STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000200030001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 217
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1965
• Content Type: SINT

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INTELLIGENCE
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
25X1
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE Ii
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, oper-
ational, or historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or re-
jecting an article rests with the Editorial
'lard,
he criterion for publication is whether or
not, in the opinion of the Board, the article
makes a contribution to the literature of in-
telligence.
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EnWARns
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairriean
ALBERT D. WHEELON 101 25X1
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other CIA components.
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CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may
come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon in-
vitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted
directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence, Room ID 27 Langley
I land need not be coordinated or submitted through chan-
nels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the original
on bond paper. Footnotes should be inserted in the body of the text
following the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be
classified through Secret.
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your office
dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk, II For
back issues and on other questions call the Office of the Editor,
All copies of each issue beginning Summer 1964 are numbered
serially and subject to recall.
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CONTENTS
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Page
The 1964 Studies in Intelligence Award ............... faces 1
Economic Observations as War Indicators . . II. C. Eisenbeiss 1
Signs that would point to Soviet surprise attack. SECRET
On Warning ................................. Keith Clark 15
Hazards of soothsaying in the political and social fields.
CONFIDENTIAL
Counterintelligence Interrogation ......... C. N. Geschwind. 23
Some precepts for the practical application of doctrine.,
SECRET
More on the Recruitment of Soviets .... Martin L. Brabournc 39
Concentration on the psychologically vulnerable target.
SECRET
Communication to the Editors ............................. 61
Seeking a brave word for defection. SECRET
Operational Contacts ...................... L. K. Bekrenev 63
Soviet doctrine on meeting with agents. SECRET
Memoranda for the President: Boston Series . . Wm. J. Donovan 81
Allen Dulles reports on Nazi government communications.
CONFIDENTIAL
Letters to the President ................ Walter Pforzheimer 91
Rose Greenhow to Jefferson Davis. CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature 97
(.;ONFIDENTIAL
Classified Listing of Articles in Volume VIII ................ 101
CONFIDENTIAL
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Economic intelligence's contribution
to strategic warning of Soviet sur-
prise attack.
ECONOMIC OBSERVATIONS AS WAR INDICATORS
H. C. Eisenbeiss
THE 1964 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
25X1 The Studies' annual award for the most significant contribution to
the literature of intelligence was shared in 1964 among three authors
whose articles were adjudged to be indistin uisliable in degree of
merit. The were:
1 -3 By special dispensation the usua
prize was augmented so that each winner could be given $200.
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The Soviet Union, being the only country with enough military
capability to constitute a serious threat to U.S. power, is the principal
focus in the intelligence effort to give warning of any deliberate
all-out attack on this country. Under prevailing conditions as of the
mid-1960's, economic intelligence can contribute to this effort: in a
number of important ways. The USSR has elaborate civil institu-
tions whose main purpose is to facilitate the transition of the economy
from peace to war: they provide for stockpiles of all kinds of goods,
industrial and agricultural, and maintain the administrative apparatus
needed to integrate industrial and transportation facilities into a
military effort. The Soviet civil defense program is already extensive
and would undoubtedly be augmented in the event of imminent
hostilities. Finally, a variety of economic problems would hinder the
Soviets from undertaking the kinds of massive action called for by
their military doctrine except after a great deal of advance preparation;
the transportation system, most notably, operates at close to capacity
under normal loads.
It is true, however, that economic intelligence has a diminishing
role in today's early warning process. Under conditions that prevailed
immediately before World War If, or even the Korean war, logistics
were frequently more important than either weapons systems or
tactics, and the potential of economic intelligence for strategic warn-
ing was correspondingly great. But as such current military con-
cepts as "zero-reaction-time" long-range ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads and "instant-ready" airborne armies approach realities, in-
formation on the slow build-up of a logistical base contributes less
toward determining whether, or where and when, the technically
advanced weapon systems are to be used. It is nevertheless to be
expected, since the maintenance of "instant readiness" will be very
expensive in this era of rapid technical advance, that economic intelli-
gence will continue to be useful for strategic early warning.
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In the USIB Watch Committee's monitoring of war indicators Com-
munist China, though a poor second to the USSR, remains of con-
siderable concern for a variety of reasons. These reasons include a
very large army, a regime which sometimes talks as if it considers
war an enjoyable pastime, an inclination toward what Mr. Kent calls
the "dramatically wrong decision," 1 its proximity to the Nationalists'
offshore islands and Taiwan itself, its Indian adventure in 1962, and
the expectation of its eventually producing nuclear weapon systems.
Today, however, it not only lacks modern weapon systems, but the
ability of its economy to support a sustained effort by its massive but
obsolescent ground force is, at best, in doubt. The achievement of
a significant modern military capability will require a large and
successful industrial program, one as much concerned with produc-
tion of basic commodities (e.g. high-grade steels and technically com-
plex chemicals) as with military equipment proper. The economic
intelligence officer charged with strategic warning of hostile Chinese
action against the United States will be preoccupied with the regime's
progress toward such a program for some years to come.
Civil Defense 2: the MOG
It could be argued that with present collection capabilities civil
defense is the best bet as source for successful strategic warning of
Soviet intention to start a big war. Furthermore, it seems probable
that the potential for collecting civil defense information of the warn-
ing type will improve.
Although the Soviet civil defense program seems to have changed
policy several times since the war, and although there are grounds
for debate over its exact size and effectiveness, there is no question
that it is large; in comparison with those in the West it is enormous,
involving millions of people. Whether the current policy calls for
urban blast shelters or urban evacuation plus fallout shelters makes
no great: difference in its value for warning. Either way, the public
has to know what it is supposed to do, when to do it, and where to
' Said of the Soviet decision to install strategic missiles on Cuba, Studies VIII 2,
2 Soviet: civil defense has long been a concern of the economic intelligence of-
ficer because the present program began as an integral part of the postwar re-
constructiion of the Soviet economy. Today the Ministry of Defense and other
institutions are heavily involved in the program, but the role of economic institu-
tions also continues to grow.
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go. The best of security is not likely to conceal even the earliest of
the massive public actions that go with the declaration of a "special
period" of possible imminent hostilities. Urban evacuation, more-
over, presently an integral part of Soviet policy, requires several days.
The program is as complex as it is large, and it appears to stipulate
detailed procedures for every part of Soviet society. These details
are one of the reasons that it offers good opportunities for the collec-
tion of strategic warning information. In Moscow they include
such seeming minutiae as relocating to the suburbs fire engines sta-
tioned in the central city, removing national treasures (probably
including Lenin's body) for safekeeping, preparing for window-by-
window blackouts, and probably even making "final disposition" of
carnivorous, poisonous, and obstreperous residents of the zoo. So
long as persons friendly to the United States can move about in Mos-
cow, we have simple, inexpensive, and reliable collection devices-
such as an embassy wife airing the heir-to give us the crucial in-
formation on implementation of civil defense procedures.~S
A Moscow Observer's Guide, assembled by the National Indications
Center, covers the possibilities for simple physical observation at
times of crisis. The MOG was used during the Cuban missile crisis,
and in retrospect it can be said to have proved a useful tool. One
defect in the performance was notable, however: an ominous sign-
distribution of gas masks before the eyes of U.S. personnel on one
of the upper floors of the Foreign Ministry building-was reported
by the highest priority cable, whereas reports of negative indications-
neither Lenin nor the live inhabitants of Moscow, neither fire engines
nor ferocious animals ever left their normal quarters-arrived by slow
boat, or not until personnel returning to Washington underwent an
end-of-tour debriefing. Next time it would help to know in Washing-
ton which items in the MOG had been checked and which of these con-
veyed "no information," which were normal, and which ominous.
Prospects for increasing the MOG type of emergency collection
appear to be improving. There is now an Indian consul stationed
in Odessa; his cooperation would double (from 1 to 2) the cities
covered. Then if a U.S. consular office opens in Leningrad the cov-
erage could be tripled.
'The simplicity, economy, and reliability of embassy wives emerges from com-
parison with other intelligence systems, not other wives.
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Disaster Columns
Paramilitarized relief and recovery columns based in rural areas
under the civil defense program offer another possible set of indicators.
The task of these "disaster columns" is to move into a nuclear-
devastated urban area and attempt to assist the injured, limit damage,
and restore or salvage what they can. They arc to get their personnel
mostly from the farms, their transport and earth-moving equipment
from farms and from construction projects. Similar city units to
be evacuated in an emergency draw personnel and equipment from
factories, utilities, and service groups. Both the Soviet press and
secret intelligence suggest that the rural relief columns have not yet
developed much beyond the planning and organization stage, but
there has been recent public exhortation to increase efforts to equip
and train them.
We have no source with a demonstrated ability to observe and report
promptly an alerting of the disaster columns. Still, collection pos-
sibilities seem fairly good. The columns will directly involve large
numbers of people. And if alerted they would disrupt the activities
of even larger numbers by their claims for equipment on farms and
construction activities. Thus the immediate task is to determine the
procedures prescribed for the disaster columns as they are organized
and trained, so that emergency collection requirements and means to
meet them may be established.
The foregoing discussion may suggest that the prime task in day-to-
(lay observation of the Soviet civil defense system is measurement of
its alertness for near-term use. In fact, it is not. Although portions
of the system have been alerted and exercised, there is no evidence
of any national exercise having been staged, even one of a command-
post type. The most widely held (but not necessarily the best) guess
at the reason for this apparent shortcoming is that the Soviet popula-
tion has a proclivity to read too much between the lines and might
react in ways that would hurt, for example panic buying.
Over the years, in support of the National Indications Center and
the Watch Committee, economic analysts have charted the slowly
growing capabilities of the civil defense apparatus. They seek the
answers to such questions as: "Does the disaster column program
have a readiness date? Does it require the diversion of resources
from some other user? How effective will the columns be?" In
order to answer such questions as well as possible the collection and
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analysis of data on civil defense developments must be a day-to-day
process rather than one concentrated on periods of crisis.
The overwhelming majority of the answers have, in NIC jargon,
been "negative." That is, we have never (Cuban crisis included)
discovered an urgent effort to achieve early readiness, peak at a given
time, or otherwise meet a specific target date. It appears rather that
the Soviet regime believes civil defense to be a necessary part of
the balanced economic and military power base of the state which,
like the other parts of that base, must more or less keep pace with
general progress.
Suppression for Surprise?
What of the possibility of a surprise attack plan which omits any
direct pre-action alerting of the civil defense apparatus? Summarily,
such a plan is considered to be unlikely. Even if we ignore the
strategic military reasons for using the civil defense system, what-
ever its capability (as well as the even more cogent military reasons
for not meditating an attack at all under the present balance of
forces), there remain a number of considerations against it.
Civil defense is an integral part of Soviet power. In some areas,
when a regional military authority has conducted an air defense
exercise, the regional civil defense mechanism or some part of it has
also been exercised. The military authority can do this because civil
defense is now a military responsibility. The regional military com-
mander is trained to consider civil defense another of his many tools.
Consequently, it appears that a decision to omit civil defense would
be administratively as complex as a decision to cancel participation
of aircraft in an air defense effort and leave the job entirely to missiles.
The military commander, however, does not bear sole responsibility
for civil defense. The party, the economic bureaucracy, and the civil
government each has its own responsibilities, chain of command, and
interlocking liaison with respect to it. In order to omit civil defense
from a surprise strike plan, positive :instructions to prevent the execu-
tion of standing operating procedures would thus appear to be
necessary at a multitude of geographic locations-would need to go to
party officials, military officers, civil government bureaucrats, and
managers of factories, and would need to go to many levels in each
of these hierarchies. With so many people involved, the planners of
the strike have a problem: would the security of the surprise be well
served by an attempt to leave out civil defense?
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Most important is the probability that the party leaders would not
accept a military plan which excluded civil defense participation.
One totally unacceptable result of such a plan might be the decimation
or worse of the party while the military leadership remained rela-
tively unimpaired. Another consideration of the Presidium ought to
be the reaction of the surviving members of the populace, as well as
of the party, if available civil defense facilities had not been put
to use.
Above all, the party leaders remember the effects of World War II
on Soviet industry and the prodigious logistic efforts required to
fight the war and afterward to rebuild the economy and restore the
culture. Even now the demographic effects of World War II present
problems of labor force and military manpower. It is these memories
and the dangers of nuclear warfare, not charity, that have caused the
party leaders to expend the money, effort, and manpower to create
a civil defense organization, along with strategic reserve and in-
dustrial mobilization systems.
To sum up, the Soviet civil defense program involves millions of
people in a multitude of tasks. It is considered a basic component of
national power, and there are strong reasons for expecting it to be
activated even in connection with a planned surprise attack. Cur-
rent collection systems are relatively inexpensive and reliable, and
they are capable of timely reporting on the activation of at least
some part of the system. Prospects for this reporting appear to be
improving rather than diminishing. Let us now look at indicators
in other economic fields that can be monitored with existing collec-
tion capabilities.
Transportation: Pre-attack Moves
Because the Soviet transportation system is usually operating at
close to capacity, a major increase in military movements would dis-
rupt normal traffic patterns. The operation of the system is conse-
quently of great interest for strategic early warning. Moreover, be-
cause the bulk of transport is concentrated in rail facilities, the Soviets
are concerned that the existing system might not give them the flexi-
bility and service they would need after a war had begun, and schemes
to remedy the projected shortcomings are probably also of value in
pointing to possible indicators.
These propositions are not just wishful thinking on the part of
U.S. intelligence officers. The July 1961 issue of the Soviet journal
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Military Thought (secret edition) contained an article which discussed
military transport in much this light. The author was quite concerned
lest the West be tipped off to any imminent action against NATO by
the total disruption of normal freight when reinforcements were
moved to the western front. He proposed, in order to allay this
danger, that a large proportion of normal movements be continued
and the reinforcement trains mixed in as a minor part: of total rail
activity over several weeks.
From the Soviet viewpoint the problem of concealing this westward
reinforcement of the ground armies, a necessary action under the
"balanced force" concept, is complicated by the difference in gauge
between Soviet and European railroad tracks. At each border cross-
ing point, paired tracks of the two sizes parallel one another in order
to facilitate train-to-train transloading. These transfer yards have
grown slowly but steadily, and some now reach many miles both east
and west of the Soviet border.
Surveillance of the routes, crossing points, and yards in the western
USSR and abutting parts of eastern Europe should reveal by direct
observation the reinforcement of the armies facing NATO. For in-
direct acquisition, information useful to the strategic warning process
should he available to a number of railroad men, bureaucrats in
economic administration, and plant officials on both sides of the
border. These people would quickly be aware of an either general
or partial embargo on civil freight or passenger traffic, and many of
therm could determine whether it resulted from military usage of the
system.
Wartime Capability
Soviet military planners also appear to be much concerned about
the difficulties their transportation system will face in providing the
required service after the start of a war. A variety of measures
intended to strengthen it have been proposed, some of which would
offer opportunities to collect early warning information. Because
some of the measures could also serve purely economic ends, how-
ever, both collectors and analysts must treat them with care.
A central organization for the control and direction of all forms
of transportation would increase the efficiency, flexibility, and recuper-
ability of the Soviet system. With central direction, priority freight
could be more rationally shuttled among various routes and carriers
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and around bottlenecks and damaged facilities; repairs could be
organized in better accord with national priorities. The intelligence
officer concerned with strategic warning therefore watches constantly
the administration of Soviet transport. Centralization, subordination
to the Ministry of Defense or a supraministerial body, and military
staffing of either the operating or directing levels of transportation
administration are considered possible moves that would have mean-
ing for early warning.
A wide range of physical improvements in peacetime have also
been suggested as means to strengthen the wartime capacity of Soviet
transport. At one end of the range these consist simply of more
facilities, especially of kinds other than railroads-more pipelines,
more and better roads, improved canals, and more double tracking.
Less grandiose proposals are for road and rail bypasses around cities,
alternative bridging, and extension of Soviet-gauge track farther into
eastern Europe. Proposed emergency measures include road trailers
to move rail cars across breaks in rail lines, stocking of reconstruction
materials in the vicinity of probable Western priority targets, and
last-minute evacuation of transportation equipment from target areas.
We do not know which of these proposals might be implemented in
preparation for an anticipated war. Economic development requires
that some of them-the "Friendship" oil pipeline into eastern Europe,
for example-be acted on without particular regard to their military
utility. Others, particularly evacuation of transport equipment from
target areas, would be either very expensive or so disruptive of normal
military and civil activity that they are unlikely. But if evacuation
did occur, it would be an unmistakable sign that large-scale hostilities
were imminently expected.
Finally, in addition to land transportation, the intelligence officer
must follow Soviet merchant shipping and civil aviation. Normality
in the deployment and occupation of the merchant marine has been
a comforting phenomenon during past crises. Sometimes the Soviets
have moved ships out of an area of immediate danger, but they have
not put them in safe havens. If they really mean business one would
expect them to move at least some ships to home or friendly ports.
As to aviation, almost as many high-performance air transports are
operated by Aeroflot as by U.S. air carriers. These planes plus the
military air transports provide a substantial airlift potential, and so
any unusual activity in Aeroflot needs to be identified.
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Thus transportation, like civil defense, should be featured in a list
of activities that under existing collection capabilities could provide
useful, perhaps conclusive, strategic warning information.
Strategic Reserves
Over the years the Soviets have quietly created a vast and expensive
system for maintaining strategic stockpiles. It is administered un-
obtrusively and with unusual care from Moscow by the Chief Direc-
torate of State Reserves, apparently directly responsible to the Council
of Ministers. Its object is support for a war effort. It was used for
the initial effort in the Korean war.
For this purpose the Directorate administers and operates stores of
foodstuffs, raw materials for industry, semiprocessed materials, finished
manufactures, medical supplies, fuels, spare parts, construction ma-
terials--some of almost everything. It is not the only operator of stor-
age facilities in the Soviet Union: the Ministry of Defense has depots;
factories and distributors hold limited inventories; economic and
political administrative institutions keep some stocks. But State Re-
serve inventories are probably by far the most important. They were
designed, for example, to enable the economically deficient eastern
littoral of the Soviet Union to operate for extended periods without
the aid of the vulnerable Trans-Siberian Railroad.
Under Khrushchev the rules governing the withdrawal of materials
stored in the facilities of the Directorate were relaxed to allow use
in casing the effects of natural disaster and economic abnornahties-
in June 1964 Tass noted that farmers lacking seed were being supplied
from state reserves. But the primary purpose of the system-strategic
reserve for war-remains. Withdrawals from stock are not a routine
bureaucratic procedure; high officials must rule on each individual
release and approve the replacement schedule. Accounting proce-
dures, including physical inventory, are apparently stringent. The
refreshing process, putting old stores into service and replacing them
with newly procured goods, seems to be pursued with care.
As long as the Chief Directorate of State Reserves exists it must: be
presumed to have a role in any Soviet plan to start a large war, and
it may have one to play in limited war. In recent years, however,
the value of this knowledge to the indications process has l:,een slight
because the intelligence community lacks a source for timely and de-
tailed information on actions of the institution. The USIB's Economic
Intelligence Committee reaffirmed in 1964 that development of such
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a source is one of the first-priority requirements for economic informa-
tion. Prospects for filling this requirement are uncertain.
Industrial Mobilization
Another unique Soviet institution (or perhaps set of institutions) is
designed to coordinate the efforts of industry and transport in filling
wartime military needs. It is most easily explained in terms of the
pre-1957 economic administration because there was information on
its operation then. Prior to 1957 the Soviet government ran the econ-
omy through a series of ministries based in Moscow; there was an oil
ministry, an aircraft production ministry, an ocean fleet ministry, etc.,
sometimes close to fifty of them. Each ministry was subdivided into
departments, some functional, like supply or finance, some product-
oriented, e.g., fighter aircraft production, and some geographical, as
eastern area oil exploration.
Now each ministry had also a military affairs office called the "Mili-
tary Mobilization Department," and the administration of each factory,
railroad section, river fleet, or other activity had a similar subdivision
under one of a variety of names-mobilization section, special depart-
ment, secret department. These two, the ministry department and
the factory department, had a number of different responsibilities, de-
pending on the kind of ministry or facility it was in. For example, at
plants which had been converted after the war to the production of
agricultural implements instead of small arms and ammunition, the
responsibility of these departments included maintenance of an ability
to switch back to arms-the required equipment, limited quantities
of raw materials, and personnel with the right skills. Another re-
sponsibility was to keep track of the draft status of the employees in
order to assure that quotas for draftees and for skilled production
personnel would both be met. It was the factory departments that
handled classified documents at the plant level.
Like all Soviet institutions, these were required to submit many
reports. The instructions for some of the reports, which have come
into the hands of U.S. intelligence, clearly assumed that these units
would be deeply involved in the Soviet actions precedent to initiation
of any major military action. In some instances they were the chan-
nel through which the civil defense readiness of the plant was reported
to the ministry in Moscow and would have been the channel for re-
porting the effect of enemy military action on the plant. The intel-
ligence officer concerned with economic activity in the Soviet Union
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presumes that these units will continue to play a considerable part
in any Soviet preparations for war.
Again, as reflected in the 1964 updating of EIC priorities, the in-
telligence community needs a source. In at least one of the few eco-
nomic ministries that retain more or less their pre-1957 form, the units
continue to exist and to function. Soviet attitudes and procedures
being what they are, the continuity of the system would be-assumed
without any evidence at all, but there is some indication that units at
the factory level also continue to exist. A source is now needed for
much more basic information than the alerting of the system. We
need to reidentify its parts and rediscover its procedures after the con-
stant shuffle of industrial administrative bodies since 1957. Prospects
for such a source do not appear very bright.
The four activities discussed above (strategic reserves, the industrial
mobilization system, civil defense, and the transportation system) are
the ones that the economic intelligence officers in CIA consider the
most likely to be productive for indications purposes. They are the
fields that are kept under constant review for the National Indications
Center, subject of course to what the quantity and quality of reporting
are at any given time. The list of four, however, by no means exhausts
the economic phenomena from which early warning indicators may be
derived. Indeed, they may not even be the most important.
General Economic Activity
At least some economists turned intelligence officers believe that
their most important contribution to the warning process is the con-
tinuing analysis of the totality of Soviet economic policy; they believe
that a Soviet decision as important as to go to war will be reflected in
a variety of broad economic developments. These might include
great changes in the share of investment resources going to support
military activities, in the division of epnstruction activities between
projects offering a relatively quick return and those having a slow
return over a very long period, in the proportion of total goods avail-
able assigned to people for consumption and to industry for investment
opposed to that available for military forces, in the way the annual
addition to the labor force is divided up, and in the assignment of
priorities among the various claimants in the economy.
Other intelligence officers, including economists, arguing that data
on general economic policy is too imprecise to be of great value for
early war o t that conclusions reached in the last 10 years
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or so via this route have regularly been that the Soviet Union is hell-
bent for peace. The fact that there has been no global war in this
period does not demolish the objection: in late October of 1962 econo-
mists involved in intelligence were not likely to be making arrange-
ments for a winter vacation in southern Florida, even though the
evidence from Soviet economic policy suggested that it would be rea-
sonable to do so.
Strictly, it can be claimed only that the total economic picture should
tell us what the potential enemy ought to be considering if he is ra-
tional, not what he will necessarily do. The Chinese Communists,
for example, would be unable at present to sustain a massive military
operation over an extended period, but Mao and friends might still
start one. At times, nevertheless, the total economic view can he
fairly conclusive. In late 1963 and up to Khrushchev's fall in 1964
a variety of sources, secret and public, have given evidence of a Soviet
economic policy so clearly reflecting peaceful intent that it should pre-
vail even in the face of fairly strong contrary evidence.
In practice, the National Indications Center and the Watch Com-
mittee have been interested in Soviet economic policy only as back-
ground for the week-to-week examination of more direct indicators.
Though this practice may seem to neglect an important part of the
total picture, there are valid reasons for limiting broad economic policy
to a background role. The information on which judgments about
this policy are based is more often than not obtained from open Soviet
sources and is therefore subject to manipulation by the Soviets. It
also requires interpretation, which can be a long and involved process,
and frequently it is not timely enough for indications purposes. Ma-
terial' in open sources becomes available when the Soviet publisher is
ready, not when the economic intelligence officer needs it.
Bottleneck Intelligence
Under this heading one can collect the unending flow of reports on
shortages of particular kinds of equipment and materials in the Com-
munist world. The warning watchman is traditionally interested in
the bottleneck because it might reflect a diversion of the commodity in
question from normal to military use ("Lucky Strike `green' has gone
to wart"). A typical example might be the periodic Soviet shortages
of petroleum products, generally diesel fuel or bunker oil. The bottle-
neck report of a commodity specialist is generally his most frequent
contact with the indications process. All such reports are carefully
reviewed for indications implications.
The commodity specialist himself, however, is not likely to consider
bottleneck intelligence a very useful input for strategic warnin;4. Be-
cause the Communist economies are continually trying, to get from
available resources the maximum output and because these resources
frequently do not stretch as far as the planners had scheduled them,
shortages are a permanent part of all economic systems like the Soviet.
The specialist might even find it more disturbing if all references to
shortages among the commodities he watches disappeared from the
Communist press; the disappearance might be a reflection of tightened
security, which in turn might suggest some dark intent. Moreover,
a confirmed or admitted shortage in a commodity which he h, -td esti-
mated to be in good supply might move the analyst rather to question
his previous estimates, all too often based on inadequate sources, than
to suspect a diversion to military usage.
Most investigations of bottlenecks as indications turn out like one
made at the request of a congressional leader who had been told
that the Soviet purchases of Canadian and U.S. grain reflected very
high military consumption of alcohol (industrial) rather than a crop
too small to feed the population. The gist of the intelligence reply
was that even if Soviet military use of alcohol exceeded U.S. military
use by 10 times it would still consume only about three percent of
Soviet alcohol output, far too little to require large grain: imports.
In the light of his experience the commodity analyst thus properly
looks first to the economy rather than to hostile intentions for the ex-
planation of all shortages. Even when he cannot find an economic
explanation he remains reasonably sure that there must be one. That
he still looks carefully for indications implications in each new shortage
does credit to his integrity, for he feels like a man examining clams
for pearls.
A myriad of other possible economic events might theoretically pro-
vide valuable indications information, but limits on collection capabili-
ties and on the ability to generalize from fragmentary information
(like data on one activity at one facility at one point in time) severely
reduce the logical possibilities.
A large "unknown" area in the potential utility of economic intel-
ligence for strategic warning is covered by the items in the General
Indicator List which refer to relocation of plants, increased output in
armament plants, and changes in the pattern of industrial output.
The validity of such indicators and to some extent the prospects of
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collecting information on them would depend on what assumptions
were made as to the kind of war plan the USSR might settle upon.
There is little precedent in the history of such activities to serve as a
guide for early warning; some redirection of economic effort occurred
during (but not before) the Korean war.
In practice, there are only a few additional economic areas of oc-
casional concern, even as background, to the NIC and the Watch
Committee. Economic developments in the GDR are of considerable
background value for strategic warning. In particular, the level of
interzonal trade has over the past several years been a good gauge of
the intensity of Communist feeling on the Berlin issue. Moreover, it
is difficult to see how the Group of Soviet Forces Germany could be
put to extended use without the support of the GDR railroad net, which
is sometimes hard pressed to handle normal loads and therefore could
not move greatly increased military traffic without cutting off its civil
customers.
The varying priorities accorded Communist agriculture are also of
background value. For an extreme example, the periods when signifi-
cant number of troops are engaged in digging potatoes or moving
wheat seem unlikely to bring war. At other times the Soviet Union
is involved in one of its chronic reorganizations of economic adminis-
tration (such as that being prepared in the fall of 1962), with in-
evitable disruptive effects on command, output, and supply flows,
aggravated by infighting for position in the new scheme. That such a
reorganization is in progress does not preclude war, of course, but it
does indicate strongly that the possibility of war is not preempting
the undivided attention of party and government leaders.
Construction projects are of occasional concern in early warning.
Information on important projects is sometimes available with little
time lag, and analysis of the purpose, priority, and cost of the effort
may then be of significance.
Finally, merchant shipping and related information provided in late
July and early August of 1962 the initial indisputable evidence of a
drastic modification in Soviet policy on Cuba. On 29 August the
Watch Committee concluded that "at the least, recent deliveries in-
dicate a significant Soviet effort to improve the defensive military
capabilities of the Cuban regime." This conclusion was made pos-
sible primarily by the collectors and collators of information on com-
mercial maritime shipping. Were the Soviets again to try such a
build-up in an overseas location, shipping information might again
provide strategic warning.
Some observations on the hazardous
duty of conveying early warning in
political and other "soft" areas of
intelligence.
ON WARNING
Keith Clark
The capabilities of U.S. intelligence have improved markedly in
the course of the last fifteen years or so, but in the same period ex-
pectations about what it ought to be able to accomplish have probably
grown even faster. This is natural enough, and probably professionally
salutary for those who ply the trade, since most people need de-
manding requirements to keep them up to the mark. In any case,
the government spends a great deal of money to equip itself with
good intelligence and is rightly impatient with anything less than
the best. But the situation does carry irritations and hazards for the
professional. It is comparable to that in modern medicine, wherein
improvement in techniques and medications, by giving rise to an-
ticipation of consistent success, makes occasional failure a doubly
grievous matter.
And by some standards intelligence fails more than occasionally,
since it is considered in many quarters to have fallen down on the
job if there takes place anywhere in the world an important, or some-
times even mildly interesting, political event which it had not heralded
in advance in a way to make the warning stick in the minds of its con-
sumers. We are all familiar with the queries and the resulting search
of the record to find out whether top officials had been warned of
such and such a development prior to its occurrence, and if not why.
The short answer is often that these officials had indeed been warned,
sometimes repeatedly, but won't admit it. This is the one likely to
jump to the tongue of the participant in the post mortem, whether
intelligence collector, analyst, or estimator: he had reported a week
or a month ago that coup plotting was afoot in Ruritania and the
government's position was shaky, so nobody should have been sur-
prised when it was thrown out last night.
Whether or not anyone should have been surprised, however,
the fact is that they often enough were surprised, and so inclined to
ask why. Except in a narrow and not very profitable way, the
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analyst or estimator cannot meet the question by pointing out that
an estimate or a current intelligence daily "covered" yesterday's big
event when it noted weeks or months ago the possibility of a coup
in Ruritania. Too often that report has been forgotten in the
intervening stream of intelligence issuances and other papers or their
equivalent in briefing sessions. Unless the consumer has been in-
formed recently, and with sufficient emphasis and impact to make
it stick, he has not in an effective sense been warned.
The following observations on this subject are intended neither
as a defense of the intelligence community's record nor as definitive
analysis and solution of the difficulty. The problem of crisis antic-
ipation and early warning will continue with us, I suspect, despite
the recurrent efforts of this computer age to gear up machines for
effective and reliable prophecy in these soft areas of intelligence; here
art, old-fashioned expertise, and a judicious amount of imagination
still count for more than science. But while these reflections can
offer no new secret insights or intellectual breakthrough, it may
nonetheless be useful in a professional journal to record some guide-
lines and techniques derived from experience in asking the questions,
if not always giving the right answers.
The obvious first consideration is that the world itself is a chancey
and uncertain place, in which change, sudden or gradual, is more
the rule than the exception. One need only compare the world
today, or any one area of it, with what prevailed 10 years ago to
get a measure of the flux we live in. Technology, altering the lives
and the thinking of men everywhere, has been accelerating the pace
of even the most massive historical trends, the kind that used to
take decades to work themselves out. To take one conspicuous
example: with some stretching of the historical imagination one can
imagine a colonial revolt against imperialism getting under way a
century ago and gaining wide support in various parts of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, but one can scarcely picture such a move-
ment winning hands down, but for a few isolated spots, in little
more than a decade. Yet this is what has happened in the last 15
years, and the accompanying turbulence has generated some of the
principal problems for U.S. foreign policy and intelligence during
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In this world and this period of history, the intelligence analyst
and his customers are going to be nearer the mark if they think of
change as more or less constant, and the main question as being
not whether but when and how it will manifest itself. Unless proven
otherwise, it should be assumed that a given society is changing
daily. We face a semantic pitfall in the possibility of inferring from
the overworked term "stable" or "stability" that things are remaining
static; this attribute is often ascribed to a kind of mere surface calm
below which change and flux are going on all the time.
If accepting the fact that change is normal and widespread pre-
disposes us favorably, it still does not begin to solve the problems
arising from what we have to work with in forecasting a particular
change. In most cases the raw material of the evidence is necessarily
fragmentary and inconclusive, and as it is rounded out it normally
becomes not the stuff of early warning but news of current events.
A number of things contribute to the poor quality of evidence on
future developments.
One is the sheer impossibility of keeping track of the moves of
every individual, organization, or government that may be in a
position to change things in some part of the world. This difficulty
is compounded when the success of the move for change depends
on the ability of the promoters to keep it secret. If the coup plan
that gets leaked is the one most likely to be frustrated by its enemies,
it follows that a lot of such impending moves that have been reported
either do not come off or go quite differently than anticipated. No
one in the early-warning business can afford to overlook such reports
in his own calculations, but some of them are going to prove ill
founded by reason of the same lack of secrecy that led to our getting
them.
There is also the intrinsic element of caprice in the affairs of men
and nations. Some events cannot be predicted because the principals
seize sudden opportunities to act or are reacting to sudden stimuli,
unforeseen and quite often unforeseeable by those on the spot. If the
participants themselves could not have predicted the turn of events,
the most sensitive and pervasive of intelligence systems would not be
likely to do better. It is probably a salutary sign of awareness of such
limitations that the unanticipated fall of Khrushchev was not followed,
at least to my knowledge, by stern admonitions to the intelligence
94AOOO 00030 k0 0ts procedures and sharpen its sense of urgency.
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Shotgun and Pinpoint
For those charged with intelligence warning there is of course a
simple and appealing solution to these dilemmas-to point the gun in
all possible directions. Warning always of everything gives you a
technical defense against the charge that you failed to provide warning;
it is also likely to lose you most of your readers or listeners and beat the
remainder into a state of permanent hysteria or hopeless apathy. It
is doubtful that anyone could be got to read an estimate or current in-
telligence paper big and fat enough to cover all the dire possibilities,
and it is certain that the inflationary effect of this course on the value
of intelligence warning would be ruinous.
A cardinal principle of effective warning intelligence, then, has to
be selectivity. Selectivity involves rejection, and rejection involves
risk. If intelligence is to eschew the shotgun approach in the in-
terests of being read and respected, it will have to pick from the
voluminous mass of often fragmentary and sometimes contradictory
data a limited number of items to pass along, and sometimes what it
rejects will later prove to be important. The hope is that the
error will be corrected in time by the receipt of information supple-
menting or shedding new light on the rejected item and so pro-
moting it out of the rejection category. Or perhaps another, better
or luckier human mind will encounter the same fragment of informa-
tion and respond more sensitively and perceptively-hopefully well
in advance of the event it foreshadows. In the best of circumstances,
however, selection will occasionally eliminate something that sub-
sequently proves to have been important stuff. It is the argument of
this essay that an occasional miss of this type is preferable to the
overprudent shotgun alternative.
Now even a highly selective warning system will have to deal in
possibilities more often than in probabilities or near-certainties. Rea-
sonable prudence requires that a government be prepared, at any given
moment, to cope or at least live with a number of contingent possi-
bilities only some of which will in fact materialize. If something
could happen, it had better be borne in mind, whether it will "prob-
ably" happen or not. This being the case, some fairly substantial
proportion of the warnings delivered will in the event prove exagger-
ated or will otherwise not be borne out by subsequent develop-
ments. (Sometimes the fact that a warned-of development fails to
come off may be due to U.S. action triggered by the warning; here
intelligence has done its job to perfection even as its prophesies fail
to come true.)
Errors on the side of caution are less harmful than neglect of
warning, but they are not harmless. A false alarm will normally he
overlooked or forgiven much more easily than a failure to call the
shot on something that does happen; but both are errors and both
ought to be on the consciences of those in the warning business.
Most of us recall with acute pain instances in which intelligence
failed to forecast something that did occur. A review of the dan-
gers and opportunities warned of that did not materialize may give
less pain but is still sobering.
Importance
The area between these two kinds of error thus represents one of
the criteria in the process of selection-degree of likelihood. The
standard is admittedly a fuzzy one. A second criterion offers some-
what solider ground, namely the importance of the matter being
warned of. It is often, though not always, easier to judge how sig-
nificantly some contingency would affect our interests than how
likely it is to occur. Common sense and a reasonable familiarity
with the scope of our government's interests and activities usually
enable us to tell whether some foreseeable event would be of critical,
great, moderate, little, or no importance to national or departmental
interests. In any case the policy makers' judgment on this score can
supplement our own.
The complexity and many responsibilities of a government like
ours suggest that very few foreign developments would fail to be of
concern to some department or program. As a criterion for warning
selection, then, the question of importance probably refers less to
whether than to whom to warn and how. Some predictions should
have top billing in national intelligence publications or briefings,
others more subdued treatment in departmental or specialized is-
suances. The criterion is thus most usefully relevant to selection for
briefings and publication at the highest levels.
It is this writer's subjective and purely personal opinion that the
application of more vigorous standards in this respect would have a
salutary effect on the bulk and readability, and hence on the impact,
of most intelligence publications, not excluding the national esti-
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mates. An urge for completeness and detailed perfection is a good
thing, but sometimes an inordinate amount of time and energy is
spent in perfecting presentations of detail which can make no earthly
difference to policy decisions but confront already overburdened
readers with more information than they want or need to know. This
is not an argument for either carelessness or super-finality but a plea
for the classic virtues of brevity and concentration on the essential
as still useful in our line of work.
The criteria of likelihood and importance for determining whether,
how, and to whom to give early warning are supplemented by a third,
that of imminence, which is most relevant to the choice of when to
warn.. This timing is often of critical importance, for policy makers
arc as human as the rest of us and busier than most. On the higher
levels they are subjected to a mentally exhausting barrage of publi-
cations and briefings on a host of subjects, and in the daily round of
attending to inescapably urgent things, some of the rest are going
to be remembered and some are not.
Selection in the light of imminence is a matter of avoiding un-
acceptable extremes, warning too early or too late. Logically it
might: seem the earlier the better, giving as much time as possible
to do something about it, but this logic leads to presenting a catalog
of all kinds of important things that may or are likely to happen
eventually. Though it is unquestionably desirable to look ahead, in
appropriate context, with a general prediction of developments that
seem ultimately probable, our problem here is a pointed particular
warning at a time when something can and should be done about it.
Even the most prudent and forward-looking administration cannot
give as serious attention to a problem foreseen five years ahead as to
one shaping up next week. It is not just that something postponable
is crowded off the stage by real and present dangers; there is often
little that can or should be done about some foreseen events until
they are closer at hand. There is always the chance that the con-
tingency will not arise when expected or not at all.
It is true that in addition to delivering specific warning at the right
time, intelligence has a responsibility to keep its consumers suffi-
ciently aware of the remoter contingencies, of what Walt W. Rostow
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recently described as "the relevance of the less obvious." 1 It has to
do this without dulling their senses or straining their patience with
frequent laundry lists of all imaginable horrors. I confess it is much
easier to state this problem than to offer any but the most banal
answers. One line of procedure, however, while more the result of
evolution in the art of policy making than of intelligence innovation,
does offer the intelligence officer some help. I refer to the increased
emphasis in recent years on isolating and studying very long-range
policy problems-issues of a sort which may not require U.S. counter
action for several years to come. It may be debated whether the
policy lines worked out in these exercises will in most cases be fol-
lowed when the moment for action comes-certainly it will not be just
a matter of lifting a ready-made "courses of action" formula out of
the files-but the long lead-time concept is salutary for policy plan-
ning, and its acceptance makes the job of intelligence warning a few
degrees easier and conceivably a bit more fruitful. In an uncertain
world perhaps we can't ask for much more.
'In a lecture on "The Planning of Foreign Policy," given at the School of
Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University and published
in The Dimensions of Diplomacy (E. A. Johnson, ed., Johns Hopkins Press, Balti-?
more, L964).
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Some precepts for the practical ap-
plication of an esoteric art.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INTERROGATION
C. N. Geschwind
The general topic of interrogation is a vast one, opening into all
fields of theoretical and applied psychology and leading at its distant
limits in one direction to the wellsprings of human nature and in
another to the roots of political power. The specialized form we call
counterintelligence interrogation-that done to secure information on
a hostile intelligence service and the cooperation of the subject with
a view to neutralizing it-being a more subtle art than the interroga-
tion, say, of ordinary prisoners of war or criminal suspects, has ramifi-
cations almost equally far-reaching. The ordinary intelligence officer
cannot begin to master the enormous body of literature on the topic.'
Because of this and because a really first-class talent for inter-
rogating-as for managing people in general--is a rarity, what is
needed as a matter of practical reality is a simplified doctrine and
standard procedures that officers of average ability can follow. The
soaring doctrines of the theorist and the virtuoso have to he brought
down to earth and confined to what will work for you and me. This
kind of simplification has been performed in several guides and man-
uals.2 What I want to discuss in this article are selected aspects of
counterintelligence interrogation which have been slighted or in my
opinion simply require highlighting.
Managerial Aspects
It is a peculiar feature of most works on interrogation that they
begin with the "how to" phase; one starts out in a room face to face
A good place to sample it is in A Study for Development of Improved Inter-
rogation Techniques: Study SR 117-D, by Albert D. Biderman of the Bureau of
Social Science Research, Inc., with its bibliography of hundreds of references.
This is the final report, March 1959, on contract AF 18 (600) 1797, monitored
by the Rome Air Development Center with technical assistance from the Air Force
Office of Scientific Research.
'See Interrogation Guide (Counter Intelligence Corps Supplemental Reading.
U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Holabird: SupR 38000 June 1958) .and
Intelligence Interrogation (Department/Army FM 30-15, 1960), especially Chap-
ter 12, "Cl Interrogation."
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with the subject, all ready to interrogate him. In reality, many things
have to be done before we reach that point. The following para-
graphs cite some of them.
The need. First of all we have to decide whether the subject
actually has to be interrogated. Like a marriage, a CI interrogation
should not he embarked upon unless it is unavoidable. Does the
subject really know enough to be worth while? Can he do something
useful for us if we swing him around? Would some other subject
be better worth our time?
In answering these questions, we have to keep in mind our purpose,
at least latent in most CI interrogations, of getting the subject to col-
laborate with us, later, perhaps in an entrapment or double-agent
operation, perhaps for example by surfacing hostile operations or
testifying in court. We have to guard against a very natural desire
to get the truth out of someone just because we want to prove some-
thing or satisfy our curiosity. It takes just as long and costs just as
much to interrogate a bum as it does to lay open the secrets of an
opposition case officer who has defected.
Now there will be times when we do not know enough about a
subject to decide whether he is worth interrogating or not. We should
get the facts-by file checks, other investigation, screening assess-
ments, etc.-before we render a decision. In this connection, it is
important to bear in mind that some agent handlers have a tendency to
push their disposal or discipline problems into interrogation channels.
Those in charge of interrogations should be careful never to buy a
pig in a poke, or act until they have reviewed whatever operational
files there are.
Control. A second thing to be established is the control situation.
Authorities vary on many points in interrogation doctrine, but they
are all agreed on one: the better the control, the better the outlook
for success. A man firmly behind bars can be put under a good
deal more control than one we meet in a safe house, not to mention
his own home. Though obvious, this is often overlooked.
We should therefore catalog, in writing, the factors of control which
we have and those we can develop. Can we jail the man? Can we
convince him that we can? Could he flee across the border, or would
he face a worse fate there? Are his emotional treasures (family, etc.)
where we can reach them? What hard evidence have we in docu-
ments or witnesses? Are we free to use it? These and many other
questions must be studied.
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Bargaining position. In every interrogation there is an overt or
tmacitns
ogaining situation, and the quid pro is the single most potent
eabarf
moving the subject to action. Are we going to pay for his
information? What can we do for him if he collaborates? Will he
face jail if he does not? How can we protect him from retaliation?
What can we do about his special problems? Before entering upon
interrogation we must be quite clear as to what offers may be made
or implied and what may not.
Care and feeding. It should always be settled in advance where
the subject will be housed and under what conditions, where he will
be fed, how his laundry will be handled, where he can go and what
he can do for amusement, what medical care will be available, who
will provide transport, where he can get religious ministration, etc.
Security. We do not need to be reminded about protecting our
security from the subject, but what about his security? Will he be
quartered out of sight from the public? How can he be transported
securely? flow will he be guarded? Can he go out nights? Will
he be supplied with funds and documentation to protect him? How
and for how long can he remain away from his regular haunts with-
out attracting hostile attention? What cover can be arranged for
our contact with him? A CI interrogation differs from most other
types in the critical respect that we may wish to keep it completely
secret, not only to protect ourselves and him but to safeguard opera-
tional potentials and values that may be derived from him-potentials
of which we may have no inkling until we are well along in the
interrogation.
Covert aids. We should have firm plans on whether and how to
introduce stool pigeons among the subject's associates, whether to
read his mail, surreptitiously search his belongings and quarters, put
eavesdropping devices in his vicinity, put him under surveillance, and
so on.
Manpower. There is the question of what interrogators are to be
reserved-one might say expended. How much time will they have?
Will they have suitable facilities? What help will they have? Are
they actually up to handling the subject? Will the polygraph be
made available? How much control of it will the interrogator have?
Are recording devices on hand?
Legalities. The basic paper work often turns out to be
t i
mos
m-
portant. There should be some authorization in hand spelling out
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the right to interrogate this particular subject and why. It is well
to secure some agreement in writing from him also, if only a security
agreement. Most subjects can be talked into signing some sort of
paper. There must be a clear-cut understanding of how the local
law or legal officials fit into the picture. After the subject has com-
plained to the district attorney is the wrong time to think about this
aspect.
Females. Female subjects, whether young or old, require special
handling not only because they are more difficult to interrogate but
because they can cause scandals. If female interrogators are not
available, a witness, possibly through a mirror-window, should always
be arranged. Neglect of this point can lead to extremely painful
incidents.
Interpreters. The use of interpreters poses many problems. In
professional work there should he someone listening in at least from
time to time to report what the interpreter is really saying. The
availability and the ability of interpreters should be determined in
advance.
Concurrent research. It would be nice to have an interrogator who
knew all the topics of the interrogation as well as the subject did, but
in most cases the interrogator's knowledge will be deficient in one or
more respects. He may therefore not recognize the significance of
certain information the source provides or could provide, may waste
valuable time getting information that is already well known, may
misinterpret information, or may not even reach a common under-
standing with the subject on what they are talking about. Every
interrogator, however well informed, has blind spots and therefore
needs to have his "take" reviewed concurrently, while the subject is
available to supply further or clarifying data.
This means that concurrent research support should be arranged,
if not at the site of the interrogation then near enough that the inter-
rogator can have the drafts of his reports reviewed daily and can
discuss the trend of the interrogation with one or more competent
analysts. In practice, unfortunately, the U.S. services have been so
organized that the consumer-analysts are far away and first see the
interrogation reports long after both subject and interrogator are busy
with other things.
Spot interrogation. Many times the subject is available only at
intervals-a border crosser, a possible double agent, a defector who
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has steady employment elsewhere, a prisoner of the police to whom
access is but fleeting, or some person whose contact with its must
be concealed. In such cases the planning must be especially thorough
and details of questions well worked out with the help of the best
analysts available.
Supervision. The interrogator must of course be alone with his
subject a good deal of the time, and he must have a wide latitude in
dealing with him. He may spend quite a bit of time discussing trivia
without necessarily being out of line. He cannot do his job with some-
one breathing down his neck. The simplest means of supervision,
short of closed-circuit TV, is a microphone in the interrogation room,
so that when the supervisor is minded and has time he can listen in
to what is going on. This is a good way to keep interrogators on
their toes and keep some track of the development of the interrogation.
The mirror-window (if suitably camouflaged, as in a medicine cabinet)
is also a big help.
Communications. A one-way telephone is most helpful, one that
does not ring but can be used by the interrogator for outgoing calls.
A light and buzzer system to show when the corridors are free and
enable the interrogator to call for assistance or block the corridor is
one of a number of refinements that can be elaborated at an interroga-
tion center but are usually too costly for smaller setups.
Comforts. It is important to be sure the refreshment facilities are
adequate. Toilets, snacks, coffee, etc., must be handy and controlled
by the interrogator without his having to leave the subject alone.
Disposal. Planning should be quite concrete on what is to become
of the subject after the interrogation is over. Provision for the sign-
ing of receipts, quit-claims, security and recontact agreements, etc.
should be made in advance; you can't tell when an interrogation
may suddenly be terminated.
Conversion. It will almost always be a major objective to win the
cooperation of the subject at least to the extent of maintaining secrecy.
Is your interrogator able to argue ideologies? Can he handle the
man in such a way as to win his allegiance? These are matters to
have in hand before the struggle begins.
The golden rule of counterintelligence interrogation is take care of
the housekeeping before the how-to part, being sure that everything
is as efficient, secure, dignified, and impressive as you can possibly
make it.
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The Interrogator Job
It is a truism to say that most men who have the ability to handle
interrogation have more sense than to want to. In many ways the
interrogator has become a forgotten man of intelligence and counter-
intelligence, looked upon as a question-machine and seldom given
adequate career prospects. The work is just about the hardest there
is, for it includes the two separate jobs of questioning people and
writing reports. And it is of key importance: interrogation and in-
vestigation are the twin pillars of counterintelligence.
The Communist services have provided the most elaborate interro-
gation careers and facilities procurable. They rely very heavily upon
interrogation not only to get facts but to grind people down to their
specifications. Successful interrogators can look forward to positions
of increased importance. One East German, a certain Gustav Szinda,
who used to beat subjects up first and ask questions afterward, with
the twin objectives of knocking them off balance and convincing
them that he meant it when he threatened violence, eventually
wound up as chief of a provincial headquarters of his service. Others
have been given such positions as chief of operations and illegal
rezident abroad. The Communists consider interrogation training
to be the building of a fundamental skill, and a successful interrogator
they seem to look upon as so heavily compromised to the regime as
to be trusted on foreign missions.
We, on the other hand, seem to have made the job a drudge assign-
ment which does not lead anywhere. The easiest way out of this
dangerous situation would be to make a half-year or so of interrogation
duty routine in the development of all officers who aspire to run
secret agents. This would yield a reservoir of interrogators for any
situation, train agent handlers in the skills of questioning and
reporting, strongly reinforce their knowledge of counterintelligence
topics, foreign languages, hostile thinking, etc., and at the same time
provide manpower with motivation to handle the presently much
neglected basic job of interrogation.
In any case, those upon whom the interrogation task is laid require
more than routine good handling; they have to be made to feel that
their work is appreciated and the greatest care taken to steer their
careers away from blind alleys. Above all, one must see to it that
unimportant or curiosity interrogations are not imposed upon experi-
enced men; nothing is so demoralizing to an interrogator as to
struggle with worthless subjects to get a product that will soon find
its way into the classified trash. As good sources become scarce, pres-
sure develops to fish out marginal ones and dubious individuals such
as fabricators for the sake of producing some kind of report. Con-
sistent resort to this practice risks killing the goose that lays the
golden eggs.
The best protection against such misuse is to give established
interrogators the responsibility for assessing and evaluating their
sources. If an interrogator says a subject shows signs of mental
aberrations or other deficiencies or is worthless in point of knowledge,
his judgment should be accepted unless there are very important
reasons for overriding it. In the latter case these should be candidly
explained. If at all possible, interrogators should function in groups
or as a staff led by a senior interrogator. This is a great morale-
builder and stimulant to productive competition.
The how of Interrogation
The general successfulness of interrogators in eliciting compliance makes for
a difficulty in analyzing scientifically the bases of their effectiveness. A high
rate of success is apparently achieved by many different kinds of personalities,
employing a wide variety of methods, on the basis of assumptions and lines
of reasoning which, to the extent that they are articulated at all, are fre-
quently unfounded or mutually incompatible s
It seems to me that this finding is substantially correct. That is
to say there are all sorts of people and all sorts of approaches that
work. There is no best way. There are not even many general rules.
People are complex, variable, and vulnerable or invulnerable at the
most unexpected points. More important, depending on the person
doing the interrogation and the personal equation that evolves be-
tween him and the subject, the vulnerabilities may change. An
elderly woman, for example, may develop a strong interest in im-
pressing a personable young male interrogator and entirely reject
another elderly woman. On the other hand, she may refuse to talk
at all except to another woman in the same age bracket. Many
people, of course, make adaptations, so that an interrogator not
basically compatible with the subject assigned him may soon get
along swimmingly.
The tricks and tactics of interrogation worked out by generations
of interrogators can be found in many books; all of them have
validity some of the time. There are many tomes on how to assess
Biderman, op. cit., p. 48.
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 the vulnerabilities of subjects, mostly in rather abstruse psychological
language. What it all boils down to is that what works with one
person may not work with another.
It seems to me that we have again to fall back heavily on what
are in the main the managerial aspects. We have to arrange a suit-
able setting and props in accordance with the role to be given the
subject in our interrogation psychodrama. Is he to play the role of
a captured spy? A fellow conspirator? A terrified victim? A hero?
An oracle? A being entitled to every consideration and protection?
A suspect? Is he to change roles, and if so when and how? When
we have a controlled situation, we have enormous power to force a
role upon the subject because we can manipulate his environment.
Unless our subject is highly sophisticated, he will hardly realize
he is being offered a part to play. He may, of course, seek to play
a part: of his own, but if we have assessed him and the situation
correctly and approach him skillfully, we can fairly easily maneuver
him at least to take one of two roles we prefer. Insensibly he drifts
into the part and begins to respond as if he were the person repre-
sented in that role.
In counterintelligence interrogation, no matter where we start we
want at the end to have our subject playing the same role-the
oracle; this is the pose that makes him as productive as a gusher.
We can hardly start with it if he is recalcitrant, but we can lead
toward it from the beginning by getting him to pontificate on trivia
and harmless matters. The best interrogators-sometimes uncon-
sciously-all head in that direction.
The worst interrogators are those who (usually unconsciously)
want to be the heroes of the drama themselves and so beat the sub-
ject (mentally) to the ground. The interrogator must firmly suppress
all impulses to dramatize himself, unless for the purpose of arousing
the subject to compete. He can boast of his own operational achieve-
ments, for example, and quite possibly get a recalcitrant subject to
top his story.
We must decide early on whether we are going to interrogate on
many topics and in detail or only on a few or superficially. When
we are in for a long siege, the managerial aspects become very im-
portant indeed, and the problems of writing, accuracy, concurrent
research, and keeping the subject productive become more difficult.
If we confine ourselves to a few topics-relatively rare in counter-
intelligence interrogation-we need not expect too much trouble with
the source once he has been made productive.
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Some Approaches
Making the subject productive is the first goal of any interrogation,
and it can be reached, as we have said, by many avenues. The prob-
lem may range from coping with open hostility to working around
mental blocks. In a paper of this length we had better concentrate
on ways of transforming a recalcitrant subject into an oracle, and
of these on a few that are not covered in nearly every work on inter-
rogation. The following are some that have proved profitable.
Hypnotism. In a legal and control situation where chemical or
natural hypnotism can be induced by qualified practitioners, its value
does not lie in questioning an entranced subject. You get worthless
suggestion-results, fabrications, and distortions. What it can do is
enable you to change the subject's attitude toward the interrogation.
Ile can he made to see foes as friends (a good CI interrogator of
course is never a foe, but only a man who wants to get the subject
on his side), and post-hypnotic suggestion can often make him co-
operative after he is out of his trance.
The polygraph. This machine is the stethoscope of interrogators,
used in diagnosis of areas of deception. It is also a fabulous stalking
horse, offering the interrogator many openings to give the subject
an excuse for not holding out any longer.
The ideological argument. Every interrogator should be prepared
to refute tenets of Communism such as that the end justifies the means.
The ideological line vis-a-vis a subject, however, should not be to
prove him wrong but to provide him with rationalizations which
he can use to justify to himself his changing sides (which every
person to some extent wants to do).
The quid pro quo. Cl officers are sometimes in a position to make
substantial offers to a recalcitrant subject-protection, a chance to
"work against the Communists on our side," etc. Backstopped and
approved on the proper level, such inducements can occasionally
shortcut weeks of effort. Quite a few subjects who do not want
to say so are actually very much interested in "what's in it for me."
Threats. Threats to turn the subject over to local authorities, to
return him to the Communists, of blacklisting, public exposure,
solitary confinement, deprivations, deportation, confiscation of prop-
erty, physical violence, etc. are dangerous instruments, for if they
fail of their effect it usually means the loss of irre b1
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having been cleared beforehand on the highest level. The fear ele-
ment can be stimulated easily and safely by manipulating the situation
in such a way as to imply the threat.
If threats arc employed, it should always be implied that the sub-
ject himself is to blame-"you leave us no choice but to ...' He
should never be ordered to comply "or else." Readers familiar with
the Jaitner case will recall that he was told he left us no choice but
to blacklist him everywhere. This potent threat to his swindling
future brought him almost at once around to an agreement to tell
us the truth now if we would keep quiet and not bar him from future
deceptions. Essentially the threat is the basis for a quid pro quo.
One should always be prepared to carry out an explicit threat, for the
subject will generally sense a bluff.
Confrontation. There is a strong temptation, when we are in
possession of hard evidence such as a witness, documents, or self-
contradiction, to face the subject with it. Certainly in many cases it
becomes necessary eventually to use this type of ammunition openly,
but the moment should be put off until all else has failed, always until
after our advantage has been used in polygraph tests or a decision
made not to run any. There is nothing so valuable to interrogators
as having a question on which the subject is known to lie, especially
when he has no idea that we know it.
A woman agent of the East German MfS, for example, was observed
shoplifting by our surveillants. In the general polygraph examina-
tion she was casually asked whether she stole things, and the resultant
reaction became an invaluable gauge. Later interrogated on the
same point, she almost immediately admitted it; if this had happened
before the polygraph test the effect would have been lost. Coming
as it did, the confession was the turning point in the interrogation,
proving an entering wedge for other detailed admissions.
In the instructions issued by Communist services to their agents
there is usually a section on what to do under interrogation. They
are told to stick to their story and try to find out what evidence there
is against them, and particularly to be alert for anything indicating
who has betrayed them. It is well to hear this in mind in surfacing
evidence in the confrontation maneuver or in the "we know every-
thing" ploy.
Divide-and-conquer tactic. Whenever two or more persons are
under interrogation on the same topic, for example two agents from
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other, not only as sources of detail exposing and refuting cover stories
and other lies, but also as levers. A clever interrogator can get the
idea across to each subject that the other is leaking, especially if he
has reliable derogatory information he can let slip into his question-
ing. In the still hours of the night, when the subject is free to mull
over the day's exchange, he will stumble on the "slips" and their
significance, with very weakening effect on his morale.
Harassment. Three things very hard on a subject are to have to
go back over the same ground, to change abruptly from topic to topic,
and to be interrogated at irregular intervals, say once at dawn, an-
other time at midnight, etc. They are particularly effective if done
under the pretense of "emergencies in which your help is needed"
rather than as a hostile measure. But harassment which goes so far
as to impair the functioning of the subject's nervous system reduces
his capacity to provide accurate and complete information. All
harassment and threats build up the subject's sense of moral superi-
ority and so his resources for resistance.
Isolation. We often find that resistant subjects are kept in com-
pounds with open-mesh fences, windows, etc. which allow them
visual contact with the outside world. In some cases they have been
allowed to listen to broadcasts or receive newspapers. Resisters draw
great strength from this. They should be isolated visually and in
every other way, so that they come to regard the prison as their world
and gradually respond to the fully controlled environment.
Violence. There is little doubt that violence, correctly applied,
often gets crude results quickly; but it lowers the moral caliber of
the organization employing it and soon corrupts the interrogation staff,
which degenerates until it cannot operate without violence. There
are many more powerful persuaders, and violence should never be
used.
Miscellaneous Considerations
Most of the following topics are each worth a book to themselves;
here we arc only hitting a few points where an interrogation can be
helped or hurt.
Questionnaires. It should be a function of the concurrent research
analysts to work out as thoroughgoing a biographic questionnaire as
possible, so that a junior interrogator, if no one else is available, can
get down the main facts on which the interrogation plan will have
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to be based. The standard Personal Information Report forms in
use are inadequate but far better than nothing. Special questionnaires
should also be devised to cover each main topic. By using question-
naires we do risk stereotyping the questioning process, but we gain so
much in the way of systematic coverage that the disadvantage is
trivial. This is hard work that has to be done before the subject
has even been contacted. It is a staff job.
Subject assessment. Tomes have been written on how to deter-
mine the character of individuals, their strengths, interests, weaknesses
etc. It remains a fact that the best clue to the future behaviour of
any man is his past performance. The more you can find out about
the subject's past reactions in situations which confronted him with
unpleasant choices and problems, the better you can determine who
should interrogate him and can plan the interrogation tactics. It is
quite beyond this paper to get into details on this enormous topic.
The plethora of aids is confusing. If you have psychiatric assist-
ance it may prove quite valuable. The polygraph can be used as an
assessment tool. So can handwriting analysis. Direct interviews,
batteries of tests, etc., all have some validity. But the situation is
often the determining factor.
Thus a basically dishonest millionaire would scarcely ever be a
thief because he has no need to steal, while an honest man faced
with necessity can perform quite spectacular larcenies. A weakling
being asked to divulge information when it would mean death for a
beloved child will put up a hell of a battle, while a hardnosed fighter
type may be quite easily induced to cooperate in exchange for a
fortune or the chance to do in a personal enemy. It is accordingly
illusory to devote too much time to assessing a subject's inherent
resistance potential.
Far more important is to select an interrogator whose personal
equation meshes with the subject's. And that is easily done by trying
out a few people in harmless personal interviews. Most of us have
the gift of being able to tell whether we like and are liked by given
individuals. Another very important thing is to be sure to determine
whether the subject can in fact tell an accurate story about anything.
Some criminals with jail experience habitually put out a screen of
confusing tales on any and all topics when confronted by authorities.
Such people can often be trapped by stool pigeons.
Clues on bona fides. Only detailed research and investigation can
confirm bona fides. There are, however, some warning signs that
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should be looked for. Subjects who use or understand jargon. they
could not know unless they were "hep" should be trapped with more
jargon, provocation, etc. Subjects who defend one or another aspect
of Communist doctrine while disavowing Communist affiliations should
always be viewed with suspicion. Subjects with a fund of "guard-
house lawyer" talk, like those who do not seem to be able to tell a
straight story about anything, are often found to have had extensive
criminal involvement. Subjects who get off on side issues in great
detail but are brief on certain central matters are worried about the
latter.
Pocket litter. Never forget to turn out all pockets, cuff linings, etc.
and where possible conduct a full body search. Make sure the subject
gets a chance to explain each item.
The interrogation plan. This should be made by the interrogator
and approved by the supervisor. It should include deadlines. Never
start without one.
Story building. As far as possible, the first interrogation should
be conducted as if it were the last, with detail piled on detail. It is
not a good idea to have different people give the subject "`once over
lightly" treatments. As he tells and re-tells his story lie will develop
it, plug loopholes, resolve contradictions, add corroborative detail,
learn how to talk under questioning, etc., making the job of the detailed
interrogator and the breaking of recalcitrance harder and harder.
Some subjects even begin to believe their own lies.
Commanders should politely but firmly resist the efforts of visiting
firemen to "get immediate information on a few important points"
while the detailed interrogation is postponed. If there is need for
haste on particular matters, as in order to get evidence for making
arrests, this interrogation should be done, in detail, by the assigned
interrogator. The visiting firemen can if need be sit (or better just
listen) in, but it is a very bad error to let them take over unless
political considerations have precedence. These smash-and-grab art-
ists not only contaminate the subject by providing him with all sorts
of information in their efforts to get immediate answers but also put
him in the position of being able to say much later, when cornered:
"Oh that, why I told the big man with the white mustache all about
that--didn't he tell you?"
Recording hints. Full tape recordings are usually useless because
they include too man preliminary and clarifying verbal exchanges
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and other confused matter. Cut the recorder in while you summarize
out loud, paragraph by paragraph, what the subject has just said,
asking him to confirm or correct you. This greatly reduces volume
and error and in effect gives you the first draft of your report.
Reporting hints. All interrogation reports, unless they have been
fully verified by research, should be labeled "Unevaluated Informa-
tion." They should distinguish carefully between what the subject
has directly observed, what he has heard, and what he deduces, e.g.,
"Subject infers, because of so and so, that ...." The interrogator's
comment should always be carried in footnotes, never inserted in the
body of the report. If the results of research and check-ups such as
confirmatory name-traces are to be mentioned, they too should appear
as footnotes. There should also be a statement informing the reader
how much confirmatory research was done; otherwise a heavily an-
notated report will give the impression of having been fully researched
although only aspects of a pivotal nature (or those interesting the
interrogator) had been checked out.
Maps and plans. Beware of letting the subject have maps or build-
ing plans to work with until he has drawn what he can from memory.
Nothing suits a fabricator better than to get a .map thrust into his
hands from which to give verisimilitude to his lies about installations,
escape routes, etc. When the subject has produced his memory work
the comparison with maps and plans will yield many interesting
insights.
Questions on organization and functions. The rarest of birds is a
man who really knows how his organization is set up and functions.
It is well to be very careful in taking any subject's say-so, no matter
how sincere and confident he is, on how his outfit works. The best
safeguard is to do detailed biographical and job interrogations con-
cerning all his colleagues; then do an organization and function inter-
rogation; then examine whether the job descriptions of individuals
confirm the organic picture.
Two-man teams. A prolific source is a heavy burden on a single
interrogator. It is not extravagant but highly efficient to use two
interrogators alternately on different topics, one questioning while
the other is off writing up what he has gleaned, so that the subject
is kept continuously occupied. This not only leaves no time for
idling and brooding but introduces a measure of variety and com-
petition into the interrogation process.
Operational officers as interrogators. Their use is often unavoidable,
as in handling double agents. It is poor practice to use them for
ordinary interrogations, both because it ties up specialized manpower
and because no operational officer can be expected to buckle down
to detailed interrogation work not directly affecting his own operation.
Interrogator training. Other things being equal, it is better to get
people who are interrogators more or less by nature and inclination.
The training really has to be done on the job. It is possible to lecture
and give it dry-run, ground-school type of training, with each mar,
interrogating a fellow student and being in turn interrogated (the
latter aspect is often overlooked); but the best results and the quickest
assessment of ultimate suitability are obtained by putting the man to
work interrogating real but second-class subjects. Sometimes arrange-
ments can be made to assign candidates to local security or police
interrogation work for a few months.
CI background. No interrogator will be useful or productive unless
he has had full CI operations training and experience and acquires an
extensive and detailed knowledge of the organization, functions, per-
sonnel, tactics, methods, etc. of the Communist services against
which he is to work.
Indigenous interrogators. As a rule, these will have a great deal
of trouble winning the confidence of indigenous subjects, who gen-
erally distrust their countrymen's security and resent the imposition
of a mere fellow countryman's will. If they have to be used, their
original motivation should gradually be reinforced, as by inducing
them to apply for U.S, citizenship and providing a career path that
leads to attractive goals. One should make sure that they are soon
moved on to other and better work, not left stuck in an interroga-
tion rut.
The interrogator's attitude. The most important single attribute
every successful interrogator appears to have is an inflexible determina-
tion to get the facts. Persons who quail at difficulties, look for fast
and easy solutions, are lazy, have turned out to be misfits in other
jobs, etc. should not be disposed of into the interrogation team.
They will not only lower morale but be the cause of costly failures.
When the recalcitrant subject meets with an interrogator who he
senses is absolutely determined, his resistance is invariably weakened.
And the subject soon perceives the caliber of the man who faces him.
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Never forget that some day the subject may have an opportunity to
tell his side of the story to the press or other public medium, friendly
or hostile. Ile certainly will talk to individuals. What he should
honestly be able to say about us is that we are tough but fair. If he
decides to paint us in other colors falsely, he probably won't be con-
vincing. In any case, let's not provide him with ammunition.
A program for identifying and at-
tacking the adversary's psychologi-
cally vulnerable fringe.
MORE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF SOVIETS
Martin L. Brabourne
Andrew J. Twiddy's "Recruitment of Soviet Officials" 1 came as an
invigorating breath of fresh air to at least one much interested reader,
combining a realistic appraisal of one of our key intelligence tasks
and an unenchanted review of past efforts with an original and
optimistic approach to the future. Its community-wide dissemination
in the Studies was also a forward move in striking the keynote, so to
speak, for a renewed and broader examination of Soviet recruitments
which would lift the subject out of its status as the arcane, esoteric
specialty of a selected few. It is not out of disagreement with Mr.
Twiddy but stimulated by his refreshing treatment that this reader
has tried to organize and pull together his own parallel thoughts
and experiences in the hope of continuing the conversation, the
"thinking out loud" that Twiddy began. He believes he has some-
thing to say, and perhaps this may in turn stimulate others to join
the discussion.
The Vulnerable Target
We have for years studied so-called "vulnerabilities," the "basis for
recruitment," the "motivation of defection," and so on, and there is no
question
ffthat we have learned something from these studies. That
ou eorts have somehow been wide of the mark, however, is indi-
cated by the consistent failure of operational approaches based. on the
studies. It may be that we have lost sight of the forest, or perhaps
more appropriately have failed, in our wandering among the trees, to
perceive that we are in a forest at all. What we are looking for is so
evident, so perfectly obvious, that in a sense it has escaped our notice.
This single, simple, self-evident observation is that the enormous
act of defection, of betrayal, treason, is almost invariably the act of
a warped, emotionally maladjusted personality. It is compelled by a
fear, hatred, deep sense of grievance, or obsession with revenge far
1 St J'
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exceeding in intensity these emotions as experienced by normal,
reasonably well-integrated and well-adjusted persons. Defection is
atypical, and continued betrayal even more so: of the thousands,
even tens of thousands of Soviets who have served abroad since say
1950, only a few dozen have defected, and of these only a few have
worked in place for us as agents. Such acts in peacetime are clearly
a manifestation of abnormal psychology; a normal, mature, emotionally
healthy person, deeply embedded in his own ethnic, national, cultural,
social, and family matrix, just doesn't do such things.2
This general principle is illustrated in our experience with Soviet
defectors, All of them have been lonely people. All of those in the
writer's experience have manifested some serious behavior problem-
such as alcoholism, satyriasis, morbid depression, a psychopathic
pattern of one type or another, an evasion of adult responsibility-
which was adequate evidence for an underlying personality defect
decisive in their defection.3 It is only a mild hyperbole to say that
no one can consider himself a Soviet operations officer until he has
gone through the sordid experience of holding his Soviet "friend's"
head while he vomits five days of drinking into the sink.4
What is the evident corollary of this proposition? Simply stated,
it is that our operational efforts should be focussed against the emo-
tionally weak, immature, and disturbed fringe elements of a Soviet
colony. Systematic fishing in these troubled waters should have a
much higher probability of yield, over a period of time, than un-
focussed, indiscriminate efforts such as have been made in the past.
This is the principle that has been so obvious as to escape notice.
2 The truth of this generalization is today adequately recognized in overt
academic, journalistic, and literary works. Of the many references that could be
given, Rebecca West's Meaning of Treason comes to mind, and William L. Shirer's
The Traitor. From a psychoanalytical standpoint there is Robert Lindner's
Prescription for Rebellion. A sociological treatment, and the best one for our
own systematic study and understanding, is Morton Grozdin's The Loyal and the
Disloyal (University of Chicago, 1956).
a Our classified literature has finally recognized this fact, and articles in this
journal have reflected the hard-earned lesson. See, for example, "What to Do
with Defectors" by John Ankerbrand, Studies V 4, p. 33 if.
' We shall not attempt an analysis of the degree to which this post-defection
behavior may reflect guilt and remorse for the act of defection. Suffice it here
to observe that psychiatric study of several of these defectors identified the alco-
holic manifestations as merely one symptom of lon -standing er onalit difticultie
of which the defection itself was another. XpproVe(~ I-or R elease 2005/01/05: C
Given the principle, a number of conditions must be satisfied before
it can be translated into an operational program. First is the ques-
tion whether it is possible to recognize and identify these fringe ele-
ments by means of traditional and existing sources of information,. Do
sources normally available to us produce the kind of clues which
would at least tentatively identify such potential targets? If so, the
next step is to isolate and catalog these clues, criteria, and indicators
of our targets. That done, case officers and analysts have to be
sensitized to recognize the indicators, have to develop the outlook
and sophistication to seize on them in their observations and report
them. Finally, access must be gained to the targets so identified, and
officers must learn how to talk to them.
Target Characteristics
An intelligence officer once observed that the only reliable motiva-
tion for treasonable espionage is hatred and thirst for revenge. Else--
where it has been said that most traitors have been impelled to their
treason by dreams of power and glory. Who are the people that
hate and seek revenge with such passion they commit treason? Who
are the people that dream of power and glory and, not only frustrated
in these dreams but perhaps even ridiculed in their daily lives, be-
come so bitter as to turn their backs on family, friends, and nation?
It is necessary at this point to go into a little amateur (and vastly
oversimplified) psychology. In this writer's opinion, the persons we
are seeking are those with a markedly deficient or defective con-
science-the psychopaths, also called sociopaths-and at the other
end of the spectrum those who may have an adequate (or perhaps
overdeveloped) conscience but are hampered in their life and work
by intense internal conflicts-neurotic and prepsychotic personalities.
The psychopath is a person basically without scruples or one whose
weak or defective conscience is eroded by the problems and frustra-
tions of living and finally collapses under their intolerable accurnula-
tion. Sometimes a deceptively charming and seemingly well-adjusted
person, he can also be an easily recognizable misfit, an intrigant, a
con man, a chiseler. He is highly self-centered, even if he hides it
with some degree of success. He is impulsive, with a low frustration
tolerance, hypersensitive, easily angered. He has an enormous need
for prestige, status, recognition. He is often highly arrogant. Ile
characteristicall seeks revenge for real or ima
ined sli
ht
Th
g
g
s.
e
RDP78T03194AqQr9?( 99q1kpn in coolly calculated actions to wreak the rnaxi-
 Approved For ~pjggpf 405/01/05: CIA
mum damage or in indiscriminate destructive retaliation, a blind
lashing out. Sgt. Dunlap, Col. Penkovskiy, Joe Valachi, Aaron Burr,
Rastvorov, George Blake, and Lee Oswald almost certainly belong co
this type. Eleazar Lipsky has written a highly perceptive fictional
account of such a person in his story The Scientist, which is well worth
reading. Another by the same author is Kiss of Death, presenting a
fictional precursor of Joe Valachi.
