of policy. They are no doubt well informed, but it
is also theirs to be hopeful. Above all, their responsibility is to their
policy-making chiefs, and they can hardly be expected to recite before
an intelligence working group information or beliefs which implicitly
or explicitly might suggest that established policy is based upon un-
sound premises. Study of the premises of national policy is the
business of intelligence officers, and it is as unfair to ask the executors
of policy to testify on the soundness of those premises as it is unwise
to accord their views uncritical acceptance.
The Goa Invasion
The estimate that illustrates the difficulty of forecasting in cate-
gory c-when the evidence is contradictory, perhaps because of delib-
erate deception-was not very important in terms of its policy impact;
its conclusion was so equivocal that it provided the warning needed.
It was, however, wrong, and I who chaired it was among those who
thought it wrong at the time. It was a crash estimate, requested on
the morning of December 12, 1961 and approved by the USIB on
the afternoon of the following day, concerning the likelihood of an
Indian attack upon Goa. During the preceding few weeks Indian
troops had been concentrating in the Goa area, public opinion-
especially on the left-was clamoring for action, and a strong mo-
mentum in favor of invasion had developed. Yet the evidence was
conflicting, and it was possible that these activities were designed
purely to apply pressure and to bring about the incorporation of
Goa into India by peaceful means.
We thought that Nehru had not made up his mind and was being
subjected to contradictory pressures. We concluded:
Clearly there is strong evidence pointing to an invasion-the military and
political preparations have gone so far as to be difficult to reverse without
some loss of prestige to the Indian government. Although the Indians perhaps
still hope that their warlike activities will extract concessions from the Por-
SECRET 35
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0003000'ID001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
SECRET Three Estimates
tuguese, we doubt that the Lisbon Government will move far enough-if at
all-to meet Indian requirements. However, relying chiefly on our judgment
of what Nehru conceives to be India's basic interests and our assessment of his
past behavior, we believe that the chances of a direct military invasion are
still about even.
Five days after this estimate was approved the Indians seized Goa
by military force.
The formulation in the final estimate was close to that of the staff
draft. In a post-invasion memorandum to the Chairman of the Esti-
mates Board, the head of the Near East Staff stated that initially he
and his colleagues had rated the chances as less than even, "relying
mainly on Nehru's restraint in previous crises over Goa and their
estimate of his attitudes, objectives, and ability to control develop-
ments," and that he had learned through informal contacts that the
State Department people went even further, calling the odds "con-
siderably less than even." Nevertheless, impressed by the evidence
of advancing preparations, the Staff was uncertain enough to qualify
the chances as only "slightly less than even."
The Estimates Board members, in their review, agreed generally
with the experts. It was difficult for me, as chairman, to dissent;
but I was impressed more by the evidence of preparations than by
the history of Nehru's political attitudes. The reports from people
who had seen the preparations and talked with the Indians sounded
as if the latter meant business, meant to finish off the Goa affair once
and for all. Argument along these lines succeeded in moving the
Board toward dead center-"The chances of a direct military inva-
sion are still only about even"-and implying that as preparations
continued and the Portuguese failed to give, the chances of invasion
might rise.
The coordination meetings did not help very much. One depart-
mental representative who wanted to raise the odds on invasion
wanted also to add a paragraph about the threat to U.S.-Portuguese
relations and U.S. base rights in the Azores if the Indians went ahead.
It seemed to me that his position derived more from departmental
interest than objective judgment, and this was not acceptable in an
intelligence estimate. We stayed with the Board's "still about even"
formula, and the USIB also agreed to this without dissent.
The day after the estimate was approved, the odds or. an invasion
rose perceptibly in reports from New Delhi. The Army attache said
he believed invasion would "take place very soon."
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
 Approvedd Forelease 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
Mee s imates SECRET
I
the country team believed that military action was
imminent unless the Portuguese promptly folded.
The only person who i not seem to thin
an invasion was on was the U.S. ambassador in New Delhi, who
expressed the belief that action was not imminent less than 24 hours
before it began.
The actual invasion gave a sense of vindication to those of us who
had thought it likely, but it also raised the question of why the others
had been wrong. The evidence, though conflicting-the ambassador
no doubt was the victim of some deceit-did include reports with a
decided ring of seriousness. Those who rated the chances of invasion
as even or less than even of course read these reports. They were
relying on Nehru's high-mindedness, and since this did not jibe with
the evidence, they had nowhere to go but to sit on the fence. The
lesson to be derived from this experience is not that one should look
only at the evidence and disregard the doctrines and attitudes of
leaders; that would be folly. It is that one should try to reconcile
the two; in so doing one might perhaps find that, as in the law, there
is more than one line of precedent.
Other Board members could, I am sure, make an analysis of how
estimates in which they participated fell short and similarly draw
lessons from them. In time we could have enough lessons floating
around to keep us tongue-tied. We could fall into the tragic error
of the young man whose aggressive and fast-moving brother killed
himself by wrapping his car around a light pole; the surviving brother,
having taken this lesson to heart and resolved to plod about on foot,
was run over by a truck. Our job is to make estimates; we have to
take the plunge. This does not mean reckless diving, but it does not
mean standing on the end of the diving board helpless with worry
about every conceivable hazard to health and safety.
There is no alternative to regarding each estimative problem as a
new one and applying one's accumulated knowledge and experience
to it. It helps to try to determine why we were right or why we
were wrong and to use these determinations as signposts along the
way, but we must also remember that the specialist who misled us
on one estimate corrected our misapprehensions on another, that the
25X1
SECRET 37
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Three Estimates
political philosophy which a national leader seemed to negate in one
action he might never negate again. The problems we a:re dealing
with are too complex for simple rules or simple "lessons." The magic
words "estimate" or "judgment" are simply the exercise of good sense
in light of everything it is possible to learn or to ponder concerning
any particular matter.
Appved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A00~300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Latin American guerrilla's
protection against government
intelligence and security.
INSURGENT COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Carlos Revilla Arango
The leaders of an insurgent movement anticipate and counter efforts
by established authority to acquire information about their organization
and activities. The success of the Irish revolutionists must be ascribed
in large part to the operational achievements of their security chief
Michael Collins, who made it his job to know in advance what the
British were going to do, on what information they based their action,
and the identity of their sources. He succeeded in this by gaining
direct, personal access to metropolitan police records. A subject of
his protective interest later wrote:
About a fortnight after my return I received from him, not a copy, but the
original of the report from the police of the districts through which I had
passed. . . . The fact that such an original document should have come into
my hand was an example of the thoroughness with which Collins worked his
intelligence system and enabled the I. R. A. to know what its enemy was
thinking and often what the enemy proposed to do.'
This is counterintelligence activity. The importance of a satisfac-
tory counterintelligence effort is underscored by an instructor of
Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas, General Alberto Bayo, who treated
this subject in 23 of the 150 questions and answers he devised for
guerrillas. In his opinion a counterintelligence agent was of greater
value than 50 machineguns: he could work among the security forces
and keep one advised of all their intelligence and plans.2
The insurgent organization's counterintelligence and security pro-
gram must meet not only the threat posed by established governmental
authority but that represented by competitive dissident groups, by the
unilateral interests of third-country sponsors, sympathizers, and foes,
and by disaffected members of its own organization. It must do so
1 Padraic Colum, Ourselves Alone! The Story of Arthur Griffith and the Origin
of the Irish Free State. (New York: Crown Publishers, 1959.) p. 215.
'General Alberto Bayo, 150 Questions for a Guerrilla. Translation from the
Spanish. (Denver: Robert K. Brown, 1963.) pp. 44, 45, 83.
MORI/HRP PAGES 39-53
Appro9SS"F'6?'i IR ~sQ~bt5/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A00030001 @001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Insurgent Counterintelligence
through the acquisition and use of information on the personnel, or-
ganization, modus operandi, assets, plans, and activities of those that
seek to penetrate or compromise it. It must concern itself not only
with an enemy's deliberate efforts but with chance crises of all kinds-
some weak or careless act of an insurgent, an unannounced. curfew or
document check, the compromise of a courier, or a natural disaster.
Gompartmentation
The leaders of an insurgency make every effort to win public recogni-
tion for their cause and objectives. One means they use is to carry
out propaganda activities in large communities. They accept thereby
the threat from urban police and security forces, who attend their
public rallies and get copies of their flysheets and pamphlets. They
anticipate the casualty list which follows from each night's wall-
painting or window-breaking. They sign petitions to parliament
demanding redress of wrongs. They do not seek anonymity, but
are eager to be heard and talked about in the market place. They
even lay claim to the achievements of competitive groups when these
earn public approval. They turn failure to advantage if it can serve
to arouse the sympathy of the people, proclaiming their martyrs to
the cause of freedom.
They do these things because the future success of the insurgency
depends on the establishment of a broad popular base, but there is a
contradiction between the importance of security and this need for
numbers. Mao Tse-tung recognized the paradox but did not resolve
it when he wrote that although closed-door sectarianism was im-
permissible, vigilance against infiltration of the ranks was essential.;
The contradiction is in practice resolved by compartmenting overt
from clandestine activities, though coordinating the steps in each, and
minimizing the possibility of compromise for the secret cadres.
Because of the sensitive organizational knowledge held by an area
coordinator, the fewer people who know his identity, functions, or
business or home address, the better his security and that of the
groups for which he is responsible. "Street" and secret cells are
established in both the city and the countryside. The members of a
street cell do not know the identities of their colleagues in the secret
cell. The members of the secret cell may learn the identities of those
'Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works. (New York: International Publishers, 1954.)
Vol. 2, p. 249.
Ap bved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDPW +J4k(60 f 10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Insurgent Counterintelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
whose overt duties get their names into the papers, but the reverse
should not be true. The identity of the secret coordinator is similarly
unknown to the leader of a street cell; each is required to report
separately to a central committee.
As a safeguard against possible compromises among the secret
cadres General Bayo recommended that an urban underground be
divided into cells of no more than three persons. He warned against
having cells of eight to ten men each, some of whom also served as
chiefs of lesser units.4 His proposed figure, however, does not take
into account the security hazard to an organization in which one
of every three persons communicates with higher echelon. Under
this arrangement an urban coordinator must communicate with seven
of every twenty-one persons working under his direction. He can
reduce these heavy communication needs by adopting a cell of seven,
so that he deals with only three persons out of twenty-one.
For field guerrilla units General Bayo proposed no more than ten
to twenty men per cell: "The smaller the number, the greater the
mobility." s These figures are particularly applicable to the Andean
regions of South America. A larger group would find it difficult to
conceal its members for any useful length of time from the gossips of
the Indian communities. The guerrilla chief would have difficulty
controlling his group. And forage is scarce and the Indians poor.
Topography determines the size of field units in the Peruvian sierra.
Security with Recruits
In the field, in order to preserve the security of guerrilla camps,
the initial training-assessment of guerrilla volunteers is usually carried
out by street-type units which operate under the guise of sports clubs.
Yet the security of these units is critical. It is difficult to conceal
the absence of young men from their villages or fields for any extended
period of time. Their lack of discipline, their status as weekend war-
riors, and the possibilities of dissatisfaction or defection are matters
of great concern. Therefore instructors are brought to the training
camps from the cities or from another country to work under aliases
with students whose true names they do not know. Classes are held
at night in areas remote from main settlements. The students are
kept for one or two hours at the most, or only for as many minutes
`Ibid., p. 45.
'Ibid., p. 20.
Appr 9 4 F9694'1605/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A0003000fd001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Insurgent Counterintelligence
as they might spend away from their own villages visiting friends.
The stated purpose of the instruction is training in guerrilla warfare,
but at this stage the main aim is assessment of the student.
The urgent task of a training cell coordinator is to satisfy himself
about the reliability and personal security of a volunteer, He tries to
learn as much as possible' about the man during the few hours he has
him under observation. Might he really be working for the govern-
ment? In any case can one trust him with secrets? With money-
or the lives of others? What is his motivation?
The coordinator's assessment constitutes the first line of defense
against police penetration of the insurgent organization. And if the
police manage to penetrate his training group they will encounter
many safeguards set up to limit damage to the movement.
In advance of the training-assessment, investigation and surveillance
are essential for checking the bona fides of volunteers. For this work
the organization selects individuals who have or can build a suitable
cover. They may work under the cover of beggars or in the guise
of persons seeking employment. The investigator asking questions
about the candidate may do so under the pretext of collecting a debt
or of selling goods or services to homes in the neighborhood.
In a typical case an investigator who has the job of checking a
volunteer's background will first find out where he lives and talk to
shopkeepers in the immediate neighborhood, corner news vendors,
barbers, and coffee boys in nearby cafes. He tries to elicit com-
ments that point to lines for further investigation: "The police often
talked to him, though his mother says he has been in no trouble."
"He applied for a government job and then went away." "He owed
me much money and ran off." Then the investigator will report to
his superiors and intensify his inquiry. His search for information
is no less thorough and frequently more so than that of government
investigators. The insurgent organization has more at stake.
Communications Security
Communications are the most sensitive element in any secret ac-
tivity. If an adversary gains control over one of the links in a com-
munications net it can monitor or exploit a group's transmissions,
rendering the work of the group hazardous or useless and collecting
leads for further penetrations. For this reason an insurgent organiza-
tion must have arrangements whereby funds, material, instructions,
AppAdved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDPnMtJAdp 03?0,'40001-1
 Approved For Release 200(05/16: CIA-RDP78T8~3F11UA0q9,108fRGp1-1
Insurgent Counterintelligence
and reports can be passed among its members with a high level of
security. It may use personal contact, mail, telephone, telegraph,
newspaper advertisements, couriers, drops, and signs or signals con-
cealed from the general public, but it observes the principles of
communication which are gospel to illegal groups throughout the
world.
It uses codes and cover names in both oral and written comimunica-
tions. It conceals the identities and missions of its couriers from
echelons which have no need to know them. The couriers use a
cover which fits their background and skills. They set up alternative
meeting sites in any plan for contact, and they give signals to indicate
an absence of danger before going ahead with a meeting. Similarly,
the organization may transmit a broader warning to its people by
simply refraining from an otherwise indicated action. It may direct
that compromising materials be passed by means of drops even when
it has authorized a personal contact between the members in question.
Or it may order that personal meetings be held to a minimum even
when the participants have plausible social or business reasons to
meet: what seem good ostensible reasons to them may not be readily
apparent to a police observer.
The significance of these precautions should be evident. Unless
the police get the details of a prisoner's safety signal, he can, when
they release him under their concealed control, warn an approaching
colleague of danger just by taking no action to indicate its absence.
Or if the police do not learn in time about a prisoner's next regularly
scheduled meeting, his failure to make it will warn his headquarters
of trouble. Or failure of a scheduled safety check which requires his
presence at a specified place and time for observation by insurgent
surveillants may give the warning.
Insurgents generally avoid the use of the mails for sensitive com-
munications. They may send innocuous messages by telephone or
telegraph to signal the safe arrival of a member or to request a per-
sonal contact, but they prefer to keep in touch by courier. A courier
can see his contact, satisfy himself that the man is not in. custody,
conduct a countersurveillance to ensure that he is "clean," assess his
behavior for the enlightenment of the leaders, and give instructions
orally in more detail than a letter can.
The insurgents often use drops for the transmission of funds, in-
structions, or material. These drops need not have a KGB sophistica-
tion if they serve to conceal the act of communication. They may be
OFFICIAL USE ONLY 43
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Ap roved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Insurgent Counterintelligence
a hole in a tree, a hollow under a stone, or a crevice in a wall. Or a
fruit jar buried in a field, a flower vase in a cemetery, or a. kilometer
marker on a desert road. They need only to be places to which both
parties have normal access and can devise acceptable cover stories
to approach.
Names and Identities
It is a common practice for members of illegal groups to use war
names to help conceal their true identities from colleagues and ul-
timately from security forces. Peruvian security police must have
spent long hours in their analysis of a message they found among the
personal effects of a prisoner:
Tell D-1 that B-145 will arrive tomorrow morning at 12 noon en Canadian
Pacific. Tell him to alert Grity, Malla, Maruja, Pasch, Hilda that all is well."
The war name is used in secret oral and written communications-
in messages, in discussions at cell meetings or around campfires, some-
times in formal reports in place of numbers. It should not be on
personal documents or in pocket litter. If compromised, it is changed.
A war name may or may not match the sex of its bearer. It should
not link a man to a trade or a region. It may be a full name-Jose
Armand Dubois-or simply Armand. It may be "Saxon" only if its
bearer is not from Saxony; "Quasimodo" if he is not a hunchback;
"Stupid" if he is not.
A change of war names creates problems for the police. They can
learn of one name through penetration of enemy communications
or from careless talk by members of the insurgency, record it, and
begin to build a profile of the bearer. But a change vitiates these
records. It leads to inaccurate estimates of insurgent strength or,
more seriously, to confusion of identities. The police find themselves
wondering if Jose has replaced Juan as the leader of a unit, or
indeed whether Juan was ever the leader, or if Jose and Juan are pos-
sibly identical. From this uncertainty the insurgents gain a measure
of security.
The insurgent organization, for its part, makes every effort to iden-
tify individual police officers, police informants, and hostile installa-
tions. It prepares lists of such individuals and installations and briefs
its couriers and action units to avoid them. It avoids putting a safe-
site in the area of a police or security establishment. It directs a
Correo (Lima, Peru), 9 January 1964, p. 2.
Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RgfR&iiY i&0 b'6010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP77TAJ'~JeA8ff38S11O001-1
Insurgent Counterintelligence V
threatened unit to move to a place more remote from such an establish-
ment. A courier is given the physical description of a security official
operating on his route so that if he is caught he knows whether he is
in the hands of security personnel or less dangerous adversaries.
Controls over Cadres
The insurgent organization usually imposes travel restrictions on its
cadres and couriers. It warns them against carrying documents which
conflict with agreed cover stories. It emphasizes the value of story-
confirming pocket litter, such as a letter from the family requesting
that their son return home (a usual explanation for travel) or match
boxes from a hotel where the traveller claims to have stayed. It
finances small purchases of hardware or food from the town in which
he claims past residence, or of materials related to his professed
occupation, and has him carry the receipts for these purchases.
The organization creates a system whereby one member of a cell
or guerrilla unit is responsible for knowing the whereabouts of a col-
league at all times. On occasion it checks the whereabouts of some
particular member. It may send a coded telegram directing him to
report to a specified address. It may telephone his residence from
a pay booth to see whether he is home. It may send a courier, if he
lives in a distant province, with an order that he report to the capital
city. If he is absent from his assigned post without cause, the leaders
order an investigation.
In an insurgency the problems of control are intrinsic, far surpassing
those encountered by the government in its secret work. It is part
of the secret insurgent's business to know how to cover unauthorized
or illegal ventures with plausible explanations. Before he opens his
door to step forth on a secret action he has readied multiple cover
arrangements. (He is going to buy bread or pay an account at the
cafe. But on the way he passes an old wall, and if there is a sign
on it he must service a drop a block from the town plaza. The way
to this drop is fortunately also the way to an old friend's house, so he
is covered at every point.) He lives in a world of security arrange-
ments and survives by observing them. If the police recruit him, he
has only changed sponsors, not this security way of life. The in-
surgent leaders have a constant concern over this possibility-. They
cannot object to a suspect's covering his movements and engaging
in practices they have taught him to be essential to good security.
45
Appro\,Qhese 10/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
 AppraF ICd IAI Release 2005/05/16 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1 USE ONLY Insurgent Counterintelligence
They must therefore refine their controls and devise tests to assess
his reliability.
Some tests are simple. The leaders may give Jose letters to mail
to Alberto. By instruction Alberto returns these unopened. Had
Jose opened the letters? They may direct Jose to service a drop con-
taining a specified sum of money. Jose finds in the drop a sum
far in excess of what he was told to expect. Does he turn it all over,
or only the specified sum? They may order Jose to take a trip. Dur-
ing his absence a team searches his house or room for any records
he may have kept in violation of secrecy rules. It also assesses his
household possessions against his known income. If it finds nothing
it may leave some clear evidence of its search. Does Jose report a
suspicion that his quarters were searched in his absence?
The leaders may write Jose a letter as though from the security
police and ask his cooperation. They include a sum cf money as
evidence of good faith and give instructions for future contact. Does
Jose report this attempt at recruitment? Does he hand over the
letter and the right amount of money? They may place him under
carefully concealed surveillance for a period of time and then ask
him to submit a written report on his activities and contacts during
that time. What items does his report omit? They may brief him
on an impending violent action against the government and then
surveil its site. Have the police been warned? 7
The courage, patience, and altertness of members can he tested by
other devices. But the all-important thing is reliability and honesty.
In a sense, with this need to he sure of the full loyalty of its people,
the insurgent organization thrives on suspicion. Yet the pressure of
its controls breeds discontent among members. When malcontents or
traitors are uncovered, the leaders reemphasize the rules of conduct
and establish new levels of severity which further disgruntle the
membership. At the same time, however, these restrictions and con-
trols do make the life of an agent who penetrates the group both
difficult and hazardous, and his case officer must have a thorough
knowledge of the protective tactics used by the dissident leaders.
'These techniques and many other aspects of insurgent modus operandi herein
cited are described in Andrew T. Molnar, et. al., Undergrounds in Insurgent, Revo-
lutionary, and Resistance Warfare. (Special Operations Research Office, The
American University, Washington, D. C., 1963.) pp. 33-34 et passim.
46
Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RD *9 ?0 6'10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
Insurgent Counterintelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The Uninvited
The insurgent takes measures to guard his camp or cell against
those who come uninvited to the door. He extends a cautious wel-
come to any newcomer and examines the man's credentials with care.
In the world of counterintelligence no one assumes he knows whom
he is dealing with.
When camp outguards intercept a newcomer they follow a pre-
arranged reception plan. They usually take him to a site removed
from the main camp. They get his full name, address, occupation,
the route by which he came, the identity of anyone who may have
directed him to the camp, and the whereabouts of his family. They
ask who knew of his intention to come. They ask what his friends,
family, or employer think he is doing now.
The camp chief checks the man's biographic data against the
knowledge possessed by members of his command. If he claims to
be a fisherman from a particular village, and if there is a guerrilla
in the camp who knows the people and principal officials of that
village, the story can be readily checked. If he claims to have walked
there by a particular route, his shoes are checked against that claim.
If he says he was directed there by a friend sympathetic to the move-
ment, the friend's identity will be checked by investigative personnel
in the place concerned.
Clothing is given the newcomer in exchange for what he wore
when he came. Guards check the latter for labels, quality, markings,
wear, and travel stain as evidence to support or refute his story. They
check letters, identity or voter registration cards, matchbooks, and
cigarettes. They may check his health and appearance against their
estimate ,of the wear and tear of his professed occupation and recent
experience. The guards who live with him at the processing camp
make every effort to get him to talk freely. They talk about the area
he came from, question him concerning his likes and dislikes, and
comment on true and notional personalities in his home village.. Does
he truly know the mayor of the village? Does he also know one
Senor Gasco de Barmas--a creature of their imagination? Has he
really been in that small bar to the right of the alley of women?
Conversely, the guards avoid talking about the number, equipment,
supplies, plans, activities, or true identities of the guerrillas. They
use their war names in conversation. They do not discuss other
members of the group, their comings and goings, or their problems.
Appro& cfl k2ggis@ t5/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A00030001dV01-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Insurgent Counterintelligence
The camp chief sends the details of the newcomer's story to an area
coordinator for investigation. If no information is turned up to refute
the story he may then direct him to report to a training camp. When
the man is gone he moves his command to another site, since its loca-
tion had become known to a person of unproved reliability.
If the area coordinator concludes from his investigation that there
is reason to doubt the volunteer's bona fides, he may order the camp
chief simply to desert the suspect as he moves his group to the other
site. Or put him in charge of a remote, unused camp site and leave
him there. This is a very good thing to do. If the boy works for the
police he has no contact with them now and we can move freely
out of the area. The boy guards an old camp of straw- huts and
latrines. He believes that we will return and take him with us. But
the camp is very far away from any village. He dares not leave to
make contact with the police because who knows when we might
return? So he sits out the days. Or the area coordinator may, finally,
direct that the suspect be escorted to a point near the city, where he
can be tricked into an overseas trip for "training," i.e., interrogation
under control.
A camp chief must be concerned about the presence in his area
of any competitive groups of dissidents. He remembers that Fidel
Castro, as dictator, had some success in establishing state-controlled
guerrilla groups which served as magnets to draw the discontented,
the dissident, or the disillusioned to their graves. Or he remembers
groups which volunteered to join his own but then brought problems
of command which he could not control. If he discovers that he has
a genuinely competitive though friendly group as a neighbor, his
worries are not less. It may not have good security, may not be
careful in assessing its membership. He cannot afford to be caught
in a counterinsurgency sweep even though he may not be its target.
Once, said the boy, some fishermen gave me a ride in their boat.
did not know they were smugglers. The police caught is all-but
it was me they tortured.
A camp chief must beware of hunters or zoologists who roam his
area. They may report his presence to the police. He must also
beware of the local peasants' penchant for gossip; the civil guard has
long ears. At the same time he must keep the peasants' favor, since
he cannot survive their enmity. In anticipation of the eventualities
lie readies alternative camp sites for use by his group. At a time of
ApW$oved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDF SAID006W10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Insurgent Counterintelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
danger he may move his people to one of these or, with central com-
mittee approval, disband the force and direct its members to fade
into the cities and villages.
The Counterintelligence Organization
The guerrilla chief and the area coordinator have prime responsi-
bility for the counterintelligence effort. General Bayo felt so strongly
about the contribution of counterintelligence to the revolutionary
movement that he recommended the second in command be put in
charge of it. The counterintelligence organization is responsible for
the security of the movement's personnel, assets, and activities. It
acquires sources to report on hostile security organizations and com-
petitive groups, maintains appropriate records, and isolates and in-
terrogates hostile agents. Ordinary members of the movement know
that it has a counterintelligence capability, but not what assets are
involved; the counterintelligence personnel are concealed from the
rank and file.
The counterintelligence program usually includes periodic lectures
on security discipline, spot surveillance of personnel, and provocative
tests of loyalty. An effective program which can strengthen the
group as a whole provides for each cell to appoint one of its members
secretary for discipline. This member is charged with enforcing
the .decrees of the central committee and maintaining an acceptable
level of security. He gives lectures, ensures the security of cell
meetings, reports secrecy violations to the cell chief for transmittal
to higher echelon, and carries out other security and counterintelli-
gence tasks as assigned by the central committee.
The Tainted
The insurgent organization also safeguards its security by taking
prompt and effective action against suspect members and newly re-
leased prisoners. When a member is arrested it orders his immediate
colleagues into hiding. It seals off the activities in which he was in-
volved, changes communication systems known to him, and sends
his family to a safesite. After taking these immediate protective
measures it analyzes the circumstances of his arrest. It investigates
anyone who might for some reason have reported him to the police.
It questions his wife to assess her attitude toward him. It may, if
time permits and a preliminary analysis does not warn against it,
search his home and examine his personal effects to satisfy itself
ApproQVQ& a sP 5/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010~1-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Insurgent Counterintelligence
that no record of his activities is there. If his knowledge includes
matters of an unusually sensitive nature, it may take action to deny
the government the advantage of it-a smash-and-grab raid, or pre-
ventive executive action against the prisoner himself.
Each member of an insurgency is instructed in advance on what
steps he should take on release from prison. He should make no
written or oral contact with his group but proceed to a designated
point at a time set for this purpose. If countersurveilh.nce shows
no hostile coverage of the former prisoner, the counterintelligence unit
will pick him up and take him to a rendezvous from which a second
group will transport him to a safesite for interrogation. This pattern
of countersurveillance and reacquisition is standard procedure. The
safeguards are obvious.
At the safesite counterintelligence specialists question their colleague
in detail. When and where was he arrested? Who were the arrest-
ing officers? What charges did they levy against him? Was any-
one arrested with him? Where was he taken? What questions were
asked? Was he shown photographs of individuals to identify? Whom
did he identify? Was he given maps on which to pinpoint facilities?
What safesites or communications did he reveal? Was he asked
to cooperate with the police? What did the police promise him?
Was he forced to cooperate? (A man can be brave but need not be
foolish, they tell him. If he was forced to talk, they know he did
so from prudence and not from fear or greed.) But what did they
promise him? Where was he jailed? How does he know? What
were the names of his guards? How does he know? Was he in-
deed tortured? Did he have a cell mate? What was his name?
O id they engage in conversation? What was said? Now, where
did he go upon release? Whom did he talk to? What did he tell
the neighbors? Whom did he try to contact? How?
It is important to know what the charges were against the member
and who his jailor was. If the charge is black market dealing and
the arresting authority the financial police, the insurgent group's
problems may be less serious than they might have been. Although
a member who deals in the black market for personal gain is not
one to be trusted. financial police do not generally have the same
level of competence as the security forces. Their interests do not
usually impinge on the very security of the state and they are not
skilled interrogators-and only determined and experienced officers
can get critical information from members of a well-run insurgency.
Ap 11oved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RD t94)M QQ'Q10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Insurgent Counterintelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
It is also important that the group know what its colleague may
have revealed of its interests. Unless he is part of the central com-
mittee, a member does not usually know how sensitive each item of
information he possesses is. He may, like Ito Ritsu, whose red-herring
revelation ultimately led the Japanese police to Richard Sorge, give
his captors the name of a person whom he believes is expendable.
If the dissident movement believes its colleague behaved correctly,
it will order him to return home and lie low for a period of time. It
may permit his family to rejoin him, since that would be normal.
It will direct him to cease all contact with the movement until in-
formed to the contrary, and it alerts its membership to this effect.
It then checks the details of his story through various counterintelli-
gence assets. If it comes to believe that the man has turned against
the movement, it may redouble him, turning him back against the
police, or order him to leave the country illegally and go to Cuba
for "his own security," i.e. liquidation.
General Bayo recommends the execution of traitors in these cir-
cumstances. Although this worked in Castro's insurgency it is not
always the end of the victim's influence. An execution in the home
country leaves emotional scars and memories which return to haunt
the executioner. But death by accident in another country, while
on a mission for the movement, provides inspiration for those who
remain behind. Counterintelligence disposes of a threat and gains
a hero.
Instead of by killing, a police agent may be blocked by provoca-
tion. Once we learned that a shopkeeper in our city worked as an in-
formant for the police. We decided to destroy him But how? To
kill was easy. But the police would investigate. They would, of
course, know why he was killed. Some of our people would be picked
up as suspects. They would be hurt. They were brave, but they
might talk. It would be a mistake. We thought of other things.
One of us thought of something that was very good. The informer
was a good family man. A bad person, but a good family man. He
had one child, a four-year-old girl. She had white hair and blue eyes.
He loved her very much. We often saw him buy her ice cream, and
then they would walk home together. We bought a doll that had
blue eyes and white hair. We dressed it in white. It was very beauti-
ful. We crushed its head with a rock and put it on the doorstep
of his house and rang the bell. We ran off and into a building from
where we could watch. He came to the door. At first he looked
Appro9~Slpd' IR ~sQ~b~5/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300016 01-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Insurgent Counterintelligence
around, I think a little afraid. And then he saw the doll. He shut
the door very quickly. The next day he left with his wife and child
for the capital. He did not return. He did not pay his servants;
they were very angry. The police arrested no one.
The insurgency makes every effort to place its informants as serv-
ants in the homes of police officers, in police clubs, or with other
hostile personalities. The value of such plants is evident. They can
get useful information from dinner conversations or by answering the
telephone in the absence of their master or by monitoring his mail.
The movement also uses money or persuasion to acquire informants
in opposition political groups or security organizations. Since the
conditions which give rise to the insurgency also affect the living
standards and hopes of the noncommitted, opportunities for recruit-
ment of sources in hostile groups are many. A little money, a little
uncertainty, a little fear-and we find friends. We. even make friends
in prison. If I am detained I am authorized to offer so many dollars
to my guard. If he doubts the validity of this offer, because I seem
poor and dirty, I let him see a part of the sum. Not from me, but
from the committee. That the committee can offer such a sum, small
to us but great to him, makes an impression. He leaves the question
open and an open mind for the future. We do not press. The next
time he has more trust.
You see, we build trust in people. Only the police destroy; we
build. Soon this guard, because he likes money, and because he
has learned to respect our work, and maybe because he fears us just
a little bit, is cooperative. He passes information which may or may
not be important. What is important is the fact that he passes it.
To know that your family will be permitted to visit you in prison is
not a great thing, for example. But the fact that the guard tells you
this is important. He has taken a step, a first step.
Penetration of competitive political groups is not a major problem.
Since these are aiming in part at the same goals, an organization which
has contacts abroad and funds at hand finds congenial spirits among
such competitors. An aggressive leadership, a record of publicly ac-
knowledged accomplishment, or a known plan for the future often
suffices to ease the conscience of selected competitors who cooperate,
telling themselves that the means to an end are not important.
App*ved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP Q*4M??0MY10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Insurgent Counterintelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Thus the insurgent organization takes certain protective measures
to counter the espionage and disruptive efforts of opposing forces.