The neurotic and prepsychotic are different from the psychopath,
but equally interesting from an operations standpoint. Here we have
emotional constellations characterized by inner conflicts, anxieties, and
severe repressions or distortions of particular facets of the personality.
It is to this category that Morton Grozdin's "alienated" personality
belongs. The neurotic or prepsychotic has difficulty getting along
in life; in severe cases he is immobilized in his job or perhaps in his
family relations. He may be severely repressed, or over-organized
and rigid (the Puritan, for example). His ability to understand and
gel: along with other people is characteristically poor. He is pre-
occupied with his own problems. He loses contact with other people
to varying degrees, and he acutely feels need for such contact, for com-
munication and affection. He will be over-dependent or over-
aggressive. His personality distortions cause his unsatisfied needs to
he experienced with much greater intensity than in "normal" people,
and it is these overwhelmingly intense feelings which can provide
the driving power for defection and espionage.'
Whether the neurotic/prepsychotic is overly dependent (often shy,
withdrawn, even isolated), or overly aggressive, obnoxious, and up-
staging, he retains the opposite tendency repressed, driven out of sight,
so to speak, with greater or less success. A highly dependent person
thus has strongly repressed hostility and unsatisfied aggressive needs,
while the highly aggressive ones have rigidly suppressed dependency
needs and are often most lonely persons. The suppressed tendency,
whether to dependency or aggression, often splashes over into overt
behavior, giving the outside observer an impression of inconsistency,
"spottiness," or instability of character.
' The force of these drives was well illustrated by an incident in the writer's
handling of a defector. The defector was being "dried out" from one of his
periodic alcoholic bouts and had been placed under sedation. The doctor ad-
ministered about ten times the dosage normally sufficient to knock a person cold.
This massive dosage failed to put him to sleep, however; it merely "slowed him
down." Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : Cl
DP78T03194A000200030001-0
Recruitment
Neurotic and prcpsychotic persons are characteristically unable to
evaluate friend and foe objectively. They systematically misread the
motives and intentions of others, projecting their own problems onto
people in the outer world. In aggregate all these attributes, while
making their possessors difficult to work with, render many of them
peculiarly susceptible to approach and development.
Finally, even in more normal people, we should look especially at
the unique vulnerabilities of middle age. The incidence of various
types of emotional and mental breakdown is highest in the middle-
age category. The period of life from say age 37 on shows the highest
incidences of divorce, disappearance, alcoholism, infidelity, suicide,
embezzlement-and probably defection, overt or in place.
The reasons for this phenomenon are not hard to find. There is
the onset of decline from physiological peak; one's children suddenly
are no longer children but young adults, bringing a sharp realization
of the passage of one's life; youthful ambitions and ideals suffer dis-
illusion and then sudden, brutal collapse; career turning-points occur
at this time. The prospect of an insignificant old age looms large
and immediate. Most men, according to numerous qualified sources,
go through a complete reevaluation of personal philosophy, religious
and moral beliefs, and so on in this period.' It is the time when a
man takes stock of his life, and the result is frequently traumatic in
the extreme. This so-called "middle-age revolt" is of exceptional
importance from an intelligence operations standpoint, since men of
37 or older are usually well advanced in their professional careers
and highly enough placed to make them extremely interesting targets.
Symptoms and Sources
What precisely, then, should we look for in our scrutiny of source
materials during the initial search for targets? The following sketches
the outline of an indicator list; it is not, of course, complete or
comprehensive:
Alienation in interpersonal relationships. Lack of close friends in
the Soviet colony. Evidence of coldness in personal relationships.
Isolation, aloneness. Personality difficult to get along with. Ar-
rogant, offensive, sullen, hostile. Feels discriminated against.
Resentful. Hypersensitive. Enemies in the Soviet colony. Ob-
n Sec Edmund Bergler, The Revolt of the Middle-Aged Man (Grosset and
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ject of either ridicule or contempt. Difficulties with co-workers
or psychological isolation from them.
Career Situation. Evidence or reasonable inference of difficulties in
job situation. Resentment of supervision, direction, interference.
Evasion of job responsibilities. Lack of appropriate career pro-
gression. Resentment of others' progression.
Family Situation. Difficulties in family. Lack of warm relationship
with wife, children. Resentment of wife, children. Infidelity.
Avoidance or disregard of family (e.g., in off-duty diversions).
Non-Duty Outlets. Avoidance of family or other Soviets. Excessive
drinking. Infidelity. Wasting away time in trivial diversions.
Having no physical sports or diversions. Predominance of diver-
sions over responsibilities and obligations.
Personality. Aggressive vs. submissive evaluation. Rigid and com-
pulsive behavior patterns. Anxiety and self-protective maneuvers.
Unusual shyness and over-dependency. Or anxious efforts to
please, over-submissiveness. Preoccupied with self ("McLandress
dimension"), selfish, overestimating own problems, ideas, outlook.
Excessively impulsive, chronically impatient, easily angered. hy-
persensitive, feelings easily hurt, unable to accept criticism. Tend-
ing to blame others, evade own responsibility. Arrogant, exces-
sively prestige- and status-conscious, anxious to impress everyone
with own brilliance and importance. Great mood swings, depres-
sions, evidence of low self-esteem or self-estimate. Constant
criticism of others, fault-finding, sarcastic manner, sarcastic or
anti-social type of humor. Rigid, highly organized, inflexible
personality, or its opposite.
All of the above are relative questions; they call for qualitative
evaluation of the ways a given Soviet relates to other Soviets. To
make valid evaluations of this type requires persons, analysts and case
officers, who know and understand the Soviets as participants in their
own culture and society. It requires mature, sophisticated, socially
sensitive, and observant persons who mingle and converse with a
broad range of Soviets reasonably frequently and over a period of time.
Telephone taps and audio sources which provide coverage of in-
ternal conversations in a Soviet colony, properly read, are an exceed-
ingly valuable source of clues and leads bearing on the questions of
interest. Wives' personal chatter and complaints, the planning of
social events (picnics, hunting and fist rov'ednior'ele)ase12005/01/05: CI
said when the children become ill, when the boss insists a man leave
his lunch to come to the office, when people arc planning home leave-
all of these situations are among the kind that provide occasion for
personal commentary, for flashes of irritation, frustration, and anger,
for identifying persons who are disliked or isolated, and so on
People who have business relations with the Soviets visit their offices
frequently and also attend parties and receptions. As recruited agents,
they can report on pecking order, on arrogance/ submissiveness, on
the personal manner and personality of individual Soviets, and on
warmth or coldness in interpersonal relationships, as well as more con-
crete observations such as disparaging remarks made by one Soviet
about another, jokes and ridicule, flashes of irritation and anger, im-
patience in dealing with people, and so on. As a given Soviet be-
comes acquainted with such a contact and gains confidence in him,
he may over time decide that the man is no risk, regardless of what
the security officer might say, and may increasingly confide in him.
All of these observations and confidences provide insight into the Soviet
colony and produce the hints and leads we are seeking.
Double agent operations can also, in certain circumstances, produce
similar information.
Finally, there is direct diplomatic or social contact. Numerous ad-
vantages accrue from a broad and continuing contact of this kind.
Foremost is the short-circuiting of all the indirect assessment problems,
problems occasioned by working through one or several intermediaries;
face-to-face meetings by trained intelligence professionals should pro-
duce far more comprehensive and reliable impressions. Second, the
direct American-Soviet confrontation permits individuals on each side
to become acquainted with individuals on the other and so dispels
the numerous halo effects and stereotype conceptions that arise when
the two are isolated from each other. Third, if there is information
already on hand leading to a given target or if it is obtained from
another source such as a telephone tap, it is far easier, faster, and
more productive to undertake direct probing and development of him
and observe and evaluate at first hand his reactions. Fourth, it is ex-
tremely useful, if not indeed essential, to expose a given target to a
range of diverse personality types, for purposes of both assessment
and development. Finally, an intelligence officer (and to a lesser
degree any U.S. government officer) can be much more fully briefed
and guided than say a third-national agent.
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Program Training
A, third prerequisite for making an operational program of our prin-
ciple, we said, was to provide an enabling point of view for case of-
ficers and analysts and sensitize them to the indicators. One aspect
of the problem is that most case officers regard Soviet recruitments as
a will-of-the-wisp and simply refuse, in practice if not in words, to give
the required effort to the task. The other is that they do not recognize
the necessity for sensitive observation, through fairly subtle indicators,
of personality relationships and adjustments. If a case officer cannot
himself do these things, it is of course unrealistic to expect him to give
adequate guidance to his agents. The net result is that a supervisor
trying to run such a program must spend an inordinate amount of
time in personal debriefings and guidance of these people. Some
examples follow.
Three different officers in a field station were successively charged
with responsibility for screening telephone tap production. They were
given the criteria for selection, and examples taken from live material
were repeatedly drawn to their attention. Yet time after time they
all failed to notice interesting and possibly important leads in the
material. One item missed: a series of telephone calls indicating that
a given Soviet was having serious marital problems, was drinking
heavily (on one occasion throwing the embassy into a flap at 2 a.m.),
and. was having difficulty in his work as a result. (A year later new
evidence showed the marital problems to be deep and durable ones.
Ile was of minority ethnic origin, and his wife, a Great Russian, ridi-
culed him as representative of this minority nationality.) Second item
missed: A senior officer newly assigned to the Soviet embassy con-
ducted himself with great arrogance, constantly using offensive and
abusive language over the telephone and creating numerous enemies.
(It has more recently been found that this same officer may be having
not one but several affairs simultaneously within the Soviet colony.)
Third item missed: Two Soviet officers were reflected in telephone
conversation as absolutely despising each other, to such an extent that
they could not even be seated next to each other at an official function.
Fourth item missed: In an operational development that was heading
toward a defection approach, a key unknown was the relationship of
the target with his wife. Overt observation had suggested that it was
the hoped-for cold and perfunctory one; a warm feeling between them
would probably vitiate the whole approach. The missed conversa-
tion, on a newly acquired tap, established beyond a shadow of doubt
that husband and wife were warm and iloptjved For Release 2005/01/05 :
Reports on social contacts can be equally frustrating from a super-
visory standpoint. In reporting physical characteristics, intelligence
officers trained in anti-Soviet operations generally produce good de-
scriptions of Soviets they meet. But when it goes beyond the physical
to observations on interpersonal relationships and psychological nu-
ances, they rarely produce acceptable reports in the sense of what is
needed for a program of this kind. One officer who had flirted with
a Soviet's wife recalled gleefully some weeks after the event how the
husband had bristled with antagonism from across the room, obviously
watching every move she made. This incident had not been noted
either in the written report of contact or in the oral debriefing after
the party.
Another intelligence officer, speaking fluent Russian, gained accept-
ance from the Soviets and frequently attended their get-togethers and
embassy receptions. But this officer treats social/ diplomatic contact
as just that: his eyes are blind to behavioral nuances and his cars are
closed to anything except art, books, theatre, and so on. Nothing
can be elicited from him concerning which Soviet talks to which and
in what manner, or which habitually wanders around alone and un-
engaged with others. Superior in many aspects of his job performance,
he seems to have a blind spot when it comes to functioning as a
spotter or developer. He will note that a Soviet has a seventeen-year-
old boy; but that this same Soviet is very upset because the boy's
education is about to be broken off by conscription escapes him.
Another officer, reporting that a Soviet had been in London, failed
to report that the London visit was a six-month familiarization assign-
ment in the embassy, which usually means a KGB probationary tour.
Met later by another officer, this Soviet turned out to be a quiet,
thoughtful, and seemingly impressionable young man; there was no
such description in the original contact reports. With glowing sincer-
ity he now characterized his experience in London as "the most
wonderful six months" in his life. The original case officer, ap-
prised of this remark, said "Oh I know that, he told me that a long
time ago!"
These sad stories could go on, but the point is made: officers must
be trained and sensitized, and first of all they must be convinced that
Soviets can be recruited and it is worth the effort. This is a long-
- RDP78T0319er0AVW3QQ91f0with young officers than with older ones.
 Recruit erg
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Access and Development
If we can overcome this obstacle, the final requirement for making
the program operational is gaining access to the Soviets in question
and knowing what to do when it is gained-things easier said than
done. Access is in a sense the key question of Soviet operations.
if normal social, business, and diplomatic intercourse with the Soviets
were possible, most of the problems to which this paper is addressed
would not exist. Many of the operational approaches and gimmicks
which have been devised over the years have been efforts to evade
or surmount restrictions on getting next to the target.
Some of these restrictions are created by Soviet security practices and
controls of one type or another. In addition to specific control pro-
cedures, the intense security indoctrination the Soviets get implants in
them suspicion and anxiety about any foreign contact. So even when
you succeed in establishing an outside relationship with one or two
Soviets, you usually find that it is leading nowhere unless you get
invited to their home ground, where, paradoxically, you have a chance
to break out of the controlled channel by assessing individual Soviets
in their own environment and observing their relationships with each
other. Outside the Bloc practically the only place where this is pos-
sible is at Satellite or Soviet receptions, or to a lesser degree at some
third-national receptions. Invitations to these are therefore the first
objective, regardless of whether you are seeking an opportunity in
person or trying to maneuver embassy officers, indigenous business-
men or other contacts, or recruited agents of any nationality into
promising situations.
Of equal importance with the Soviet restrictions are our own self-
limitations. These result from general American attitudes towards
the cold-war enemy, the reflection of this in the official climate estab-
lished by an embassy, a reluctance on the part of American diplo-
matic and even intelligence officers to consort with Soviets and East
Europeans, and a general diplomatic ineptitude in dealing with them,
often marked by the apparently irresistible urge to be one up on them,
embarrass them, and score at their expense in order to look good as a
loyal and clever American diplomat when the Political Counsellor
reads the Memorandum of Conversation. More on this subject a little
later. Approved For Release 2005/01/05 Cl
P78T03194A000 6i'6' 66b1-0
Third-National and Indigenous Agents
In the face of this reluctance of the official American communit1
abroad to indulge in social contact with Soviets, a natural course is
to emphasize the alternative and complementary program of running
agents into the Soviet-Satellite community. These may be Americar
(including staff agents under deep cover), indigenous, or third.
nationals. They may be persons already in business or other contact
with the Soviets whom we can coopt, or they may be carefully selected
"pigeons" whom we recruit, train, and then set up in positions where
we hope the Soviets may be interested enough to cultivate them.
'The agent approach is indeed an essential part of any comprehen-
sive program. Third-national agents, in particular, provide a broader
base for assessments and development, offer windows that may have
a truer view of certain targets than an American can get, and fre-
quently give access to Soviet groups that, like trade :missions, are
beyond reach through normal diplomatic channels. It does suffer,
however, from certain inherent difficulties. One is that the unilateral
cooption of people with established Soviet contacts is replete with
security hazards, including a high probability of their being doubled
by the local security service as well as by the Soviets, and the con-
sequent limitations on the extent to which they can be safely briefed
and guided. Finding them in the first place may require an extensive
investigative effort, and then come operational maneuvers to screen,
contact, and develop them. A year or more may thus be required
to procure only a handful of such agents. And as noted, if we are
doing this unilaterally we are operating in the same area and against
the same targets as the local services.
The planting of agents especially recruited and trained for this
purpose is an important program that takes even more time. Finding
suitable persons, recruiting and training them, creating situations
leading to contacts, and developing plausible relation ships are a
matter of long-term effort that should be undertaken in sufficient
mass to make up for the likelihood of failures. After the laborious
preparation the plant may fail to evoke any interest whatever from
the targets. Or he may develop a relationship which the local
security service then calls him in to explain. If he escapes these
hazards the time will still come in most agent-mediated operations,
DP78T03194AA~Qd90D0all9that an intelligence staff officer under viable cover
 Approved ForRRelease 2005/01/05 : Cl
ecrui men
must be introduced to make a face-to-face assessment and possibly
take over the development.'
The citation of these difficulties in trying to maneuver agents
against Soviet targets, along with a conclusion that the percentage
over time of yield from such operations will be low, is not intended
to convey a pessimistic or defeatist attitude regarding this use of
agents. It is intended as grounds for insisting that such operations
must be part of a comprehensive, long-term, focussed program; and
this is not a program that can be run with the left hand, so to speak,
part-time, by officers assigned also to other duties whose product
may be more immediately tangible and gratifying to a chief of station.
Diplomatic Contact
Broad and regular diplomatic contact with the Soviet colony is
the other main approach to the access problem. Against its unde-
niable limitations and dangers, it offers the advantages of direct assess-
ment, personal acquaintance and familiarity, gradual development
through conversations, rapid contact in any sudden opportunity for
more direct approach, and a high degree of control over what is said
to the target and how it is said.
The opportunity for this kind of contact is probably much greater
than the accepted mythology allows. The Soviets are said to shy
away from such contacts, to be prohibited from accepting invitations,
to mouth nothing but the Party line, to walk away if an American
approaches, and so on. Undoubtedly this is a true picture in many
places. In this writer's experience in one country, however, such
beliefs, buttressed by a few casual experiences, had effectively inhib-
ited efforts to cultivate Soviet bloc representatives for a considerable
period of time, but when a determined and prolonged effort was
finally made it paid off handsomely, to everyone's surprise. The
principal obstacles, it transpired, had been skepticism, indifference,
and hostility within the American establishment.
A truer picture would show that Soviet intelligence officers and
coopted workers are under instructions to cultivate Americans-for
' This statement is based in part upon the proposition, not here to be developed,
that no Soviet is going to consider seriously defection to nationals or intelligence
services of small powers. When a Soviet begins to think about treason, he is
going to think of either Britain (along with some Commonwealth countries) or
the United States. Third-national agent assessments are in any case, in this
writer's opinion, not to be considered reliable; that is why a first-hand profes-
sional assessment must be obtained. Approved For Release 2005/01/05
RDP78TO3194A000200030001-0
ecruitment
identification, assessment, and transmission of "disinformation"--and
moreover that, as human beings in a dull and restrictive environment,
they welcome such contacts, whatever their official aims may be. This
truer picture would distinguish between intelligence officers and other
Soviets; the latter are truly wary of friendly contacts with Westerners
while under the eyes of their security shepherds and tend to avoid
Westerners at receptions. Finally, willingness to engage in broad
diplomatic contact, in all probability, varies considerably from one
Soviet embassy to another, depending on the local situation, the per-
sonalities of the ambassador and the intelligence rezidents and so on.
But we don't find out what we can do in any particular place until
we really try.
There are a variety of reasons why Foreign Service, USES, and
military attache personnel and even intelligence officers under official
cover are so often reluctant to involve themselves with Soviet bloc
representatives. Some don't want it on their records that they have
had Eastern associations; some imagine that the Soviets are ten feet
tall; many feel that it's too much work with too little to show for it;
some have a visceral distaste for intelligence and just don't want to
get involved in it. Many officers are therefore also indifferent to
standing instructions that contacts and relationships be reported,
dilatory in writing reports, and reluctant to be debriefed. And there
is a certain category of persons whose chief delight is to bait, embar-
rass, and insult their Eastern counterparts.
For this latter there is no excuse. Yet time after time one can see
officers-military, diplomatic, and intelligence-ruining contacts: "All
that guy could do was talk about himself, I just walked away."
"This jerk fastened himself to me like a leech, so I told him off." "He
was so stupid I couldn't make any money with him." "When he got
gushy about friendship I asked him why they didn't take the same
approach to disarmament negotiation." "That fat slob is too incom-
petent as an Army officer for me to waste my time talking to him."
It must be recognized that some of the American inhibitions are
not wholly without justification. The KGB is known to put at the
top of its priorities the cultivation of American officials in order to
assess them, determine who does what in their installations, attempt
compromises, and hopefully recruit. But this fact merely calls for
discrimination on our part in selecting those-intelligence officers or
others--whom we encourage to cultivate and be cultivated by the
-RDP78TO319 A 2Od030(W Otnd realism in defensive briefings.
I
 Recruitment
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Many of the difficulties are often traceable to a single underlying
cause, an indifference pervading the individual establishment. The
tone or attitude of an official representation is determined by the
ambassador and his deputy. If the ambassador is indifferent, skep-
tical, or hostile toward this intelligence objective, then it is an uphill
.struggle all the time. On a personal basis one can secure the full
cooperation of Foreign Service, USIS, and attache officers, but usu-
ally only at the cost of time and developmental efforts which should
be invested rather in operations against targets. The only solution
visible to this writer is a continuing flow of requirements and guid-
ances not only from intelligence headquarters but also from the State
Department emphasizing the Soviet operations problem. Until the
U.S. Government addresses itself integrally to this problem, the intel-
ligence effort will tend to peter out in paper exercises.
The Soviets are a highly disciplined group, intensively indoctri-
nated, provocation-minded, keenly suspicious, insulated, and operat-
ing within security controls and secret observation several orders of
magnitude greater than anything to which we are accustomed. They
are prideful and highly sensitive to slight. At the same time, as indi-
viduals, many of them are extremely anxious for adventure and
exposure beyond these narrow confines, and many are eager for
acceptance and approval by Westerners and by Americans. This
mixture of conflicting tendencies can produce interesting results
and points to operationally useful tactics.
While Soviet relationships with the British and Americans (and
some others) are under tight official control, those with other nation-
alities may be, for diplomatic or other reasons, much more relaxed.
Thus it may be unusual (as well as operationally undesirable) for a
Soviet to accept a singleton invitation from an American but not at
all unusual to see singleton Soviets at parties given, for example, by
the Indians, the Iraqis, or the French. And at such a third-national
party the singleton Soviet can be approached, conversation can flow
easily, and after a number of such meetings over a period of time
a real relationship and bond may develop. The Soviet is in a posi-
tion--limited, of course, by the possible presence of Soviet agents
at the party-to report the contact or not, or to slant the report, as
he sees fit. But the minute an attempt is made to convert this relation-
ship to an overt Soviet-American one, it comes into the purview of
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 :
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-RDP78T03194'666V6d30001-0
the rezident and the security officer, and it will be either abruptly
terminated or run as a controlled intelligence contact.
In twos or more, on the other hand, the Soviets will often accept
invitations from Britishers and Americans, even during periods of
international tension, especially to reasonably large parties or recep-
tions which have a diplomatic or official rather than personal and
pointed tone. It is perfectly possible, over a period of time and in
a succession of large cocktail party meetings, to conduct highly useful
conve sations with a chosen target, even though other Soviets are
charging around and perhaps watching closely from across the room.
This is a device that can be used at posts where there is no mecha-
nism to assist elements of the diplomatic community, especially new-
comers, to meet their counterparts from other countries. Where there
are organs like International Clubs or Diplomats' Associations they
enormously simplify the problem of meeting Soviets and spotting links.
Most officers in a Soviet establishment speak the local language,
usually quite well, and very few Americans speak Russian. It is
often argued, therefore, that the Soviets will immediately suspect a
Russian-speaking American of being an intelligence officer and shy
away from him, so that in order to allay suspicion it is better for
American officers to speak the local language. This argument is
fallacious on three counts.
First, in order not to start out from a position of inferiority, the
American should he able to speak the indigenous language as well
as the Soviets do. In many places he usually is not. A man with
a six-month or one-year quickie course in one of the less common
languages usually cannot compare with the product of the Soviet
institutes, who may, moreover, be serving his second or third tour in
the area. Second, the argument presumes that the Soviets will have
nothing to do with a suspected intelligence officer. This is simply not
true, any more than that we will have nothing to do with a suspected
Soviet intelligence officer. Finally, there is the fact that many .Hes-
sians ate genuinely pleased to have a foreigner speak to them in their
own tongue. At a recent Soviet reception this writer had the pleasant
experience of finding himself "receiving" his Soviet hosts: at one time
there were seven Russians lined up to introduce themselves to their
Russian-speaking guest, one third secretary even elbowing his way
past the GRU deputy chief.
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What to Say
Here are some observations, which apply both to direct contact
and to the guidance of agents, on how to talk to Russians. The first
and overriding rule: Warmth, openness, sincerity, interest. A cold,
suspicious, cautious, unresponsive person is greeted with coldness,
suspicion, caution, and indifference. Second rule: Avoid polemics,
political evangelism, criticism, one-upmanship. Third rule: Don't
probe. Fourth rule: Show respect where respect is due.8
Remember that the object of the exercise is not to pass the after-
noon, conduct political arguments, or cement international relations;
it is to recruit Soviets. The immediate purposes of the social contact
are to build rapport, to elicit responses useful for assessment, to assist
chosen targets in articulating grievances, to awaken resentments and
anxieties, to plant ideas, to make oneself a sympathetic friend, a
channel, a "connection." These objectives should be best served
by questioning and conversation on topics which we know from our
many studies to be likely to stimulate anti-regime responses, tailored
to the extent possible to the individual Soviet in question so as to
strike a responsive note without giving cause for alarm.
Example No. I. A Soviet Army officer in assistant attache assign-
ment, rank commensurate with age but passed over a number of times
for assignment as attache. Hero of the Soviet Union. Difficult per-
sonality, has chronically had difficulties with his chiefs and expresses
contempt for them. Blunt, outspoken. Very high self-estimate.
Highly variable moods.
After rapport was solidly established, we would question him
about and discuss the Soviet Army promotion system, what he would
do after retirement, when he would make General, how it could be
that those clowns, his several chiefs, could be put in charge of any-
thing, what kind of pull and connections they must have, what the
future is for an officer who has wasted seven career years in attache
assignments under chiefs who have given him had fitness reports, and
so on. We would make frequent allusions in various contexts to cor-
responding aspects of U.S. practice. These conversations were of
'See A Guide for Interviewing Soviet Escapees, Air Research and Development
Command, HRRI, Research Study No. 3, August 1953. This is the best single
handling guide or training manual for contacts with Soviets that the writer has
run across. See also How the Soviet System Works, by Bauer, Inkeles, and
Kluckhohn, available in both hard cover and paperback.
course progressive so that the target was never offended, and we
elicited a surprisingly positive response. Then after a six-month
build-up we hit him with a disguised but definite approach. He
backed away, but not without absorbing our point. The rapport was
not broken, and we have a reasonable belief that the conversations
were never reported. No defection, no recruitment; but who knows,
in the future, if perhaps the system should kick him hard in the teeth.
Example No. 2. GRU colonel, civilian journalist cover. Spotted
and developed by third-national agents. Difficult personality, dis-
liked by a number of other Soviets. Cultural pretensions. Pompous
and conceited, high self-estimate, but work actually marginal. Self-
indulgent. Strongly dependent personality, would refuse to rebut
political arguments. Drinking progressively more during his tour,
toward the end approaching near-alcoholism. Under pressure would
block up and become unable to express himself. Marital situation
unknown, although ample evidence of frequent friction with his wife.
Constantly chafing against the "bureaucracy." Frequently in trouble
with the embassy.
After development by agents, warmly accepted direct American
contact, which confirmed almost all aspects of previous indirect assess-
ment. He was crude, arrogant, condescending, constantly talking
(about himself), highly insecure, seeming greatly in need of a sym-
pathetic listener (other Soviets apparently wouldn't give him the time
of day). Unfortunately, just when the relationship was getting warm
he and the Soviet ambassador discovered a common passion for chess,
which transported him from a condition of chronic discontent, isola-
tion, and unhappiness to a seventh heaven where all immediate oppor-
tunity for manipulation was dissolved.9
Our conversations with this Soviet were directed towards conveying
a sense of the cultural ferment, freedom, experimentation, and oppor-
tunity to be found in the West and particularly in the United States.
We especially dwelt on the immense prestige, power, and influence
exercised by Western journalists and commentators. We also fed
back to him his own complaints about the cultural and, intellectual
" Our belief in the value of using the Russian language was strengthened by this
case. Both this man and his wife spoke good English, and lie also ;poke the
local language. As he drank, however, he would revert more and more to Rus-
sian. His wife also, on one occasion at a party, after several hours of effort at
being pleasant, sought us out with the plea, "Come sit and talk with me in P essian,
I'm tired of speaking English."
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sterility of "bureaucracy," with a progressive effort to tic the terms of
reference for this into his headquarters in Moscow and the local
Soviet embassy.
Example No. 3. A young Soviet officer was noted in the telephone
taps, soon after arriving, to be having serious difficulties with his
wife and to be drinking very heavily. After raising cain on the town
one night he was apparently severely reprimanded and assigned (as
he still is) to minor embassy drudgery. His parents were divorced,
we ]earned, and as a child he lived with his stepmother and mother
alternately, a pointer to one possible source of his problems. A third-
national agent with a logical business cover established contact with
him, and a warm though unproductive relationship has resulted. (It
is unproductive because the intermediary agent is an unimaginative
plod, unresponsive to requirements and guidance by virtue of inability
to grasp any subtleties whatever. But we keep trying.)
The Soviet did make one interesting point in a conversation with
the agent, to wit: "Please don't invite me out. We are not like the
Ccrrnans or British or Americans and cannot accept an invitation just
like that. If I accept your invitation, I must obtain approval, and
for this I must offer explanation, provide justifications, and so on.
You like ine and I like you, but it just isn't worth it."
Our efforts to get additional means of regular access to this man
have so far been fruitless. Recently, however, upon being introduced
to this writer, he was talking within minutes about the sterility and
boredom of existence in the confines of the Soviet colony. 11e is out-
going, bored, curious, anxious to see and learn, chafing under embassy
restrictions, and at least partially perceptive of the negative aspects
of the Soviet system. He deserves further exploration, to assist him
in the articulation of his discontents and to discover whether his
personality, political, and career problems are deep and strong enough
to provide fuel for a channeled explosion.
These examples illuminate to some extent the generalization that
the safest, most innocuous way to surface and. cultivate anti-social
tendencies and personal grievances, as well as plant ideas and com-
municate sympathy, is by questions on certain crucial topics: "What
is your promotion system?" "You look very tired tonight, have you
been working too hard?" "You say you are bored and hate this place,
but there is this and this and this to do, you have a very pleasant
and beautiful Club, how can you feel that way?" "Why do you call
1' 1 t worthless careerists?" "How can the Soviet Foreign Office
.
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assign a man like B [whom we know the respondent hates] to such a
responsible post?"
Digression: Virtues of the Interrogative
The utility of questions in stimulating conversation, in focussing
thought, in causing inner turmoil (if that is what you want to do),
and in communicating a sympathetic awareness is of more than mere
tactical value. The mind functions four to five times as fast as oral
communication, so that even under the best circumstances, when a
respondent is interested in what you. are saying, his attention and
thoughts are continually straying, elaborating. Under less than the
best circumstances, where there is a language problem and the re-
spondent is only mildly or even negatively interested, his attention is
constantly wandering and the effectiveness of your communication
can go well below 10 percent. Addressing him a question, however,
serves to engage almost his whole consciousness, prevents his thoughts
from wandering, appeals to his ego, and communicates an interest in
him and his opinions.
In addition, the responses to certain types of questions can be use-
ful in assessment; the so-called projective questions, requiring expres-
sions of preference, interest, and the like, arc an essential part of
assessment. For example: "Who is your favorite author [or fictional
hero]?" "What do you hope to do when you retire?" "What is it you
like best [or least] about living in such and such a country?" "What
do you want your children to do in life?" "Why did you choose the
foreign service?" "Your work involves talking to people a lot, do
you like that?" "Why did you [a Satellite representative] like the
movie `Chance Meeting'?"
Suitable questions are the most effective way to probe personally
and politically sensitive topics and implant ideas without running a
risk of alienating the respondent or exposing your own prior knowl-
edge. A sure way to alienate Soviets is to criticize the system, its
methods and policies, etc., even if you know what you are talking
about and even though the Soviet may agree with you. The 'better
way to get him to think such thoughts is to trigger then by seemingly
innocuous questions. "What do you do with your evenings?" "Have
you been dancing at A?" "Have you visited B?" "Do you prefer
to spend your time at your own Club here?" These questions (and
many more like them), directed at a person already chafing at the
restricted and highly organized Soviet embassy existence (a fact
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known to you from other sources), will certainly provoke inner reac-
tions, no matter what the overt response is.70
The Last Step
After all these many words we are still faced with the crucial
problem of how this whole process is to be carried to the point of
defection or recruitment, as the case may be. In a sense, to be sure,
we can consider all we have done-identifying targets, establishing
relationships with them, working on their frustrations, pressures,
prides, and ambitions-as worth-while programmed work to increase
the probability of walk-ins. And that it will often be. Only in a most
unusual and favorable case will an outright approach be made, and
then only after every aspect has been studied and restudied at head-
quarters and in the field and the plan specifically tailored to its oppor-
tunities, peculiarities, and risks.
But to complete a hypothetical case let us assume that we have
arrived at the stage of considering an outright approach. We are
working with a Soviet who is definitely "different"-an odd-ball of
some type, neurotic, "alienated," possibly quite disturbed. We know
a great deal about him from a number of different sources as well as
through direct contact. He has shown a tendency to relax and talk
about his personal problems with his American or other friend. He
has shown he has the nerve to side-step Soviet security controls, and
we have strong grounds for believing that he is not reporting his
conversations with us. We believe that we have detected an impor-
tant change in his relationship with other Soviets (which may not
have passed unnoticed by them either).
"This digression on the interrogative was derived from the theory of sales work,
a fact which provokes a further digression: It is strange that a profession so highly
dependent on personal contact, personal rapport, and personal influence as clandes-
tine operations is has paid practically no attention to such allied lines of endeavor
as social case work and selling. The sales profession has intensively applied both
pragmatic insight and psychological research to problems of personal effectiveness,
rapport, interpersonal influence, the hard sell, and the soft, insidious sell. It has
no qualms whatever about telling a salesman both how he is to talk to people
and what he is to say, with highly effective results. A manual entitled Cold Call
Selling, published by the National Sales Development Institute, is the finest piece
this writer has seen on the "cold approach." (It cost him $17.00, which couldn't
be written off operationally but was at least income tax deductible.) Elmer Leter-
man's Creative Selling is a fine manual on personal contact, especially on the soft
sell.
What do we do now? Here we should keep in mind the very
basic proposition that a man who defects is running away from some-
thing too big for him to cope with, and a man who changes sides in
place is fighting back against something. Neither is being pulled to
us by personal magnetism or ideological attraction, even though these
motives may appear as rationalizations. Our role then is to continue
to build up, in our contacts with him and perhaps by clandestine
irritant actions on the side, these inner pressures that are driving him.
At this stage we try to contribute to building in him the conviction
that there is no hope for him within the Soviet system. Now we can
do what we could not earlier, try to channel and focus his resentment
onto the top Soviet leaders, the apparatchiki who surround theist, or
the system itself. The process is one of pinning the blame for his
intense personal dissatisfactions on the regime, of directing his anti-
social tendencies, if you will, against it.
This is a stage of utmost interest and delicacy. We are not trying
to tell a Soviet things which he himself knows better and feels more
deeply than we. But we can build on, feed back to him, and focus
feelings which he has already expressed. We all know how to calm
a friend down when he is upset; we also know, with a close friend.,
subjects to avoid talking about, not because he would get angry at
us but because they would hit sensitive nerves and plunge him into
depression or trigger anxieties. It is the reverse of this latter course,
in moderate and appropriate doses, that we deliberately pursue with
our Soviet "friend."
Once a Soviet is so far along as to question his own system and
his relationship to it, we are not far from our ultimate goal. Once he
begins to think of his rulers as bad or irresponsible or dangerous or
corrupt, or as surrounded, misinformed, and manipulated by others
who are like that, he is very close to the crossing.
It has been our thesis here that we do have a sufficient basis of
understanding to bring about recruitments and defections of Soviets.
Our information sources, if they are properly used, are adequate to
permit us at least an initial target selection; and if we deliberately
seek out "alienated" Soviets, the neurotic or sociopathic fringe, the
chronically unhappy, the misfits, we can significantly increase our
probability of yield. We must, however, seek some means of solving
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the overriding problem of our own attitudes, of overcoming our skep-
ticism and indifference. If we do not, the future will be like the past,
and such successes as we achieve will be simply from luck or circum-
stance, or perhaps from our mistakes cancelling each other out.
COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS
Wanted: a Word
Dear Sirs:
The contribution from intelligence officers who defect from the
Communist services has been one of the mainstays of our counter-
intelligence effort, and we have accordingly sought in various ways
to create as inviting an atmosphere as possible for further defections.
One of the most difficult aspects of this effort, and one of the biggest
stumbling blocks to defection, is the implication of cowardice, treason,
and desertion not only in the act itself but also in the terminology
applied to it. Deserter, turncoat, renegade, apos`fate, etc., are words
of opprobrium, and even the usual term defector, though less indignant
than the others, carries a connotation of dishonorable motives, a
touch of the subconscious revulsion Organization Man feels for any
deed that undermines his organization.
This deed is not necessarily dishonorable, however; it is usually the
only effective action within the capabilities of an intelligence officer
caught in the meshes of tyranny if disillusionment or his principle:;
drive him to oppose that tyranny. Defection from a Communist
service requires courage as well as adroitness. And even if a defector's motives are unworthy we don't attract him by the use of
stigmatizing names.
It has long been recognized that the terminology we use is infelici..
tous from the point of view of encouraging defections, and there have
been sporadic efforts now and then to develop a new semantic ap..
proach. These have not been successful; a new word or phrase is
still being sought and is badly needed. What we are looking for is
a readily understandable expression conveying the idea of a courageous
act to liberate not only oneself but other victims, one that is trans-
latable or transliterable into foreign languages and not susceptible to
invidious or comical perversion. If any of your readers has a sug-
gestion we should be happy to hear it through your good offices.
Gordon Cooperwood
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Soviet doctrine on the holding of
meetings with agents.
OPERATIONAL CONTACTS'
L. K. Bekrenev
Personal contacts with agents are conditioned by a series of mutually
related factors among which the following are basic:
The situation, maturity, and importance of the agent.
What is to be accomplished by the meeting.
The professional skill and the legal status of case officer and agent.
The timing, duration, and place of the meeting.
Prevailing operational conditions.
Quality of the Agent
If an agent is sufficiently trusted and if he supplies valuable in-
formation, personal contact with him should be reduced to a minimum.
For the intervals it suffices to work out a plan for either to summon
the other to a meeting in case of emergency.
Even in meetings with a tested and reliable agent much attention
is paid to security as well as to the fulfillment of intelligence require-
ments; but in working with an agent who has not been fully assessed
and vetted, the prime emphasis is put on vigilance and checking-has
he been planted by the local counterintelligence, are his motives in
agreeing to collaborate sincere? The need for personal meetings
with such an agent is increased, for they give the opportunity to assess
him more completely. But the meetings must be conducted with
caution. In 1959 an officer assigned to a certain residency 2 submitted
a plan for a third-country meeting with an agent who had been re-
cently and hurriedly recruited and not thoroughly assessed. Head-
quarters warned the resident 3 of the need for precautionary measures,
and in this it proved to be correct: the agent brought along counter-
intelligence officers to the meeting site. The resident's application
of precautionary measures and the case officer's observance of correct
'Adapted from a Top Secret paper issued by the Soviet Military-Diplomatic
Academy in 1960. For the circumstances of its issue see Studies VIII 1, p. 16.
'Field Station.
'Chief of Station. MORI/HRP PAGES 63-80
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operating techniques en route to the meeting made possible the de-
flection of a serious provocation by adversary counterintelligence.
One should not neglect personal meetings with agents who are not
sources of important information. Agents performing support roles
are also essential to the service and should be appreciated. If a Soviet
intelligence officer on an illegal assignment is supplied cover by an
auxiliary agent, his fate depends upon that agent.
In general, whatever an agent's role in the intelligence net, personal
contact should be made with him only when it is impossible to manage
without it. The number of meetings should be kept as low as possible,
especially with sources of valuable information. This principle holds
for all residencies and agent groups 4 but particularly for residencies
under legal 5 cover in countries which have severe counterintelligence
practices.
Purpose of Meetings
Personal meetings may be held to give an agent his next assignment
and instructions for carrying it out, to train him in tradecraft or the
use of technical or communications equipment, to transmit documents,
reports, technical equipment, money, or other items, or to fulfill several
of these purposes. In actual practice several purposes are usually
served by a meeting. In addition to its particular objectives more
general needs can be filled. A meeting held for training purposes may
be a means for clarifying biographic data on the agent or his views
on various subjects. At every meeting with an agent one should study
him and obtain new data on his potential and talents, thereby pro-
viding a better basis for judging his sincerity and deciding how much
trust to place in him.
These various objectives require different kinds of meeting in terms
of frequency, duration, and choice of time and place.
Professional Skill
Success in face-to-face handling depends to a large degree on the
professional authority of the handler, his knowledge of the business,
the firmness of his will, his adherence to principle, and his ability to
get along with people. Above all else is dedication to the assignment
and a positive resolve to achieve success and fulfill the assigned tasks.
' Which may be controlled by a principal agent rather than a staff officer.
Official (or semiofficial, like Tass).
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Vigilance in protecting one's activity and intentions not only from
counterintelligence but also from the agent requires a developed in-
tuition, the power of observation, and an ability to retain the initia-
tive and assert one's will tactfully.
Some case officers lose the initiative during agent meetings by wast-
ing time discussing secondary matters or problems in no way related
to the purpose of the meeting and end up failing to attain the objec-
tives for which the meeting had been set up. Recently, for example,
a case officer from one of our residencies under legal cover was asked
to make a quick contact with an agent in order to transmit to him
Headquarters' decision that he should immediately leave the country
because of impending danger. Instead of executing these instructions
immediately, the case officer devoted a meeting to completely un-
necessary conversation about the agent's status in the country, means
of communication, legal documentation, etc. Then he ordered the
agent not to travel anywhere without his approval and set another
meeting for six days later! The resident had to correct the situation
immediately.
There have been cases in which agents have actually refused to
meet with officers who exhibited incompetence in matters concerning
which they themselves, as specialists, were working in behalf of So-
viet intelligence. During meetings the case officers acted timid, were
not serious, let their minds wander, acted stiff and formal, attempted
to order the agents about, or did not show interest in the agents'
problems. Or they did not give the agents satisfactory explanations
of operational or contact problems, betraying thereby lack of prepara-
tion and at times confusion, which engendered doubts in the agents
as to the security of working with them. Such conduct has often lost
us the services of valuable agents.
Experienced case officers are made; not born. Experience is ac-
quired by practical work. New case officers, just beginning to work
at agent operations abroad, therefore have to hold personal meetings
with agents. But they learn also by example, instruction, and: coach-
ing. It is necessary to imbue them with professional skills and draw
them gradually, starting with less complicated tasks, into the work of
handling agents.
Legal Status
There have been instances in which agents have refused to meet
with case officers whose legal position in the country was incompatible
with their own situation. In particular, several agents have refused
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to have meetings with officers from our military attache apparatus
because if discovered by outsiders or counterintelligence they would
be incriminated. The legal status of case officers and agents is of
utmost significance for clandestinity, security of communications, and
ability to make personal contact and must be taken into account
in planning meetings.
During the years 1951-1953 our service suffered some bitter failures.
To a significant degree these were a consequence of slackened vig-
ilance on the part of case officers in legal residencies and of their
agents. The case officers would report that meetings had been carried
out under favorable conditions and there had been no external sur-
veillance. But testimony at trials would subsequently show that
counterintelligence had known not only the time and place of meetings
but also their duration and details such as who the participants were
and what they did, how the officers were dressed, and in one case even
the color of the wrapper on a package that had been passed. There
had obviously been surveillance which both case officers and agents
had failed to detect.
These failures occurred, not because operational conditions were
terribly complicated or the adversary counterintelligence service was
so skillful, but because either the case officers or the agents had for-
gotten to be vigilant at all times, mistaken the significance of cover
and security, or done incorrect things. This was what enabled
counterintelligence to arrest our agents and expel our officers from
the country. At present counterintelligence practices are less severe
in several of the eastern capitalist countries than in the west, but
that gives no reason to weaken vigilance there. Favorable elements
in any operational situation should be taken advantage of, but not
by relaxing vigilance and security consciousness.
Illegal residencies 6 and agent groups, not being subject to sur-
veillance of the kind experienced under legal cover, can depend better
on having secure personal meetings. These can be held in a re-
laxed atmosphere and in some instances without clandestinity. In
every country there live many "welcome" foreigners, tourism is a mass
phenomenon, business and family ties are widely developed; thus
large human streams cross international borders. No country has a
counterintelligence service with the capability to follow every for-
eigner? not to say every local inhabitant, in its effort to identify officers
and agents of foreign intelligence services.
0 Under deep cover, which in Soviet practice involves false documentation.
This does not mean that members of illegal residencies are not
subjected to any surveillance, only that its incidence on them is greatly
reduced. Provided, of course, that they have not compromised them-
selves by mistakes or rash acts and so been placed under special ob-
servation, counterintelligence does not follow at their heels. More-
over, they have greater freedom in selecting cover stories, means of
disguise, and other security measures, even in countries with the most
severe counterintelligence practices.
Choice of Case Officer
The legal status factor should be taken into account in deciding
what case officer is to be assigned to carry out any particular meeting
with an agent. Initially, in legal residencies, meetings with agents
are carried out by the officers who assessed and recruited therm. De-
pending on the purpose of the meeting or the importance of the agent,
they can also be held by the resident, his deputy, or a special case
officer sent for this purpose from Headquarters.
Case officers in legal residencies, in the course of recruiting agents,
cultivate new contacts among local inhabitants who seers. to have
agent: potential. The development of such persons, on top of already
recruited agents, brings an increasing number of personal meetings and
concomitant danger of detection. In order to reduce this danger and
also improve the management of the intelligence net, headquarters
splits off the most valuable agents of legal residencies and sets them up
under illegal residencies or as agent groups reporting directly to
Headquarters via illegal channels.
In illegal residencies and agent groups meetings are held by the
residents, their deputies, and the group leaders. A resident can
assign a trusted cut-out to hold a meeting that has limited objectives
such as transmitting materials. Despite the favorable conditions in
illegal residencies, meetings must be planned and held in full com-
pliance with clandestine operational doctrine. Holding them without
professional planning is not permitted. Each member of an illegal
residency or agent group must check constantly for clandestin:ity and
for the security of his illegal status and make efforts to improve that
status.
In principle it is undesirable to make frequent changes in the
person assigned to meet an agent. It: is therefore important, before
assigning an officer to make contact with any agent, to think over
thoroughly all the considerations presented above in order to avoid
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mistakes. From the point of view of security, it is also improper to
set up personal contact between the radio operator of an illegal
residency and agents in its network. Only the resident must know
the identity of the radio operator.
As a parallel security measure the agents of an illegal residency
must not know the basic biographic data (name, nationality, addresses)
on the resident, his assistants, or the cut-outs who effect the opera-
tional contact. For this reason it is better to use pseudonyms, al-
though in practice it is not always possible. Under no circumstances
should horizontal lines of personal contact be permitted, even if
adherence to this doctrine necessitates excluding an agent from opera-
tional activity for some time. This is a vitally important rule, es-
pecially among valuable and trusted agents.
Headquarters is responsible for personal contact arrangements with
illegal residents, group leaders, and singleton case officers or agents
reporting directly to Headquarters. It sends out its case officers for
this purpose, either illegally with foreign documentation or officially
with Soviet documentation and an appropriate cover story. The meet-
ings can be held in the target country or in a third country. In some
cases the agent may be summoned to Headquarters and the business
taken care of there. In that case it is necessary to expunge from the
agent's passport (or the resident's or group leader's), all notations con-
cerning his stay in the Soviet Union.
Choice of Place
The choice of meeting place is of considerable importance and
should be made deliberately and with foresight. It has to lend itself
to the objectives of the meeting, suit the positions in society of the
agent and case officer, and satisfy security considerations. Meetings
can be held on city streets, in parks, restaurants, cafes, reading rooms,
or museums, out of town, in the suburbs, etc. The range of possibili-
ties depends to a large degree on the creative initiative of members of
the residency, conditioned by a firm knowledge of the real operational
situation, local conditions, and the structure and techniques of the
counterintelligence and police forces.
Elements to be taken into account include the severity of the
country's administration, the sensitivity of the police force, the extent
to which police and counterintelligence check local inhabitants, for-
eigners, employees of Soviet installations, main highways, streets, and
squares, and how well state and private buildings and transportation
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facilities are guarded. Similarly it is necessary to hear in mind the
degree to which counterintelligence and police agents are planted in
enterprises and public buildings such as theaters, museums., libraries,
and restaurants. In addition to counterintelligence activity, one should
consider police measures for maintaining public order, particularly
the control of criminal elements and lesser violators of law and
morality. In the summer of 1959, for example, two of our illegals
meeting abroad found themselves in a district where the police were
conducting a roundup of such elements. When they saw what was
going on they took off, but could not get away without having their
documents inspected by the police. The situation would have been
much worse for an officer under legal cover meeting with an agent.
For prolonged meetings it is necessary to choose places which out-
siders cannot observe. Frequently the agent is picked up at some
predetermined place in an automobile and taken for operational work
to a place chosen earlier that the agent himself had not known about.
The agent's own car can also be used for this purpose. It is best
not to hold conversations on operational matters in the automobile,
for it is possible that a recorder might be hidden in it.
Places for long meetings present fewer difficulties in illegal resi-
dencies. Their members can meet in their own apartments, in hotels,
or in out-of-town resort areas without any special risk of suspicion.
But even in illegal residencies the demands of clandestinity and secu-
rity must be observed in choosing meeting places. The local opera-
tional climate and the status of the persons to take part in the meet-
ing must be taken into account.
The problem is greater in residencies under legal cover. lUlere it
is best either to have reliable safehouses or to deliver the agent dis-
creetly to the official residency building. The latter is a serious opera-
tional move. If neither is feasible, it is better to have headquarters
dispatch an officer to a third country, either legally or illegally, for
the meeting.
Here are some of the mistakes sometimes made by case officers
of legal residencies. They hold meetings in restaurants and other
public establishments located near hotels and houses where employees
of Soviet installations, sometimes even the case officers themselves,
reside. The service personnel in such establishments know the iden-
tities of Soviet citizens. Some of them may be counterintell igenc_e
agents, and in any case they may spot our officer holding a meeting
and report to the police or the counterintelligence service. Other
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meetings are held near guarded compounds and government installa-
tions where more intense surveillance is maintained than elsewhere.
Some case officers use the same site for successive meetings over an
extended period of time. Others hold meetings in their own or the
agent's apartment, sometimes taking along their wives in order to
suggest a family friendship. These fail to realize that social inter-
course implies a closer relationship than legitimate business relations
and unquestionably will not escape notice in these days of intense
counterintelligence activity.
Timing, Duration, Frequency
In the matter of timing it is always necessary to bear in mind the
current foreign policy objectives of the Soviet government so that
these will not be prejudiced by any unfavorable incident arising from
the operational contact. If there is any such risk the meeting should
be postponed until another time. This applies to meetings with agents
that are poorly assessed or insufficiently tested, particularly if there
is doubt of their bona fides. It applies also when there is a pos-
sibility that the case officer will be under surveillance as he leaves for
the meeting. This consideration should be borne in mind by case
officers of illegal residencies but especially by those in residencies un-
der legal cover.
Governments of capitalist countries sometimes pursue political ends
by having counterintelligence set up special provocations against So-
viet officials and catch them meeting with agents or agent candidates.
The object may be to compromise Soviet foreign policy, strain inter-
national relations, or strengthen the political position of the capitalist
government, especially if it is currently trying to get a military or
anti-democratic law through parliament. Sometimes this is done
against the opposition of the counterintelligence service, for the pre-
mature detention of the Soviet officer may frustrate its effort to make
a thorough study of his contacts. As a rule provocations against our
officers are associated with an international or internal political de-
velopment, and they are even mounted against officials who have no
connection with agent operations.
Meetings should be kept as short as the transaction of the business
allows. The case officer and agent must not be together without a
purpose. They should not waste time discussing matters having no
substantial relationship to the business at hand. This does not mean
that one should talk to the agent only about business in dry bureau-
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cratic language. Sensitivity towards the agent's interests must be
developed. If the situation permits, he should be heard out even on
matters which were not anticipated when the meeting was planned
but which have an operational relationship and can influence his
future work. But he should not be permitted to deflect the talk into
a labyrinth of secondary, insignificant topics. The case officer must
keep the initiative in his own hands, and he must remember that con-
trol of a meeting in a proper and businesslike manner cuts down its
length.
Frequent meetings with the same agent are unwise, especially if he
is a tested and reliable one producing important secret information.
Meetings with such agents can be reduced to one or two a year, or
even fewer, held whenever possible in third countries. Routine
transactions can be taken care of through nonpersonal forms of com-
munication. With more ordinary agents it should not be necessary
to meet oftener than once every two or three months. These limita-
tions are of special importance for residencies under legal cover.
Operational Conditions
It should be taken as axiomatic that Soviet intelligence officers under
legal cover are subject to counterintelligence scrutiny in all capitalist
countries, most effectively in those with severe counterintelligence prac-
tices. In some European and eastern countries the counterintelligence
effort is not as intense as in the countries of the Anglo-American bloc,
and the operational situation is therefore "easier." But this seeming
ease never justifies reduced vigilance and security-consciousness on the
part of case officers and agents. Flaps still occur in countries where
the operational situation appears to be relatively favorable, and
analysis shows that flaps do not depend on the complexity or simplic-
ity of the operational situation but are traceable to deficiencies in the
camouflage of operational activity, slackening of vigilance, and neglect
of cover and clandestinity.
In capitalist countries of the east that have comparatively small
counterintelligence apparatuses, the activities of our legal residencies
still do not necessarily go without observation. The counterintel-
ligence programs of such countries as the U.S.A., England, and France
are also extended to those eastern countries and seek to undermine
and compromise the favorably developing relations between them and
the Soviet Union. The capitalist counterintelligence services exploit
in this effort all the national peculiarities of which the east has many.
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This tactic of adversary counterintelligence carries possibilities of
great unpleasantness for us.
Because of the operational conditions now prevailing in capitalist
countries, intelligence officers, especially those in residencies under
legal cover, must seek out and apply the most reliable forms and
methods of camouflage and clandestinity when meeting personally
with agents. Although the holding of personal meetings has been
rendered difficult for them, with proper study, good planning, and
careful execution it can be successful. Counterintelligence surveil-
lance of personnel in Soviet installations abroad is not so tight or con-
tinuous as to make operational activity impossible. As a rule it is
intermittent and is shifted from one case officer to another and even
to persons that have no connection with agent operations. A counter-
intelligence service does not possess the means for uninterrupted sur-
veillance in all places at all times in all cities; it uses various systems,
and observation teams do not work around the clock in all places.
Once one understands the working patterns of a particular counter-
intelligence service, obstacles erected by it can be circumvented.
An agent with whom personal contact is maintained must be in-
culcated by his case officer with the qualities of a clandestine per-
sonality. He must be invested with the ability to camouflage himself,
to exercise vigilance, to determine whether he is being observed by
counterintelligence. He must have the ability to spot surveillance at
his place of work or outside his place of work, especially when de-
parting for an operational meeting.
Agents' carelessness or inexperience in matters of security has often
resulted in operational flaps. Some agents have failed to attach sig-
nificance to the circumstance that someone, often an acquaintance or
friend, began to show intensified interest in them before the com-
promise. They ignored changes in their relationships with co-workers
and friends. They did not wonder about the appearance of new faces
in their milieu. Some agents, because of inexperience or in a delib-
erate violation of security rules induced by personal rashness, have
failed to check for surveillance when going to an operational meeting.
Some agents go to operational meetings unprepared, without thinking
out their future actions in advance, and have not planned what be-
havior patterns to exhibit while en route to the meeting place or in
its area. Some have approached our case officers at places not stipu-
lated as meeting sites, have telephoned the case officer at his office and
discussed personal contact arrangements, or have showed up in per-
son at the Soviet installation to see the case officer.
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Regardless of how skillful and vigilant a case officer may be, he
can come to the attention of counterintelligence if one of his agents
violates operational rules deliberately or neglects them because of
inexperience. Furthermore, the agent's attitude toward cover and
clandestinity when meeting with his case officer contributes to some
degree to the over-all assessment of his sincerity and honesty in col-
laborating with Soviet intelligence. Some agents, of course, work
honestly with us without adhering to the basic rules of security on
the premise that no kind of surveillance is being directed at them.
Nevertheless the case officer must always consider the agent's attitude
toward security and train and indoctrinate him accordingly. He must
seek out the reasons for every deviation by the agent from the norms
of behavior he has laid down.
Planning a Meeting
The preparation of a meeting plan is done by the handling case
officer with the guidance of the resident or his deputy. It begins with
the meeting's objectives and tasks, including specific problems to be
resolved with the agent, the ways and order of their solution, and
operational or personal problems which the agent may have and
which should be settled at the meeting. If the meeting place and
time previously selected are not suitable for the accomplishment of
these tasks or for current operational conditions, then it is proper
to make changes. The agent should be informed in advance by non-
personal contact or at the agreed time and place during a. brief
contact. The latter procedure is the better if the scheduled meeting
is imminent; it avoids confusion and possible broken contact. If it
is possible that surveillance of the handling officer may endanger the
meeting, then he can be replaced by another handler.
The case officer must study the operational climate on the route
of travel and in the area of the meeting place. He must be prepared
to take correct stock of the situation on the spot and in case of neces-
sity make the proper security decisions. Some case officers panic
when complications arise in the operational situation in the vicinity
of the meeting place. Some officers suspecting surveillance either
continue according to plan, attaching no significance to their suspi-
cions, or completely abandon the meeting without activating planned
measures to get to the bottom of the situation. If the latter., they
frequently head for the automobile that brought them to the meeting
area instead of going home, thus giving counterintelligence the oppor-
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tunity to identify another intelligence officer, the one at the wheel
of the parked automobile. Another mistake is for the case officer,
instead of leaving the meeting area by a route designed to avoid
encountering the agent, to take a direction that results in confronta-
tion with him. Not suspecting danger (incidentally, the need for
danger signals is not always anticipated), the agent goes right up
to the case officer; and counterintelligence has caught them in contact.
The plan will include reaffirmation or replacement of agreed meet-
ing arrangements and signals, the cover story for the meeting and
the sequence of actions to be taken to substantiate it, assessment of
the personal qualities of the agent and observation of his behavior,
the sequence of actions to be used in checking the operational climate
in the meeting area beforehand and afterward, and in case of need
a check on the agent's honesty. It will include the sequence of moves
to be made in the event the agent does not appear or if complications
arise while the case officer is en route to the meeting area, approach-
ing the meeting site, or actually with the agent. Finally, it will
include arrangements with the support elements assigned to provide
security for the meeting and the danger signals agreed upon.
After he has thought over and clarified all of these elements, the
officer should make a written outline of his plan and schedule of
action. This will help him to resolve all problems and accomplish
his mission completely and clandestinely in the briefest possible
period of time.
The departure of a case officer for an agent meeting is critical when
he is under legal cover in a capitalist country with stringent counter-
intelligence practices. Preparations can be made approximately as
follows.
Several days before the scheduled meeting the residency, using sup-
port means and other available assets, studies the status of the case
officer with respect to the presence of counterintelligence surveillance.
Also studied are the counterintelligence personnel and technical assets
being used against the Soviet installations, especially the counter-
intelligence officers assigned to follow the given case officer. Trial
exits of the case officer into the city are made in order to determine
the nature and extent of surveillance. Similar exits are made simul-
taneously by other case officers in order to determine as completely
as possible the intensity of surveillance and to see whether the coun-
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terintelligence assets assigned to the given officer are withdrawn and
reassigned to follow the others.
The case officer who is to hold the meeting "trains" counterintelli-
gence personnel to a habitual daily schedule of movements in order to
take the edge off their vigilance. It may be useful to deviate from
this daily pattern sometimes in order to test how the counterintelli-
gence personnel react, but one should never "play" with the counter-
intelligence agents and tease them by acts ostensibly designed to
shake surveillance.
On the basis of data collected by these measures steps are worked
out for the officer to make a secure exit into the city to hold the
meeting (or to forewarn the agent if he discovers surveillance). A
system of signals is agreed upon and an appropriate distribution of
security and support personnel is worked out. For the latter, other
case officers and technical personnel in the residency are co-opted,
ones not subject to intensive counterintelligence surveillance.
For the exit itself various techniques of camouflage are used. In
one case, talks indicating the case officer was ill were held several
times during the day over a telephone known to be tapped by the
counterintelligence service. The state of his health was being dis-
cussed again over the telephone at the very time when he was leaving
his home to meet an agent, so early that surveillance teams had not
yet started to work. In another instance the officer was hidden in an
automobile and driven by two other members of the residency to a
place where one of the two was taking driving lessons. The counter-
intelligence agents, who for some time had been used to watching this
car leave for the driving lessons, now trailed it for a while and then
fell for the cover story and discontinued surveillance.
Once a "party" was arranged in the apartment of a case officer
who was scheduled to meet with an illegal. Counterintelligence,
believing the cover story and supposing that all residency person-
nel subject to surveillance were safely assembled in this one place,
relaxed vigilance. Taking advantage of their relaxation, the "host"
went out by a secret exit, held his meeting, and returned the same
way. He resumed entertaining his "guests" and then conducted them
down to the street before the very eyes of the counterintelligence
agents, leaving the impression he had been in the apartment with his
comrades all the time.
In order to weaken surveillance over a case officer who is about to
leave for an agent meeting, other members of the residency are some-
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times sent into town in order to disperse the strength of the surveil-
lance teams and distract their attention. The invention of successful
camouflage devices depends on the use of initiative and resourceful-
ness in the light of the specific concrete situation.
Surveillance en Route
Automobiles and residency members on foot can be used for signal-
ing danger to the case officer going to a meeting. They are stationed
at prearranged points, the men perhaps making calls from specified
telephone booths. Everything is calculated as to time and place.
The case officer may be required to go to a stipulated point at a given
time or be at a given place in order to observe what kind of a signal
is set up there. If our automobile, for example, were parked at a
specified point, this would signify that the case officer was under
surveillance and should not keep the rendezvous. In working out
such safeguards they should be so calculated as to warn the case officer
in time for him to call off the operation before making contact with
the agent.
Secret technical devices are used to detect surveillance on case
officers going to an agent meeting.? Carefully selected residency
employees can also be sent out to test operational conditions along
the handling officer's route, at particular points to be passed, and in
the area of the meeting place. This must be done, however, without
attracting superfluous persons into the meeting area and without
drawing counterintelligence attention to it. In some cases such pro-
cedures are coordinated on the spot with residents of fellow intelli-
gence organs.8 Sometimes employees supporting the meeting of a
case officer with an agent are subjected to more intense surveillance
than the case officer himself and so pull the counterintelligence "tails"
along after them to the meeting. In this fashion security support is
converted into its opposite, and the operation has to be called off.
The case officer departing for a meeting is required to check care-
fully whether he himself is under surveillance. If he is, he must con-
vince the surveillants by his actions that his trip into town has no
intelligence connotations; that is, he must act in conformity with the
approved cover story or its alternate. He must also try to shake off
the surveillants. It is not proper, however, to let it be evident that
' Presumably the monitoring of counterintelligence radios.
'Y- the VCR-
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he is trying to shake them off, especially if the meeting is with a
valuable agent. Obvious efforts usually do not work. On the con-
trary, they charge the atmosphere around the case officer and bring
on counterintelligence reinforcements.
The officer can go on to the meeting only after careful checking and
making fully certain that there is no surveillance. When surveillance
is discovered and when it is impossible to get away from it naturally,
he should calmly abort the meeting.
The Meeting
Upon meeting the agent, the case officer first tells him the cover
story for their being together and then establishes arrangements for
future contact. After that the business specified in the meeting plan
can be taken up. If the plan calls for the return of intelligence mate.
rials to the agent, these are given to him immediately. But if it
calls for the case officer to get materials from the agent, it is best
for him to take them at the last moment, just before the meeting ends.
Then, when counterintelligence activity is severe, he must get rid
of them as quickly as possible. For this purpose support automo-
biles or other members of the residency are sometimes stationed at
predetermined points in order to take them from him.
Various techniques are used to effect the transfer of intelligence
materials. They can be thrown into the open window of a parked
automobile. They can be passed outside of town between two cars
in motion, one overtaking the other and running side by side with it
for a brief span. Heavy suitcases containing radio gear, for example,
can be handed over in this way. Or the exchange can be accom-
plished under the pretext that one car is helping the other make
repairs. Under present conditions, however, residencies under legal
cover should receive and pass materials whenever possible via non-
personal forms of communication with the aid of technical opera-
tional equipment.)
After the meeting has ended the case officer may, if special per-
mission has been obtained from the resident, check on the actions
of the agent by discreet, unnoticeable surveillance. This practice
obtains when something in his behavior and performance gives rise
to suspicion.
'Presumably concealment devices, including microphotography.
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Upon return to the residency the case officer makes a detailed oral
report to the resident, and if asked he writes a report for transmittal
to Headquarters including his own comments and conclusions. The
resident adds his comments before sending it.
Under Better Conditions
Meetings with an agent in a third country are planned and con-
ducted in compliance with all the requirements of cover and clan-
destinity applicable to agent meetings everywhere. This applies
especially when a Headquarters officer has traveled there with Soviet
documentation to hold the meeting. In a third country, however,
the operational climate is more favorable in that the counterintelli-
gence and police agents do not know the identity of either the case
officer or the agent. Moreover, neither the case officer nor the agent
has acquaintances among the local populace, with whom an encounter
during a meeting would be most undesirable. The agent feels more
confident and relaxed, a circumstance which facilitates a more com-
plete and thorough examination and resolution of the business at hand.
A third country is usually chosen that has less stringent counter-
intelligence practices, one where the operational situation permits
holding a meeting with less risk of discovery. The case officer who
arrives in a third country illegally, with foreign documentation, enjoys
still more favorable conditions, not only for meetings but also for
non-clandestine association with the agent. The two can even live
in the same hotel. Nevertheless, a case officer meeting an agent in
a third country must carefully adhere to all the rules of clandestine
intelligence operations.
In illegal residencies and agent groups, meetings with agents should
conform to the same requirements, even though conditions are differ-
ent and security measures normally do not have to be carried to such
lengths. The establishment of personal contact in illegal residencies
and agent groups . is under the control of Headquarters, and residents
and group leaders report on meetings to Headquarters through their
communications channels.
Meetings with an agent summoned from abroad to Headquarters
enjoy the most favorable conditions of all, held in a safehouse and
in a calm atmosphere which provide the opportunity to thrash out
problems thoroughly and resolve pending operational matters. Such
meetings establish conditions for definitive checking and assessment
of the agent, should this be necessary. They entail, however, acute
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problems of security and cover, especially when the agent is quartered
in a hotel with other foreigners. His contacts with Soviet officials
must not become known to outsiders, especially his own countrymen.
If he arrives with false documentation, he should be quartered in a
safehouse only, and he should not appear in those places where
citizens of his country might meet him. His exit from the USSR
also requires serious attention. He cannot take an airplane or train
on which acquaintances might happen to be traveling.
Despite its obvious vulnerability, personal contact in agent opera-
tions is unavoidable. It must be used most intensively for recruitment
purposes. It has a number of advantages over other modes of agent
communication. It facilitates the exchange of materials, the assessment
of potential agents, and agent indoctrination and training. It is a
means of direct supervision, which is extraordinarily important and
necessary in intelligence operations, especially in the protection of the
network from penetration by provocateurs and counterintelligence
agents.
It is used primarily within residencies. It is also used by Head-
quarters for communication with agents, group leaders, and illegal
residents, especially in peacetime. It can seldom be the means of
delivering urgent intelligence reports, however, and therefore even in
peacetime arrangements for radio and other forms of non-personal
communication with Headquarters must be established.
Much is demanded of case officers making personal contacts-
excellence in operational preparedness, personality, education, ,and
general cultural development, knowledge of specialized matters on
which the agents are working, ability to detect surveillance, ability
to grasp quickly the content and significance of a discussion and make
correct decisions on matters broached by agents, and skill in avoiding
compromise of self and agent when danger threatens.
Because of the complexity of modern operational conditions, the
possibilities for personal contact in a target country are significantly
reduced and in some instances eliminated completely. Personal
contact with a valuable agent should take place in a third country
or at Headquarters.
Under present conditions the number of personal meetings between
agents and case officers under legal cover should be reduced to a min-
imum. This end can be achieved by the amalgamation of agents into
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agent groups or illegal residencies, by cutting off group leaders and
illegal residents from contact with legal residencies, and by training
illegal case officers at Headquarters to send out for meetings. The
indispensable residue of meetings in residencies under legal cover are
feasible if the essential measures of security and cover are taken.
Because plans for personal contacts depend on the particular par-
ticipants, purposes, and local situation, much freedom is granted to
residents in this respect. Yet control and supervision by Headquarters
is never completely absent. It is precisely the central intelligence
apparatus which can and must, by study of experience with personal
contacts in all strategic intelligence operations, substantially aid resi-
dents to set up arrangements that conform with modern operational
conditions. Headquarters officers, residency officers, and those who
are in intelligence training establishments must develop the highest
creative initiative and resourcefulness in the quest for secure agent
communications, in fitting these to actual operational problems, and
in the application of the latest attainments of Soviet and foreign sci-
ence and technology.
10 January 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
We have secured through secret intelligence channels a series of
what purport to be authentic reports, transmitted by various German
diplomatic, consular, military and intelligence sources to their head-
quarters. The source and material are being checked as to probable
authenticity both here and in London. We shall submit later a con-
sidered opinion on this point. It is possible that contact: with this
source furnishes the first important penetration into a responsible Ger-
man agency.
We have labeled these reports the "Boston Series" and append hereto
the first fourteen.2
' Described in the first of this series, subtitled "Sunrise," in Studies VII 2, p.
73 if.
'The source was publicly identified as "George Wood," a subordinate official
in a branch of the Reich Foreign Ministry, in Edward P. Morgan's "The Spy
the Nazis Missed" in True magazine for July 1950. Morgan's story, based on
information from "Wood," is fictionalized and inaccurate in some of its details
but otherwise substantially correct. It reveals that the first of Wood's reports
were cabled from Bern to Washington in late August 1943. Why "the first
fourteen" were not disseminated until after more than four months is not clear.
Perusing the enemy bureaucracy's
most secret files.
MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT::
BOSTON SERIES
The OSS station in Bern obtained access during the war to some of
the classified communications among German government offices and
between Berlin and its representatives abroad. A number of the in-
telligence reports paraphrasing these documents General Donovan con-
sidered worthy of the personal attention of the President, and carbons
of these are included in his files of correspondence with the White
House.' A sampling of historically noteworthy items thus transmitted
is reproduced below.
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GERMANS SECURE BRITISH REPORTS
Shortly prior to the 4th of November Ambassador Von Papen came
into possession of certain documents on which he clearly places great
value and which, seemingly, were secured from the British Embassy
in Ankara by an important German agent.3 Among the cables was a
list of questions which the British Ambassador took to Cairo for his
own guidance in consulting with Eden. Also included was a Foreign
Office memorandum of October 7, apparently entitled, "A Long-Range
View of Turkish-British Policy." By a special courier these and addi-
tional documents were dispatched to Berlin. Among these addi-
tional documents was a memorandum presumably dealing with the
steps which the English were taking in Turkey in preparation for war
and which was referred to in a list of questions.
*
TREATMENT OF ITALIANS LOYAL TO KING
The following order was dispatched by Keitel from General Head-
quarters to all involved, on the 12th of September:
The following treatment shall be applied at the command of
Hitler, to all Italian troops who permit their arms to come into
the possession of rebels or who in any manner unite with rebels
for mutual ends; if captured, 1) Officers are to be shot at once;
2) Soldiers and non-commissioned officers, avoiding as much as
possible any passage through Germany, are to be dispatched at
once to the East and put under Military Command for.labor.
* *
TREATMENT OF ITALIAN JEWS
On October 6, 1943, the following recommendation was made to
high German sources by a German official in Italy:
Orders have been received from Berlin by Obersturmbann-
fuehrer Kappler to seize and to take to Northern Italy the 8,000
'The famous Cicero. Documents supplied by Wood identified him sufficiently
for the British to take counteraction. These were not among the first delivered,
however; Morgan's story in True cites them as a sample of the "important news"
with which "the secret circuit between Berlin and Bern," established after Wood
had made two trips to Bern in person, "became heavily laden." Cicero's own
memoirs (Elyesa Bazna, I Was Cicero) give Wood's true name as Kolbe.
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Jews living in Rome. They are to be liquidated. General Stahel,
the city commandant of Rome, will permit this action only if it
is consistent with the policies of the Reich Foreign Minister. It
would be better business, in my opinion, to use the Jews, as in
Tunis, for work on fortifications. Together with Kappler, I shall
present this view through Field Marshall General Kesselring.
SECRET NAZI RADIO IN DUBLIN 4
A secret radio transmitter is located in the Nazi Legation in Dublin,
and the Irish are aware of its existence. Regular cables from Dublin
are sent, with considerable delay, by way of Bern; the Nazis are
keeping the secret transmitter for emergency use only. The Irish. are
putting pressure on the Nazis to give up this transmitter, but the
Germans are stalling. The Nazi Minister, Hempel, was of the opinion
that he should be permitted to state to DeValera that such a crisis
might result from the Irish insisting on the surrender of the transmitter
that it might result in the recall of Hempel, thereby causing a decrease
in the independence now enjoyed by Ireland in relations with England.
NOTE: With reference to the above report, OSS is now advised by its London
Office that this transmitter was removed on December 24th by the Government
of Eire.
INTERNMENT OF GERMAN FLIERS IN EIRE
The German Government in December proposed that, to avoid
being interned, Nazi airmen landing in Ireland should claim that they
are on a practice flight. Munitions and bombs are to be dropped over-
board prior to landing. On the basis of such actions by Nazi fliers,
the German Government is to request that DeValera release all Nazi
airmen who land in Ireland from now on. Then perhaps a civilian
airplane could fly to Ireland for the purpose of picking up these fliers,
thereby affording the German Government a chance to send a new
German official to Dublin.