These measures are designed to conceal its organization, plans, per-
sonnel, assets, and activities from hostile penetration. Since, how-
ever, defensive measures cannot by themselves ensure security, it
assigns counterintelligence personnel the task of learning about the
plans, personnel, operations, assets, and organization of its adversaries.
These counter-efforts are often the first significant contact between
the contending forces. They precede open skirmishes in the field;
they are a prelude to any war for national liberation. On this plane,
and at this time, the fate of the opposing factions is often decided.
ApprovQIS'P6'? P,M?gas9 fl65/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A00030001( 1-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL
No Foreign Dissem
The fleshing out and some
wobbly first steps as CIG.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER SOUERS
Arthur B. Darling i
The first Director of Central Intelligence was well aware of the
latent power bestowed on this office by the President's Directive of
January 22, 1946. Admiral Souers wished to see the functions of
the Director mature under the guidance of the departmental secre-
taries and the personal representative of the President who constituted
the National Intelligence Authority. But he also knew that many
in the Army, the Navy, and the Department of State were still re-
sisting every thought of a central intelligence organization which
might overpower their own intelligence agencies. The Authority, the
Director, and the Central Intelligence Group were bolstered by no
supporting legislation from the Congress. They rested only upon this
Directive by the President to the Secretaries of State, War, and the
Navy. And the President's legal authority to issue the Directive was,
with the expiration of his wartime powers, at best questionable. Souers
appreciated that this was no time to foster misgiving or animosity.
No rough waters should be raised as Congress approached a reorgani-
zation of the national military establishment in which the central in-
telligence system would have a part.
Admiral Souers' immediate objective was to get the CIG estab-
lished and in operation as a small body of experts drawn propor-
tionately from the departments and serving the departments under
supervision and control of the department heads in the National In-
telligence Authority. The power inherent in the DCI's duties and re-
sponsibilities should wait until later for development. Moreover,
Souers did not accept Donovan's principle that the DCI should ever
be independent of the departmental secretaries, equal if not superior
to them, and responsible directly to the President .2 He believed that
1 Adapted from a history of the Central Intelligence Agency prepared by the
author in 1953. For preceding installments see Studies VIII 3, p. 55 if, and X 2,
p. 1 if.
' See the author's "The Birth of Central Intelligence," Studies X 2, p. 2, for a
summary statement of Donovan's concepts.
Appr P TJk6se 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A0003000f(6001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 55-74
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
such independence would not place the Director close to the Presi-
dent, but would tend in fact to isolate him from the President. An
independent DCI would discover that often he and his agency were
shut off from the President by the interests and representations of the
departments. Through their prestige and functions they were likely
to have greater power, at least of obstruction.
As a practical matter, in politics and the science of government,
such an extraordinary officer as the DCI needed, in Souers' view, the
company of other officials. On occasion he might find their opposi-
tion almost as useful as their assent. His position might become
clearer and stronger, at least it would command attention, because
it had to be formally opposed. An independent Director of eminence
and exceptional force might realize Donovan's concept, by-passing
the departments to deal directly with the President, regardless of
obstruction. But even such a Director would have to keep ever-
lastingly at it, and he would always have a hidden war on his hands.
The time for a DCI with those attributes was not at the start of the
new organization in February 1946. It might not survive the battle.
A Cooperative Formed
It was Admiral Souers' nature to remove issues rather than to create
them. And like Eberstadt, he was mindful of the benefits which might
be obtained from "parallel, competitive, and sometimes conflicting
efforts." 3 According to the President's Directive, which he himself
had shared in writing, the persons assigned from the departments
were "collectively" to form the Central Intelligence Group. His draft
on February 4 of the first directive to himself from the National In-
telligence Authority, therefore, declared that CIG should be or-
ganized and operated as "a cooperative interdepartmental activity."
There should be in it "adequate and equitable participation" by the
State, War, and Navy Departments and by other agencies as approved
by the Authority. The Army Air Forces should have representation
on the same basis as Army and Navy; there was likely soon to be a
Department of Air.
Those in the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of justice
who watched legalities were uneasy about the dubious validity of
the President's Directive. The draft of an executive order, approved
' From Eberstadt's study for Forrestal of the proposed merger of the War and
Navy departments. Souers had written the military intelligence section of this
report. See ibid., p. 10.
Appr Wed For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO313MNMBW640001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
CIG Under Souers CONFIDENTIAL
by Acting Attorney General J. Howard McGrath, was ready in Feb-
ruary to replace the Directive. The view of the National Intelligence
Authority was that no impediment had so far been encountered in
carrying out the Directive, but there was no objection to having an
executive order as well, if its effect were to "confirm and formalize"
the status of the Authority and the CIG as a "cooperative interdepart-
mental activity, rather than a new or independent agency requiring
legislation for its existence."
The questionable rationale for regarding it as a joint activity rather
than an agency rested on the fact that personnel and funds were to be
contributed by the participating departments. It should be noted,
however, that administrative chaos would have been the result of
trying to administer it on a joint basis. The departmental secre-
taries therefore had to empower the Director of Central Intelligence
to exercise the same authorities over the funds made available to him
as they themselves could exercise. Thus the effect was to create
an operating agency.
Further discussion and study of the question continued through the
spring. By May 23rd all parties were willing to accept the above
rationale and let the Directive stand for the time being. No one in
the Executive Branch was going to raise the issue publicly and
formally; and the Comptroller General, who could have done so,
agreed with the need for the organization and was willing to let it
proceed until legislation could be obtained. Until superseded the
following year by the Central Intelligence Agency, established by act
of Congress, CIG therefore rested upon the President's authority under
the Constitution, with no particular reference to his war power, in
the face of a statute that prohibited the establishment of an operating
agency except by legislation.
To satisfy President Truman's wish that CIG should bring all in-
telligence activities into coordination and harmony, the first NIA
directive constituted of the departmental intelligence chiefs an In-
telligence Advisory Board, and Admiral Souers planned to keep its
composition flexible. Its membership, in addition to the chief in-
telligence officers from the Departments of State, War, and the Navy
and the Army Air Forces, should include representatives from other
agencies of the government at the Director's invitation. This gave
room for the Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, to have a
representative present on questions of internal security or the collec-
tion of intelligence in Latin America.
Approved or F eTease 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300 0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
Having the same purpose of coordination in mind, Admiral Souers
preferred in the beginning to name ad hoc committees to study and
report on specific problems of interdepartmental concern. The com-
mittee members would represent the permanent departmental mem-
bers of the Intelligence Advisory Board, with a chairman drawn from
CIG to act as "coordinator." In theory this procedure promised the
greatest cooperation and harmony possible. The practical difficulty
of obtaining the representatives from the departments to man the
ad hoc committees and to accomplish their work in time, however,
was discouraging. Sowers soon turned to his Central Planning Staff
to handle such problems.
It was going to be none too easy to apportion out CIG appointments
among the departments and secure persons both competent and in-
clined to enter the central intelligence service. But Admiral Souers
did not find it hard to fill his top positions. Kingman Douglass, who
had been a representative of the Air Forces at the Air Ministry in
London and knew much about the British system, became Assistant
Director and Acting Deputy Director. Captain William B. Goggins
came with intelligence experience from the Navy to head the Central
Planning Staff. In April Souers would appoint Colonel Louis J. Fortier
Assistant Director and Acting Chief of Operational Services. He had
served on the Joint Intelligence Staff for the Army and had just
finished chairing a study of the clandestine operational assets left
by the OSS and now held in escrow in the War Department as its
Strategic Services Unit.4
Souers obtained James S. Lay, Jr., from the State Department to
be Secretary of the Authority and of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
Lay had been Secretary to the joint Intelligence Committee of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ludwell L. Montague also came from State
to head the Central Reports Staff. He had been Secretary of the
Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Committee in the fall of 1941, then
Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and a senior Army member of its joint Intelligence Staff through-
out the war. Both Lay and Montague had participated in the dis-
cussions which had contributed, along with Donovan's "principles"
and Magruder's thinking, to the eventual formulation of the Presi-
dent's Directive. They had been chosen by Alfred McCormack for
'In July, after General Hoyt Vandenberg took over as DCI, both Douglass and
Goggins were transferred to positions under Fortier's successor, Colonel Donald H.
Galloway.
Appro d For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0319ZQbW11 bU1 01-1
 Approv"SQr Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
n er ouers CONFIDENTIAL
his prospective central intelligence system under the State Depart-
ment.6 Both were expert in the work which the new CIG was to
undertake and qualified to aid Souers immediately, as they did, in
writing the directives of the National Intelligence Authority. CIG
had begun to take form on January 25.
Operational Information
The draft of the first directive to Souers in February followed the
general design of the President's Directive of January 22.6 But there
was one clause in the draft so filled with past controversy and indica-
tive of more to come that it did not appear in the directive as finally
adopted by the NIA. Article 7 of the draft submitted by Admiral
Souers stipulated that the DCI should have "all necessary facilities,
intelligence, and information in the possession of our respective de-
partments, including necessary information as to policies, plans,
actions, capabilities, and intentions of the United States with reference
to foreign countries." At Souers' own suggestion, the clause con-
cerning the capabilities and intentions of the United States was stricken
from the draft in the first meeting of the NIA on February 5, 1946.
There was no explanation in the minutes, but one can reconstruct
the reasons.
It is easy to presume that those who had been so reluctant to
give the Office of Strategic Services and its Research and Analysis
.Branch access to strategic information 7 were no more willing now to
supply to the new DCI knowledge of their own capabilities and
intentions. And at the first intimation that the specific inclusion of
this provision might stir resistance in the armed services over their
right to withhold "operational" matters, Admiral Souers preferred to
remove the statement with no argument. The beginning of the CIG
was precarious enough without inviting trouble that could be post-
poned. According to Souers, the Army and the Navy both under-
stood that he was entitled by the President's Directive to have all
intelligence in their possession. From their point of view, he said,
information about "policies, plans, actions, capabilities, and intentions
of the United States" was not intelligence. In their thinking, the new
'For McCormack's plan, as opposed to that for an independent or at least
interdepartmental central intelligence, see "The Birth of Central Intelligence,"
Studies X 2, pp. 6-10.
For a resume of the Directive's provisions see ibid., pp. 17-19.
See the author's "Origins of Central Intelligence," Studies VIII 3, pp. 62-65.
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00030001a801-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
Central Intelligence Group was expected to purvey all its knowledge
to the departments, but the reverse was not entirely true, particularly
with respect to "operational" information.
Close examination of Article 7 as issued in final form by the NIA
nevertheless reveals that the Authority gave to the DCI the right
to have "as required in the performance" of his authorized mission,
"all necessary facilities, intelligence, and information" in the posses-
sion of the departments. This distinguished "intelligence" from "in-
formation" but applied to both the unequivocal "all," modified only
by the requirements of the CIG mission. That mission, as stated in
Article 2 of the directive, included furnishing "strategic and national
policy intelligence to the President and the State, War, and Navy
Departments." And knowledge of the nation's own capabilities enters
into the intelligence which is necessary to determine the policy for
maintaining the nation's security. The requirement of an effective
national estimate is that it shall be compounded from all facts to be
had from every available source.
Dissents
Article 3 of the first directive to Souers stipulated that 'all recom-
mendations" of the DCI should be referred to the Intelligence Advisory
Board "for concurrence or comment" prior to submission to the Au-
thority. If a member of the IAB did not concur, the Director was to
submit with his recommendation the member's explanation of his non-
concurrence. Only if the IAB approved the Director's recommenda-
tion unanimously might he put it into effect without action by the
Authority.
The Lovett Committee 8 had proposed such a procedure for national
estimates to safeguard the interests of the departmental intelligence
services as they came under the coordinating power of the central
intelligence organization. William H. Jackson's letter to Secretary
Forrestal contained a similar provision." But this stipulation, which
eventually became established practice in estimating, was to be, in
its application to "recommendations," the center of controversy be-
'Set up in the War Department on October 22, 1945, to study the diverse pro-
posals for centralizing intelligence. Its report did much to crystalize interdepart-
mental thinking and led directly to the President's Directive of 22 January. See
"The Birth of Central Intelligence," Studies X 2, pp. 8, 12-14.
9Ibid., pp. 12-13.
App ved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0~4~OOD300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T031 C
CIG Under Souers ~El11R001-1
tween subsequent DCIs and the IAB over the administration of the
CIG and its successor CIA. The chiefs of departmental intelligence
used it to try to make themselves the governing board of the "coopera-
tive interdepartmental activity." If they had their wish, it was not to
be an independent agency.
Secretary Byrnes, just returned from London, presided over the
first meeting of the NIA on February 5, 1946. Byrnes wished to make
it clear at once that the Department of State was responsible for report-
ing to the President on matters of foreign policy. And this included
performing the service that the President himself had expressly desig-
nated the first duty of the new CIG: Instead of the piles of cables,
dispatches, and reports on his desk, President Truman wanted a daily
summary that was comprehensive. He wished to be rid of the
mass of papers, and yet to be certain that nothing significant had
been left out.
Admiral Souers endeavored to reassure Secretary Byrnes that the
President expected the DCI only to have the cables and dispatches
digested; there was no intention that the information should be inter-
preted to advise the President on matters of foreign policy. The Sec-
retary nevertheless pressed the point that it was his function to supply
the President with information upon which to base his conclusions.
Admiral Leahy entered the discussion as the personal representative of
the President; information from all three departments, he said, should
be summarized in order to keep the President currently informed.
Byrnes replied that Admiral Souers would not be representing the
viewpoint of any of the departments; any man assigned to GIG from a
department would be responsible to the DCI.
Secretary Byrnes felt so strongly about the matter that he appealed
to the President personally on behalf of the Department of State.
According to the recollection of Admiral Souers, his argument ran
along the line that a digest of incoming dispatches was not intelligence
within the jurisdiction of the CIG. President Truman said it might
not be generally considered intelligence, but it was information which
he needed and therefore it was intelligence to him. It was agreed in
the end that the CIG daily summaries should be "factual statements."
The Department of State prepared its own digest, so the President
had two summaries on his desk. From his point of view, that was at
least some improvement.
CONFIDENTIAL 61
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL C1G Under Souers
Central Planning, March-June 1946
The Central Planning Staff, drawn from the department;, was to be
sensitive to the interests of them all. It should assist the Director in
preparing recommendations with regard to policies and objectives for
the whole "national intelligence mission," according to the second
NIA directive of February 8. Admiral Souers advised Captain Goggins
on March 4 that "as a general rule, the Staff should take the active
leadership in arranging and conducting interdepartmental studies."
One of its members should participate and act as coordinator in all
meetings concerning foreign intelligence related to the national security.
As the use of ad hoc interdepartmental committees proved difficult,
the Central Planning Staff was soon loaded with orders for investigation
and report upon a variety of subjects that were intricate and sweeping.
The Staff had a hand in preparing the executive order which was
intended but not used to confirm the President's Directive. On March
21 it undertook a broad survey of all clandestine collection of foreign
intelligence. On March 28 it received instruction to make a survey
of the coverage of the foreign-language press in the United States.
The next day it was assigned an interim survey of the collection of
intelligence in China. On April 20 it was directed to examine the Joint
Intelligence Study Publishing Board of the Joint Intelligence Com-
mittee and determine whether there should be a change in its super-
vision and control.
The Central Planning Staff inherited a share in the steady of the
Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service which the Federal Communi-
cations Commission had organized to monitor foreign news and propa-
ganda. The Service had been taken over by the War Department on
the preceding December 30 for the remainder of the fiscal year, and the
War Department wished to have it placed in the new central intelli-
gence organization. But Souers was not eager to expand the opera-
tional services of the Central Intelligence Group. On the basis of an
ad hoc committee's report he had recommended on April 26 that the
War Department continue to operate the Service with a new organiza-
tion, that is with personnel thoroughly screened for security. The War
Department had demurred, May 8, on the ground that the State Depart-
ment was the chief user of this "predominantly non-military intelli-
gence function." The matter was discussed the next day by the IAB.
It was at this point that members of the Central Planning Staff were
directed to consult with representatives of the Assistant Chief of Staff
Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0 % RO 10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CIG Under Souers CONFIDENTIAL
(G-2) and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State. The result
was that the latter, now William L. Langer in place of Alfred Mc-
Cormack, agreed on behalf of the Department of State that it should
support the FBIS budget, while the War Department continued to
operate the Service, at least during fiscal year 1947. (This working
arrangement was later superseded; eventually the opinion prevailed
that CIG should take over the function as one of common concern.)
On May 31 the Central Planning Staff was directed to make an in-
formal survey of the intelligence available in the United States from
colleges, foundations, libraries, individuals, business concerns, and
other non-government sources. On June 4 it received instructions to
study explicitly the exploitation of American businesses with connec-
tions abroad. On June 6 it was told to look into the problems of
psychological warfare. And on June 7 it was called upon to make
an interim survey of the adequacy of intelligence facilities related to
the national security.