NOTE: With reference to the above report, OSS had been advised from London
that, whether or not German aviators were engaged in "nonoperational" flights,
everyone has been interned on landing and they will continue to be interned.
' Morgan puts the delivery of a fancifully embroidered version of this document
not with the initial take but as one of Wood's reasons for making-still in 1.943,
"late October"-his second trip in person to Ber?
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11 January 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following paraphrase comes from German sources, the ultimate
source allegedly being the German Foreign Office. It purports to be
a report to Berlin by the German Minister to Switzerland, embodying
the substance of a report from the Swiss Minister in Washington to
the Swiss Foreign Office:
"1..K. O. Schweiz [Note: Kriegs Organization, the Swiss secret in-
telligence agency]5 has seen reports of the Swiss Minister, which were
based upon talks with the Vice President.? According to these reports,
at the start of the Moscow Conference the Americans and British tried
to vindicate both the past and future actions of the Allied GHQ's;
however, their Russian partner exhibited practically no sympathy or
appreciation of their position. On the other hand, it seems that the
foundations were laid for coming military cooperation. Not until a
second front has been opened up, i.e., not until the Allies have carried
out a successful invasion of France, will this plan for cooperation go
into effect. Until then Russia retains the right to unrestricted action
in military and political matters. The Vice President stated, how-
ever, that Russian conditions for more complete military cooperation
will soon be met.
10. The report of the Swiss Minister is a valuable supplement to
the reports from friendly diplomats which I [the German Minister to
Switzerland] sent earlier. The reason that the above report contains
so much more concrete information than the data which came to Bern
from the American and British governments is due to the fact that the
Vice President was talking to the Swiss Minister, his brother-in-law,
in the greatest confidence."7
`Erroneous. K. 0. Schweiz would be the German Abwehr station in Switzer-
land.
'Henry Wallace.
'Admiral Leahy made excerpts from this memorandum public in his memoirs
(I Was There, pp. 220-1).
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84 CONFIDENTIAL
The V-Weapons
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
10 July 1.944
Here is a message just received through OSS in Berne from our in-
formant strategically placed in Berlin:
"1. With reference to the rocket bombs, extremely secret in-
formation from Pari (Koerperbau) 8 reveals that the 'gerade Lau-
fapparatur' ? is produced in Gdynia, at the Ascania works; both
the V-1 and V-2 models are made in Hersograd (sic), which is
located in Niederdonau10 in the vicinity of St. Valentin; the
`Duesen''1 are built at the Krupp works in Wuppertal; additional
parts which are not named are manufactured by the Siemens-
plauia 12 factories at Murtenberglech (sic) 13, situated 30 kilo-
meters north of Augsburg.
"2. Approximately 10% of the V-1 model rocket bombs will
have short-wave transmitters installed in them. The purpose of
this will be to direct the path and aim of the rocket bomb. The
problem which arises with respect to this, however, is whether
waves transmitted from England will be able to interfere with the
apparatus.
"3. To the best of the informant's knowledge, Berlin has not
been able to obtain any first-hand information regarding con-
sequences of the bombing of southern England. They have se-
cured the following indirect reports, however, through third
persons:
"(A) On June 29th, von Papen wired Berlin that be was in-
formed in confidence by the Deputy General Secretary that al-
though England has ended the suspension of diplomatic privileges
and although the Turkish government has asked its Embassy at
London for a report on this topic, still no report has been received.
'Paris body works.
'The edited version of this report which was delivered to the other recipients
reads "flight control mechanism."
" ? Translated in the edited version to "the lower Danube region."
" Translated in the edited version to "jets."
" Typo for Siemensplania.
" Noted in the edited version as probable garble for Meitingen-bei-Augsburg,
but later messages have Moertingen.
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Britain has requested all diplomatic representatives stationed in
England not to transmit any information regarding the invasion
situation and the Nazi weapon.
"(B) From Madrid, Ambassador Dieckhoff wired the following
on July 2nd: In the last two days, the initial results of the rocket
bombing of southern England have become a great deal graver.
If this bombing is maintained, it is anticipated that there will be
heavy damage and disorder, even though public services have not
yet been halted. Dieckhoff's information was based on a cable
from Alba which reached Madrid on July 1.
"4. In the neighborhood of Orlamuende, south of Kahla on the
railroad line between Rudolfstadt and Jena, a large new airplane
plant is being built. It is underground in part. It was already
bombed on either June 29th or 30th, but this raid did not cause
much injury and the plant will soon be in operation. Pursuit
planes (Jagd maschinen) are manufactured here; in addition, per-
haps new secret weapons are also produced. In comparison with
the V-1 model, the V-2 travels through the stratosphere. It is
radio-controlled and is therefore a more accurate weapon. In
addition, it possesses a longer range. This new model will be in
use by the Nazis within 60 days, at the outside."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
We have just received through our representative in Bern the fol-
lowing report from a reliable source inside Germany, concerning the
characteristics of the German V-2 bomb:
"A-4 is the designation applied to the V-2 bomb by the experts, but
there are many conflicting reports concerning it. It is reported to be
manufactured at Saint Gallen in Austria southeast of Steyr. The parts
are assembled at MDW (Mittel-Deutschen Werke) Harz (sic) and
all buildings for this work are located beneath the earth. The most
effective way to cripple this production would be to smash the lines
for rail shipment. The weapon is claimed to be capable of a speed
of 1 kilometer per second and to sustain itself in flight for a distance
of 500 to 600 kilometers. It carries anywhere from 1 to 2 tons of
explosive charges and has a weight of about 20 tons. It is not directed
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86 CONFIDENTIAL
by remote control, however. The fuse is manufactured in Moertingen
near Augsburg. The bomb is propelled from steel plates wl-iich are
mounted on a movable track. The Germans are said to be all ready to
employ the weapon in Norway. On October 3, a wire was sent by
General Jodal 14 to the Oberbefehlshaber in the West that this is not a
propitious time, politically, to launch these bombs against Paris, and
no attack should be made in that region now. It is the opinion of
everyone that any talk of other so-named V weapons is mere propa-
ganda, or, at least if there are such bombs, they will not be ready for
use till March or April next year. If the V-1 or V-2 are directed by
remote control they use a wave length frequency of 24 to 56 centi-
meters. Operations have been resumed at Peenemuende."
15 April 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The enclosed dispatch from Berne and the accompanying evaluation
of its source should, it is believed, be brought to your attention as
early as possible.
You will recall earlier copies of a special character which were
secured from original official German sources through our Agency in
Switzerland. This cable is not such a message but it is the evaluation
by our principal Swiss intelligence representative16 of two hundred
such enemy documents (four hundred pages) which have just come
into his hands.
As is customary with material of such special character these en-
closures are also being delivered personally to the Secretary of State,
General Marshall, Admiral King, General Eisenhower and the Secre-
tary of the Joint Chiefs.
Under existing arrangements on this particular contact the British
will see this cable and, as in the past, will doubtless show it to their
highest officials.
" Sic.
' Note that the memoranda in this section preceded those on the V-weapons,
dating well before the invasion of Normandy.
" Allen Dulles.
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MEMORANDUM TO ACCOMPANY 2787-92 ATTACHED
With regard to the attached message which left Bern April 12th,
the following is to be said.
(1) The author of message is an American citizen, 52 years
old, in charge of OSS secret intelligence in Switzerland since
November 1942. His intimate knowledge of European politics
dates back to 1915. During the last war he acted as an intel-
ligence officer for the United States Government from the Lega-
tion in Switzerland. Subsequently, he represented the United
States officially on several occasions in important diplomatic nego-
tiations. During the last 30 years he has had a continuing expert
and responsible interest in European affairs.
(2) All "Boston" (Kappa) material has been handled per-
sonally by him in Switzerland since it first appeared in October
1943.17
(3) The sender of this message has hitherto acted merely as
a reporter of material received by him, transmitting it as it
reached him, and only occasionally making a brief note of com-
ment on some point of fact or on some individual named in
Boston material.
(4) His last previous evaluation, a month ago (not based
primarily on earlier Boston material), was conservative and by no
means optimistic with regard to the possibility of an early Ger-
man internal collapse.
(5) As a man experienced in affairs, he knows how significant
the attached message may be and the responsibility he assumes
by sending it.
(6) However, in view of the very great implications in this
message, a cable has been sent to the author requesting him to
review it carefully to see whether he wishes, on reflection, to
modify any of its language and to report here by cable im-
mediately.
(7) It would seem that the author, thanks to the sudden receipt
of 400 pages of material all at one moment, finds himself in a posi-
tion where he can see the whole picture rather than any single
'This date splits the difference between the actual first appearance in August
and the first dissemination in January 1944. The volume of reporting did in-
crease in October with Wood's second trip to Bern.
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part. He is probably better able to see and evaluate that whole
picture than the Germans are themselves, since they have neither
the time nor the calm nor the undistracted minds to take an over-
all view of their own diplomatic situation.
(8) You will be further informed when and if any modification
of this message comes from Bern.
Sincerely regret that you cannot at this time see Wood's material as it stands
without condensation and abridgement. In some 400 pages, dealing with the
internal maneuverings of German diplomatic policy for the past two months, a
picture of imminent doom and final downfall is presented. Into a tormented
General Headquarters and a half-dead Foreign Office stream the lamentations
of a score of diplomatic posts. It is a scene wherein haggard Secret Service and
diplomatic agents are doing their best to cope with the defeatism and desertion
of flatly defiant satellites and allies and recalcitrant neutrals. The period of secret
service under Canaris and diplomacy under the champagne salesman is drawing to
an end. Already Canaris has disappeared from the picture, and a conference was
hurriedly convoked in Berlin at which efforts were made to mend the gaping holes
left in the Abwehr. Unable now to fall back on his favorite means of avoiding
disconcerting crises by retiring to his bed, Ribbentrop has beat a retreat: to Fuschl
and retains a number of his principal aides at Salzburg. The remainder of the
Foreign Office is strung out all the way between Riesengebirge and the capital.
Almost impossible working conditions exist in the latter, and bombing shelters are
being permanently used for code work. Once messages have been deciphered,
a frantic search begins to locate the particular service or minister to which each
cable must be forwarded; and, when a reply is called for, another search is neces-
sary to deliver this to the right place.
Borman or Neubacher will step forward if Ribbentrop is sacked, and one of
them will carry out Gestapo diplomacy. Ample evidence of what this will mean
is contained in 100-odd pages of Weesenmeyer cables describing the situation in
the Hungarian capital. There, however, the drama involves that old fox, Horthy,
playing the role of a 1944 Petain. Weesenmeyer's cable dated the 20th of last
month ends on the following querulous note: "Within the last 24 hours, I have
had three long talks with Von Iorthy. As a result, I am becoming more and
more convinced that on the one hand the Regent is an unmitigated liar and on
the other he is physically no longer capable of performing his duties. He is con-
stantly repeating himself, often contradicting himself within a few sentences, and
sometimes does not know how to go on. Everything he says sounds like a
memorized formula, and I fear that it will be difficult to convince him, let alone
win him over."
In Sofia, cagy Bulgarians are playing all kinds of tricks on Beckerle and going
off to Turkey on pleasure trips, while Nazi offices are accusing each other right
and left of letting traitors clear out from under their noses. In Bucharest,
Antonescu's harried aides try to think up excuses for the Stirbey-Chastelain in-
cidents that will satisfy the Nazis, while the Marshall himself is getting reports
that looting German troops are just ahead of the Russians.
The final death-bed contortions of a putrefied Nazi diplomacy are pictured in
these telegrams. The reader is carried from one extreme of emotion to the other.
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved Forrr 'eqeoseP2005/01/05 : Cl
from tears to laughter, as he examines these messages and sees the cruelty ex-
hibited by the Germans in their final swan-song of brutality toward the peoples so
irrevocably and pitifully enmeshed by the Gestapo after half a decade of futile
struggles, and yet at the same time sees also the absurdity of the dilemma which
now confronts this diplomacy both within and outside of Festung Europa.
19 April 1944
In connection with the message from Switzerland (transmitted to
you on 15 April 1944) giving an appreciation of the German political
and diplomatic situation rendered by the principal OSS intelligence
officer, Switzerland, he was immediately queried as to whether he
wished to modify or add to that message, in view of its import. He
has now replied.
He states:
(1) That he sees no reason to change or qualify his earlier message
as a description of the current Nazi diplomatic and political scene.
(2) That though his evaluation is derived most immediately from
the material recently received by him, and from conversations with
one tried informant, he has received other similar reports recently
from other well-proven informants in the same strain, and background
data to him in Bern supports his view.
He adds:
That his message should not be read as indicating that the morale
of the Nazi army is nearing collapse (excepting probably the so-called
Gross Deutscher, Slav and other non-German elements). Nor does
he think that any important Nazi military officials are ready and
willing to let us come in through the West unopposed. He believes,
rather, that fierce opposition may be given to any invasion attempt.
A collapse of Germany might follow, however, a few months after
the establishment of a firm toe-hold in the West.
He concludes :
The timing of the invasion attempt may be all important. The
German people are war-weary and apathetic, and even in Nazi circles
the same kind of psychological depression can be seen as appeared
last August and September.
Yet if they could stabilize the Russian front once more, they might
catch a second wind, and put up an even stronger defense against
invasion.
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90 CONFIDENTIAL
From a Confederate heroine-
LETTERS TO THE PRESIDENT
Walter Pforzheimer
On the following pages are reproduced two letters written in August
1863 to President Jefferson Davis by Rose O'Neal Greenhow, prewar
Washington socialite who became, as the chronic North-South quarrel
flamed into armed hostilities, a celebrated propagandist, intrigante,
and espionage agent for the Confederacy. To her information on
Union troop movements is credited the Southern victory at First
Manassas. Arrested by Pinkerton in August 1861, she was imprisoned
for nearly a year, then "exiled" to Richmond. Now she is on her way
to Europe, commissioned by Davis to try to rekindle sympathy for the
South in the cooling governments of France and England. The letter
from Bermuda has not been reproduced before.'
It was in returning from this mission, after a year of personally
triumphant effort in behalf of a cause that was too far gone to save,
that the writer died in the service of her country. Running the
blockade and pursued by a Union gunboat, her ship ran aground in
a storm, but within the protective range of Confederate guns. 'Too
impetuous to wait for calming waters, she insisted on putting to shore
in a boat and drowned when it overturned.
' The originals of both are held in this writer's private collection.
RDP78T03194A000200030001-0
CONFIDENTIAL 91
 Approved For Re ease 105/01/05
:
Wilmington [North Carolina]
August 4th
lvGai/2~ ~ G~i
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 :
To The President
My dear Sir
In a few hours I shall be aboard the Phantom. The tide being most favorable
tonight, Capt. Porter intends to make the attempt to get out. Of course 1( am
anxious, for Fort Warren or Delaware are looming in the distance. The Yankees
are reported as being unusually vigilant, a double line of blockaders block the way.
Still I am nothing daunted, and hope by the blessing of Providence to get: out
in safety.
I think I should brave any fate rather than remain here ten days longer. It
is the hottest and most disagreeable place in the world, and the very atmosphere
seems laden with disease. The better class of the inhabitants have left the city.
A great many people are here for the purpose of running the Blockade, and I am
surprized to see amongst the number so many men who ought to be in the Army.
Dr. Gwin & Lucy are going I think on the Ella & Annie. The Capt. of
the Phantom would only take me as passenger on his ship.
I saw Gen. Whiting last evening and in the course of conversation he said he
thought that he would be able to raise a brigade of Cavalry amongst persons
about here whom he knew if he were allowed to promise that the officers selected
would be commissioned.
I have a letter this morning from an intelligent gentleman Col. Jones who
started some twenty days since for Matamoros, who has been obliged to :retire
to Mobile, as he represents Louisiana & Mississippi to be completely infested by
the Yankees.
And now my dear Sir I must say goodbye. I can never sufficiently thank you
for your goodness to me. May heaven guard you Sir and keep you in health
is my most fervent prayer.
[Minor corrections made in punctuation and spelling]
 Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-
?firL~
!2rJ ` /1'~~ri-c..~G`%s~/.~~ .e i//1~i_,le 2 7!
/cam Ii_c G~i2 ~?-`- .~2r / G~ ~4~.s~.c.~./j1~~-rte
1x. /1-1Z1-
7AZ
~'?c J_. :.yam
Approved For Release 2005/01/05 :
To The President
My dear Sir
St. George Bermuda
August 19th
I have been detained here for the last ten days awaiting a vessel for Europe.
I had concluded by advise of Maj. Walker to go on the Harriet Pinkney, a vessel
which sails with English papers and with English officers and leaves in a few days
for Liverpool. But yesterday a person whose position enables him to know most
things came to me confidentially and told me that a decision had been given by
Crown lawyers in England that all vessels on the high seas carrying cotton were
lawfully liable to capture altho the vessel and cargo should be owned by
British subjects, and that Col. Monroe, the officer in command here, admitted
that such instructions had been sent out, altho with the injunction of secrecy. I
have no doubt at all of the accuracy of this as the intelligence and reliability of
my informant is without question.
Today I am going to address a note to the Gov. asking for information on the
subject & stating my object of going on a British vessel &c. The Lee has just
got in, having had a hard trip and being obliged to throw 150 bales of cotton
overboard. If I elicit a response to my letter I shall send it. For if this be the
case the blockade is also in British waters.
Our Agent Maj. Walker has a very delicate and difficult post here. I have
informed myself thoroughly as to the business &c. here, and I feel that I cannot
give him too much credit for his indefatigable zeal and ready resources. One of
the greatest difficulties is the procuring of funds in gold or silver, there being no
Bank on the Island, and I really have felt for his difficulty this last ten days,
there having been cleared fifteen vessels which each had to have their share of
the sterling. I will not take up your time which I know is so valuable, but I
thought it proper to communicate this information which I know can be relied
upon.
With my prayers and my best wishes. Believe me most truly and respectfully.
Rose O'N. Greenhow
[Minor corrections made in punctuation and spelling)
 Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CLE1-RDP78T03194A000200030001-0
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
THE FORTRESS THAT NEVER WAS: The Myth of Hitler's Bavar-
ian Stronghold. By Rodney G. Minott. (New York: Holt, Rine-
hart and Winston. 1964. 208 pp. $4.95.)
The thesis of this book, which is based on study of Allied intel-
ligence reports and some German documents, is that General Eisen-
bower's Supreme Headquarters became so obsessed in the spring of
1945 with fear of a prospective German redoubt in the Bavarian Alps
as to drop plans to take Berlin and Vienna. The author, described
on the dust wrapper as a young American historian currently teaching
at Stanford, does not know what he is writing about.
Perhaps Mr. Minott was influenced by Chester Wilmot's The
Struggle for Europe,' which, following the British line, blames Eisen-
hower for not capturing Berlin, Prague, and Vienna and makes con-
cern over the purported redoubt one of the principal reasons for not
driving more aggressively to the east. William L. Shirer, in his gen-
erally authoritative Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, also says that
Eisenhower and his staff were obsessed with the urgency of capturing
the so-called National Redoubt, although it "was a phantom. It never
existed except in the propaganda blasts of Dr. Goebbels and in the
cautious minds at Eisenhower's headquarters ..."
With this encouragement the young author, pontificating that
"intelligence evaluations of all types from the tactical up to the na-
tional level are incredibly important for our defense in this age,"
tries to make something out of nothing, and fails. It is true that
there was a lot of talk about a planned National Redoubt in the
Bavarian Alps, talk by the Germans and by American and British in-
telligence. Shirer indicates the command attitude toward it in quot-
? ing Omar Bradley's statement that it was "too ominous a threat to
ignore." Eisenhower writes in his Crusade in Europe, "The evidence
was clear that the Nazi intended to make the attempt and I decided
to give him no opportunity to carry it out.... The way to stop this
project . . . was to overrun the entire national territory before its
organization could be effected." And that is exactly what was done.
It is true that the German project had not got off the ground. It
is absolutely untrue that the preventive action affected the rest of
Allied strategy in any way. One army group, unemployed, was di-
MORI/HRP PAGES
97-98
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verted to clean out the area of potential danger. This, the Sixth
Army Group under General Devers, was unemployed because the
enemy had been destroyed and because there wasn't room on the
roads or supplies for further advances to the east. One division, in
fact, the 13th U.S. Airborne assigned to the Army Group for this task,
had acquired distinction as the only U.S. division sent to Europe that
never had anything to do-not of its own choosing, of course.
Mr. Minott suggests that if we had had enough intelligence analysts
to study the matter we wouldn't have been taken in by the stronghold
myth. He is off base on three counts. First, we weren't taken in.
Second, you don't stop fighting a war to await the results of a research
project. And third, if we were "obsessed" or even very much worried
about the danger, I who was General Bradley's G-2 briefing officer at
Tactical Headquarters wasn't aware of it. Certainly we wanted to
make sure that there was no problem on our right flank, but anything
beyond that takes our concern out of context.
It's a commander's job to anticipate all problems, and that's what
Eisenhower and Bradley did here without detriment to any other task.
We had divisions and corps to spare. It would have been wrong to
dismiss the redoubt as a myth on the strength of intelligence analysis.
Intelligence cannot be omniscient; maybe Mr. Minott's book is about
the wrong profession.
L. B. Kirkpatrick
TIIE GESTAPO: A History of Horror. By Jacques Delarue. Trans-
lated from the French Histoire de la Gestapo (Librairie Artheme
Fayard, 1962) by Mervyn Savill. Published in England (London:
Macdonald, 1964) under title The History of the Gestapo. (New
York: William Morrow. 1964. 384 pp. $6.95.)
This purported history of the Nazi political police boils over not
only into an account of the Reich intelligence and security services
generally, along with the SS and other instruments of oppression, but
into a wide-ranging treatment of the rise and eventual triumph of the
Nazi party, the consolidation of its dictatorship in Germany and its
preparations for conquest, the atrocities of the occupation, and the
final cataclasm that began with the plot of 20 July. The author, who
was a member of the Paris Surete, a resistance worker, a Nazi prisoner,
and then postwar liquidator of occupation records for the Surete, is too
unskillful a writer and too careless a historian-he says for example
that Mussolini was "a refugee in Germany" in July 1944-to bring any
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new perspectives to the familiar material he resplashes on this broader
canvas. The value of his work is thus confined to the two chapters
reflecting his own experience and documentary studies, those on the
SIPO-SD units in France. Even here the pickings are pretty slim, the
prize exhibit being a hitherto unpublished jurisdictional agreement
with the Vichy police, which in any case was not honored.
What is remarkable about the book in its English-language versions
is that the British and American publishers were satisfied with such a
clumsy, dictionary translation and such a sloppy job of editing. When
the author begs leave to tell of his personal memories, he "hopes the
reader will excuse him from recounting . . ." Himmler was unwilling
to "participate" (for share) his control of the police. Stenographers
are "shorthand typists." A cell is a "casemate"; prison rules are a
"material regime." Cruel regulations are called "insensate." News-
papers are "presses." The Gestapo had "integrated" (for absorbed)
units of the SD. The RSHA had "a special formation" (i.e. course
of training) for all agents. "I could not tell from his glance if he was
still alive." Ostmark is "the Eastern Marches." "Woe to the journa-
list who dared write a misplaced allusion."
A few of these are edited out in the British edition. The American
editors passed all of them and many more, along with some Briticisms
and a lot of plain errors. The Schupo is the "urban police correspond-
ing to our constables." March is specified when it should be Feb-
ruary; we get A.M. for P.M., 1944 for 1943, francs for marks, political
forces for police forces. Czechoslovakia is to evacuate "the Sudeten
Germans" rather than Sudeten Germany. 1Ieydrich's assassin is mis-
spelled "Gabeik" in both editions. "Hitler was dominated . . . by
the conflict against the `Reds,' in other words the Democrats and. the
Republicans." Stool pigeons had been "baptized 'wel]-wishers,"'
whereas "well-wishers had been baptized V. Maenner, in other words
men of trust."'
In justice, one cannot have expected editors to catch some of the
errors which must have been made in the original French. Schel-
lenberg's man Hoettl is said to have made contacts in Berne with
General Donovan. Beck's being passed over as replacement for von
Fritsch in 1938 is attributed to a speech he made in 1934. And details
for the installation of the first gas chambers-that would be 1940-
are said to have been decided over lunches held in EicbmaDn'S office
after "the Allied bombing had seriously damaged all the [RSHA]
buildings" in Berlin-which could not be before 1944.
 Recent Books CONFIDENTIAL
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The book seems to represent a lot of honest effort on Delarue's
part, and it isn't quite as bad as this fault-finding makes it. But it
isn't worth wading through, at least in this translation.
Art Rosenhagen
Tl:IEIR TRADE IS TREACHERY. Prepared by the British Central
Office of Information. (London: II. M. Stationery Office. 1964.
59 pp. For official use only.)
Much better than its garish title promises, this is a counterintel-
ligence handout for British government employees. Its principal con-
tent is a score of sanitized case histories which show how the Soviet
and Bloc services go about the spotting and recruitment of indigenous
agents, what action some prospects they approach take to escape
entrapment, and how others fail to escape. The treatment is light
and the style simple, featuring the one-short-sentence paragraph of
the preschool book:
Gorski and Zaremba were interrogated.
The dangers were explained.
Zaremba never went to Poland. He didn't want to, now....
Lucky Zaremba.
This playful rendering of the earnest message, together with the in-
trinsic interest of the case histories, keeps the reader's attention and
lets him enjoy being preached to. Except for the inevitable lecture
on physical security at the end (you'd think they could have handed
that out separately) it is skillful propaganda, and universal enough
to be suitable for U.S. use if our own CI propagandists are all too
heavy-handed for this kind of job.
Anthony Quibble
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STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 9 NO. 2
SPRING 1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, opera-
tional, or historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or re-
jecting an article rests with the Editorial
Board.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
The criterion for publication is whether or
not, in the opinion of the Board, the article
makes a contribution to the literature of in-
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CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may
come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon in-
vitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be submitted
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Shepherding a Soviet Tour ............ John Anthony Dahms
Backstage exploration of the USSR's industrial economy.
SECRET
Page
1
The Enigma of Soviet BW
Wilton E. Lexow and Julian Hoptnnan 15
Frustrating search for evidence climaxed at Vozrozhdeniya
island. SECRET
Death of an Hypothesis ...................... Sherman Kent 21
Old art treasures as China's gold reserve. CONFIDENTIAL
The Okhrana's Female Agents, Part I .... Rita T. Kronenbitter 25
Tzarist intelligence uses Russian women to penetrate the
revolutionaries. CONFIDENTIAL,
Communications to the Editors ............. ........... 43
Some new words for defection. CONFIDENTIAL
The Ninja .............................. W. M. Trengrouse 45
Unconventional warrior-spies of old Japan. CONFIDENTIAL
Memoranda for the President: From Peter to Tito
Wm. J. Donovan 53
Contemporary intelligence watches the birth of a new Yugo-
slavia. CONFIDENTIAL
Nothing to Hide ............................ J. J'Charlevois 85
A letter from Ben Franklin. CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature. CONFIDENTIAL
Traitors 89
World War II ...................... .. ............. 93
Miscellaneous ....................... ......... ... 95
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Leaves from the diary of an intelli-
gence-minded interpreter with ex-
pertise in industrial matters.
SHEPHERDING A SOVIET TOUR
John Anthony Dahms
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant contribu-
tion to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in the
Studies. The prize may be divided if the two or more best articles
submitted are judged to be of equal merit, or it may be withheld if
no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year, articles
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literary qualities. Members of the Studies editorial board and staff
are of course excluded from the competition.
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Approved For Release 2005/01/05 :
The main job of the interpreter accompanying a Soviet delegation
around this country is to facilitate communication. He should. not
be so loaded with other assignments that he reaches the point of
exhaustion in which, as a Soviet interpreter once put it, he feels like
a wise dog-he understands everything but cannot say a word.
Yet if he keeps it a secondary function he can elicit, and help in
the elicitation of, useful information, a good deal more these days
than in the first years of the exchange program.' Sometimes he
stumbles on it; sometimes he works for it and succeeds, sometimes
fails. And exceptionally he may be deluged with more than he
can absorb. How he goes about it can most easily be shown by
holding up some pages from his life.
As I near the top of the temporary ladder leading to the second
floor of the new Paducah city hall, open to the sky during construc-
tion, the December fog from the Ohio river is so thick that I cannot
see whether the two missing members of the Soviet delegation
are there. Twisting around on the top rung, I now spot the two
ghostly figures at the far end of the building-and simultaneously
slip and nearly tumble. I picture the headline in the Paducah paper:
"State Department Interpreter Breaks Leg in Fall: John Dahms,
who accompanied the Soviet delegation of 12 construction spe-
cialists to dams and construction sites around Paducah, is said to
be in satisfactory condition after . . .
The slip is a warning that I am overanxious. The reason for
my eagerness is that these two Soviets, the most communicative of
the 12, for the moment are alone. All week the head of the delega-
tion, Andrei Schepetyev, has blocked my every move to talk to
them without his supervision. Here is my chance. As i[ approach
them amid the pipes, conduits, and construction debris, I can tell
'C f. Francis Agnor, "The Interpreter as an Agent," Studies IV 1, p. 21 if.
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from their stance and dramatic gestures that their conversation is
of the heart-to-heart kind. Now I can hear it.
Pravilno, pravilno! Girenko is agreeing with something. The big
man of magnetic personality is head of some 400,000 construction
workers in the South Ural economic district, a gold-starred Hero
of the Soviet Union, and a delegate to the Supreme Soviet.
"I told them, I wrote them; but it did no good," protests Denyega,
an idealistic, obstinate, and bitter Ukrainian whose job is to coordi-
nate the production of construction machinery throughout the USSR.
Ile is thirty-seven but looks fifty. The head of the delegation
appears to hate him.
From the commodious pockets of my trenchcoat, from among
the neosynephrine, aspirin, cough drops, and indigestion pills there,
I take a small box of chocolates which were to have been my break-
fast (try ordering for a dozen hungry Russians in Paducah when
they want real Central Asian kefir and won't settle for buttermilk
or even yogurt) and hold it out to them. "Chocolates, Pavel
Gavrilovich, Andrei Yermolayevich?" With an automatic spasibo
they munch the candy and continue talking. Denyega, I learn,
has written a report in which he is going to take on the entire
Gosstroy chain of command and doesn't care what happens.
Drug nioi, proshu vas ochen-ne goryachites. Like an old coach
calming clown his star player, Girenko in his velvety basso tells his
friend not to get excited and act rashly because he will only hurt
himself. Denyega gives a frustrated kick at an imaginary impedi-
ment, then reluctantly concedes, "You are right. But how long
do we have to wait? It is not for me. It is for the good of all."
"You can be sure," answers Girenko with great power of persuasion
in his voice, "that soon there will be changes. Enormous changes.
Life demands it. But right now be calm and do not criticize them."
"Them," I think, the insiders, the politicos. I interrupt. "I am
glad I found you. Shepetyev worries when you are missing."
"Let him. We are not children," says Denyega, just as I expected.
"May I ask you, is this building of interest to you? It is old-style
custom construction, monumental type. The last delegation from
Gosstroy that I had was only interested in mass production methods,
prefabricated parts and all that."
"That's absolutely wrong," says Denyega, and Girenko nods. "If
our responsible people were, not so blinded by dogmatics, they would
learn much here-they would see our weaknesses."
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"What do you mean?"
"Rhythm, Ivan Antonovich. Rhythm."
I am puzzled, and both smile at me. "Better speak Russian, not
construction jargon," suggests Girenko, lighting another Russian long
cigarette.
"Look!" Denyega paints his dream, "The second floor is put on top
of the first with all the electrical conduits and outlets, all the pipes
already in place. The building emerges from the ground a logical
organic whole-like a squash coming up from the earth. The car-
penters, masons, electricians, assistants, truckers all work in rhythms
doing the right thing at the right time-like players in a symphony.,
like our great Moscow orchestra under Kondrashin. Have you heard
him? Now do you understand?"
I say I do but I already knew that some buildings were quickly
assembled in the USSR out of prefabricated parts. What's wrong?
Again they smile at my naivete. "True we put a building together.
But it is only the shell. Then come the pipefitters and poke it full
of holes. Then the electricians and make more holes, then the
plumbers who usually flood it for you," explains Denyega.
"And chip off all the plasterl" breaks in Girenko. "So before your
customer will sign the acceptance you practically have to refinish
the whole building, and then explain the delay to the bank and a
myriad of supervisors. Oh, Ivan Antonovich, you have no idea what
unpleasant negotiations one has to carry on! You know I have an
ulcer, don't you?"
"Not only buildings; even roads. Remember the road?" asks
Denyega, beginning to laugh.
"Yes, the road!" roars Girenko, and then the two of them, inter-
rupting each other and doubling over with laughter, gasp out the
story of how 500 kilometers of a highway Girenko had just built
were torn up so that telegraph wires could be placed under it.
I realize that I am witnessing a rare moment of purgation---
accumulated frustration suddenly expressing itself in near-hysteria.
I play along. "I understand that under your system each enterprise
makes its own plans and sends them to Gosplan for approval, What
goes wrong?"
"Gosplan-those mother-rapers]" explodes Denyega.
"Our cross and crown of thorns," says Girenko, rolling his eyes
to the foggy sky.
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"We in Washington are accustomed to thinking of them as top
experts surrounded with computers, etc. Are we mistaken?"
"Partly. They have good engineers, good staff. But key decisions
are often made by unqualified people at the top. Overall planning
devitalizes the individual building organizations. Here your con-
tractors do what common sense tells them. We frequently can not.
That is our grief. It is not your factories and engineers that impress
me," continues Denyega. "Man for man, plant for plant, we are
as good as you are. But in system of management-here you have
something we should take lessons in."
"Ach, we know all this," Girenko says. "We didn't have to come to
America to see the changes that are needed. Life demands them.
Life teaches us. It is just a question of time, we will make them.
And then, mark my words, we will catch up with you."
At this juncture the head of the delegation comes climbing up
and slips on the same rung I did. It does not improve his humor.
"Well, have you found anything useful?" he asks Denyega and Girenko.
"Not very much ..."
"Then why waste time?"
"Well, not utter waste. Note here-they use stamped pipe clamps.
We still cast them. It is cheaper their way," says Denyega.
"Aha, Ahal" Shepetyev is pleased and tells the secretary, Kazari-
nov, always at his elbow, to note the name and location of the
factory that makes this minor item. "Now please, Ivan Antonovich,
do stay at my side," he turns to me. "My colleagues need you.
What were you discussing here so long?"
"The delegates very kindly explained some facts about building
planning that confused me."
"Later, later, I will personally explain and answer all your ques-
tions. They are not specialists in this field and should not try to
educate you. I am the specialist. I will talk to you later. But
right now please work with me. Every minute is valuable. This
trip is very expensive and we are not rich like you. Shall we go?"
Some Notes and Thoughts
At the airport I quickly make notes on the conversation, and then
I test my recall from brief notes I took about a week ago on
another incident involving Denyega.
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My notes, like those of most interpreters trained by the State
Department, are based on the principle of Egyptian ideographs
with a few key words, letters, or symbols added. In the t\'inkling
of an eye a whole idea or incident can thus be recorded. This
method releases the interpreter's attention for listening and compre-
bending. Of course it takes practice. The principles of interpreting
impressed on us in the instruction are the following:
Learn to listen; subordinate yourself. Listen for the ideas, to what
the man is selling, not what he is saying. Interpret the man's ideas
rather than his words whenever possible. Make your notes suggestive,
to stimulate your memory. These personal reminders will also be
secure.
Now I am pleased that I seem to recall fully the week-old incident
from just a few ideographs and words and can compare it with
what just happened at Paducah city hall. Here is how it goes.
The letter L and the symbols 3/12, yd. tell me that on 3 December
1963 we were at the Lorain factory near Cleveland which makes
cranes, and the incident took place in the yard. A crudely drawn
fish skeleton and the words Loch Ness, tubular, 250' welded remind
me that we were looking at a tower of a crane 250 feet high made of
welded tubular steel instead of the usual riveted flat members. It
therefore had unusual lightness and strength. And it did look to
me like the skeleton of a Loch Ness Monster.
The letters D, K, 0, and the word Gosplan with a line through
it mean that Denyega, Kazarinov, and an engineer named Ozerov
who builds cranes assured me they knew of such crane construction
and wanted to build some, but Gosplan objected. Or, rather, it
upheld the steel industry, which did not want to have to make a
special small production run for the tubing.
Uralmash=Henry Ford "T" tells how, when I asked the engineers
why they could not place an order with say the famous Uralmash,
they replied that this wealthy combine, with its own sanatoria and
a huge director's fund from which special bonuses can be given its
employees, is slow to change models and so makes a lot: of money
but produces machinery they considered obsolete. I thought of Henry
Ford clinging to his Model T and making quite a few millions by
not changing.
The last symbol is a book with the letter K. This is my observa-
tion that Kazarinov, the secretary, who at home is a senior engineer
at Gosstroy and tests all the foreign machinery for it (to compare it
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with the Soviet, he says)-this Kazarinov, with a face like Shosta-
kovich and as tall and lean as an Olympic track star, is a fabulous
note-taker. Looking over his shoulder I see that he too uses symbols
and ideographs, and he is a marvelous sketcher. When he cannot
take pictures (as he does by the hundreds) or get photos or drawings
from the plant, he takes notes in order to make sketches later. "The
design of this connector is so interesting," he confides with a happy
smile.
I bet he will have an almost 100-percent recall of every plant layout,
dam site, and construction project we visited, as well as design
features of new machinery. But I note that the Americans shy away
from telling him everything. Usually they hold back about steel
specifications. Maybe this is one reason the Soviets still have to buy
U.S. technical data and know-how.
St. Louis
Six months later, in the summer of 1964, I am in St. Louis with
another delegation. A high-powered one, it includes: Novikov, head
of Gosstroy and deputy to Khrushchev in the Council of Ministers;
Neporozhny, top man on electrification and builder of the Aswan
Dann, just back from a visit to Egypt with Khrushchev; several Min-
isters of Construction from large republics; Petya Chernyshev, builder
of the largest turbines for electric generators and a recent Hero of
the Soviet Union. The last is a pudgy, nervous, pleasant young
man who speaks in snatches. His hands testify that he did indeed i
start his career as a lathe operator at the plant where he is now
the principal engineer.
I no sooner step into the hotel than I am told to call a number
in Washington "no matter what the time is." I recognize the number
as that of my backstop, Sean. I cannot make the call until 2:30 A.M.
Reason: his most communistic majesty Ignaty Trofimovich Novikov
chooses to have tantrums and summons me and the tour manager to
his suite and bawls us out because no crowds, no VIP's, no press
and photographers met him at the airport. He had wanted to make
a speech on Soviet-USA friendship there at eleven o'clock at night
in a pouring rain. We express anguish at his displeasure, promise
to phone Washington, and hope to do better in the future. Thanks
to Neporozhny we are dismissed with a conciliatory pat on the back
and a tumbler of Ukrainian vodka aptly called Gorilka, the Burner.
Then I get Sean out of bed and get the news, which is good.
The host company has been briefed by the local CIA office and is
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cooperating fully in the effort to get answers to intelligence questions.
A young engineer named Joe is the key man, and I should work
with him. I have seen the questions, and they are good. They
are clear, logical, and not probing sensitive matters about which a
delegate cannot tactfully be asked. Enough background is given
for the questioner to understand the problem. Petya (t:he Turbine)
Chernyshev is the main target.
The next morning finds me working without a break. Since the
tour began, ten days ago, I have not asked a single question; but
I have bought technical books 2 and periodicals as gifts, have given
Neporozhny a plastic raincoat, have made some useful suggestions
from prior experience in some of the areas visited-in short, I have
put the Soviets under obligation to me. I have helped there and
they know it.
I spot Joe easily. He is a smart young engineer, a turbine spe-
cialist. He and Petya enjoy talking to each other through me. But
there never is an opportunity for them really to get together. The
next day is the same. The third day it rains, and I am getting des-
perate. Nonetheless a part of the group goes out to a power plant
under construction, puts on rubber boots, and sloshes through the
foot-deep mud at the site.
As we start back Joe and I make our move. Joe says he wants
Petya to ride with us. Petya is most agreeable, for he has questions
on the huge new turbine he has seen. But the other Soviets raise
a cry as if Petya is being kidnapped, and the Americans not in on
the game side with them. Shortly everybody is hopping in and out
of cars-a Mack Sennet comedy in the mud. I am getting dirty
looks from everybody. Petya ignores them and gets into the car
next to Joe, who is at the wheel. I get in and shut the door and
we drive off. The others follow, then overtake us as we slow down
for conversation.
Petya wants to know why the compressor is located where it is
on the new turbine. A tough question, but Petya sketches the tur-
bine and Joe explains why. Petya understands, takes notes, and
begins to look like the cat that swallowed the canary. Then Joe
asks him questions about his turbine and his problems with it.
I suggest that he sketch it, pleading the very real difficulty of inter-
preting technical descriptions. Petya does; and presto he shows its
2 Soviets were particularly interested in the "critical path raei:hod" of pro-
gramming construction.
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configuration, its size, the steam flow, and many other characteristics-
everything we wanted to know.
Joe takes the sketch while driving. He glances at it, points to
the exhaust, and says, "Tell him, John, there's where his trouble is."
Petya turns beet-colored and bursts out with something incompre-
hensible, showering my face with saliva. Then he chokes with
laughter as he wipes my face with his hand in a friendly Soviet
way--"Tell him that I have trouble here too," and he points to the
last section where the blades are longest. He says Joe is real bright
and pats his shoulder. Joe says Petya is real bright and pats him
back. He says both Westinghouse and General Electric had trouble
in exactly these same spots when they were in the design stage.
Petya asks about steels, and Joe tells him something but seems unable
to recall the full answer.
Suddenly Joe honks madly. The lead car has forgotten to make a
turn. Joe makes the turn, and soon we are driving along the Missis-
sippi without the other car. Joe asks if Petya would like a ride to
see another plant with an interesting water intake. Would he? Why
it's the river of Mark Twain. He has read "Life on the Mississippi."
So another hour of talk about turbines. The two promise to write
to each other; Joe will send Petya some steel specifications when he
finds them.
When we arrive at the hotel Novikov's personal secretary is stand-
ing at the entrance, angry and impatient. He demands what Petya
was doing for such a long time. Petya pats the pocket where his note-
book is with a happy expression and says he was learning things
about turbines and viewing the Mississippi. "And how was it?" asks
the secretary. "Wet," says Petya, and walks away.
Joe and I compare notes. He reveals he was the one that made the
wrong turn-on purpose. He agrees to write a report for Washing-
ton. Petya is at least three-maybe four-years behind us, he says.
But he is bright. If he knew English he would recommend the Com-
pany hire him. "He's no competition now, but he will be."
Schenectady
Although the people who work and live in Schenectady call it an
ugly and dull company town, I found it a cool, immaculately kept
little city, set in an emerald valley and having wide boulevards,
magnificent factories, and a lovely old section of colonial homes
with large neat lawns and flowering shrubs that have Georgetown
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in D.C. beat all hollow. Furthermore, Neporozhny, his secretary,
and Petya (the Turbine) Chernyshev, who were there with me
on the closing days of their tour, agreed with me wholeheartedly.
When the tour of the factories was over we walked through this
colonial section, and the Soviets daydreamed like kids, picking out
which house they would like to live in. They praised Schenectady
and the American engineers and managers and labor and General
Electric and the whole United States. Schenectady and the Hudson
river valley is just like countryside in the vicinity of Kiev, they said,
admitting they were getting homesick.
Maybe Schenectady looked so good because all of us were happy,
the Soviets with what they had learned and I with the facts I had
gathered. For after St. Louis, and particularly after Los Angeles,
mid-way in the tour-after I had taken care of Neporozhny when
he fell ill and got him gratis a miracle-working doctor who had
him back on his feet in one day-the tour became for me virtually
a movable feast of facts and interpretations. My main frustration
was inability to absorb all of the particulars and details that were
thrust upon me from all sides; it is my practice not to take notes
during such conversations. Consider the following:
Item one. The Minister of Construction from Kazakhstan, shaken
by the colossal irrigation and flood-control works in southern Cali-
fornia, began to tell me all about his irrigation scheme. The Minister
from the Ukraine said his was much bigger, and both started reeling
off names and details concerning the crash program that seems to
be under way in the USSR. Neporozhny, with a mischievous twinkle
in his eye, said the program was drawn up personally by his friend
Nikita Khrushchev, who sequestered himself a whole month at his
dacha after the disastrous crop failure, helped by only one expert.
Item two. Neporozhny revealed to a host (who I could tell had
been well briefed intelligence-wise) his problem with costs in electric
power production, how they seem to be twice the average in the
United States, and how all the turbines in the world will not lower
them significantly as long as Gosplan makes the electric industry
use the worst coal in the RSFSR so it can give the best to the
chemical and steel industries. "Right now the chemists in the
Soviet Union are Czar and God," he said. "I am having to use my
cadres on building twenty factories for them."
Item three. At the amazing Enrico Fermi atomic plant in Detroit,
again in Boston at an experimental plant that generates electricity
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directly from burning gases, and again in Schenectady the Soviet
electric power specialists made no secret of their philosophy for
expansion of the industry, their troubles with a long-range trans-
mission system which they had been boosting for sale to the United
States, the high cost of atomic fuel in the Soviet Union, apparently
precluding large-scale commercial use until a fast breeder reactor
is perfected, and their troubles with bursting boilers, symptomatic
of the general stand-still in electrical engineering until there is a
breakthrough in metallurgy. The American hosts agreed they had
similar troubles; electricity knows no politics. But everywhere in
this area we seem to be ahead, sometimes by a nose and sometimes
by several lengths.
Item four. On one long flight I opened a gambit by saying I had
not yet met a delegation that liked Gosplan. The delegates laugh-
ingly agreed and told the following story:
"We understand that the mythical figure Jesus Christ once worked
an utterly improbable miracle; he fed the multitudes with five loaves
and two fishes. Well, it might have been possible after all. He did
not have the Gosplan allocating his material resources."
Then, referring to speeches of Novikov, I asked his secretary if
Novikov was satisfied that he could bring about with his existing
authority and organization the programmed improvements in the
construction industry. "No," was the reply, "he has asked the
Council of Ministers for some added powers, which Gosplan, headed
by Lomako, now has."
For the next several hours, five miles up in the sky, I was afforded
insight into the workings of the minds of the top Soviet echelon as
the various Ministers dropped in on this bull session. They com-
plained that insufficient funds are allocated for planning and super-
vision. "The difference between us and the Americans," said the
six-foot-seven Minister from the Ukraine, "is that here they think
before they start construction, and we afterwards." Even Novikov
joined the party to remark that Ministers should merely execute
orders while others-more intelligent people-do the thinking for
them.
Last Flight
Mulling all this over at the Schenectady airport, I decide I should
make one more try, for the answer to a question a colleague has
asked about Soviet organization. So another gambit. I give Nepo-
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rozhny a handbook I have promised him-Annual Indicators of the
USSR, published by the joint Economic Committee of Congress in
February 1964. It is my personal copy and shows the use. Nepo-
rozhny is grateful. Since he can read some English he is at once
so absorbed in it that I begin to regret giving it to him.
"Aha, aba," he mutters. "See how much bigger you are than we.
What is all this devilishness Lomako has been telling mel Wait till
I shove this at him. Oh I will shove it hard."
I ask if it is possible that a person of his rank has trouble getting
original foreign statistical data. Surely the Soviet embassy in Wash-
ington would send him a copy. Looking away, he says matter-of-
factly, "Shameful as it is to admit, this is one of the hangovers from
the Stalinist period we have not yet eliminated. Our government
organizations do not exchange information freely-lateral dissemina-
tion of economic data is frowned upon. There is a prejudice against
asking for it unless it is directly related to your job; and occupying
the position I do, I am supposed to set an example for others."
Boarding the airplane, I ask to be seated next to Neporozhny. He
is still studying the handbook with shifting expressions of satisfac-
tion and dissatisfaction. I pull out of my briefcase a new, still
uncatalogued Soviet book on organization of economic management
and open it to a place my colleague had marked. Here is indicated
a new organization, and one of great importance, for it stands squarely
between the Council of Ministers, which runs the economic life of
the Soviet Union, and the four pillars of planning and management-
Gosplan (Lomako), the Councils of National Economy ('.Dimshyts ),
Gosstroy (Novikov), and the several specialized State Production
Committees (headed by men like Neporozhny). This new body is
headed by Ustinov and called the USSR Supreme Council of National
Economy. Its function is not at all explained by the tiny paragraph
devoted to it.
I ask Neporozhny what this organization does and does he know
Ustinov. I tell him how hard it is for me to make intelligent transla-
tions because of a lack of clarity in some Soviet publications, of which
this is a good example. His answer is simple; it is a kind of appeals
board for conflicts which can be resolved on a technical basis without
modification of basic directives. The Council of Ministers did not
want to be bothered with questions which experts could settle.
I note that the new Council has specialists for defense on its staff
and pry further-for it is suspected that it also coordinates economic
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activity with defense requirements. What kind of experts does Usti-
nov have? Neporozhny says Utinov's staff is small but he calls in
experts as needed. What kind, I ask.
The now familiar twinkle comes into Neporozhny's intense blue
eyes. "Preference is given to ex-wrestlers," he says. "They grab
the ministers by the scruff of the neck and seat of the pants, catch-
as-catch-can fashion, and pull them off each other. For Ustinov
is a small man and not very strong. Against a man like Novikov,
who is a former coal miner, he wouldn't have a chancel"
Checkmate. I know when I'm licked and put the book away.
I make a few notes, openly this time. Neporozhny continues to
answer questions and talk freely on other problems of economic
organization and management-industrial consolidation, capital for-
mation, labor productivity, and its scarcity under the new priority
for agriculture. When I ask how a central planning system can com-
pensate for the lack of the built-in incentives to cut costs in a com-
petitive system, he says, "Since you raise this question, you are the
person best qualified to answer it. Come to Moscow and we will
give you all the information needed for a comparative study."
"Do you think it would be useful?"
"I think," says Neporozhny, "the more meaningful fact is the suita-
bility of a system to a people at their present stage of development.
At one time your system gave you very rapid growth. Your mastery
of technology is beyond what I imagined it to be; yet your growth
has slowed down. Clearly something is wrong if, having such fine
cadres of labor and engineers, such abundance of resources, and
such a God-sent climate, you are not working at your highest poten-
tial. We are. Our growth is more rapid than yours. So Communism
is in our blood and there can be no hint of a return to the past."
I explain that I was not thinking of that, but of the capacity of
their system to evolve, as ours has also evolved. "Yes, we change,"
he replies. "So long as new ideas do not conflict with basic Marxism
and dialectical materialism, we adapt them for our use. Notice I
say adapt; we do not copy. Neither machinery nor ideas do we
copy. All require adaptation before being incorporated in our
system."
Neporozhny, who had been a professor of electrical engineering
with many published works, says he became an industrialist when,
under Khrushchev's reforms of 1957, a decision was made to have
the economic life of the country run not by politicians but by top
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specialists. I ask if Novikov is a PhD. Again sparks fly from
Neporozhny's eyes and he cannot resist a witticism. "He is a political
engineer," he says, leaving me to ponder the double meaning while
his colleagues turn red.
Net Evaluation
The tour is over. At the Kennedy airport, as the delegation
prepares to emplane, Novikov gets off his last speech before a few
Americans, including the official State Department host. Compared
with his initial speech a month ago, this shows him a changed man.
He is more relaxed, far more thoughtful. The strident, self-confident
style of the udarnik, the shock worker, is mercifully gone. 1110 speaks
of the usefulness of the tour, simply, with dignity and sincerity. He
asks the Americans to come and visit the USSR, where they too may
learn something. His talk of peace and friendship does not sound
like propaganda. The dapper Ambassador Fcdorenko, delegate to
the UN, trembling in the presence of Novikov, translates his speech.
He falters and I have the satisfaction of prompting him.
Later I shall see that Novikov gave a favorable and fair interview
to Pravda on his return to Moscow. The main nonintelligence objec-
tive of the tour, its one really big purpose, has been accomplished:
even a tough, doctrinaire Communist like Novikov has been deeply
impressed by the United States. And this is the usual pattern for
every delegation I have accompanied. At first impatience, bragga-
docio, suspicion, and unreasonable demands. Then the big thaw
and a period of good feeling. Then the thoughtful, quiet parting,
the warmth of a month's comradeship dissipated as the Soviets make
ready to be whisked back into their perilous, rigid world.
What impressed them? Not only, I hope, our industrial might,
roads, cars, real wages. I hope it is our people and their attitude
towards life: the semi-employed workman speaking without embar-
rassment to a Minister about his car, his mortgage, his union benefits,
his sons in school or in the army; the lovely air hostess who quickly
learns enough Russian to offer them ko f e ili chai; the soft-spoken
colored porter who graciously refuses their tip; the earnest college
students poring over books in the library.
As for the intelligence objective, the interpreter is greatly aided if
there is no break in the question chain that originates with the
specialists in Washington and ends with a cooperative host. The
latter is in by far the best position to ask questions at the usual
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meeting winding up a plant visit. To the Soviets it seems only
fair that reasonable questions should be put to them by Americans
engaged in the same line of work. This then gives the interpreter
an opening to follow up with more questions and develop the topic
more fully. It is quite difficult-sometimes, with a hostile delega-
tion, utterly impossible-for an interpreter to start the questions on
his own.
Aside from factual information there is need for interpretive insight
into what stands behind it. The integral meaning of what lies
openly before us is probably one of the more important problems in
Soviet studies today, and the interpreter who lives for a month with
a Soviet group is in a good position to achieve some insight into
deeper meanings.
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A dearth of information continues
to keep open the Soviet germ war-
fare intelligence gap.
THE ENIGMA OF SOVIET BW
Wilton E. Lexow
and
Julian Hoptman
Despite a considerable expenditure of time and resources, the
pursuit of intelligence on biological warfare activities in the USSR
has been unrewarding. There is no firm evidence of the existence
of an offensive Soviet BW program. Some Soviet biomedical research
transcends normal public health requirements, and from time to
time top Soviet military officials have boasted publicly that they
have the means to rebuff a U.S. attack with nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons. We know that the Soviet military establish-
ment is concerned over U.S. BW research, and we have some insight
into their organization and activities for medical defense agaiinst
BW attack. But we still do not know their precise defense readiness
posture or their specific logistical preparations.
The paucity of real evidence has forced us to resort to indirect
signs. Attempts have been made to examine all military-related
activity in the fields of biology and medicine, all technical publications
which appeared to be censored by security considerations, and all
biomedical studies which did not jibe with Soviet public health
requirements as we know them. Analysts have used speculation,
analogy, and parallels with other nations' BW research, development,
and practice in recent times and in the historical past. They have
analyzed Soviet, Satellite, and Chinese propaganda charges of U.S.
germ warfare for clues as to the Communists' sophistication and
familiarity with BW hardware and agents.
The Grim Presumption
The accepted premise had been that the heavy U.S. BW commit-
ment which has been public knowledge, along with the Japanese
World War II effort as known to the Soviets, would probably have
engendered a comparable program in the USSR. Postwar defector
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 reports and German intelligence findings implicated several persons
and locations in such a Soviet program. It was with this premise in
mind that available sources, primarily the open literature, had been
closely screened for indications such as those cited above. But it
seemed that good Soviet security, censorship, and care not to mar
the image of their well-advertised adherence to the Geneva Con-
vention had eliminated from the scientific literature all trace except
of defensive preparations and attitudes. The same was true of writ-
ings on military doctrine. Sensitization of expert travelers to the
problem and the evaluation of such evidence as there was by the
most knowledgeable sources in the United States brought no new
insights. Then suddenly new photographic and other intelligence
seemed for a time to confirm our worst suspicions with hard evidence
of elaborate BW test range activities.
The foremost suspect as a biological warfare center had long been
Vozrozhdeniya Island in the Aral Sea. The finger was first put
on this island in 1951 by the "Hirsch Report." Hirsch, who had
been a German intelligence officer during the war, compiled his
report on Soviet BW and chemical warfare activities from data in
German intelligence files. The bulk of its great volume was devoted
to CW, and since much of this agreed with other information avail-
able to U.S. intelligence, the entire report gained some credence.
Hirsch declared that the Soviets had been engaged in BW research
in the early 1930's, carrying out experiments in a Moscow laboratory
and on Gorodomlya Island in Lake Seliger northwest of Moscow.
BW field trials were at first held at the CW proving ground at
Shikhany near the city of Volsk. But the proximity of this proving
ground to the city limits made it too hazardous for BW, and they
were shifted in 1936 to Vozrozhdeniya Island and reportedly again
in 1937.
The island is well suited to BW experimentation. It is located
quite a distance from the nearest shore of the Aral Sea, which
itself lies in an arid, barren, and sparsely settled region of the
USSR. Animal ecology difficulties which would plague a mainland
facility are virtually nonexistent; only a transient bird population
presents a problem in containing the spread of experimental diseases.
Security against observation and accidental or intentional intrusion
by unauthorized persons is at a maximum. The climate is suitable
for testing the influence of a variety of environmental conditions.
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Trials could be carried out over water, as the British had demon-
strated during their offshore BW trials at Bermuda. The site offers
few of the restrictions which the U.S. mainland facility has had to
overcome.
Target Analysis
With this first clue to an intelligence target, BW analysts in the
community embarked upon an intensive search of Soviet literature
dealing with the Aral Sea region. Requirements were :levied upon
all collectors, and a comprehensive survey was made of all the
economic and scientific aspects of the area. In support of collection
and analysis, surveys were made of fishing, transportation, geography,
scientific expeditions, hydrochemistry, marine biology, geology, and
climate and weather in the area. It is probably safe to say that
some of the analysts came to know this region and its problems
better than the inhabitants.
Despite all this area research, little was found specifically about
Vozrozhdeniya Island. It had been surveyed by a scientific expedi-
tion in the early 1900's; there was a prison camp there in 1926.
A small fishing village, uninhabited during the winter inonths, appar-
ently existed on the island in the 1920's and 1930's. But the paucity
of information about this island could not be an indicator of anything
particularly sinister, for there was very little known about any of the
many islands in the Sea, including the largest one, Barsa-Kelmes.
Other sources than literature yielded little information. Two clan-
destine reports noted physical security measures to prohibit access
to the island but revealed nothing of the nature of any facility on it.
Then in 1957 high-level photography brought the first big wind-
.fall. Photographs of the island revealed the rather extensive .installa-
tions shown on the model pictured on page 18. There were more
than 150 buildings of various sizes grouped into two settlements
about 21/2 miles apart. The northern and largest group of buildings
appeared to be the administration, housing, and logistics area, marked
"operational headquarters" on the model. Its barrack-like buildings
were large enough to accommodate about 1,400 people. The south-
ern group was contained within a high walled area which appeared
to be the work or "laboratory" site. South from the "laboratory" area
tangled roads and tracks led to five centers, called "test sites" on
the model. At each of these centers was a tower and one or two
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small hnildings. About three miles to the .south, not .shown. Il1, the
small island of Konstantin, with some 35 buildings on its ne th~~r n tip.
lietnr tr to Enigma
Th, fact that Vozrozhdeniya Island had been carried for years
as a ;aspect BW site so oriented the thinking of PI analysts, hat a
BW b.uu,tion was immediately hypothesized. Many of the frararneters
of it i\V research and test area do fit the picture of ill( island, but
it wa ; `soon realized that a few do not, some of them too critical
to be discounted. The whole range of other possible functions was
therefore examined with all the background information on the area
in mind. CW research or testing, a guided missile or clrctronic
installation, fishing and fish processing, geological exploration, a
prison:, a secret police training establishment, and it i ra nilitary
training area were considered and discarded. The enly certain
finding was that the general layout of the buildings, parade r mind,
and other features distinguished it as a military rather timan cit'iliau
establishment.
The island was photographed a second time in 1959. Although
there wire changes such as additional building, there were nn new
clues to its function. Three major obstacles remained before it
could Is' classified as a BW installation. First, the apparent grid
systems, needed for measuring dispersion of test agents, were small,
ill-defined as to configuration and purpose, and not con rparalrle. to
those it the Soviet CW proving ground and U.S. 13W-CW proving
grounds. Second, there were no indications of the ne,cessarv air
support for BW test activities. For example there was no evidence of
a sophisticated landing strip, decontamination facilities; for aircraft,
or night landing facilities. Third, the buildings and presarnccl in-
habitants of Konstantin Island just to the south were in the lath of
the prevailing winds, precluding tests with live 13W agents.
Since 1959 renewed efforts on an all-source basis have trirncd rip
no otis r indications of the nature of the activity on the islaurl In
recent years the Soviets have published a considerable amount of
material on the Aral area and its economic problems, esp,,cially
the fishing industry. In this connection they have occasionally
mentioned some of the smaller islands. The largest island, 3arsa-
Kelmes has been given some publicity in the Soviet and British Irress
as a unique game preserve. But about Vozrozhdeniya fsfind the
enigmatic silence holds.
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Despite tight security, a highly developed Soviet BW weapons
system and technology should have surfaced sometime during the
years since the war, just as the nuclear and chemical warfare efforts
have. Current analyses, therefore, while clearly stating our lack
of positive knowledge, depart radically from the old assumptions
and look at Soviet military doctrine realistically in terms of limited
BW activity and the unsure potential of BW weapons.
This reappraisal has not lessened the need for an alert analytical
thrust into Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect to BW
weaponry. Rather, it points the way for greater emphasis on the
possibility of Soviet covert action with such weapons in the light
of U.S. vulnerability to clandestine attack. It calls for more intensive
scrutiny of available R&D benchmarks for BW activity and of
medical defense applications that could also be used for offensive
purposes. Intelligence on the biomedical aspects of unconventional
warfare in the USSR will also continue to contribute to other related
fields-biological contamination of aircraft and spacecraft, bioastro-
nautics applications of BW-related technology, estimates of Soviet
vulnerability to BW attack and the socio-economic consequences.
Retrenchment and reorientation are thus helping us make the best
of our few resources. Nonetheless, the BW intelligence effort needs
new overt collection methods and more emphasis on covert penetra-
tion in order to improve the low-quality information now available
from reliance on collective experience and sensitivity to indicators.
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Chinese art in
the balance.
DEATH OF AN HYPOTHESIS
Sherman Kent
One of the obvious rules of our calling-and one not: always
observed-is not to do things the hard way when an easier way
will suffice.
Some of us vividly remember the occasion when General Smith
at the head of the IAC table referring to the National Intelligence
Estimate under consideration asked how in the world it came to be
there. Its subject was the UK. With something more than his
usual asperity, and be it said, some disingenuousness, he fairly spat
at one of his lieutenants, "If I want to know what the British are
up to, I call them up and ask."
Perhaps more to the point is a story of a student who was taking
Dr. Siegerist's course in the history of medicine at Hopkins. Some-
one had sent in a peculiar object and wanted to know what could be
made of it. It was sculpted stone; its subject was clearly anatomical
(some sort of organ from some sort of animal; and it was embellished
with a good amount of cuneiform script). Dr. Siegerist gave it to
the class as a problem in identification. One student took it to the
professor of ancient oriental languages who read the inscription and
said it was gibberish. He rendered a few passages out loud to
prove it.
Another student looked long at the stone and decided it resembled
no human organ. Thus skipping over his professor of gross anatomy
he took it to a butcher. The butcher instantly and unequivocally
identified it as a liver, in fact a sheep's liver. When the professor of
ancient oriental languages heard this, his thinking changed gears and
an unexpected kind of sense began to emerge from the cuneiform
gibberish. Suddenly he recognized some of the formularies of a spell
or a charm or an utterance of divination. The hero to ]Dr. Siegerist
was, however, not the professor; it was student number two who had
made the essential contribution and had done it the easy way.
What follows is another piece of the same-but something by
far closer to our professional calling. It is recounted here not only
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to praise the methodology of student number two, but also to make
the point that the destruction of an interesting hypothesis is often as
important a part of our trade as its confirmation.
Old Art for Cash
One morning while shaving, Intelligence Officer Jones had a bright
thought-or so it seemed. If he could prove it out perhaps it would
help explain how the Chinese Communists were getting some of the
hard currency for sorely needed imports-foodstuffs, for example.
Suppose, Jones thought, the Chinese, recognizing the great cash value
of their national art treasures, decided to sell them. Why shouldn't
they? Why should the Communist leadership sentimentally rate these
relics of classical society and the rotten old empires as "treasures"?
So long as rotten young Western capitalism did so rate them, why
not realize the seemingly large amount of foreign exchange their cold-
blooded sale would produce? Why not?
Jones speedily took his hypothesis to his professional colleagues.
None of them knew much more about oriental art and its market
than he. They too may have thought they recalled stories of Park-
Bernet auctions where some bit of Tang or Ming sold for a very
large sum. They did not, however, jump aboard Jones' hypothesis
with his sort of enthusiasm. They confined themselves to a lukewarm
comment that only served to spur Jones on.
Still doing it the easy way, he took the hypothesis to a higher level
of expertise: to an orientalist who had engineered San Francisco's
acquisition of the Brundage collection, who in turn took it to her
colleagues and dealer friends. Her reports showed a lot of interest
in the proposition, but produced no evidence to confirm. Indeed
what did come through was strictly negative.
Jones began to feel that he had given the hypothesis all the play
it deserved and was about to let it die when two things occurred
to revive it. The first was when Jones was informed that Newsweek
sometime back had published an article to the effect that a Swedish
dealer had purchased some treasures in Communist China and had
exported them under license of the Chinese government. The objects
in question were on their way to an oriental collection in Stockholm.
The second was when Jones heard from an impeccable witness that
a good many old and extremely costly Chinese rugs were appearing
on the Hong Kong market. Surely these could not be considered
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as representing national treasures but they might be the indication
of something that was.
Missed Magnitude
Jones decided to revive the enquiry. This time he would go to
the real experts. He drafted a letter that went like this:
Dear
The other day some of us were talking about the growing tension between
the Russians and the Chinese. One of my friends, who is particularly well
informed in such matters, spoke of the new and dramatic turn. for the worse
in their relationship, and wondered in passing how the Chinese would be
able to continue their very substantial purchases of foodstuffs and other
raw materials in the world market if they can no longer count on the Russians
and the European Satellites for financial help. Another member of the
group suggested that if the Chinese Communist government finds itself
really pressed for hard currency, it might turn to selling its national art
treasures. It seems likely that if they should reach this point, they would
probably do everything possible to conceal the matter. In that case, the
only way we could find out would be through chance communications
between museum personnel and others who work in the field of oriental
art around the world.
With this piece of prose in hand he invited the curator of a famous
oriental collection to lunch, gave him the necessary background, and
made a cold pitch. What did the curator think of the idea? Would
he be willing to send a letter like the above to his knowledgeable
colleagues and show Jones what he got in reply?
To Jones' delight the curator was enthusiastic. Not that he gave
a whoop for Jones' hypothesis, but for a totally different reason he
was happy to go along. It was as the curator was explaining his own
interest that he casually dropped an oblique half sentence that killed
the hypothesis for Jones' purposes stone dead. The death. blow was
the curator's aside to the effect that the yearly sum spent world-
wide for Chinese art was of the order of a million dollars. With this
amount of hard currency the Chinese would have less than one per-
cent of their annual outlays for imported foodstuffs.
Anti-Customs Consensus
What had caught the curator's interest was an excuse to poll the
experts in his field of expertise. It seemed that the U.S. law for-
bidding the import of all goods of Red Chinese origin was a major
headache to U.S. art collectors and U.S. and foreign dealers. Here is
the reason: suppppose Mayuyama and Company of Tokyo acquired a.
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Chinese antique from a Japanese family that had owned it for a
century. Suppose the American curator wanted to buy it for his
museum. Before he could get the object into the United States he
and Mayuyama would have to satisfy the U.S. customs people that
the transaction would in no sense profit the Chinese Communists.
The Japanese dealer would have to be able to prove that the object
in question had left the Chinese mainland and had been paid for
prior to the Communist takeover of 1949. Jones got the idea that our
customs people were pretty hard to satisfy. Their attitude was under-
standably irksome to American collectors, not to say foreign dealers
who were not getting the full good out of the affluent American
market.
If the curator could get full and expert testimony to the effect that
the Chinese were not willing to sell their art treasures and had not
done so, then, he reasoned, he might have less trouble with U.S.
customs. Accordingly, he snatched at Jones' idea and Jones' draft
letter; he added a paragraph of his own and sent it to some thirty
colleagues. They were fellow curators of the world's most important
museums of oriental art and the world's most important dealers.
If the hypothesis was not already dead as far as the curator was
concerned, it speedily became so. All but one or two of the people
queried answered. Most of them wrote after they had talked the
matter over with other experts in the field. The twenty-eight replies
that did come in represented the view of several score, and every
single one responded with a shattering negative. A few did not
confine themselves to saying they knew of no sales from the main-
land, but quite gratuitously went on to indicate that they could not
imagine the situation in which the Chinese regime would part with
any of its treasures. Two indicated that they had had unsubstantiated
reports that the Chinese were actually spending good hard cash to
repatriate certain objects of art.
And what of the objects which Newsweek had reported on the way
to Stockholm? One of the respondents had seen them and called
them "rubbish"; another, "junk."
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Some anti-revolutionary opera-
tions of the imperial Russian
political police.
THE OKHRANA'S FEMALE AGENTS'
Rita T. Kronenbitter
Part I: Russian Women
In a memorandum of 31 January 1911 addressed to the: Police
Department in Petersburg, the imperial MVD gave a description. of
Anna Gregoriyeva Serebryakova, the ideal of female agents:
"She had completed 25 years of continuous and very useful service
for Moscow Okhrana. As a secret [penetration] agent she had. con-
nections with the leaders of many subversive organizations but was
not attached anywhere as a regular or active member. Her motiva-
tion for hard agent work came from her strong personal convictions.
She hated sedition in all forms and performed her assignments against
subversives as an idealist, having little interest in monetary remunera-
tion . . .
"She kept her secrets even from her family. Accepting the job
of clandestine employment against the revolutionaries, she had to
reconcile herself to exposing her own children to revolutionary propa-
ganda by holding meetings of subversives in her home . . . Despite
the emotional and spiritual conflicts she had to suppress unshared
with anyone, her devotion to duty never failed."
The memorandum goes on to declare that Serebryakova, now ill,
blind, and deserted by her family after Burtzev, chief of the revolu-
tionaries' counterintelligence, exposed her in 1909 as an Okhrana
agent, was to receive an annual pension of 1200 rubles in gratitude
for her long and devoted service.
Personnel Practices
The Okhrana depended heavily on female agents, particularly in
foreign operations, and Serebryakova came to be held up and #re-
' Most of the information in this article: is derived from the collection Zagra-
nichnaya Okhrana (The Okhrana Abroad) at the Hoover Institution, Stanford,
California, consisting principally of the complete archives of the Okhrana station
in Paris. For the story of operations within Russia, however, it has been neces-
sary to use secondary sources-Agafonov, Vassiliyev, Zavarzin, and others.
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quently pointed to as a model. The best of the female operatives,
the records show, did have their paramount motivation in patriotism
and devotion to the anti-revolutionary cause. But as in any intelli-
gence service some were attracted by the danger and glamor of
clandestine life, some were blackmailed into intelligence work, and
many, especially those that were not Russian, had strictly mercenary
motives. Later we shall trace some individual agent careers of all
these kinds.
The records show that a number of Russian deep-cover agents
were drawn into the service by some form of conversion after con-
viction as revolutionaries. Kovalskaya, "Gramm" (true name not
recorded), Borovskaya, and Romanova are some of the ex-revolu-
tionary women on the agent lists. After having served part of their
terms in prisons or in exile, they were persuaded to work for the
Okhrana, freed on some legal pretext, and normally helped to escape
abroad to begin their agent activity. Although some of these con-
verts in time became proficient and trusted employees, they were
seldom accorded the same confidence as agents without prior leftist
records.
Wives, mistresses, and sisters of male Okhrana agents were often a
convenient source of recruits, particularly for operations abroad.
When director Lopukhin sent Lev Beitner to Paris in 1905 with the
assignment of collecting the intelligence required to control arms
smuggling on the part of the revolutionaries, the agent took with
him his wife and sister in order to engage in simultaneous operations
in the capitals and ports of France, England, and the Low Countries.
The three received their pay separately, but Beitner did the planning
and gave the women their assignments. The operation was successful
in uncovering every major shipment of arms in the Baltic and
Black Seas.
"Julietta," Beitner's sister, in addition to her immense contribution
in spotting clandestine arms sales, supply dumps, and cargo craft and
crews, distinguished herself later by discovering and infiltrating the
shop where Robert Loewenthal, an emigre from Russia, counterfeited
Russian banknotes to finance the revolutionaries. She became
Loewenthal's partner in the shop by giving 1000 francs, ostensibly
from her savings but supplied by the Okhrana, for the purchase of
some special printing equipment. She met daily with her case officer
for the operation, an Okhrana staff agent, and they worked out a
Okhrana Women I CONFIDENTIAL
detailed plan whereby the entire ring of producers and distributors
could be taken red-handed.
Agent Brontman's mistress Eropkina played a similar role. Like
Beitner, Brontman had served many successful years in Russia. When
the Okhrana decided to send him abroad, it hired his mistress and
sent her along with him. The two worked for a number of years as
penetration agents, he in the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, she
with the Social Democrats (Bolsheviks).
It appears that the salaries of women agents were for the most
part equal to those of men, and frequently they were even higher.
Their code names and pseudonyms were usually male (while male
agents were at times given female first names or nicknames-- Katia,
Lucy, Belle, and the like).
Okhrana staff officers were always men. Staff agents abroad, who
did spotting, recruiting, and liaison work, controlled operations, and
handled agents, were likewise always men. The archives of the
Okhrana abroad have no record of a woman in the capacity of case
officer. Women could be the most valuable of agents, engaged in
extremely dangerous or sensitive operations, but they never held
positions entailing any kind of supervisory function. The Okhrrana
offices at home likewise had no females on the staff except in clerical
capacities; women served otherwise as agents only.