The Central Planning Staff set for itself on the one hand the tre-
mendous chore of elaborating a "complete framework of a system of
interdepartmental intelligence coordination" to be contained in a series
of studies for the DCI. Subjects would include the "essential ele-
ments of information" in a national system and the coordination of
counterintelligence with security, of intelligence research with collec-
tion of information, etc., by means of a coordinating board, a scien-
tific committee, and other interagency committees on military, eco-
nomic, political, and geographical matters. At the other extreme it
made an office space survey of the Central Reports Staff, allotting 90
sq. ft. per person to it.
The Defense Project
In the meantime a substantive interdepartmental project was being
organized. Colonel J. R. Lovell of the Military Intelligence Service
proposed on March 4 a plan for producing "the highest possible quality
of intelligence on the USSR in the shortest possible time." The in-
telligence services of the Army, Navy, Air Forces, and State Depart-
ment should have equal representation on the planning and working
committees of this endeavor, soon to be known as the Defense Project.
It should be subject to CIG coordination. Admiral Souers accepted
the offer at once.
A Planning Committee drew up a proposal which on May 9 was
incorporated into a CIG directive unanimously approved by the .IAB.
Approvne-c1FF~ oFPAlase 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0003000fM01-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
The Planning Committee should choose its own chairman and secre-
tary. A coordinator from CIG should meet with the committee when
appropriate; in case of disagreement within the committee he would
submit the question to the DCI for decision. This DCI responsibility,
however, was more fearsome in prospect than in fact. It would be
some time before there could be any great decisions possible. The
evidence had first to be accumulated.
It was the Working Committee, under the chairmanship of the sec-
retary of the Planning Committee, with the CIG coordinator acting
in advisory capacity, that had the first and most important job. It
was to compile a veritable encyclopedia of "all types of factual strategic
intelligence on the USSR." From this Strategic Intelligence Digest
the member agencies would individually prepare Strategic Intelligence
Estimates as required to meet their own needs or when requested by
the DCI. Whenever "the national interest" required it, the CIG too
could prepare estimates from the Strategic Intelligence Digest. But
there was no attempt to establish here a single national intelligence
estimate which should govern the thinking of all agencies concerned.
The CIG Central Reports Staff was still too small to undertake this
extraordinary project, but it would not have been assigned it anyway.
The plan originated in the Military Intelligence Service. Its military
advocates looked to CIG for a coordinator and for editorial assistance
on the Working Committee, but they considered it primarily their
own affair. CIG had still to establish its right to means oil its own for
procuring and processing the raw materials of intelligence. Its cen-
tral facilities had yet to become so useful to the departments that their
intelligence officers would rely on it for services of common concern.
The first task of the Working Committee was to review the papers
of the Joint Intelligence Staff on the Soviet Union. This took a couple
of months. By June 4, however, an outline had been made and alloca-
tions of the work planned. The use of task forces, interdepartmental
committees, was rejected on grounds of security; an agency's files
would have to be opened to persons not under its control. Instead,
the work was assigned by subject to particular agencies, sometimes
illogically. For example, the Military Intelligence Service was charged
at first with preparing certain economic and political data. Later
the plan was revised so that the greater portion of the political
material was allotted to the State Department.
Colonel Lovell's expectations were not met; the project could not be
finished by September. It was far from complete in December when
Appr6Wed For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T031 ?$WMb001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CIG Under Souers CONFIDENTIAL
work was stopped pending the decision of an interdepartmental com-
mittee on a program of National Intelligence Surveys to take the place
of the Joint Army-Navy Intelligence Studies. This program changed
CIG's attitude toward the Defense Project; it was no longer merely
a question of coordination. Though the most important, this Digest
would be only one of several surveys to be produced by CIG/CIA.
When resumed in April 1947, the project was still an interdepartmental
activity, but it was no longer centered in the Pentagon as a major
interest of the Military Intelligence Service. The official date of pub-
lication for the Strategic Intelligence Digest was March 1, 1948, but
it was nearer the beginning of 1949 before all three bulky volumes
were complete.
Reports and Estimates
By direction of the National Intelligence Authority on February
8, a Central Reports Staff was to assist the Director in correlating and
evaluating intelligence related to the national security and in dis-
seminating within the government the resultant "strategic and national
policy intelligence." Admiral Souers followed the directive with an
administrative order dated March 4, though the Staff had already gone
to work during February and had produced the first Daily Summary
for the President. There were in what was then called the Current
Section seventeen persons seconded from the Departments of State,
War, and the Navy. They were established in the Pentagon under
L. L. Montague, with the expectation that they would be joined
shortly by other persons assigned from the departments to form an
Estimates Section or Branch.
The purpose from the start was to have the CIG take over the major
function of producing the strategic estimates for the formulation of
national policy, as Donovan had proposed. But it was not yet de-
cided that CIG should have a division comparable to the old OSS
Research and Analysis Branch. There was doubt that it ought to en-
gage in initial research. Many believed that it would do well to remain
a small and compact body which should receive from the several
departmental agencies the materials of intelligence and produce from
them the "strategic and national policy intelligence" for the policy
makers. The Department of State was still uncertain whether it
should continue its own Office of Research and Intelligence as Mc-
Cormack had expected to have it when he hoped to retain there the
function of making intelligence estimates for the policy makers.
Approv& it A 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010U 1-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
Now on March 4 Admiral Souers' administrative order, prepared
by Montague, elaborated the organization and functions of the Central
Reports Staff. There was in this administrative order a provision
embodying ideas which are still of interest for the production of na-
tional intelligence estimates. As Montague wished to have the Staff
constructed at that time, there should be four Assistants delegated to
him, as Chief, by the permanent members of the IAB. Their distinc-
tion from other persons furnished by the departments for the Staff
was to be that they should not be responsible to the DCI but to their
parent agencies, although serving full time with the Staff. The pur-
pose was to have the Assistants represent in the Staff the interests of
their respective departments and also to represent the Central Reports
Staff in its relations with those agencies. Montague had acquired
these ideas from his experiences as representative of the Army on the
Senior Team of the Joint Intelligence Staff.
The Assistants would aid in directing the work of the Staff, review
all its reports and estimates, make recommendations on the dissemina-
tion of them, reconcile conflicting departmental estimates when pos-
sible, and otherwise formulate dissents for their principals on the IAB.
Thus Sowers and Montague hoped to establish a panel of intelligence
experts drawn from the departments who would continue to under-
stand and represent the interests of those departments but at the same
time through their continuous work in the Reports Staff would be-
come experts too in the business of central intelligence and the pro-
duction of national estimates.
The benefits to accrue from the continuity and momentum which
might be gained from such an estimating board were left unknown.
The ideas were put on paper but were not tested. Difficulties in
obtaining personnel and in meeting other more pressing demands in
the new central intelligence organization prevented the establishment
of such a board.
Within a month of its formal activation, the Central Reports Staff
entered another phase of its development. Montague proposed on
April 1 a revision of the administrative order to make possible two
things. First, experience with the allotment of personnel by the De-
partments of State, War, and the Navy demonstrated that there should
be more flexibility within the proportions agreed among the depart-
ments. The right persons for particular positions were not to be had
according to any predetermined ratio. The difficulty grew worse with
the necessity of apportioning within each grade. Navy captains, Army
Af6roved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T@ 9# (Mj 010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
CIG Under Souers CONFIDENTIAL
colonels, and civilian "P-8's" were not equally available in number or
competence. The principle of proportion could be maintained, but
deviations should be permitted so long as there was no substantial
change in the budgetary obligations of the departments.
We should note at this point the predicament of CIG as a whole
with respect to personnel. The departments had been directed by
the President to assign personnel to CIG. To make the general state-
ment that they minimized the obligation to supply able persons, as
soon as possible, is doubtless to do injustice in some cases, perhaps
many. A reading of correspondence on this matter from the spring
of 1946, however, and conversations with some who were present and
responsible for recruitment at the time, lead to the conclusion that
there were many recommendations for office in CIG that were not bona
fide nominations. Some nominees were not really available because
they were headed toward more important positions in their own serv-
ices and could not remain long in CIG if they came at all. Six months
was often the limit. Some appeared on the lists because they had
become surplus-good fellows, but with no future in the service to
which they had given so much of their lives. The name of the best
man available was often left off because he was wanted where he was.
It was neither easy nor desirable to select the personnel of the new
CIG staffs, branches, and sections from such lists. Admiral Souers
and his successor, General Vandenberg, were not able to do much
about solving this problem so long as they were obliged to request
referrals from the departments and hope for the best. Whether or
not they minimized their responsibility, the departments failed to pro-
vide adequate personnel for CIG. Why General Vandenberg sought
an independent budget and the right to hire and fire his own per-
sonnel is clear.
The second change in the Central Reports Staff was intended to pro-
vide it with area specialists as it set up its Estimates Branch. The
Estimates Branch itself was not to have geographical segments, but the
plan was to have five such sections supporting it-Western Europe-
Africa, Eastern Europe-USSR, Middle East-India, Far East-Pacific,
and Western Hemisphere. The staff of each section would be appor-
tioned by grade and among the departments.
The Central Planning Staff objected to so early a rewrite of the
administrative order to effect these changes and formally disapproved
the plan. There ensued a test of strength between the two Staffs
which Central Planning lost. It was discharged from further con-
2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A00030001 dff01-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
sideration of the proposal, and the principle was established that the
chiefs of the component parts of CIG should be responsible for the
organization and administration of their respective domains as they
deemed fit.
Espionage and Counterespionage
The remnants of the clandestine parts of OSS were being held in
a Strategic Services Unit in the War Department. By Executive Order
9621 of September 20, 1945, the Secretary of War was to discontinue
any of its activities whenever he deemed this compatib:!e with the
national interest and was to wind up all affairs related thereto. The
policy under this Order was to maintain those intelligence functions
which would be required permanently in peacetime, such as espionage
and counterintelligence, and to release personnel from other activities,
such as sabotage and black propaganda, for which no peacetime need
was seen and close them out. General John Magruder, the SSU chief,
kept at this task of liquidation through the fall of 1945 and into Janu-
ary, until the number of military and civilian personnel had fallen
from over 9,000 to nearly 3,000.
On January 29, 1946, the Secretary of War directed that the Strategic
Services Unit should be closed by June 30. The SSU records, along
with those of the OSS, transferred to the Office of the Secretary of
War by the Executive Order, were "placed under the operational
control of the Director of Central Intelligence." Title to these records
remained to be settled later.
General Magruder strove to make clear that the assets of the Strategic
Services Unit were indispensable for the procurement of intelligence in
peacetime. In a memorandum of January 15 he detailed the irrepar-
able loss that abandonment of the Unit's properties, plans, and person-
nel would entail. Its Secret Intelligence Branch, he said, had stations
in seven countries through the Near East and four in North Africa
that were already converted to peacetime work. There were con-
tinuing activities with the military commands in Germany, Austria,
China, and Southeast Asia.10 Plans were being completed for opera-
tions in the Far East, and studies were in progress elsewhere. Se-
lected persons from the old covert action branches had been trans-
ferred into the Secret Intelligence Branch to be ready for the future.
'? The military commands in Southeast Asia actually terminated on V-J Day.
One or two SSU men were left in the area.
Apived For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0 @ 6b9b640001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CIG Under Souers CONFIDENTIAL
The Counterintelligence Branch, X-2, had some 400,000 dossiers on
individuals. It was still at work against the operations of foreign in-
telligence services and secret organizations. This work was done in
close liaison with other American agencies, and in military areas in
cooperation with the Counter Intelligence Corps of the Army.. The
two Branches were supported by components for communications
(though reduced), technical services, special funds, a training pro-
gram, and other elements of the old OSS still in operation.
As the new Central Intelligence Group got under way, General
Magruder sent a memorandum to the Secretary of War on February
4, 1948, answering criticisms of the SSU and recommending immedi-
ate action by the National Intelligence Authority to appraise its value.
Again on February 14 he urged that the Authority place the Unit under
the Director of Central Intelligence and set a date for transferring
all its assets. Had this been the only idea abroad in Washington,
there should have been no further delay. But there was more than
one opinion on the matter.
At a meeting held in the War Department on February 8, repre-
sentatives of the intelligence services were still discussing which facili-
ties and functions of the SSU should be kept, and which of these should
be operated by CIG and which by the departments or other existing
agencies. There was question whether the whole SSU belonged at
the center of the national intelligence system. There was strong
doubt that CIG should have exclusive collection of foreign intelligence
by clandestine means, as Magruder was advocating. It was agreed
in this meeting that "an authoritative group" should make a study and
that prompt decisions should be reached. On February 19, 1946,
therefore, Admiral Souers, with the concurrence of the IAB, estab-
lished an interdepartmental committee to study the SSU problem.
The interdepartmental committee, with Colonel Fortier as chairman,
met continuously until March 13. It listened to General Magruder
and his principal subordinates, inspected files, obtained opinions on
the value of the Unit from agencies which used its product, and heard
testimony from ranking officers with OSS service overseas. The mem-
bers made individual studies of the SSU branches and divisions.
The Fortier Committee heard that the bulk of the information for
intelligence purposes came from friendly governments. A large
amount of material, such as commercial and other economic statistics,
was obtained from activities other than secret collection. This testi-
mony supported the opinion that the SSU should not be taken over
Approdfe9lPl9PAb1;fie 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
whole by CIG. Another reservation frequently expressed in the in-
vestigation was that the SSU personnel had not been adequately
screened, especially in the light of changes from wartime conditions
and the new threat from the East.
The conclusions of the Committee were nevertheless in favor of
saving the SSU structure. It was a "going concern" for operations in
the field. It should be "properly and closely supervised, pruned and
rebuilt," and placed under the CIG. The Committee proposed that
the Secretary of State, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation, and the Director of Central Intelligence should reconsider
the existing division of "analogous functions" on a geographic basis-
the FBI doing in the western hemisphere what SSU was doing in the
eastern.
The Committee suggested that the SSU as subordinated to CIG
should concentrate on the current activities of the Soviet Union and
its Satellites. Plans should be made to penetrate key institutions in
support of possible U.S. military operations. Liaison with the in-
telligence agencies of other countries should be developed for the
same p.....
ose
Liquidation should continue substantially as proposed by General
Magruder. But at the same time such personnel and facilities as the
DCI wished to have should be transferred to CIG on terms of new
employment. Until CIG should have an independent budget and
funds of its own, the War Department should continue to supply the
amounts needed.
The Fortier Committee also proposed that there should be closer
coordination of the SSU with research and analysis activities. The
OSS Research and Analysis Branch, which had been transferred to
the State Department, was "closely geared to the secret intelligence
branches as their chief customer and their chief guide" in the selec-
tion of sources and the evaluation of intelligence. Their files were
interrelated, and their activities interwoven.
Following the report of the Fortier Committee and agreement be-
tween Admiral Sowers and Secretary of War Patterson, the National
Intelligence Authority issued a directive on April 2, 19413, that the
DCI take over the administration of the SSU pending final liquidation,
which would be delayed another fiscal year, through June 1947. The
Apm
pT-oved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T00041010MIKIM10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CIG Under Souers CONFIDENTIAL
DCI (represented by his Acting Chief of Operational Services, Colonel
Fortier) would determine which funds, personnel, and facilities of
the Unit were required in CIG. Secretary Patterson reserved the right
to determine what portion of the funds, personnel, and facilities could
be made available.
These provisions, rather than a simple executive order, were :legally
necessary to avoid shifting the SSU en masse from the War Depart-
ment to CIG, in the way the OSS Research and Analysis Branch had
been placed in State. It was necessary in dealing with personnel to
bring to an end the appointment of everybody in SSU and give new
appointments to those who were wanted in CIG. Otherwise seniori-
ties, preference for veterans, and the whole intricate mechanism for
Civil Service reductions in force would have prevented a satisfactory
screening of personnel for security and suitability for peacetime clan-
destine activities.
The plans, records, and properties of the Unit were to be handled
differently. There were funds, such as rupees in India, that were not
to be turned back to the Treasury but retained like a stockpile for
future use. There were physical properties which could be trans-
ferred to other agencies but which should be available first to CIG.
The equipment, techniques, codes, and other facilities of communica-
tion came through intact. The legal question of title-the Economy
Act of 1933 prevented the transfer of property without reimburse-
ment-was bypassed in assigning control and use of the assets to GIG.
Later, the National Security Act of 1947 would transfer the "personnel,
property, and records" of CIG to the Central Intelligence Agency.