In this respect the Okhrana's practice contrasts sharply with that
in revolutionary ranks. Lenin's wife Krupskaya, as the heavy Okhrana
folders of her intercepted mail indicate, could be considered the de
facto intelligence director for the Social Democratic Party (Bolshevik)
and, in part, the Jewish Bundists. Much of her correspondence with
fellow conspirators all over Europe and the Russian Empire was in
secret writing; this was of many types and often complex, For years
she was busy gathering information for the party and the revolution,
sending out instructions, designing codes for communications, receiv-
ing and dispatching couriers, and acting as an informal but competent
intelligence center.
The Okhrana's women were different from their counterparts among
the revolutionaries in various other ways. They were predominantly
Christian, i.e., Greek Orthodox when of Russian origin, while the
revolutionary women, like most of the men, either were Jewish or
belonged to some minority group of the Empire such as the Poles,
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Armenians, or Latvians.2 The only Jewish female agents sent abroad
by the Okhrana seem to be those who accompanied their male
partners to form operational teams like those of Beitner and Brontman
mentioned above. But the Okhrana's male deep-cover agents abroad
tended to be predominantly Jewish like the revolutionaries.
The files contain no record of any special training for the women
sent abroad. All the outstanding ones, however, are shown to have
spent some preparatory time in close association with the very top
operators in Petersburg and Moscow. That time was presumably de-
voted to some kind of training, at least briefing on targets and methods
of operation abroad. There is no indication of any other than strictly
operational relationship between the bosses in Russia and the female
agents. Abroad, the propaganda of the revolutionaries accused ex-
posed female agents of being prostitutes or mistresses of their case
officers, but the records give no reason to believe that the accusations
were anything but convenient propaganda.
Some of the women agents were instructed to communicate directly,
upon arrival in the field, with the chiefs at headquarters in Petersburg
or at Moscow Okhrana; accommodation addresses were supplied at
both ends. In all cases, however, it soon became the practice to
channel communications through the field office in Paris or Berlin.
The field offices then ultimately assigned case officers and exercised
direct control over the agents.
Following are case histories of some of the individual Okhrana
women, selected as typifying the operations and methods of the time.
First come the stories of three Russian agents, then those of some
indigenous recruits.3
Francesco
Dr. Nikolai Sergeyevich Zhuchenko, a physician of excellent pro-
fessional reputation and high standing in the Moscow society of 1913,
made a discreet inquiry at the police department concerning the where-
abouts of his wife Zinaida. She had left him full fifteen years ago
'Paris Okhrana files contain about 75,000 cards on some 20,000 Russian exiles
abroad. These operational records cover known and suspected revolutionaries,
members of Anarchist, terrorist, Socialist, and similar groups. The names and
personal descriptions reveal that over 75 percent of them were Jewish and about
10 percent were from other minority groups, leaving less than 15 percent Russian.
The card file of Okhrana secret operatives abroad shows an even greater pro-
portion of Jewish agents.
' These latter in Part II, to appear in a future issue.
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to go into hiding from the police, and she had not been heard: from
again. The doctor, being a good and law-abiding citizen, had never
approved of her revolutionary associations during their five years
of married life together, and for that reason her disappearance had
not unduly upset him. Now he had decided that fifteen years was
long enough to wait; he wanted to know whether she was dead or
alive. In fact, he wanted to remarry.
As was usual with such inquiries, this found its way to the Okhrana
identity section in Moscow. Zinaida's name was there, but the card
contained only a reference to another set of identity records kept at
Okhrana headquarters. In Petersburg Zinaida's card and voluminous
operational dossier were located under the name "Francesco."
Matters under this operational code name were of utmost impor-
tance and sensitive enough to require the personal attention of the
chief. Police Director Aleksei Vassiliyev wrote to Paris, instructing
Paris Okhrana chief Krassilnikov to have a talk with agent Francesco,
Mrne. Zhuchenko. The Okhrana chiefs were just as anxious as the
parties concerned to avoid a divorce suit in the open courts. The lady
turned out to be agreeable to a quiet divorce. She asked that the
doctor be told she was no longer in hiding but in Paris and still active
as a revolutionary. He should be given her Paris address in order
to simplify negotiation on the divorce.'
Paris Okhrana files contain many references to Francesco, but the
bulk of her operational dossier was probably removed to Petersburg
after she was exposed by revolutionary intelligence and denounced
as an Okhrana agent. It is possible also that a revolutionary com-
mission which came to Paris in 1917 to search the Okhrana records
removed some of the papers on her. This account of her career
is therefore sketchy and drawn in part from general histories of the
Okhrana. All early writers about the service devote considerable
space to her position among the revolutionaries and her accomplish-
ments against them.
Apprenticeship
Zinaida, daughter of a government official named Guerngross and
graduate of the Smolny Institute in Petersburg, was still a student at
Moscow University when she made three vows, all at about the same
time. She took the marriage vow with young Doctor Zhuchenko;
' Paris Okhrana files, Incoming Dispatches, 1913, No. 1465.
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 A Moftrbdse 2005/01/05 :
she took oath with a group of university students conspiring to kill
the Czar; and she swore to serve faithfully as an Okhrana agent.
From the beginning, her career shows that she took only the last of
these seriously. Even during her five years of married life she could
not settle down to relatively prosperous ease as a housewife; to her
husbands distress she associated with revolutionaries and malcontents
of all brands.
Her refusal to single out any one subversive group and become a
member may have been due to her husband's protest, but it was more
likely in conformity with the Okhrana's doctrine that the most de-
pendable agent is one who succeeds in developing access to all revolu-
tionary groups without belonging to any.2 In her later operations, as
she forged the reputation of being one of the two most important of
all Okhrana agents at home and abroad,3 she adhered strictly to this
doctrine. The other of the two, Evno Azev, contrastingly, forever
strove to attain top positions among the revolutionaries, frequently by
means of betraying his rivals to the Okhrana.
Zinaida, according to a case officer's description of her as a student
at the fashionable Smolny Institute, was thoroughly opposed to revolu-
tionary activities but had a love for adventure and challenging risks.
Even at: this time, before her recruitment, she expressed her convic-
tion that the revolutionaries had a corrupting and demoralizing effect
upon students and the people in general. An eager recruit, she fol-
lowed instructions with enthusiasm and was perspicacious and adven-
turous enough to penetrate subversive groups and bands of con-
spirators beyond her assigned targets. Her case officers 4 first re-
quired reports on individuals, groups, activities, and plans. Much
of her year or so under her Moscow case officer, Zubatov, must have
been devoted to training and some to a cooling-off period. But by
1895 she had already attained the distinction, though probably known
then only to Zubatov, of having saved the life of Czar Nicolas II.
In the spring of that year Moscow students worked out a plan
to kill tEhe Czar. One of them was assigned to throw a bomb from a
steeple of the Church of Ivan the Terrible down on the imperial
'Pavel P. Zavarzine, Souvenirs d'un Chef de l'Okhrana, p. 21.
Boris Nikolaevsky, Asef}: the Russian Judas, p. 158.
Her case officer in Petersburg in 1893 was Colonel Semyakin, who introduced
her in 1894 to the chief organizer of the Okhrana's penetration service, Zubatov.
The latter, as chief of operations in Moscow, remained her case officer until her
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IA-RD P78TO319kAff AM% 4-0
cortege as it passed below. The chemists in the conspiracy fashioned
the device and it was delivered to a nearby monastery. Zinaida
waited until the preparations were finished and the conspirators were
all in place, and then gave the word. All were arrested, including
Zinaida, and deported to Siberia. There it was arranged that she,
along with several others as a screen, could make good an escape.
Trial by Terror
Zinaida thus went abroad as an escaped Siberian exile and began
operations under Arkadi Harting, chief of the Okhrana's Berlin out-
post, who assigned her tasks in Berlin and Leipzig. She was soon
called to other European countries, but her principal target became
the Socialist Revolutionaries and their Fighting Unit (Boyevaya dru-
zhina) which carried out assassinations and other kinds of terror in
Russia.
Paralleling Zubatov in Moscow, Harting was the counter-intelligence
planner par excellence abroad. His successes as a provocation agent
in Paris in 1890 had launched him on an intelligence career that took
him to the very top of the Okhrana ladder. In Berlin he relied
heavily upon Zinaida's work, not only as her case officer but as chief
of operations in Germany. The two worked together as the most
successful team of the period. When Harting left Berlin to take
charge of the integrated Okhrana station in Paris, Francesco, to use
her code name, remained in Heidelberg with instructions to concen-
trate on the Socialist Revolutionaries through active participation in
their Fighting Unit for purposes of control.
Active participation soon meant trouble for Francesco. The rev-
olutionaries had reason to suspect treachery in their ranks: too many
conspirators sent to Russia to commit atrocities were being appre-
hended. Francesco was among those who had knowledge of all of
these, and the central committee of the party may have had other
grounds for suspecting her in particular. Now the customary means
of testing the loyalty of a member under suspicion was to assign acts
of terror to him. Francesco was accordingly, in 1905, made leader
of one of three assassination teams to be dispatched simultaneously
to Russia. She personally was to carry out her team's assignment,
the assassination of General Kurlov, governor of Minsk.
This assignment posed a veritable dilemma before the Okhrana.
If it wanted Francesco to remain in the Fighting Unit and continue
her good work, she would have to carry out the assassination. A
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 A Q 8 FWPR@I se 2005/01/05 :
solution was worked out by Colonel Klimovich of Moscow Okhrana.
Francesco consented to carry out the assassination as instructed. She
met with her team of assistants and planned the details of the ac-
tion-how, when, and where she would throw the bomb. But from
her lodgings she took the bomb to an Okhrana safe house, where
an expert disarmed the detonator and made it a dud. When it was
thrown at General Kurlov nothing happened.
In the meantime the other two teams had been successful in their
assassinations. Mme. Zhuchenko, Francesco, had given ample warn-
ings of them, but there had been a slip-up somewhere in Colonel
Klimovich's plans to prevent them. In the course of investigating
these acts of terror, Kurlov turned up the name Zhuchenko, and his
pursuit of this lead was eventually to cause the exposure of her agent
work. Not knowing that she had actually saved his life, the governor
made so much fuss about her that her true status had to be made
known to certain Okhrana personnel that did not otherwise need
to know. Among these was a Leonid Menshchikov, who in 1910
defected to the revolutionary intelligence service and betrayed her.
Successful and Sought After
Before that eventuality, however, Francesco had five more years of
continuous, prolific service. Now the conspirators fully trusted her,
after she had personally participated in the triple assassination, two-
thirds successful; they could not hold her responsible that her bomb
turned out to be a dud. Terrorist groups were liquidated by the
authorities one after another, thanks in considerable measure to her
reports and forewarnings. Large-scale bank and other robberies,
euphemistically called "expropriations" by the revolutionaries, failed
after her alert.
These extraordinary achievements gained Francesco a name as
Okhrana's ace agent at home and abroad. The top leaders at head-
quarters, in Moscow, and in Paris, the only ones supposed to know
her identity, vied for her services. A set of cables and letters in a
folder labeled Mikheyev-this was her pseudonym for interoffice
correspondence-shows a tug-of-war for her between Harting in
Paris and Colonel Klimovich in Moscow. Klimovich's demands for
her transfer finally ceased after Harting sent the following cable.
(The French words were carried in clear text among the encoded
Russian, here translated to English.)
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CIA-RDP78T031(AM9'2o9913Ob11-0
"Veuillez stop asking for Mikheyev. Semblables procedes impos-
sibles. I shall never approve transfer . . . I consider such attitudes
among colleagues in the same service unpardonable . .
agents from each other only makes more difficulties for
ligence efforts . . .
. Stealing
By 1906 Mme. Zhuchenko's monthly pay had been raised to 500
rubles, ample to let her move about as a fairly well-to-do lady. In
addition there were liberal presents for Christmas and Easter; bonuses
for major exposures of assassination and burglary projects, and allow-
ances for travel and other operational expense. She had a son, her
only personal responsibility, whom she kept in Berlin even when on
prolonged assignments in Moscow. Her home was in Berlin's western
suburb of Charlottenburg.
That is where she was when exposed by the defector Menshchikov.
Burtzev, chief of counterintelligence for the revolutionaries, solemnly
called on her. He explained in his methodical and unexcited way
that his intelligence penetration of the Okhrana made it completely
clear to him that she was an Okhrana agent, that the central com-
mittee had already sentenced her to death, and that he would per-
sonally guarantee her life if she would come clean, confess, and
thenceforth help him in the fight against the Okhrana. She refused,
and reported promptly to her case officer, Colonel von Kotten.
Soon all the revolutionary press published her name as one of the
most vicious agents-provocateurs ever exposed. The Berlin police
provided the necessary protection for her, but she had to be pensioned
off-at pay higher than her active wages had been. Resigned to her
retirement, she said to Von Kotten, "In this profession no one can be
safe from traitors and betrayals. The fall of my life has come after
rich and active labors in the spring and summer." But Zavarz;in,
Vassiliyev, and other authors have written that she still continued to
make useful reports on the revolutionaries. None of them knew what
finally became of her.
In 1910 she was about 45 years old but looked younger. Zavarzin
described her then as a tall, slender blonde, wearing glasses with
round gold frames on a small nose under her large forehead, in short
not particularly attractive and far from beautiful. But her speech,
he said, was most pleasant, firm, and precise, usually serious and
giving an impression of extraordinary character and intelligence.
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Reminiscing about the long line of conspiracies broken up by her
reporting, her eyes were animated as she described subterfuges she
had used to escape from difficult situations.
She knew that reforms were needed in Russia but was convinced
that a better life could not be achieved through the Communists'
proletarian revolution or the Socialist Revolutionaries' terror and
agrarian revolt. For herself she had only one real aim in life, to
bring up her son properly. Music was her main recreation, and she
attended the opera frequently. Knowing society well and feeling
at home among all classes of people, from monarchists and aristocrats
to underground subversives of all colors and morals, she was well
equipped for her dedicated work.
Ulyanova
The Okhrana had recruited Roman Vatslavovich Malinovski, a
Communist and personal friend of Lenin, in March 1910. Within
a few months it selected him for all-out clandestine support as candi-
date for the Imperial Duma. He was active in the Metal Workers
Union and a good orator. Some behind-the-scenes campaigning, the
obedient good will of the gendarmes, and a supply of money from
the Okhrana overcame all handicaps, even his prohibitive court record
of having been jailed for common thievery. The Okhrana just had
to have a penetration among the dozen or so Socialist and Communist
deputies. That little fraction was numerically insignificant in the
unwieldy Duma, but it was the only body of deputies who knew
what they wanted and how to plan their action. And Okhrana agent
"Ulyanova," who had been reporting on them profusely and re-
ligiously, had been terminated on 14 June.
Letter from a Lady
Ulya.nova's true name was Julia Orestova Serova. In signing her
reports she used another alias-Pravdivy, Truthful. She was an edu-
cated and rather literary woman, a member of the Social Democratic
Workers Party (Bolshevik) who had never taken a very active part
in its affairs. She had probably joined it to please her husband, who
was a militant Bolshevik, committee member, archivist of the party,
and its first deputy in the Duma.
The Okhrana's record of Ulyanova's life and work is replete with
contradictions. She was described as a weak character, yet her steady
and painstaking contributions to the service reveal a hard and con-
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34 CONFIDENTIAL
scientious worker. She loved her husband and was a faithful. wife,
but she betrayed him daily with reports on his political activities.
She was described as frugal and a good housewife, yet it was need
for money that recruited her and she was hungry for bonuses and
awards on top of her regular monthly pay. Among the party of iliates
she was spoken of as a saint and a quiet devotee, she who probably
had no equal in betraying their trust and causing their arrest in groups.
She first made contact with the Okhrana in 1905, a write-in. In a
letter dated 1 March she offered, for 1000 rubles, to give the under-
ground locations where the committee of the Social. Democratic
Workers Party could be found. She was invited to come to the
Fontanka, Okhrana headquarters in Petersburg, under secure arrange-
ments. She did not obtain 1000 rubles, but half that sum was also
considerable in the days when an average bourgeois family could
live on it for six months. Soon thereafter the entire committee of
the party was under arrest.
Ulyanova appears not to have expected this single betrayal to lead
to any regular connections with the Okhrana. She needed the money
at the moment but was not interested in continued employment there-
after. But Okhrana headquarters, quite pleased with the first trans-
action, was inclined otherwise. A case officer saw her. He knew
about the clerical work she did for the party; how simple it would
be for her to bring him information from the underground office. By
collaborating she would be freed of fear of being watched herself.
No one would suspect her. And it would give her a regular income.
She refused.
But the case officer had her signature on a receipt for 500 rubles.
Resorting to simple blackmail, he pointed out that what she had
already done might easily become known, and she would lose her
husband and family. Or she might land in the Fortress of Peter
and Paul where those whom she had betrayed were prisoners;, and
they might find out that the new prisoner was the one who had
reported on them. Faced with these consequences of refusal, Ulya-
nova agreed to continue. She submitted irregular reports until Sep-
tember 1907, when, having by now become a willing and even en-
thusiastic agent, she signed a regular contract providing compensation
at 25 rubles a month, which eventually grew to 150 a month.
In the Spirit of Service
Although her assignment required her to report only on the Peters-
burg Bolsheviks' internal affairs, she soon extended her purview to
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several other subversive groups. Her husband had many connec-
tions. Serov felt completely safe in his own home. He had a good,
taciturn wife with political views identical to his own, and it would
not have occurred to him not to introduce her to visiting fellow
conspirators.
Numerous arrests were made in Petersburg and other cities as a
result of Ulyanova's disclosures. In May 1907 her reports made
possible the capture of an entire revolutionary band which, operating
out of Vilna, was about to perform a set of "expropriations" from
banks and the state treasury. In the same city they led to the dis-
covery of a load of forbidden literature, including brochures and
leaflets calling for an armed uprising. For this she got a 300-ruble
special award. In September her information provided legal grounds
for the arrest of Sergei Saltykov, a Duma deputy. Her reward of
500 rubles for this was paid on the day she signed on as a regular
contract agent.
Through 1908 Ulyanova kept the Okhrana informed on all meetings
of the Bolshevik central committee, the composition and structure of
the organization, and the personnel of many local committees. In
April of that year her information led to the arrest of four militants,
among them Trotzky's brother-in-law Kamenev, in May to the capture
of an entire underground gathering, and in September to the appre-
hension of Dubrovski, another member of the central committee. In
February 1909 she brought about the exposure and liquidation of a
revolutionary printshop in Petersburg and one for counterfeiting pass-
ports. Later that year the Bolsheviks sent her abroad to attend a
conference, and in this connection she made a report on Aleksei
Rykov.
These are just the recorded highlights of Ulyanova's work of dis-
ruption among the Bolsheviks. Her sources were always authentic,
derived from her attendance at underground meetings, where she
frequently served as recorder and general administrative assistant,
and from activities in her own home, where her husband handled
party matters and received fellow conspirators. She was an avid corre-
spondent, and among the many letters she wrote to friends there were
interspersed, sometimes daily, reports for delivery to the Okhrana.
Her sizable salary and awards would probably have led her to
disaster sooner or later, for she began to spend far beyond her legiti-
mate means. Some gossip about this had reached her husband, but
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he remained trustful and never doubted her explanation that she got
money from her family, who were not poor. Her undoing came from
her own carelessness. As her zeal and practice in the work increased,
she became slack in her precautions, often copying from her husband's
papers right at his desk. One spring day in 1910, coming home un-
expectedly, he caught her copying his confidential record of a meeting
held with his Bolshevik deputy colleagues the preceding night,
Serova tried to make a confused explanation, but he grabbed all
the papers and saw that she had done the copying in the form of a
letter to a friend. "Who is the friend?" Persistently evasive answers
to his questions brought him to the point of violence. After giving
her a thorough beating on the spot, he chased her out of the house,
forbidding her ever to return. She took their two small children with
her, and she never did return. On 10 June Serov ran a notice in
the Petersburg newspaper to the effect that he no longer considered
Julia Orestova his wife.
Okhrana director Beletzky fully understood what this announce-
ment meant. Four days after it was published a memorandum was
added to Ulyanova's dossier recording that her name had been deleted
from the roster of secret agents. A copy of this memorandum came
to the attention of the Minister of Interior, who was acquainted with
Ulyanova's record. He demanded an explanation from Beletzky.
Why should such an extraordinarily productive and frequently re-
warded agent be subject to sudden termination? The explanation,
of course, was convincing.
From then on hounded by her husband, without friends, and with-
out: income, Ulyanova from time to time contacted her Okhrana bosses.
In August 1912 she pleaded urgently for help: "My two children, one
only five years old, are without clothes, and we have no food.. I have
sold everything, even furniture; I have no work, and if you do not
help me I will end as a suicide." She was given 150 rubles. Other
letters followed, sometimes pressing and desperate, not seldom threat-
ening suicide. All of them elicited some amount or other, 50, 100,
200 rubles, until they totaled 1800 rubles at the end of 1912. One
last letter after that brought her 300 rubles and an order to leave
Petersburg for good. She was given transportation for herself and
children to any place she wanted to go.
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Serova found another husband during the war. Just before the
first revolution of 1917, she addressed a final letter to headquarters in
Petersburg:
"I would like you to recall my good and loyal services. On the eve
of great events that we all feel are coming, it hurts me to stay inactive
and unable to be useful. My second husband is an excellent man
and worthy of your confidence. It would not be difficult for me to
have him join the Bolsheviks and guide him in the procurement of
intelligence. You must realize that that party has to be watched very
closely now in the interest of all-our Czar, our Empire, and our
armies."
The letter was never answered. She and her husband both perished
in the revolution.
Sharzh, Sharni, Sharli, Charlie, Shalnoi
The Okhrana used these code names for Mme. Zagorskaya, who
had a remarkably long record of continuous service as an agent and
was the highest paid of them all. Her targets were the top leaders
among the Socialist Revolutionaries, the terrorists, and the Anarchists.
She worked under the direct supervision of three successive chiefs of
Paris Okhrana, beginning with Ratayev in 1903, then Harting, and
finally Krassilnikov until February 1917.
Because she was handled by the chief rather than staff agents who
would have to report in detail to the chief, Paris Okhrana files are
rather meager concerning her activities and stages of growth as an
agent. Her full name was Maria Alekseyevna Zagorskaya, nee
Andreyevna. She was married to Peter Frantsevich Zagorski, another
Okhrana agent, who was a Catholic and originally came from Croatia
in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. At times the couple worked as a
team, but she scored her major achievements in her singleton op-
erations.
Socialite Couple
Zagorski had begun his agent work in 1901, having been hired by
the Okhrana's staff agent Manusevich-Manuilov in Rome and given
the task of reporting on Polish and Catholic emigres from Russia.
His wife-to-be was recruited not long after by Ratayev, as head of
the Okhrana personnel section in Petersburg just before his departure
to become chief of the Paris station. The two new agents met at
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Petersburg when Manuilov brought the young Croat to headquarters
for training.
The Okhrana files contain no record of the married life of the
couple. They were assigned abroad in early 1903 to work with
Ratayev, but there the record of Zagorski himself stops for several
years. He is described as unusually well qualified, having encyclo-
pedic knowledge of geography, economics, arts, people, etc. He was
therefore not used for ordinary anti-revolutionary operations but
frequently assigned to missions involving travel as an Austrian subject,
on which he would report directly to the police directorate. At one
time he associated with Pilsudski and other Polish and Russian
rebels and top Anarchists.
Later Zagorski changed his Austrian citizenship to French, and the
couple established a home in Paris. When the revolutionaries, after
Azev's exposure, started a vigorous campaign to uncover all the
Okhrana's penetrations, the Zagorskis came under considerable suspi-
cion. Both of them were apparently without employment of any
kind, yet they lived in lordly luxury and gave sumptuous parties.
Zagorskaya, however, casually let slip food for gossip about their
family wealth, and her parents were soon spoken of as rich merchants
while he became known as a great landowner in Croatia. This tactic
was successful and suspicion subsided, especially since it was widely
understood that they distributed a good deal of their wealth in dona-
tions to various subversive causes.
Zagorskaya's chief task in all her fifteen years of service was to
penetrate the leading groups of the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries
and its Fighting Unit at home and abroad. To this end she had
joined the party in Petersburg and won the confidence of the under-
ground as a capable member who could do much for the cause
abroad. She had no difficulty making herself useful not only in the
central committee of the party headquarters in Paris but among the
leaders of the terrorist Fighting Unit. For years she was a close
friend and associate of the mistress of Boris Savinkov, leader of the
Fighting Unit, and she maintained a steady correspondence with
Russian terrorists in France, Italy, and England.
Belittled by New Boss
Iler pay was high enough to let her live in grand style. Her income
from her agent work was 3500 French francs a month, about that
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of cabinet ministers of the period. It was higher than Krassilnikov's
salary when he became chief of Paris Okhrana in 1910. He did not
particularly relish this situation, and he wrote headquarters that her
accomplishments were not worth the amounts paid her in salary and
operational expenses. He not only wanted her salary lowered but
recommended that he stop handling her directly and turn her over to
his principal staff agent, Lt. Col. Erhardt.
It was generally agreed that her services were now less valuable
than under Ratayev and Harting, from 1903 to 1909, and so her salary
and expense allowance was cut to 2500 francs a month. But Kras-
silnikov did not succeed in transferring her to the staff agent. She
enjoyed considerable protection at headquarters, and Okhrana direc-
tor Vissarionov himself saw to it that her wishes about who should
direct her work were honored.
But Krassilnikov persisted. In 1912 he decided to transfer Zagor-
skaya to staff agent Erhardt regardless of what attitude headquarters
might take about it. Then she wrote, in her own typescript, directly
to Vissarionov:
Esteemed Sergei Evlampiyevich:
A. A. [Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Krassilnikov] told me he received orders
to discontinue contact with me and transfer me to a different person. He
has been proposing this transfer for some time, but I have always refused
to be transferred and I still insist on refusing. The reasons A. A. gives for
this transfer are not valid, and the transfer would cause an unnecessary change
in my life. A. A. is known by name and address to many as an official
representative, but he maintains no open contact with the person to whom
he wants to assign me. I find that dealing with this new man would be
inconvenient and even dangerous. (I do not need to go into particulars,
you can see for yourself why it would be dangerous for me.) Dealing with
A. A. directly would assure me that our contact will remain strictly clandestine
and dependable. A. A. is well known and I can maintain contact with him,
like so many others, without fear for my security.
Please consider this aspect-the psychological effect of transferring an
agent from one case officer to another. One does not have to be subtle
to comprehend the feelings of an agent transferred to a new case officer.
You recall our work together, and you can understand that my work is
bound to suffer severely from the change . . .
The lengthy letter begged that Krassilnikov be ordered to continue
handling her. Headquarters, after some vacillation, complied, and
there was no change in case officer.
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To the End
Zagorskaya remained in Okhrana employ until the revolution of
February 1917. Her husband, however, after joining the French
army in 1914, was released to fight with the Yugoslav volunteer army
on the Salonica front. Agafonov, writing about the Okhrana and
its agents from the revolutionary point of view, claims that Zagorski
was exposed as an Austrian agent by the Serbs at Salonica. Con-
sidering, however, that it was normal Serbian practice to hang all
suspects, one may suppose that this allegation was only added color-
ing to paint the agent still more despicable in the eyes of the Russian
revolutionaries.
After the war the Zagorski couple lived quietly in retirement on
the French Riviera.
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COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS
Some New Words for Defection
Dear Sirs:
In response to Gordon Cooperwood's appeal in your last issue for
a new term for defection,' it strikes me that a case can be made for
the neologism "transcreder" as a noun, or in infinitive form "to trans-
credo," to shift beliefs or basic values to another creed or credo that
demands another allegiance. Of course many defections are not really
transcreditions, being prompted by less august motives, but I gather
that Mr. Cooperwood is seeking terminology that may assist a potential
transcreder to commit the act.
The simple pairing of Latin roots seems to meet the requirement
for easy translation or transliteration and avoid susceptibility to un-
desirable interpretations. While emotionally neutral in a literal sense,
the combination may nevertheless be capable of virtuous associations in
the minds of our adversaries experiencing qualms or disillusionment.
The shift from falsehood to truth, from a lesser level of belief to a
higher one in a process of conversion to another value system suggests
honor and courage. At the same time the expression appears to be
accurate enough to describe some of the more notable successes of
our opponents.
By focusing on the central core of a man's beliefs the terminology
seeks to surmount in his own eyes the personal, selfish motivations
that may underlie his decision to come over. As with conversion,
the aura of this term carries an implication that the community of
fellow believers will welcome a soul tardily emerging from the dark-
ness. To this extent our transcreders of the future may be of con-
tinuing service after the information they bring has been exhausted;
they can appeal to similar emotions in former compatriots who may
be susceptible to transcredition.
William A. Kugler
' Studies IX 1, p. 61. MORI/HRP PAGES 43-44
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Dear Sirs:
In answer to Gordon Cooperwood's inquiry, I suggest a freedom-
seeking and -promoting defector be called a l i u e r t a r i a n.
Robert Ausdenmore
Dear Sirs:
I suggest Gordon Cooperwood try variations on the old concept
of seeking and taking sanctuary. Unfortunately there is no noun for
one who has taken sanctuary; he is in sanctuary. This lack could be
gotten around by use of longer forms: "In taking sanctuary, you . . .";
"Those who have taken sanctuary from oppression . .." and so on.
This device associates the ancient right of sanctuary in the Church
with the sanctity of a freedom which offers sanctuary to the oppressed.
John Littlewood
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Oriental prototype of the
cloak-and-dagger man.
THE NINJA
W. M. Trengrouse
What cowboys have been to U.S. entertainment, the Ninja-the
stealers-in-are in contemporary Japan. But a Ninja is less like a
cowboy than a dirty-dealing Superman. Originally a medieval cult
of unconventional warrior-spies, as presented in the vogue now sweep-
ing Japan from toddlers to grandparents they have the power to turn
themselves into stones or toads, are as invisibly ubiquitous as grem-
lins, and can do things like jumping ten-foot walls and walking on
water.
Television carries Ninja dramas from morning until night, kabuki
and the serious stage put on Ninja plays, eighteen Ninja movies were
made in 1963 and 1964, bookstores carry two hundred fiction and
non-fiction titles on the occult art, children's comic books and the
adult pulps are loaded with their adventures, toy stores sell Ninja
masks and weapons, and even Kellogg's corn flakes has a Ninja mask
on the box. It has got to the point that kindergarten classes have
been asked to pledge they will not play Ninja, the police are plagued
by moppet bands of Ninja, and hardly a castle wall in Japan has not
been attacked by amateur Ninja scalers.
The legend of the stealers-in-as much a part of Japanese culture
as Robin Hood and King Arthur are of the English-has a reasonably
firm if little researched basis in history, and its artifacts can be seen
even today. The supernatural powers of the popular Ninja character
are only an exaggeration of some remarkable accomplishments of his
prototype, some of them strangely similar to things we regard as
peculiarly modern. The Ninja did practice the art of invisibility-
ninjutsu-through choice of clothes and other quite natural means.
The inventions they used in their profession anticipated the skin-
diver's snorkel and fins, the collapsible boat, K-rations, the four-
pronged scatter spike for traffic sabotage, tactical rockets, and water
skis.
Origins
The Ninja most probably began with a group of "mountain ascetics"
who lived in the hills around Kyoto and Nara when those towns were
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the capitals of Japan and Buddhism was being established. The
Ninja beliefs and practices show the influence of Buddhism (with a
mixture of Shinto), of the Chinese way of hand fighting, and of the
ancient writings of the Chinese Sun Tzu, with his emphasis on spies
and on stratagems, deception operations.' By the end of the Nara
period (710-784) this cult of mountaineers (Yama-bushi, those who
sleep among the mountains), who were "men of lower caste repre-
senting the crude side of religion. ... exercised a great influence upon
the people by appealing directly to vulgar ideas and superstitions." 2
Occult and dreaded, they lived and taught their blend of Buddhism
(mainly of the Tendai and Shingon sects, the latter dealing in mystic
hymns and secret formulas) and Shinto on such mountains as Koya
and Hiei. They inducted young men into their secret orders, and
they came down to the villages to get contributions in return for
doing magical cures through formulas and medicines.
But their miracles were not enough to protect them in the face of
government hostility to the cult, and the priests turned to guerrilla
warfare, versing themselves in what was to become bujutsu, the mar-
tial. art of eighteen methods-karate, bojutsu, kenjutsu, and so on-
to protect their shrines and temples. These had been established
twenty miles to the east of Nara at Iga-Ueno, then a farming village
situated on a broad tableland rimmed by mountains. The area was
so poor and isolated that it was not deemed worth fighting for by the
warring landlords of Nara and Kyoto, and so it went by default to
the mountaineer cult. Here ninjutsu became an independent art.
Before the end of the Heian period (794-1185), the first book treat-
ing ninjutsu appeared, written by the great Genji warrior Yoshitsune
Minamoto (1159-1189), the "Book of Eight Styles of Kurama." Mt.
Kurama, a training station of the mountain ascetics, was where
Yoshitsune mastered his arts as a child. This book emphasizes the
art of flying-Yoshitsune is believed to have been a great jumper-
and the use of shock troops. It first distinguished among the three
arts of strategy, bujutsu, and ninjutsu. Although ninjutsu was still
'For example: "In the whole army none should be more favorably regarded
than the spies; none should be more liberally rewarded than the spies " And
elsewhere, "A stratagem is a military trick. You should win the enemy to your
side . . . throw him into confusion . . . break his unity by provocation .
make him overconfident and relax his guard . .
2Masaharu Anesaki, History of Japanese Religion.
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embryonic, it was established as an art by Yoshitsune's "book of
ninjutsu," so referred to and extant today.
The Iga area was so impoverished that families often killed their
children, particularly girls, and they could not get their whole liveli-
hood from farming. On the other hand adults, or any who could
perform adult labor, were valuable. Warfare in the plains of Iga
therefore tended to be carried on by stealth rather than by bloodshed.
The mountain priests would teach the head of a strong familly their
secret arts, and these would be passed from a father to his sons, who
might also visit the wilderness temples for indoctrination. Even to-
day, says playwright-novelist Tomoyoshi Murayama, the people of
Iga are known as sly, tricky, and crafty.
Three grades of Ninja sprang up-the jonin (leader), who was
head of a strong family, the chunin (middle class), a skilled Ninja,
and the genin (lowest), a day laborer in ninjutsu. As the people of
Iga became known for Ninja, fighting landlords in the period of the
civil wars from the middle of the fourteenth to the end of the six-
teenth century called upon the town for spies and warriors. There
were two major families there, each having about three hundred
Ninja. In addition, another settlement at Koga, some twelve miles
away, had fifty-three families of roughly equal rank with a smaller
number of Ninja. The heads of the Iga forces were jonin, those in
Koga only chunin.
Masashige Kusunoki, the warrior genius of the latter part of the
1.4th century, is regarded as the father of advanced ninjutsu. Like
Yoshitsune Minamoto, he had learned the basics of the science from
mountain ascetics as a child, but unlike him used Ninja not only for
attack but also for defense and peacetime purposes. According to
Iga. historian Heishichiro Okuse, he had forty-eight Ninja under him
who spied in Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe. One of his exploits, reduc-
ing an impregnable fortress, was accomplished by locating the enemy's
supply route, killing the bearers, dressing his Ninja in their armor,
and sending them on, bearing bags of arms. When the gates swung
open the Ninja struck and set fire to the castle. On another occasion,
after vainly trying to defend his castle from attack, he was found dead
in his armor by the attackers, his personal Ninja crying over the body.
But while the enemy were celebrating their triumph, Kusunoki, who
of course had only been feigning death, arose and crushed them.
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"Two Hundred Techniques" a
The Ninja's garb was all black. He wore a black cloth wrapped
in turban style about his head and covering his mouth and jaw. His
cloak was full-sleeved, and the arms ended in gauntlets. Chain mesh
armor was often worn beneath it. The pants were baggy, tied above
the ankle. Even the socks (tabi) and sandals (zori) were black, with
cotton padding on the bottom of the zori for stealthy walking. The
clothes were filled with hidden pockets.
The traditional samurai sword was often shortened to leave room
in the bottom of the scabbard for poisonous dust or blinding-powder
which could be hurled into an enemy's face. The hilt was likely to
be square across, with a long light cord attached, so that the sword
could be leaned against a wall as a first step in scaling and then pulled
up afterwards.
In travelling, the Ninja usually carried the following equipment: a
straw hood for covering his face except for small holes to see through;
a rope and hook for climbing; a stone pen for writing on walls; medi-
cal and food pills (including hyorogan pellets a half inch in diameter
made of carrot extract, soba powder, wheat flour, mountain potatoes,
herbs, and rice powder-two or three a day would sustain the Ninja
for ten days); thirst-allaying tablets made of palm fruit, sugar, and
barley; medicine to prevent frozen fingers; a lighter flint; and a black
three-foot towel which could be used in climbing, to hide the face,
or to carry water purifiers or poison absorbed from secret mixtures
into which its ends had been dipped.
One type of weapon was shuriken, missiles which he could hurl with
pinpoint accuracy for thirty feet. Usually he had nine of these, either
metal knives six or so inches long or disks in the shape of stars, comets,
swastikas, or crosses. Another was the bamboo pole fitted with a
hook for climbing or with a balled chain for attack. More subtle
were hollowed eggs containing dried jellyfish, toads' eggs, powdered
snake grass, and powdered leaves from a "sneeze tree"; these were
thrown to blind or unnerve his opponent. Water guns, to be shot
from up wind only, were loaded with a deadly three-second poison.
' Most of the information in this section is taken from the 22-volume Bansen
Shukai (Thousands of Rivers Gather in the Sea), written in 1674 by Natsutake
Fujibayashi. Extant in seven manuscript copies, it is now being edited for pub-
lication. Notable among the score or more of other 17th- and 18th-century
accounts of ninjutsu is the volume Shonin-ki (The True Ninjutsu).
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There were poison rings utilizing the all-powerful tiger's nail, and
leather gloves (shuko) were tipped with iron cat's claws for climbing,
raking a face, or fending off a sword.
The Ninja had the secret of gunpowder before it was generally
known in Japan. They developed wooden cannons, designed gre-
nades and time bombs, mounted incendiaries on arrows, and tipped
arrows with leaf-like ends to scatter the fire. As anti-personnel weap-
ons against their soft-shod enemies they scattered sharp-pointed nuts,
iron tripods with needle points, and solid pyramids of metal which
would fall upright.
There were two types of water shoes. One was a wooden circle
three feet in diameter with a center of solid board, the other simply
two buckets, with a wooden fan on a bamboo pole used as a paddle.
For invisible swimming the Ninja used bamboo tubes as snorkels,
wooden fins for speed and silence. The snorkel sometimes had one
enlarged end and could double as a horn or a blowgun. Their col-
lapsible boat folded on its hinges to the size of a filing drawer. In
use it would be caulked with sap. They also used rabbis: skin to
make floats of the Mae West type.
The Ninja are credited with developing a secret walk which would
take them along at twelve miles an hour with less effort than ordinary
mortals make for four; but this secret, if they had it, has been lost.
They did use a crab-like walk, crossing one foot over the other and
moving sideways, for walls and narrow passages.
They were well versed in nature lore. To get his direction in the
dark a Ninja would pull up a radish; the side with more root fibers
points south. To find the depth of water in a moat he would pull
a reed toward him (they can't be pulled up by the roots) and calcu-
late by a sort of empirical Pythagorean geometry from the submerged
increment per displacement from the vertical. From a cat's eyes he
could read time with the help of a song into which the formula was
woven. He watched the tides, currents, constellations, the moon and
sun, the winds, and the colors of the sky to forecast the weather and
the best moment to strike (there was another song on the dates of
currents). A thin sheet of iron heated and then cooled at rest could
be floated in water to form a crude compass.
A study of snores observed with a bamboo listening pipe told the
Ninja the sleep status of their victims. They learned to, boil rice
without a pot (wrapping it in a wet straw sack, burying it in the
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ground, and building a fire on top) and freshen salt water (by pack-
ing red earth on the bottom of the boat to absorb the salt). A
wooden fan was used as a protractor to measure angles and thereby
determine distances. They had their own secret ideographs and
coded call signs. They were adept at "Gojo no Ri," the ability to
read their opponent's mind and mood from facial indications, voice,
gesture, etc.
The Ninja used many disguises, but it is said there were seven basic
covers-the priest, perhaps offering prayers for the enemy dead while
making a head count of the quick and a general survey of their battle-
fields, the mountain ascetic who could spy from above and signal by
conch shell from mountain top to mountain top, the itinerant merchant
who could be admitted to castles, the wandering bard and the enter-
tainer with their songs and tricks, and the commoner.
The mystical elements of ninjutsu, largely from the Shingon sect,
took the form of secret hand signs and murmured formulas. The art
of invisibility and transformation is also put in mystical terms. Shu-
gendo, the mountain ascetic creed, says, "Conceive that you are a
stone." If you believe you are a stone, then you are. It is much
like becoming one with Buddha. When the Ninja is surrounded by
enemies and has no place to escape, he shortens his breath, shrinks
himself as small as a stone and conceives he is a stone. The enemy
cannot find him.
This particular camouflage is called Doton no jutsu, invisibility by
means of the earth. But four other elements can be used. In Katon
no jutsu a man is turned into smoke (helped by liberal use of gun-
powder in the Ninja practice of blowing one's face off to preserve
secrecy when cornered). But this probably refers primarily to the
use of smoke screens, setting fire to infiltrated castles, etc. Suiton no
jutsu is making use of water to disappear, likely with a snorkel.
Mokuton no jutsu is to hide in trees. And Kinton no jutsu is the use
of metal; Ninja would crawl into rice boilers, hanging bells, and
temple statuary to spy. A combination of metal and water was to
steal a large temple bell and jump into deep water with it, making
use both of its weight and of its trapped air supply.
Mass Action and Decline
The last burst of Ninja activity came under Ieyasu Tokugawa (1541-
1616), who was to become the first shogun of a unified Japan. On
February 6th, 1562, the general wrote a letter of gratitude to a Koga
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Ninja, Yoshichiro Ban, for services rendered two years before. ][eyasu
had had to attack an impregnable castle (we gather all castles were
impregnable until the Ninja were called in) and had asked Ban to
lead 280 Ninja in an infiltration movement. This band slipped in
at night and fired the castle towers. The defenders thought their
own men had betrayed them and fell into confusion. The Ninja
totally disrupted them without use of staff or sword except to behead
the enemy leader.
Two other generals, however, who helped in the unification of the
country, Nobunaga Oda (1534-1582) and Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536-
1598) were trying to stamp out Buddhism and therefore not only re-
buffed but held and tortured any Ninja who fell into their hands. In
1581, 9000 of Oda's men attacked a force of 4000 men from Iga, in-
cluding many Ninja, laid waste the town, and slaughtered its warriors.
Ninja leader Hanzo Hattori, lamenting the death of his townsmen,
asked Ieyasu to employ the survivors, and the great general did.
Then in the battle of Sekigahara (1600), 100 Ninja of the 200 in
the Ieyasu forces were killed.
In the first years of the 17th century, when Ieyasu as shogun moved
the political capital of the country to Edo (Tokyo), he took 200 Ninja
with him. He made Hanzo and his successors the equivalent of U.S.
Secret Service chiefs. The Ninja had complete and unquestioned
access to the shogun to protect and inform him. (The main west
entrance to the Imperial Palace, then the shogun's residence, is still
called Hanzo's gate, and parts of Tokyo where the Ninja lived are
now named Koga-cho, Iga-cho, and Kogai-cho.) Their cover was
gardener employment, and they lived it. But they were always ready
to be stopped among the poppies with the order, "Go to Kyoto," and
they would drop their spades and set out at once at Ninja speed.
In 1638, when farmers and Christians in Shimabara, Kyushu, re-
belled against the shogunate, Ninja were called in again, this time
strictly to gather information. The fight had lasted ten months, and
40,000 rebels were holding the Shimabara castle (impregnable) against
130,000 of Ieyasu's troops. Finally the commanding general, Nobu-
tsuna Matsudaira, ordered ten Ninja to reconnoiter the castle. "We
have no idea of the layout inside the enemy camp," he said. "De-
termine the depth and width of the moat, the height of the wall and
fence, and the distance from our camp to theirs; and draw a map."
Five Ninja fired guns as a diversion. After the consequent enemy
stir had subsided, at midnight, the Ninja moved in from the opposite
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side, scaling the castle wall with rope ladders. Two of them fell
into traps in the floor, and this aroused the guards. Nevertheless the
Ninja, with their black garb and ability to work in the dark, accom-
plished their mission, and they carried off the enemy's cross-bearing
flag as well.
With the coming of peace, however, the Ninjas, like old generals,
now faded into the administrative spy and other dull professions.
The era of the true Ninja was over.
A history of intelligence re-
porting from high, if ineffec-
tual, political levels.
MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT:
FROM PETER TO TITO
Because of President Roosevelt's interest in Balkan affairs, one of the
most extensive and detailed series of memoranda contained: in the
OSS Reports to the White House 1 is formed by those that trace the
evolution from monarchist Yugoslavia to the Tito dictatorship, a course
of events in which Roosevelt and particularly Winston Churchill played
a hand. In Yugoslavia OSS had representatives with both of the feud-
ing resistance leaders Mihailovich and Tito, and it once proposed to
include among the latter the man whom Churchill later forced upon
King Peter as prime minister and who still later became Tito's first
foreign minister, the Croatian leader Ivan Subasic. In London it had
a representative who enjoyed the intimate confidence both of Subasic
and of Peter and whose reports reflect minutely the political develop-
ments. The most important of the documents are excerpted' below.
During my last conversation with you, you showed a great deal. of
interest in the Balkan Theater of Operations. Since that time 1 had
a very interesting talk with the Ban 2 of Croatia, whose letter to you I
am enclosing herewith.
The Ban is willing to go for OSS first to Italy and later to make an
appearance in Yugoslavia proper in order to establish direct contact
with the political and military leaders of Croatia. He understands
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52 CONFIDENTIAL
'Described in the first of these articles, subtitled "Sunrise," in Studies VII
2, p. 73 fF.
'Ban is an old title equivalent to Governor, notably under the Austro-Hungarian
empire.
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that he will go merely as a soldier and patriot to assist us in our fight
against the enemy. .. .
The Ban told me that it would aid him tremendously in carrying out
his duties, and would greatly facilitate his future tasks, if he could
have an interview with you, not in his diplomatic capacity,3 but merely
as a patriot who is working for the common cause. . . .
The Ban, who fought in the last war as a Serbian officer, is very
popular among the 5,000,000 Croats. They regard him as their cham-
pion and leader.
I believe that the Ban can be of great value to us in paving the way
for our forces. .. .
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
... here is additional information on the Balkan situation:
"1. All political leaders, with the exception of the fighting forces,
are regarded apathetically by the people. The fighting forces are
composed of two parts-the Cetniks, lead 4 by Mihailovitch, and the
Partisans, led by Tito. Nearly all the Cetnik units are east of the Tara
and Drina Rivers in old Serbia. Their strength is customarily ex-
aggerated. .. . These men are nearly all Serbians. Disturbances
among the population are created by Mihailovich's title as Jugoslav
commander-in-chief and Minister of War, which is obviously opposed
to fact.
'T. The Partisans are led by Tito, whose true name is Josip Broz.
Their official designation is the National Army of Liberation. They
are made up of men from every region of the country and they are
engaged in hostilities in every part of the country, even including old
Serbia. This is in favorable contrast to Mihailovich's relative lack of
activity and narrow field. Each day, Tito's forces are growing... .
"3. Included in the political goals of the Partisans is the establish-
merit of federated Jugoslavia with a government selected by democratic
' In 1942 he had been named by the government in exile to a mission for
organizing the Yugoslavs in the United States.
' Misspellings retained as a matter of documentary interest throughout.
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CONFIDENTIAL
elections. This aim is extremely popular. There is no factual founda-
tion for the allegation of communism made against the Partisans.
Such inclinations are found only among a small part of the rank and
file or the leaders.
"4. The Government-in-Exile anticipates that Mihailovitch, with
assistance from the Allies, will reestablish the monarchy with the pres-
ent cabinet and with Pan-Serbian inclinations. . . . The Govern-
ment is not representative of the population, and causes controversy
between factions which frequently terminate in grave clashes. The
people are irritated that the United States and Britain protect the
Government-in-Exile.
"7. Outside of old Serbia and with the exception of some of the
Slovene clericals, who are a tiny part of the Slovenes, the monarchy
is quite unpopular today. King Peter is popularly believed to be a
youth under the control of political and officer cliques possessing
Pan-Serbian inclinations. The population is irritated by the sizeable
allowance made to Peter and particularly by his becoming engaged,
during the war, to Alexandra.
"8. There is no genuine understanding between the Government-in-
Exile and the Soviet Union. The principal barrier to such an under-
standing is Mihailovitch. Although it is frequently stated in rumors,
there is no definite evidence which can be obtained of an accord be-
tween the Partisans and the Soviet Union. . . ."
.Attached is a copy of memorandum which I am submitting today
to the joint Chiefs of Staff. It has to do with the British request for
concurrent withdrawal of British and American officers now with
Mihailovich.
Attached to the memorandum is an intelligence report by an OSS
officer who has been with Mihailovich during the past six months. I
believe that it will be of much interest to you.
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Here is a digest of discussions had by a representative of ours with
King Peter:
King Peter's sojourn in Cairo was both futile and difficult for
the following reasons:
(a) General Zivkovic was engaged in plots directed toward
deposing Peter and placing Prince Tomislav, the brother of Peter,
on the throne. Supposedly, Prince Tomislav is the bastard son
of General Zivkovic and Queen Marie.
(b) Yugoslav army officers have been going over to Marshal
Tito.
(c) Cabinet underlings have issued inflammatory decrees favor-
ing General Mihailovic and have been affixing King Peter's signa-
ture to these decrees without his consent. This has made it hard
to work for an understanding with Tito.
(d) The British have followed a policy of keeping King Peter
practically a prisoner. King Peter verified newspaper accounts
reporting this fact, although he was forced to refute them publicly
at the time.
The foregoing factors, as well as his desire to affect American
and British policy in favor of General Mihailovic and to expedite
his marriage were responsible for his wishing to go back to
London.
The agreed policy of the Purich cabinet and King Peter is the
backing of General Mihailovic not only as a force opposed to
the Nazis but also as a guarantee of Peter's ultimate return to the
Yugoslav throne. They are also agreed on the policy of securing
material assistance for Mihailovic. King Peter ... intimated that
if the British did not order him to do otherwise, he would keep
Punch in his present position. .. .
Purich. . . . No Croats have been asked to participate in the discus-
sions to date, on the theory that agreement must first be reached
among the Serbian factions. .. .
3. Neither the King nor the British Foreign Office has been con-
tacted by this group as yet; ..."
10 May 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Here is a report sent to me by one of our representatives on state-
merits made by the Ban of Croatia on his departure for England:
"... The Yugoslav crisis is due primarily in his opinion to the utter
weakness of the present government. His advice, if sought by the
King, will be to suggest the formation of a strong government under
the King. .. .
"The great mistake in the past has been that the Allied governments,
because of the weakness of the Yugoslav governments-in-exile, dealt
directly with General Mihailovic and Marshal Tito. .. .
"The Shepherds believes that if a strong government is set up the
first task would be to relegate General Mihailovic and Marshal Tito to
their legitimate tasks, namely, military commanders of the resistance
forces within the respective areas controlled by each one of them
separately. The only effective way to bring about such a situation
would be for the Allies to give all military assistance and supplies
through the government only. .. .
"Finally, the Shepherd stated that if a strong government is now
formed, it must seek, as stated above, by exercising its authority, to
consolidate all resistance forces throughout Yugoslavia in order to
achieve the maximum effort to conquer the enemy. .. ."
22 May 1,944
From our London office, we learn the following:
"1. Effort is being made to construct the basis of a new government
which will stand for the potential middle element between Tito and
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56 CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following report of the meeting on 21 May between the Baia of
Croatia and Mr. Churchill was prepared for me by my special assist-
ant, Mr. Bernard Yarrow. .. .
5 Apparently not an additional or alternative title but a code designation. The
plan to make use of him was called the Shepard project.
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CONFIDENTIAL Peter to Tito Peter to Tito CONFIDENTIAL
In view of the secrecy maintained by the British on this conference,
apart from this report to you, I am having only the Secretary of State
advised. .. .
"The Ban informed me yesterday that he had received a telephone
call from Churchill's secretary, requesting him to have dinner with
Churchill at the lattcr's country place . . . on Sunday, 21 May .. .
The Ban, . . . accompanied by Mr. Stevenson, British Minister to
Yugoslavia, . . . arrived there about noon. . . .
"At one o'clock, Mr. Churchill joined them and during the dinner
he had the Prime Minister of Holland seated at his right and the Ban
at his left. Addressing his guests and pointing to the Ban, Mr.
Churchill said: `I want you to meet the next Prime Minister of Yugo-
slavia.' Noticing the expression of surprise on the Ban's face, Mr.
Churchill said to him: `Why don't you know that you are going to be
the Prime Minister of the new Yugoslav Government?' The Ban
replied: `The King consulted with me regarding the formation of a
new government but has not as yet informed me of the fact that I am
to be the Prime Minister of that Government and that I will be en-
trusted with its formation.' Mr. Churchill then said: `Why of course.
That is the reason I asked you to come here.'
"Thereafter . . . Mr. Churchill stated . . . that he consulted, of
course, with the President of the United States about the formation
of this new government under the premiership of the Ban and was
assured of his complete approval.
"Turning to the Ban, Churchill then said: 'You will form this gov-
ernment and I assure.you that Great Britain and the United States
will regard yours as the only government of the Yugoslav people, and
within four or five weeks you will get all the support and assistance
we can possibly render to your country to increase its resistance to
the enemy.' . . .
"Churchill further added: `We shall continue to have friendly rela-
tions with Tito because he is conducting a vigorous campaign in Yugo-
slavia, but we shall look to you and your cabinet as the only legitimate
government of Yugoslavia.'
"Churchill informed the Ban that he had informed Tito that, if he is
in favor of the new government, his support will be very welcome,
but at any rate he must refrain from attacking it and thereby disrupting
the earnest attempt which will be made by the new government to
ApprovC6h9r N,p&e 2005/01/05
unify Yugoslavia. . . . He frankly did not know what the attitude of
Stalin would be. He expressed the hope that the USSR will join
with England and America in giving whole-hearted support to the
new government but had no information on that point up to the
present.
`... On the way home Mr. Stevenson spoke to the Ban about the
conference with Churchill. The Ban pointed out to him that whereas
the Prime Minister took it for granted that he is the future Premier,
the King has not advised him as yet that he is entrusted to form the
government. The Ban then said that he is contemplating calling
King Peter tomorrow, Monday, May 22nd, and informing him of the
conference with Churchill so as to bring the matter to a head. ..."
27 June 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following is a paraphrase of a cable from General Donovan
which he asked be delivered to you:
"I had lunch with General Sir Maitland Wilson today. General
Wilson stated that the conversations between Tito and Subasich went
better than anticipated. The following was agreed upon:
'T The Subasich Government would have a Tito representative.
"2. As part of his Army, Tito would accept Mihailovich troops who
would be allowed to wear the Royal insignia as distinguished from
Tito's red star. This would also apply to Naval forces.
"3. That ultimate determination of the King's position would be
put off until after the war was over.
Wilson remarked that the chasing around the mountains which the
Nazis gave Tito had had a healthful effect. Both Peter and Subasich
are going back to London."
25 August 1.944
General Donovan (who is presently in London) has asked that the
following report of a conversation he had on 21 August with Prime
Minister Subasich be sent to you from him:
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"I talked with Subasich on Monday and he told me the fol-
lowing:
"'On August 20 I had a conversation with Adam Pribicevich,
Vice President of Draga Mihailovich's Committee. When Pribice-
vich asked for my help to stop the Partisans' fight against the
Chetniks, which is now raging with full intensity and when he
asked me whether we could bring about a reconciliation between
the Partisans and the Chetniks, I answered:
" . . . If you wish to fight the Partisans as. Communists-con-
scious of the fact that they are sons of our nation-and to this
end, accept the help and collaboration of the Germans, you cannot
expect anything from the King, the Royal Government or the
Allies. . ..' "
There has also been received from our representative in Bern the
following Boston Series report', which is of direct relevance to the
matters discussed in General Donovan's talk with Subasic. . . .
"During the second week of August, 1944, Hermann Neubacher,
German special plenipotentiary for the Balkan area, is reported to have
made the following comments on Mihailovich and the political situa-
tion in Yugoslavia:
" `... The position of those Chetniks who advocate cooperation
with the Germans is strengthened by the fact that the latter may
soon be forced to evacuate Serbia. This would be the signal for
a show-down engagement between the Communists and the Na-
tionalists. Mihailovich therefore probably intends to cooperate
with the German Army while it is still in Serbia, in order to lessen
the effectiveness of Tito's Partisans. By emphasizing the common
fight against Communism, Mihailovich would obtain as many
weapons as possible from the Germans. He feels that he will
then be able to take over the German positions easily when the
German army leaves. Informal negotiations between Mihailo-
vich and the Germans are said to have been initiated, and
may possibly be followed by an official conference at a later
date.' . . .'
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CONFIDENTIAL
22 September 1,944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following intelligence has just been relayed to us from Caserta:
"2 C-47's, with stars on the rudders, landed on Vis Monday
evening with Russian Yak fighter escort. Tito left in one of them
near midnight for parts unknown, according to information we
have received here. Source of information is U.S. Air Command
Vis. Major Alston and Colonel Maxwell, British Army, have
checked and verified Tito's departure."
24 September 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I am sending to you the following paraphrase of message sent by
General Wilson to Marshal Tito on 16 September, and a report from
our Bari office concerning an order issued by Marshal Tito's head-
quarters on 20 September restricting intelligence operations loth of
ourselves and the British. .. .
General Wilson's message to Marshal Tito:
"1. A communication was addressed by you on the 5 of Septem-
ber to the British and American missions at your Headquarters,
in which you made a statement to the effect that the Chetniks
were being sent supplies and afforded other aid by the Allies, and
that the Allied command in Italy is maintaining relations with
Draga Mihailovich.
"2. It is not my plan to send these to either the British or the
United States governments as a strong exception to these allega-
tions is taken by me personally. I am perfectly competent to
take care of the situation as the Allied officer personnel to which
you made reference in your communication of the 5 of September
are under my direct orders.
"3. In any event, you have apparently been misinformed. The
statement that we are sending Mihailovich any supplies or main-
taining relationship with him is absolutely false. At the time,
you were made aware of the special reasons for which the two
American missions have been in the region that Mihailovich con-
trols. The evacuation of Allied air personnel in Yugoslavia was
RDP78T03194A000200030001-0
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 Approved PF@PrrRteleate 2005/01/05 : C
the specific reason of the first mission, the air crew rescue unit.
A small unit under direction of Col. McDowell, the second mis-
sion, is in no way accredited to General Draga Mihailovich; its sole
object is to collect intelligence in Serbia.
"6. The fact that on a few occasions rescued American airmen
were brought out garbed in Chetnik clothing because of the loss
of their own, may have caused some misunderstanding. A few
supplies, which may have been dropped in the wrong area, may
have fallen into the hands of the Chetniks. The complaints made
by you must be wholly based on erroneous reports which resulted
from distortion of the facts stated above."
Report concerning order issued by Marshal Tito's Headquarters
on. 20 September:
"Tito's headquarters issued orders on September 20 to all Par-
tisan corps commanders to the effect that no Allied missions may
operate henceforth with units smaller than a corps and further
that no Allied military personnel are to travel inside the country
unless Tito has given them written permission to do so. The Par-
tisan Istrian Corps Headquarters has ordered one of our officers
stationed in Slovenia to report to the headquarters without delay.
This order was in fulfillment to Tito's order.
"According to the British military mission, similar communica-
tions have been received by its representatives in other areas. All
supply drops were immediately cancelled by the British and also
all flights to remove Partisan wounded. Nothing further will be
done along either line until the situation is clarified. .. .
"Probably the motive behind Tito's move is his desire to curtail
and control American and British military representation in the
country now that he believes the civil war is all but in the bag and
now that British and American supplies are no longer needed. He
evidently does not wish American and British representatives to
observe and report developments of his plans to consolidate his
military victory in the political and economic field. The order,
significantly enough, was issued at a moment when Tito was
almost certainly with the Russian leaders in Bulgaria or Rumania.
He has not come back to Vis since he left for an undisclosed
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A-RDP78T0319 A 0 1Mktt0001-0
destination in Russian planes. There is no way of knowing if
the Russians come under the phrase "allied" personnel.
"The Russians have for a long time had the closest possible
liaison with Tito and his staff and have probably taken part in
his political and military councils.
30 September 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
We have just received word from Colonel Huntington, Chief of our
group with Tito, that the Partisan Headquarters have been moved to
Serbia.
The British and Russian groups, as well as our own, are in the
process of transferring their personnel to the new headquarters.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I believe that you will find of interest the following report of con-
versations which our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, had with
the King of Yugoslavia and with Subasic:
"On Wednesday September 27, I saw the King. He gave me a warm
welcome and spent an hour with me chatting about the present situa-
tion. He told me ... that Winston Churchill sent a sizzling telegram
to Tito telling him in effect that the British Government has sent
supplies and arms to Tito to fight the enemy and not to fight his own
people. The King also said that this cable which was of a challenging
tone and the sharpest yet delivered to Tito was provoked by a certain
note sent by Tito to Churchill. Two days later this ... was con-
firmed by Subasic independently and without any questioning on my
part. Subasic told me that Tito sent a cable to Churchill protesting
vehemently against assistance rendered by the British to certain Chet-
niks in Switzerland and to other acts of assistance to M:ihailovich.
Subasic further informed me that Churchill sent to Tito a reply in
which lie rebuked him sharply for using arms and ammunition sup-
plied by the British Government to fight the Yugoslav people instead
of fighting the enemy.
CONFIDENTIAL
 Peer to Tit
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
We have just received the following dispatch from our representa-
tive, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, concerning a cable which Subasic has re-
ceived from Stalin:
"Tonight Subasic informed me that he received a cable directly
from Stalin in which Stalin stated that the National Committee
of Liberation agreed to the Red Army's entrance into Yugoslavia.
"Stalin stated that the Red Army will liberate the Yugoslav
people from the yoke imposed by the enemy. Stalin extended his
best wishes to Subasic personally as the Prime Minister of Royal
Yugoslav Government to carry out successfully the policies in-
augurated by his government.
"Subasic asked that contents of cable from Stalin to him not
be wired to Washington because he has not informed the British
about it."
In view of the nature of this communication and the fact that the
value of our informant might be seriously jeopardized, Mr. Yarrow
has requested that contents of the message not be revealed.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following report from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow,
will, I believe, be of interest to you:
".. . Subasic lunched with Churchill on August 3 and asked him
to provide two divisions to invade Yugoslavia, promising to capture
Belgrade with assistance of Yugoslav troops within short time.
Churchill stated cannot spare two divisions but assured Subasic of
whole-hearted support. Before leaving for Quebec, Anthony Eden
spoke to Subasic about moving government to Italy in anticipation of
liberation of Yugoslavia. Subasic heard no more about it and is
mystified by British verbal promises of support and lack of any real
backing. Subasic believes that British in concert with Soviets working
with Tito only, disregarding royal Government."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following dispatch which we have just received from our repre-
sentative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow, will, I believe, be of interest to you:
"Saturday October 7 Churchill conferred with King Peter. The
King telephoned Subasic from 10 Downing Street asking him to prepare
a speech to be broadcast by the King upon liberation of Belgrade.
Churchill wanted to see the speech by 5 P.M. The speech was pre-
pared on time. Briefly, the King will congratulate people of Yugo-
slavia for bringing about their own liberation. He will thank Tito,
Red Army, and American and British Allies for assistance rendered,
and will appeal for unity.
"Subasic believes Tito still in Serbia with troops, not in Moscow as
rumored."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I believe you will be interested in the following report which we
have just received from our representative, Mr. Bernard Yarrow:
"Saw King today, October 10. He related to me his conversation
with Churchill on October 7, before latter's departure for Moscow.
Churchill said that he is dissatisfied with Tito's continuous non-
cooperation, and will find new ways to bring pressure to bear upon
him. He assured the King that he will discuss with Marshal Stalin
the whole situation and will seek Stalin's assistance to exert his in-
fluence over Tito with thought of forming a single government upon
liberation of Belgrade."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I believe you will be interested in the attached memorandum which
the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia gave to one of our representatives
in London for transmission to the State Department.
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MEMORANDUM FROM PRIME MINISTER SUBASIC
. The Royal Yugoslav Government have decided to adopt the
following measures:
1) Instructions will be sent immediately to the Army personnel in
the Middle East and elsewhere ordering them to join up with the
National Army of Liberation in one single front. .. .
3) Officers and men who ... fail to join up with the National Army
of Liberation ... will be demobilised and will assume the status of
refugees. . . . It is to be expected that those who assume the status
of refugees . . . will not be allowed to return to Yugoslavia at the
end of the war. .. .
6) . . . The Royal Yugoslav Government have already issued the
strictest instructions to their Ambassador in Ankara for ... dealing
with the group in Turkey (Istanbul) who have operated a secret wire-
less station and ... engaged in propaganda ... in opposition to ...
the National Army of Liberation. . . .
7) . . . The Red Cross personnel in Cairo will be changed and an
inquiry concerning their activities will be instituted. . . .
10) The intention of the Royal Yugoslav Government in resorting
to these measures is to carry out the terms of the agreement which was
signed with Marshal Tito on behalf of the National Committee of
Liberation on June 16 at Vis . . .
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
King Peter saw Churchill this afternoon. Herewith report as
given me [Yarrow] by King. Stalin and Churchill discussed general
Balkan situation. . . . Yugoslavia military operations and adminis-
tration upon liberation will be under joint British-Russian control.
... Stalin was not in principle against re-establishment of Monarchies
in Balkans. He said, `If a King can be more useful in waging war
against enemy and maintaining stability after victory, he would prefer
him to a makeshift Republic.' Specifically as to Peter Stalin said,
'Ile seems to be a young man who is close to his people.' But insisted
that question of King's return be postponed until people express will by
plebescite. Churchill added, `When time comes I shall see to it that
plebescite is conducted under British, Russian and American super-
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66 CONFIDENTIAL
vision.' Churchill smilingly said, `I shall manage your campaign when
time comes.'
King informed Churchill that he learned . . . that Subasic before
departure harbored plan to create Regency commission and appoint-
ing himself as member of same. King expressed anxiety that Subasic
will attempt to perpetuate own political power and is not person upon
whom King can rely to fight for his return. Churchill said that this
regency idea was news to him and that it is despicable that Subasic
promoted it. He assured King that if regency is suggested to him by
Subasic or anyone, he will rudely reject it. Ile said, `You are neither
minor nor at your death bed or mentally deficient, therefore there can
be no question of appointing regent.' Churchill amplified that if
regent were appointed his acts of malfeasance would be charged
against King hence unacceptable. Churchill made a note to send
word immediately to British representative participating Tito-Subasic
conferences and warn him of Subasic's regency -scheme. . . .
Churchill said that when he met with Tito and Subasic in Italy it was
he who fought the battle of the Monarchy with Tito and not Subasic.
Churchill said that Tito is only a Communist and will try to put one
of his followers as Prime Minister who will exercise very little power,
Tito retaining same.
King asked Churchill to arrange conference between him and Tito
in Churchill's presence. Churchill said, `It is premature now but I
will seek the [U.S.] President's opinion as to the advisability of such
a meeting.'
Churchill expressed view that King should not under any circum-
stances be on Yugoslav soil at present. First because lie does not
wish by King's presence to legalize some of the misdeeds perpetrated
by Tito against some of Yugoslav people. Second that it would be
easy to assassinate him and then claim that he was murdered by
German agent or Mihailovich henchmen. Churchill expressed an-
noyance at ... Minister of Defence placing Royal Yugoslav Air Force
and Navy under Tito's command. He said that he received word from
his Admiral commanding Mediterranean that he will not tolerate same.
Finally Churchill reassured King that he need not worry about
Subasic-Tito conference for any agreement will have to get. his sanc-
tion. Ile said that Stalin was not unreasonable about general Balkan
situation but that of course Stalin is a very shrewd man and situation
will have to be watched.
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 ApprovW(VotoRlie?ase 2005/01/05 :
King requests you to keep this report confidential. He is concerned
that Churchill may be annoyed if he suspects that King is talking.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
.. . From Mr. Yarrow:
"The King received a telephone message from Sir Alexander Cado-
gan requesting an audience at 2:30 P.M. on 2 November. Cadogan
stated he had a message from Mr. Churchill and handed a written
memorandum the text of which is as follows:
`Memorandum on agreement reached between Marshal Tito and
Dr. Subasic. In accordance with the terms of this agreement, King
Peter would appoint a council of 3 regents to represent his Majesty
in Yugoslavia, pending the decision of the country on the ultimate form
of government. . . . The regents would form a government of 18
ministers from the members of Dr. Subasic's government and of the
National Committee. It would be the task of the united government
to conduct the plebiscite which would eventually decide upon the form
of government of the country. . . . The Prime Minister would be
Marshal Tito, who would also be Minister of Defense and Com-
mander-in-Chief. . . . Dr. Subasic is proceeding to Moscow ... to
ascertain for himself the attitude of the Soviet Government towards
Yugoslavia.
"Cadogan then asked the King whether he had any message for Mr.
Churchill. The King stated, `Please tell Mr. Churchill that . I was
shocked by this agreement and I shall not accept it.' Cadogan then
informed the King that Mr. Churchill expressed consternation at sud-
den departure of Subasic for Moscow without first reporting to Church-
ill and to King Peter. He further stated that he was not consulted by
Subasic as to details of the agreement. Churchill accordingly, said
Cadogan, sent a cable to the British Ambassador in Moscow instructing
him to ask Subasic to proceed immediately to London to report to
King Peter and Churchill. Churchill also sent cable to Stalin inform-
ing him that neither Churchill nor King Peter were consulted by
Subasic during his conference with Tito with respect to agreement
and specifically asked him not to make any decisions until Churchill
had opportunity to get a complete report of the agreement and until
CIA-RDP78T03&4Ar0662Tdbb30001-0
We have also received from our representative in Belgrade a con-
current report concerning the Tito-Subasic agreement . .. .
11. . . Subasic said that Tito was very reasonable although urged
by followers who are anxious to set up a federated republic im-
mediately. Subasic indicated the regency compromise agreement by
Tito was only to obtain immediate recognition of United States and
England. If this recognition is withheld I feel that the agreement
might weaken.
"Subasic plans to go to Moscow tomorrow for three or four days
and will sign agreement when he returns provided presumably Peter
agrees."
The OSS representative in London has forwarded the following ac-
count of an interview between Prime Minister Churchill and King
Peter. The information was received from King Peter immediately
following the interview on 17 November:
Churchill, holding in his hand a copy of the proposed agreement
between Tito and Subasich, commented to King Peter that the draft
could have been worse and that it represented at least a partial victory
because it recognized, for the time being, the constitutional Monarchy.
"As you know," Churchill added, "I am against a Regency. . . . I
thought Subasich was statesman enough to see the inadvisability of
such a step. But I believe this clause may be eliminated; the agree-
ment is not yet final."
King Peter told Churchill that he regarded the agreement as a polite
way to oust the King quietly, that ... he wished to disavow Subasich
immediately for transgressing his powers and for proceeding to Moscow
without first reporting to him. This comment, however, is said to
have infuriated Churchill, who warned the King under no circum-
stances to take any action before Subasich has returned to Lon-
don. . . .
Churchill reportedly added: "You know I do not trust Tito. Ile
surreptitiously flew to Moscow to meet with Stalin before my arrival
in London. He is nothing but a Communist thug, but he is in power
and we must reckon with that fact. President Roosevelt, Stalin, and I
have agreed that there will be a plebiscite by which the people of
Yugoslavia will decide on the question of the Monarchy. Your re-
IA-RDP78TO3194A000200030001-0
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King Peter had opportunity to study same. . . ."
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turn, therefore, will have to be postponed until the plebiscite takes
place." The King replied, "What chance have I in a plebiscite when
Tito is in Yugoslavia? It will be nothing but a farce." Churchill
then stated that he would insure that the plebiscite would be super-
vised by "impartial umpires" including "British, Americans and
Russians."
During, the conversation, the King said, "I have followed your advice,
Mr. Prime Minister, since I escaped from Yugoslavia, and look where
I am today." To which Churchill replied, "Would you have been
better off if you had followed Mihailovich?"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
... In a lengthy conversation with the OSS representative in Bel-
grade on 5 December, Subasich indicated that his visit to Moscow
had been a difficult ordeal. Much time was spent discussing questions
of government procedure pending a plebiscite, which Subasich feels
will take place six months after the complete liberation of Yugoslavia.
According to Subasich, Stalin insisted on the free expression of popular
opinion in Yugoslavia and expressed abhorrence of any Yugoslav "ex-
periments" in Communism or Bolshevism. Stalin appeared shocked
to learn that some delegates to the Serb congress (the Supreme Anti-
Fascist Assembly of National Liberation of Serbia, held in mid-
November 1944) were elected by acclaim, which he characterized
as an undemocratic procedure.
Subasich reportedly admitted to British authorities in Belgrade that
the return of King Peter was out of the question at present. To the
OSS representative Subasich admitted surprise at the attitude of the
Serbs, whom he had considered monarchists, and added that if King
Peter were to return it would cause riots and disorders. . . .
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
. MacLean has shown the OSS representative in Belgrade a
lengthy, strongly-worded, and slightly menacing message from Church-
to Tito, protesting against the non-cooperative and discourteous
ill
attitude of Tito and his subordinates toward the British. The message
mentioned a number of incidents involving ApprovedlFor Relea military
2005/01/05 : C
70 CONFIDENTIAL
operations on the Dalmatian coast. MacLean states that Tito ap-
peared much disturbed by the communication and offered profuse
apologies. At the same time, however, Tito complained that the
British had failed to keep him informed of their operations, and stated
that the incidents were due largely to the unexpected appearance of
strong British forces in various areas.