Oversight
After accepting Admiral Souers' program for the SSU on April 2,
1946, the National Intelligence Authority did not meet again formally
until July 17, when it conferred with General Vandenberg about his
reorganization of the CIG. It was content to rely upon the Intelligence
Advisory Board and Admiral Souers, personal choice of President: Tru-
man, to establish and activate the new central intelligence organization
as a "cooperative interdepartmental activity."
The IAB too held but occasional and desultory meetings. It dis-
cussed on February 4 the proposed policies and procedures governing
the CIG but made no important comment. On March 26 the plan for
liquidating the SSU interested but did not excite it. The men who
composed it had made their decisions elsewhere. This session did
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For elease 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300071b001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
touch upon one pregnant problem. General Vandenberg, representing
the Army, remarked that applications were coming in from persons who
wished to be secret agents abroad. Admiral Souers preferred not to
confuse the existing operations of the SSU with the permanent clan-
destine program. Until the latter was established, therefore, he
thought the individual agencies should continue their own operations.
He agreed with Vandenberg, however, that eventually "all such op-
erations should be under a single directing head." Here was one
opinion giving promise of more lively meetings of the IAB.
At the third IAB meeting, on April 8 with Kingman Douglass in
the chair as Acting DCI, Alfred McCormack reported that the Bureau
of the Budget had reduced the amount requested by the Secretary of
State for intelligence activity in 1947 and there was uncertainty in
the Department whether to continue its work in research and analysis.
Admiral Inglis for the Navy and General Vandenberg for the Army both
favored transferring the function from the Department to CIG if the
Department did not wish to retain it. Here was another promise of
things to come. Some two weeks later, as Secretary Byrnes issued an
order dispersing State's intelligence research among its geographical
divisions, McCormack resigned, and within four months there was
an Office of Research and Evaluation in CIG.
The last meeting of the IAB before the end of Admiral Souers'
tenure came on May 9. There was discussion of the request from
General Vandenberg that State take over the Foreign Broadcast In-
telligence Service, and the matter was referred, as we noted above,
to the Central Planning Staff. The IAB listened to the plan for
the Defense Project but made no suggestions worth mention. Again,
the intelligence officers present had done their deciding elsewhere.
Then they considered methods of clearing personnel for duty with
CIG. The suggestion of Admiral Inglis that there should be an in-
terdepartmental screening committee for the purpose (lid not meet
approval, and each department was held responsible for clearing
the persons it assigned to CIG. The CIG security officer would have
the right of review, and final decision would rest with the DCI. (This
method did not prove satisfactory; the directive was :rescinded on
October 4, 1946, and CIG undertook full responsibility for clearing
its personnel.)
There was one more meeting of the Intelligence Advisory Board
with Admiral Souers in the chair as General Vandenberg became
Director of Central Intelligence on June 10, 1946. Souers expressed
Appr0ed For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T031?9Tdk001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
CIG Under Souers CONFIDENTIAL
his appreciation of the unstinted cooperation he had received. He
took "great satisfaction" in turning his duties over to General Vanden-
berg. As he reminisced in 1952, there was no doubt in his mind that
he did. He had been reluctant to take the office. He had sought
others for it in. his place at the start. He had recommended a suc-
cessor for his public appeal and personal attributes.
The first Director of Central Intelligence left a progress report,
dated June 7, 1946, to summarize his administration and point to
the immediate needs of his successor. Responsible officers in the
departments had cooperated wholeheartedly in meeting his requests
for personnel, he said, but the process had been slow because of
demobilization in the armed forces and CIG's very specific require-
ments. He had given priority to the Central Planning Staff as a
necessary "prelude to accomplishment." Concentration now ,should
be upon the Central Reports Staff.
The primary CIG function was to prepare and distribute "definitive
estimates" on the capabilities and intentions of foreign countries.
Since it required the best qualified personnel, it had been slow in
filling the complement of the Reports Staff. This had delayed too
the solution of the relationship to be established with the departments,
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and other agencies in regard to the production of such "national
policy intelligence." Listing the interdepartmental problems which
the Central Planning Staff had undertaken to solve or study, Souers
stressed in particular the CIG function of supporting the budgets
for departmental intelligence. "Coordinated representation to the
Bureau of the Budget and the Congress," he said, promised to be
"one of the more effective means for guarding against arbitrary de-
pletion of intelligence sources at the expense of national security."
It was an interesting suggestion, leading far into the future of the
national intelligence system. But it was not one to have smooth
sailing.
The final paragraphs of Admiral Souers' progress report came to
vigorous conclusions for benefit of General Vandenberg. CIE's re-
lationship with the National Intelligence Authority and the Intelli-
gence Advisory Board was sound. But CIG was suffering from the
departments' inability to give it the personnel and facilities it must
have. It could recruit no personnel from civilian life. Without
enabling legislation, it could make no contracts for essential services.
It was now ready to monitor foreign broadcasts, collect foreign iritelli-
CONFIDENfAL
Approved or Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300Q7?0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL CIG Under Souers
gence by clandestine methods, produce studies of foreign countries,
establish a central register of information, and do basic research and
analysis in economics, geography, sociology, and other subjects of
common concern. The National Intelligence Authority and its Central
Intelligence Group should have "enabling legislation and an inde-
pendent budget" as soon as possible, either as part of a new national
defense organization or as a separate agency.
Textbook on Estimates
A volume entitled National Intelligence Estimates has been issued
by the Intelligence Production Faculty of CIA's Office of Training.
A ten-page exposition of the national estimating setup and process is
therein followed by a compilation of Studies articles about estimating
and estimates, to which have been added Fred Greene's and Roberta
Wohlstetter's reviews of the Cuban missile crisis. The text of perti-
nent directives, a list of USIB committees, and the NIE subject codes
are given in appendices. The over-all classification is Secret.
Appr9Xed For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0313T*001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
SECRET
No Foreign Dissem
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
Ill Told Tales
SPION VOOR NATO. By Evert Reydon. (Amsterdam: Polak & van
Gennep. 1967. 330 pp. f8.50.)
Evert Reydon, an engineering officer in the Dutch merchant marine,
was recruited by the Dutch Foreign Intelligence Service in 1957.
From then until 1961 the Dutch Service, in conjunction with MI-6,
used him primarily as an observation and Elint collection agent in
Soviet ports at which his ship called. In July 1961 he and a merchant
marine colleague were sent as legal travelers by automobile on an
observation mission to the USSR. As they attempted to leave the
country, on 20 August, they were arrested by the KGB. In October
they were tried, found guilty of espionage for NATO, and sentenced
to 13 years in prison. In November 1963, after considerable behind-
the-scenes negotiations, they were released and returned to The Nether-
lands. Reydon's colleague, who had stood up nobly during his trial,
telling the court he was proud of his services to his country and the
West-something Reydon did not do-suffered a nervous breakdown
soon after his return and has been in a Dutch mental institution ever
since. Reydon found on his return that Dutch shipping companies,
most of which do business with the Bloc, would not rehire him. With
official help he bought a gas station but failed to make a go of it; he
was a taxi driver at the time he wrote this purported autobiography.
The publication of the book in May 1967 created quite a stir in the
Dutch press and was even noted by the Soviets in their domestic broad-
casts. This was understandable; Reydon was the first Dutchman to
have written about his espionage exploits for his country and her
allies since World War II. But except for recounting the disclosures
made at his Moscow trial, he offers the reader a story with little rela-
tion to his actual activities. The following caveat, which, in small
print on the inside of the face plate, is calculated to be missed by most
readers, betrays the real tone of the book: "All the situations and most
of the persons described in this book live only in the imagination of the
writer, and hopefully will live only in the imagination of the reader."
The book is divided into three sections. The first details Reydon's
youth, his entering the Dutch merchant marine, and his recruitment
Approv??Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A0003000 M$~RI%HRP PAGES 75-76
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET Recent Books: Dutch
and training as a "NATO spy" in The Netherlands, the UK, and France;
the second tells of purported espionage activities, primarily for the
British, in the Middle East, where he claims he was employed under
a BOAC cover; and the third covers his training, dispatch, f=ancied ex-
ploits, capture, interrogation, trial, and imprisonment in the USSR.
He claims he dealt with George Blake in the Middle East and met
Gary Powers, Greville Wynne, and others in his Soviet prison. The
book is filled with his adventures with women of various no.tionalities,
including an American college girl in the Middle East.
Facts are lost in fantasy, with great self-damage to the author, for
he had served his country and the West well. By making himself
a junior James Bond he may have boosted the sale of his book, but
this cheap, flamboyant story can only degrade his real contribution.
THE BROKEN SEAL: The Story of "Operation Magic" and the Pearl
Harbor Disaster. By Ladislas Farago. (New York: Random House.
1967. 439 pp. $6.95.)
It was perhaps inevitable that Ladislas Farago, veteran ;;ginner of
espionage and other yarns, would sooner or later turn his attention to
Pearl Harbor. In The Broken Seal he has brought forth an untidy
compilation covering the whole interbellum period, much of it ir-
relevant to the problem of the Pearl disaster, all of it put together with
approximately the care and perception we have come to expect in a
routine espionage potboiler.
The book is based on extensive research, however, and it claims a
big purpose-to answer the question "Since we possessed this fantastic
source of intelligence [the Magics] . . . why did we fail to anticipate
the blow?" It had seemed unlikely that anyone would try to improve
on Roberta Wohlstetter's answers to this question (in Pearl Harbor:
Warning and Decision; 1962). Evidently Farago was emboldened to
try by the knowledge that there were several stockpiles of source ma-
terial that had not been exploited. These new materials made his
book, but they also unmade it; they seduced him into admitting stories
Ap7j6roved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A010001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 76-82
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Pearl CONFIDENTIAL
unrelated or only vaguely related to his stated object, to the point
where he seems to have forgotten that object. The Broken Seal is
essentially not the analysis he promises but a long, shallow narrative;
it makes several additions to the fund of information on the intelli-
gence background of Pearl Harbor, but does so without improving
our understanding of the surprise.
Farago's biggest such addition-a real eyebrow-raiser-is his story
of how the Japanese in the spring of 1941 came to suspect that we
were reading their diplomatic traffic. He reports that Under Sec-
retary of State Sumner Welles, in attempting to convince the Soviet
ambassador that the Germans were going to attack the USSR, showed
him telegrams to this effect which the Japanese ambassador in Berlin
had sent. This revelation then leaked to the Germans through an
agent of theirs in the Soviet embassy in Washington, whence it passed
to Berlin and on to Tokyo.
Japanese suspicions of the safety of their cipher systems appeared in
messages that we read. The ciphers remained unchanged, but the
Magic custodians, not knowing how the leak had happened, reacted
with their near-boycott of the White House, where a couple of acci-
dental mishandlings of Magics had occurred. The Magic service to the
White House was not resumed until months had passed, and then
only at the President's insistence.
What Farago has contributed here is not simply an explanation of
the military men's caution (which has been explained-with caustic
comment-in practically every Pearl Harbor account), but a revelation
that the leak was not where their suspicions pointed. This part of the
story does not lack for detail, but it does for documentation; it is at-
tributed to anonymous sources.
Another major finding of the author's is that the Japanese decision
to attack Hawaii was influenced by indiscreet revelations of U.S. mili-
tary information by Postmaster General Walker, the President's repre-
sentative in the "John Doe" negotiations that were conducted in 1941
outside regular diplomatic channels. Like most of Farago's theses,
however, this one loses something in the presentation-and if it is an
intelligence story it is a story about Japanese intelligence, not U.S.
intelligence that could have warned us.
The most persistent of Farago's theses is the failure of the Magic
producers and their customers to recognize the warning value in-
herent in the traffic of the Japanese espionage agents in Hawaii. But
his chief example of this supposed blundering is the message available
Appro qUP 1TJhe 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010R1-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL Recent Books: Pearl
on December 6 that revealed a proposed shore-to-ship communication
system so clumsy as to invite the belief that whatever it was the Japs
had afoot in Hawaii, it was surely frivolous. His explanation of the
G-2 and ONI failure to appreciate the importance of these messages
is that because they bore diplomatic addresses and signatures, their
military significance was not evident. Here Farago has added em-
phasis, but not persuasiveness, to the testimony on this point in the
Pearl Harbor hearings.
One story clearly pertinent to Farago's announced purpose con-
cerns the inability of G-2's Colonel Bratton to get an audience for the
implications of the Japanese code-destruction message that reached
the Washington embassy December 3. This failure the author at-
tributes to Bratton's misfortune in having stirred up the High Com-
mand during the previous week with his conviction that the Japa-
nese would open the war on the weekend of November 29.30. What
Farago contributes in this case is new appreciation of old information-
and evidently some overplaying.
Because he indicates that his sources included participants in the
Pearl Harbor cryptologic events, the reader's expectations rise when
he begins his chapter on "How the Japanese Fleet Was `Last"' by our
interceptors before and during its voyage to Hawaii. But this account
is half-hearted-short and unsatisfying-and obviously garbled (for
example, what presents itself to Farago's mind as radio camouflage looks
like no more than ordinary radio security). This reader, led to ex-
pect an account of successful communications deception, was surprised
to turn the page and learn that our interceptors realized, and reported,
that they had lost the target fleet. That being the case, the loss was
in itself an important piece of intelligence, which fact Farago does not
appear to notice.
He implies that the Purple cryptosystem may have been used for
deception, but later we find that the only deception in these communi-
cations that he is really prepared to accept is Tokyo's deception of its
ambassadors in Washington. This seems a correct analysis-but we
have been led up and down several confusing layers of dissimulation
to arrive at a point long recognized as absolutely basic to the whole
story of the disaster: Nomura and Kurusu were being told as little
as possible; their instructions from Tokyo could never have revealed
to us where the blow would fall.
Farago's conclusion on the question whether a "winds code execute"
message was ever intercepted is simply that this remains an unsolved
Ap S$oved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0G4 4I IO tlG0.10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Pearl CONFIDENTIAL
puzzle. But he found, in the files seized by the FBI at the Honolulu
consulate, a decrypted telegram whose text ("Relations strained be-
tween Japan and the United States and Britain") is similar to the mean-
ings assigned to two of the looked-for broadcast phrases. This sug-
gests that Tokyo sent telegrams in lieu of a broadcast that might be
missed by some outposts-in other words, that the winds code scheme
was left unused, presumably because it was never more than a pre-
caution against the closing of the commercial radio circuits, and these
remained open. But Farago, overlooking this plausible but undra-
matic conclusion, chooses to view the telegram as evidence support-
ing in some measure those who contended that there was an execute
broadcast message.
One of The Broken Seal's main contributions, and it is no mean
one, is its wealth of background on the Japanese preparations for war,
especially their intelligence preparations-and especially Yamamoto's
long-shot effort to sell his plan to attack Hawaii. This story, how-
ever, scarcely bears on the subject of our intelligence-unless Farago
means to suggest that if we had had a Richard Sorge in Tokyo we
might have learned these secrets, which were of course held within
a very small circle.
In dealing with the history of cryptologic operations Farago ac-
quired just enough information, and possessed just enough technical
knowledge, to entangle himself in a series of stories which are un-
satisfying at best (e.g., the account of the "loss" of the Japanese! fleet)
and badly misleading at worst. Some of his blunders require no
special knowledge to detect, as when he labels as "Magic's finest
hour" the report by a Navy cryptologist (August 1941) that Japan
was not going to attack Russia but instead would make her major move
to the south. Other errors are of a kind visible only to participants
in the cryptologic events of the time, but these are massive ones--long
accounts of cryptanalytic operations which Farago renders (a good
word, renders) in such a way as to make them only barely recognizable
to actual participants in the events, some of whom were interviewed
for the purpose of this review. Perhaps the key to Farago the cryp-
tologist is his repeated references to "encoded cipher." The crypto-
system he refers to in each case is enciphered code-but there's quite
a difference. Even a layman, if he stops to think, will see that if the
Japanese had communicated by anything so cumbersome as encoded
cipher (as Farago conceives it), Admiral Nagumo might still be lurk-
Appr9Qe 66se 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0003000f6b01-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL Recent Books: Pearl
ing in the western Pacific waiting for the communicators to finish de-
crypting his orders to sail against Pearl.
This complaint is no mere technicality; Farago's blundering signals
a warning that as cryptologic and intelligence history The Broken Seal
is altogether unreliable because the author went far beyond his depth.
For the general reader the cryptologic matters pertinent to Farago's
stated theme could be treated adequately at a completely nontechnical
level; that he elected to do otherwise must be attributed to a belief
that any reference to cryptology, however obscure or confused, lends
a certain aura of mystery that can only further the sale of books.
This is the most research-oriented of Farago's opuses, but the
practiced spinner of popular spy stories still comes through. We
do not read far before we encounter the inevitable Nip agent
peering quizzically through thick-lens spectacles, bowing, hissing, and
emitting mysterious frozen smiles. Even earlier comes that other
stereotype, the U.S. diplomat wearing morning coat and affected man-
nerisms. Cryptanalysis, it seems, is the province of persons for whom
there was no adequate one-word label until kook entered the language.
On the attache circuit intelligence is obtained "by a judicious mixing
of sensitive topics and powerful cocktails." A fair sample of Farago's
idea of cryptologic "in" lingo is "the message that emerged from the
crypt." In his sentence "the strain became arrant" (during those
months of brain-breaking work on the Purple solution) we detect
the presence of Roget close by the author's side.
But his offenses are against more than fact and style. His docu-
mentation, though lengthy, is generalized and slippery, with some key
passages left undocumented (evidently not because of any desire to
shun attribution to anonymous informants, for there are several in-
stances of this). Another form of carelessness, constantly repeated, is
the burial of significant narrative points in footnotes-which leaves us
uncertain as to the author's view of their significance. The most setious
violation of good practice, however, is the use of selective hindsight;
the whole narrative, so far as it bears on the announced subject, focuses
on Hawaii and on the pieces of intelligence that could have alerted
us, to the exclusion of the pieces that drew attention elsewhere.
Avoidance of this way of reading history was the essence of Mrs.
Wohlstetter's study; Farago realized he was setting an easier dis-
cipline for himself, but his awareness does not save him.
This much derogation of a veteran author's big opus has to have
a point, and it is this. The flaws in his treatment of his material are
Appr9yed For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T031Q0WD 01* A0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Pearl CONFIDENTIAL
no less than tragic; for if a major addition to the Pearl Harbor litera-
ture is possible at this time, Farago's material should have produced
such an addition. As a piece of research The Broken Seal is monu-
mental. Earlier authors must be devastatingly embarrassed at the
amount of unused material he turned up in that out-of-the-way deposi-
tory, the Library of Congress, which has harbored a stockpile of micro-
filmed Japanese Foreign Office documents for now these two decades.
His other documentary sources-in Hawaii, Japan, even Germany-
also contain numerous surprises; equally surprising is the amount
of hitherto obscure material he found in published sources. Farago
has given us all a lesson in Pearl Harbor bibliography.
What may be only a minor tragedy for scholarship generally is a
more serious one for the intelligence community, which must now sit
back and watch a new spate of Pearl Harbor studies come out, touched
off by Farago's discoveries. Some of these will be improvements,
where they mine Farago's documentary sources carefully and stick
to the rules of the game. But it is likely that all of them will be
dependent on The Broken Seal itself for the long stretches of inside
information Farago got from private sources; thus they will perpetuate
and magnify his extensive distortions and errors. It is becoming in-
creasingly clear that if we want a straight story going beyond Mrs.
Wohlstetter's-and that is surely a reasonable want-it is going to
have to be produced by intelligence professionals. This is true
not only because of the unlikelihood of getting an adequate "outside"
study but also because a really complete study involves information
still classified. Much of it does not even exist on paper; it consists of
the recollections of cryptanalysts, translators, and other participants
in the intelligence events.
This is not the place to write a prospectus for such a study, but a
few descriptive or prescriptive points may be suggested. For one, the
participants' recollections, wanted for their answers to the present-
day intelligence officer's questions, happen also to make the story
several times as interesting as anything written on Pearl Harbor to
date. For another, the coverage of events before, say, 1939 need be
of only the briefest and most prefatory character, if only to avoid
burying the story under its own weight as Farago tends to do. For
a third, although only the cryptanalysts can explain some of the ins
and outs of the intelligence events, it does not have to be, and should
not be, a heavily technical story.
Approvedol~Pe Blase 2005/05/16 :CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010D01-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
CONFIDENTIAL Recent Books: Pearl
Meanwhile, The Broken Seal is with us. Now that this much-
heralded book is to hand, we have two recommendations for anyone
who wants to bone up on Pearl Harbor: (1) Read Farago's bibliogra-
phy and source notes. (2) Re-read Wohlstetter.
AplBlibved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T0= F b9a0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78Jf~9AC4W30%J?01-1
ADVENTURE IN DIPLOMACY. By Kenneth Pendar. (London:
Cassell. 1966. 382 pp. 42/-.)
Early in 1941, an agreement was negotiated between Robert Murphy
for the United States and General Weygand for the Vichy government.
Under its terms we undertook to ship certain specified commodities
for the benefit of the civilian population in French North Africa, and
the French agreed to accept American observers to see that the supplies
were used for the designated purposes and not reexported. ]Pendar
was one of the U.S. "control officers," and this book stems from his
sojourn in Morocco and Algeria from June 1941 to July 1943.
The assignment provided both an opportunity and a cover for travel
throughout the area and the collection of information and impressions
concerning the attitudes of French and Arabs and the degree of Ger-
man influence. Increasingly, it came to involve the clandestine gather-
ing of military information in preparation for the Allied landings in
November 1942.
The account of these activities, however, takes up only the first
hundred or so pages of this book. It is a good picture of the field of
play: the heritage of Lyautey, the nature of the French protectorate
and the Frenchmen who served it, the stresses of conflicting loyalties
to which French officers were subjected, the characteristics of the
Moroccans and Algerians themselves. Pendar, who before long was
appointed vice-consul at Marrakesh, came to be a good friend of the
legendary El Glaoui. But there is not very much specific detail about
the strictly intelligence aspects of the work of Pendar and his col-
leagues.
This is by design, not accident, as is shown by the book's subtitle,
The Emergence of General de Gaulle in North Africa. The last hun-
dred pages of text, and thirty-four appendices which run to another
hundred-odd pages, are largely given over to a persuasive exposition
of Pendar's thesis that de Gaulle was from the start far more intent
on securing his own political role in postwar France than in making
a military contribution to the winning of the war. Jean Monnet
emerges as a subsidiary villain who, as a self-appointed adviser to
General Giraud, effectively delivered that political innocent into de
Gaull.e's power.
Appro9S&lF6 IRb ~s9Nb'5/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 83-84
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Books: WW 11
In 1967 none of this is particularly novel. In fact, the publishing
history of the book may at this stage be more interesting than its con-
tent. It was originally brought out in 1945 in a small U.S. edition.
A larger edition was published in France in 1948. Now comes the
English edition, using the original text with only very minor changes
and a fair number of footnote references, mostly to such later material
as Murphy's own account of the same period in Diplomat among War-
riors. But about half of the documentary appendices are new since
the first edition, as well as a Prologue and an Epilogue in which Pendar
reiterates his disillusionment with de Gaulle. He can probably look
for a more responsive readership now than in 1945.
James Cooley
MORI/HRP PAGE9
MY OWN RIVER KWAI. By Pierre Boulle. Translated from the
French by Xan Fielding. (New York: Vanguard Press. 1967.
214 pp. $5.95.)
The outbreak of World War II found Pierre Boulle on a rubber
plantation some 50 miles from Kuala Lumpur. Other Frenchmen,
as well as Danes, Britons, and Americans, were in Malaya as planta-
tion managers and employees at the time. Like Boulle, most of them
tried to get into the war action in some form. Some went into mili-
tary organizations; a number were associated with British and Ameri-
can quasi-military intelligence groups in the area.
After reporting via Singapore to Indochina for mobilization, Boulle
began a series of frustrations and hardships that lasted for over four
years, two of them spent in prison. His friends from Malaya were
part of a group that identified with the Free French movement and
so found themselves in opposition to the French colonial establish-
ment and frequently treated as traitors.
The story of Boulle's adventures in traveling to Indochina, then back
to Singapore, then into Burma, and from there up into Yunnan in
southern China makes up the early part of this book. He then moved
into northeastern Thailand and finally into Indochina where, after a
horrendous trip via rivers and rapids, he fell into the hands of the
Vichy-oriented French establishment. He was condemned and spent
two years in prisons, sometimes in solitary confinement and sometimes
shackled in circumstances that clearly formed a basis for some of the
ved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP%ff t9444Wf 09NbM0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A00 30 01-1
Recent Books: WW II OFFICIAL I E L
fictional incidents related in his well-known "Bridge Over the River
Kwai."
There is not a great deal about intelligence in this book, but it does
picture the process of gaining information from tribal groups in the
Indochina, Chinese border, and Thai areas. The Westerner's exaspera-
tion with the tribal social protocol through which he has to work, deal-
ing with village head men, chance couriers, porters, and guides, is
clearly reflected in the incidents of Boulle's journey. Withal, however,
he tells the story without complaint and with some understated humor.
It is interesting to remember, with respect to intelligence work, that of
the previously mentioned plantation managers and experts there were
a number who, trading on their experience with ethnic groups and
knowledge of how to handle them, contributed a great deal to British
and American intelligence activities in that part of the world through-
out the years 1943-45. This reviewer recalls in particular one man-
ager who knew the Malaya countryside well from traversing most of
it in his peacetime duties. After the Japanese occupied the Southeast
Asia peninsula down to Singapore, this man regularly flew on day-long
trips, belly down in a B-24 bomber, scanning the roads and bridges
to check on their state of maintenance and to spot vulnerabilities and
other information needed at CBI and SEAC headquarters, as well as
by British and American clandestine elements.
Shortly after returning to Malaya at the end of the war, either
through distaste for the problems of reconstruction in Malaya or be-
cause there was at work in him the ferment of creative expression,
Boulle took account of his assets, threw up all his Malayan plantation
experience and future, and returned to France to begin a career as
a writer of fiction. This particular book, he admits in an introduction,
was undertaken out of some irritation at frequently being asked what
background he had for writing The Bridge Over the River Kwai.
While the setting of the book that became the famous motion picture
was geographically well to the west of his own area and the incidents
in it were based on prison experiences that were not his, still the river
and jungle terrain of that part of Southeast Asia is sufficiently uniform
and the true hardship conditions of his own confinement sufficiently
similar to those that obtained in Thailand and Burma to give the
novel authenticity. If the author really needed justification, My Own
River Kwai does the job.
John R. Ohleger
ApproOff ke1 sP5/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010DD1-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Spy Fiction
THE MAN FROM MOSCOW. By Greville Wynne. (London:
Hutchinson. 1967. 222 pp. $4.20.)
When one writes of Greville Wynne, one must put first things first.
The first thing is that Mr. Wynne, when confronted with a great chal-
lenge and a grave threat not only to his livelihood but to life, responded
with courage and intelligence. Nothing he has said or done since
meeting that challenge can detract from the honor due hint-not even
this book.
When reading it, I had to keep reminding myself of that first thing
because, unfortunately, Wynne has not written a closely factual ac-
count of his involvement in the Penkovskiy case, one which could have
been the authentic statement of a man who was in his own way a hero
of our time. Instead he has chosen to record his fantasies of Greville
Wynne as James Bond to a degree which largely vitiates the factual
material his book includes,
Wynne in reality had something in common with the seedy little
men in Eric Ambler novels who suddenly find themselves thrust upon
the stage of history in some dark scene of international intrigue.
The fundamental difference between him and Ambler's antiheroes is
that Wynne met the challenge and ultimately emerged from the dif-
ficult situation with dignity and respect. That story could have made
a very moving book. Instead, we have a novel about 008/ being set
on the trail of Penkovskiy in 1955 and gradually circling closer and
i.qoser to his target until the day-that London had foreseen from
the beginning-when Penkovskiy turns to Wynne and confides to
him not only his intentions to serve as a British spy, but his first photos
Of classified Soviet documents. Wynne depicts himself as a carefully
selected and long-trained British undercover agent whose career in
intelligence goes back to the beginning of the Second World War.
The true Wynne, the indifferently successful salesman with a limited
education and no serious experience in the kind of undertaking in
which he found himself involved, is a much more sympathetic man
and his role in the Penkovskiy operation much more deserving of our
admiration.
Wynne describes at length how he foiled the interrogators who
pressed him for months to confess all the details he knew of the
MORI/HRPAi~t86 ;ES~ 86 For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RD1190Qt4610001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Fiction OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Penkovskiy case. He also tells stories of involvement in other intel-
ligence operations, information which he managed to conceal from
the Soviets to the very end. Unfortunately, neither as a record of
what happened nor as a guide to defense against interrogation is
Wynne's account very useful. There is not much point in going into
the various absurdities of the story of his interrogation and imprison-
ment as he relates it here. In view of the arrest and confession of
Penkovskiy and the evidence accumulated during the investigation
prior to his arrest, Wynne's confessing to his own role with relatively
little reticence is certainly understandable and would have made a
more moving story than the months of clever repartee between him
and his various Soviet adversaries in the Lubyanka.
The same absence of fact irretrievably mars his account of the
Penkovskiy operation. I hope this book is not widely circulated
among potential Soviet spies, or at least not believed by them if it is.
Wynne's romantic and highly fictionalized view of intelligence: trade-
craft is characterized by a neglect for the most ordinary security pre-
cautions and compartmentation on the part of the British and Ameri-
can services that would appall anybody with experience in clan-
destine operations. Wynne naively describes these things with pre-
cisely the opposite intent. In his imaginings he has used James Bond
rather than reality as his guide. For example, he portrays the de-
briefing of Penkovskiy in London as conducted in an "operations
center [where] . . . in place of the prim bedroom furniture, were
installed typewriters, tape-recorders, coding machines, radio equip-
ment, a private line to Washington, and a projector for slides and
films. Stenographers, typists and interpreters in case of technical
language difficulties. A doctor with stethoscope, syringe, and pep
pills to keep Alex awake and alert; during his whole stay in Lon-
don he never had more than three hours' sleep a night. And
relays of British and American Intelligence officers to question, ques-
tion, question."
Wynne also tells how American and British intelligence services
rounded up from Britain and America a host of twenty Soviet defectors
and introduced them to Penkovskiy to assure him that former Soviet
citizens can succeed in life in the West. Wynne says "the effect on
Alex was electrical." If Penkovskiy had really been confronted with
a room full of twenty defectors, the effect would almost certainly
have been fatal.
ApproR~eFc19 F a 05/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A00030004$b01-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Books: Fiction
The whole story is skewed by Wynne's placing himself at the center
of the operation when, in fact, both Penkovskiy and his British and
American colleagues looked upon Wynne as a vehicle of opportunity
for communication. That role was, as Wynne's subsequent experi-
ence proved, as dangerous and in its own way as demanding as that
of anyone involved, with the sole exception of Penkovskiy. It could
have been told well and truthfully and the library of books on intelli-
gence operations would have been enriched thereby. But Wynne
chose to cast himself in the role of Penkovskiy's closest friend and
confidant, as a trained intelligence officer who in many ways directed
the operation, and as a man skilled and educated to fit the public
conception of the master spy. Being in truth none of these things, he
has written a hollow and unrewarding narrative.
And yet in writing of Greville Wynne, one must also say last things
last. Who can say, without having undergone what Wynne experi-
enced, how he himself would conceive of his own role and how he
would go about exploiting it once he had managed to endure the
mental and physical stress of being the courier, of being subjected to
interrogation and trial, and finally of imprisonment?
Wayne Lambridges
TOPAZ. By Leon Uris. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 19?7. 341 pp.
$5.95.)
Two interesting intelligence cases are recounted in Topaz. One
begins with the defection of a Soviet operative and ends with the
discovery of a French officer spying for the Russians in an inter-
allied headquarters. The other describes how an agent of the French
service observed a Soviet missile being moved along the streets of
Havana and how his report triggered the final steps to the confronta-
tion. What is more, these stories are placed in the context of decision-
making at the national level, in both the United States and France.
A good deal is said about the immensely delicate situation which arises
between two Western governments when one is known to have been
penetrated by the Soviets. There is also some well-informed writing
about the way in which Soviet disinformation operations are carried
out at the highest levels in the Western alliance.
These promising ingredients, however, are ground into a crowded
and overly emotional novel. French hostility to the United States is
Appreved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP 1AI4AMVA6Y0001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 88-89
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Fiction OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the subject matter of the main plot, with the chief of French opera-
tions in Washington billed as a tragic hero. As the story moves
toward its catastrophe this worthy returns to Paris burdened with the
unwelcome news of a Soviet penetration at the top of his government.
He also carries with him the knowledge that he has helped the
Americans-a serious offense-by giving them the missile report.
There, at headquarters, in an atmosphere laden with deceit and ten-
sion, he spends his last days in the service of his country.
Some years ago this kind of story might have been cast against the
background of the cold war. Here Soviet espionage and a Cuban
missile crisis are but props in dramatizing the gradual disaffection
of a senior French officer. The inside view of a malevolent foreign
service is not to be had in Moscow or East Berlin but in Paris. This
is not just innocent fun; Uris evidently let himself go writing about
the French.