Churchill's message also emphasized the necessity for genuinely
democratic elections in implementing the Tito-Subasich agreement,
and expressed the hope that all democratic groups will be free to
put forward their candidates and support them in election campaigns.
Churchill added that he expects the question of the monarchy will be
put directly to the electorate and that the vote will be by free and
secret ballot. (Subasich had informed the OSS representative in Bel-
grade that present plans call for a constitutional assembly and not the
electorate to decide this issue.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
... From our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow ...
"King saw Churchill at 3:00 P.M. on 13 December. The conference
lasted 1 hour. .. .
"In discussing Tito-Subasic agreement Churchill said, `I advise
you to sign this agreement for with it the constitutional monarchy
is helped to some extent and it is not as bad as it looks, If you
sign it there is still a chance for you. If you refuse to sign Tito may
form his own government and banish you forever from Yugoslavia.
I cannot make up your mind for you. It will have to be your own
decision. You are your own master. Think about it and don't rush.
You can take your time and we shall discuss it further.' Churchill
suggested that King and Subasic meet with him on Friday at 5:00
P.M. King agreed. . . ..
Subsequent to the receipt of the report set forth above we have
just received another dispatch dated 14 December 1944 from 'Mr.
Yarrow, which reads as follows:
"King Peter decided to seek advice and assistance of godfather,
King George of England. Peter telephoned him today and will
see King George this afternoon or tomorrow morning."
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
We have just received by pouch a report of a conference which
our representative Mr. Bernard Yarrow had with Subasic on 15 De-
cember 1944. . . .
"Yesterday, December 15, I had a long discussion with Prime Min-
ister Subasic. Knowing him as I do for the last two years, I should
like to say that I am pretty certain that he spoke his mind to me
and was utterly frank in those matters which he related. . . .
"When Subasic got to Bari on his last trip, he was met by an
official of the British Foreign Office, Mr. Philip Broad. Mr. Broad
suggested that he accompany the Prime Minister on his trip to Yugo-
slavia, to which the Prime Minister replied that he appreciated
very much the kindness of Mr. Broad to be of assistance to him
but he preferred to conduct his negotiations with Tito alone. He
amplified his statement by saying that he did not wish it to be said
among the National Committee of Liberation that he was traveling
around with a British representative of the Foreign Office. .. .
"The Prime Minister related to me that when he first got to
Belgrade after its liberation he knew by that time that he was con-
demned on an alleged indictment that he was responsible for the
death of many communists, whom he interned before the Germans
advanced into Yugoslavia, because he did not release them in time.
Instead of evading the issue, said the Prime Minister, he delivered
a two hour talk before the National Committee of Liberation in the
presence of Tito, who brought him into the Assembly. He told me
how, after the two hour talk, he convinced them that he was not
responsible in any manner for the deaths at the hands of the Germans.
"He told them of his impressions of America and I could gather
that he tried to give them the impression that he was very well
acquainted with the policy of the American Government, has con-
tacts with officials of that Government and would be in a position
to handle Yugoslav affairs more successfully because of his presence
in America for two years and the contacts established by him there.
"The attitude of the members of the National Committee of Lib-
eration towards him was, according to Subasic, most cautious and
distant. He heard rumors that they were regarding him as a spy
and agent for King Peter II and were most uncommunicative with him.
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"The Russians, during his stay in Belgrade, were exceedingly cor-
dial to him and showed every sign of consideration and attention.
Ile struck up a friendship with General Kornieff, who was the head
of the Russian military mission in Yugoslavia. It was Kornieff who
had a large comfortable chair built in the Douglas plane which took
him eventually from Belgrade to Rumania. Later on Subasic got
to know and became very friendly with Colonel Melnikoff, who,
although a colonel in rank, has more authority and power, according
to Subasic, than General Kornieff. It was Melnikoff who accom-
panied the Prime Minister to Russia when he undertook his trip to see
Stalin.
"The Prime Minister related to me the following incident: before
his departure from Yugoslavia to Ploesti, General Kornieff asked him
whether he would prefer to fly in a Russian or Yugoslav plane, that
they were both of the Douglas model built in Russia. Kornieff said
he was asking the question because on the Yugoslav plane there
was the Red Star emblem. The Prime Minister replied to Kornieff
that he did not mind the star as long as the plane was a Yugoslav
plane.
"The Prime Minister spoke to me at length about Tito. He told
me he found Tito to be exceedingly reasonable, that although he
is a devoted communist by `religion' he found no traces of his ideology
as far as Yugoslavia is concerned. He regards him primarily as a
Croat and a good Yugoslav. Tito became exceedingly friendly to
Subasic, according to his report.
"Tito told Subasic that he is surrounded by a bunch of incompetent
persons who, although good communists at heart, know very little
about how to handle affairs of state. He complained to him time
and again of the troubles they cause him by their ignorance and
incompetence. Said Tito, `You, Subasic, can be of the greatest
assistance to me and Yugoslavia. You can handle delicately and
tactfully our relations with the western democracies and America.
It is too bad that we are both Croats but we shall manage and make
Yugoslavia in the future a happy democratic state.'
"The Prime Minister related to me that when he was brought by
Major General Velebit to Yugoslavia., it was to Vrsac where Tito's
headquarters were located that he was escorted. The General left
him in the hall where he waited for fifteen minutes and when Tito
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came out he turned to Velebit in great rage and said, `My instruc-
tions were not to bring the Prime Minister to me. You always mix
things up. You know that I wanted to come and greet the Prime
Minister at his villa instead of him coming to me.' The Prime Min-
ister cited to me that incident as an example of the respect with
which Tito is treating him. He said that it was at Tito's request
that he saw Stalin. He stated that it was exceedingly important
for him to meet with Stalin and discuss with him in detail the state
of affairs of Yugoslavia and therefore he took the trip at Tito's request.
"Another incident related to me by Subasic as proof of Tito's trust
in him was that the Prime Minister suggested to appoint Dr. Ante
Pavelic, formerly his secretary in New York, as Counsel General
and perhaps Minister in South Africa. Subasic told Tito that of
course it was a bit embarrassing to appoint Dr. Pavelic to that post
because he bears the very same name as the Croatian quisling. Tito,
however, dismissed that obstacle saying, `What difference does it
make what his name is. If you find him reliable I shall appoint
him as Minister to South Africa when I become Prime Minister.'
11
. Tito begged the Prime Minister to accept the portfolio of
Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to the Prime Minister, Tito
assured him that he will give him complete freedom of action and will
be guided entirely in the field of foreign policy by Subasic's sugges-
tions and ideas. Tito told the Prime Minister that he is contemplat-
ing to cultivate the close cooperation of the western democracies and
America.
"Prime Minister related to me further that Tito, although he will
never pursue a policy against the interest of Russia, will nevertheless
attempt his utmost to build up a closer economic and diplomatic
relationship between Yugoslavia and Great Britain and the United
States.
"The Prime Minister told me that Tito was distressed a couple of
weeks ago when he received a letter from Churchill, couched in the
sharpest language he has ever received from Churchill. Subasic
told me that he personally saw that letter and gave me the following
account of same:
"It seems that Churchill recently sent a request to Tito for permis-
sion to land several divisions of Anglo-American troops in western
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Croatia along the Dalmatia coast. Tito refused categorically to permit
Anglo-American troops to land in Croatia. Thereafter Churchill sent
his famous letter to Tito in which he upbraided Tito in no uncertain
terms and told him that Allied troops can land wherever they wish if
the military operations require it.
"Tito, according to Subasic, was terribly shaken up and distraught
over the message and took the point of view that he would not give
in to Churchill because he was fearful, as he stated to Subasic, that
the Croatian separatists and all elements in Croatia who are against
Tito, would seize upon the opportunity to separate from. Yugoslavia.
Tito was very nervous that the presence of Allied troops in Croatia
and Dalmatia would jeopardize his position and would afford the
Croatian nationalistic elements an opportunity to rally against the
National Committee of Liberation.
"Subasic told me confidentially that he shared entirely Tito's point
of view. He told me that he knows only too well that the Vatican is
trying to organize a federation of Catholic states into which Croatia
should be included and that he favors Tito's feeling that Croatian
separatists would avail themselves of the opportunity when the Allied
troops landed in Yugoslavia to march against the Partisans.
"Subasic told me that Churchill was exceedingly nervous and
jittery when he left for Moscow but that he, Subasic, could see no
other way and hopes to pacify Churchill when he sees him. He will
try to explain to him that he did it for one reason only: to come to an
agreement with Tito and that he needed Stalin's backing in dealing
with the members of the National Committee of Liberation.
"In relating his story yesterday, Dr. Subasic told me that at the
very beginning Stalin opened the conversation saying, 'You under-
stand, Ivan Oissipovic, (addressing him in Slavic style;, calling him
by his first name and the first name of his father) that Churchill and
I have agreed to work out our arrangement on Yugoslavia on a fifty-
fifty basis.' He said Stalin was very cautious with him when they
spoke about diplomatic matters, but again, the Prime Minister reiter-
ated, Stalin warned him not to try to emulate Soviet Russia. Stalin
allegedly said, `You have not the territory of Russia nor the people of
Russia. You are a small country of small landowners in the heart
of Europe. You will have to build your state upon democratic prin-
ciples with equal representation for all the national groups of Yugo-
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slavia. You will have to seek economic assistance from America the
way we here in Russia are planning to do after the war is over.'
Stalin, according to Subasic, spoke in `very warm terms about the
United States.'
"Discussing the monarchy, Stalin wanted to know from Subasic
what the people's feelings are about King Peter, II. Subasic confided
in me for the first time that the King is not popular in Croatia,
Macedonia and Slovenia but that he has some following, of course, in
Serbia, and that he told this to Stalin. Stalin replied that he does
not care whether there is a monarchy or a republican form of gov-
ernment but no one should force the people to accept a monarchy
if they do not wish it.
"Upon returning to Yugoslavia from Moscow, Subasic told me that
his prestige went up tremendously in Yugoslavia. The members of
the National Committee of Liberation who condemned him first and
treated him like a spy and agent for the monarchy made every effort
to cultivate his friendship. He told me that he found an entirely
different attitude when he returned to Yugoslavia. That was one
reason why he is glad that he took the trip to see Stalin. .. .
"Talking further to me about King Peter, Subasic confided in me
in no uncertain terms that he regards King Peter's chances to return
to Yugoslavia as absolutely nil. He said that he is convinced that
King Peter will never return but added, `Why should I destroy his
hopes.'
11
.. . Subasic told me as a deep secret that there are several
Partisan divisions at the Dalmatian coastline and that if the British
troops should land in Yugoslavia along the Dalmatian coast they will
meet with a formidable resistance on the part of the Partisans. He
said that he hopes Churchill will not repeat the mistake in Yugo-
slavia that he made in Athens......
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
... From . . . Yarrow:
"Saw Subasic yesterday December 27th. He expressed great an-
noyance at the King's failure to see him during last week. Subasic
stated that if King refuses to, sign agreement he will forever forfeit his
chances to be King. Signing of agreement will in Subasic's opinion
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arouse sympathy for King and enhance his prestige. Subasic added
that in event of King's refusal to sign, a new government will be formed
nevertheless. Subasic has not seen Churchill.
"Saw King this afternoon December 28th. King contemplating
to prepare extensive memorandum explaining unconstitutionality of
present agreements. Told me he will forward copies of same wher
ready to Churchill, British Foreign Office, Ambassador Patterson and
may even send copy to Moscow. King determined to insist upor
naming regency. Princess Aspasia and Queen Alexandra exerting
utmost pressure on King not to yield."
8 January 1945
. . From . . . Yarrow:
"Dined with Subasic last night, very perturbed over present situation. Has appointment with Churchill Monday afternoon, 8 January
prior to British cabinet meeting dealing with Yugoslavia problem.
"King George of Greece saw King Peter and told latter that he wa!
given the `3rd degree'. He spent with Churchill from 1000 p.m. tc
0500 a.m. when he finally weakened and gave consent to Regent':
appointment. Peter is full of determination not to follow same path.'
11 January 1945
The following information has been transmitted by the OSS representative in London:
On the night of 10 January, at 2300 hours, King Peter completed
deliberations with his advisors concerning his final reply to Churchill
on the proposed agreement between the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile
and Marshall Tito's Partisan administration. The letter to Churchill
[rejecting the proposals concerning a regency and the delegation of
legislative powers to the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council] was to be
delivered on the morning of 11 January. At 1200 noon on 11 January
it was planned to release the King's decision in a communique.
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At 1100 on the morning of 11 January, British Ambassador Steven-
son learned from King Peter's adjutant the contents of the proposed
communique . . . Stevenson telephoned to King Peter and Princess
Aspasia Eden's instructions and warning not under any circumstances
to release the communique to the press. Eden himself telephoned
King Peter at his country residence requesting an immediate inter-
view. 42 press representatives who had gathered at the Royal Yugo-
slav Court to receive the promised communique were informed, much
to their annoyance, that last-minute developments had prevented its
publication. .. .
11 January 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following
information:
In a recent conference with the OSS representative, Premier
Subasich summarized his conference of 8 January with Prime Minister
Churchill. .. .
According to Subasich, Churchill declared: "I do not like this agree-
ment. It appears to set up a dictatorship by Tito, who has the army
under his control. But I do not see any other way to solve the prob-
lem and I shall advise the King to sign the agreement." Churchill
further pointed out that the agreement does not provide for the free
functioning of other political parties [than those included in the
Partisan movement] and emphasized that the members of the Avnoj
[the Partisan Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation] are not
elected representatives of the people. Subasich replied that he is
contemplating the possibility of broadening the Avnoj by inclusion
of former parliamentarians now in Yugoslavia.
In conversation with the OSS representative, Subasich complained
of not having seen King Peter for three weeks. He expressed con-
cern over the "unfounded fears" of Britain and the United States that
a Communist dictatorship will be installed in Yugoslavia, adding that
the people of Yugoslavia want only a democracy and will insist on this
form of government. Even Stalin himself, said Subasich, does not
wish a Communist regime in Yugoslavia. Finally, Subasich expressed
his hope that "the King will himself grant concessions rather than
have them taken by the masses themselves."
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78 CONFIDENTIAL -11
29 January 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information has been transmitted by the OSS repre-
sentative in London:
On 27 January, Ambassador Stevenson handed Subasich a written
communication from the British Foreign Office, stating that the Foreign
Office had received a telegram from Stalin with reference to Churchill's
speech of 16 January. The telegram expressed Stalin's opinion that
the Yugoslav Government should depart at once for Belgrade and fuse
with the Tito government, which would then name a Regency.
Churchill replied to this telegram that he wanted United States con-
sent, which had not yet been received.
In spite of this information, the Yugoslav Cabinet again expressed
itself as unanimously opposed to leaving London until a settlement
had been reached with King Peter. Peter is still holding firmly to
his position, but desires help "in defense of the people's liberties."
Partisan General Velebit is conferring with leaders of the progressive
democratic parties. Subasich is in a state of physical collapse and
has begged the King for two days rest.
14 February 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The OSS representative in London has transmitted the following
information:
Premier Subasich has stated that the entire Yugoslav Cabinet will
leave on Thursday, 15 February, for Belgrade with the consent of
King Peter. The King's nominations for the Regency, Milan Grol,
Yuray Shutay (Sutej), and Dushan Sernets (Sernec), will be sub-
mitted by Subasich for Tito's approval.
26 February 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information has been transmitted by the OSS repre-
sentative in Belgrade:
Premier Subasich, who is currently negotiating with Partisan leaders
in Belgrade, states that he continues to find Marshal Tito most rceason-
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able, but that Tito's subordinates are more difficult. Many of the
latter, Subasich explains, have had little opportunity to learn about
the United States or Britain, and hence underrate their importance.
Subasich said he would endeavor to carry out King Peter's instruc-
tions concerning the regency council, but if this should be impossible
and the King should refuse to ratify the counterproposals of Tito and
Subasich, the result would be "very bad." Subasich would not say
whether, in such case, he would proceed without the King's approval,
but stated that he definitely would not return to London.
Ed.vard Kardely, Vice President of the National Liberation Com-
mittee (the Partisan provisional cabinet) and one of the leading nego-
tiators, asserted on 22 February that the basic conflict between the
King and Tito is due to the fact that the King insists on nominating
politically prominent men to the regency, while Tito feels the regents
should exercise only the royal prerogatives and should be non-political
figures "Otherwise," added Kardely, "we would have a regency fol-
'.(owing one political line while we would be following another." This,
said Kardely, was Tito's reason for rejecting Milan Grol and Yuray
Shutey (Sutej), the latter of whom is unacceptable to the Partisans
for other reasons as well. . . .
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information has been transmitted by the OSS repre-
sentatiive in Belgrade:
In Serbia there is reported to be considerable dissatisfaction with
the lack of a genuine Serb in the newly appointed Yugoslav regency
council. [Srdjan Budisavlyevich is a Serb from Croatia, who is be-
lieved to have little or no following in Serbia.] The disappointment
of anti-Partisan Serbs has contributed to a general feeling of despair
among those Yugoslavs who had hoped that Subasich would exercise
a restraining influence on the Partisans. General Alexander's visit
to Belgrade also contributed to this feeling. At first the opposition
interpreted Alexander's arrival as a sign of Allied pressure on Tito.
When the General's convoy of fifty jeeps entered Belgrade, rumors
quickly spread that this was the vanguard of an Allied armored corps,
and. Alexander himself was greeted by spontaneous demonstrations.
The opposition's hopes were soon dashed, however, by the realization
that the Western Allies were not prepared to rescue them from their
predicament. In this atmosphere the announcement of the regency,
while relieving the uncertainty of past weeks, has produced little evi-
dence of the general rejoicing reported in Belgrade by the BBC.
30 April 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
I attach summary and conclusions of a report from Lt. Col. Charles
Thayer, who is in charge of our mission in Yugoslavia.
15 April 1945
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
.... Aside from the restoration of essential services, Tito has made
little progress in solving his economic problems. What steps he has
taken are toward a centralized state-directed economy which under
an inexperienced bureaucracy have not improved a bad situation. .. .
Although Tito has continued to assert that democracy and freedom
are his ultimate aims, his methods have in reality been completely
dictatorial, and the system of control he has imposed on the country
has been in effect no less thorough and rigorous than those of the
German dominated puppet regimes that preceded him.
Under the guise of military necessity, a censorship has been enforced
that permits of no criticism either in the press or in public utterances.
Active non-conformists are arrested and imprisoned until they can
satisfy Tito's followers that they are no longer dangerous.
The Yalta recommendation to broaden the base of the supreme
legislative organ by including uncompromised members of the last
parliament is being carried out by a committee composed exclusively
of veteran Partisans and dominated by the Communists who may be
expected to apply strict standards, peculiarly their own in determining
the eligibility of former Yugoslav politicians to participate in the
future political life of the country.
Similarly, if past performance is any guide, future elections will be
dominated by the National Liberation Front which heretofore has in
practice had the exclusive right of nominating candidates in local
elections. The Front, together with its affiliated organizations among
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the youth and the women has already managed to penetrate every
city ward, every block, and practically every house. Similarly, every
office and factory has its political organizers who are establishing a
disciplined control over the workers.
In addition he has organized a political police force and an espionage
system recruited from his most loyal followers, who, with fanatical
zeal seek out their internal enemies and dispose of them with little
regard for those legal rights which form the basis of a genuine demo-
cratic government. .. .
In foreign affairs, as in internal affairs, Russia is the lodestone gov-
erning Tito's policies. In every international issue, whether it is the
direct concern of Yugoslavia or not, Tito and his press assiduously
follow Moscow's lead. In fact, Tito and his followers exhibit a servility
toward the Kremlin which contrasts strangely with their otherwise
dynamic individuality. It is enough for Moscow to express a view
and the Belgrade press reprints it in toto, adding a few biting words
of its own. Under these circumstances it is no small wonder that in
Belgrade one finds no evidence of a corps of Russian agents directing
the activities of individual ministries or agencies. Should the necessity
arise for specific guidance, no doubt a brief message from Stalin to
Tito would suffice. .. .
13 May 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following message came in yesterday from our representative
in Belgrade:
"Yesterday morning Air Vice Marshall Lee and myself were sum-
moned to the office of Arso Jovanovic, Chief of Staff for Tito. He
advised us curtly that Tito had ordered our missions to leave, including
both the Belgrade mission and those in the field. He stated that our
work should be taken over by the Military Attaches. Obviously this
is in retaliation for our strong stand on Trieste and Corinthia. I made
no commitment to him on time of withdrawal, and I do not intend to
hurry. Lee stated that he presumed the Yugoslav missions in Cairo,
Rome and Bari would be withdrawn. Arso obviously had not thought
of this but was forced to say yes.
As he had no word of appreciation for the missions, I reviewed for
him what the missions had done for Yugoslavia in bringing recogni-
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tion to the Partisans and in providing material aid. He replied that
the Partisans would have won with or without our support and that
the materials we provided were their right to receive. He then
launched into a tirade about who occupied Trieste and Venezia
Giulia first."
16 June 1945
I believe you will be interested in the following dispatch which
we have received from our representative at Caserta:
"1. Following memorandum reported to have been distributed to
all Jugoslav Army Officers: `It has been seen in the past that Jugo-
slavian officers do not mix with the officers of the USSR and we wish
to have greater brotherhood between the officers of these two coun-
tries. Do not be afraid to talk of military information and army
movements to the Russian officers are to be considered as instructors
and brothers and our only allies.7 (Signed Tito).'
5 September 1945
OSS representatives in Rome, Madrid and Kunming have trans-
mitted the following information, as of 1 September, concerning under-
ground movements and secret intelligence activities continuing at the
present time in the following areas:
YUGOSLAVIA: Royal Yugoslav missions and Chetnik groups (Yugo-
slav nationalists, some of whose leaders cooperated with the Germans)
are operating in Italy under cover of a Yugoslav welfare society which
recently established a new branch in Milan. Under the leadership
of Zhivko Topalovich (President of Mihailovich's anti-Partisan "Na-
tional Committee") energetic steps are being taken to unite numerous
Serb, Croat and Slovene anti-Tito groups into one so-called "demo-
cratic bloc." Detention and refugee camps for Yugoslavs in Italy
are being combed for recruits to this new organization. Late in
August the organization dispatched a Chetnik agent to renew contact
with clandestine anti-Partisan groups in Yugoslavia. .. . .
' Sic.
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, bearing on the Yugoslav elections sched-
uled for 11 November, has been transmitted by the OSS representative
in Belgrade and is dated 10, 11 and 12 September:
Partisan Attitude. The official Partisan attitude toward the elec-
tions was outlined by Lieutenant General Milovan Djilas, Minister
of State for Montenegro in the Tito cabinet and an influential member
of the Partisan Liberation Front, in a recent speech to a plenary
assembly of the (Partisan) Anti-Fascist Youth Organization. Djilas
stated: "Our enemies at home and the foreign reactionaries who are
helping them regard these elections as if they were to decide the
destiny of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia. The leaders of the
National Liberation struggle, however, do not consider the elections
to involve any question of the survival of the National Liberation
Front. . .. We consider the question of our national government
actually to have been decided by our armed struggle. These elec-
tions by the peoples of Yugoslavia should only endow the results of
our struggle with legality and constitutionality. We consider the
question of monarchy versus republic to have been settled by our
struggle. It has not been formally settled, as far as the final legaliza-
tion of the form of government in Yugoslavia is concerned, but in
actual practice it is already decided. What then is the purpose of
these elections? Their purpose is to enable us "to continue along the
lines of the national liberation struggle." . . .
Precept from Poor Richard.
One of the most egregious penetrations in the history of espionage
was the British agent Edward Bancroft, who made himself invaluable
to Benjamin Franklin as private secretary when Franklin was the
American envoy in Paris working to get French aid for the revolu-
tion.1 Franklin has been called a dupe and stubborn fool for ignoring
repeated warnings about this man, who was not conclusively exposed
until a collection of British secret service papers was published more
than a century later. On the following pages, however, is reproduced
a letter from Franklin acknowledging a similar warning,z,which shows
the attitude he took toward the security of his secretariat. It is also
a classic contribution to doctrine for general application.
'The full story is told in Studies V 1, p. A53 ff.
2 Transcription of warning letter on p. 88.
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Paris, Jan. 19. 177 i
Madam,
Madam,
Your most obedient &
humble Servant
BF
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I am much oblig'd to you for your kind Attention to my Welfare,
in the Information you give me. I have no doubt of its being well
founded. But as it is impossible to discover in every case the Falsity
of pretended Friends who would know our Affairs; and more so t prevent being watch'd by Spies, when interested People may think
proper to place them for that purpose; I have long observ'd one Rule
which prevents any Inconvenience from such Practices. It is simply
this, to be concern'd in no Affairs that I should blush to have made
publick; and to do nothing but what Spies may see & welcome.
When a Man's Actions are just & honourable, the more they are known
the more his Reputation is increas'd & establish'd. If I was sure
therefore that my Valet de Place was a Spy, as probably he is, I
think I should not discharge him for that, if in other Respects I liked
him. The various Conjectures you mention concerning my Business
here, must have their Course. They amuse those that make them,
& some of those that hear them; they do me no harm, and therefore
it is not necessary that I should take the least Pains to rectify them.
I am glad to learn that you are in a Situation that is agreeable to
you, and that Mr. Richie was lately well. My Daughter and her
Children were so when I left them, but I have lost my dear Mrs.
Franklin now two Years since. I have the Honour to be very
respectfully
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Carnbray 12th Jan" 1777
Sir
The agreeable manner in which I lived for several years in the once happy
citty of Philadelphia-made too deep an impression upon my mind-for either
time-distance or the vicissitudes of fortune to erase; you will not be surprised
Sir--after this declaration-when I inform you-that the unhappy situation of
the affairs of America-has caused me to pass many days in painful anxiety-&
sleepless nights since the commencement of the present warr with England,
hoping & fearing alternatively-for the safety of the country in general but
more perticulerly for the fate of those-whom repeated acts of friendship and
kindness-rendered truly dear to my heart-it is from these sentiments-that I
take the liberty of addressing you Sir-being fully persuaded from the knowledge
I have of your amiable charactor, that you will not only pardon the freedom
I am now takeing-but will allso-keep the purport of this letter-from the
knowledge of any other Person-or otherwise-I shall be involved in great
trouble-but I am quite easy upon that head-knowing that that it is to a gentle-
man of integrity-I am writeing and therefore without further preface-I proceed
to the purpose of this letter-which is to inform you Sir-that you are surrounded
with spies-who watch your every movement who you visit-& by whom you
are visited-of the latter there are who pretend to be friends to the cause of
your Country but that is a mere pretense-your own good sense will easilly
infer-the motive of their conduct. one Party assures- that you are seeking
aid & support from this Kingdom the other party-insinuate that you have given
up that Cause & are making the best terms you can for the private advantage
of your own family connections & friends I dare not be more explicit-for
weighty reasons to my self-but on the truth of what I inform you-you may
strictly rely. as I am ignorant of your address-I send this to Mess" Le Normond
& Co. Rue St Honory-to deliver to your own hand-& shall rejoice to know that
you have received it safe-if at your leisure you favor me with a few lines-please
to address me at Cambrai-that address will be sufficient-as I have resided here
for two years with five young ladies of fortune-Doughters to my perticuler
friends in England, who are all under my care-we return to England in the
spring season-where if I can render you any acceptable service-to know your
Commands will give me real pleasure. I make no doubt but you have many
abler friends-but I am sure none more willing then my self. I hope you left
M" Franklin & your Doughter well-an account whereof will give me pleasure
I had a letter from my husband a few days since-but He does not mention
the affairs of America.
I have the honor to be with great esteem
Sir Your humble serv
Juliann Ritchie
Beni" Franklin Esq'.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
THE NEW MEANING OF TREASON. By Rebecca Wes. (Nev
York: Viking. 1964. 374 pp. $6.95.)
TREASON IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. By Margaret Boveri
Translated from the German (Hamburg, 1956) by Jonathan Stein
berg.* (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1963. 370 pp. $5.95.'
These two books cover roughly the same subject ;matter-treason
and espionage in World War II and the postwar period. Both are
thoughtful and scholarly and obviously required a great deal of re
search, which on the whole appears to have been most carefully done
Both try through detailed and extensive analyses of episodes the,
class as treachery to evolve a thesis of philosophical concepts whic
have general application, and here I believe both fail.
In her earlier book on The Meaning of Treason (1947) Miss Wes
presented a good deal of the same material but came to a quite differ
ent conclusion. In effect, she said that the high development o
modern civilization impairs the relationship between the citizen an(
the state and that loyalty to country is no longer the simple an(
clear-cut bond it once was. Now she has expanded and updated he
discussion of William Joyce, the wartime Lord Haw-Haw of Radi
Berlin, and added more recent cases, notably those involving Burges
and Maclean, Vassall, Abel, the Rosenbergs, and Profurno, layin;
particular emphasis on the security aspects; and she concludes tha
in today's world there is a pervasive and expanding espionage effor
met by an equally widespread and expanding counterespionage effort
While recognizing the national need for security, she dwells at som
length on the dangers that security and countersecurity activity pose
to our societies and warns us to balance security requirements with
determination to preserve our liberties.
The German author, Miss Boveri, argues a change in the nature c
loyalties since the days of feudalism, pointing out that with th
French Revolution the simple allegiance of vassal to lord began t
break down and be replaced by the more complicated obligation
of a citizen in the developing democratic states. As an example c
* See bibliographical note p. 98.
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the feudal practice she notes the soldier's oath required by the King
of Prussia as late as 1831. Clearly inconsistent with this thesis
is her own observation that the oath of personal loyalty which Hitler
required of all German officers was one of the main inhibitions to
their active participation in the 20 July 1944 plot against him.
In developing her thesis Miss Boveri uses a remarkable collection
of examples. One of the first is Vidkun Quisling, who incidentally
bears a strong resemblance to William Joyce. He is followed by such
figures as King Leopold of Belgium, Marshal Petain, Admiral Darlan,
and Laval. She then mixes in Joyce, Ezra Pound, Tokyo Rose, and
Knut Hamsun. Next she treats at length the opposition to Hitler by
the various German groups from the old conservatives like General
Beck through the curious combination of people involved in "Rote
Kapelle" and on to Stauffenberg. Finally she mentions rather briefly
such cases as those of Rudolf Rossler (the "Lucy" of Alexander
Foote's net) and Otto John.
She claims to be able to see a common thread running through all
these diverse types, but I find the argument unconvincing. It is
difficult to see the tie between a despicable William Joyce and
Stauffenberg, or between the patriot Rossler and Ezra Pound. More
generally, espionage cases like that of Colonel Abel cannot be classed
as treason. The detailed studies of all these people in both books
seem to me to be not susceptible of the authors' interpretations but
rather to lead to the conclusion that
The wrong is mixed. In tragic life, God wot,
No villain need bel Passions spin the plot:
We are betrayed by what is false within.'
Another book on Lord Haw-Haw appeared in 1964, written by
J. A. Cole.2 It covers the same ground Miss West did and expands
particularly on Joyce's activities in Germany and his personal life.
(Curiously, it does not credit or even refer to her work, although some
of its passages are so like hers as to suggest familiarity with it.) Is
William Joyce worth all this effort? Perhaps the British, on whom
his broadcasts had such an impact during the war, find the subject
fascinating; but for me, well written as these books are, they do not
make a major figure out of him. Both authors show a surprising
1 George Meredith, Modern Love, XLIII.
'Lord Haw-Haw and William Joyce: The Full Story (New York: Farrar,
Straus & Giroux. $4.95.)
sympathy for their anti-hero, whose behavior manifested few redeem-
ing features except a certain amount of rough courage and a perverse
sentimentality about England.
Lawrence It. Houston
RED PAWN: The Story of Noel Field. By Flora Lewis., (New
York: Doubleday. 1965. 283 pp. $4.95.)
In 1949 three American citizens disappeared behind the iron cur-
tain-Noel Field, his wife Herta, and his brother Hermann. A year
later his foster daughter Erika Wallach bravely went to Communist
headquarters in East Berlin looking for him; she was arrested and
disappeared too. In 1954 Noel and Herta were released in Buda-
pest and chose to remain there. Hermann was released in Warsaw
and hurried back to the United States. Erika Wallach was released
in Moscow and, not having U.S. citizenship, was finally permitted to
join her American husband and children here only after Congressman
Francis Walters had intervened on her behalf.
Noel, Herta, and Erika were all avowed Communists. Hermann
was not. Their arrests, tortured interrogations, and lengthy stays in
prison played a part-perhaps a key part-in the extensive purges
of the late Stalin period. The incredibly complex story of their case,
and of the era, is told in Red Pawn.
Pawn, dupe, or something more sinister, Noel Field became a touch-
stone in most of the East European purge trials in the early fifties-
those of Rajk and his associates in Hungary, of Gomulka in Poland,
of Slansky in Czechoslovakia, others in East Germany. Flora Lewis-
Mrs. Sydney Gruson in private life-estimates that the number of
people involved in these purges who had some association, direct or
indirect, with Noel Field may run into the tens or even hundreds of
thousands. Many were executed, committed suicide, died in prison,
or just disappeared. All spent long periods in prison, under torture,
or in work camps in the Soviet Union; the whole thing was a Soviet
show. After Stalin and Beria died, and particularly after Khru-
shchev's revelations at the Twentieth Congress concerning Stalinist
excesses, a great number of the victims were released and rehabilitated.
Some got a posthumous rehabilitation, undoubtedly significant in the
Red Valhalla.
An unhappy central figure in this web, Noel Field was born in
London of American parents in 1904, raised in Switzerland, and edu-
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Gated at Harvard. He was a U.S. Foreign Service employee until
the mid-thirties, when he resigned and went to work for the League
of Nations Secretariat in Geneva: although a Communist, he is sup-
posed to have had scruples about spying on his own country from
his State Department job. This itself is a tip-off as to how good a
Communist he was, and the Communists in fact never accepted him.
All of his many and persistent approaches to leaders to obtain some
important assignment were rejected.
Field was unquestionably of service to the Communists in the
period that began during the Spanish Civil War and continued until
after the end of World War If. Working with the Unitarian Service
Committee, his humanitarian efforts were directed toward getting
preferred treatment for the Communists. During this period he also
made the contact with Allen Dulles in Switzerland that was later used
as evidence of his being an American intelligence agent to justify the
liquidation of many of his Communist contacts. (Dulles made cau-
tious use of him, considering him neither trustworthy nor a real
intelligence operator.)
Flora Lewis has unearthed an impressive amount of information
for this book, considering her difficulties with sources. Noel and
Ilerta Field refused to talk to her. The OSS and CIA files were not
available to her. (Assuming that the data in these would be ex-
clusively historical, she expresses concern over this secrecy.) Erika
Glaser Wallach and Hermann Field undoubtedly told her all they
knew. But she must be given credit for having tracked down thou-
sands of leads to persons living and dead.
Perhaps because of this lack of access to some files, the author
has left one or two erroneous impressions. She overstresses the as-
sistance OSS gave to the Communists during the war, neglecting the
fact that the Soviet Union was an ally of the United States in the
common effort against Nazi Germany. She also seems to place Noel
Field on an undeserved pedestal-possibly because material on his
activities remained thin despite her arduous research-when basically
he was a rather stupid idealist who never held an important post in
his life.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
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CONFIDENTIAL
DIEPPE: The Shame and the Glory. By Terence Robertson. (Bos-
ton: Little, Brown & Co. 1962. 432 pp. $6.50.)
As the fogs of time settle more and more on World War II, obscur-
ing many actions that seemed important at the time, one that stands
clear in historical perspective as of particular intelligence significance
is the raid that was made on the French channel port of Dieppe on
August 19, 1942.
Dieppe has been described as a reconnaissance in force. It was
actually a test battle staged to learn the strength of the German
defenses around a typical channel port. The British General Staff
felt that a landing in near-division strength should be undertaken
in preparation for the invasion of Europe. The Canadians, because
they had been training in England since 1939, were selected to provide
the bulk of the ground forces.
The action developed into five separate ground fights, an air battle,
and a sea skirmish. Three of the landings were disasters, those on
the main beaches at Dieppe and the two flanking ports at Puits and
Pourville. The two successful assaults were on the extreme :flanks:
the 4th Commando destroyed a German battery at Varengeville and
the remnants of the 3rd Commando neutralized the guns at Berneval.
But the slaughter on the beaches made Dieppe one of the most costly
actions of the war.
The reporting on the battle at the time was distorted in nearly the
entire Allied press. British papers called it a Commando raid and
touted the RAF action as a major air victory (RAF losses 113,
Luftwaffe 40). The American press played up American participa-
tion out of all proportion (50 Rangers among more than 6,000 ground
troops). The Canadian reports, coming closest to the truth, saw it as
a bloody catastrophe (3,369 Canadian casualties).
This is the first book-length description of the action at Dieppe
for the Canadian audience. Of the three previous book-length treat-
ments one was published in France and two in England. The official
Canadian history of the war by Stacey devoted only about a hundred
pages to the battle which Canada has more reasons to remember
than any other single action; more Canadians were taken prisoner at
Dieppe than in the entire balance of the European campaign.
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Robertson has done an excellent research job, though obviously
swayed heavily by the emotions which the battle still arouses in
Canada. His book is full of personal anecdotes; he has probably
interviewed just about every survivor in Canada. He pays great at-
tention to the validity of prior intelligence, both British and German,
but he neglects some very important items. If he had treated the
whole action more as an intelligence exercise, stressing the great
value that what was learned at Dieppe assumed nearly two years later
on, D Day in Normandy, his book would have been not only more
perceptive history but perhaps of more solace to the Canadians.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
A TASTE OF FREEDOM. By Robert Jackson. (London: Arthur
Barker. 1964. 207 pp. 21/-.)
No German or Italian prisoner of war who escaped from custody in
England succeeded in making the home run to the continent while
World War II was still in progress. A Taste of Freedom is a roundup
of the frustrations of several men who tried. Some of their tales
have been told in books and articles (for example that of von Werra),
but a few are published here for the first time. Noteworthy among
these is that of Luftwaffe pilots Wappler and Schnabel, who escaped
from a prison near Carlisle, stole a training aircraft from Kingstown
airfield, and flew eastward, Short of fuel and uncertain of their loca-
tion, the Germans put down at a RAF field, where, incredibly, they
'were able to refuel and take to the air again without causing alarm.
The end came when they again ran short of fuel and were forced to
land in a meadow in southeastern England, some 120 miles from
German-held France. With slightly better flying weather this daring
attempt might well have succeeded.
Although not intended as a survey of life in prisoner-of-war camps
in Britain, the book includes considerable background on the schemes
and aberrations of unrepentant Nazis who carried on in the prison
camps from where they had left off in Germany.
Louis Thomas
I CAN TELL IT NOW. Edited by David Brown and W. Richard
Bruner. (New York: E. P. Dutton. 1964. 362 pp. $5.95,)
This is a collection of almost two score past news stories, some
hitherto untold, which stood out in the recollections of the contributors,
members of the Overseas Press Club. Several of them touch, not
sensationally, on intelligence interests.
Drew Middleton recalls bow widely the Nazi invasion of the USSR,
21 June 1941, was foreknown not only in intelligence circles but to
the public, to "everyone but Stalin." Middleton first heard in March
from a British intelligence officer in Lisbon that the German plan
called for the attack that spring. In May the word in Lisbon was
that it had been delayed by the unexpected Balkan campaign (as
indeed it had) but would take place about 20 June. In the first week
of June Anthony Eden told correspondents that 120 divisions were
deployed along the Soviet frontier and would move in sometime during
the last half of the month. Middleton, paying tribute to British in-
telligence for getting this information, says, "Soviet intelligence must
have known of Hitler's build-up"; he apparently hasn't heard of Serge's
warning to Moscow.
Sigrid Schultz reports, not very credibly, end-of-war conversations
with Germans which revealed the Germans' intent to play the Rus-
sians and the Western capitalists off against each other as they had
after World War I. One "carefully planned move" to this end was
to preserve the Reich intelligence files on the United States and turn
them over to the Russians, while on the other hand "Gehlen and his
friends managed to put over a deal with the Americans by using his
ample files [on the USSR] as bait. Germans boast .... that we al-
lowed him to set up his own `Gehlen outfit' that retained its files, sent
out its own agents, and handed over to the Americans only what
Gehlen himself considered suitable while we were footing the bill
for all these operations."
Bob Considine tells the story of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg's espio-
nage activity and trial and ends with a gruesomely detailed eye-witness
account of their electrocution, hers bungled and prolonged.
Four of the selections are centered on Communist leaders. Harrison
Salisbury relives the mysterious apprehension in the Moscow atmos-
phere culminating in the announcement on 13 January 1953 about the
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Doctors' Plot and then the "frozen terror" that reigned until Stalin's
death two months later. William L. Ryan, taking off from his
recollections of Soviet leaders' indiscretions at an October Revolution
banquet in 1953 which Khrushchev did not attend, reviews the former
Premier's career. Jules Dubois writes about Castro's coming to power;
he begins by quoting "Dick" Rubottom on the question whether Fidel
was a Communist: "Every week we had a high-level meeting with all
intelligence agencies in Washington and I always asked for such in-
formation and always received a negative reply." And Martin A.
Bursten, with dubious authority, portrays Janos Kadar as a eunuch
whose sole aim in life has been to survive.
Jules Bergman tells "The Unfinished Saga of the U-2," emphasizing
not the political embarrassment of the Powers shoot-down but the
compelling need there was for reconnaissance, the answer in "one of
the most astounding demonstrations of intelligence work in modern
history," the "colossal" value of the photographic take, and the role
of the U-2 as forerunner of the A-l1 and spy-in-the-sky satellites.
Edward Hymoff reviews his own past coverage of the U.S. and Soviet
space-flight programs. Although he complains that "the United States
has been just as . . . secretive as the Soviets," he has managed to
get hold of a number of secrets, including the fact that U.S. radar sta-
tions in Turkey monitoring Soviet missile launchings are huge installa-
tions with some "screens"-he must mean antennas-"as long as foot-
ball fields."
Daniel G. Van Acken writes about the Cuban missile crisis, less from
the intelligence angle than from the viewpoint of the UN and with
gratitude that "enough men . . . took time out to think." And Jess
Corkin, Parade editor, tells how he spent almost two years promoting
a hot line to Moscow, winning approval from Eisenhower, Nixon,
]Kennedy, and Khrushchev but no action, before that crisis lent suf-
ficient impetus to the idea.
TIE STRATEGY OF SUBVERSION. By Paul W. Blackstock. (Chi-
cago: Quadrangle. 1964. 351 pp. $7.50.)
This is a political scientist's study of covert political (including para-
military) operations as an instrument of state policy. It inquires into
their effectiveness and liabilities and dwells on some persistent prob-
lems in managing and controlling them. As empirical base for his
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analysis and conclusions the author uses three chief examples--some
Tsarist operations in the nineteenth century, Nazi German prewar and
wartime efforts, and at greatest length CIA's publicized activities,
centering on the failure at the Bay of Pigs.
Although he promises the reader that he will keep his attention
on political principles and avoid both U.S. policy recommendations
and scapegoating of U.S. agencies, this choice of evidential base in-
evitably leaves CIA the villain of his book, especially since he dis-
counts the most authoritative accounts of the Bay of Pigs crisis as
CIA-inspired special pleading, quotes approvingly the arguments for a
congressional watchdog committee, and reverts again and again to
Truman's astonishing repudiation of CIA's operational responsibilities.
Ile also steps down from the plane of principle in suggesting that the
FBI rather than CIA should help small nations develop their security
organs, in declaring that the Pentagon has a "far more sophisticated"
counterinsurgency doctrine, and in blaming CIA for not being a silent
service like the British.
The reader comes to suspect, in fact, that the professor is less in-
terested in producing a work of scholarship than in cashing in on the
public interest which made best sellers of two recent journalistic books
on CIA operations. Although his foreword deprecates such "well-
meaning but only partially informed criticism" as "alarmist literature,"
his text proper immediately reverses field and begins to quote these
books respectfully as his authority. This impression of duplicity, of a
facade of objective scholarship over a pandering to sensationalism, is
reinforced by his remarkable act of false coyness during an interview
reported in the Philadelphia Bulletin of 17 January last. .Asked
whether he had ever served with CIA-he hadn't, but in an Army
Special Warfare office-"'It is not in my record,' he replied cau-
tiously-and grinned. That was all I could get from him on the
subject."
On the political science level Blackstock generalizes in conclusion
that among the major world powers covert operations have been over-
sold, are undermined by bureaucratic rivalry over control of them,
introduce distortions into intelligence, interfere in policy making, and
embarrass international relations. Large-scale operations risk spark-
ing a thermonuclear conflagration, and the techniques taught to un-
developed nations foment strife and disorder. Nevertheless he does
not urge that they be altogether abandoned but only insists that "the
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veil of secrecy must be lifted"-he doesn't explain how this fits in
with his admiration for the "silent service" of the British-so that they
can be employed, presumably under the guidance of the political sci-
entists, "with an understanding of the principles involved."
David D. Hawkswell
* The Boveri book (p. 89) was originally published in four paperback volumes
under title Der Verrat im 20. Jahrhundert (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1956-1960). The
British edition (London: Macdonald, 1961) and the American edition reviewed
here represent only the first two volumes of the original, and the American omits
two chapters (31 and 32) contained in the British. (Although both are based
on the same translation, there are also other editorial differences between them.)
The original third volume dealt with Communist agents, including the Sorge ring,
Burgess and Maclean, and Whittaker Chambers, the fourth with problems of
treason and security in the United States.
25X1
STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 9 NO. 3 SUMMER '1965
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any theoretical, doctrinal, opera-
tional, or historical aspect of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or re-
jecting an article rests with the Editorial
Board.
This material contains information affecting the National Defense
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws Title
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to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
The criterion for publication is whether or
not, in the opinion of the Board, the article
makes a contribution to the literature of in-
telligence.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
25X1
25X1
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON ? ALBERT D. WIIEELON
Additional members of the Board are
drawn from other C.iA components.
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 SECRETApproved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors may
come from any member of the intelligence community or, upon in-
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CONTENTS
25X1
On Estimating Reactions .................. John Whitman
Peculiarities of a special service to policy makers. SECRET
Scientific Estimating ................... Wayne G. Jackson
Problem of the technically possible technology.
CONFIDENTIAL
For a Board of Definitions ................ George Berkeley
To pin down terms like "nationalist" and "democracy."
CONFIDENTIAL
Geo-Time and Intelligence .................. Chronom.aniac
Recommends studying the distribution of global working
hours. CONFIDENTIAL
B-29s Against Coke Ovens ................ A. R. Northridge
A field view of Washington's air targeting. CoNFmE:xTIAE
Memoranda for the President: Japanese Feelers
Wm. J. Donovan
Unauthorized efforts to end the war in the Pacific.
CONFIDENTIAL
Training Pays ........................ James A. Savacool
Says a successful denied-area agent. SECRET
The Okhrana's Female Agents, Part II ... Rita T. Kronenbitter
Indigenous recruits in Tsarist anti-revolutionary opera-
tions. CONFIDENTIAL
Cranks, Nuts, and Screwballs ............ David R. McLean
Curiosa and case histories in public relations. CONFIDENTIAL
Communications to the Editors .......... ........
More words for defector. CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature. CONFIDENTIAL
Festung Europa in two great wars .............. .
Fair exchange in the cold war ..... .... ........ . .
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Shortcomings and net usefulness of
a sharply policy-pointed class of esti-
mative exercise.
ON ESTIMATING REACTIONS
John Whitman
The most fascinating and frustrating of the National Intelligence
Estimates which an estimates officer writes begin as follows:
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Communist reactions to a U.S. course of action involv-
ing ...
These estimates form a quite distinct category. They originate
in a unique way; they pose special problems of organization; their
coordination with the representatives of the USIB member agencies
is exceptionally difficult; and final USIB approval almost always re-
quires more than one meeting, often more than two. Herein reside
the frustrations, to which I shall devote the greater part of what
follows. The fascination lies in the assurance that the drafter is
involved in major and immediate decisions of U.S. policy. No other
estimates can generate in his breast quite such a sharp sense of
relevance to action.
These papers are often miscalled "contingency estimates." Con-
tingencies figure in almost all NIEs. Sometimes they concern what
one foreign country may do if a neighbor takes certain steps, e.g.,
what Pakistan will do if India embarks on a nuclear weapons program.
Sometimes a contingency lying in possible U.S. action is examined
as part of a wider study, e.g., in the course of a genera] estimate
on South Korea, ROK reactions to a reduction of U.S. military aid
may be explored. To avoid confusion with these, it will be useful to
reserve the term "reaction estimates" for those NIEs which are ad-
dressed exclusively to the question of other countries'--usually Com-
munist powers'-responses to a postulated U.S. course of action in
a crisis situation.
Origination
Reaction estimates are never self-initiated. They are commissioned
by policy-making departments which are considering taking some
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specific course of action and want an appraisal of how the enemy
will probably respond. They are invariably written against short
deadlines and deal with immediately critical problems. Those of
the last few years have dealt principally with three situations-
Berlin, Laos, and Vietnam. The first were requested by the Berlin
Task Force in the State Department; the father of the other two sets
is an alumnus of the Office of National Estimates who migrated to
policy-making posts and established a practice-now sustained by
the White House, the Joint Chiefs, and others-of subjecting a great
variety of Indochina policy proposals to the estimative test.
After writing quite a number of reaction estimates, I'm still not
entirely sure why requesters keep on asking for them. The results,
as we shall see, are often of dubious value. Sometimes I suspect
that the commissions come from opponents of the policy proposal
who hope that the estimators will help them kill it. But the process
does reflect a fundamental principle of intelligence: that when early
enemy reactions are the critical test of a policy proposal, these reactions
should be estimated in advance, not by proponents or opponents, but
by someone uninvolved in the heat of policy contention. Full ob-
jectivity is of course a counsel of perfection, but I think it correct,
not merely charitable, to say that the policy makers should and do
feel better-feel protected against the full force of bias-when they
have an outside opinion. And since these matters are too sensitive
to be submitted to public opinion, they turn to intelligence as an
inside outsider.
Terms of Reference
And intelligence always bucks. We are never satisfied with the
way the questions are put. They are far too general; we need a
clearer idea of what the United States proposes to do; in particular
we need sharper distinctions among the various steps to be taken in
a sequence. Very well, responds the policy maker, and lists for us
four major steps and a dozen specific actions within each, including
inter al'ia, say, the exact inventory of implements to be used in each
of three probes on the Berlin autobahn. Now we are really out-
raged. Perhaps, we say, we can provide some general guidance, but
how do you expect us to distinguish between reactions on the one
hand to ten air sorties against troop concentrations in Laos with high
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explosives and on the other to fifteen sorties against lines of communi-
cation with napalm?
It would be nice to think that we eventually sort out with the
requester the proper level of detail and can proceed to answer ques-
tions which are governed by the limits of professional intelligence
and human judgment. Unfortunately, this is often not the case; the
question of proper terms of reference dogs us to the very end of the
process. The reason, I am sorry to say, is that we are not "outside"
after all. Each of the intelligence agencies works for a particular
policy maker. Even the Director of Central Intelligence is, under
one of his hats, a senior policy advisor to the President. And it is
uncanny how the choice of a level of detail will influence the esti-
mated enemy reaction, and therefore the seeming wisdom of the
proposed policy. A proposal may appear to bloom with fair prospects
when viewed in a general way, yet prove to be studded with thorns
when examined in detail. Surely everyone can understand this; how
many bright ideas have we all had which might survive one or at
most two levels of detailed criticism but fell apart at the third? And
when that third level is reached, do we not insist that its a good
idea "in principle" and plead for a reconsideration at the higher,
more favorable level of generalization?
Other Kinds of Bias
_ That was a fairly subtle point. A more obvious one is that the
participating agencies may already, at their policy-making summits,
have decided what they think about the proposed U.S. course. Their
intelligence arms are then under pressure, of course, to bend the
estimate toward these conclusions. There are two barriers against
this: the fortitude of the drafter and the chairman, and the collective
conscience-a sense of mutual responsibility, really-which has grown
up over the years in the estimative community. The latter works
surprisingly well most of the time.
Another source of bias, again on the subtle side, lies in the fact
that the estimators are American citizens, rooting for their country.
If the policy proposal is not outrageously unreasonable, it is well-nigh
impossible for us to bring ourselves to a firm estimate that the United
States is bound to lose. We can make differential judgments in
which some parts of the policy look more likely than others to pro-
duce the desired results. But at some point the course of action will
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usually culminate in a sheer test of will, and how can we bring our-
selves to estimate that we will be the first to falter?'
But: having bared all these misgivings, I remain persuaded that the
policy maker is better off for having solicited an estimate of enemy
reactions from intelligence agencies which, bureaucratically tied
though they are to policy departments, are by training and inclination
and conscience freer from commitments to policy than he and his
colleagues are. And so we proceed with the drafting, knowing that
we will have to continue solving and re-solving the terms-of-reference
question as honestly as we can.
The Drafting
(Though the precepts which follow may all be golden truths, they
are not likely to be of much help to the next estimator who has to
draft a reaction estimate. This poor fellow will have to read the
request, negotiate its unclarities with some ill-informed representative
of the requester, exchange confusions with the newly appointed chair-
man of the estimate, and produce a first draft-all within 24 or ten
or even six hours. Theory is gray, Lenin remarked, but the tree of
life is ever green. Or, as Stalin put it, cadres decide everything.)
Through the bitter experience of many redrafts I have learned that
it is absolutely indispensable to begin a reaction estimate with an
analysis of the situation preceding the U.S. action proposed. Usually,
in fact, it is necessary to back up two steps: In many cases the U.S.
policy presupposes an enemy initiative which then sets us into motion
along the hypothesized line. What, then, did he mean by this action?
Did he expect our reaction, in which case he presumably has a pre-
planned counter-reaction? Or would he be taken aback by what we
did and discover himself in the midst of some major miscalculation,
unready with a next move and wholly uncertain about further U.S.
intentions? These questions make a great deal of difference. Often
no single answer can be given, and instead there emerge alternative
analyses which must then be run out in parallel through the re-
mainder of the estimate. Well why not, you say, but I promise you
'This irreducible element of bias probably saved us (the estimators, not the
United States) in a series of Berlin estimates. The USSR's local advantages
seemed overwhelming, and it was very hard to see how various U.S. cotIrses
of action could surmount the crisis. Gritting our teeth, we estimated some
even chances. More important, the President gritted his teeth and made us right.
that this plays hell with drafting a paper simple and intelligible
enough to be useful.
An ordinary NIE-on Soviet military policy, say, or the outlook
for Brazil-has a theme, a tone. A competent drafter will marshal
his facts and his ideas and construct an argument which leads to a
single or a few major conclusions. If he does not, there's no use
writing the estimate. If he does, and if he constructs well, then his
betters 2 may tug and pull at his paragraphs, alter his adjectives, and
qualify his estimative passages, but his message still comes through.
It is fatal to approach a reaction estimate in this fashion. The
drafter will encounter a long succession of close judgments ,as he
works his way through the paper. Most of them will be near the
50-50 mark; if they were not, the estimate would not have been re-
quested. He will make some of them in one direction, others in the
opposite. He will estimate "desirable" reactions to some U.S. moves,
"undesirable" ones to others. Out of the sum total of these, some
general theme may in the end emerge, but he had better lei: this
happen rather than aim at it. For his paper consists essentially of
nothing but this succession of judgments, and many of them will be
changed before the USIB finally signs off. If his draft is built
around a theme, he will have to restructure, probably sooner rather
than later.
But he can make his contribution. In thinking through the ques-
tions, he can try to find the turning points, the stage or stages which
constitute, in Alsopian language, the "crunch." This, I think, is a
real service. It tells the policy maker, not what will happen, but
what to worry most or pray hardest about. It tells him about: the
moment of truth-what its content will be and where, as he gropes
along an uncertain path, he may expect to encounter it. To do this
well is a triumph.
If he is lucky enough to find a turning point, the wise drafter will
stop and point in both directions. He will give a scrupulously com-
plete list of arguments why the enemy might do what we want him
to do. Then be will give an exhaustive set of reasons why the
enemy might do just the opposite. This is another service. It gets
the policy maker to think about all the - factors, the unpleasant as
well as the pleasant ones. And it insures that he cannot dismiss
'First the Board of National Estimates, then the representatives of the USIB
agencies, finally the USIB itself.
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the conclusion which follows on the grounds that the intelligence
people forgot something important.
The Result
Once this is done, the drafter can be rather casual about which
direction he chooses. It doesn't much matter; the Director will make
up his mind, some USIB members will join him in the text, and
others will take footnotes of dissent. But if the text has not laid the
proper groundwork for these decisions, the drafter will have to
endure an hour of confused argument at the USIB table and then
start over again.
Nor, I would maintain, should it make very much difference what
the USIB decides. The President surely would be silly to let his
decision be determined by whether intelligence said the chances.
were "slightly better than even" or "slightly worse than even." In
the first place, the policy proposal has probably been changed in
two or three minor ways, just enough to render the estimate slightly
inapplicable, when he gets it. In the second place, the policy would
assuredly be modified in the course of its implementation, enough to
render the estimate more than slightly inapplicable. In the third
and resounding place, everyone from drafter to President knows that
the future is plain unknowable.
Well then, why write a reaction estimate? Because it is always
a help to have the issues defined. Because the estimate may serve
to highlight a forgotten or glossed-over problem. Because it may
dispose of some wild, far-out ideas which heretofore had not been
adequately confronted. Because a sober and at least partially dis-
interested accounting of risks and chances may not be available from
any other source. Because subsequent policy argument can perhaps
be more realistic.
You will notice that I have been very sparing of examples. This
is because all reaction estimates are classified Top Secret and dis-
tributed. to a small readership. In fact, they are not even accorded
a permanent printing. Garden-variety NIEs get their conclusions
distributed as rapidly as possible, after USIB approval, in an informal
,offset version. Subsequently the reader receives a handsome printed
version of the full text. Reaction estimates get the first treatment
but not the second. Thus their covers bear two of the finest, most
lucid sentences ever written in the U.S. Government:
"NOTE: This is the estimate. No further versions will be pub-
lished."
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Problem of ranging technical possi-
bilities in due policy perspective.
SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATING
Wayne G. Jackson
Those of us in the estimating business have a troublesome time
with the problem of incorporating scientific or technical contributions
into a finished estimate. To make the point, a hypothetical case re-
lating to missiles and nuclear warheads is discussed below', 'but the
example might as well be any complicated piece of military hardware
or other technical subject.
Technical Possibility
An estimate on the advanced weapons program of Upper Volta is
started. In the normal routine a contribution is asked from the
Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee. In due
course, the estimators receive a contribution which concludes that,
on the basis of an examination of the evidence, "Upper Volta could
have an IRBM system ready for production in 1967-68 and carry out
deployment in 1968-69." The economists submit a contribution saying
that, given a high enough priority, the economy of Upper 'Volta could
support such a program. The political analysts find that Upper `Volta
thinks it has an urgent requirement for such a weapons system. So
the estimate comes out saying that "Upper Volta could start deploying
an IRI3M system in 1968-69."
The Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee also submits a
contribution, one on nuclear developments. Upper Volta has con-
ducted a few atmospheric tests of nuclear devices, something is known
of its general level of technical competence and production facilities;
and so JAEIC states that warheads compatible with the IRBM's could
be produced by the time GMAIC says the missiles could be ready for
deployment. So the estimate adds to its sentence on deployment of
the missiles the words "with compatible fission warheads." In the
course of this exercise, what started out to be very special statements
of raw capabilities get transformed into USIB-approved estimates that
have an aura of probability. While the word "could," in the estimating
business, is understood to be purely a statement of possibility, the mere
fact that the possibility is stated with no further qualification gives
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it something more of substance. The reader is apt to think, "If there
is not a good chance that the possibility will be realized, why
mention it?"
Hypotheses on Thin Ice
it is possible that the estimate could be handled with so much
emphasis on its being a mere statement of potentialities that the reader
would not be confused into taking it as having any significant element
of probability. But it is doubtful if drafting could convey the tenuous-
ness of the many technical components of the estimate. For instance,
the estimate that Upper Volta could have compatible nuclear war-
heads involves in itself at least two estimates, each based on a number
of subsidiary estimates. What is the maximum weight of the war-
head-including guidance, firing mechanism, etc.-which the Upper
Volta missile can carry? What is the likely actual weight of each
of these components? What are the warhead's dimensions? It is
highly unlikely that anyone can make more than crude guesses on
these questions, even if we had seen a missile in the Army Day parade
in Ougadougou.
Similarly, we probably know little about the probable size, weight,
and shape of the nuclear component of the postulated warhead, how
much fissionable material would be in it, its yield, or even its general
design. Yet some hypotheses on all these questions underlay the
estimate that a warhead compatible with the missile could be avail-
able. The estimators ask the technicians for opinions, and they oblige.
Indeed, the estimators often ask for even more speculative data, as
for the CEP and reliability of missiles. Comparable estimative prob-
lems arise in all technical subjects, e.g., capabilities for CW and BW,
specifications for most kinds of complicated hardware such as aircraft,
naval vessels, etc.
The intellectual philosophy of a scientist leads him to consider his
scientific statements, however couched in language, as hypotheses-the
most satisfactory synthesis that he can make of the available data
at hand. If and as evidence changes, he will adjust the hypothesis
accordingly, or even abandon it, without any feeling that he is chang-
ing previously established truth. Estimative intelligence judgments
are of a different kind, even though they are based in large part on
analysis of the known facts. The intelligence estimator feels in-
stinctively that he should state what he believes true, qualifying the
estimate to indicate his qualms about its validity. When it turns
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out to have been wrong, even though it was the most reasonable one
he could make on the basis of available evidence (as on the missiles
in Cuba), he feels that he failed. The biological researcher is not
much upset when his hypothesis doesn't work out in laboratory tests,
but the doctor is when the treatment he prescribes for his patient
doesn't work and the patient dies. This analysis or analogy cannot
be pressed too far, but it is part of the difference between scientific
and intelligence estimating.
Worst-Casing
The scientist, in making an intelligence estimate, must have in
mind the purpose for which he is making it-as do all estimators.
The temptation to estimate the "worst case" is just as strong with him
as with anyone else. If U.S. security plans are to be made on the
basis of his estimate, it seems better that they be based on the worst
that is reasonably possible, not on hopes which may turn out to be
false. This is not necessarily the phenomenon of "Pearl Harbor in-
surance," wherein one estimates the worst, secure in the knowledge
that if his dire predictions do not turn out, no one will blame him
for an unexpectedly favorable course of events. It is rather a judg-
ment that when all hypotheses are shaky, the reader had best be pre-
pared for the worst. In respect of other nations' weapons, this worst
is often arrived at by taking the best skills, experience, and technology
known to the estimator, discounting them by a relatively small factor,
and coming out with an estimate of raw capability.
The non-technical estimator is at a great disadvantage in dealing
with such technical contributions. He can be nowhere nearly as
familiar with the evidence as the technician or as well equipped to
deal with it. If he questions the hypothesis, he can often be silenced
when his ignorance is pointed out. (This pointing out of his lack of
competence to deal with technical subjects is most often done by
people who serve on technical bodies but are at best amateur scientists.
The vigor with which hypotheses are defended as truth often seems
inversely proportional to the technical competence of the defender.)
The non-technical inquirer can unearth, without too much prodding,
the vast areas of uncertainty in our evidence on advanced weapons
systems. But he is hard put to it to offer a more defensible judgment.
Taking into account what we know (which is little enough) about
Upper Volta's experiments, technical and economic resources, and
what we believe to be its national objectives, attributing to it a. fair
amount of the best technology we know (usually U.S. technology),
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and considering that it is better to over-warn the U.S. policy maker
than to engender any degree of complacency by a judgment which
cannot be documented, we thus come up with the estimate that "it
is possible that Upper Volta could deploy IRBM's with nuclear war-
heads in three years."
Yet the estimator, technical or non-technical, feels in his bones that
this worst case is highly unlikely. Does he estimate as above and
add "but it might just as well be three or four years later, or even
longer?" This hardly looks as if he's earning his living. He is also
affected by a conscious or unconscious desire to avoid the bias that if
it took the United States ten years to develop an IRBM it will take
those foreigners longer.
Ways Out
Does the calling in of a consulting panel help? In most cases it is
doubtful. The two- or three-day panel has not kept up with the evi-
dence, could not possibly have done so. Just the classification of
much of the evidence precludes this. The panel is briefed by the
technicians, who under the best of circumstances feed into the mech-
anism the same data which formed their own views. The panel has
many of the same compulsions as the original technical group and
is apt to produce some variation of the "worst case." The con-
sultant does not have to act or budget on the basis of the judgments
he makes, and while the government estimator doesn't either, he does
feel a longer-term responsibility for his advice to the budgeter.
A formal intelligence estimate should whenever possible give a
judgment as to the most likely contingency. The scientist often says
that there is no basis for determining the most likely. The estimator
is therefore in a dilemma for which there may be no solution. Perhaps
such estimates can only be so clothed with caveats and qualifications
as to make them seem ethereal, and certainly annoying to the reader
who craves certainty. (Incidentally, the use of footnotes to call atten-
tion to uncertainties is of limited value. Especially when numerical
tables are given, the footnote, usually in microscopic type, is easily
overlooked or forgotten.)
Perhaps it should be the rule that the non-technical estimator ingest
the scientific contribution, append it as an annex to his estimate, and
present his layman's best judgment with all the deprecating language
he can think of as to the difficulty of making confident estimates.
This is what sometimes happens. But in most cases, those participat-
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ing in the coordination meetings on an estimate include the tech-
nicians, professional and amateur alike, and the pressure they exert
on the chairman of the coordinating group to accept the scientific
contribution's language is great. The chairman can, and often does.,
retreat to a strict interpretation of "could," "possible," "might" and
not try to fight the experts. In this process the reader is likely to be
given an impression of probability and firmness which is not warranted,
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Proposed approach to pinning down
some free-floating terms often used
in intelligence.
FOR A BOARD OF DEFINITIONS
George Berkeley
worse, let ourselves
As an example of a word that is open to all sorts of interpretations,
let's look at a real dandy-"nationalist." On one day in early 1964,
I read two accounts of a crisis in Brazil's state petroleum agency,
Petrobras. The first was a newspaper editorial. It said, "The na-
tionalists in Petrobras denounce the Communists and vice versa."
Among those that the newspaper called "nationalists" was the Petro-
bras president. The other account was an intelligence report. It
quoted a Communist leader as saying that the Petrobras president
was trying "to demoralize the nationalists and the Communists." The
context made it clear that the Communist leader considered the two
groups to be allied with one another, with the president their mutual
enemy.
ing each other out or,
misunderstandings.
Some Kind of Measles
If a nuclear physicist were to write that "A few whatchamacallits
created a new thingamajig when they bounced off a slew of whoosies,"
we might suggest that his terminology needed honing. Yet day in
and day out we let reporters of political events (me included) get
away with talking about "democracy," "nationalism," "insurgency,"
"dictatorship," "totalitarianism," "the right," "the left," "the slightly left
of center," "probability," "possibility," and many other concepts that
lack any universally accepted definitions.
Why?
My guess is that it's because the poets don't care-they like to keep
words nice and loose-and the mathematicians 1 haven't united to do
something about it. This article is one mathematician's brief for
doing something. Unless those of us concerned with the flow of
information up through the pipeline to the policy makers understand
clearly what our terms mean we will continue to waste time straighten-
of Estimative Probability," Studies VIII 4, pp. 49-64.
'For this usage of "poets" and "mathematicians" see Sherman Kent, "Words
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I once threw out to an English class in Brazil the question, "What
is a nationalist?" The answers that came back ranged all the way
from "a patriot" to "a Communist." (And the fellow who said
"patriot" was no Communist, if you're wondering.)
What kind of word is this that means so many things to so many
people? It's only one member of the whole class of compound ab-
stractions that this article is concerned with. As a matter of fact,
there's no dearth of definitions for these words. Every scholar in
the behavioral sciences setting out to write a book apparently feels
obliged to come up with a new set of definitions uniquely his. For
"nationalism" our literature is rich in definitions. Some samples:
"Nationalism: loyalty and devotion to a nation; esp: a sense of national
consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary
emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of
other nations or supranational groups."
--Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary
"Nationalism is the preference for the competitive interest of a nation
and its members 'over those of all outsiders in a world of social mobility and
economic competition, dominated by the values of wealth, power, and pres-
tige, so that the goals of personal security and group identification appear
bound up with the group's attainment of these values."
-Karl W. Deutsch in Nationalism and Social Communication
"It is a state of mind in which we give our paramount political loyalty
to one fraction of the human race-to the particular tribe of which we
happen to be tribesmen. In so far as we are captured by this ideology,
we hold that the highest political good for us is our own nation's sovereign
independence; that our nation has a moral right to exercise its sovereignty
according to what it believes to be its own national interests, whatever con-
sequences this may entail for the foreign majority of the human race; and
that our duty, as citizens of our country, is to support our country, right
or wrong."
-Arnold J. Toynbee in New York Times Sunday Magazine,
3 November 1963
"Nationalism, a product of political, economic, social, and intellectual
factors at a certain stage in history, is a condition of mind, feeling, or
sentiment of a group of people living in a well-defined geographical area,
speaking a common language, possessing a literature in which the aspira-
tions of the nation have been expressed, attached to common traditions and
common customs, venerating its own heroes, and, in some cases, having a
common religion."
-Louis L. Snyder in The Meaning of Nationalism
the measles of mankind."
-Albert Einstein (quoted in a letter to Time,
issue of 12 March 1965)
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The differences among these range from fine intellectual[ distinc-
tions to the moral connotations strongly felt by Toynbee, whom you
can almost see shaking his head in dismay, and Einstein, who minces
no words at all.
Some scholars feel a need for breaking down the concept into more
than one category. Hans Kohn distinguishes between (1) nationalism
in the Western world and (2) nationalism outside the Western world.
Snyder has suggested a chronological classification using these labels:
integrative nationalism (1815-1871), disruptive nationalism (1.871-
1890), aggressive nationalism (1900-1945), contemporary nationalism
(since 1945). Other writers have used many modifiers to show the
variety of forms that nationalism can take: "humanitarian," "Jacobin,"
"traditional," "liberal," "integral," "medieval," "monarchica'l," "revolu-
tionary," "totalitarian," "cultural."
The label is thus subject to more interpretations than the elephant
was to the seven blind men. But "nationalism" is unequivocally clear
in comparison with those warped old standards "right" and "left." At
your next party, try a parlor game. I-lave each guest write his defini-
tion of these political labels. Promise a prize to any two of them that
agree. But don't bother to have a real prize on hand; you won't
need it.
So much for the problem.
Now is the time, in my opinion, to set up a board to define abstract
concepts relevant to the intelligence business. Because the need for
precise verbal standards reaches its apogee in the intelligence com-
munity., the initiative in organizing such a board should be taken by
that community. The coordinating role, the job of running the se-
mantic clearing-house, should rest with an official group.
This group should by no means work behind high walls. On the
contrary, it should be in close touch with the unofficial intelligence
community, and by this I mean university faculties, book publishers,
newspaper editors, and other private citizens who contribute to the
flow of information that is intelligence in its broadest sense. At the
outset of the program and perhaps periodically thereafter the board
might invite members of this unofficial intelligence community to
participate.
Let's say that the board has been organized and that a hundred
or so private entities have also agreed to take part. Here is one
possible modus operandi: The board chooses an abstract concept like
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one of those in the first paragraph. A researcher compiles a selection
of definitions already in use in some part of the world. The board
might meet to concoct one or more new definitions. The board then
sends to all participants, official and unofficial, a copy of these defini-
tions of the term under consideration.
At this point the board relaxes for a spell. It gives the participants
a good, long stretch to mull the matter over and submit comments
and recommendations. Six months or more would be quite reasonable
for this phase. This is one program that is uncrash. The ball is
now with the participating entities (parents, to coin an acronym).
Their task is to recommend a single definition which employs a mini-
mum of abstractions and relies as much as possible on quantifiable
criteria.
What we're asking of the parents is their help in substituting con-
crete or otherwise measurable elements for abstract terms like the
"competitive interest," "social mobility," and "values" in Deutsch's
definition above. Too wild a dream, you say? Not at all. One
school of behavioral scientists has been gaining ground on the quanti-
fication problem for at least twenty years.2
My job does not place me in contact with them, so I can't draw
any current examples of their work from first-hand knowledge. But
let's suppose that one of them has been studying the correlations
between the ethnic breakdowns of entire populations and the ethnic
breakdowns of their national legislative bodies. He might propose
that one of the criteria for defining "democracy" should be just this
correlation. If it's better than a certain figure, the government under
study meets one of the criteria for a democracy. Another measurable
phenomenon relevant to this definition: the number of political parties
that ran candidates in the last national election.
Getting back to the modus operandi, after the six-month incubation
period the board considers all entries, chooses the best-very likely
a composite of several-and publishes the results for distribution to
members of the intelligence community and to the parents. The
finished product is apt to be long. It may run to the length of a
National Intelligence Estimate or a long magazine article. Excessive?
'And at least two kindred spirits have made a beginning within our immediate
community. Both the Kent article cited earlier and "The Definition of Some
Estimative Expressions," by David L. Wark in the same issue of the Studies,
sought to establish a consensus on the arithmetic implications of such words as
"possible" and "probable."
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Probably not; abstractions are like that. When a dozen French
mathematicians started out to make a definitive study of their subject
they found they needed 200 pages to deal with the ins and outs of
the number "one" alone.
Side Benefits
Two by-products of all this activity are worth noting. First, with
so much talent focussed on abstract concepts, one by one, we are
surely going to discover newer and better ways of dividing up and
classifying some of them. We may invent a new term now and then
for a newly isolated concept. Through the board and the parents
we will have an unprecedented test market for tentative terminology.
Second, if well organized and managed, the board's activities will
win the respect of influential entities outside the intelligence com-
munity. It will be performing a public service. In its modest way
it should earn some favorable press comment, and this, I submit, is
something that the community could use.