At the popular level, Topaz has all the paraphernalia of a spy
thriller. There is a love story, some sex, and a little sadism, all acted
out by foreigners. The American operators are tight-lipped, ded-
icated, and competent, their tradecraft crisp and their operations
sound. It is a simple world of the good and bad, peopled with black-
and-white characters whose doings have little meaning beyond the
most obvious.
For the reader who is looking for adult fare, Topaz must stand,
then, on the appeal of the spy cases it incorporates. On this basis it
does quite well. The stories have an authentic ring. They merit
the reader's attention; and the rest of the book can be easily skimmed.
L'ACTUELLE GUERRE SECRETE (The Secret War Today). By
Pierre Nord (pseud.) and Jacques Bergier. (Paris: Editions
Planete. 1967. 254 pp. 17 frs.)
The most that can be said of this interestingly organized and well
illustrated volume is that it reveals a painstaking perusal of the con-
temporary press and a soaring imagination. One utterly delightful
paragraph will show something of the spirit of the book:
The Chiefs of the CIA, in the luxury and calm of their offices, in bedroom
slippers and suspenders-which is how they like to dress when taking their
Appr99iWIJr k9feaRVi'605/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A0003000?8001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 89-90
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Books: Fiction
ease-can exploit the work of the satellites such as Midas II which detects
missiles. This enables them to count the number of intercontinental missiles
the Russians have in stock at Sverdlovsk . . . and listen to the count-down
of Luna No. Y. at Kapustin Yar in deepest Russia ... .
It is a little bit premature to say that [CIA] is listening to the most intimate
discussions held in the Kremlin-as in 1955 it listened to the telephone con-
versations between East German authorities, natives as wel'. as occupiers,
thanks to a tunnel which led right into the transmission center in East Berlin.
We are treated to the inevitable bit of French hauteur in. the political
realm, it being well known that all Americans-in rerum nature-are
political cretins. Messrs. Dulles and McCone "were politically fre-
quently wrong." And "the CIA has done a great deal on the technical
side in the secret war . . . The CIA is a machine perfectly adapted to
scientific war . . . but politically it is weak."
With respect to other agencies: "to become a member of the famous
FBI, a G-man, one does not have to be a fine marksman or a judo
expert-but one must absolutely be an expert accountant."
The book is not pointedly anti-American. It is like any French
book on America. All Frenchmen know from birth that the American
intellect ends at the flat end of a screw driver and that the world
would be happier if the Quai d'Orsay were to run the Department of
State. As for its contribution of information, it has nothing to tell
a dutiful reader of Ramparts.
ApprMed For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP70TOKOI9f AOU3091T0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Military Intelligence
DER DEUTSCHE GEHEIMDIENST: Geschichte der Militiirischen
Abwehr. By Gert Buchheit. (Munchen: List Verlag. 1966.
494 pp. DM 29.80.)
It may be that intelligence organizations are the most hazard-
ridden of all possible subjects for historical description. Outsiders
are strongly tempted to write sensational exposes, insiders to produce
whitewashes and glorifications. Sources are often mainly the per-
sonal recollections of two or three individuals with strong prejudices
about the organization and with personal interests to defend. Their
memories are sometimes extended with a few documentary scraps,
but the files of the organization usually remain closed-a state of
affairs which, however excellent for security, poses a major obstacle
to serious historical study, Good history seems to require a sub-
stantial volume of hard evidence worked over by a number of inde-
pendent investigators who criticize each other and name their sources.
If any secret services can be treated seriously in public print, it
should be those of the Third Reich. Here the files-to the extent
that they have escaped destruction-are largely open, and officers
of the several organizations still survive in some numbers, so that
their accounts can be questioned and compared. Much has already
been published on the Nazi state and the Wehrmacht, and some of
it treating subjects close to intelligence has been of high quality.
Dr. Buchheit now makes the first serious attempt at a comprehensive
study of the Abwehr itself; be covers a span from 1912 to 1945. Al-
though he succumbs to some of the hazards, he has made a real
contribution.
An ex-Wehrmacht officer with some intelligence experience, Buch-
heit has also written books on Hitler and on General Ludwig Beck,
to some extent glossing over the latter's less admirable characteristics.
In the work under review here he was encouraged and assisted by
Col. Otto Wagner, who has become a leader of the Abwehr veterans,
so that the book might be considered a sort of authorized history
of the organization. It has an official history's virtues and faults.
Almost invariably the Abwehr and its chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris,
emerge as effective, upstanding, loyal to the Fatherland, and un-
stained by Hitlerite crime. (Since the work of this company of
ApprovWP +el use'NX/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0003 MOR%HRP PAGES 91-93
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Books: Military
honorable gentlemen is contrasted with the misdeeds of the Sicher-
heitsdienst, perhaps someone will undertake a rebuttal on behalf of
that organization.) In one area familiar to this reviewer, Buchheit
plays down the role of the pre-Hitler Abwehr in some activities which
might seem less creditable today-protecting the security of the
Reichswehr's illegal rearmament preparations, or spying on politicians
and diplomats for General Kurt von Schleicher. More generally,
given the documentary material available in German and American
archives, much of which he used, he might have made a more detailed
analysis of selected Abwehr operations.
Two of the author's themes may especially interest readers of this
journal. One is the problem the Germans faced in intelligence col-
lection and counterintelligence defense on the Russian front. Before
hostilities began, the military attache in Moscow told Canaris that
it would be easier for an Arab wearing a flowing white burnoose to
pass through Berlin unnoticed than for a foreign agent to escape
notice in Soviet Russia. After 22 June 1941 the mass executions by
the SS Einsatzgruppen ensured the hostility of the people, prejudic-
ing intelligence as well as operations. Soviet partisan bands were
rapidly mobilized and expanded under long-standing plans, harassing
the German rear and sending intelligence to the Red Army; the reader
will see the resemblances between these partisans and today's Viet
Cong. The French underground also became much more active
after the Russians were engaged. Buchheit makes no boner about the
superiority of Soviet intelligence, claiming only that the Abwehr
managed to mount a serious opposition. He says that the Abwehr suc-
ceeded in recognizing 50,000 out of 130,000 Soviet agents and "mak-
ing 20,000 harmless" (not necessarily executing all these; many were
turned and played back). German intelligence units on the front
lost 30% of their strength to enemy attack.
The other theme, one running through the whole book, is the in-
telligence officer's problem of honesty and honor when his objective
reports are considered "defeatist" at a high level, or when he is made
a witness to or an unwilling participant in inhuman acts. What is
he to do when protests go unheard? In early 1940 one high Abwehr
officer, General Hans Oster, deliberately gave information on impend-
ing German attacks to the Dutch, hoping to frustrate Hitler's plan.
lie also conspired with other generals against Hitler. Canaris did
not go this far, but he did work to discourage a German attack on
Gibraltar, and he warned the Swiss that Hitler intended to overrun
Ai ?roved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RD 1Il IM.9 !'i60MID010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Military OFFICIAL USE ONLY
their country. Such extreme actions could only be justified under
and against a Hitler. But on a more ordinary level, we are con-
stantly reminded that any intelligence officer in any service sometimes
has a duty to speak unwelcome truths. The Abwehr, at least as
Buchheit describes it, had a good record for such Zivilcourage.
J. L. Lilienfeld
THE MILITARY ATTACHE. By Alfred Vagts. (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press. 1967. 408 pp. $10.00.)
This is a good book. It is well documented; it is interesting; it is,
at times, humorous. Additionally, it accomplishes what it intends
to accomplish, i.e., to give the reader a history of the service attache
post-as used by many countries-and to show the various fields of
activity in which attaches have engaged.
Professor Vagts has apparently elected to delve into this aspect of
his continued field of interest, the history of militarism, with little
updating as to source material. He mentions a few New York; Times
articles from the early 1960's, but of approximately 50 books and
lengthy documents comprising his bibliography only one has been
published in the past ten years. That one is the revised edition (1959)
of his own A History of Militarism. Also, to the best of my recollec-
tion, none of his illustrative examples involve either an air attache
or a marine attache. It is true, however, that his well-selected quota-
tions and incidents, though devoted to army or navy instances, make
his point for all the military services.
With respect to intelligence in particular, there is little that is in-
structive in "Part I: Historical Outline." This first section does include,
however, many not-so-well-known items for one's storehouse of anec-
dotes-from the caning of a Roman army officer by an ambassador in
the camp of Syphax (so as to protect the officer-spy's cover as a slave
of the ambassador) to the freeing of a U.S. male attache for field
duty in 1944 by the appointment of a WAC major as assistant mili-
tary attache in London.
Part II, which occupies about sixty percent of the book, is of more
interest from an intelligence viewpoint. Surprisingly, though, there
is much more on intelligence in its Chapter 17, which deals with
"Service Attaches and the Alliances"-in two sections, before and
Appro RM?AsP%5/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010%1-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 93-94
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Books: Military
after 1918-than in those with the more likely intelligence titles of
"The Attache as Observer" and "Spying Attaches and Diplomacy."
This is not a book to be read through at one sitting. There is an
unexpected number of footnotes (1,040 of them), and these sometimes
prove more revealing than the text proper. But even reading a bit
at a time, one cannot avoid the cumulative thrust of the historical
incidents which the author brings in again and again to show the
conflicts that civilian-military relationships create for attaches from
most nations at the various world embassies. Vagts' quote from an
instruction issued in Germany
Since no mission can pursue two policies in its relations with a foreign state,
every report of a military attache must be submitted to the Ambassador.
highlights an attache problem of 1891-and of years before, and since.
Several attaches-designate of my acquaintance have now read The
Military Attache'. They were distracted by its multitude of footnotes
and disappointed by its almost total lack of reference to the past
decade. If neither of these peculiarities will unduly affect you, you
will probably find in it a good deal to enjoy, stretching the reading
out over a period of time.
THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. By Monro
MacCloskey, Brigadier General, USAF (ret.). (New York: Richards
Rosen Press. 1967. 190 pp. $3.78.)
This inept concoction will not do at all.
Not that the book does great harm. It bears no malice, grinds
no axes, and seems to have no deeper purpose than to turn an honest
dollar. Its intended audience is no more exalted than, say, the reserve
lieutenant who needs to eke out a point toward retirement by boning
up on the book for a talk on intelligence to a meeting of his reserve
unit. But it is a thoroughly unsatisfactory job. The reason for
reviewing such a book here is twofold: to lessen the chance that,
given the importance of the subject and the impressive military
background of the author, some training establishment will put it on a
list of required or recommended reading; and to discourage other
amateur researchers from undertaking a subject so far beyond them.
Apefloved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDFOMMM U4XM03O W'10001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 94-96
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Military OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The book is apparently the eighth title in its publisher's "Military
Research Series," of which the other seven entries were also by Gen.
MacCloskey. But military research is exactly what it is not. The
lieutenant boning up for his point could compile a more accurate and
useful treatment of the subject by browsing for a few hours in any
reasonably good public library. He would be spared having to
accept misinformation like this on the say-so of a retired general officer
with some intelligence experience:
The (US Intelligence] Board meets at least once a week at CIA headquarters
to weigh the input from the operating agencies and to prepare a compre-
hensive summary of secret information known as the National Intelligence
Estimate. This report is sent to the President weekly and provides him with
an excellent compendium of events and trends world-wide. In addition to
the weekly presentations, about twenty-five special reports are prepared each
year. ... The work of the Board is performed by about fifty special com-
mittees. . . . (p. 58)
Those are four of the sixteen sentences on USIB, which take up rather
less space than the author gives to a passage about diplomatic immu-
nity quoted from a training manual for defense attaches. On the other
hand, he does give to USIB a little more space than to Mata what's-her-
name, whose career he recounts in a couple of dozen lines that end
with an erroneous date and a fearless judgment:
... executed by a firing squad on October 15, 1916. Though much famed
in fiction and motion pictures, her actual accomplishments in espionage would
hardly be worthy of a footnote in military intelligence history. (p. 31)
In point of fact, the author treats his whole large subject as unworthy
of footnotes. The book has none of the elementary apparatus of
scholarship which any serious reader has a right to expect, and which
indeed the title of the series promises. No citation of authority how-
ever flimsy, except the two acts of Congress quoted in appendices and
a training manual or two; no bibliography however fragmentary; not
even an index. The level of research is exposed most cruelly in the
chapter on the defense attache system, which is the field of intelligence
the author knows best:
In late 1966, there were 168 Air Force officers and 260 enlisted airmen
assigned to Defense attache offices. Strengths of the Army and Navy attache
offices may be assumed to be roughly the same. (p. 113)
But what is most damaging is not the author's laziness, it is his
total want of discrimination, judgment, ability to evaluate evidence.
ApprovQ@ VAe d0,W/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010881-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Soaks: Military
He read somewhere, no telling where, that Bismarck owed his quick
successes over Austria in 1866 and France in 1870 to the clandestine
operations of "the notorious Prussian spymaster, Wilhelm Stieber."
So that goes into the chapter on "historical background" (p. 27), along
with Christopher Marlowe and Mata Hari. Then he read somewhere
else that Bismarck owed those same quick successes largely to "the
volume and accuracy of the intelligence information furnished by
attaches." So that goes into the chapter on attaches. (p. 106).
In short, this is a thing of shreds and patches; one of those books
which string together threadbare assertions, unverified, unquestioned,
unrelated to the subject at hand, often pointless, scavenged from other
incompetent secondary sources which acquired the same shoddy goods
the same way. How many times have you read the flat assertion that
in 1929 Secretary Stimson said. "Gentlemen do not read each other's
mail?" Dozens. But have you ever seen one of these hacks make
even the feeblest effort to document that assertion? I never have.
Here is one more publication on that low level of research and analysis.
Hugh T. Cunningham
A~~roved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDOF81MAt98 SOLO f 10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USIE ONLY
Intelligence and Policy
THE ESPIONAGE ESTABLISHMENT. By David Wise and. Thomas
B. Ross. (New York: Random House. 1967. 308 pp. $6.95.)
In this new book the authors have undertaken an ambitious forward
step in exploitation of the groundwork laid in their earlier one. Where
The Invisible Government capitalized on the dramatic effect of expo-
sure, The Espionage Establishment represents a more serious and in
many respects a more effective resort to analysis. This will offer little
satisfaction to the professional intelligence officer who, taking his
business seriously, strives to retain a general sense of proportion with
respect to the nature and purpose of his endeavor. Messrs. Wise
and Ross frankly deplore its nature, although they will concede with
some reluctance that it probably cannot be dispensed with in today's
world.
The concept of the intelligence community as a source of secret
power threatening the freedom it is designed to defend remains the
authors' basic premise, but they have now widened the arena. Focus-
ing first on the intelligence services of the four major powers, they
lay great stress on the institutional features of espionage. They depict
the parallel roles played by the major services in their respective
countries. That done, they launch a new thesis which in effect
comprises the main thrust of the book. The espionage revolution, as
Ross and Wise term it, is predicated upon the mushroom growth of
vast espionage "establishments" following World War II, and on the
inevitability of open and spectacular collision between them. Out
of this collision Ross and Wise see emerging a new set of rules
governing international espionage, unwritten but understood, which
taken as a whole represent a new, permissive way of looking at the spy
business on the part of governments and people.
The authors naturally view this phenomenon with considerable
alarm. Reader reaction to it is likely to vary according to attitudes
developed prior to perusal of the book. Viewed charitably and with
appropriate concession to the authors' premises, The Espionage Estab-
lishment stands up under scrutiny as a better than average specimen
of its genre. It is superior in almost every respect to The Invisible
Government. The writing is good journalese, and the narrative flows
smoothly with only moderate exploitation of the sensational potential
Approve OdFFFolRele -se Mobl/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010831-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 97-100
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Books: Policy
of the subject matter. While the cut-and-paste-approach is not en-
tirely disguised, there is reasonable coherence and sustained momen-
tum.
Good marks are also in order for the authors' treatment of the Soviet
intelligence system. Drawing largely on factual data that have been
in the public domain for some time, they have compiled an accurate
and readable account of a subject that should fascinate but rarely
does. The espionage cases they feature are all Soviet operations
targeted at the United States except for the Stashynsky assassination
and the mustard gas attack on West German electronics expert
Schwirkmann. Soviet "illegal" operations are handled extremely well.
With allowance for inaccuracies discernible to few outside of pro-
fessional circles, this is probably the most lucid exposition of the
subject currently available to the layman.