Our Greek forebears believed that the universe consisted of only
four elements-fire, water, air, and earth. Today we know of ten
varieties, or isotopes, of a single element called tin. A lot of people
along the way have done a lot of classifying-and quantifying. Some-
body had to, of course. Our rising level of sophistication in the physi-
cal sciences is both a cause and a result of their work. [n tackling
behavioral science problems in similar fashion we will be making,, use
of a lesson already learned by the operations researchers: "'Some of
the intangibles that one generation treats by experience are converted
to measurable factors by the next generation." 3
But to avoid the charge that I consider all abstract words completely
reducible to quantifiable terms, let me hastily second the rest of the
above quotation: "This process is a never-ending one because reality
is too complex to be completely circumscribed by a finite set of
measurements."
'David W. Miller & Martin K. Starr, Executive Decisions and Operations Re-
search (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1960).
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Suggests more systematic coping with
the simultaneously diverse states of ac-
tivity and quiescence around the world.
GEO-TIME AND INTELLIGENCE
Chronomaniac
". . . It often seems that in today's conditions both government and
public are too often the captives of the spot-news report, the daily
headline, the minute-to-minute news bulletin . . ."'
The concept of geo-time, briefly sketched below together with
some of its possible repercussions on intelligence, was stimulated
partially by the writer's recent browsing in the literature of geo-
politics. (That subject, after being discredited by pseudo-scientific
treatment at the hands of the Nazis and others, may he in for some
rethinking and rehabilitation: a recent article in the Department of
State Bulletin by the Department's Geographer appears to take a
much saner approach to it.) Other stimuli have been the writer's
experience as a former analyst and part-time night duty officer and
the increasingly manifest desire on the part of intelligence consumers
for what amounts to "instant analysis"-in quantity and depth.
Time Zones and Timing
Geo-time is simply the notion that there exist, superimposed on the
geo-political relationships of land and water masses to each other
and of both to problems of national strategy, two equally obvious
world physical relationships of which little account seems to have
been taken: (1) roughly half the earth's surface being in darkness
and the other half in daylight at any given moment; and (2) the
phenomena of the seasons and of the polar "long clay" and "long
night" produced by the tilt of the earth's axis. Although many
individuals and organizations in intelligence, as well as in the defense
establishment generally and to some extent in other agencies dealing
with foreign affairs, habitually take these relationships into their
daily calculations for technical if for no other reasons, I have the
impression that no consciously coordinated effort has yet been made
`Robert J. Manning, former Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, in the
Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1962. i~
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 CONFIDENTIAL -Time Geo-Time CONFIDENTIAL
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to think through the many implications and possible applications of
this concept in various fields. Hoping that such a comprehensive
effort may be undertaken by those competent to do so, I shall confine
myself here to an introductory consideration of the impact of gco-time
on an activity with which I am familiar, intelligence analysis, merely
noting a few other possible implications.
First a word on the real and practical importance of geo-time.
Historically, men have long been familiar with the "night watch"
concept, which in much more sophisticated form has necessarily been
adopted by intelligence as well as military organizations. In some
fields;, particularly military, the day-night and seasonal factors are
crucial in questions relating to attack and defense. It is superfluous
to point out that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor could not have
been better timed to catch our forces off balance. Making use of
complications arising from the overlayering of the day-night and
seasonal factors by varying social customs around the globe, the con-
cept has been successfully employed in such limited time zones as
western Europe for timing critical communiques or ultimata so as
to take greatest advantage of another power's press deadlines or
long weekends and holiday slackness. Even within the comparatively
small time region covered by the continental United States, there has
been recent debate whether televising election results from the east
coast affects the late vote in the far west. All these observations
suggest reasons for systematically applying geo-time in intelligence,
now that a "collapse of space" has been produced by modern com-
munications.
Analysis and Reporting
So far as intelligence analysis is concerned-and to some extent
the reporting of raw intelligence and the operations which produce
such reports-I submit that our system of virtually instantaneous
transmission and rapid dissemination of information from all quarters
of the globe and from all sources including the press deserves re-
examination in the light of geo-time both in Washington and in the
field. The hour of day or night at which a given message arrives,
and the season of its arrival in this north temperate zone, almost
inevitably affect the quality as well as the timeliness of the analysis,
particularly of the "instant" variety. The main reason is the cus-
tomary disparity between analytical resources available during the
normal working day and those readily available after office hours,
while the intelligence material now flows in as steadily by night as by
day. I am aware of recent efforts to tighten the night watch and
increase round-the-clock analysis and production capability through-
out the community, but I am inclined to doubt .that these efforts are
nearly as far-reaching as what a detailed study of the impact of geo-
time might lead to.
Simply to illustrate the problem in its crudest form, the day-night
factor without reference to seasons or social customs, the two tables
on page 22 juxtapose Washington and field times, highlighting (1)
the most disadvantageous hours for analysis and production capabili-
ties in Washington, and (2) the most disadvantageous times, depend-
ing on locality, for collection and reporting in the field. The calcula-
tions are based only on the schematic division of the globe into 24
equal time zones; to be truly useful they would have to take account
of latitude, season, arbitrary local time, and local customs. The
nature of the activities generating the information reports would also
be a factor, since some are obviously best conducted by night and
others by day. The crudeness of these tables should riot, however,
obscure their implications; it simply reflects the writer's lack of specific
area knowledge covering all points of intelligence interest and his
not having the skill and leisure to pursue this matter as far as it
seems to warrant.
Aside from the implications of each table separately, a comparison
of the two suggests that Washington is particularly at a disadvantage
in terms of its own staffing during the optimum field reporting times
in most of the areas which are currently most troublesome and are
likely to be so in the foreseeable future. A case could also be made
for the existence of doubly critical periods when the bracketed areas
of Table II heavily overlap Table I regional times, showing Wash-
ington and field capabilities to be in balance because both .arc poor.
A review of the implications of geo-time might suggest further
changes not only in staffing for after-hours intelligence analysis and
production but in the two-way flow of communications between
Washington and the field. This might improve coordination and
direction of the field in administrative as well as operational matters.
The conscious and complete adaptation of the geo-time concept to a
variety of political as well as military tactics might also be con-
sidered; e.g., major pronouncements affecting foreign governments
might be timed less with an eye to the convenience of the domestic
press than, say, to precipitating an atmosphere of crisis, if that is
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I al
desirable, at an hour which would most disadvantage analysis and
reaction in a particular foreign capital.
If nothing else, as a friend of the writer has pointed out, some
alteration in our present staffing pattern might at least relieve the
parking situation.
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m s
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22 CONFIDENTIAL .11 CONFIDENTIAL 23
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A theory and some practice in
strategic air targeting against
Japan.
B-29s AGAINST COKE OVENS
A. R. Northridge
The operations of an air intelligence section may often, even in
an active theater of war, be too routine and colorless to offer much
amusement or instruction to another generation. I recount below,
however, one episode from my experience as intelligence officer for
Major General Claire Chennault which is not without color and not
uninstructive. If the story seems biased against the Washington ap-
paratus, that is the bias of the man on the spot in contact with the job.
Big Order
In 1943 Chennault's 14th USAAF in Western China was ordered
to proceed with the construction of a new complex of airfields at
designated locations. The specifications for the thickness of the run-
ways and their length made it plain that these bases were intended
for a new type of aircraft, much larger and having much longer
range than any in our inventory or any we had ever heard of. Since
the fields had to be built by hand labor, locally recruited, several
hundred thousands of Chinese shared in this information. But we
knew only thus by inference that we were to be so reinforced. We
were told nothing of the new plane. We in the intelligence section
were not tasked with finding targets for it (though we did so any-
way). Indeed, and this was the crowning indignity, we were not
even ordered to refrain from speculating about it. Some of us worked
up estimates of its specifications which turned out not to be far off.'
Airfield construction in the China section of the CBI 'Theater was a
slow proposition. Powered construction equipment was scarce, and
in all remaining China not in Japanese hands, there was not a single
New arrivals from over the Hump told of the construction of similar new
fields in eastern India, but no visitors from the States could confirm the existence
of an aircraft having the specifications we envisaged. I suspect General Chen-
nault had been told that a new, larger bomber was in the works, but I very
much doubt that he knew its actual size and range. He certainly appeared
surprised at the eventual briefing when these figures were given, probably more
surprised than some members of his staff. pn1) ~1~
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powered rock crusher. The rock for paving the runways, aprons, and
taxi strips was all crushed by hand, small children working with light
hammers on the smaller stones alongside their elders hammering on
the larger ones. But eventually the fields were completed; the Air
Force Engineer was rewarded by a promotion and a decoration; and
at long last a team of senior officers arrived from Washington, repre-
sentatives of the joint Chiefs of Staff, to explain what this was all about.
New Program
The briefing took place in General Chennault's office. The B-29
was described and we were told how many would come to China.
They were to be organized as the XXth Bomber Command, which
was, and would remain, under the control of the joint Chiefs. The
CBI Theater and its China component in particular had certain sup-
port responsibilities toward the Command, but no authority over it.
This displeased General Chennault, of course, and he made no
secret of it.
Next we were told that the employment of the Command, its
program, had already been determined. If General Chennault dis-
approved of this program, he could, as the senior American Air Force
commander in China and on behalf of the senior American commander
in the Theater, Lieutenant General Stilwell, make known to the joint
Chiefs his disagreement. They would not necessarily heed him, but
he could comment if he chose. It was clear that this provision like-
wise held no particular charm for the General, especially since he
would have to divert the better part of a composite wing from its
offensive operations to the defense of the XXth Command's bases.
The program, we were told, provided first of all for a mission from
the ]Indian fields against Bangkok to tune up the Command. It would
then move to its China fields. The General nodded. Next, the
briefers continued, now somewhat diffident, would be a mission under-
taken by the entire Command against the Japanese islands, the par-
ticular target being Tokyo.
General Chennault demurred, loudly. From the figures they had
just given, he said, the bomb payload at that distance would have to
be calculated at mere hundreds of pounds per plane. He enlarged
on this theme with such vigor that the briefers, who were by no
means unsophisticated officers, could see that although he might
reconcile himself to JCS direct control over the XXth Bomber Com-
mand, if they attempted a large-scale mission against Tokyo from the
China bases, he might tell them to find a new commanding general
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for the 14th USAAF. The subject of the Tokyo raid was thereupon
dropped, and it was not revived.2
When General Chennault had concluded his remarks, a junior
member of the briefing team, hitherto silent, opened an enormous
briefcase, took out an armful of handsomely bound books each the
size of a copy of Fortune, and passed them around. Calling attention
to their Top Secret classification, he said the brochures described
the balance of the program and its rationale, the target: system U.S.
intelligence had selected for the China-based B-29s to attack. If he
might presume, the briefer went on, he would suggest that we rapidly
run through them, the material being quite complicated, and he would
answer any queries that immediately occurred to us. Then we could
review them in detail overnight-it was now nearly midnight--and
if we had further questions, he would be available between nine
and ten the next morning before he and his colleagues emplaned
for Washington. He left the impression that they were anxious to
get this pro forma ceremony out of the way; the die had been cast
and there was no thought of allowing a fresh throw.
To follow the printed plan in detail was, as the briefer had sug-
gested, more than ordinarily difficult. Charts, graphs, and text (lone
up with Byzantine opulence were combined in an explication, or better
justification, that we all found obscure. What was being justified,
however, was clear enough. The target system was the Japanese
coke industry. The JCS had apparently been persuaded by a bevy
of intelligence analysts that no better use could be found for the XXth
Bomber Command, a new instrument designed for the destruction of
Japan's military might, than to launch it against Japan's coke ovens
wherever they might be. Within four years, said the briefer, if the
attacks were successful and so sustained that repairs were impossible,
and if no new coke manufacturing capacity were constructed by the
Japanese undetected by us, within four years-that is by 1947--the
Japanese steel industry would begin to feel the pinch of coke shortage,
and soon thereafter the Japanese armament industry would begin to
feel the pinch of a steel shortage.
Recalcitrance
The realization on the part of the 14th USAAF staff that this mag-
nificent new weapon with its enormous supporting base was being
deployed a good two-thirds of the way around the globe to bomb
'I have often wondered if this far-out proposal was not a ploy to soften us up
for those that immediately followed. It was, of course, a highly impractical idea
and I feel sure the briefers knew it.
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coke ovens gave rise to wonderment-and argument. Each of us
could think of targets by the score that were vulnerable to the B-29s
and if attacked with vigor would save countless Chinese and American
lives. To cite but one example, despite the slight pressure that the
14th Air Force could exert, slight because of our logistic transport
difficulties, the Japanese had accumulated large stocks of materiel
at Hankow. With this they had launched a drive that cost the 14th
its eastern airfields and gave the Japanese an overland route between
their Hong Kong-Canton enclave and their holdings on the middle
Yangtze and the North China plain. Unequipped to offer serious
resistance, the Chinese suffered personnel losses, military and civilian,
numbering in the tens of thousands. The XXth Bomber Command
could have destroyed the Hankow supply dumps in a single strike.
Or, again within easy range under a full bomb load, there was
on 'Taiwan an operational air depot where new aircraft, fresh from
the Japanese factories, were readied for combat and ferried off to the
Philippines and the southwest Pacific to do battle with General
Kenney's air forces and Admiral Nimitz' ships and the planes from his
carriers. The destruction of this depot could well have shortened
our approach to the Philippines and saved considerable losses in men,
ships, and aircraft.3
As the debate began to get acrimonious, the briefers left us. We
spent the rest of the night studying their brochure and preparing an
alternative plan for them to carry back to the JCS. We had not
worked very long, plowing through the impressive presentation, before
we could see that the conclusions reached were derived from elab-
orately contrived projections of equally elaborate hypotheses which
were based, in the end, on meager data of dubious authenticity. This
is an important point. The program was a scholarly piece of work,
honestly researched and presented without gloss. The argument was
logically flawless, but the authors simply lacked the basic data neces-
sary to determine the proper use of the China-based B-29s. It
became eminently plain that someone in Washington who had a fixa-
tion about the role of coke in Japan's war economy had enlisted
followers and somehow taken the JCS by storm. He must have been
a very persuasive man.
It scarcely needs saying that the alternative program we prepared
for the XXth Bomber Command was found wanting in Washington,
'Eventually, as mentioned below, the China-based B-29s mounted strikes against
both of these targets, but late and with low priority. In the meantime they had
been of much service to the enemy.
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and it was not long before the B-29s reached China under the
original plan.4
The Yawata Strike
Even though the planes could not cover the distance with anything
like a full bomb load, the target selected for their initial mission was
the Yawata steel plant, on Kyushu near the Straits of Shimonoseki,
because it was here that Washington said Japan's largest collection
of coke ovens was to be found. I do not recall any very convincing
reasons for this estimate, but the ovens were brightly printed in
colored ink on the target charts and Washington was convinced that
the B-29s would find them there.
We learned of the decision to hit Yawata only a few days before
the strike was scheduled, when the XXth Bomber Command sent us
a message asking would we kindly provide pre-strike and post-strike
aerial photography of the target. This presented some diffi.cult:ies for
us. The Yawata area lay beyond the range of a photo plane flying
from any of our fields. There was, however, a field in guerrilla-held
territory near the coast. If the weather conditions were just right
(and this was predictable only within the narrowest of limits) and
if the Japanese stayed where they were-they could take the field
in a day's operation, and had done so in the past whenever they
chose-the flight could be accomplished.
This scarcely practicable procedure had actually been carried out
once some time earlier. The pilot had not made it quite as far as
Yawata, and during his time over the target an unanticipated layer
of clouds lay between his cameras and the ground; but there was
no denying that he had overflown a part of Kyushu and returned
safely, though with no considerable reserves of fuel. It also hap-
pened that this pilot, having completed the required number of
missions, was still in China, about to embark at any moment on his
' Their passage to their new bases was attended by a curious incident. Coming
over the Hump, one squadron was intercepted by a Japanese fighter evidently
flown by a very wise pilot. He flew on all sides of the formation, estimating the
planes' size and cruising speed. Then he moved in close enough to draw fire and
so learned most of what there was to know about their defensive armament and
fire control. Then he pulled away, wagged his wings, and took off for his home
field in northern Burma to report what he had seen. A week earlier the very
presence of the B-29 in China had officially been classified Secret. In spite of
the fact that the Japanese now knew more about the plane than any Americans
except a handful of General Chennault's staff and the XXth Bomber Command
personnel, this classification remained in force for months, until the press could
re ort its first offensive mission.
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Coke Ovens
IA-RDP78T03194A000200030001-0
return flight to the States. He was apprised of the XXth Bomber
Command request. After the briefest cogitation, and on learning
that there was still available for consultation a certain weather officer
whom he believed to be in some kind of direct communication with
the elements, he volunteered to fly to Yawata once, not twice, if the
weather officer found the omens favorable. His offer was accepted, and
the weather was found good enough, barely, for a post-strike mission.
The photo mission was flown a few days after the strike and the
pilot returned safely, though his fuel ran out before he could taxi
his plane off the runway. A duplicate negative and a set of prints,
made at an East China field, were delivered to the 14th Air Force
Headquarters in Kunming only minutes before the arrival of a plane
carrying General Wolfe, who commanded the XXth Bomber Com-
mand, and a large part of his staff. When we had had a hasty look
at the prints and had told General Chennault what they showed,
it was his decision that they be given to General Wolfe without
comment. General Chennault suggested to him that he would doubt-
less prefer to have his own photo interpreters make the post-strike
assessment. General Wolfe, thus having been made aware, indirectly
and most courteously, that his interpreters would see nothing to
delight him, motioned to his aide to pick up the package and left
for his plane and his headquarters.
We had, of course, our own set of prints. A more leisurely perusal
confirmed our original impression, that the Yawata plant was un-
damaged. Furthermore, the area that on the target charts had been
so liberally sprinkled with coke oven symbols was in reality a sandspit
in a shallow bay, with no buildings other than a shack or two within
three-quarters of a mile. The coke ovens, less than half as many as
predicted, were even farther distant and also unscathed. Indeed, no
bomb craters were visible in the assigned target area at all.
As we continued to study the magnificent photography, which
covered in detail a large area of strategic importance, we found, some
twelve miles from the target, the fresh ruins of an industrial estab-
lishment the existence of which had previously been unknown. A
complete rebuilding job would now obviously be necessary to put
it back in production. We later learned that this had been Japan's
second largest tank factory, smashed by mistake.
Coke Phased Out
For a time the war on the coke ovens continued. The next mission
had as its target an industrial compleApp re-
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member its name. Here, it was said, the intelligence depicted on the
target charts was reliable because it came directly from the plans
of the plant, which had been drawn by an American firm engaged
to design the entire installation. Since this objective was nearer
than Kyushu, we were able to promise and deliver photo coverage
both before and after the strike. The pre-strike photography showed
the target charts were wrong again. There were coke ovens about
where the chart showed them to be, but there were only a small
fraction of the number it showed. The owners had evidently decided
to build a plant of smaller capacity than the one designed. Since
this was a daylight mission instead of a night strike-at Yawata most
of the bombing was done by radar-quite a few of the coke ovens
were destroyed or damaged.
After this mission the B-29s still took an occasional crack at coke
ovens--though never any as distant as Yawata's-but more and more
they took their targets from the 14th Air Force list of strategic
priorities. Even when they did go out to attack coke facilities, more
and more of them aborted part way to the assigned targets and
attacked instead a nearer alternative picked from the 14th Air Force
list. By and by the Marianas were taken, and fields built there be-
came the new home of the XXth Bomber Command, reconstituted as
the 20th USAAF and charged with battering Japan's home islands.
In China, except for a handful of B-29s equipped with cameras for
mapping photography,5 we saw them no more and turned our atten-
tion from coke ovens to other things.
'A slightly different employment of these photo planes, one that might quite
logically have been made, might well have changed the course of history in East
Asia. What they did was plod back and forth photographing untold thousands
of square miles of territory of no conceivable strategic interest, though doubtless
holding a certain fascination for the cartographer. Properly equipped and
targeted, they would have detected the Asiatic ports nearest Japan to be all but
barren of maritime traffic, permitting the conclusion that our extensive mining
of the Korean Straits and our destruction of Japanese shipping had in effect cut
Japan off from the mainland of Asia. With this link broken, and the home islands
deprived of all the external support required for their economy and the very
lives of their people, Japan's capacity to continue fighting was negligible. A
more continuation of the blockade and the aerial offensive then being carried on
must soon force a surrender, quite possibly without the use of exotic weapons
or the Soviet Union's late participation. As it was, the first photo coverage of
Manchurian and Korean ports was accomplished by the 14th Air Force. It is my
recollection that these flights were made less than a month before the war ended.
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Documents tracing some fervent but
fruitless Japanese efforts to end the
war in the Pacific.
MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT:
JAPANESE FEELERS
The last two volumes of the OSS Reports to the White House pre-
served among General Donovan's papers i include records of several
different Japanese approaches in 1945 to the Vatican and to OSS Lis-
bon, Bern, and Wiesbaden seeking a way to end the war. These
peace feelers were generally the product of local initiative and had
at most only a tacit approval from official Tokyo, where government
quarreling over the question of capitulation was growing more and
more desperate as the year advanced. They did not lead in any
way to the eventual Japanese notes sent through standard diplomatic
channels on 10 and 14 August, but they may have helped define for
both sides the conditions therein drawn which made "unconditional"
surrender a practical possibility.
The intelligence reports provide interesting and sometimes puzzling
footnotes for Robert J. C. Butow's fastidious-and fascinating-re-
construction of the intricate political maneuverings that ended in
Japan's Decision to Surrender.2 The documents are reproduced
below.
Through the Vatican
17 January 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
On 10 January the Japanese Emperor attended a secret council
meeting during which someone dared to speak about peace feelers.-3
' Described in the first of this series, subtitled "Sunrise," in Studies VII 2, p. 73 if.
' Stanford University Press, 1954.
Butow, who had examined the Japanese records most thoroughly, does not
mention such a 10 January meeting. It was at this time, however, with the
American return to the Philippines, that the Emperor and the government began
to be seriously worried about the outcome of the war. On 6 January the Emperor
proposed consulting the senior statesmen (former premiers) about the war situa-
tion, and individual audiences were set up for them during February. The im-
perial favorite among them, Prince Konoye, declaring that "Japan has already
lost the war," suggested purging the military of its extremists in order to clear
MORI/HRP PAGES 33-50
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The Emperor was informed that certain Japanese individuals have
been attempting to interest the highest authority at source I in mediat-
ing the Pacific War. The Emperor did not express any disapproval
of these efforts.
Someone at the meeting declared that such activities might be a
useful preparation for a time more opportune than the present. The
Council was skeptical of mediation possibilities, evidently believing
that only force of arms would settle the conflict.
24 January 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
On 17 January a conference, the substance of which is reported
below, took place with the following people present:
Ma.sahide Kanayama, Japanese representative at the Holy See
Giovani Montini, acting Secretary of State
Mgr. Domenico Tardini, President of the Pontifical Commission
for Russia
Pio Rossignani, Private Secretary of the Pope
KANAYAMA: The pacifists in Japan have great faith in the Holy
See. An attempt by the Holy See to initiate mediation would greatly
encourage our pacifists, even if there should be no immediate con-
crete results.
MoNTINI: It is clear to us that the gap between the viewpoints of
the two belligerents is too wide to permit Papal mediation.
TARDINI: Japanese adherence to the tripartite pact seriously hurts
the Japanese case in Allied countries. World opinion stigmatizes
Japan as an aggressor, and even Soviet Russia concurs.
KANAYAMA: Our Ambassador in Moscow has informed our Gov-
ernment that the Far East will be discussed when the Big Three
meet. The United States, supported by Churchill, will ask for Russian
help to crush us completely. The Anglo-Americans will ask that
Russia denounce the pact of non-aggression with Japan and that
Russia passively participate in the Pacific War and permit Anglo-
American use of Russian air bases. Our Government also under-
stands that, before Stalin will agree to this, he will request a whole-
hearted attempt on the part of the Anglo-Americans to mediate, and
that he will even offer to act as mediator. Our Government also
understands that the Big Three will discuss European problems first,
and that if they are not settled to Russia's satisfaction, especially the
Polish question, then Stalin will not discuss the Far East.
TARDINI: The United States and England have already made a
declaration on Poland. American public opinion is behind Roosevelt.
KANAYAMA: It is a diplomatic maneuver to draw concessions from
Russia. Moreover, Roosevelt and Churchill have another move to
make against Russia. Turkey and the countries of the Middle East
are ready to enter the war against us. Stalin is opposed to these
countries entering either the Pacific or the European War.
ROSSIGNANI: In view of all this, would it not be better for the
Pope to synchronize his mediation with that of Stalin?
KANAYAMA: On the contrary, it is urgent that His Holiness come
to our assistance before the Big Three meet to discuss Japan, and
that this mediation be in full swing at the time. Stalin is interested
in close collaboration with the Anglo-Americans, but he wishes to
gain the maximum benefits from this collaboration. Stalin knows
that the Japanese reaction will be swift when it becomes evident
that Russian denunciation of the non-aggression pact is imminent.
There may be a stiffening of Japanese resistance, or the pacifists may
prevail. In this latter case, Stalin would cut a big figure, and be
would be able to gain satisfying terms for the Anglo-Americans.
And even to the Japanese he might appear as the savior of Japan
from destruction. Stalin desires to have De Gaulle at the coming
conference, but Roosevelt and Churchill are opposed. However,
should De Gaulle be admitted to the conference, then Chiang Kai-
shek will be present also.
MONTINI: Would it not be possible for the Japanese Government
to offer terms that would be closer to those of the Anglo-Americans
so that the Holy See could begin mediation on more concrete bases?
KANAYAMA: We will communicate your request to our government
at once, together with an account of this conference. Meanwliile, it
would be useful if the Holy See would begin mediation attempts.
RossIGNANI: Very well. This evening I will present Mr, Kana-
yama's memorandum and the minutes of this conference to His
Holiness.
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27 January 1945
The following is source's account of the conference held on 19
January between the Pope and Mr. Myron Taylor:
When asked whether he considered Papal mediation in the Pacific
war possible, Taylor was skeptical. He stated that recent develop-
ments had evidently not brought the Japanese point of view any
closer to that of the Anglo-Americans. The Pope asked if he would
discuss the situation with the Japanese Ambassador to the Holy See,
and Taylor replied that he was neither an official nor semi-official
representative of the United States, and accordingly could speak
only as a private individual. Taylor promised to communicate with
the President, for which the Pope thanked him, and asked him to
explain the sentiments which animated this inquiry.
2 February 1945
On 25 January, Harada Ken, Japanese Ambassador to the Holy
See, made the following assertions to the Pope:
The Japanese Government would be willing to interpret the Vatican's
wishes to the Kremlin.
The Kremlin has assured the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow that
Russia will ask the Anglo-Americans to attempt to reach a negotiated
peace in the Pacific, provided the Japanese Government accepts the
Soviet proposal that the Far East peace conference include Russia,
China, Great Britain, the United States, France, and japan.'' . . .
Reports from this source in the Vatican were code-named Vessel. By March
some of them were proved false, and it was soon suspected that many of them
had been fabricated or planted. This may explain the discrepancies between
them and Butow's account.
Butow touches on these feelers through the Vatican only in one footnote
reference to an AP dispatch of the preceding 17 July, shortly after the fall of
Saipan, reporting Harada to have told the Pope that Japan was ready for any
peace that would leave its national life and economy intact. The report was
categorically denied by a government spokesman in Tokyo.
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2 February 1945
Source 7 has been informed by connections in Japan that the Japa-
nese Government is confident that Stalin will categorically refuse
to abrogate the non-aggression pact with Japan. The Japanese hope
for new Soviet-Japanese pacts strengthening the non-aggression pact.
The Japanese Government feels that Japan can continue the Pacific
war indefinitely in view of Russia's certain refusal to enter the war.
Japan therefore cannot reduce its minimum terms for a peace
settlement.
16 February 1945
The following is a resume of the first talk between Myron Taylor
and Harada Ken, Japanese Ambassador to the Holy See, as reported
by Vessel:
Harada declared that Japanese elements desirous of peace are not
responsible for the Pacific war, and that those elements might be able
to make their will felt if the Anglo-Americans would offer acceptable
terms.
Taylor reminded Harada that American public opinion still re-
members the unprovoked attack on Pearl Harbor. He promised,
however, to initiate a friendly investigation of the possibilities for
negotiation.
Taylor and Harada agreed that the terms of the two belligerent
groups, as they knew them, were too far apart to permit: negotiations.
Harada stated that the United States' chief war aim apparently was
a victory that would give Japanese pacifist elements ascendancy over
the military and prevent any future militarist aggression. He added
that Japan was exhausted by the war she has been fightin since
1937, and that she needs a long period of peace.
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11 April 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
An OSS representative has transmitted the following information,
reportedly sent to the Vatican on 6 April 8 by Lorenzo Tatewaki Toda,
the Apostolic Delegate in Yokohama:
Tatewaki Toda, who is a member of a Japanese princely family
and related to the Emperor, proposes to call on the Emperor in order
to "comfort him with the certain hope that the Holy See will not
abandon its attempt at mediation" of the war in the Pacific. Tatewaki
Toda believes that the present is the most favorable moment to
conquer the intransigence of the extreme militarists in the interests
of a peaceful solution to the war. He promises as soon as possible
to send the Holy See a set of conditions which it may judge acceptable
to the Anglo-Americans, and he beseeches the Pope to pray that
Japan's rulers may become convinced of the necessity of an honorable
peace.
31 May 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information has been transmitted by the OSS repre-
sentative in Lisbon:
On 7 May 1945 the OSS representative reported that during a
contact with a regular source of varying reliability, source stated
that he had been asked by Masutaro Inoue, Counsellor of the Japa-
nese Legation in Portugal, to contact United States representatives.
Source quoted Inoue as saying that the Japanese are ready to cease
hostilities, provided they are allowed to retain possession of their
home islands. Inoue stressed American and Japanese "common in-
terests" against the USSR. He said, however, that unconditional sur-
render would not be acceptable to Japan.
(The OSS representative believes that Inoue selected this par-
ticular source to carry his message to American representatives,
because of source's long experience in Portugal and Japan.)
8 That is, just after the assault on Okinawa, the collapse of the Koiso cabinet,
and the USSR's announcement that its neutrality pact with Japan would not
be renewed.
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On 19 May, the OSS representative reported that Inoue again had
repeated to source his desire to talk with an American representative.
On this occasion Inoue declared that actual peace terms were un-
important so long as the term "unconditional surrender" was not
employed. The Japanese, he asserted, are convinced that within a
few weeks all of their wood and paper houses will be destroyed.
Inoue insisted, however, that such destruction would not lead to
unconditional surrender and that the war would still be prosecuted in
China. The destruction of the Meiji Jinja shrine, Inoue added, had
strengthened Japanese will to resist.
[The information contained in the above messages was given the
United States Ambassador by the OSS representative.]
The OSS representative on 23 May reported that the United States
Ambassador, after consultation with the British and Chinese, in-
structed that Inoue be told he must show proof that he is authorized
to speak for the Japanese Government and that he is prepared to
discuss unconditional surrender-the only basis acceptable to the
United States.
12 May 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative
in Bern,' originates with a German source, an authority on the Far
East who is considered anti-Nazi but pro-Japanese: 10
The source, on 11 May, talked with Shunichi Kase, the Japanese
Minister to Switzerland. He reports that Kase expressed a wish to
help arrange for a cessation of hostilities between the Japanese and
the Allies. Kase reportedly considers direct talks with the Americans
and the British preferable to negotiations through the USSR,71 because
the latter eventually would increase Soviet prestige so much that the
whole Far East would become Communist.
? Allen Dulles.
'? Butow identifies this man as a Dr. Friedrich Hack (apparently in retrans-
literation from the Japanese "Hakku") and connects hint with incidental references
in Willoughby's Shanghai Conspiracy to a man named Haak or Haag.
"The official Japanese efforts to bring an end to the war were all mistakenly
directed at securing Soviet mediation. These efforts continued right up to the
Soviet: invasion of Manchuria on 9 August.
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Kase allegedly believes that one of the few provisions the Japanese
would insist upon would be the retention of the Emperor as the only
safeguard against Japan's conversion to Communism. Kase feels
that Under Secretary of State Grew, whom he considers the best
US authority on Japan, shares this opinion.
Added by hand: Should we pursue this? Donovan
4 June 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative
in Bern on 2 June, is a sequel to memorandum dated 12 May 1945
concerning an alleged Japanese peace feeler. The source of the
information is the same German authority on the Far East who is
considered anti-Nazi but pro-Japanese:
Source is in touch with Fujimura, who is understood to be one of
the principal Japanese naval representatives in Europe and a former
Assistant Naval Attache in Berlin. Fujimura is reported to be in
direct and secret contact by cable with the Japanese Minister of
Marine [Navy?] and is believed to enjoy the confidence of the Japa-
nese Government.
Fujimura indicated to source that the Navy circles who now control
[?] the Japanese Government would be willing to surrender but wish,
if possible, to save some face from the present wreckage. These Navy
circles, he declares, particularly stress the necessity of preserving the
Emperor in order to avoid Communism and chaos. Fujimura empha-
sizes that Japan can not supply itself with basically essential food-
stuffs and is dependent upon Korea for sugar and rice. He also insists
that Japan needs to retain some of its merchant marine for necessary
food imports.12
22 June 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative
in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 12 May and 4 June concern-
ing peace feelers emanating reportedly from the Japanese Legation in
Bern. The source of the information is the same German authority
referred to in previous memoranda, a description of whom is ap-
pended below:
According to source, Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before
surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be
retained. Fujimura has read accounts in the Bern press of Mr. Allen
Dulles' part in arranging for the German capitulation in North Italy.
Fujimura is obviously interested in knowing what terms short of
unconditional surrender might have been granted these Germans.rs
[Source is a German national who was taken prisoner by the Japa-
nese in World War I. Upon his release he remained in Japan and
established important commercial relations there. He placed Japa-
nese purchases in Germany, made a substantial fortune, and gained
the confidence of high Japanese circles, particularly in the Navy.
Some years ago he returned to Europe and, as he was persona non
grata with the Hitler Government, took up residence in Zurich. He
maintained contacts, however, with Japanese circles in Berlin, par-
ticularly with Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Naval Attache. He is
understood to have advised the Japanese two years ago that Germany
would be decisively defeated, while Ambassador Oshima. at that
time officially predicted a German victory. ]
Butow carries a detailed account of this approach from Yoshiro Fujimura's
own testimony, but there are gross discrepancies especially with respect to dates.
It has Hack meeting as intermediary for Fujimura with Gero von Gaevernitz and
others of Mr. Dulles' staff from 23 April on and Mr. Dulles receiving authorization
"from the State Department" to continue the meetings on 3 May. According to
this account Minister Shunichi Kase, whose 11 May approach is reported above,
did not enter the picture until 20 June, when Tokyo finally instructed Fujimura
to work with him. Fujimura is said to have cabled urgent operational dispatches
to the Navy chiefs in Tokyo on 9, 10, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, and four later dates in
May, presenting the contact as effected on American initiative and urging that
he be authorized to negotiate. But in Tokyo there was too much opposition even
in Navy circles, most notably from Naval Chief of Staff Toyoda.
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13 July 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, received from Mr. Allen Dulles in
Wiesbaden, dated 12 and 13 July, concerns a new Japanese attempt
-At about this time Admiral Leahy, according to his account in I Was There,
asked Mr. Dulles about "rumors that some OSS agents were trying to arrange
for conversations with high Japanese officials regarding peace terms" and Mr.
Dulles said "he had no knowledge of any such activity and did not believe the
OSS was involved."
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Japanese Feelers
to approach Allied authorities through OSS representatives in Switzer-
land:
Per Jacobson,14 a Swedish national and economic adviser to the
Bank for International Settlements, has been approached by Kojiro
Kitamura, a director of the Bank, a representative of the Yokohama
Specie Bank and former financial attache in Berlin. Kitamura indi-
cated to Jacobson that he was anxious to establish immediate contact
with American representatives and implied that the only condition on
which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some
consideration for the Japanese Imperial family. Kitamura showed
that he was completely familiar with OSS operations which led to
the surrender of the German forces in North Italy, and declared that
he wished to establish a contact similar to that made by General
Karl Wolff.
According to Jacobson, Kitamura is acting with the consent of the
Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and is working with
Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, a former Japanese Military
Attache in Bern. [Okamoto is probably the chief of Japanese Intelli-
gence in Europe.] Kitamura claims that the Japanese group in
Switzerland has direct communications with Tokyo and is in a posi-
tion to make definite commitments.
(Responsible OSS cut-out sources who talked with Jacobson at
Basel believe that the Kitamura approach was initiated locally rather
than on the basis of instructions from Tokyo. Hence it is difficult
to assess the seriousness of the approach.
(The OSS representative in Bern reports that Jacobson has urgently
requested him to come to Basel to see him this coming week-end.
The OSS representative has declined the invitation but has told
Jacobson that he could see him in Bern L' on Sunday, 15 July. The
OSS representative in Bern will see Jacobson only to obtain such
intelligence as Jacobson is able to give, and expects to treat the
entire matter with the greatest caution and reserve.)
"The surname should be spelled with a double s. Butow, apparently not find-
ing a given name in his sources, calls him "a certain Mr. Jacobsson."
" All three anachronistic references to Bern in this paragraph should read
Wiesbaden.
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1.6 July 1945
The following information, a sequel to a memorandum dated 13
July . . . has been received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden. .. .
Jacobsson reports that between 10 and 13 July he had a series of
conferences with Yoshimura, a Japanese official attached to the Bank
for International Settlements, and Kojiro Kitamura, a director of the
Bank, representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank, and former finan-
cial attache in Berlin. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim to be acting
in consultation with the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi
Kase, and Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, former Japanese
military attache in Bern, who now is believed to be chief of Japanese
Intelligence in Europe. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim further that
Kase and Okamoto have direct and secret means of communicating
with the Japanese Chief of Staff. Yoshimura also claims that the
peace group which he represents includes General Ushijiro Umezu,
Army Chief of Staff; 18 Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Minister of Navy;
and Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister.
Yoshimura and Kitamura appeared to Jacobsson no longer to ques-
tion the principle of unconditional surrender, though at one point they
asked whether unconditional military and naval surrender might not
be sufficient. On his own initiative Jacobsson replied that such a pro-
posal would not be acceptable to the Allies but would be considered
merely a quibble.17 Both Japanese officials raised the question of
maintaining Japanese territorial integrity, but they apparently did not
mean to include Manchukuo, Korea or Formosa.
Throughout discussions with Jacobsson, the Japanese officials
stressed only two points: (a) the preservation of the Emperor, and
(b) the possibility of returning to the constitution promulgated in
1889. Kitamura prepared and presented to Jacobsson a memorandum
asking him to sound out Mr. Dulles' opinion on the two points.
(Mr. Dulles feels that these two Japanese are insisting on the
retention of the Emperor because they feel that he alone can take
'" Umezu was actually one of the bitter-enders wanting to the last to give battle
to the invaders on home soil. He, with War Minister Anami and Naval Chief of
Staff Toyoda, were brought into line with the "peace group" only by the inter-
vention of the Emperor on 10 and again on 14 August.
" But this quibble, incorporated on 26 July into the Potsdam proclamation,
became an important argument for accepting the surrender terms.
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effective action with respect to surrender and that some hope of
survival must be held out to him in order to gain his support for
unconditional surrender.)
Later Yoshimura and Kitamura prepared a second memorandum in
which they asked how, if Tokyo were ready to proceed, conversations
could be arranged with Allied representatives and what form of
authorization would be required.
Jacobsson is personally convinced that these approaches are serious
and that the Japanese group in Switzerland is in constant cable con-
tact with Tokyo.18 This conviction appears to be based on impres-
sions only, since his two Japanese contacts never stated precisely
that they had received instructions from any authorized agency in
Tokyo.
(Mr. Dulles, in carefully guarded statements, pointed out to Jacobs-
son that:
(1. Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July covered the situation. As yet
these approaches which Jacobsson described, in the absence of con-
clusive evidence that they emanated from a fully-empowered official,
fall squarely into the category of "peace feelers" described by Mr.
Grew. 19
(2. If competent Japanese authorities accepted unconditional sur-
render, appropriate Allied authorities would determine how such
a surrender should be effected.
(3. He (Mr. Dulles) had no comments to make with regard to
dynastic and constitutional questions.20
(4. Prompt unconditional surrender appears to be the only way to
save anything out of the wreckage.
Okamoto and Kase sent many cables (in which they, like Fujimura, apparently
implied that the initiative for the contact had come from Mr. Dulles), but the
only encouragement they got from Tokyo was the lack of any rebuke.
"? "Conversations relating to peace have been reported to the Department from
various parts of the world, but in no case has an approach been made .. . by a
person who could establish his authority to speak for the Japanese Govern-
ment. . . . The purported `peace feelers' . . are the usual moves in the
conduct of psychological warfare by a defeated enemy."
'? But according to Butow's information from the postwar testimony of Kase,
Yoshimura, and Kitamura, Mr. Dulles' reply as relayed by Jacobsson had been
that the United States was not opposed to preserving the imperial institution but
had to take its allies' views into account and so could not make any firm com-
mitment. It could state its "understanding" that the imperial system would be
retained. The constitution, however, would have to be changed.
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(Mr. Dulles agrees with Jacobsson that the Japanese have taken t
heart the consequences which Germany has suffered, including ex
tensive physical destruction and the collapse of all German authority
because it prolonged a futile struggle many months after its hope
lessness was wholly apparent. Jacobsson feels therefore that
tendency is growing in certain Japanese circles to try to terminatf
the war at any cost, provided that non-militaristic Japanese govern
mental institutions can be preserved in the Japanese home islands
(Mr. Dulles expects within a few days to obtain some evidence
as to whether these approaches by Yoshimura and Kitamura have any
serious backing or represent merely an effort by the Japanese group
in Switzerland to start something on their own initiative.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
18 July :1945
Mr. Dulles has been informed by OSS representatives in Switzer-
land that Yoshimura and Kojiro Kitamura, Japanese official; in the
Bank for International Settlements, were scheduled to confer at once
with Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto at Zurich, and immediately
thereafter to cable Tokyo. .. .
(Mr. Dulles believes that for the next few days important de-
velopments in this matter are not likely, but that a line is being
opened which the Japanese may use when the situation in Tokyo
permits Japan to accept unconditional surrender.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
2 August 1945
Immediately following is a summary of a report by Per Jacobsson,
a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International
Settlements, transmitted to Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:
The Japanese Chief of Staff has acknowledged without comment a
long cable which Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto sent. from
Switzerland on 19 July. Okamoto's telegram reportedly stated that
Japan has lost the war and must promptly accept the conse-
quences... .
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 Approvefd'`Z7le%ggr1005/01/05 : Cl
The Japanese Foreign Minister has also acknowledged a detailed
report from Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern. Kase's re-
port, sent on or about 21 July, included (a) Mr. Grew's statement
of 10 July, (b) a memorandum from Kojiro Kitamura, director of
the Bank for International Settlements and former financial attache
in Berlin, who has been active in the current Japanese approaches to
Mr. Dulles, and (c) a statement of Kase's own position. The Foreign
Minister's reply to Kase's message contained the following query:
"Is that all you have to say?" Kase interprets this query as an
invitation to continue peace approaches.
The recent tripartite ultimatum to Japan 21 has been the chief topic
of discussion among Japanese groups in Switzerland. Their first re-
action, on the basis of excerpts published in the Swiss press, was
that (a) the proclamation showed a lack of understanding of Japa-
nese character, (b) the document should have not been framed on
a basis of "take it or leave it," (c) the inclusion of China as a
signatory represented an "added element of humiliation," and (d)
the document should have been sent through private channels rather
than publicly. After receiving the full English text through Jacobs-
son, and after further study, the attitude of the group changed, and
the proclamation was accepted as an "astute document which left a
possible way out." The group was particularly impressed by "un-
conditional surrender" in connection with the "Japanese armed forces"
and to the reference to revival and strengthening of democratic
tendencies among the Japanese people. As a result, a telegram stress-
ing these points was to be sent to Tokyo on 30 July.
The following is a summary of a memorandum to Mr. Dulles from
the Japanese group in contact with Per Jacobsson. Jacobsson trans-
mitted this memo along with his own report summarized above.
The Japanese group emphasizes that it is hoping for some decision
within a week unless "resistance is too great." The Allies should not
take "too seriously" what was said over the Tokyo radio about the
tripartite proclamation.22 This radio comment was merely "propa-
The Potsdam proclamation.
22 It .had been formally decided at cabinet level to withhold public comment
on the proclamation while seeking clarification through Soviet good offices. But
this decision was somehow twisted in the next day's press and radio into one to
show "silent contempt" for the tripartite terms, and then Premier Suzuki, under
pressure from the military, confirmed this interpretation.
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ganda to maintain morale in Japan." The real reply will be given
through some "official channel," possibly by Minister Kase or General
Okamoto, if an official Government reply is not made over the
Tokyo radio.
Mr. Dulles also has been informed, by a German authority on the
Far. East living in Switzerland who is one of his regular contacts,
that Yosikazu 23 Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative in Bern,
has sent seven long cables to his superiors in Tokyo during the past
two months urging immediate cessation of hostilities. His superiors
cabled in reply that the Japanese Navy no longer is able to "act
alone," and instructed Fujimura not to take the initiative without
orders from Tokyo, but to maintain his "most valuable contacts." 24
The German source reports and Jacobsson confirms that Fu.jimura
and Kitamura have established close contact with each other. The
two men, Jacobsson confirms, are agreed that joint action by all Japa-
nese services in Switzerland might make some impression on the
Japanese Government, since Bern now "is probably next to Moscow
the most important Japanese foreign post."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
9 August 1945
Per Jacobsson .. . has transmitted the following information to
Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:
Kojiro Kitamura .. . has held a number of conversations on the
significance of the tripartite ultimatum to Japan issued at ]Potsdam
with the Japanese Minister in Bern, Shunichi Kase, and Brigadier
General Kiyotomi Okamoto, believed to be the head of Japanese
intelligence in Europe.
According to indications from the Tokyo Radio, the three men all
feel that the declaration initially was badly received. They empha-
size, however, the "brief and perfunctory" nature of the formal reply
Error for Yoshiro.
u Butow has him receiving only two replies from Tokyo, one in mid-May en-
joining caution against an enemy trap and the one on 20 June telling him to work
with Kase. See note 12 above.
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as given over the Tokyo Radio by Premier Suzuki. They attribute
the terseness of the reply as evidence of the influence of a "peace
party."
This group in Switzerland has been sending daily cables to Tokyo
stating that the Potsdam declaration to Japan was merely a simple
statement of Allied war aims and not a "take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum
which Japan could not honorably accept, as was first believed." The
group feels that these daily messages to Tokyo have served to bolster
the efforts of the "peace Party" in Tokyo. The group finds encourag-
ing the fact that it has not been rebuked for such frank statements,
and attaches considerable importance to a report in the Swiss press
on 5 August that Foreign Minister Togo was received in private
audience by the Emperor.25 The group considers that Togo belongs
to "a new peace party."
The group requested Jacobsson to ask Mr. Dulles whether he would
be willing to see an authorized representative of the Japanese Gov-
ernment. If so, one of the following would be selected as the repre-
sentative: (1) Minister Kase, acting as Japanese Government delegate
to the conversations, not as Minister to Switzerland; (2) Ambassador
Sato in Moscow; or preferably (3) some Swiss civilian now in Tokyo
who could be sent under the cover of a representative of the Inter-
national Red Cross. The group prefers the third alternative because
it feels that such a person would know the situation in Tokyo and
"would evaluate the situation as envisaged in Europe."
Mr. Dulles comments that there is no direct evidence that these
suggestions from the Japanese group in Switzerland are based on
instructions from Tokyo. Mr. Dulles has again cautioned Jacobsson
on this point and has emphasized to Jacobsson that the only ques-
tion is whether the Japanese are ready to accept unconditional sur-
render as set forth in the Potsdam and other previous official declara-
tions. Realizing the extreme delicacy of this matter, Mr. Dulles con-
tinues to handle it with the greatest caution.
13 September 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following, prepared to complete your records, is the substance
of a final report, dated 27 August, from Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of
` Butow does not record this audience. Togo was received on 8 August to
report what enemy broadcasts were saying about the bomb that had destroyed
Hiroshima and to emphasize the urgency of accepting the Potsdam proclamation.
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the OSS Mission in Wiesbaden, concerning the Japanese pre-surrender
attempt to approach Allied authorities through OSS representa-
tives. . . .
On 17 August, Per Jacobsson transmitted the following information
to Mr. Dulles:
Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, believed to be head of Japa-
nese intelligence in Europe until his suicide 15 August, received a
telegram just before his death from the Japanese Chief of Staff,
thanking him and his associates in Bern for their work in communicat-
ing with "the Americans" in Switzerland. The wire stated that their
work in Switzerland had been most useful in enabling Tokyo to
reach a decision.
(Mr. Dulles comments that the Navy and civilian groups were pre-
pared to seek peace before the Army had come to such a decision.
The initiation of formal peace offers therefore was blocked until some-
one in the Army group came out in favor of surrender.) 26
After receiving the message, General Okamoto wrote Fujimura
asking him to express thanks to Jacobsson and Mr. Dulles. In rec-
ognition of his work, Jacobsson is to be entertained by both Fujimura
and Kitamura. Jacobsson feels that the Japanese in Bern must have
been praised by Tokyo for their work.
In his messages to Tokyo prior to the Japanese surrender, General
Okamoto had insisted that his government should deal solely with
the United States. Jacobsson believes it is likely that the suggestions
of the Japanese in Bern "persuaded the Emperor finally to turn to
the United States alone." The Swiss group, inspired by Jacobsson,
suggested the face-saving formula that avoided the use of the word
"surrender" in Japanese official communications.27
Before he died, General Okamoto collected all of Fujimura's letters
and other pertinent papers and directed that they be saved for his-
torians' use. Jacobsson learned from Fujimura that immediately after
General Okamoto's death, the Japanese Chief of Staff sent Okamoto's
"military office" in Bern a message of condolence. The message ap-
parently was not a mere formality, since it was much longer than
customary and included the following sentence: "I appreciate his
patriotic service rendered at our country's most critical moment."
"But Okamoto's coming out in favor of surrender had had no evident effect
on Army circles in Tokyo. See note 16 above.
'To judge from Butow's study, the cables from Switzerland commanded little
attention in Tokyo.
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A new contract agent wins his spurs
and reports with conviction that-
Fujimura and Kitamura regard this action as expressing approval and
appreciation of the General's last telegrams advocating surrender.
Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern, decided in July that he
had been wrong in favoring the USSR as the intermediary for peace
negotiations. He radioed Tokyo that the Soviet Union was not a
satisfactory channel and that the wisest course would be to deal
directly with the United States through Swiss contacts.
Jacobsson believes that, because of the above, the Japanese Gov-
ernment elected to send the final surrender communication through
Bern. Stockholm, he points out, would have served as well and
would have been the normal transmittal point since the USSR, by
then at war, had diplomatic representatives in the Swedish capital.28
1 The surrender notes were communicated to Britain and the USSR through
the Swedish government, to the United States and China through the Swiss.
TRAINING PAYS
James A. Savacool
The following are excerpts from a contract agent's report on his
successful operations in a denied area. He had been arrested, to
be sure, but only in the course of a mass roundup of potentially sub-
versive elements, and his security had been so good that after about
eight weeks he was released for lack of evidence. His report shows
the possibility as well as the difficulty of operating under severe
counterintelligence controls and above all the value of thorough train-
ing. Experienced intelligence operatives may find the lessons herein
illustrated a bit elementary, but this agent is understandably sold on
the value of those elementary lessons and proud of having learned
them well and followed them.
I am altogether convinced that I managed to evade detection be-
cause of the thorough teaching in tradecraft I was given by my
instructors, particularly Al, with his insistence on careful planning
and close attention to every detail regardless of how small or in-
consequential it might appear.
Meetings
Because of the close surveillance to which all persons living under
the block system of neighborhood control are subject, meetings and
meeting places were the problem of primary concern. Meetings just
to transfer material or funds were comparatively simple; the main
essential was coordinated timing. There was no telephone number
that could be called for the exact time, but a local radio station gave
the hour on the minute. We used this to synchronize our watches.
Our unalterable rule was, "Never before the hour and never more
than three minutes after the hour." If contact was not made in that
interval it was deferred to an alternative time and place. In a full
year of such meetings we had to resort to the alternative only two
or three times.
We soon discovered that Al's advice about woo cover for status
and for action was right, that it was much easier to devise a reason
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for being who and where we were and doing what we were doing
if members of the opposite sex were involved. So wherever possible
we arranged to have a woman as cutout, and the cover for a meeting
with her would be simply a lovers' tryst. We met in bars and
restaurants and, seemingly by chance, in areas normally frequented
by both parties. Meetings without a cutout were held only when
absolutely unavoidable, as when planning the details of a sabotage
project.
When such direct contact had to be made, we generally followed
this basic outline: The time and place, plus the alternate plan, were
passed by the cutout. We used code words for the meeting places
and a plus or minus number of hours. At the appointed hour one
of the two parties would be, let's say, at a bus stop in a fairly busy
section of town, with an appropriate cover for "status." The cover
for action was almost invariably the other's offer to give him a ride
home. Cover for their acquaintance was generally a former pupil-
teacher relationship. Neither person carried documents to these
meetings. Information was given orally and no notes were taken.
The writing up was done immediately after the meeting when safely
at home.
Staying Inconspicuous
Every effort was made to avoid both deserted sections and exces-
sively busy areas. Al's maxim "Know the area" became a way of life.
In my area, which was quite large, I knew the location of security
forces, where government officials lived, and where foreigners of
consequence were to be found. How important this knowledge is
was impressed on me one time when I parked my car in an un-
fortunate spot to go to a meeting. It happened like this:
Returning to my car after the meeting, I recalled Al's reiterated
"Always have a cover story." I truthfully did not believe there was
any need for a cover story at this point, but just to follow the rujes
I prepared one. It was not a well-planned cover; certainly it could
not compare with those I prepared after that: But it was a story.
I knew a teacher who lived about a block from where I had parked
my car. I went by his house and spent a few minutes there before
going back to the parking place. As soon as I got to the car and
opened the door about five spotlights went on and I was surrounded
by militiamen. They searched me and the car, made me identify
self and asked what I was doing there. Since I was prepared,
I could tell my story readily and convincingly, and it had enough
truth in it to get by.
I learned later that a high government official had moved that
very day into the house in front of which I had parked. Close! A
good object lesson, and an extremely convincing one. Al was right:
"Have a cover story at all times, for if you don't you may panic and
trap yourself."
Regular Sessions
Tutoring sessions were used as a cover for regular meetings. The
"pupil" was supposed to be taking English lessons from me at my
house. I supplied him with books, gave him a list of things we would
have covered in the last session, had him do under my supervision
a paper to be handed in as homework, and gave him another list
of items to be covered in the current session. He always arrived
carrying several books to use in the lesson, and he would enclose
in them any papers necessary for the meeting. We drew up a class
schedule for twice a week and had a reason why he had not been
able to attend his last class if we had not met then. If he was there
off schedule he was making up a session he had missed. While our
meetings were in progress I played a tape recording of English read-
ings to give more realism to the cover and also to preclude any eaves-
dropping on our conversation.
This attention to detail made it possible for me to meet with one
of my contacts countless times, though the block warden might be
standing in front of the house watching us. Thoroughness in detail
had been one of the fundamentals drilled into me by all my in-
structors, and in practice it paid off.
Caution with New Contact
One afternoon I received a call from my case officer asking me to
come immediately to a restaurant. When I arrived he told me we
were meeting a student who he believed had good potential as a
political agent. The case officer was leaving the -country, and I
would have to handle this man on my own. He was energetic, ap-
parently well acquainted, and anxious to do something against the
government; but he needed some financial aid to continue in the
university. I was to give him $200 and explore the possibility of his
working for us.
Y
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The student arrived and I was introduced to him, by a first name
only. I invited him to take a walk with me and talk about his activi-
ties. He was very enthusiastic. He told me he had organized about
300 students but they needed arms. He wanted me to get him
weapons, gelatin, etc. I pleaded ignorance in all such matters. Then
he began asking questions. He asked me where I lived. I gave him
the name of a suburb favored by Americans. He asked if I had a
car. I told him no, that was one of my problems; living in the
suburbs and working down town I lost quite a bit of time. He wanted
to know bow long I had been in the country, etc.
Then he turned to describing the "active" groups at the univer-
sity. He seemed thoroughly conversant with the membership of
these groups. When I inquired which one he belonged to he said
he was an independent. He cooperated with several groups in
sabotage undertakings, but he preferred to remain unattached; it
gave him more chance to act. I just listened, carefully. I asl?Ced
him where he could meet me so that I could give him the tuition
money. He was very grateful for our helping him continue his
studies; he would always cherish the memory of our friendship for
the "little" people, the real people of his country. Could I meet him
at such-and-such a corner tomorrow at 2:00 p.m.? "Of course; would
you like the money in big bills or small?" "Twenties would be per-
feet," he said.
All the information he had elicited from me was of course false.
I really don't know why I went to such pains to lie so plausibly, even
adding little anecdotes about my troubles with public transportation
during the rush hour. I presume it was the oft-repeated admonition
of my instructors to let my contacts know as little of me as possible.
The added trimmings to induce belief were probably just instinct,
quickened by the knowledge that two Americans had recently been
seized in the area of our rendezvous.
IA-RDP78T0319r4A6V &5 80001-0
the son's name on it. He was then to leave immediately, taking pre-
cautions against being followed. The courier did exactly as di-
rected and reported back that no one except the mother had been
in the store.
In the meantime I had started a check on my new would-be friend,
asking the head of one of the activist groups at the university to look
into him. He returned mystified; my friend was unknown to anyone
in his group. Was I sure of the name and school? I verified these
and asked him to try again. At the same time I started another
investigation through a second group. The results were the same:
subject unknown; their security suspected counterintelligence.
I now alerted both groups and gave them the names of the people
the man had mentioned as members. They were appalled that
counterintelligence was onto these, their top echelon at the univer-
sity. One of them muttered it might be a good idea if the man
got in the way of a bus. I heard later that he died under mysterious
circumstances; I don't know what happened to him.
A regretful postscript is that at the time of the mass arrests they
picked up an American citizen, fluent in the local language, who lived
in the suburb I had named, had no car, and worked down town.
They interrogated him frequently and at odd hours--at lunch or
supper time so he wouldn't get anything to eat, in the middle of the
night, etc. My story held up all too well in the absence of ident fica-
tion by the dead man.
Security Behind Bars
A big headache was caching materials. My house had a tile :floor,
and any attempt to loosen a tile would be fatal. There is no way
to conceal its looseness. At the time of the mass roundup the house
was searched tile by tile; light fixtures were taken down from the
ceiling; the hi-fi cabinet was taken apart and examined minutely;
every piece of clothing was processed; the bathroom was torn up;
even the little tank on the roof for maintaining water pressure was
examined and measured. The only item they missed was a breakfast
table.
This was a standard formica-top table with tubular aluminum legs.
During the first search my data was hidden in one of the legs. Im-
mediately afterward I destroyed it, but they overlooked the table
again in the second search. I don't know whether they thought of
Provocation Deflected
The immediate problem was this prospective meeting with a person
who had been handed to me as a promising contact but whom I
had not checked. My solution was this: I called one of my con-
tacts of university age and gave him an envelope containing the
money. I told him that at exactly 2:00 p.m., when my new contact
would be standing on a corner five miles away, he was to enter a
kiosque this man's parents owned and hand them the envelope with
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it in later searches, for I was taken to jail immediately after the
second one.
When he trained me, Al insist?d that I use a safety signal rather than
a danger signal. I put that system into effect with my contacts, in-
structing them never to approach me but just make this safe sign.
One day shortly after I was sent to prison I saw one of my contacts
in the yard. I suspected I was under observation and was afraid
he might involve both of us by recognizing me. He followed the
rule, however, and when he gave the safety signal I walked away.
:[ waited my chance and one day managed to sit next to him at
lunch. Then I could tell him that as far as I knew I was in the
clear, merely having been picked up in the mass arrests. He said
his case was the same. That made it much easier to sleep at night.
I cautioned him against making friends in prison and urged him to
sit tight and confine his conversation, even with those he believed to
he friends, to generalities. From then on we saw each other regu-
larly in the prison yard but did not so much as exchange a wink.
Seeds of Success
The prisoners were all curious about the reasons why their fellows
were in jail. In concocting an answer for them I recalled the advice
I had been given, to think in case of capture about taking a lesser
rap. So I began laying the groundwork for a lesser charge. I fig-
ured that if I was known to believe I had been jailed for a particular
reason, the police just might tend to investigate that reason rather
than another. So when asked why I was arrested I would say, "I
think they are accusing me of hoarding," and explain how when they
searched my house the police had found quite a bit of soap and
probably thought I was black-marketing that scarce item. I took
good care not to mention any specific amount of soap; I didn't want to
make the case against me too good. I do not know how effective
this story was as a red herring, but the fact remains that I was never
questioned and was eventually released.
Thus I believe it was the training I received that permitted me to
operate without detection and provided me, when picked up in the
mass arrests, with the resources to weather the danger and elude
any traps the secret police had set. I was glad my instructors had
insisted on a cover story; had I not had one the first time I was
stopped and questioned, I would have had no need for any sub-
DP78T03194A065 b
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for me to meet contacts regularly and safely despite close surveil-
lance. The rules for checking a new contact, no matter who has
introduced him, saved me from an evident disaster. The value of a
safety signal was brought home when I was able to warn off my
contact in the prison without any telltale gesture. And being well
schooled in what to do under arrest, I did not panic but was able
to form a plan under which I could have maintained my innocence
of everything except having amassed eight or ten bars of soap at home.
sequently. Their drilling me in attention to detail made it possible
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Some foreign operations of the
Tzar's political police.
THE OKHRANA'S FEMALE AGENTS
PART II: Indigenous Recruits '
Rita T. Kronenbitter
From the early stages of its existence the Okhrana adhered to a
firm policy of strictly segregating its truly clandestine services. It
divided agents into two categories, "external" and "internal," mean-
ing roughly overt and covert respectively. The external agents were
investigators. They did open and clandestine surveillance and a
variety of detective work, including cooperation with other govern-
ment security agencies at home and abroad. Whether known to the
public as Okhrana employees or not, they were officially recognized
within the government and paid overtly by it. The internal service,
in contrast, was essentially a system of penetrations and thus by
necessity completely secret. Its personnel were unknown not only
to the public and other government agencies but for the most part
to Okhrana officers themselves. The identity of its agents was masked
even in the operational files recording their activities. Each was
known personally only to his case officer and, usually, the chief of
the unit he worked for; agents did not know of one another's
existence.
Similarly no external agent was ever supposed to know an internal
one, who would normally be operating under some revolutionary
cover. So strictly was this rule enforced that an external agent who
learned the identity of an internal agent would be dismissed. Thus
it often happened that it was the duty of an external agent to mount
surveillance on an internal agent ostensibly working for a subversive
group. One obvious advantage of this circumstance was to provide
a multiple check on the veracity and dependability of the penetration
'For Part I, Russian Women, see Studies IX 2, p. 25 if. These articles are
based primarily on the Hoover Institution's collection Zagranichnaya Okhrana,
consisting chiefly of the Okhrana files from Paris, the main center of Russian
revolutionary and anti-revolutionary activity abroad before World War I. These
files, presented after the revolution to Herbert Hoover by the Kerenski govern-
ment, have only recently been opened to the public.
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agents, a number of whom turned out to be playing a double role;
but this was just a side benefit from the compartmentation practiced
for the sake of the internal agents' security.
The principle of two separate categories of agents lent itself
remarkably well to the operating problems of the Okhrana stations
abroad. The first chief in Paris, Petr Ivanovich Rachkovsky (he held
the post from 1884 to 1902), soon realized that external agents of
Russian nationality were totally unsuitable for work in western Europe.
Not just their language but their very appearance and behavior gave
them away immediately. Gradually, therefore, all the Russian in-
vestigators were returned home and replaced by French, Italian, Ger-
man, and British agents. The Okhrana abroad thus reinforced the
functional dichotomy of the two agent categories with an ethnic one:
foreigners, recruited largely from among host government and private
detectives, became the investigators, while agents from Russia were
devoted to penetration operations against the revolutionaries.
In the fall of 1913, however, most of Paris Okhrana's external,
investigation agents were exposed by the revolutionaries' counter-
intelligence. In the ensuing upheaval former investigator Jollivet
was suddenly transformed into a penetration agent inside the revolu-
tionary service. Paris Okhrana found it expedient also to be flexible
in the use of an array of mistresses of Monsieur Henri Bint.
The Women of Henri Bint
This Alsatian gentleman, hired by Rachkovsky in 1885 after ten
years of service with the French Surete, remained one of the Paris
station's principal investigators until the first world war. (During
the war the Okhrana took him off routine investigation work and
supplied him with funds to establish a residence in Switzerland,
from where he could get agents into Germany and Austria. The Swiss
imprisoned him in January 1917.) Apparently he never married,
but he was never without mistresses, one at a time after he had
learned quite early that it was neither healthy nor economical to
have two or more together.
Life on the Riviera
Another thing Bint learned was to avail himself of the help his
mistresses could render in connection with his job. In 1912, as leader
of a surveillance network on the Riviera, he took along a mistress
and loaned her free of charge both to a youn Yer agent of his network
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named Fontana and to officers of the French and Italian police de-
partments cooperating with him. This generosity led on one occasion
to a serious contretemps. The mistress, staying with Fontana at a
hotel in La Spezia, stole from his suitcase a batch of photographs and
letters and gave them to a cooperating Italian agent, and there ensued
a fist fight in one of the city's public squares. The police interfered,
the press got interested, and there were provocative stories in French
and Italian newspapers. Bint, although it was not entirely his fault,
received a stern reprimand from the chief.
Bint had been dismissed from the Okhrana on two occasions, pri-
marily on account of indecorous relations with the fair sex, but !both
times he was promptly rehired. The chiefs valued his professional
skill and realized that he occasionally got results from his mistresses'
peeping into the activities of unreliable Russian aristocrats in Paris.
Although a French demoiselle could not understand what the Russians
were saying among themselves, she could keep company with in-
dividual conspirators, who could all speak some French. By using
his girls Bint thus became more than a mere detective; the information
they procured was almost in the category of that from internal agents.
Understandably enough, however, the system gradually wore out:
the revolutionaries became wary of Parisian female companions. Then
in 1911, when Bint's colleague Leroi defected from the Okhrana to
join Burtzev's revolutionary counterintelligence, Bint had to cut off
all espieglerie with the females, as the practice was called. Bint
and Leroi had worked together for years against the same targets.,
using the same techniques and often sharing mistresses for whatever
job was on hand. No one cursed Leroi so much as Bint for his
defection; he knew he would tell Burtzev all about it. He even
anticipated that on Leroi's advice Burtzev would sooner or later try
the trick on him, hiring some female to work on him. And so he did.
Tables Turned
Liubov Julia was a Parisian whose first name suggested Russian
origin. The use of Julia as a surname was most likely her own inven-
tion. When Bint first saw her, in a public cafe, she was with a
group of revolutionaries, but she seemed much too frivolous and
gay to be concerned with politics or conspiracies. She acted. like
any ordinary Parisian demimondaine of the period. He made her
acquaintance and found that she was just as jolly in his company
as she had seemed among the Russian intellectuals. At the moment
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he was not particularly tied to any mistress, so he took her home
with him, and there she stayed.
This was early 1913. He reported in full to his Okhrana superiors.
His case officer thought that Julia might prove useful in work among
the revolutionaries, cables and dispatches were exchanged with
Petersburg headquarters, and Julia was hired under the code name
"Jourdain." She was to receive 100 francs a month for reporting to
Bint on several groups of conspirators in Paris.
Thus there happened to Bint what he was afraid would happen:
he had a mistress spy on him just as he had used mistresses to spy
on others. Julia was Burtzev's plant. She would regularly bring
Bint quantities of attractive information, all written in her own hand,
which always turned out to be of little or no value to the Okhrana.
Bint's case officer, who had reports about Julia's activities from other
sources, soon decided that she ought to be able to produce much
better intelligence. Gradually it was possible to check the sources
of the information she delivered, and it was discovered that all of it
was prepared by Burtzev's counterintelligence people.
Just about this time Julia suddenly came forth with a demand for
500 francs in cash, threatening to sue Bint and expose him in the
French press. She was dismissed at once. In the lengthy explana-
tions dispatched to headquarters toward the end of 1913, the Paris
station maintained that Julia could not possibly have gained access
to any information about the Okhrana and could not even have
supplied Burtzev with any knowledge about Bint except the fact of
his physical association with her.
Burtzev and Leroi had had even less success in an earlier, some-
what dissimilar attempt. In 1908 Henri Bint made the acquaintance
of Lea Chauvin, and she stayed in his apartment, on and off, collaborat-
ing in his professional work, for some three years until in 1911, shortly
after Leroi's defection, Bint was called to Petersburg. It was not
customary to bring non-Russian external agents to headquarters, but
he, as the most important sleuth of three decades and chief manager
of the network of detectives, was made an exception. The consulta-
tion with him was to include some training, which would entail his
absence from Paris for many weeks, possibly two or three months.
By age, Bint could have been Lea's grandfather. Although he
always preferred young girls, this affair had lasted much longer than
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usual and his leaving for Petersburg seemed a good occasion to close
it off. He told the girl that it would be sensible for her to find some-
one more suitable to her age. But she did not want to be sensible.
She refused to leave; she would stay in the apartment and wait for
his return. Bint would not have it. There were several rough
scenes, and when she still refused to go he had to call the police to
make her get out.
Lea was in a fighting, vengeful mood. She would never have
obeyed Bint's order to leave; the ingrate had to call the police to
throw her out. That was what she told Leroi, who somehow learned
of her distress and promptly called on her to offer consolation. Leroi
of course knew all about Lea's life with Bint. He himself had always
had a soft spot for her, but now she might have information about
Bint's recent activities and the purpose of his trip to Petersburg. In
this emotional state she even seemed a good prospect for agent
work--well motivated and familiar with Bint's contacts and operations.
After much talk about his friendship and understanding for her
feelings, Leroi persuaded Lea to visit Burtzev's office. She was ready
for anything as long as it meant hurting Bint, and Burtzev and Leroi
found it easy to recruit her for intelligence work against Bin! and
against the Okhrana that had taken him away from her. Leroi's
enthusiasm for the prospective operation was probably enhanced by
his fondness for Lea, but Burtzev trusted his judgment. He had made
him chief investigator in all operations against the Okhrana's non-
Russian networks.
For a short time Lea became as much devoted to Leroi as she had
been to Bint, but soon she seemed to have developed some second
thoughts. Who can tell what was really in her mind? Maybe she
thought she could reawaken the affections of her dear old Bint when
he returned, or perhaps she developed an aversion to the rather
uncouth and frequently drunk Leroi. Whatever the reason, after
everything was agreed and she was to become an agent of the revolu-
tionary counterintelligence, she secretly went to see the chief of Paris
Okhrana, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Krassilnikov. Yet this was just
a probing action; all she did was complain,about how Bint had thrown
her out on the street. In relaying her story to headquarters, Krassil-
nikov wrote that he had given her 500 francs to keep her quiet and
recover from her a packet of Bint's personal letters which she had
appropriated to use just in case.
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Lea was astonished by the 500 francs. She had never had that
much money in her hand before. She became bemused with the
possibilities of earning more; she had already observed that the
revolutionary intelligence office was short of funds. So she made a
second visit to Krassilnikov, and this time she told him all about how
Burtzev and Leroi had recruited her to work for them and assured
her of a steady income. She said she did not trust Leroi, he had
deserted his friend Bint, and he would desert her the same way.
Finally she offered her services to Krassilnikov, saying that she knew
from living with Bint and helping him just what she would have to
do to be useful.
A case officer was assigned, and soon thereafter Lea's reports were
being dispatched to headquarters under the code name ` L'heros."
The Okhrana instructed her to stay on the job in Burtzev's office and
report on every assignment she received. At first it was just de-
briefings: one lengthy report on a luncheon with Burtzcv and Leroi
told of pressing questions on the current whereabouts of Harting,
former Paris Okhrana chief, and hundreds of questions on the orders
received by Bint, the times and places he would meet with Okhrana
officers, his non-Russian affiliates, and his methods for receiving pay
and instructions and submitting reports. As a double agent working
in Burtzev's office with the position of assistant to Leroi, she was
paid 200 francs a month by the Okhrana.
Mime. Chauvin, as she was introduced to visiting revolutionaries in
Burtzev's office, delighted her chiefs there by her willingness to be
of use, though she was disappointingly ill acquainted with the opera-
tional information they wanted. Burtzev decided to use her in other
operations. Once Leroi took her to Place Bouveau, in front of the
Ministry of the Interior and the Sicrete Generale, gave her a camera,
and told her to take pictures of a man he would point out leaving the
building. This project of Leroi's was soon brought to the attention of
the Okhrana liaison officer in the Surete, M. Moreau, chief of the politi-
cal police who, it happened, was the man whose picture Leroi wanted.
Another time Leroi took her to a lawyer named Tomasini, who she
found out later was a naturalized Frenchman of Russian origin. The
two wanted a statement from her to the effect that Bint had been
receiving from the Monyjeux District post office a number of letters
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addressed to Russian revolutionaries. (Burtzev repeatedly tried to
prove that Paris postal officials were selling revolutionary correspond-
ence to the Okhrana.) Lea replied that she knew nothing of any
such mail being given to Bint. They pleaded with her for a long
time to write and sign such a deposition. Though they offered her
1,000 francs cash and the assurance of 200 francs a month for the
rest of her life, according to her report forwarded in a dispatch to
Petersburg, she answered only that she could not affirm what she did
not know.
Dispatches to Petersburg in the Paris Okhrana files show that
L'heros continued as a double agent until the outbreak of the war.
Her pay was increased to 275 francs a month, delivered to her regu-
larly by Bint, who on his return became her case officer, nothing
more this time.
Jane
Marcel Bittard-Monin, supervisor of most of Paris Okhrana's non-
Russian agents, made Mme. G. Richard Le Davadie sign five papers
relating to the termination of her service. She was furious. The
smooth talk with which the goaty Lothario tried to cheer her in her
misery only enraged her more; he was taking the side of the Russian
bosses. She didn't give a damn, she said, what new twists they were
taking in their policy. She could not care less whether they con-
formed to the attitude of the French government. What she wanted
and needed was the job they were taking away.
She felt cheated by this sudden deprivation not only of income
but of everything she had enjoyed for a half dozen interesting years
of spying-first for Bittard personally and then for the Okhrana
behind him. She had had tours at the best times of year to the Cote
d'Azur and the Italian Riviera, all expenses paid. In the endless
variety of tasks that she performed she had earned much praise,
which always made her feel happy, useful, and young again. The
job had become part of her; she truly believed that the Russian
service could never find anyone more willing to work and to sacrifice
herself when necessary. She knew, and the Okhrana bosses must
know, that no male detective could replace her. They could tail
the conspirators to the gates of their residences; she could follow
them., if need be, into their bedrooms.
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When these arguments proved of no avail, Mme. Le Davadie turned
to Bittard-Monin with personal reproaches. No other agent he was
dismissing had ever meant anything to him, while she had been his
favorite before either of them had ever heard of the Okhrana. She
recalled how she had shared with him her apartment and all in those
young and idealistic years when he was struggling along as a poorly
paid sub-inspector for the Surete. The ingrate would hear none of it;
his heart had turned to stone. Aside from the change of policy, he
reminded her coldly, the agents had to be dismissed for the obvious
reason that they had all been blown by Burtzev and their names
published in all the press of Europe, so they would be entirely useless.
"Why aren't you fired, then?" she came back. "Your name was
not only in the newspapers, but proclaimed in parliament."
He said he would be, reiterating that the Okhrana was discontinuing
operations and making a public announcement to that effect. He
declared that part of the reason for this was to insure the safety of
the agents whose names and addresses were now known to the
terrorists. But he did not convince her. The argument degenerated
into repetition and name-calling.
Finally Mme. Le Davadie saw that it was no use and signed the
five papers. First was a receipt for 200 francs, her salary for the
last month, and one for expense money and a termination bonus.
Then there was the notarized resignation:
The undersigned Madame Richard Le Davadie, residing at 52 rue Jacob,
employed by the intelligence service organized and directed by Monsieur
Marcel Bittard-Monin, am hereby resigning from said service as a result of
its complete dissolution as of 31 October 1913.
I have received as indemnity the sum of 200 francs, the equivalent of
one month's salary.
I declare that I am entirely satisfied with the payment of said sum as
my final compensation.
Paris, 31 October 1913
Le Davadie G. Richard
Another paper acknowledged that she had been returned her birth
certificate and a court document concerning herself. By her fifth sub-
scription Mme. Le Davadie declared that she no longer had in her
possession any notes, letters, ciphers, or photographs belonging to
the service.
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With the termination money in her purse and all the anger in her
heart, Mme. Le Davadie went to the nearest bistro. She was a
temperate woman and despised excessive drinking, but this time she
had to have an outlet. Not from worry about her future but for
her wrath toward Monin. She couldn't take her anger out on the
faceless Okhrana. If she knew any of its officers, it would be differ-
ent; but going to the Russian embassy without knowing anyone, as
ex-agent Fontana once had done, would be futile and ridiculous.
They would say they'd never heard of her or of Bittard-Monin or
anyone like that.
Two other agents Monin had dismissed that day were in the
bistro--Mme. Drouchot, whom Mme. Le Davadie knew well but
disliked, and Auguste Pouchot, with whom she had once served on a
surveillance team in Montreux. As an agent she would have never
approached them publicly, but now, savoring her new freedom, she
joined them at the table. No explanations were necessary; she saw at
once that they both had been canned too. The three joined in cursing
Bittard-Monin.
"The bastard should not have thrown you out," said Mme. Drouchot,
meaningfully. Le Davadie felt like grabbing her hair for twisting
this one in; then she realized that Mine. Drouchot had already taken
more cognac than was needed to drown her bitterness. Pouchot too
was nearly drunk. She determined at once not to follow their ex-
ample. She had only one absinthe and sipped it slowly, thinking.
Not really listening to the other two, she heard them naming Burtzev
again and again, just as Monin had, it seemed a hundred times.
Burtzev's revolutionary. intelligence had busted Paris Okhrana. He
was powerful, the Sherlock Holmes of the revolution. All the press
of Paris was praising him, and the leading politicians were fighting
his battles in parliament.
On the Victor's Bandwagon
Mine. Le Davadie made up her mind. Without even finishing her
drink, she left her companions and went straight to the rue de La
Glaciere. She knew Burtzev's office well from having done sur-
veillance on it. She would get even with Monin. She would join
the revolutionary service; and Burtzev, now so strong and successful,
would pay her just as he was paying Leroi, who had defected as
Okhrana agent at about the time she had formally signed on in 1911.
She would even be paid for her revenge.
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The office at 53 rue de la Glacicre was a noisier place than Monin's
bureau. It was not large, but some half dozen people were engaged
in heated discussions. Burtzev was not there; his assistant Leroi
received her. This was well. She knew how much influence he had
with Burtzev, and she thought he would help her. Back in 1908 he
had been one of her more persistent admirers among the investigation
agents. True that his awkwardly long figure, frequently unstable
because of too much alcohol, had not attracted her even to the point
of the camaraderie usual among fellow agents; but when he was
sober and alone with her, he used to flatter her with attentions. Now
he showed his surprise and joy at seeing her. He moved as though
to kiss her in front of everyone but settled for kissing her hand. He
took her to Burtzev's private office.
When the pleasantries were over, she described how she had quit
Monin and the Okhrana, and much of what she said was quite untrue.
They wanted her to stay, she said, but she was fed up with them
all and wanted to get even, particularly with Monin and his net.
She finally recognized, she said, that Burtzev was doing the right
thing, and she would be glad to join him even at a small salary, just
enough to keep her alive. She would help to the best of her ability
to fight and expose the entire Russian service. Leroi was pleased, and
they worked out a preliminary plan of employment that he thought
would be acceptable to Burtzev. She also was pleased, and she
forgot all her past antipathy for Leroi.
she took him to her apartment.
The following day, on 1 November 1913, Mme. Richard Le Davadie
was hired as agent of the revolutionary intelligence service. Leroi
spoke enthusiastically to Burtzev about her exceptional qualities and
vast knowledge of the personnel and activities of the Okhrana's non-
Russian networks in France, Switzerland, and Italy, as well as her
excellent current motivation. Burtzev was not opposed; but,
seasoned as he was in the game and not sharing Leroi's personal
reasons for enthusiasm, he. wanted first to determine how much she
knew and to make sure she was not a plant of some kind. She had
to be interrogated in detail, be kept under surveillance for several
days, and in the meantime be given no chance to learn anything
about his service.
The first interrogation satisfied Burtzev about her knowledge, and
the many questions about Okhrana targets, methods of surveillance,
timing and location of operations, reporting procedures in clear and
in code, and cooperation with local security organs convinced Le
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Davadie that she was dealing with just as professional a service as
the one she had left. She knew enough to fill a book, and since it
would take forever to get this in debriefings, Burtzev told her to put
in writing a full account of every surveillance job she had done since
February 1911, when she formally became a salaried Okhrrana agent.
She could write this in the quiet of her own apartment.
Burtzev gave her 40 francs and the promise of a better monthly
salary than that. All she had to do for the time being was write this
report and keep in daily touch with Leroi or with Burtzev if Leroi
was away. Leroi accompanied her home. Pleased as Punch, he
wanted to celebrate right away, and on her 40 francs. But she was
not in the mood. She was disturbed by his assurances of how they
would have a secure job together and he would look after her, and
especially by his remark that he personally would take care of the
surveillance Burtzev wanted her kept under. She talked him out of
coming up to her apartment this time.
Second Thoughts
Alone, it took her but little thinking to decide that she could
never serve Leroi; that was about what this job would mean. And
although Burtzev made a pleasant impression on her-'the kindly,
soft-spoken, bearded, scholarly gentleman knew how to treat a lady-
those 40 francs of salary advance perturbed her. The appearance of
the people in Burtzev's office, too, like Leroi's shabbiness:, gave her
shivers. They looked intellectual all right, but all haggard and
undernourished. She understood no Russian, and their speaking it
made her feel strange. No, she couldn't bring herself to associate
with Leroi and those sallow-faced conspirators, even if the prospects
of remuneration had been brighter than they were.
Late the same evening, after she had made up her mind not to
go through with it, she had a visitor. Thinking it might: be Leroi,
she was not going to answer the door, but the knocking persisted
and the caller spoke her last name. She opened to find Henri Bint
there. She had met Bint on two occasions, but he had never been
in her apartment. She liked the old reprobate. "Henri!" she called
him by his first name as in the days when he organized her surveil-
lance team. "I'm so pleased to see you. What a surprise!"
The call was not a social one. Bint said he was sorry albout her
dismissal from the Okhrana service but it was unavoidable for every-
one, even for him after 35 years of service. She started talking about
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the ingrates and was going to indulge in some more scolding, but
Bint stopped her:
"You shouldn't feel bad. You got yourself another job."
"What job?" She looked puzzled.
"With Burtzev's service. I know it all."
How could Bint, a mortal enemy of Leroi, know? He knew just
when she had made the two visits to Burtzev's office, what she had
said to Leroi and Burtzev, what they said to her, and what was
decided. He even knew about the 40 francs and her assignment to
write about the Okhrana. He did not tell her that Jollivet, another
"dismissed" Okhrana agent whom Mme. Le Davadie had never known,
had recently been employed by Burtzev and had been in the office
both times.
Mine. Le Davadie was not at all embarrassed. She told Bint she
had just decided not to work for Burtzev after all. But Bint had a
different idea, and that was the reason for his visit. He had a simple
plan: she should not only go ahead with Burtzev but perform so well
as to make herself indispensable in the office on the rue de la Glaciere.
She needed persuading. They talked until after midnight. She
warned him that Leroi might come around, for she was to be under
his surveillance for some time. Bint knew all that; he had disposed of
Leroi by seeing to it that he had a drinking partner at a cabaret.
Le Davadie insisted that under no circumstances would she ever
work again with Bittard-Monin.
"Of course not," Bint said. "Your position will be completely
changed. You will no longer be a detective conducting surveillance
and investigating through local security offices. That is a thing of
the past for you. You will no longer be an overt agent for anyone.
Your position will be that of a secret agent reporting to the Okhrana
the inside story of revolutionary espionage and propaganda." She
liked the secrecy and the adventurousness of the proposal. "But it
would be dangerous) To whom would I be reporting? You?"
"Maybe to me at times, but the Russians prefer to handle the secret
agents themselves. All important dealings would be with them."
"How much will they pay?"
Bint did not know exactly, but he was sure that as secret agent
she would be getting much higher pay than ever before, depending
partly upon herself. As for the dangers, he said that the Okhrana
people knew how to play it safe; she would only have to follow their
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instructions. He told her he would visit her once more and then
arrange a meeting with a Russian for further instructions. He
promised to help her write the long story of her agent career that
Burtzev required.
Leroi, showing the signs of his night of drinking, called in the
middle of the afternoon. He found her at the table, in cheerful
spirits, writing her report. He went on to the office to tell Burtzev
that he had had the new recruit under surveillance and that she was
now at home doing the required writing.
On 4 November Le Davadie went to Burtzev's office again. She
brought a sheaf of papers in her own handwriting, done hastily and
without much concern for tidiness. They listed in simple chronologi-
cal order, from 15 February 1911 to 29 October 1913, her singleton
and team assignments-dates, locations, targets, where and how
picked up, whom with, where followed. In several instances the
assistance of local security organs was noted. The story was im-
pressive in the quantity of data recalled but not so elaborate as to
suggest reference to contemporary records. It had of course been
prepared by Bint, from the records in Bittard-Monin's office. Before
giving it to Le Davadie to copy he had also consulted Sushkov,
assistant to Krassilnikov.
New Jane at Work
It is not known what code name Burtzev gave Le Davadie, who now
became an operative in the revolutionary service. Krassilnikov and
all the Okhrana office thenceforth referred to her as Jane. A great
pile of reports from December 1913 to late summer 1914, when Burtzev
folded up his office and returned to Russia, attests that she knew and
reported every move made by the revolutionaries. The records indi-
cate that all her reports were in writing, urgent ones in the con-
venient enveloppes pneumatiques which were handled like telegrams,
others in ordinary registered mail, often addressed to Bint's cover firm.
At no time, it appears, did she arouse suspicion in Burtzev or his staff.
She reported first on several French and Italian agents Monin had
dismissed who came to Burtzev in search of employment. In an
effort to ingratiate themselves, these would all disparage Le Davadie's
reputation as a person or an agent. A Mme. Tiercelin, in particular,
made vitriolic attacks on her as Monin's and other agents' mistress;
but Burtzev and Leroi did not care. Le Davadie did not hide any-
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thing-like that-from them, and she proved to he a good agent.
They never suspected that all her reporting to them actually came
from 79 rue de la Grenelle or was at least approved there.
Thanks to Jane, the Okhrana was able to forstall a number of
terrorist attempts during this period. It was she who led Krassilnikov
onto the trail of a certain Bessel as he left Brindisi for Macedonia to
pick up a load of bombs for assassins in Russia. Ile was arrested in
Belgrade and his shipment confiscated on a train in Serbia. By a
curious coincidence, Jane was also assigned to help Burtzcv prepare
evidence of Bessel's innocence for the revolutionary press to use in
showing that the charges for the arrest in Belgrade had been trumped
up by the Okhrana.
Jane reported on the speeches Burtzev prepared for Jaurez to deliver
in the French parliament attacking the Okhrana. In some instances
the Okhrana thus had Jaurez's speeches before he himself had seen
them. During the first half of 1914, when Burtzev exposed a con-
siderable bag of Okhrana agents, both Russian and non-Russian, Jane
could at least warn when and how they would be exposed. She
became so important to Burtzev that he wanted to take her with him
early in 1914 on a campaign to expose the activities of the Russian
secret service in the Italian parliament. She consulted Krassilnikov,
who actually approved the trip, but she preferred to develop an acute
migrant: she was afraid that it might bring to light discrepancies in
her first report to Burtzev with respect to cooperation with Italian
security personnel.
It is evident from Okhrana records that Jane ceased to be an agent
after Burtzev's departure and the closing of his service. She ap-
parently located some war-related employment; in August and Sep-
tember 1914 at least half the personnel of the Okhrana abroad were
drafted into military services.
Soon after the outbreak of the revolution a number of writers began
competing in their efforts to expose all Okhrana secret agents. Jane's
role was somehow never exposed, even by writer Agafonov, who as
a member of the commission investigating the Okhrana had full
access to her papers. It is possible that he was unable to detect her
identity behind the cover name. Several writers named Le Davadie
among the non-Russian investigation agents belonging to the Bittard-
Monin network, but all ignore not only her services for Burtzev but
her double role for the Okhrana.
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La Petite
Three intelligence services used "the little one"-the revolutionaries
when she was a child, the Austrians against Russia, and the Russians
against Austria. The files of Paris Okhrana contained only 3 x 5 cards
on the activities of her parents, but Pavel Zavarzin, Warsaw Okhrana
chief at the time of the childhood episode, has told her story.
Living Doll
The Warsaw Okhrana office was located in the Hotel de 'Ville, a
large building which also provided living quarters for Zavarzin and
his subordinates with their families. Beginning in 1904, milk was
delivered in a large can to the Zavarzin apartment by an eleven-year-
old girl. It came from a dairy where her mother was also employed.
The girl was diminutive and charming. She had light, fluffy blond
hair and brilliant blue eyes, like a doll. Everybody called her La
Petite. Pleased by her promptness and friendliness, the occupants of
the Hotel de Ville spoiled her with gifts of all sorts. A particular
attachment was formed between her and the children of Yan, Zavar-
zin's coachman.
This pleasant association flourished for two years. Then one day
a surveillance team was tailing a female terrorist named Rotte. She
was accompanied by a young girl carrying a milk can, apparently
full. They both went into a house in the Warsaw suburb Praga;
within five minutes the girl came out alone and without the can.
The detectives now recognized her as La Petite. One of them fol-
lowed to see where she would go next. Surveilling a child proved to
be a difficult game: she often stopped and played at corners or
wandered down side streets looking in the windows. After two hours
she was back at home.
A penetration of a terrorist group reported at about this time that
groups preparing assassinations and robberies were using children
to deliver arms, one piece at a time, to the perpetrators. A child
carrying a package or container with a small gun or bomb inside
would be followed by a terrorist at some distance, then overtaken at
the place of action. The investigation of a number of terrorist acts
confirmed that this was indeed the practice. Penetrations :reported
also that the conspirators maintained surveillance of the Okhrana
premises in a way that would never be detected. The conspirators
knew the tag numbers of Okhrana carriages and the names of officers
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and surveillance agents. Still another report said that the sub-
versives had possession of some important documents stolen from the
Okhrana office.
Elaborate security precautions had always been taken to keep un-
authorized personnel off the Okhrana premises. La Petite was the
only outsider ever admitted to the official quarters, and now she had
been seen with the terrorist Rotte. A few forgotten incidents of the
past two years were now recalled. One morning, Zavarzin himself
remembered, he had found Yan's wife and daughter Handzhia clean-
ing his office, and La Petite was with them. When he asked what she
was doing there, "After I delivered the milk I came to see Handzhia,"
she had said.
She spoke perfect Russian. Her explanation was that her father,
although a Pole from Austria, spoke only Russian at home, having
learned it during years of employment in a Moscow brewery. After
his death three years earlier her mother had come to work in Warsaw.
Zavarzin recalled also that one morning his administrative assistant
was unable to find a batch of papers which he thought he had-
careelessly-left on a table the night before. A thorough search was
made without success. Moreover, La Petite was often seen in the
carriage shed and the dressing room where agents changed into
coachman's uniform for surveillance assignments.
La Petite and her mother were both placed under surveillance. It
was soon learned that the woman lived with Mishas, an influential
member of the Polish Socialist Party, and that this man had been
accompanied by La Petite on walks through the city. It was decided
that the mother, being an Austrian subject, should be expelled from
Warsaw and should be induced to take La Petite with her.
Zavarzin had them both brought to his office. The mother, named
Kusitska, was cooperative but evasive when it came to giving in-
formation. When she realized he knew about her daughter's activity,
she admitted through tears that she had been unable to counteract
the corrupting pressure of the revolutionaries upon her child. She
would therefore be glad to leave Warsaw for any place where she
could get the girl away from their vicious influence and enroll her
in some school.
"One would not give her ten years," she said, "and she's already
thirteen. She did spy on your office at first, but after being treated
so kindly by you all she was ashamed and stopped. Didn't you?"
The girl was all red in the face, too embarrassed to answer, or more
likely unwilling to confirm a patent lie.
Nine years later, when Russia and Austria were at war and. Zavarzin
was in charge of the Okhrana office in Odessa, he received a telephone
call late in the evening. A woman's voice: "Hello, Colonel Zavarzin,
Chief of Section." No one ever addressed him thus by title? Whose
was this strange, attractive voice?
"I must see you urgently, but not in your office. I'm calling from
the railroad station. Tell me a good hotel where we can meet."
"But who are you?"
"La Petite from Warsaw. Do you remember me?"
She stayed in the Hotel London, but the meeting took place in
a safe house. Zavarzin instructed Budakov, his chief of surveillance,
to arrange for complete coverage after the meeting. He did not
share Budakov's fears for the meeting itself-that La Petite might
come with a pistol in her muff.
She came in, still small for a grown woman, scintillating with
pleasure: "You remember me! That's so wonderful! But I'm no
longer the subversive La Petite of Warsaw. I have become your
ally, Before coming in I asked this man [Budakov] to inspect my
bag.. One could of course expect anything from La Petite of the
past." Zavarzin soon realized that she had become a professional
intelligence agent. But whose?
"You have no doubt taken measures to keep me under surveillance,"
she plunged in. "That's important, because at one after midnight
tonight I am to meet at the Variete a man I don't know. I'm to be
introduced to him by a woman who is appearing in the show as a
famous sharpshooter. The man is in touch with the Austrian general
staff, and it will be important for you to keep him under close watch.
He is one of the top Austrian agents here. Then tomorrow I am
going to Petersburg to see Okhrana chief Bieletzky, who will probably
take me to the imperial general staff. It may be that on the road
to Petersburg I shall be met by persons in whom you may be inter-
ested, so you will probably want to have me covered all the way
through."
Having disposed of this urgent matter on her mind, the attractive
visitor proposed dinner. She was tired and hungry; the wartime trip
from Vienna to Odessa was by no means without hardships. After the
meal she was ready to talk about her past. But first she Wanted to
thank Zavarzin as the great benefactor who had played an important
role in her life. Instead of putting her mother and her in prison
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he had given them good advice and sent them to safety. Her mother,
La Petite said, had been a weak woman; for a little love she had be-
come a slave to Mishas. His every word came to be an order for both
mother and child. La Petite delivered dynamite and bombs for the
Rotte woman and other terrorists. It was Mishas' plan to blow up
the. Warsaw Okhrana office and kill Zavarzin. As a child she had been
fascinated by the plan, and Mishas became a hero in her eyes. Three
years after leaving Warsaw, when she read in the newspapers about
the apprehension of the Warsaw terrorists, including Mishas, and their
trial and execution, she realized how criminal her activities had been.
Zavarzin probably did not swallow whole the story of her remorse,
for he changed the cgnversation with a question about the color
of her hair. As a child it was light blond, now nearly jet black.
How come? She said she dyed it in order to look -older. Then she
went back to what had happened since she last saw him at thirteen.
Tale of Two Services
Upon arrival in Lvov her mother sent her to a convent for schooling
and to learn dressmaking. It was a harsh life, with constant work or
kneeling in prayer and frequent cruel punishment as she grew
rebellious. More often than not she was hungry, and after her
mother's death she had no affection from anyone. One day the
mother superior found her crying in the cold chapel, took pity on her,
and promised thereafter to be a mother to her. Life remained hard,
but under the old abbess' protection Seraphine, as she was named
in the convent, became an obedient pupil.
After six years of convent life she was employed in the household
of a wealthy Galician merchant. A romance soon developed with
the merchant's nephew and they were married. He was a panslavist
employed by the Russian services, and thus both newly-weds were
soon working for the Russians in Austrian Galicia.
When the war broke out the Austrians drafted her husband, and
soon thereafter he was taken prisoner by the Russians. La Petite,
after giving birth to a child, made up her mind to get to Russia at
all. costs. She thought of the possibility of being taken into the
Austrian espionage service and sent there. Leaving the baby with
her mother-in-law, she set up as a dressmaker catering to various
families of army officers. In time she found an officer of the general
staff who was interested in more than her dressmaking.
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Her frequent night meetings with this man gave her a chance to
let him see her, incidentally, as an Austrian patriot who knew Warsaw
extremely well, spoke Russian perfectly, and was intelligent and re-
sourceful. She did not need to prompt him to the proposal that she
would do well in Austrian intelligence. With all the modesty
Seraphine had learned in the convent, she replied that she had no
experience to fit her for such work, but he insisted that she should
at least give it a try. After a few days of thinking it over, she decided
that there would be nothing wrong in tentative acceptance.
They tried all sorts of tests on her. Questions were shot at her
in the least expected forms. She would be left alone in an office
with documents marked secret scattered on the desks and watched
through a peephole to see whether she showed undue interest in the
papers. She was followed on city streets to determine whether she
had assimilated the psychological training they had given her in
operational conduct and patriotism. After two months' training the
Austrians set up an interview with a German officer. He inter-
rogated her in German and Russian and found her Russian more
fluent than her German. When he learned that the convent had
given her considerable training in caring for the sick, he named her
on the spot chief nurse in a hospital for seriously wounded Russian
prisoners. It was he who insisted that she dye her hair black so
as to look old enough to be a chief nurse. Her job was to attend
the wounded and report anything they might say, perhaps in. delirium,
of interest to the German forces.
After three months of this service, she was summoned before a
captain and told she had been assigned an important mission on
which much would be expected of her.
"From now on your name shall be Anna Yakovlevna Lyubova, with
Tyumen in Siberia as your place of origin. Here is your passport.
It is a genuine document: the real Lyubova is here in Austria. She
is married and has no desire to return to Russia. You will take her
place among a large group of Russians who are being repatriated in
exchange for Austrians from Russia. In this assignment you will
have to exercise much prudence, and if there arc difficulties you will
have to be guided by your patriotism. We all put our country
first . . ."
The entire operational program, with many alternative courses of
action, was outlined for "Lyubova." She was to contact Austrian
agents and deliver them instructions all along the way, as far as
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 Vladivostok. From there she was to go on to Harbin and then
proceed to Shanghai, where she should report to the German con-
sulate.
L'Autrichienne
From Odessa Zavarzin promptly wired to Petersburg headquarters
the whole long story. Surveilling La Petite and her German contacts
the same night, Budakov found that the introduction and meeting
took place as she had told. The sharpshooter woman and the German
man, named Gross, were both exiled to Siberia for the duration; there
was not enough proof to hang them.
La Petite revealed also that the German dreadnoughts "Goeben"
and "Breslau" were heading for the Black Sea to bombard Russian
ports. This information was confirmed within a few days. Although
Zavarzin had reported the intelligence promptly, the defense com-
mand was in no position to take counter action, and the attack caused
havoc in several harbors.
"Lyubova" was carefully watched on her way to Petersburg, where
she went directly to the Okhrana chief as scheduled. He had her
case transferred to military intelligence, and there was no trace in
Okhrana files of her subsequent whereabouts and activities. Years
after his exile, Zavarzin speculated that a dashing young lady of her
description who lived in Monte Carlo and was known as "1'Autri-
chiienne," speaking perfect Russian and Polish, of angelic beauty,
and wildly spending her Brazilian husband's wealth, could be La
Petite.
Volunteers for intelligence-the
fringe and farther-out.
hh WW I'
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CRANKS, NUTS, AND SCREWBALLS
David R. McLean
"I have always had adequate sex that no one appreciated.
I need a better grade of iron to eat, and so do the astro-
nauts." (Excerpt from a July 1964 letter to the Director
of Central Intelligence.)
"A defenseless woman having husband trouble sincerely
requests your help." (June 1964 letter to the DCI, enclos-
ing picture of a convertible and address of a suburban
motel.)
"O.K.I Keep me off the payroll. I'll try and sell my
abilities to the Soviet Union." (1965 postcard peevishly
addressed to the U.S. Lower Intelligence Agency.)
"Please be informed, old pal, I have entered m;y na.me
with the 87th Congress as a candidate for the Presidency
of the United States in the next elections. If I make it, I am
going to reinstate you in CIA." (1962 letter to Allen W.
Dulles.)
"You can tell John A. McCone to go to hell if you think I'm
going to be treated this way after all I've done for you
people." (Early morning telephone call from "Agent 44"
on his release from the drunk cell of a Washington .police
precinct. )
"ORNISCOPYTHEOBI BLIOPSYCHOCRYSI ARROSCI-
OAEROGEN ETHLIOMETEOR OAU STRAHIEROAIV-
TIIRO VICHTHYOPYROSI DEROCH PNOMYOALE .. ."
(Excerpt from a 1963 telegram to CIA. )
Something about a secret intelligence agency attracts an endless
stream of letters, cards, telegrams, phone calls, and personal visits
from deranged, possibly dangerous, or merely daffy citizens who
want to horn in on the cloak-and-dagger act. Mixed into the CIA
morning mail, these unsolicited testimonials to the Agency's drawing
power create some delicate screening problems, waste a lot of time,
and justify elaborate security precautions to protect its top officials.
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The Agency's Office of Security keeps a watch list of nearly four
thousand persons or organizations who have tried to visit, write, or
phone its officials and who have been, at a minimum, a source of
annoyance. Every suspected crank contact is checked against this
list. The signatures include "The Green Russian" in Charlotte,
N.C., and "Your Aunt Minnie" in San Francisco. Nearly all crank
letters are domestic, but alongside addresses in Pewee Valley, Ky.,
and Big Bear City, Cal., are foreign listings from Quito to Warsaw
and from Edinburgh to Australia.
Steadies and One-Timers
The flow of oddball letters and phone calls increases perceptibly
when CIA is in the news. Less than 48 hours after President Johnson
announced he would nominate Admiral Raborn to be the DCI, a
Detroit man had sent the Director-designate 8,000 words of com-
plaint about the high cost of prescription medicines and a New Yorker
had asked his help in controlling a whistling brain. The file of
letters to him was mounting even before his appointment had been
confirmed. On 17 April a Massachusetts man sent him some well-
intentioned advice. "Dear Admiral," he wrote, "as you may be
aware, L.B.J. ain't got much Brains or he wouldn't be President. I
dealt with his type for 37 years. The best way to get along with
him is humor him."
But a faithful nucleus of loyal intelligence fans always contributes
about 25 percent of the total. Probably most of the cranks are as
harmless as the childish codes they sometimes use. The trouble is,
they're unpredictable. A few might have complaints worth hearing;
others might pose a real threat to an unsuspecting officer who re-
ceived them.
Nut-and-dolt visits to headquarters offices have practically dis-
appeared since CIA moved out to Langley; an occasional walk-in still
calls at its personnel office downtown. Its overt or semi-overt
domestic offices, which are more approachable, have now compiled
an impressive record of coping with off-beat visitors.
Clairvoyance and Contrivances
A fairly common complaint of the walk-ins is getting messages
from the Communists by thought-transference or through the fillings
in their teeth. One disturbed gentleman from Buffalo claimed the
Communists had kidnapped him, cut open his head, removed his
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80 CONFIDENTIAL
brains, and substituted a radio. After warning his interviewer to
say nothing the opposition should not hear, he asked CIA to remove
the radio and replace the brains. For sheer imagination in fielding
such a complaint, the prize probably goes to the CIA man who as-
sured a woman she might indeed be getting radio messages by static
electricity. Reminding her of the chains that drag under gasoline
trucks, he linked a series of paper clips, hooked one end in her skirt,
let the other end trail on the floor, and sent her happily on her way
with the static safely grounded.
Then there was the man who came in to volunteer as a spy in
the Czechoslovakian uranium mines. He confided that he had been
stalling because he feared the radiation might make him sterile.
Now, however, he had solved this problem: he planned to carry along
a carton of Chesterfields and wrap the tinfoil around his private
parts. The Agency secretary who transcribed a memorandum on
his visit never could understand why he insisted on Chesterfields.
Some fairly far-out ideas have been seriously proposed by sensible
citizens. One responsible businessman developed a mechanical chess-
playing machine which countered any move according to prepunched
IBM cards. He proposed to take his machine to Moscow, consolidate
his position there, and then suggest that the machine could be used
as a training aid for any move-and-countermove situation, such as
military tactics. Instead of chessmen he would use symbols for
tanks, infantry, hills, forests, planes, and fields of fire. Since he
knew nothing about military tactics, the Soviet general staff would
have to tell him the prescribed response to every move. As soon as
he had all the responses punched on IBM cards he would deliver
duplicates to the American Embassy. Then if we ever faced the
USSR in battle we could always run the IBM cards and tell what
the Soviets would do next.
The most intriguing case investigated by a domestic office involved
a school superintendent of unassailable reliability who dabbled in
hypnotism as a hobby and reported that he could induce clairvoyance
in his subject, an engineering student. In 1957, while in a hypnotic
trance, the subject described in minute technical detail a Soviet
ballistic missile of a type unknown in the United States but con-
sistent with expert private assessments of Soviet capabilities. The
research chief of a respected American aircraft plant was present at
the demonstration, framed many questions, and made a tape recording
of the answers. The subject used technical and scientific terminology
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which neither he nor the hypnotist could be expected to know. Wash-
ington experts who studied the tape found "just enough substantive
data to stimulate the imagination" but decided that clairvoyance
would be "a very risky approach to the collection of Soviet guided
missile data." The mystery remains unsolved.
Other Field Office Walk-ins
Some unlikely sources have produced usable information. In 1959
a soldier of fortune fresh from Cuba wearing yellow canvas shoes,
red denim slacks, and a gaudy sport shirt contacted a domestic office.
His debriefing was worth while but abbreviated by his arrest for
having a bag of dynamite in his hotel room. In October 1964 a
Miami man brought to CIA a box which he had bought sight-unseen
at an auction of shipments abandoned in U.S. customs. The box
contained more than 2,000 negatives of Cuban propaganda. And on
8 July 1960 an admitted swindler and diamond smuggler volunteered
the information that five Soviet missile experts had just travelled to
Cuba by way of Mexico. This report was taken with a grain of
salt at the time.
One probable James Bond fan seems obsessed with finding un-
usual ways of eliminating the opposition. Besides the usual poisons
and trick guns, he has suggested a lethally exploding cigar disguised
with a band reading "It's a boy!" He has also offered to dispose
of bodies for us in his home meat grinder. An attractive divorcee
leads a sober life in this country as an airline secretary but regularly
flies to another country and cuts loose there among the political
leaders. For all her Mata Hari complex she has brought useful
information.
Ever since 1948 a Slovak economist has been trying to peddle
information he claims to obtain through a private underground net.
He is presentable and persuasive and has impressed countless high
officials, including a senator who brought him to lunch with the
upper echelons of CIA. Fortunately these official contacts quickly
lead back to a burn notice identifying him as a fabricator. As late
as 1963, however, he was still trying with some success to interest
leading American industries in technical data from anti-Communist
researchers behind the iron curtain. Having abandoned the atomic
cannon he offered the government, he was tempting industry with
everything from synthetic fibers to jet engine designs, high-temperature
ceramics, and flexible concrete. Meanwhile he had hired a lawyer
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and sued a Washington shoe store for $25,000 because his shoes
were too tight; in the brief he filed with the court he claimed that as
a spy he needed to run fast.
Letters to Langley
By far the greatest number of crank contacts are by mail. In the
first eight months of Fiscal Year 1965, 1,143 letters addressed simply
to CIA were identified as from cranks. This does not count those
addressed otherwise-to the DCI by name or to specific field offices.
Neither does it include some unsolicited letters which may be help-
ful, pathetic, or merely misguided but are not from cranks. The
following examples are all from March 1965: An ex-Marine sent a
possibly practical suggestion for guerrilla warfare. A 17-year-old
Thai girl asked how to get training in police investigation. A German
student asked for help in locating his father, who had been captured
by the Soviets in World War H. A 14-year-old boy asked if there
were really such organizations as SMERSII and U.N.C.L.E. All such
writers receive courteous replies.
But in the same month there arrived elaborate greetings to the
DCI from a Maryland woman who thinks she is Catherine III, Empress
of all the Russias, and who had previously sent a 5,000-word report
on how she insured the successful invasion of Europe by entertaining
Hitler privately for 12 hours on D-Day. Also in March 1965 came
the advice that "now is the time-at last-to train 100 of the top
CIA men to penetrate every possible beauty parlor and Chinese
restaurant . . . the results will amaze and constantly astound your
organization." On 13 March a New York correspondent informed its
that Rudolph Hess, from his cell in Spandau, was controlling ten
leading Southern segregationists by long-distance hypnotism. And on
25 March a woman wrote to the Director from Massachusetts: "As
near as I can make out there normally is a grey cloud at the base
of the psyche. When the cloud backs up you go out of focus. But
after taking Alka Seltzer and sodium bicarbonate I can sing Hokus
Pokus you're in focus."
A 1964 letter was addressed to "Snuffy McDuffy, Top Floor, Closed
Door, CIA, Washington, D.C." Perceptive mail clerks sent it to the
Director's office, where it was found to contain a fairly reasonable
suggestion for propaganda. The letter ended: "P.S. If you don't take
appropriate action I'll write to the President and tell him you're
chicken."
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crew a s crew a
Probably the most imaginative and persistent correspondent is a
gaunt long-faced man with sunken eyes and prominent ears who first
wrote to CIA on 27 January 1952 asking for a high-powered rifle
with telescopic sights and terrain maps of Siberia, Manchuria, and
Korea. Since then he has sent thousands of letters, postcards, and
telegrams and used more than 50 aliases ranging from "Alexis Alex-
androvich" to "Old Woody, The Fox." Usually he signs his true
name followed by "U.S. Code 143," CIA's government tie-line code.
Here we shall call him Old Woody.
Even though his handwriting and literary style are well known
around the DCI's office, age cannot wither nor custom stale Old
Woody's infinite variety. One letter told the Director: "I have
allotted you a maximum life span of 94 years, not to exceed the year
1987." Another complained that "someone has wired my head for
sight and sound." A third urged the Director to "tell Hoffa to require
seat belts in all trucks." A fourth began: "Allen, I regret to inform
you Kennedy won the election fair and square." Then came a tele-
gram (collect) from Florida: "REQUEST FEDERAL TROOPS,
MARTIAL LAW. MIAMI SITUATION OUT OF CONTROL."
Old. Woody travels widely, usually first class. He has written from
Cuba, Puerto Rico, Nassau, Honolulu, and Hong Kong, as well as
from most major cities in the United States. On domestic airlines
and in American hotels he has often registered as "A.W. Dulles, Jr."
and mailed cancelled tickets and receipted bills to CIA. He likes
luxury hotels; his suite at a Washington hotel in 1960 was billed at
$52 a day. On many of his trips he listed CIA's street address as
his residence and the DCI as his next-of-kin, often reinforcing the
latter claim by taking out $62,500 in flight insurance with the Director
as beneficiary.
In October 1964 Old Woody was arrested for vagrancy in Richmond.
Allowed only one phone call, be used it to notify CIA of his plight.
A couple of weeks later he phoned to report his new motorcycle
license, and still later he wrote that he was working on a boat in
Miami. Back in the money early in 1965, he wrote from Bermuda
that he had been appointed King of the British Empire.
The risk of arrest does not dampen Old Woody's enthusiasm for
the service. In August 1960 he made a telephone appointment with
the commanding officer of an Air Force base in Nevada, conducted
a "CIA security inspection," used the base commander's telephone
to call CIA headquarters in Washington, and on departure warned
the commander that some officers were out of uniform at Harcld's
Club. After sending MP's on a wild goose chase to the gambling
club, the base commander somewhat grumpily reported the incident
in an official letter to CIA. A few months later Old Woody was not
so lucky. In Ponce, Puerto Rico, he represented himself as an FBI
agent, borrowed a jeep from the National Guard, and drove it across
the island to San Juan, where he was arrested. "Dear Allen," he
wrote from jail, "I am in trouble again." A few days later he grew
petulant. "You are wasting your time and the Armed Forces' time,"
he wrote, "I do not intend a reconciliation."
Generous to a fault, Old Woody rented a Cadillac limousine and
chauffeur at $100 a day just before Christmas 1960 and drove to the
Soviet embassy, where he left $100 for Francis Gary Powers. 't'hen
he drove to the Cuban embassy with $100 for prisoners on the Isle
of Pines, and then to the American Red Cross, where he contributed
$70 to help unmarried mothers. Finally he came to CIA headquarters
and handed the receptionist an envelope addressed to Mr. Dulles
containing $50 as a Christmas present, These activities landed him
in St. Elizabeth's Hospital, from which he escaped a few days later
after getting back the $50 from CIA. But he was pleased with the
episode; nearly two years later he wrote Mr. Dulles that "some day
I'll give you another $50 bill as a token of my affection."
In November 1961 he wrote from El Paso: "When the new Direc-
tor takes over, I guess I'll wash my hands of CIA." But Old Woody
didn't, and the flow of letters continues. In December 1961 he put
down CIA as his home address when he opened a bank account in
Wilmington, Delaware. In October 1962 he telegraphed from Chi-
cago: "FIDEL CASTRO MINUS HIS BEARD ARRIVED CHICAGO
THIS P.M. HAVE DETAIL COVERING HIM." In September
1963 a Washington-Miami airliner turned back and off-loaded him;
be had alarmed fellow-passengers by claiming to be a personal friend
of Fidel Castro and trying to communicate with CIA by radio.
Is Old Woody just a harmless screwball? In 1960 he wrote:, "Allen,
I am going to start carrying a regulation FBI revolver and if someone
forces me into a situation I intend on using it." In 1961 he warned
Mr. Dulles: "The bomb attached to my radio in Room 313 has not
availed you anything so far." Who knows what Old Woody will
interpret as "a situation"? At a minimum, he has cost the Govern-
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ment a great many dollars in wasted time, filing space, analyses, and
precautions. As he himself put it in a 1960 letter from West Palm
Beach: "Allen, you should deduct me from your income tax."
Fish and a Record
Some crank correspondents are remarkably well educated and
successful in business or the arts. Take the 50-year-old daughter
of a high-ranking Army officer who now owns a prosperous small-
town shop. Educated in Europe and widely travelled, she served
abroad with the Red Cross in World War II and has written many
successful books-including one which was made into a major motion
picture. She writes beautifully and, at first glance, convincingly.
It was the fish that gave her away. Her early letters just asked
for information about an inner circle of Government officials who
used a drawing of a fish as the symbol of "a confidentially shared
community of patriotic attitude." Then she started sending CIA offi-
cials postcards with crude drawings of fish. Later she adopted the
fish as a signature to her own letters.
In 1962 the fish-woman asked the vice president of a Washington
bank to help finance a small private counterespionage organization
working to expose "the mammoth traitorous operation at present
flourishing within our Government." Meanwhile she wrote threaten-
ing anonymous letters, mailed them to herself, and then forwarded
them to CIA to prove the existence of a conspiracy. Ignored for
years, she continues writing long and quite articulate letters. The
most recent one, mailed in March 1965, contains roughly 11,000
words.
One might think that if no one answered their letters the crank
correspondents would eventually get discouraged and quit writing.
This is not always true. CIA's most faithful correspondent has been
plugging a single theme steadily since 1951, when he decided a
"CIA agent" had welshed on a job offer. Almost every day he mails
a postcard with the same message: "Take Action on CIA Agent Joe
Blank!" He has been arrested and released on his promise to stop
writing; within a few days the postcards arrive again. He has written
from Miami, Las Vegas, San Francisco, Phoenix, Denver, Rochester,
Colorado Springs, and Hampton, Va.-hitting his peak in 1962 with
n total of 332 postcards to CIA. Ile has also carried his complaint
to the Secretary of Defense, but a special assistant at the Pentagon
politely suggested in reply that he deal directly with CIA.
Violence
Are such cranks actually dangerous? Read on.
On 13 March 1963 a "consulting nuclear engineer" called at CIA's
downtown personnel office and tried to see the DCI. File checks
showed that four years earlier he had sent the Director a letter
marked "DEATH" and signed "Lord God, God of Israel." Or. 28
October 1958 he had hired a taxi in Richmond, picked up two hitch-
hikers and a 9-year-old boy, and tried to invade the Quantico Marine
Corps School brandishing the boy's toy pistols.
The night of 21 February 1962 a man who thought the was a CIA
agent telephoned four times trying to report to the Director. On 11
November 1962 the same man was arrested in Rapid City, S.D., after
terrorizing residential areas of that city, firing dozens of shots through
windows, and wounding one resident. When arrested he was carry-
ing a high-powered rifle, a .22-caliber rifle, and a large quantity of
ammunition.
One crank has been bombarding more than 50 top Government
officials with details of alleged Communist electronic thought-control
by "a coherent light process of inducing a state of controlled hypnosis
by radiation of radio frequency energy on a wavelength of approxi-
mately 4 x 10-5 centimeters." The writer is officially diagnosed as
a paranoiac schizophrenic, potentially dangerous.
On 12 December 1964 a 53-year-old Florida real estate salesman
mailed the DCI a crude threat note ending "Your card is the ACE
OF SPADES." This man had tried to see the Director in the past-
once to discuss a proposed trip to Russia, again to report his inven-
tion of the hardest metal in the world. He is diagnosed as a chronic
schizophrenic paranoiac with "delusions of grandeur, seclusiveness,
and hostility" who should be kept in a "structured and supervised
setting." He was arrested three times in 1964, once for carrying a
concealed weapon. Earlier he had been arrested for armed robbery
and in 1960 in Arlington, Va., for attempted murder.
In 1962, with the arrival of a new DCI, CIA informally reviewed
protective measures with Secret Service and Metropolitan Police De-
partment officers. It was reaffirmed that, while the threat: of an
attack on top Agency officials was unpredictable and might never
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 Screwballs CONFIDENTIAL
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materialize, it was nevertheless real enough to require professional
protection. Events since then have underlined this view, although
there has been no (knock on wood) actual injury. Probably the
closest call was when a woman wrestler traced one top official to
the home of relatives and lunged at him with a bouquet of roses
which was afterwards found to hide a jagged broken beer bottle.
In any intelligence agency it is important to keep track of crank
contacts, not only to improve protection but also to assure continuity
of control and analysis. Centralization of records in CIA's Office
of Security permits quick identification of phonies and time-wasters.
Professional security officers know how to handle the off-beat ap-
proach, and others would do well to rely on the professionals when
they receive an irrational letter or find themselves face to face with
an apparently unbalanced stranger.
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88 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
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COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS
More Words for Defector
Dear Sirs:
In response to Gordon Cooperwood's appeal for a more palatable
word to replace "defector," 1 I would like to suggest the terms migrant
or convert.
William J. Brantley
... Volunteer might do, though there should be some better word.
Louis Thomas-
In discussing this problem together we hit upon the con-
traction freelector.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
Festung Europa in Two Great Wars
BLOOD ON THE MIDNIGHT SUN. By Hans Christian Adamson
and Per Klem. (New York: W. W. Norton. 1964. 282 pp.
$4.95.)
MUSKETOON: COMMANDO RAID, GLOMFJORD, 1942. By
Stephen Schofield. (London: Jonathan Cape. 1964. 156 pp.
18/-.)
Two books on intelligence operations in Norway during World
War II take their place on the growing bookshelf of Allied intelli-
gence activities in Europe.
Musketoon describes a September 1942 Commando raid on the
power plant for an aluminum works at Glomfjord. Ten British and
two Norwegian Commandos, put ashore by the French submarine
Junon, blew up the power generators and the pipeline that carried
water from the mountain lakes, effectively shutting down the alumi-
num plant for the rest of the war. Eight of the raiders were captured,
taken first to Colditz prison, and then to the RSHA building on
Albrechtstrasse in Berlin for interrogation. On October 23, under
Hitler's order of the. 18th to kill all Commandos, they were executed
at Sachsenhausen.
The remarkable thing about the Musketoon raid, and what lay
behind its success, was the excellent intelligence on which it was
based. The attacking party had every detail required for a precise
sabotage operation in an area teeming with German troops. Even
three small slips didn't affect the outcome: a fishing boat spotted the
submarine's periscope; an old lady at the window of her house by the
fjord saw the Commandos land in their dinghy; and a German patrol
discovered an empty Players cigarette package at a camp site they
used. Schofield has done a fine job of research in reconstructing the
raid and the fate of the eight captives.
Blood on the Midnight Sun consists of three stories of the Nor-
wegian resistance. The first describes how the Norwegians were able
to get the country's gold reserves of $55,000,000 out of Oslo, north
across the country to Andalsnes, and then by ship to England and
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across the Atlantic. The story of smuggling out 1,542 heavy boxes
by road, rail, and sea, just one jump ahead of German troops and
under air attack, outdoes Hollywood at its best.
The second episode concerns the heavy water plant at Vemork.
Intelligence on the activities of this installation was reaching London
almost as quickly as it reached Berlin, so when the Germans began
to dismantle it on 31 January 1944 and were preparing to ship the
stock of heavy water to Germany, word was passed that the shipment
be stopped at all costs. The Norwegians had intelligence indicating
that it was to go by train from Vemork to Mael on Lake Tinn, by
train-ferry across the Lake, and thence to Skien for shipping out.
They determined to sink the train-ferry, the Hydro, at the deepest
part of Lake Tinn, in about 1,200 feet of water, despite any cost in
lives among the Norwegian crew and passengers. The ship was
sunk as planned, carrying 53 of the 57 heavy water tanks out of
German reach.
The third part, entitled "Friends and Foes in the Underground,"
deals with an "Export Group" which established rat lines for escape.
Among its accomplishments was assisting about half of Norway's 1,500
Jews to sanctuary in Sweden. This is a detailed report on its work
in the Trondheim area, its penetration by Quisling agents and the
Gestapo, and the constant undercover war for survival.
Adamson and Klem have produced a book that is both readable
and historically quite accurate. They were a bit carried away by
their determination to clear Norway's name of the "Quisling" stigma-
no one has ever doubted the valor of the Norwegian home forces-
but their contribution to intelligence literature is a valuable one.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
SPIONE IN HAMBURG UND AUF HELGOLAND. By Frank
Lynder. (Hamburg: Hoffman and Campe. 1964. 120 pp. DM
9.80.)
In the fall of 1807 the British Navy, in connection with the attack
it launched on thitherto neutral Denmark when Napoleon's designs
on the Danish fleet became known, occupied the then Danish island
of Helgoland which commands the approaches to the Elbe and Weser
estuaries. This small rock mountain-top in the North Sea rapidly
became the chief illegal port of entry into Napoleon's Festung Europa.
Big-time smugglers crowded onto the island and loaded it with
thousands of tons of contraband: The few hundred Helgolanders,
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fishermen and pilots, grew rich sneaking their boats in to the main-
land and handling cargo. And less conspicuously, British intelligence
established regular courier channels which brought out information
and personnel from all over the continent and took back agents,
propaganda pamphlets, and funds for dissident movements.
A good deal of the smuggling and some of the intelligence story
has been told before, in connection with individual episodes-how
the Scotch priest Father James G. Robertson, under commission of
the Duke-to-be of Wellington, was infiltrated to arrange the defec-
tion from Napoleon of the elite Spanish troops under the Marquis de
Romana and their evacuation from the mainland, how the British
encouraged and financed too-little-and-too-early uprisings that ended
tragically, like those of Schill and Dornberg (in which latter, two of
the participants, Witzleben and Trott zu Selz, had descendants that
repeated history 135 years later), how the Duke of Braunschweig-
Oels fought all the way across Germany from Bohemia to evacuate
his men through Helgoland, how the deposed, and mentally unsound
Gustav Adolf IV of Sweden had a sojourn on the island.
But now Herr Lynder makes public here for the first time the
pertinent documents from the full correspondence between the so-
to-speak Chief of Station Helgoland, Edward Nicholas, and the For-
eign Minister in London, first George Canning and then Lord Henry
Bathurst. These Foreign Office papers, supplemented by some from
the War Ministry and Admiralty and material from German archives
and contemporary newspapers, add much realistic detail about pre-
viously known events and describe new facets of the intelligence and
counterintelligence operations. The image of the self-sacrificing
Scotch priest Robertson, for example, is somewhat smudged by two
post facto letters from him in the Foreign Office files. He had been
paid about a thousand pounds for his mission, but after getting back
to London he wrote stressing the dangers he had been through and
asking for a job. He listed his preferences and then requested finan-
cial support in the meantime, adding the Latin proverb, "He gives
doubly who gives fast." Then a month later he tried again: "I've
been much urged to publish something about my mission, but I refuse;
this is another financial hardship!" 1 Canning noted on the margin,
"He has been amply rewarded."
1 English reconstructed, here and elsewhere, from Lynder's translation into
German.
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When Bathurst took over the Foreign Office from Canning he asked
Nicholas just how his communications into the continent worked.
Nicholas answered (28 March 1810) :
My packet of letters goes from here in a boat to the island Nework in
the mouth of the Elbe. At low tide you can wade ashore there and
immediately hide the packet underground. It stays there until someone
comes and replaces it with a bundle of dispatches from the continent.
This person takes the Helgoland packet and passes it to a second agent, who
carries it to Hamburg via little-used roads. As soon as it reaches there I
count the greatest danger past. In Hamburg a contact man distributes
the letters among our various "personal friends," who in turn carry them
securely on to their recipients in different countries of the continent. Al-
though from Nework to the distribution in Hamburg all of ten persons are
working for me and so are witting, I can still say that in these two years
past no single pouch of dispatches has been lost . . .
Lynder tells the whole story chronologically, from the mid-Memel
meeting of Napoleon and Alexander I on 25 June 1807, where British
secret agent Colin Mackenzie-who later acted as case officer for
Father Robertson-somehow learned that Napoleon intended to
seize the Danish fleet, to the devastating letdown for the Helgolanders
when Napoleon's defeat in 1813 put an end to their high living. Al-
though something like half his slim text is quotation from documents,
these are selected and interwoven so skillfully, and loose ends so
carefully researched and tied up, that they bring Station Helgoland
and its operations vividly to life.
Anthony Quibble
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STRANGERS ON A BRIDGE.
By James B. Donovan.
(New York:
Atheneum.
1964. 432 pp.
$6.95. In paperback:
Popular Li-
brary. 1965.
$.95.)
In reading Strangers on a Bridge my thoughts go back to the drama
which was played out in U.S. government offices preceding and dur-
ing the exchange of Rudolf Abel for Francis Powers. All of this that
went on behind the scenes of Jim Donovan's own drama unknown
to him held a particular excitement for the participants.
Donovan did know more than he put into the book. But he was
prudent enough to draw the line between what is of interest to the
public and what is in the public interest, and he had help in drawing
it. About six months after he had accomplished the exchange he
mentioned to me, too casually I thought, that he was having trouble
finding time to write his book. Guardedly, I asked the question
he wanted me to ask, "What book?" He said he had been wanting
to write about some of his experiences; he thought the Abel case-
he had been Abel's defense counsel, you recall-would be of particu-
lar interest. He then concluded, much too casually now, that he
probably would end the book by "just mentioning the exchange."
He didn't want an answer right then, but he was fishing for some
kind of carte blanche approval. Later it was agreed that he should
submit galley proofs for review. There wasn't much that needed
security revision after all, and the story of the exchange made the
book a best seller.
Strangers on a Bridge is a well-knit book. The eventual exchange
comes as no surprise; Donovan carefully weaves in the possibility of
one from the beginning and thus supplies the chief element of real
suspense. But this is not just a device to make a good story. With
Donovan's experience in OSS and a natural bent toward deviousness,
I am sure he expected that his client would neither be executed nor
rot in an American jail. He was in fact troubled by the problem of
how, if he won the case, the freed Abel could be used to the benefit
of the United States.
Donovan is a careful legal craftsman, and he also knows the in-
gredients of a good story. (He points out his early desire to be a
newspaperman, and he often proudly reminisces about his news-
paper experience before he entered Harvard Law School.) He made
espionage the dominant theme of the book, and as a result the legal
intricacies of the search-and-seizure constitutional issue are bound
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claim that the USSR could not exercise criminal jurisdiction beyond
certain upward limits, would not be entertained by the Soviet gov-
ernment, it still could provide a basis for later negotiation.
When the gigantic Soviet propaganda drive had been climaxed by
Powers' trial, the decision to sentence him to prison for a term of
years suggested that he might be ransomed for the right price. We
knew that historically the USSR had shown keen interest in getting
the prompt release of Soviet citizens held in foreign countries on
espionage charges; but Abel they had not admitted to be a Soviet
citizen. We turned to Donovan as a channel through which Moscow
might be willing to work.
As Donovan writes, we waited until the trade winds shifted. His
letters to Helen Abel were composed in CIA, and we often thought
of the parallel procedures that must have been going on in Moscow.
When we finally got Helen Abel's letter describing her "visits" to
the Soviet embassy in Berlin, we knew the Russians were ready to
negotiate a trade of Powers for Abel.
It then became necessary to negotiate within the U.S. government
a position to present to the President concerning the release of Abel
by pardon. The President would act here on the recommendation of
the Attorney General, who in such a case as this would make his
recommendation only after consultation with the Department of
State. To start the process, General Cabell, then Acting Director of
Central Intelligence, sent a letter to the Secretary of State recom-
mending that the government initiate efforts to have Powers released.
He cited Powers' employment by the government, his imprisonment
as a result of his employment, and the fact that he had information
which would be of use to the government. He pointed out that
according to every indication Powers' conduct had been consistent
with his instructions. The release of Abel, on the other hand, would
in CIA's view not harm the interests of the United States; more could
be gained from Powers' release than continuing to hold Abel. This
position was in fact agreed upon and approved by the President,
with the proviso that Abel was not to be released until it was deter-
mined that Powers actually had been.
A small task force was established in CIA to plan the execution
of the hoped-for exchange, and Donovan willingly agreed to be the
executor. A strict need-to-know regimen was imposed; we did not
want our hands tipped by any leaks. Thousands of details had to be
into the spy story as an absorbing sub-plot. The picture of Colonel
Abel that arises from Donovan's faithfully reported conversations with
him is one of a dedicated, intelligent Soviet agent with a rare ability
to adjust patiently to circumstance, a much realer person than the
usual fictional spy.
The first three-quarters of the book tells the story of Abel's espionage
activity in the United States, as Donovan pieced it together after
he was asked by the Brooklyn Bar Association to defend the Russian,
and follows the legal case through to the final Supreme Court decision
upholding his conviction. Donovan's version makes the Court's de-
cision seem even closer than the 5-4 split on it would indicate. But
even before the case was concluded, letters from "Mrs. Abel" to
Donovan raised the possibility of an exchange, and Donovan's plea
to the trial court included the argument that a death sentence should
not be imposed because it could be useful to have a live Soviet spy
in U.S. custody.
That possibility was kept alive after the Supreme Court decision,
and it became more real in May of 1960 when Francis Powers' U-2
was shot down. This was when that intense behind-the-scenes ac-
tivity in CIA and other government offices began.
Fundamentally, the objective was to free an American citizen who
had been captured while carrying out his assigned duties. But it
wasn't that simple. For a while there was not even any indication
that he was alive, and then it was not known what he had told his
captors. And an answer was needed to the important operational
question of what caused the U-2 to go down. For months we could
only ask ourselves how long the Russians would go on making
propaganda hay with their prize captive and what they would do
with him then.
A legal position was devised under which Powers, being an agent
of the United States, was not responsible as an individual for his
acts. We knew the USSR would not accept a legalism to its own dis-
advantage, but we needed some kind of base from which to work.
Through the Powers family and through Frank Rogers, Alex Parker,
and William Dickson-American lawyers who sacrificed time and
effort (and at times it seemed their reputations)-eve laid the ground-
work for the only defense suitable for shifting the Soviet case from
Powers to the U.S. government itself. We thought that, while this
defense of Powers as an employee of the government, along with the
98
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faced, along with major decisions such as a location for the physical
hand-over. And all of this without any facts from the USSR to go on.
But we knew what we wanted and made some shrewd estimates on
Soviet thinking. As Donovan excitingly shows, our plan worked; but
I doubt if anyone except him could have carried it off so handsomely.
Donovan could not know what efforts the government had put
into the project. The necessary planning and coordination alone
among State, Defense, Justice, CIA, and the White House were truly
staggering. From the perspective of this part of the accomplishment,
Strangers on a Bridge becomes an even more impressive story of
devotion to justice and the national interest.
M. C. Miskovsky
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Editor, Studies in Intelligence
CIA Headquarters, Rm. 1D-27
CONTENTS
Page
Guns or Butter Problems of the Cold War .... George Ecklund
1
Economic impact of military programs: a rudimentary meth-
odology. SECRET
Yesterday's Weapons Tomorrow ........... Dwayne Anderson
13
All is not nukes and rockets yet. SECRET
Chinese Defections Overseas .................. Henry Flooks
19
Some case histories and a few common features. SECRET
Communications to the Editors .............................
39
Helgoland . . . Ben Franklin ... Defection ... Approach
to Soviets. CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET
The Hotel in Operations ................... James J. Lagrone
43
Institutional vulnerability and potential. SECRET
The Intelligence Role in Counterinsurgency .. Walter Steinrneyer
57
Planning outline in four phases. SECRET
Pearl Harbor: Estimating Then and Now ..... A. R. Northridge
65
Influence of a distorted public image of an adversary nation.
CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence Story in Three Parts .......... Edward M. Zivich
75
Robert E. Lee reads a paper. CONFIDENTIAL
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature ................. ....
77
New Soviet publicity for spies. CONFIDENTIAL
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 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/01/05 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200030001-0
Rudimentary methodology for
studying the effects of military
programs on the Soviet economy.
GUNS OR BUTTER PROBLEMS OF THE COLD WAR
George Ecklund
When a Roman commander in 50 B.C. took the men and. materials
to throw up a fortress wall or build a new catapult, no one balanced
this against civilian use of the resources. Defense was paramount.
But no organization man in Washington or Moscow today would
think of ordering a strategic weapon system without inquiring, among
other things, into its impact on the economy. In this nuclear age
both weapons and organization have become so complex, even in
peacetime, that men must now study carefully the economic result of
every major armaments decision. The questions asked may range
from the industrial implications, here and in the USSR, of disarmament
proposals on the one hand to the effects for the Russian consumer if
Moscow matches a Washington decision to install an expensive anti-
missile system on the other. This article will explore the contribution
of economic analysis in studying the impact of alternative military
programs and will point out some of the intelligence problems involved
in doing it on the USSR.
Economists recognize that in a global context the major considera-
tions relative to disarmament or increased armament are not economic.
Maintaining a counterpoise to the adversary in military strength; and
political initiatives will continue to be the overriding objective over
the next decade. The economic problems will increase in importance
only if the political and military problems come nearer to solution.
But analysis of the economic impact of alternative defense budgets
may help us understand the implications of military and political
developments as they occur.
It is the cost of modern armaments and the stretch-out in develop-
merit of new military hardware that make it necessary to consider the
economic impact of defense. The world now spends about $135 bil-
lion annually on the war industry, roughly as much as the entire
income of the poorer half of mankind. The United States spends a
little more than a third of the total, the USSR about a third, and the
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rest of the world a little less than a third. There are many competing
demands for the resources represented by this money, for example
increases in personal consumption, more investment to accelerate
economic growth, war on poverty, expansion of higher education, more
aid to developing countries. Moreover, decisions on arms spending
made today cannot easily be changed tomorrow by beating the swords
into plowshares. The Pentagon's shopping list has few items in
common with the housewife's, and military hardware ordered two or
three years ahead cannot be converted to patios or cabin cruisers.
That is why a new military order, usually expensive and highly
specialized, will affect other claimants to the nation's output for several
years to come.
What is needed for studying the economic impact of defense is a
technique that will translate military spending into civilian spending
and vice-versa, so as to forecast the effect on the structure and growth
of all civilian sectors as the resources available to them are increased
or decreased. One must take into account: (1) the quality as well
as the quantity of resources left for the civilian economy (a GI
mustered back to an Iowa farm will not contribute as much to tech-
nological progress as an engineer released from the Redstone arsenal
to AT&T); (2) the regional impact of defense spending, particularly
with respect to small cities where the phasing out of a weapons system
may close an assembly plant, for example; (3) the speed of military-
civilian conversions, which may aggravate the frictions developed in
switching resources from production of household appliances, say, to
marine turbines; (4) the differences in national abilities to adjust,
recognizing that a taut and muscle-bound economy like the USSR's
will not as readily absorb increased defense outlays as one with some
unused resources and the tremendous flexibility of the American.
Economists have not yet developed standard techniques with which
to attack this many-faceted task, indeed have done very little pioneer-
ing work on it.
A Hypothetical Case: The Problems
Military planning today requires some notion of the possible size
and structure of the enemy's forces ten years from now and of its
economic capability to support them. Suppose one were speculating
about the size of Soviet defense outlays through 1975, necessarily
making assumptions about many things such as technological break-
throughs and the shifting winds of coexistence. With the USSR's
current defense spending at about $45 billion, a plausible range of
alternative budgets over the next decade might be from a low of
$35 billion to a high of $75 billion (reflecting, perhaps, a great differ-
ence in the magnitude and sophistication of strategic forces). With
this frame of reference established, the economic impact problems
begin.
First, would the $40 billion difference between the high and the
low, if Moscow chose the latter, buy $40 billion worth of Russian
consumption, or foreign aid, or investment in economic growth? Not
necessarily. It might yield more (or less) than $40 billion in addi-
tional consumption, less (or more) than $40 billion in new investment,
or some indeterminate addition to foreign aid. One of the riiddles
that research on the Soviet economy has not yet solved and must
devote more attention to is the "exchange rate" between military and
other spending.
This problem illustrates a fundamental difference between the U.S.
and Soviet economies. In the United States a dollar is a dollar
whether spent on military R&D or new housing, and our price system
reflects the spending of economic resources in a way that accords
with our national and individual desires. Through the price system
people vote for the goods they want, and investors plan their output
in line with these price votes-a very efficient arrangement. But in
the USSR a ruble is not a ruble, because prices are set by Moscow
without reference to consumer votes. If more resources are needed
for military R&D, the Soviet price system does not determine which
sector of the civilian economy will give up these resources. The
decision is part of the economic plan, and the resulting shift in re-
sources may be quite inefficient. Thus it is difficult to determine
whether a ruble taken from housing will buy a ruble of military R&D.
Second, would Soviet GNP grow at the same rate under the high
and the low military budgets? That depends on the quantity and
quality of men and materials left for the civilian sector and on how
Moscow divides them between investment and consumption. The
quantity problem by itself is easily interpreted-sum up all the men
and. the metal and the electronics gear ticketed for defense, and those
resources are lost to the civilian economy. The quality problem is
more difficult-the kinds of men and metal preempted by defense
will affect the rate of technological development and hence the rate
of growth in the civilian economy.
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A, high defense budget that concentrated specialized resources on
military research, development, production, and space activities would
interfere seriously with the introduction of new techniques in civilian
industry. For example, if a disproportionate share of high-grade
scientists and engineers are shunted to defense for several years,
progress in developing new chemical processes and automation may
be greatly retarded. Economists would say that growth in "factor
productivity"-the productivity of labor and capital, measured by
the ratio of GNP to the input of the two combined-has slowed down
because of pressing military needs.
A question quite apart from the character of the military bite on
resources is how Moscow will use those that are left, whether to
increase (or decrease) the rate of growth of GNP by raising (or lower-
ing) investment. But adding a ruble to investment will subtract a
ruble, more or less, from consumption.
A Quantitative Method
The concept of factor productivity is useful in expressing more
specifically the impact on the Soviet economy of the $75 billion and
$35 billion defense budgets. Historically, during the long period
1928-63, factor productivity in the USSR increased at a rate of 1.5%
annually; but during 1950-58, when defense expenditures grew slowly,
this rate was accelerated to a little more than 3.0%, and then during
1958-63, when defense expenditures were stepped up, it fell to about
1.0%. This is the empirical basis for the following hypothesis: high
defense expenditures preempt critical resources such as R&D and
cause a slowdown in the growth of factor productivity. In our hypo-
thetical example the growth in factor productivity might be about
1.0% with the high defense budget and about 2.0% with the low.
The higher rate, of course, permits a faster growth of GNP. But
several other factors enter into the projections of GNP under the
two defense budgets:
(1) Moscow's decision whether to put primary emphasis in the
civilian economy on investment or on personal consumption; if in-
vestment is planned to increase 10% annually, the capital stock (plant
and equipment) will grow faster than if it increases only 7%, and the
faster capital stock grows the faster GNP will grow;
(2) The annual growth in the labor force; this is related to the
growth in adult population and is estimated at 1.7%;
(3) The relative shares of labor and capital in GNP; it is estimated
that the return to labor in the form of wages and other payments
amounts to about 75% of GNP, and the return to capital about 25%.
We are now ready to summarize in a table the possible impact of a
high and a low defense budget on Soviet consumption and economic
growth over a decade.
Table 1
HYPOTHETICAL ANNUAL INCREASES IN GNP AND COMPONENTS,
USSR, 1965-75
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF G]IOWT]:; (%p )
Priority on
Economic Growth
Priority on
Consumption
Case I-High Military Budget:
GNP ...................................
5.0
4.0
Consumption ............................
-1.0
3.5
New Fixed Investment ....................
1.0.0
70
Military Expenditures ....................
5.5
5.5
Case II-Low Military Budget:
GNP ...................................
6.0
5.0
Consumption ............................
3.5
5.0
New Fixed Investment ....................
10.0
7
0
Military Expenditures ....................
-2.5
.
--2.5
The general formula is:
GNP growth rate= (factor productivity growth rate) + (labor
growth rate) X (labor's share of GNP) -h
(capital growth rate) X (capital's share of
GNP)
Substituting figures for the high military budget and priority on
economic growth:
GNP growth=1.0%+(1.7%) (.75)+(10%) (.25)
=1.0%+1.275%-h2.5%
=4.775%, rounded to 5.0%
When the GNP growth rates have been determined, aggregate
GNP can be projected to 1975 for each of the four cases. Military
expenditures and investment, as given, can then be subtracted
from GNP to derive the only residual-consumption.
From this quantification of economic impact it can be seen that
the high defense budget is not compatible with a premium on economic
growth; it would result in an annual decline of 1.0% in personal
consumption (about 2% in per capita terms), which would be anathema
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 Guns or Buffer
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to the Soviet leaders and their constituents. If Moscow chose the
high military budget for a decade, it would probably have to be
content with a rather low rate (4%) of growth in GNP, and even then
personal consumption would increase more slowly-3.5% annually
in aggregate, or about 2.5% per capita-than it has during the past
10 years. If, on the other hand, Moscow considered the low military
budget adequate through 1975, it could maintain a substantial growth
in GNP (5%) and the large increase of 5% in personal consumption
(about 4% per capita), or alternatively it could opt for a higher rate
of growth in GNP (6%) and a more modest increase in consumption
(3.5 %0).1
A puzzling question still remains. Would the high military budget
put too much strain on the Soviet economy? The new leadership is
already stretching resources to the limit in its grandiose plans for
expanding agriculture, boosting consumer welfare, keeping abreast of
the United States in space, and maintaining the image of a dynamic
economy. If Moscow spent $75 billion annually for defense by
1975 it is certain that something else in the economy would have to
give. Could the USSR really afford such a high level of military
spending? This question economic analysis cannot answer; it can
say how much must be sacrificed for a given level of defense, but
not whether the sacrifice will be made. What a nation can be per-
suaded to give up for defense depends on a host of sociological
factors, including the nature and seriousness of the threat, the charisma
of the leadership, and the cohesiveness of the people. It is a problem
for the combined talents of political scientists, sociologists, economists,
and other kinds of experts.
Although disarmament talks have made no dramatic progress, it is
wise to think of economic impact along with the disarmament itself.
Some of the many forms that an agreement might take are general
and complete disarmament, halting the production of nuclear weapons
and delivery systems, a ban on research, development, and testing of
new weapons, reduction in conventional forces, and annual percentage
'It is emphasized that these figures are purely hypothetical, serving only to
illustrate the methodology.
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reduction in over-all defense spending. All of these programs would
release men and resources to the civilian economy, but some would be
more useful to a particular economy than others. For example, a
country with a labor shortage might be attracted by the prospect of
a reduction in conventional forces that would release manpower,
whereas a technology-poor one might prefer a ban on new weapons
development in order to free scientists and engineers for industrial
research. It would be useful for disarmament negotiators to know
which possible proposals would be most attractive to the USSR, or
Communist China, because of economic impact.
The impact of disarmament might be likened to that of a shift in
popularity from vacations at the beach to private swimming pools in
the back yard. Demand for services at Ocean City would go down,
whereas demand for cement, excavating equipment, and local labor
would go up. There would be a similar shift of men and resources
if the Pentagon were to slash its orders for aircraft and the Interior
Department let contracts for large new dams. In a modern, devel-
oped economy there are dozens of industries that would be involved
in the switch from planes to dams. While some industries push the
finished planes off their assembly lines, others produce only the engines
or the tires or the radar systems, and still others make only the metal
or only the sulphuric acid that helps make the metal. Some sell
primarily to other industries; some sell most of their output to final
consumers. How will each of these interrelated industries be affected
if military aircraft production is banned by a disarmament agreement?
Would the subsequent shifts in resources affect economic growth and
personal consumption? These are the key impact questions.
One way of getting at the answers is through input-output analysis,
a technique for tracing the complex adjustments that occur throughout
a nation's industrial machine as demand for final products is cut back
or increased at one point or another. A large "flow table" is prepared.,
in which each major industry is listed once as a row and once as a
column. The row shows how industry A sells its products to all the
industries listed in the columns, and to final consumers in an extra
column. The column shows how industry A buys from all the in-
dustries listed in the rows, and from the labor market in an extra row.
The table thus shows, for example, the total sales of aluminum to
the aircraft industry and as pots and pans to households.
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 Using the Table
Table 2 is a highly simplified example of the basic flow table in
input-output analysis. A usable one would have at least 30 columns
and rows; in practice it would be likely to have several hundred.
Table 2
HYPOTHETICAL INPUT-OUTPUT TABLE
millions of dollars
TOTAL INTER-
PURCHASES
BY STEEL
PURCHASES
BY COAL
INDUSTR}'
PURCHASES
PURCHASES BY
CONSUMERS
TOTAL
OUTPUT
Sales of Steel
....... 20
20
40
25
65
Sales of Coal
....... 30
10
40
10
50
Sales of Labor
...... 10
15
25
25
Guns or Butter
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the highly intricate chain reaction through the industrial structure
and measuring the resulting demands, direct and indirect, on each
of the industries.
Aircraft production is a comparatively trivial example. General
and complete disarmament would have a substantial impact, releasing
perhaps $40 billion in resources annually to both the Soviet and the
U.S. economy. Input-output tables would show the kinds and amounts
of material and the quantity of labor that would be freed for use in
civilian industry. This information, together with regional economic
data, would form the basis for planning the alternative uses. In the
USSR the government would make all the decisions as to what re-
sources go where and when. But in the United States planners in
private industry would bid for the released materials and labor, basing
their bids on their estimates of consumer demand; the government
would step in only if a geographic region or an industry needed out-
side help to adjust to the new conditions.
Another use for the input-output tables would be to evaluate the
impact of a large increase in military expenditures. They would show
the additional effort required by each industry, would point to the
kinds of civilian activities that might be cut back, and would help
identify bottlenecks.
To construct an input-output table for the USSR would require a
great deal more data than is presently available to Western econo-
mists, but fortunately the USSR has become interested enough in
this technique to develop some large-scale tables of its own. Parts
of the tables for the year 1959 were published in 1962. Russian
books and journals have referred to nine national and nineteen
regional input-output tables that have been constructed or are in
preparation. Soviet writers use input-output data widely in their
unclassified papers, implying that the tables are circulated in the
USSR and that economists are free to use their statistics in detail.