Her Britannic Majesty's intelligence and security services are treated
shabbily in what is certainly the most objectionable portion of the
book. The detailed exposure of MI-5 and MI-6 exceeds by far any-
thing previously in print. Undoubtedly Messrs. Ross and Wise have
exploited information long available to the British press which it
could not print in the face of the D-notice system backed by the Official
Secrets Acts. The extent and significance of damage thus inflicted on
our British counterparts can better be judged by them. The authors
would certainly argue-as they did in the case of The Invisible Govern-
ment-that all they have done by cooperating with British journalists
to circumvent British security procedures was designed simply to tell
the public what it had a right to know. British Intelligence, they
would contend, once it recovers from the shock, can go on to greater
glory under the new ground rules.
The chapter on Chinese Communist Intelligence has a dogmatic
ring of authority, but it falls flat upon scrutiny. Its dramatic case
for Kang Sheng as the leading light of the Chinese intelligence service
cannot be authenticated. A number of factual inaccuracies and
much dated information mark the sections dealing with the service's
organization and distribution of responsibilities. On the :Plus side,
the authors present a reasonably accurate picture of the intelligence
role of Peking's embassies and trade missions. For reasons difficult
to explain, they occasionally resort to such dubious generalizations as
"in the rest of Asia, and in Australia as well, the KGB has become so
bogged down in counterintelligence operations against the Chinese
Ap l-oved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RD Brq*gvAi0 "o10001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Policy OFFICIAL USE ONLY
that its subversive activities had practically come to a standstill."
Overt sources-Time magazine and other periodicals-would account
for most of the material included in the chapter.
The "establishment" motif is played for all it is worth in the chapter
on the United States. Ross and Wise appreciate the existence and
scope of the rest of the intelligence community, but in their 44 pages
devoted to the subject, CIA-clearly a source of better copy-receives
their total attention. Names are named, some of them for the ump-
teenth time, all designed to reflect the Agency's intimate partnership
in the select circle of public figures presumed to be in control of
national policy. For background and color, all the old tales from
the cocktail circuit are trotted out and replayed in apparent seriousness.
A sense of humor, which the authors clearly lack, might have added
some badly needed perspective and served to offset the superficiality of
their approach.
In their search for novelty Ross and Wise have now "discovered"
the CIA Domestic Operations Division, They make a good deal of
it, and go to some pains to question the legality of the activity centered
on 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue. The net effect of the effort is to cast
a hazy shadow over it all, without ever really coming to grips with the
issue. Specific data relating to Agency personnel and operations are
taken from public sources. In this sense they do no particular damage.
The net effect, nevertheless, is bad. The citizen reader in his :inno-
cence, scanning these pages uncritically, will probably find what he
bargained for at the counter-a bit of sex, a touch of murder, a power-
ful agency relentlessly expanding, its soiled cloak and dagger only
half concealed by its Madison Avenue style. Some of this is lain
nonsense. Some of it is patently irresponsible. Regrettably, the
specifics will escape rebuttal and the authors enjoy the last word.
When all is said and done, it is obvious that although Ross and
Wise have widened the scope of their interests to encompass the
intelligence services of the other world powers, they have done so only
as a tour de force. CIA and all its works and pomps are their real
concern. The main arguments of The Invisible Government echo
again and again through these pages. They insist that the President,
despite protestations to the contrary, is not informed of many of the
Agency's important activities. To support this they cite President
Johnson's statement last February that he was "totally unaware"
ApproveCci o* r-USE ON
Kelease'1005/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A0003008?0001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Books: Policy
of the Agency's involvement with the National Student Association.
They dismiss the various forms of control over the Agency, including
congressional supervision, as inadequate. Congress, they contend,
has virtually abdicated its responsibility to act as a check on the vast
hidden power of "the invisible government." They hold further, in
reviewing the NSA "scandal," that the Special Group and the Agency
violated the spirit, if not the letter, of the Agency's charter. They
conclude by urging that the "obsolete" machinery for control of the
Agency be replaced by a visible and credible guardian, thus assuring
the public that the secret instruments of government are the servants
and not the masters of the national will.
It is difficult to debate the Ross-Wise thesis, in part because they
dismiss one's premises out of hand, and in part because of their re-
luctance to accept at face value anything reflecting favorably on CIA.
Their elaboration on the new role of espionage in world affairs,
although contrived and specious, is not uninteresting. It will certainly
help to sell the book. Few readers can fail to react to the exhortation
that espionage per se is a potential threat to world peace, "infinitely
more dangerous" now than ever before. Few can but be impressed
by the authors' assurance that espionage today creates a:n atmosphere
in which the veracity of government is questioned even when it is
telling the truth. The credibility gap, according to Messrs. Ross and
Wise, arose out of the Government's need to hide and protect its
espionage activity. When they argue that the Government has no
right to lie, few would disagree. Concomitantly, they seem to imply
that the Government has no right ever to remain silent. The Press,
by the same token, must ferret out the truth and force the Government
to confirm its impressions.
Ross and Wise allude frequently to the "literature of intelligence."
In it they see the lamentable extent to which espionage has permeated
the consciousness of modern society. They deplore the genie's escape
from the bottle. Oh, for a return to a quieter agel There is a tongue-
in-check quality to all of this. The genie has, after all, brought zest
to the new journalism, and nobody knows it better than Messrs. Ross
and Wise.
Apprd' &%1 For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP76qb9J4 C9W001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Policy OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COMPETITIVE INTERFERENCE and Twentieth Century Diplo-
macy. By Richard W. Cottam. (University of Pittsburgh Press.
1967. 243 pp. $5.95.)
The core of this book is the development of an "ideal type model"
for foreign policy planning and its illustration in application to U.S.
policy in Iran. The model comprises a statement of objectives, ex-
plicit and detailed analysis of the situation and trends, formulation
of a strategy for changing these trends in favor of our objectives, and
selection, through an elaborate system of probes,. of tactical steps
in pursuit of the strategy. In Iran, for example-to simplify radi-
cally-one of our objectives is a stable non-communist government,
one of the trends is toward a concentration of power in the hands of
one man who :might be assassinated, so part of our strategy should
be to gradually broaden the base of the government, using our overt
leverage and covert assets in specified tactical moves to that end.
Intelligence comes into this not to make the required situational
analysis-Professor Cottam despairs of the "bureaucracy's" ever doing
such a careful and explicit job or being objective about it, and he would
have scholars do it for the benefit of congressional critics of administra-
tion policy-but by way of CIA's "other duties and functions," for
covert political action. It is artificial and old-fashioned, he says, to
shrink from this kind of meddling in other countries' internal affairs;
competitive interference is the very essence of foreign policy in the
nuclear age. But it should be done early, continuously, and unob-
trusively, instead of waiting until unfavorable trends have taken their
course and then having to do a crude thing like unseating Mossadeq.
CIA should therefore not be thought of as merely a supportive arm
of foreign policy, an instrument to be resorted to in crisis, but inte-
grated functionally into all stages of policy formulation and execution.
The new interdepartmental committees are a step in the right direction.
Like most books on foreign policy, this one virtually ignores the
role of intelligence proper, in planning and decision. Otherwise its
argument is logical, closely reasoned, and concretely illustrated, though
not phrased for easy reading. One suspects, however, that the "ideal
type model" is all too ideal ever to be put into practice.
ApproQW WkdY2 rse0W5/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0003%fg101 b PAGE 101
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recenf Books: Policy
WHITE TIE AND DAGGER. By Andrew Tully. (New York:
William Morrow. 1967, 257 pp. $5.95.)
If this latest "inside story"-of diplomacy-is not a potboiler, it has
all the disarming characteristics of one. Spy stories and diplomatic
scandals from the Profumo affair to the Cuban missile crisis-in which
latter it appears that the Briton Ormsby-Gore had the hidden guiding
role-are dressed in inimitable graphic detail and verbatim quotations
of the author's imagining and strung tenuously on a provocative theme
addressed in the last chapter, "Is Embassy Row Obsolete?" This
chapter offers food for pondering in a belief attributed to Dean Rusk
that international "tensions will decrease if international relations can
be kept in the background."
In pursuit of this line Mr. Tully actually appears to have run out of
material when he had only about half enough pages for a book, so
he introduces a section on lobbying, a chapter each on Red China's
effort to influence Washington, on the Formosa lobby, and on Julius
Klein and sundry lobbyists; and then, since that added only about
forty pages, comes a section on ambassadors of history at the threshold
of U.S. wars-,Serurier in 1812, Lord Lyons in 1861, Von Bernstorff in
1915-16, and Nomura-Kurusu in 1941. But this cold outline gives no
idea of the high humour with which the author writes. Let him speak
for himself, as he describes the practical joke of a "bibulous British
diplomat" on a Soviet minister counselor:
"It's not Johnson at all, you know," he told Zinchuk. "He was assassinated
(luring the campaign, but they kept it quiet and elected a double. It was
quite easy, with Goldwater running on the Republican ticket." Zinchuk, one
of the more urbane Soviet diplomats, tore himself away as soon as it seemed
safe, convinced the Englishman was mad. But the British envoy later
reported he had checked with "an intelligence bloke" and discovered that
Moscow was making discreet inquiries about a reported "accident" to
Johnson during the 1964 campaign.
Anthony Quibble
CHALLENGES. By James B. Donovan. (New York: Atheneum.
1967. 155 pp. $4.50.)
The purpose of this book appears to be to demonstrate the author's
versatility. It is a collection of rather short talks or papers which
he has delivered at one time or another., each concentratir.g on some
Ap ved For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDF?CT @9 0JW 910001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES
102-103
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Policy OFFICIAL USE ONLY
experience he has had or some role he has played. These do have
a wide range: war crimes trials; his defense of unpopular clients, as
of Colonel Abel; the Cuban prisoner exchange after the Bay of Pigs;
and a number of different episodes from his work with the public
schools in New York. Only one section, entitled "World Power and
Strategic Intelligence," has to do with intelligence. It is a rather simple
outline of what the function is and how important it is in the modern
world, with emphasis on the role of the Central Intelligence Agency.
While it is nice to have such kind words appear in print, the discussion
offers nothing instructive for intelligence officers, being probably well
suited to the audience to which it was delivered at the Lake Placid
Club in New York.
ApprRFS Ir IU agA1605/05/16: CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300d%001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THE YOUNG STALIN. By Edward Ellis Smith. (New York:
Farrar, Straus, and Giroux. 1967. 470 pp. $8,50.)
This book is built around the thesis that Stalin was an Okhrana agent
throughout his prerevolutionary career, and all the evidence pre-
sented-the product of a very substantial research effort:-is shaped
to fit this view. The results are sometimes persuasive but frequently
awkward and incredible, even to a reader who was originally pre-
disposed toward the author's thesis.
For Mr. Smith tries too hard. All too often, when evidence is
either lacking or completely ambiguous, he constructs a highly specula-
tive and improbable hypothesis which he later alludes to as established
fact. (His depiction of Stalin's supposed conspiratorial relationship
in 1913 with the Bolshevik leader and known Okhrana agent Ramon
Malinovsky-at a time when by Smith's own showing Stalin was in
very bad odor with the Okhrana-is an example of such a hypothesis.)
More than once he sets forth an impressive generalization which he
himself subsequently undermines, apparently unwittingly: thus he
attaches (p. 59) tremendous sinister significance to the fact that
Stalin "alone" escaped arrest in the Okhrana raids in Tiflis in March
1901 but three pages later alludes in passing to a more important
Georgian revolutionary, Ketskhoveli, who had similarly escaped. This
overenthusiastic approach to the facts creates unnecessary distrust
in the reader and weakens confidence in some conclusions which may
nevertheless be correct.
The author does best in the first third of his narrative: although he
does not prove his thesis, there seems nothing inherently impossible
and much that is reasonable in his suggestion that Dzhugashvili may
have been tapped by the Okhrana as a low-level agent shortly after
his expulsion from the Tiflis seminary in 1899, that he systematically
informed on comrades in party organizations in Tiflis, Baku, and Batum
over the next few years, that he acquired a highly unsavory reputation
among the Social Democrats of each city in turn, that he was finally
arrested for cover purposes in 1902 when revolutionary suspicions
about him were about to boil over, and that the Okhrana furnished
Apprt1 d For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP7@f6tAII4AW?@3 416001-1
MORI/HRP PAGES 104-105
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Recent Books: Miscellaneous OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the otherwise invisible means of support for the family he acquired
after 1904.
It is after this that Smith begins increasingly to strain the evidence.
He insists that the Okhrana was behind Stalin's masterminding of the
particularly bloody and ill-fated Yerevan Square robbery in Tiflis in
June 1907, although he is not consistent enough even to examine the
question of whether the Okhrana endorsed all the other Caucasus
"expropriations" Stalin is believed to have planned for the Bolsheviks
in 1906 and 1907. These operations were congenial work for Stalin,
and it was through them that he first acquired importance in Lenin's
eyes-surely sufficient motivation in itself for performing them. From
here on the effort to explain Stalin's behavior in terms of supposed
Okhrana operations becomes ludicrous in the light of what both the
Okhrana and Stalin actually did. The Okhrana arrested Stalin five
times in the nine years between March 1908 and the February Revolu-
tion, and it left :him at large a total of 3 months in 1908, 6 months in
1909, 3 months in 1910, 2 months in 1911, 6 months in 1912, 2 months in
1913, and not at all in 1914, 1915, or 1916. In September 1911 Stalin
had barely been in St. Petersburg two days before he was picked
up again and sent back to his term in exile. This seems to go well
beyond any conceivable requirements of cover. For Stalin's part,
when he was helping to run Pravda in St. Petersburg late in 1912 he took
a temporarily conciliatory line toward the Mensheviks-which, as
Smith admits, was precisely the opposite of what was wanted by both
the Okhrana and Lenin.
Smith recognizes that Stalin was not at all under Okhrana control by
1912, yet stubbornly insists (p. 202) that he must have continued to
have a regular contact in the Department of Police in St. Petersburg
to whom he supposedly could plan to denounce Roman Malinovsky
for disloyalty to the Okhrana. One of the weakest aspects of the
book is the failure to consider carefully when such links must have
disappeared, at what point Stalin must have decided to opt for the
Bolsheviks rather than the police. The evidence provided in the
book itself suggests strongly that this occurred much earlier than
the author is willing to admit, and that if Stalin had once had a foot
in the Okhrana camp it was probably withdrawn by 1907 or 1.908.
Harry Gelman
Approoved For Rereasse 005/05/16: CIA-RDP78T03194A0003000'ID001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recent Books: Miscellaneous
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD ESPIONAGE. By As^ye Hashavia.
In Hebrew. (Tel Aviv: Ledory Publishing House. 1967. 339 pp.)
This is the title printed in English on one of the flyleaves. The
actual Hebrew title translates as follows: "Espionage: Encyclopedia
of Espionage and Spies." It covers the ambitious effort to present
in one volume of 48 chapters a historical review of the development
of espionage and a description of the structure of intelligence services
in the West, of present-day political and economic intelligence, and of
the essence of cryptology, secret writing, listening devices, and wire
tapping, as well as summaries of some famous spy cases.
Obviously, with such a wide range of topics, the author could give
no more than snatches of tradecraft and some briefest synopses of
case history. But he is not interested in a serious analysis anyway.
He is writing not for the professional but for the layman, and more
specifically for youthful readers attracted to the glamor of cloak-and-
dagger activities. (Two previous books under his name, possibly a
pseudonym, deal with exploration and discovery.) For this audience
he does very well. He writes in a light, entertaining tone which makes
for easy reading, treats the actors in the case histories sympathetically,
on the whole, and invests their exploits with an aura of romance.
The book begins, predictably, with the reconnaissance party Moses
sent into the Promised Land and Joshua's mission to Jericho; it ends
with the U-2 flight of Francis Powers. From U.S. history come
also the stories of Benedict Arnold, the Civil War nurse Emma
Edmonds, OSS's Dr. Stanley Lovell and his unconventional gadgets,
and Yoshikawa, "Hero of Pearl Harbor." Alongside these are ranged
the internationally famous spy stories of Mata Hari and her daughter,
"Cicero," Klaus Fuchs, Eric Erickson, Lonsdale, and others.
Of especially Jewish interest are the case histories of the Dreyfus
affair, the Nili spy net in Turkish Palestine during Word War I, the
Israeli spy Ali Cohen, caught and executed in Syria, and Frances
Hagen, the U.S. pro-Arab female spy caught and sentenced in Israel.
There are no revelations about Israeli intelligence, :however; the
author's principal source appears to have been the prolific writings
of Kurt D. Singer, whom he specifically mentions in several places.
Marvin J. Heiberg
ApprdQad For Release 2005/05/16: CIA-RDP76MgWkfff%(QbN 001-1
MORI/HRP PAGE 106
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
Next 15 Page(s) In Document Exempt
Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
 Approved For Release 2005/05/16 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000300010001-1
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/058'BCRQA-RDP78T03194A000300010001-1