Moscow may in time release some of the more extensive tables for
other years.
It is clear that Soviet input-output tables would be more useful to
economic planners in Moscow than to intelligence analysts in Wash-
ington. The planners have to solve the problems, whereas analysts
only identify them. Nevertheless, the wealth of information that
emanates from an input-output table would help the analyst measure
the strains in the Soviet economy caused by increased defense spend-
ing or evaluate the impact of resources rclca-t
It is apparent from the table that in producing $25 million of steel
for use by final consumers the steel and coal industry used up $40
million of steel. In other words, it takes steel to make steel and coal,
and it takes coal and steel to produce coal. If consumer demand for
steel and coal should increase by $5 million each, the input-output
technique will tell us how much additional steel, coal, and labor will
be needed to satisfy both the increase in consumer purchases ($5 mil-
lion each) and the additional inter-industry purchases ($? million).
The procedure is approximately as follows: The flow table is used to
derive a coefficient matrix, a table which shows the inputs of steel,
coal, and labor required per dollar of steel and coal output. We now
ask a computer to invert the coefficient matrix and multiply it by the
column showing the increases in consumer demand. The resulting
product is the total increase of steel, coal, and labor needed. If a flow
table has 200 industries rather than 2, and if we define a calculation as
either a multiplication or a division, inversion of the corresponding
coefficient matrix requires about 2,500,000 calculations.
Pentagon were to cancel its contracts for the F-ill, an
economist with a set of input-output tables and a digital computer
could estimate the resulting changes in every industry affected. There
would be a decrease in demand for steel, which in turn would require
less sulphuric acid, less iron, less limestone, and less coal. There
would be a reduced demand for synthetic fibres and plastics from
the chemical industry. The tire industry would demand less rubber
and less nylon and rayon. Employment would be cut at General
Dynamics and at some of its subcontractors and suppliers. These
are only a few of the ramifications from such a single cut in produc-
tion of military aircraft. The input-output tables are a tool for tracing
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Other Economic Impact Questions
The ready transferability of men and factories from the military to
the civilian sector has received relatively little attention. In the event
of general disarmament, what amounts and kinds of the material and
human inputs to defense could be used in the civilian economy
(1) immediately? (2) after modification or retraining? (3) not at all?
A number of excellent studies of this problem have been made in
the West,2 but the few Soviet economists who have written on
problems of disarmament substantially understate the difficulties that
would likely be encountered in the USSR.3 The costs of transfer
would be less in the United States than in the USSR, because our
market mechanism will more quickly and efficiently switch resources
to products the consumers want. Conversion probably would cause
more problems for the Soviet economy and require greater effort than
is now recognized in Moscow, and some of our economic intelligence
efforts should be directed to the specifics of the consequent dislocations
and effects on the development of the economy.
Educational progress has been an important factor, though difficult
to quantify, in the rapid economic growth of the USSR. With the
increasing complexity of modern weapons, a greater share of the
highly trained scientists and engineers in the USSR are now used in
defense, and the implications of this for the future development and
growth of civilian industry are uncertain. In order to refine his
impact studies, the economist needs more information on educational
achievement in the USSR, including projections a decade ahead, and
a better understanding of the contribution that education makes to
economic growth.
Economists often say that defense is a quite separate sector of the
economy that drains resources away from other uses. Although prima
facie true, this assertion may ignore a possible feedback from defense
to the civilian economy. To what extent, if any, does technological
know-bow developed specifically for defense benefit the civilian
economy? In the United States, military-space technology is often
diffused into the civilian sector: e.g., the Y2-thousandth-inch aluminum-
coated plastic film developed for the ECHO satellite is now used as
a reflective insulator for very low temperature vessels; superior print-
ing rolls have been made from the polysulfide rubber developed for
cast solid propellants; sintered aluminum oxide ceramic, developed
for rocket nozzles, is now used in industry for special check valves
and resistor cores. Little is known about interchange of technology
in the Soviet economy between the military and civilian sectors; it is
probably not as widespread as here. It is an important matter to
the economist, however, because the extent to which military R&D
filters into the civilian sector will affect his estimate of factor pppro-
ductivity and future growth of Soviet industry.
' Benoit and Boulding, Disarmament and the Economy, 1963. The Economist
Intelligence Unit, The Economic Effects of Disarmament, 1963.
'I. S. Glagolev, Vliyaniye razoruzheniya na ekonomiku (The Economic Impact
of Disarmament), 1964. I. S. Glagolev, ed., Ekonomicheskiye problemy razoru-
zhenie~a (Economic Problems of Disarmament), 1961.
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The importance of anachronistic
intelligence to supplement that
on advanced weapon systems.
YESTERDAY'S WEAPONS TOMORROW
Dwayne Anderson
The great emphasis that U.S. intelligence publications place on
advanced weapons, in accordance with their strategic significance,
may leave the casual reader with the impression that the Soviet mili-
tary machine is made up of ICBM and ABM forces backed by a
ponderous but ineffective mishmash of traditional components armed
with elderly weapons. His familiarity with Soviet military sites may
include Tyuratam and Sary Shagan but probably little else. He
knows the Soviets still have some tube artillery, bombs, and torpedoes
but believes these will soon be in museums alongside crossbow
exhibits.
Such impressions can result from rigid application of the reporting
priority accorded developments involving missiles and from a general
assumption that the importance of a weapon is in direct ratio to its
complexity. Thus superficial indications that some missile may be
propelled by solid fuels would make the intelligence front pages,
while good evidence that the Soviets were reequipping ground forces
with a new and better rifle would be lucky to get in at all.
Certainly Soviet silo digging must be carefully watched so that we
can adjust our own strategic stance accordingly, and the Soviets'
success or lack of success with antimissiles could have as great an
impact on our defense budget as on theirs. But preoccupation with
these unquestionably important matters may have become so great
as to skew our appreciation of over-all Soviet capabilities. Factors
operating to degrade the theoretical capabilities of modern weapons
have been ignored, and important capabilities of older weapon systems
have been overlooked or forgotten.
Weaknesses in Complication
The very complexity of advanced weapons is their major draw-
back. They depend on highly trained personnel for maintenance and
operation. They must have back-up stocks of precisely manufactured
and inspected parts. They are almost useless if counterm
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interfere with the functioning of any of their many components. In
many instances they can operate only under carefully controlled
temperature and humidity conditions, and they must have exactly
regulated power supplies available at all times.
Often the refire function of sophisticated systems is limited, com-
plicated, and slow, rendering them vulnerable to saturation tactics.
Equally often sensor capabilities lag far behind the capabilities of
other elements and so lower the effectiveness of the entire system.
These can also be adversely affected by physical phenomena: an
auroral display can blank out a radar, and a school of fish can blind
a sonar.
Elaborate check-out systems to check out the check-out equipment,
all of which must function perfectly, have added to the bulkiness of
many of the newer weapons. This may be of no great importance
with ICBMs, but in mobile combat units it can be critical. A costly
antiaircraft missile had to be abandoned recently when the system
was'found to be so bulky it could be carried only by ships of cruiser
size.
]Bombers have frequently been relegated to the strategic intelligence
boneyard on the assumption that modern air defense has done them
in despite the development of stand-off missiles, electronic counter-
measures, and low-altitude flight profiles. Even if this assumption
were correct with respect to conditions in non-nuclear general war,
it has no validity for nuclear war. The electromagnetic effects of
thermonuclear and fission weapons, the clouds of radioactive debris,
and the resultant ionization of the atmosphere would hamper the air
defense's command and control communications and greatly reduce
radar effectiveness. The defensive forces might have to rely heavily
on the human eye for warning and fire control. The bomber, then,
should have a reasonable life span.
Need for Versatility
Complexity is not the only drawback of newer weapons. In some
instances the weaponry they replace is better suited for certain types
of missions. The high speeds and limited loiter time of jet aircraft
have led to a new appreciation of propeller planes in a variety of
attack and reconnaissance roles. The elderly bolt-action Springfield,
long after it had been phased out of production, continued to perform
as a sharpshooter's rifle because it was superior to its successors for
this purpose.
History is replete with examples of weapons abandoned too soon
or with too little consideration. The bow, phased out by the Greeks
in Homeric times, was winning battles centuries after the city-states
had been destroyed as political entities. Spanish commanders of the
early 16th century armed their tercios with the long-abandoned armor
and short swords of the Roman legions and did quite well against their
progressive arquebus- and pike-armed opponents. In the Korean war
carefully organized and coordinated U.N. amphibious operations were
hamstrung by the North Korean expedient of dropping obsolete con-
tact mines in coastal waters from junks and sampans. The carrier-
oriented U.S. Navy had to activate World War II minesweepers and
crews to cope with this obstacle. Most recently a whole array of
obsolescent weapons have been dusted off and adapted to the needs
of the unconventional fighting in Vietnam.
During Taiwan Strait air operations in 1958, Nationalist F-86 air-
craft battled Communist MIGs with overwhelming success despite
the fact that the MIGs were faster and could climb more briskly.
A few of the Nationalist aircraft were armed with Sidewinder air-to-
air missiles, and the actions were studied to determine the effectiveness
of this missile. But the post mortems showed that all but a few of
the Communist losses resulted from the Nationalist pilots' gunfire.
Subsequently some USAF officers, noting the difficulty of maintaining
the missile in ready condition and the limited refire capabilities of
aircraft fitted with it, recommended that missile-carrying fighter air-
craft be reequipped with automatic cannon for at least part of their
armament.
Defensive systems are particularly vulnerable to saturation effects.
In antisubmarine warfare teams of aircraft, surface ships, and sub-
marines, backed with shore-based sound surveillance systems, can
present formidable opposition to one or two conventional submarines;
but a large number of submarines scattered along a few hundred
miles of coastline would currently pose an extremely difficult prob-
lem. Field and shipboard air defense missile systems can in general
attack very few targets at a time. Their major limitation lies in the
guidance radars which direct the missiles during their flights. An
installation with two guidance radars can attack only two targets
over a period of several minutes. During this time other enemy
aircraft or cruise missiles can carry out their missions without
hindrance.
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The inflexibility of many advanced weapons, particularly those of
mass destruction, is clear. Essentially, they can apply force on one
scale only, and as a rule only to certain pre-selected targets. A
105-mm howitzer can fire one round near a target to draw attention or
to press compliance with a demand. If necessary, a second round
can be fired into the target to indicate that the demand will be en-
forced; and this can be followed, again if necessary, by twenty rounds
to put enemy personnel in the face-saving position of having offered
token resistance. Finally the target can be reduced by using 100
rounds, or whatever number is needed.
Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, offer only one option, oblitera-
tion of the target. U.S. preparations for action during the Cuban
crisis were slowed by having to weld conventional bomb racks on
aircraft which could otherwise have delivered only nuclear weapons.
The presence of Minuteman and Polaris missiles of course greatly
affects the basic rules under which engagements such as that in
South Vietnam are carried out. Nevertheless they cannot play any
active role in them.
In sum, the whole gamut of wars that may occur, from a jungle
insurrection to a prolonged broken-back nuclear struggle, demands
a variety of military hardware, much of which may be primitive in
design. National military capabilities can therefore not be measured
just by counting mass destruction weapons or assessing the complexity
of weapon systems. Weaponry must be evaluated according to its
probable performance under fire, in the face of countermeasures,
under conditions of limited logistic and maintenance support. It
must be evaluated in terms of the environment and kind of war in
which it may be used, and the attention it is to get in intelligence
reporting should be determined accordingly. At the present: time
intelligence should be devoting more effort to the evaluation of
Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities with respect to support
for the kind of fighting being done, for example, in Vietnam,.
A Range of Wars
Present mutual deterrent policies of the United States and the
Soviet Union are unlikely to be affected by less than extreme changes
in the relative numbers or capabilities of ICBMs or other major
weapons. This being the case, it may be more important to learn
how quickly and in what numbers the Soviets can send heavy infantry
weapons to the Congo than to know the vernier characteristics of the
SS-8 propulsion system. It may even be more important to know
Soviet capabilities for low-altitude conventional bombing than the
precise yield of certain Soviet fission weapons.
Finally, it may be more useful to know the quantities and types of
equipment that have been stockpiled or mothballed than to know
every detail about the first-line hardware. The scrapping of the battle-
ship fleet and near elimination of eight-inch guns on cruisers had led
to a serious decline in U.S. capabilities for giving fire support to
amphibious operations. Recently, however, the Navy pulled rocket-
equipped LST's of World War II vintage out of moth balls to rectify
this deficiency. Knowing whether the Soviets could similarly remedy
certain weaknesses on short notice may prove critical in our assess-
ments of Bloc courses of action in Africa and Asia.
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Some case histories of disaffection among
Chinese Communists trusted abroad and
some common factors therein.
Henry Flooks
As the number of Chinese Communists stationed abroad or sent
out on tours with delegations increases, the possibility of walk-ins
and the opportunities to stimulate defections increase accordingly. In
an effort to give some definition to the characteristics of such possibili-
ties, the score or so of defections that were attempted or effected by
Chinese personnel in the foreign environment up through mid-1964
have been studied. It has been possible to draw a few generalizations
about motivation, deterrents, and procedure, centering on the Chi-
nese sense of mutual obligation between protecting authority and
protected vassal.
A half dozen of the most instructive cases are presented in capsule
below. Names have been changed where necessary to protect sensi-
tive information.
Frustrated Penetration Agent
In Japanese-occupied Manchuria Lao Keng-nung was a college
student. His father was a secret Kuomintang agent working against
the occupier. Lao came of age and graduated about the time of
the Japanese surrender, and the ruthless arrogance of the conquering
Russian troops disgusted him; it was the Kuomintang, the Chinese
government, that really deserved the credit for driving the Japanese
out. But when Mao Tse-tung's troops followed not long after, he was
much impressed by their considerate treatment of the people, even
helpfulness. He was also pleased with the Communist land reform
measures and Mao's program in general, and so, without objection
from his father, he went to work for the Party.
In 1949, when all mainland China became the Chinese People's
Republic in alliance with the Soviet Union, and anti-Russian elements
were being suppressed, Lao indiscreetly spoke up in defense of a
Russian-hater who was being purged from the Party. He pointed
out how the Russians had dismantled Manchurian industrial plants
and carted them off. The upshot was that he had to engage in self-
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criticism and write a confession. Yet his misconduct was handled
with such seeming earnestness and logic that the incident left no bad
taste in his mouth. Nor in the Party's: his confession was accepted
and his status cleared of any cloud. He married a Party member
at about this time.
Lao's particular Party organ was the United Front Work Depart-
ment. In 1951 the UFWD asked him to undertake a deep-cover
mission to Taiwan. He balked. It would not be safe; a lot of people
on Taiwan knew him by sight and knew he was a Party man, and
sooner or later someone would recognize him. It took strong and
lengthy argument, but he finally convinced his superiors that he
should be sent to Hong Kong instead. He took his wife along.
In Hong Kong he had a case officer named Wei, who transmitted
UFWD instructions and his reports and passed him a small salary
to supplement what he could earn in a cover job; but operationally
he was left pretty much to his own devices. His mission was to
penetrate the Chinese Third Force group there which opposed both
the Communists and the Nationalists. After much difficulty he landed
a job as reporter for a Third Force newspaper. He was to write
exposes unmasking Communist double-dealing and showing how ruth-
less the Party was. The trouble was, Wei refused him permission
to write about Party secrets, even when they were well known out-
side, and wouldn't approve articles that put the Party in a too un-
favorable light. His colorless copy was therefore rarely accepted,
and he made no progress toward getting inside the Third Force. This
lack of accomplishment in his mission, in turn, made the UFWD more
and more dissatisfied with him.
Early in 1953 Wei told him bluntly that if his work didn't improve
he would be recalled to China to explain his failures. Alternatively
he could go to Taiwan as originally scheduled. Frustrated and re-
sentful, Lao now began to question privately the decency of a Party
that would insist on the dangerous mission to Taiwan, impose im-
possible conditions and then punish for failure, encourage mutual
distrust among people, and throw a man out when it had got all the
use it could out of him. Undoubtedly Mao was the greatest leader
China had had in modern times; but the apparatus, especially in its
international aspect, was too rigid, dogmatic, and intolerant, too much
afraid of criticism. More particularly, it disregarded its obligations
to those who served it loyally.
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In June and July Lao had several stiff arguments with 'Wei.
Taiwan, he was told, was still open to him, but his usefulness here
in Hong Kong was zero, and his Party salary would accordingly be
that from now on. This was the crunch. For the first time he dis-
cussed the situation with his wife. They could go on to Taiwan and
turn themselves in as soon as they got there. But they really had
no sympathy with the Kuomintang, did not trust it, and further were
not confident Taiwan would hold out against the Communists. They
could ask asylum of the Crown Colony authorities; but the British
were friendly enough with the People's Republic that that might not be
safe. Moreover, the long arm of violent Communist justice might
reach them if they deserted and stayed in Hong Kong.
The third course lay to the U.S. consulate, and they took it. The
United States was strong enough to protect them from any enemy.
On 18 July Lao wrote a careful letter to the consulate-in Chinese,
his only foreign language being a bit of Japanese-saying that he
had been doing clandestine work for the Party but no longer believed
in it and wanted to work against it; he had important information for
the Americans. He particularly stressed his wanting to work against
the Communists and the importance of the information he had. He
assumed that he would be valuable enough in U.S. eyes to be offered
sanctuary; and he was right.
Premeditated Abduction
Chung Jen-lung was a member of the Youth League and a student
at Peking's Institute of International Relations. He wasn't particu-
larly fond of political science; he'd have preferred medicine, and he
rather resented the arbitrary way the Communists had made the
choice for him. In fact, although he wasn't foolish enough to let on
to anybody, he resented Communist authoritarianism generally;, and
he had fallen into the habit of tending to believe the opposite of
what they told people to believe.
Take America, which they painted so black. A cousin of his had
learned a lot about it when he worked for an American aid mission,
and he had talked of it as a prosperous, generous land where anyone
with ability could find fulfillment. He himself had seen something
of American generosity in the rehabilitation of Manchuria, after the
Russian plundering. That was before the Communists came in and.
swallowed up his family's money in the new China's universa' . egali-
tarian poverty. And now at the Institute he was able to read trans-
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lations from the American and European press; the bad capitalists,
he observed, told you what was so, while the righteous Communists
told you what they thought was good for you to think.
At the end of 1958, when he was graduating from the Institute
and preparing for a study tour in Southeast Asia-to polish up his
language skills-he came across a London Times story about the young
pianist Fu Tsung, just escaped to England. Fu, it seemed, in Warsaw
on a scholarship, had made some critical remarks about the suppres-
sion of the Hungarian uprising. Later someone had tattled on him
and he was ordered home. What "labor reform" might do to a pianist's
handsl His escape seemed so simple. That's for me, thought Chung,
but America, not England.
The first chance was at the Hong Kong stop en route to his South-
east Asian post. But Chung had the impression that only embassies,
not consulates, could grant political asylum, and he didn't want to
make any false breaks. Even when he reached his post he spent
a week getting the lay of the land and writing up a bitter denuncia-
tion of the Communists with which to sell himself to the Americans.
Then one day when everyone else was leaving the Chinese hostel
to go to work at the embassy, he begged off, saying he had to finish
up some homework first. As soon as they were out of sight he walked
a few blocks away and took a pedicab to a corner near the U.S.
embassy.
Chung had no doubt that the Americans would be happy to re-
ceive him, but he was conscious of violating his obligation to his
family. They would surely be made to suffer in one way or another
if they had nurtured a defector. He had therefore taken care to
leave his papers and personal effects spread out as though he had been
kidnapped while in the midst of work. At the U.S. embassy he
begged that his whereabouts be concealed, and he steadfastly refused
to be used in any propaganda play. He even denied knowing how
to reach a brother of his in the Chinese air force.
Cultured Misfit
Tung Chi-p'ing's family, in Shanghai, though mentally well en-
dowed, was an unhappy one. The father was a niggardly and callous
man who got what he could out of his wife and children and sub-
ordinates without doing anything for them in return. He suffered
financially when the Communists took over, but as the children grew
up they fared quite well, though they had no interest in the new
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ideology. Two brothers got good jobs in factories in the area. One
sister became a college teacher and married a physicist. The other
married a Foreign Trade officer; she was the only one to join the
Youth League. Tung's ideal for himself was the cultivated intellec-
tual, and he pointed his schooling to this end.
In 1957, in the course of a rectification campaign, several of Tuing's
middle school teachers were sentenced to labor reform, and he felt
keenly the injustice and the degradation of it. Then came the futility
and mismanagement of the Great Leap Forward; he himself was put
to work at a backyard steel furnace. The Communists were like his
father, driving you and then not taking care of you. But he did like
school. He had a particular interest in the ways of the outside
world; he was fascinated to learn that the French National Assembly
could reject the EDC treaty after the French government had signed
it, and he stood at the top of his class in Russian studies.
He was therefore given a chance at the entrance examinations for
the Shanghai Foreign Language Institute, passed with flying colors,
and put to studying French. Here he had a teacher, born in England
of a French mother and Chinese father, whom he greatly admired for
her competence and knowledge of life abroad (life in such contrast
to the grinding poverty all around him here, especially starting with
the bleak winter of 1960-61). She had once been put in jail for
associating with a foreign missionary-another bit of crude oppres-
sion by those that represented the unfeeling masses. Then there
were those endless indoctrination sessions of the Party's that took time
away from higher learning. He got himself branded a "backward
element" for disdaining political study and Youth League membershiip.
He emerged from the Institute in September 1963 as a French
expert and was put on the staff of the Commission for Cultural Rela-
tions with Foreign Countries. More disillusionment. He did! once
get to interpret for Guinean President Sekou Toure', but that was the
one bright spot in day after day of menial drudgery, making travel
arrangements for visiting delegations and submitting routine reports,
and moreover getting criticized for being late with these. Was it
for this he had sharpened his wit and enriched his mind in the bright
world of French literature?
He decided to make an escape when he could. There were some
jobs in China that would offer a satisfying life and work, but these
were all held by old Party hands; no chance for a young man, espe-
cially without Party pull. Nor was he interested in Chian
K
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regime, with its corruption and nepotism. No, he would go West,
where his ability would be rewarded. He didn't let his family in
on this decision; he no longer felt close to them. But he wanted
to show the people he most respected that he was not going to
succumb to frustration here, and he told his old French teacher and
several of his classmates. They kept his secret.
His chance came the following spring, May 1964, when he was
sent as assistant cultural attache to Burundi with the flattering ex-
planation that the need for French-speaking representatives was so
acute that they just had to use him in spite of his being only 24 years
old, inexperienced, and politically backward. He would have left
the plane the first time it stopped at a city that had an American
embassy if he had known any English; he'd better wait until he got
to the former Belgian trust territory. In Bujumbura he spent one
night at the Chinese embassy, then next morning after breakfast
disappeared.
When Wu Nai-chi was four years old his father, an army officer,
was killed, and he was brought up by a rather too indulgent mother.
The family was now quite poor, but it enjoyed the protection of the
father's former commanding officer, a warlord in Yunnan. A year or
so after the Japanese were defeated, when Wu was in his early
twenties and ambitious to become a doctor, this patron sent him to
the United States for schooling.
He enrolled in pre-med courses but didn't buckle down to them.
His fellow Chinese students were rather ashamed of him. He
gambled a great deal, was forever in debt and trying to borrow more
money. He had girl trouble more serious than normal; once the
Chinese embassy had to arrange an out-of-court settlement for him.
No medical school would accept him. A friend introduced him to
Communism; he began to read Communist literature and grew
progressively more leftist. Finally, in 1951, another friend persuaded
him to go back to China and "devote himself to the socialist revo-
lution."
In China he was given a six-month indoctrination course and then
assigned an English instructorship in the Institute of Foreign Lan-
guages. He became a probationary member of the Party and married
a Party girl. Faced with the realities of Communism in practice,
he never wavered in his belief in it. He remained convinced that
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socialism was the best system for a backward country like China;elthme
Chinese needed a paternalistic, authoritarian regime. An overwh-
ing majority of them supported this or.. It was doing wonders in
health and education; it had liberated Tibet. He only regretted its
anti-Americanism, because otherwise China might qualify for Ameri-
can aid, as some other Communist countries had.
In the summer of 1958 his turn came for the intellectuals' 1:our of duty
at manual labor. He had to work for a year on a collective farm, then
three months at a backyard steel furnace. This he approved too, and
he took pleasure in being commended publicly for his performance
on the labor tour. When it was over, in October 1959, he was sent
to the Middle East to hold Chinese language classes for Arab stu-
dents. He had to leave his wife behind with the children, but this
did not bother him much. A rift had grown between them. She
was such a militant Communist that she had told the Party her husband
had an unprogressive attitude.
And it was true. Although Wu retained his firm faith in the
Party's program for China, he personally had by now had about all
he could take of it. He was fed up with having absolutely no free-
dom of ideas, expression, or action. Even the Arabs were better
off. He couldn't stand the thought of another session of self-criticism
at which everyone was passed around "the same old piece of gum
to chew and each in turn praised it as absolutely delicious." (At one
session he had picked up the wrong piece of gum: praising Khru-
shchev's program of peaceful coexistence and disarmament, he was
jumped on for his backward thinking and thereby learned that all
was not well with the Sino-Soviet alliance.) He recalled the laissez-
faire intellectual atmosphere in America. He spent more and more
time listening to the Voice of America and BBC (which the Party
approved for the sake of keeping up his English) and reading English
news magazines (which it did not). He especially liked a BBC pro-
gram that compared what Communists said with what they did.
After much debate with himself, particularly on the point of desert-
ing his family, Wu decided in the spring of 1960 to give up and have
another try at life in America. He was sure he could hold up his
end of the deal this time. At 37 he was still young enough to start
anew, and he had the advantages of knowing English and of his pre-
vious experience. He decided to wait until the end of the school
term. That would neatly round out his
 Appra WyEa? Base 2005/01/05 : C
students; moreover, the lump-sum check for his services he would
get then might come in handy.
Like most Chinese would-be defectors abroad overtly or under
official, cover, Wu had some purely tactical obstacles to overcome
in order to carry the act off. For one thing, it required some sur-
reptitious research just to find out where the U.S. embassy was,
though this was not a serious problem if you had plenty of time, as
he had. More difficult was the Party practice of seeing to it that no
one was ever left by himself in this dangerous foreign world; Wu
was always accompanied to and from school by another instructor
named Hsieh. He did get away long enough to telephone the U.S.
embassy that he had information to offer and would like to set up a
rendezvous with an American in a car; he was told he would have
to come to the embassy. This he managed by asynchronizing haircuts.
On the last day of school he took there with him, packed in his
briefcase, his toothbrush and shaving kit and a change of underwear.
On the way home, after picking up their checks, he and Hsieh stopped
at the bank and cashed them. Then he said he had to have a haircut
and suggested that Hsieh, who had just had one, could while away
the time in the bookstore here while he went around the corner to the
barber shop. When Hsieh agreed and went into the bookstore, Wu
took a taxi to the U.S. embassy. The Arab guard stopped him at the
door, but he lied that he was Japanese and was let through. He ex-
plained his situation to an embassy officer and asked if he could stay
in the building overnight and be flown to the United States the next
day "on a Pan-American Bight."
Then the blow. They could not possibly give him asylum on the
spur of the moment like this; such a decision would have to be made
in Washington, and even if favorable it would take several days at
best. Stunned, he raced back to the bookstore. Hsieh was gone;
it had been almost two hours. So back to the Chinese embassy,
devising on the way a story of how he had gone from one barber shop
to another trying to find one without a crowd of people waiting for
haircuts. He was desperate enough to be convincing, and it worked.
Realizing now that defecting was more complicated than he had
thought, Wu resolved to lay some preliminary groundwork next time.
The following spring he learned he was being sent home that summer
for leave and reindoctrination. Supposing that he would travel via
Hong Kong, he tried to make contact with the British, first talking to
h ' char e of a local library that was not off limits for
n
h
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him and Hsieh. This man didn't want to get involved in political
intrigue; he suggested the British embassy. Wu was still trying to
get away long enough to follow this up when he learned that he was
routed through Athens on a northerly flight instead of Hong Kong
after all.
Wu and the steadfast Hsieh emplaned, June 1961, under an injunc-
tion to stay aboard during the Athens stop. But the day was hot,
even on the Aegean, and it seemed sensible to go into the terminal
building for a cool drink. Once inside, Wu used the pretext of a
visit to the rest room to get out of sight, and then he just kept on
going. As the plane's departure was announced, Hsieh made a frantic
search for him, but at the last minute he gave up
flight taking him home to face the music.
Persistent Juggler
Yang Shao-heng was born, in 1937, into an acrobatic troupe where
everyone was a relative or an in-law. In the old China acrobats were
a free-wheeling lot living hand to mouth, and they didn't change much
when the Communists took over. They were poor enough to be
good proletarians, but they were too gypsyish and wild. Yang's
troupe was given some indoctrination, and a brother-in-law of his
who took it more seriously than most of them was made security
officer on their travels. But by Communist standards discipline was
pretty loose.
Yang became a juggler. The juggler section was headed by another
brother-in-law, and Yang found himself more and more irked by these
two, the boss who threw his weight around on the job and the secu-
rity officer who poked his nose into what you were doing off of it.
He caught some glimpses of a freer life; in Hong Kong the movies
were for fun, not about how to "build socialism," and people really
lived. In 1959 they had a tour around Latin America, and this was
an eye-opener. He began to think about jumping the traces. The
trouble would be earning a living, knowing only Chinese and how
to juggle. Well, the Chinese would like juggling on Taiwan.
In the spring of 1963 the cultural exchange program gave the troupe
a trip to the Sudan. On the first day in Khartoum they had a. guided
tour of the city, and among the places pointed out was a Sudanese
"Refugee Aid Headquarters." That did it. In the wee hours of the
next morning Yang sneaked out of the hotel and walked to the Head-
quarters. He managed to get across to a guard on duty there that
s man r
an Eng
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he wanted asylum, and the guard made him understand that he would
have to come during office hours. Disappointed, he tried to sneak
back into the hotel just before daybreak, but the security brother-in-
law was awake.
Ile was bawled out: he had been expressly warned not to get in-
volved with women here, and the first thing he did was stay out all
nightl He would have to have a watch set on him. And watched
he was; no chance for a daytime search for refuge. But by the next
evening they had relaxed enough so he could get away shortly after
midnight. By chance or deliberately, people were working at the
Headquarters, but the only Chinese interpreter available knew nothing
but Fukienese and no characters. He didn't do any better than the
guard had on the first trip, but he did know a proper Chinese linguist
who could be there the following evening. It was conveyed to Yang
that he should come again at 10 p.m. the next day.
Back at the hotel things really popped this time. Within 48 hours
Yang was to have ready a full confession about his insubordination
and a program for disciplining himself in the future; in the meantime
he would be under continuous surveillance, even while in the bath-
room. Yet that very evening, while the whole troupe was getting
ready to go on stage for an 8:30 performance, he succeeded in slip-
ping out a back door and keeping his appointment. The third time
was a charm.
Security Officer
Chao Fu was born in Manchuria to a family that for generations
had been poor peasants. He was only about ten when the Russians
drove out the Japanese and brought in the Communists; Chiang
Kai-shek and the Nationalists meant nothing to him. At seventeen,
with his peasant background and having shown in two years of middle
school that he was quite bright, he was selected for special training.
He was sent to military school, made a full member of the Party, and
rotated through various positions in the public security administration.
He married the girl his mother had selected for him in the traditional
way; he found her an adequate wife. In 1960, twenty-five years old,
he was put through a one-semester course at the Advanced Civil
Police Cadre School in Peking and then sent to Stockholm as security
officer for the embassy. He had to leave his wife and baby at home.
It was something of a shock for him to find that Sweden was not
really a country of poor slaves mercilessly driven to support the dis-
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solute idleness of rich capitalists. And in addition to the workers'
prosperity, he also observed with envy the freedom which the Swedes,
as well as the foreigners in other embassies, had to come and go as
they pleased, make friends outside their own circle, and generally
choose their own way of life. If life had been regimented back home,
it was much worse here in the embassy: no social mingling outside,
no female companionship, and nothing to do in your spare time but
play ping-pong, watch a movie once a week, or go on a rare picnic
when the weather was right.
And back home things seemed to be getting worse all the time.
Just before he left, a cousin who worked in an auto factory had told
him it hadn't produced any trucks for a year except a few thrown
together for Cuba which he doubted would run; now he heard that
the cousin had been laid off for lack of work and sent back to farm-
ing. In 1961 the embassy cashier had a few months' leave in China.
When he came back he had lost 20 pounds, and when someone com-
plained about the portions of meat served at dinner he bitterly pointed
out that in China anything containing a piece of meat the size of your
fingertip is called a meat dish. In 1962 the embassy cook got a letter
from home with such a distressing description of hunger and want
that he cried as he read it aloud to the others.
Chao frequently lay awake at night comparing life as lie knew it
in China with what he could see around him in Sweden. The Com-
munists had let China down; they had failed. The grass didn't just
look greener on this side of the fence; it was incomparably greener.
He had heard that not long before he got to Stockholm the embassy
administrative officer had simply disappeared. They suspected a
defection, but since no news of him came from the West or anywhere,
they didn't even have to acknowledge he was missing, just took his
name off the diplomatic list the next year. That way he didn't dis-
grace his family back home and cause them to suffer, either.
Chao had been thinking secretly along these lines for several months
when, in July 1962, he heard that the embassy was getting a ,personnel
cut in the course of an economy drive. His own security officer posi-
tion was vulnerable; it wasn't a full-time job, and he was assigned all
sorts of leg work and errand-running to round it out. The prospect
of being dumped and sent back home decided him. But he couldn't
really just disappear: he would need legal status, concealment, some
way to earn a living. There wasn't any reason why the neutral Swedes
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should give him these. He would seek the protection of the Com-
munists' arch-enemies, the Americans.
He had long since discovered, in the course of outside errands,
where the American embassy was, and one day he had a chance to go
by it. He went in. Alas, no one there could speak Chinese. Casting
about, he thought of an American Chinese he had known. A few
days later, when he was supposed to be running an errand on the
other side of town, he met him at the railroad station. This man
advised him to get out of Sweden.
As luck would have it, a party from the Chinese embassy was meet-
ing a train at the time and saw this encounter, and reported it. Chao
tried to explain it away but was not convincing. He was confined
to his room. After everyone was asleep that night, he managed to
slip out, taking a pistol and the keys to an embassy car. He drove out
into the countryside. He stopped at farmhouses, trying to establish
that he was suffering from amnesia after a car accident. A woman
gave him a cup of coffee.
Finally he took a train to Denmark, and from there he walked and
hitchhiked until he reached the Americans in Germany. The Chinese
embassy had meanwhile notified the Swedish police he was missing,
saying he'd hurt his head in an accident and disappeared. So he
wrote a letter to his wife back home in China, telling her that he had
run over a man and killed him and had. therefore gone into hiding to
escape punishment.
suffer.
Now he was confident the family would not
Those Left Behind
Although the Chinese never admit such defections to the outside
world, keeping them quiet if they can and otherwise usually charging
abduction, within the delegations and installations where they have
occurred they earnestly discuss them in meeting after meeting, trying
to explain how they could happen and seeking ways to guard against
them in the future. The case histories, moreover, are posed at in-
doctrination sessions in other installations as object lessons from which
to take warning. The kinds of explanations and remedies offered at
these meetings and in less formal discussions among the comrades are
also instructive.
Recently a member of a Chinese delegation abroad, a man we shall
call Chen, tried to break away from the delegation and get to the
U.S. embassy, failed,- and was immediately sent back to China. The
Approved
rest of the delegation were then moved from their hotel into the
Chinese embassy, and there they held several group meetings. A
later defector has reported what went on at some of these meetings.
The delegates were anxious lest Chen's action be held against the
rest of them and prevent them from going abroad again. They took
comfort in the ambassador's report on the incident, which tried to
absolve them of serious blame.
Speaking in turn, nevertheless, they admitted that if Chen had
been properly watched, his disaffection could have revealed itself
and the attempted defection been prevented. They stressed the need
to tighten the bond between the delegation leaders and other mem-
bers; proper leadership would have prevented Chen from straying
about and being contaminated by outside influences. Yet everyone,
not just the leadership, was at fault to some extent. Chen was not
basically bad; he had been entrapped by evil influences. No one had
stopped him when he visited prostitutes in several countries, and these
women had been agents of the dirty and unscrupulous U.S. imperial-
ists, who will do anything to achieve their aims. One of the delega-
tion leaders, it was reported, summed up the sentiments of the group
something like this:
"In order to get us, the enemy uses all means. If someone, par-
ticularly a young comrade, has a weakness or unhealthy thoughts,
he can fall into the enemy's trap. Chen's conduct was not generated
in one day, and backward thinking is not spontaneous or accidental.
He had this dangerous frame of mind some time before it came into
the open and must have revealed somehow to intimate friends some
sign of his intended action. We were lacking in political knowledge
and alertness not to have seen such signs. Everybody is responsible
in part for what happened."
The members of the diplomatic installation, according to our de-
fector, also analyzed among themselves this case and others of poten-
tial, abortive, or successful defection-among them Chao Fu's and
the earlier one from the embassy in Sweden, a "high-level cadre" in
Cuba, one Chang Chien-yu who in 1959 had defected in Bombay and
redefected the next morning, our juggler Yang Shao-heng, pianist
Fu Tsung who had fled to England, a chauffeur in England who
visited houses of prostitution on the way back from the airport but
was caught at it in time. Speakers pointed out by hindsight the signs
of potential defection which closer watching would have revealed.
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The ill consequences for the defector were also stressed, on the re-
defector Chang Chien-yu along these lines:
"Chang wouldn't have come back if they had promised to let him
settle down in America. Instead, they told him he would first be
sent to America to have some training and get married to a beautiful
American woman, and then sent back to Asia to do intelligence work.
The poor fellow was scared to death to learn that he would have to
face the Chinese again. He pondered over his predicament and his
future and made up his mind."
In a similar vein of Chao Fu: "He will regret doing that. Of course
he will., After they have pumped all the information out of him, he
will be kicked out and his sorrow will begin. I imagine he was told
that he will get some training in America and then be sent back to
Asia to work for them." Of juggler Yang Shao-heng it was said that
the imperialists had exploited him for propaganda purposes and then
pawned. him off on the Kuomintang on Taiwan and forgotten about
him.
Much discussion was devoted to the danger of Kuomintang or im-
perialist agents, especially women. Chen had been seen in unauthor-
ized conversation with a "tall foreigner" before his attempt. The U.S.
embassy had Chinese-speaking officials who were especially engaged
in this sort of thing. Chao Fu's predecessor in defection in Sweden
had been contacted by a "beautiful woman." A member of this
embassy had recently been approached by an English woman on the
street and asked about his job. Another told about an Italian woman
who had invited a colleague of his to her room; she wanted money.
In Switzerland women followed you around wherever you went, said
another. An American woman in a very scanty bathing suit had
flirted with another at a swimming pool. For that reason yet another
never went to the swimming pool with fewer than two companions.
A defector from another Chinese diplomatic mission has reported
how the principal officers discussed the defection of one Chu Heng-
pan, secretary of a mission in West Europe, to the USSR. The chief
was deeply concerned in particular over the question of the responsi-
bility of a chief of mission for defections, considered as a failure in
leadership. After speculating about what might have gone wrong
and comparing the case with six or eight previous defections in vari-
ous countries, he turned to the question of prevention and began to
go through the list of his own staff:
Approved
acquired a verAy pretty wife, which should eliminate the possibility
for him. But about Comrade C there is something that nobody
knows. As for D, if she goes back to China she should not be allowed
to travel by herself; nobody questions her loyalty, but we have to
take precautions for her safety. Then there are three blue-collar
workers we will have to watch, along with E. And F and C have
to go out on official business, and very often they do not have anyone
with them.
"Another bad thing is that when a chauffeur takes someone some-
place, very often he comes back by himself and is completely out of
control. In a country like this there are many material attractions,
and we at the head will just have to set a good example. It is my
responsibility, of course, to check on people's thoughts and political
consciousness, but how are you going to do it. The man who has
wrong thoughts will be the very one to hide them and cover lip."
In regard to Chu, the responsibility was similarly laid largely upon
the leadership of his mission. Chu had probably had correct ideologi-
cal views at the time of his assignment abroad, it was said, because
his political reliability would have been thoroughly investigated be-
fore he was allowed to leave China. His deviation then began abroad
and grew gradually over the years until he finally became a traitor.
The mission leaders must have known that he had been indulging in
personal and material amenities, and it had been wrong not to take
corrective measures.
But the foreign ministry's personnel management was also at fault
for allowing him to remain abroad for six or seven years. Being
away so long, he had not undergone a full-scale thought reform since
the 3-Anti and 5-Anti rectification campaigns of the mid-fifties, and
so he lacked the ideological strength to counteract the insidious in-
fluence of the bourgeois world. Diplomats had a special problem in
that they associated primarily with the upper classes in the host coun-
try and so did not get a true picture of the decadence of bourgeois
society.
In discussing this mission's own preventive measures it was re-
marked that it would be impossible to watch everyone 24 hours a
day, but they should try to keep as close track of each other as
possible. The most important preventive measures were to strengthen
thought reform and completely eradicate individualism, and as a
check to require detailed reports of all social
d b
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Chinese Defections Chinese Defections
with foreigners. Throughout this discussion little distinction was
made between "bourgeois" and "revisionist." Chu was corrupted by
the bourgeois environment in West Europe so that he defected to the
Russian revisionists. Speakers used the two terms almost inter-
changeably in referring to alien influences by which they might be
entrapped.
The defectors have invariably claimed to be ideologically motivated,
particularly when they first walked in, They doubtless feel this
explanation to be the most eye-catching for convincing Western
officials that they are worthy of political asylum, but the initial em-
phasis on ideological disaffection is by no means a ruse. Until the
moment of defection they have been immersed-if unwillingly-in an
ideological world. In rejecting this environment so thoroughly im-
bued with ideological pressures, the totality of the rejection empha-
sizes, conversely, the same pressures. Deeper probing during the
course of debriefing has revealed that almost all have indeed been
dissatisfied with some aspects of the Chinese Communist political
system, but in most cases what has bothered them has been practical
consequences of the regime's program-its failure to take due care
of its subjects or the restrictions it imposes on personal freedom-
rather than the ideology proper. In addition, there has usually been
some pressing personal problem to trigger the defection-failure on
the job, dread of an assignment to manual labor, imminent recall, etc.
More than half the defectors were less than 30 years old, and with
two or three exceptions all were under 40. None had achieved such
high positions that they defected at great sacrifice of status. It would
be of importance to be young enough to have reasonable hope for a
successful new start in life. One-quarter of the score, curiously, came
originally from Manchuria, and three had got an unfavorable im-
pression of the Russian occupation there. The rest lived all over
China.
Only one defector, Chao Fu, came from a real peasant family.
Several others were very poor, but they were from urban areas and
so had more exposure to modern life than the average poor peasant.
One obvious consideration in examining backgrounds as a clue to
vulnerabilities is that anyone whose personal history would make
him look like a non-conformist or troublemaker would not be sent
abroad. The nearest case to an exception here was French linguist
'l'ung.
The defectors' average educational level was fairly high. None
was illiterate; even juggler Yang had been taught to read and write
by members of his family. Most had some kind of status in ~`he
Party. The high percentage of Party members, like the educational
level, probably reflects only criteria for selecting Chinese to be sent
abroad. Knowledge of foreign languages also seems surprisingly
irrelevant to the defections. Only one spoke English, and about half
spoke only Chinese.
Family ties are probably the strongest deterrent to defection, as
the Chinese Communists themselves recognize. The number of offi-
cial Chinese abroad accompanied by their entire families, always
small, has decreased even further in recent years. Though the main
reason for this is probably the one given officially---economy--det.er-
rence from defection is also a consideration. Of these defectors, two
intelligence officers working under deep cover and a few others were
able to bring their wives and children out with them. Others, though
not close to their families, felt the traditional obligation toward them
and tried to protect them by their manner of defection, as by staging
amnesia or kidnapping. Others were completely alienated from their
families.
Most of the defectors had had some contact with non-Chinese in-
fluences before their final assignment abroad, and most had consider-
able opportunity to observe life outside China. Western publications
and radio broadcasts were of secondary significance in one or two
cases. All those who walked into U.S. installations felt that the
United States was the strongest and most determined antagonist of
Communist China and could provide them the greatest security. The
economic opportunities in America were not ignored, but at least
superficially they were less important than the security of a sanctuary.
A characteristic of most Chinese seems to be a particular need
for sanctuary, for the protection of a strong authority to which in
turn they give obedience, deference, and loyalty. This need is filled
in their society by the traditional family system, and it may help
explain both their allegiance to the authoritarian Communist Party
and their disaffection when it fails in its reciprocal obligation.. They
tend to be docile before superiors, dictatorial with inferiors, and un-
comfortable when treated as equals. When the defector breaks away
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from the system that has been his life, his most pressing need is for
another sanctuary, a new authority that will give him protection as
well as exact obedience from him. He needs and wants a clear
understanding of what his obligations to this new protector are.
This is our best lever for getting him to undertake intelligence mis-
sions like working for us in place.
Knowledge of previous successful defections provided encourage-
ment in several of these cases, though it seems not to have been a
decisive factor. None had any substantial knowledge about how
previous defectors had been received. We have no information as
to whether knowledge of unsuccessful attempts or difficulties previous
defectors have faced has ever deterred a Chinese from defecting, as
the Communists seek to make it do.
Only one defection was the direct result of a relationship with a
woman in the host country. But it seems clear that the enforced
celibacy of most of the Chinese abroad is perturbing to them as a
vulnerability of which they are aware.
'Three of the defectors at one time or other threatened suicide,
and three others seemed emotionally disturbed or in the midst of
some sort of psychological crisis. Although the very fact of defecting
suggests a failure to adjust, however, the majority were moved by
quite rational considerations. Most weighed the alternatives care-
fully before defecting.
Only four of the defectors had some realistic idea about how they
might be received and made their first approach to U.S. authorities
in such manner, time, and place that they could immediately be
accommodated. Three others seem to have had no great problem
once they got in touch with other Western authorities. But all the
rest had difficulty finding a way to defect, and some failed altogether.
Mere knowledge of a place where they could defect was a critical
factor in many cases. Language was often a barrier. The tactical
difficulties are aggravated by security measures consciously taken
by the Communists.
There is a standing rule in all Chinese Communist installations
that no one may go outside alone except on official business. This
rule is strictly enforced. The efficacy of the rule is illustrated by
the difficulty many of the defectors found in breaking away and even
in netting the address of a Western installation. Another security
measure is to lock up passports in safes. At least four of these de-
fectors had had their passports locked up.
Wherever possible, traveling Chinese are routed through cities
where official Chinese installations are located, and these installations
are notified to meet the travelers at the airport. This is done "to
avoid kidnapping."
When there is any reason for suspicion, a preventive measure is
confinement within the installation, and the ultimate one
to China.
A Few Inferences
These security practices have several implications for us. When
a defector walks in, the chances are strong that he will have made a
considerable effort and taken considerable risks in breaking away;
he may not always be able to do so again. There is a strong chance
that walk-ins will have inadequate or no identification. If a defector
agrees to go back and remain in place, it is highly possible that at a
later time he may be confined to the installation or even taken out
of the country under guard.
No attempted defection has been demonstrated to be a provocation.
To set up a Chinese official in such a way that he would look attrac-
tive to a Western intelligence service and then willingly place him
in its hands would require both a realistic estimate of the reception
he would receive and complete trust in the individual. The Chinese
Communists have yet to show they can meet these requirements.
Although the Chinese criteria for selecting personnel for foreign
duty are heavily "political," in the Communist sense of the word,
the process of screening, being an inexact science, will occasionally
permit a wrong-thinking, individualistic, or potentially unreliable
person to go abroad. The process is also compromised by practical
necessities; a person's technical qualifications may counterbalance a
less than perfect security assessment.
Political theory per se appears to play little part in defection.
More important is whether the system based on the theory is com-
patible with the Chinese social tradition, conforms to the individual's
sense of what is right, or seems effective in practice. The regime's
preventive measures against defection, ranging from ideological to
physical, seem sometimes themselves to help create doubts about the
system.
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As would be expected, self-interest, both individual and family,
can make or break a defection. Lack of strong family ties, assessment
of future possibilities for a reasonably good life, and personal and
political problems-present or potential-all appear as basic mo-
tivations.
COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS
Station Helgoland
Dear Sirs:
Thanks are due Anthony Quibble for drawing attention to Frank
Lynder's Spione in Hamburg and au f Helgoland: Neuentdeckte
Geheimdokumente aus der Napoleonischen Zeit.1 Not only is it of
historical interest, but its day-by-day record of the Helgoland opera-
tion strikes a responsive chord in any reader engaged in the intelli-
gence business today.
For instance, note the early use of a ploy now favored by the Soviet
intelligence services for documenting illegals in the authentic identities
of innocent citizens living or dead. Father Robertson's memoirs
relate how, after his black entry onto the continent by smuggling
boat, he betook himself to the Bremen City Hall to obtain a travel
pass. "I had long since thought up a false name," his account con-
tinues. "In London I had known a German, who had since died. He
had left his homeland as a child and had never gone back. I re-
membered the name of his birthplace and the fact that all of his
relatives were now dead, and so I adopted his name in order to make
my transformation complete. I had also written to the pastor of his
village some time before, requesting written confirmation of 'my' birth
there. The pastor complied without further ado. I thus identified
myself as `Adam Rorauer, language teacher' and laid the evidence
before the Bremen City Hall official. As I went to sign ray name,
I began, from habit, with the J of my first name, James.
"'What's this?' cried the official. `You've just said your name is
Adam l'
"Whereupon I told him that in my homeland Bavaria almost all
of us have the extra first name Johannes; and he gave me my passport
and the visa."
Julia Ibbs
'Studies IX 3, p. 94 if.
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Dear Sirs:
In Ben Franklin's letter, which you carried under the caption
"Nothing to Hide," 2 there appears to be a difference between the
script version and your transcription, if I read the former correctly.
The transcription includes the phrase "as probably he is"-his own
valet a spy-which does not appear in the photographic reproduction.
Walter E. Bass
This sly phrase of Franklin's, inserted at the bottom of his first
page under the crossed-out "and I like," was accidentally eliminated
when the second page was juxtaposed for reproduction. Thanks
and apologies.-Ed.
More Words for Defection
Dear Sirs:
The question of finding new terminology for
posed by Gordon Cooperwood 3 certainly is
initiatives so boldly attempted by contributors
recently
a knotty one. The
to subsequent issues
Dear Sirs:
I would like to suggest the verb depatriate, connoting self-
expatriation. The depatriator might be called a depatrier (accented
on the final syllable).
Robert T. Karp
only serve to dramatize the difficulty; for me, at least, their well-
reasoned suggestions do not quite bridge the gap between idea and
ideography.
But one might possibly build on their efforts and advance the
search a bit farther. I wanted to take from them the solid thought
of pairing Latin roots as in "transcreder" and the sound advice about
avoiding the implication of "personal, selfish motivations." At least
one root, it seemed, should have associations almost universally
favorable in any culture, as "libertarian" was meant to do. Then
I tried to start from such concepts as seeking and taking sanctuary.
From this circuitous contemplation a word did spring to mind.
May I respectfully suggest superpatriate? Its possible perversion
into "super-patriot" does not escape me, but I believe any word would
contain the seeds of its own "invidious or comical perversion." I
hope at least to have helped keep this important word-hunt going
until we bring one back alive.
Mike Jaderquist
'Studies IX 2, p. 85 if.
'Studies IX 1, p. 61.
MORI/HRP PAGES 40-41
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Operational Approach to Soviets
Dear Sirs:
The Winter issue of the Studies reached me out here in the field
only the other day, and I hope it is not too late to tell you how much
I admire your journal and author Martin L. Brabour:ne for the
straightforwardness with which you presented his thesis.4 As a past
contributor and one of the sources cited by Brabourne (page 40,
footnote 3), I would like to make a general observation on a related
point that I believe important for our future ability to manipulate
Soviet personalities.
Brabourne's thesis, quite correct, is that we are most likely to reap
a good intelligence harvest from among the well-placed neurotics
of Soviet society. To date, at any rate, it is these human misfits
who have constituted our major successes; and they may continue
to do so for years to come. At the same time, I would like to suggest
a case for the "normal" Soviet citizen as an object of our operational
interest.
I believe I have met and observed as many individual Soviets as
anyone in the intelligence community, and under a great variety of
circumstances. Very few of these have been from the diplomatic
or military services, but all have had one unvarying characteristic:
they have been educated people. Quite aside from the interests of
the Soviet intelligence services, these Soviets have subjected me and
others like me to their own curious personal observation: So this is
an American. What kind of person is he? How does he act, speak,
behave socially, think? What kind of an impression does he make?
Does his behavior confirm or refute what we hear officially about
Americans? And so on.
Without gainsaying Brabourne's contention that the best intelligence
target is the Soviet nervous-breakdown-going-somewhere--to-happen, I
suggest that it is equally important to make a good impression on
these average, often well-placed Soviets. This is really the key
'In "More on the Recruitment of Soviets," Studies IX 1, p. 39 if.
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41
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element in our so-called covert action, capable of being taken by
any one of us in a most overt way. The trick is simple: we put
forward, at all times, the best foot of the intelligent American.
One of the personality details that impressed me about Soviet
Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy was that for some years his very model
of the modern American was Colonel X, a U.S. Army officer who
had served a tour in Turkey concurrently with his own service there.
Ile told one of our operations officers that Colonel X was the man
he most respected and most wished to emulate. (It was an un-
expected irony when we later learned that Colonel X could remember
neither Penkovskiy's name nor his face.)
If we can't recruit these Soviets, why bother with them? Well,
it could be this approach will recruit some Soviets some day; who
can say it won't? But short of that, good impressions made on
thoughtful Soviets by thoughtful Americans may well influence them
toward a less intransigent policy line in their work in the Foreign
Ministry, the Defense Ministry, on Pravda or Radio Moscow, perhaps
even within the diabolical schemings of Party subcommittees. Such
indirect effects can but be salutary.
Brabourne cautioned against disregard for courtesy and the amenities
in our relations with Soviets. I take this one step further, urging
a positive effort to make the best impression that correct and intelli-
gent deportment can. No one has to go out of his way in order to
gain respect, and approaching the Soviets in this manner doesn't
take one cent of operational funds.
And this suggestion need not be limited to Soviets. Colleagues
involved with the Cubans, the Congo, or Cambodia may find therein
some comparable application.
John Ankerbrand
Catalog of opportunities and
hazards in standardized insti-
tutional routine.
THE HOTEL IN OPERATIONS
James J. Lagrone
Hotels have been used for years by case officers for meetings and
other purposes, but the recent world-wide proliferation of larger
and more modern hotels, often used by the local governments for
official meetings and state visitors, has increased operational interest
in them. If a case officer knows the basic systems and operating
procedures of a hotel he is working in or against, he is more likely
to be able to do the job without attracting attention. Although a
hotel staff is rarely looking for intelligence activities as such, it is
constantly on the lookout for bad credit risks, thieves, sexual deviates,
organized prostitution, and any activities that may disturb the guests
or damage the hotel physically. In watching for such things, an
alert employee can easily trip up a case officer who through careless-
ness or ignorance attracts undue attention.
The following describes the systems used by large hotels to check
and control their guests and then examines the staff positions from
the viewpoint of the desirability of different employees as agents
for operational tasks. Any hotel of more than 100 rooms will. neces-
sarily have procedures which more or less parallel those discussed
here. A given hotel may be more strictly or more laxly run, but
it would be wise always to assume full application of the control
procedures. In a smaller hotel, with fewer guests and a tighter staff,
it can be assumed that little passes unnoticed. (An exception is the
U.S.-style motel, whose layout complicates control and observation.)
It is safe to say, then, that any hazard pointed out in the following
paragraphs will be even more difficult for a case officer in a smaller
establishment.
On arrival the guest fills in a registration form giving his name,
address, passport number, etc. (In some countries he must still turn
over the passport for a short time for registration with the local
police.) This information the front office staff transfers to an ac-
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counting card, called a folio, used to record charges made to the
guest during his stay. The ribbon copy of the folio goes to the
cashier or credit department, but a carbon is retained by the front
desk in a card-index file usually called a room rack.
If any problem concerning a room comes to the Assistant Manager's
attention, the room rack is immediately checked to see who is in the
room and what he represents. The information on the folio can thus
be of critical importance in reassuring the management so that it
lets the matter drop there or causing it to investigate further. For
no single slight irregularity is likely to create a hazard for the case
officer, but mysterious noises or comings and goings from his room
might, in combination with poor credit implications on his card, lead
to a, thorough investigation. Some of the credit indications and other
features of the folio's content are the following:
Name and address. Many hotels keep in their credit offices phone
directories of every large city in Europe, Canada, and the United
States. If a guest's name does not show up in the appropriate phone
book it is not seriously damaging, but it does not help his credit rating.
A fictitious company name or business address would naturally be
worse.
Reservations. The folio records whether a reservation had been
made before arrival. If the case officer can plan ahead the time
he is to spend in a hotel, it is well worth his effort to make a reserva-
tion some time in advance, preferably through a travel agency as
backing for his credit status. Next best is to make the reservation
personally by mail or telephone a week or so ahead. But even one
made a day or two before arrival gives status better than a walk-in's.
Room choice and price. It is an axiom in the hotel business that
occupants of the higher-priced rooms (particularly the corner suites,
which are often used for entertainment) can get away with more
noise and strange activity than ordinary guests. One should be care-
ful, however, not to take an expensive room without proper attention
to the establishment of a good credit impression, for high charges
against an undetermined credit rating will arouse the concern of any
credit manager.
Credit cards. The room clerk will often tactfully ask for these on
registration. If not, the case officer would do well to show them
casually, if the situation allows, as a good way of establishing his
credit and avoiding the prying eyes of the credit manager. He does
not have to charge on a credit card, just let the front desk record
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the data. He could even flash a false credit card on arrival and then
settle his bill by cash when leaving.
Luggage. The old jokes about one-night stands with a hat-box
for the girl and a toothbrush for the man are really quite true; the
notation "light luggage" is a warning signal in all hotels. Usually the
room clerk or the bellman reports this condition to the Assistant
Manager on duty or the Night Manager, and an entry is made on the
room rack folio. The case officer could devise a story of a missed
plane or some other explanation; but a suitcase, even filled with
nothing but dirty clothes, would avoid the whole issue.
Special arrangements. In large hotels it is more common than may
be recognized that "special arrangements" are made for a guest.
These may concern diet,- laundry service, or a wide range of con-
veniences. One of operational interest provides for holding; incoming
telephone calls and informing the guest who is calling. Another is
a "no information" arrangement: it is noted on the room rack and
at the telephone switchboard that if anyone inquires for the guest
he is to be told there is no record of him. A request for this service
would not strike the hotel staff as anything out of the ordinary.
Mr. and Mrs. If a woman is involved in the operation and must
come to the hotel, it is best either to have her take a separate room
or to register her as the case officer's wife. No matter how improbable
the couple, the Mr.-and-Mrs. registration is better than none. Hotel
managers, acutely aware that lawsuits and other troubles can result
from harassment of couples who may turn out to be really married,
normally accept such a registration without prying. But an un-
registered woman's comings and goings will be noted by the hotel
staff, particularly after early evening (or later if there is an upstairs
or roof-top night club or restaurant patronized by outsiders).
Day use. Room occupancy, at a reduced rate, for one day and
up to 6 p.m. only is generally encouraged by hotels for the extra
revenue it brings in. It is practiced almost exclusively by businessmen
for meetings and other such purposes. As for any registration, a
normal reservation, naturally with a business address, is desirable.
Out-of-town women sometimes take day-use rooms when shopping in
the city; but the unaccompanied female in a hotel is always scru-
tinized more closely than a man. In most hotels tape recorders and
typewriters can be rented in conjunction with day-use rooms. It is
a good idea to take advantage of this service, whether to use the
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machines in debriefings, say, or just to
mosphere of the occupancy.
Procedures During Occupancy
suspicious she will tell her Floor Housekeeper, who will report it
to the front office. The front office will then usually telephone the
occupant or stop him the next time he is at the desk and ask whether
anyone is staying with him. The penalty would usually be only an
extra charge for double occupancy, but the staff's attention has thus
been attracted. It would be better either to register the double or to
be careful to remove any evidence before the maid enters.
Because of the theft problem, maids are constantly under close
supervision by the management and security staffs. Unless a maid
is a thief she will therefore rarely try to open any luggage or even
drawers, and a room is fairly secure if all telltale equipment and
papers are locked up in luggage while she is there. If someone must
be in the room continuously, he should give the maid some excuse
such as a headache. The grapevine in a hotel is extremely fast and
effective, and anything unusual will be passed on by word of mouth
until it arouses the management's suspicion. Although a guest who
remains constantly in his room violates no hotel rule, he thus invites
investigation.
Room service, laundry boys, and other service personnel. will enter
a room only if called. But they are notoriously observant, and the
room should be cleared of anything unusual before they are called.
In the matter of services it is also hazardous to charge too much
on a hotel bill. If a credit card has been presented on registering,
it may be all right to charge a reasonable amount to the room; but
if credit standing has not been firmly established, any sizable
charges-say more than $25 in one day-would come to the attention
of the Credit Manager. It is his job to review daily any, bills that
seem to be getting unduly large. Even with credit established,
excesses in the use of room service and charging to the room are
bound to attract attention.
If a case officer or his agent is to stay a long time in the hotel so
that his bill will be large, it is imperative that he establish a good
credit impression at the outset. (This may be a particular problem
when an agent's hotel bill is to be paid not by him but by mail. A
business letter making the arrangement in advance is the ideal solu-
tion, but short of that a personal visit to the Credit Manager before
a large bill piles up is advisable.) During a long stay, an interim
bill may appear in one's room or front desk letterbox. ']['his is ordi-
narily intended as a reminder of the size of the account, not as a hard
demand for payment. But it is an excellent idea, if you get such a
In a large hotel, especially if it is full to capacity, one can get away
with almost anything for about 24 hours, short of continuous loud
noises. A hotel staff is usually stretched very thin when all rooms
are occupied, when ceremonial affairs bring in many dignitaries, or
when they are serving large banquets. Moreover, the management
will generally not take any action against a guest until it has monitored
his behavior for a reasonable time.
In going about his business in his room, the case officer should keep
in mind two chief hazards. First, the only way to prevent physical
entry by members of the hotel staff is the chain latch, the ordinary
lock being no bar to them. Maids, bellmen, and assistant managers,
particularly in Europe, make a common practice of entering without
knocking. Second, whatever the soundproofing of walls, ceiling, and
floor, the room door is a weak point in the insulation and the place
,",here a staff member's ear will promptly be cocked if suspicion or
interest is aroused.
Moreover, the staff has legitimate need to enter from time to time,
the maids daily. There is no surer way to draw attention to a room
than to hang a "Do Not Disturb" notice permanently on the doorknob.
After about eight hours it will be brought to the attention of the Head
Housekeeper, who may ask the Assistant Manager to make sure no
accident has befallen the guest. Complete isolation can be arranged
for a period by calling the front desk and giving some pretext for
requesting freedom from all disturbances including phone calls. Such
a request, recorded at the front desk and passed on to the House-
keeping Department, will give perhaps 24 hours without interruptions
from the hotel staff.
When the maid enters a room she wants to make it up quickly
and get out; she usually has more work than she can handle. As
long as nothing arouses her special interest, therefore, she will do
her job and leave. (Beware the maid who stops and talks. She
disobeys a strict rule in saying more than "Good day" to a guest-and
probably has a purpose in it, to solicit "business," perhaps, or get
information.) She is responsible, while straightening up the room,
for checking evidence (beds, toothbrushes, etc.) that two or more
people are using one registered as a single. If she sees anything
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notice, to inform the front desk how much longer you will be staying
and ask if they would like you to pay the bill up to date. This will
make a good impression on the Credit Manager, who gets some of his
ulcers from guests that are never seen while their bills run up into
the hundreds of dollars.
No telephone in a hotel can be trusted. During the day, when
the operators are busy, calls are only occasionally monitored; but at
night, when phone traffic is light, it is common for the operators to
monitor all conversations, even internal ones between rooms. Long-
distance calls they usually monitor at all hours of the day, particu-
larly when the charges are reversed. These practices, the result of
police requirements and hotel efforts to control organized prostitution,
together with operators' curiosity and boredom, are world-wide. The
rule about increased snooping at night applies, incidentally, to other
employees than the operators: the staff tends to be busy during the
day with its regular work, but its inquisitiveness and capacity for
observation go up sharply after six p.m. and practically double
after ten.
Should a guest fall under suspicion for any reason, the usual pro-
cedure is as follows: The Assistant Manager is alerted during the day,
or the Night Manager at night. Before taking any action, he usu-
ally tries to verify whatever was reported by sending hotel security
officers to check the room involved. If the room is occupied they
will listen outside and mount a surveillance in the hall (usually stand-
ing near the elevators as if waiting for a car), If they think that
something may be wrong, the Assistant Manager will then come to
inquire or investigate what is going on inside.
The case officer's best defense against such an investigation is of
course to avoid creating any suspicion in the first place. But if the
Assistant Manager or Night Manager presents himself at the door,
reasonable answers to any questions will usually end the inquiry.
The importance of the often-forgotten cover story is clearly evident
here. If nothing else works, a last resort is to show pure outrage.
A demand for the Manager will at least win some time, for even at
this stage the hotel staff will be nervous about pushing too hard.
A mistake would be very hard for them to explain, and people staying
in large hotels often have money and connections. Thus a bold front
can stop the Assistant or Night Manager at the door and force him to
get the Manager or the police, or both, in order to gain entry.
If a room is unoccupied when the investigation is first mounted, it
may be entered and searched. Then if suspicions appear to be con-
firmed it might be double-locked with a special key that turns the
night latch from the outside and prevents the guest from reentering on
his own. So if a case officer returns to his room and finds that his key
will no longer open the door, it may mean that it has been pur-
posely double-locked. He then has the choice of going down to the
front desk, where a problem could be waiting, or skipping out and
abandoning whatever effects he has in the room.
Keys and Security
Hotel keys are usually controlled by the Manager's office or the
Security Department. There are the following types:
Grand Master. This key will open all the rooms in the hotel. It is
controlled as strictly as possible; only the Manager and Department
Heads have copies of their own. The Night and Assistant Managers
share one, passing it from one to another as they come on duty.
Floor Master. This is the key the maids carry; it opens all guest
rooms on one floor. Each maid takes a key from the Housekeeping
Department office when she starts work, carries it fastened around) her
waist, and turns it in at the end of her shift.
Section Master. Usually intended for maintenance workers, this
key opens all maintenance doors in one area. Copies are controlled
by the Engineering Department.
Room Keys. These are controlled by the front desk; there are
usually at least four for each room.
Individual hotel locks can usually be changed a maximum of four
times before the grand master has to be changed, a prohibitively
expensive job. In practice the individual locks are infrequently
changed even when copies of the keys are lost. It is an excellent
idea to build up a collection of keys from a hotel which is of special
operational interest. By billeting staff personnel, transients, and agent
contacts in it you can collect a good assortment over a period of time.
Each key means at least entry to one room, and enough keys from
one floor may give an expert locksmith the clues he needs to re-
produce the floor master. If enough floors are represented in the
collection, even the grand master can be fabricated.
Although the regulations of most large hotels clearly provide for
strict control of keys, the strictness varies widely in different hotels
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according to enforcement measures taken by the Manager and the
Chief Security Officer. Since keys become status symbols among the
hotel staff they tend to show up in the possession of some personnel
not entitled to them, but just what irregularities one might find in an
individual hotel cannot be predicted.
The hotel security forces almost always have close links with the
local police; the Chief Security Officer and most of his staff are usu-
ally ex-policemen. The two groups exchange information regularly,
and the local authorities seldom take any action in the hotel without
the knowledge and cooperation of the Chief Security Officer. The
Security Department has a twofold mission, to protect the hotel and
to protect the guests; and its staff is divided into two corresponding
sections. Those guarding the hotel usually have uniforms, while
those concerned with guest relations more often wear plain clothes
or inconspicuous jackets supplied by the hotel. The plain-clothes
types, nevertheless, are as a rule easily recognizable, for they stay
in the lobby near the Assistant Manager's desk when not sent off on
some special duty, and they stand out prominently when the lobby
is not crowded. The uniformed guards, on the other hand, move
about: the hotel according to a regular pattern; they are more con-
cerned with checking entrances and fire exits and other physical
security matters than with monitoring guests' activities.
In general, the more intelligent officers of the security staff are
assigned to the section concerned with guest relations. It is worth
remembering that the status of all the security officers except the
Chief' is rather low. Although they may pretend to some authority
in dealing with guests, there is actually very little that they are
empowered to do. They are only aides to the management and
rarely allowed to act independently. Although they are often not
armed, it is best to assume they are.
The position of "house detective" is more or less peculiar to the
United States. It is often filled by a licensed private investigator.
Ile may be granted a considerable independence of action compared
with ordinary security officers, and he is generally armed.
Agent Potential
It would of course be highly desirable to have a recruitment on
the staff of any hotel regarded as a target in audio or other operations.
(This fact is so evident that we must assume other intelligence
services in the area will also be trying to acquire assets on the staff.)
The following paragraphs describe in some detail the attributes of
the various positions, their work functions, their status in the admin-
istrative setup, and their potential for intelligence purposes. It 'will
be noted that none of the positions from the "back of the house"
are included, such as those in the kitchen, restaurants, or steward
department. These, which usually have little or no access to upper
floors of the hotel, are not worth examining.
Before we proceed to look at the individual positions, we should
note a few characteristics of hotel staffs in general. The pay for
hotel employees is fairly low at practically all levels. By giving
free meals and supplying uniforms hotels are often able to offer lower
salaries than they would otherwise have to. This situation increases
the importance of the practice of tipping. Throughout the entire
spectrum of hotel transactions, various kinds of tips, kickbacks, and
commissions are customary. Some are more overt than others, but
personnel from the Manager down to the restaurant bus boy are
accustomed to getting a monetary reward for any extra service.
This being the case, the typical hotel employee exhibits two interest-
ing characteristics: he is usually short of money, and he expects
to make extra income by performing various services for superiors
or guests. He therefore might tend to be more susceptible to ap-
proaches by intelligence officers and perhaps easier to recruit and
control than many other employee types of comparable operational
interest.
Front Desk and Office
Room Clerk. This is the man behind the front desk who, registers
new guests. He must be presentable and fairly fluent in ]languages
spoken by the hotel's usual clientele. Often he is a young man,
just starting out in the business, and receives very little pay. His
status in the hotel is rather low-a little higher than a secretary-
and he has no authorized access to keys or rooms. He can be useful,
however, in that he knows who is in the hotel, when VIP's will arrive,
and which rooms they probably will occupy. He also has enough
latitude in room assignments to place an ordinary guest in a room
of his choice. He is usually well plugged into the hotel grapevine
and knows many details about the activities of guests and staff alike.
Senior Night Clerk. Usually the most competent room clerk, he
has command of the front desk during the night, a position in which
he works closely with the Night Manager. His duties are more
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extensive than those of an ordinary room clerk; he may even look
into minor troubles in upstairs rooms if the Night Manager wishes.
He has no official access to keys but can get any key he desires for
a short period. He has the operational potential of a room clerk
plus a degree of mobility at night that would make him more useful
than the latter.
Front Office Manager. This is the head man behind the front desk.
He usually works a normal day and is not in the hotel at night.
As a department head, he has his own grand master key and may
move through the hotel at his discretion without question. Usually,
however, his job keeps him tied to the front office. Besides having
somewhat better access in the hotel than his subordinates, he attends
the top management's monthly or weekly meetings where the hotel's
activities are reviewed and discussed.
Hotel Services
Bellman. Although traditionally the eyes and ears of a hotel, the
bellman is not ordinarily an attractive agent prospect. He spends
much of his time in the lobby, leaving it only on specific errands
such as carrying luggage for the guests. Any long absence would come
to the attention of his fellow bellmen and his Captain or Head Bell-
man. He has no direct access to keys, receiving room keys only
in connection with check-ins and occasionally a floor master from
the Captain for delivering or getting something from a room. His
pay is very small, but tips still make the job attractive. His greatest
potential for operations lies in the fact that he is somehow always
tuned to the grapevine and knows a vast amount about the hotel,
staff, and guests. One drawback to using him is that management
watches him constantly for signs of theft, graft, or pimping.
Head Bellman or Bell Captain. This is an operationally interesting
position whose incumbent ordinarily has contacts for getting anything
the hotel's guests may want-show tickets, plane reservations, special
restaurant tables, rented cars, guides, women. These activities of
his are usually known to the management; he operates with their
blessing. Thus he has both extensive connections on the outside
and a good deal of authority within the hotel, particularly at lower
levels. He receives many kinds of favors and kickbacks and makes
in all good money. Moreover, he keeps a close eye on the activities
of the service staff, bellmen, elevator operators, and doormen, using
an iron hand to prevent their engaging in any of his sidelines with
the guests. He does not ordinarily have access to a grand master
key but has the next best thing; copies of the floor masters are kept
at his station for bell service to all guest rooms. Although he himself
seldom has reason to leave the lobby or go to a guest's room, his
authority over the other bellmen might make him an ideall primary
agent. With the right operational flair, he could get his subordinates
to carry out intelligence tasks without difficulty, for he alone controls
their activities.
Room Service. Room service personnel do not have the high poten-
tial as recruits they might seem to at first glance. These waiters are
under the strict control of the kitchen; a special Room Service Man-
ager, the Chief Steward, or a sous-chef always keeps an eye on their
activities, especially the amount of time they spend away from the
kitchen. None of the waiters has access to keys, and all are watched
closely by hotel security for signs of thieving. Their only real opera-
tional potential lies in being tuned to the hotel grapevine and being
able to enter guests' rooms upon routine request.
Housekeeping Department
Maid. Like the room service waiters, hotel maids would seem
promising as agents; they spend most of every day inside guests'
rooms. There are several cracks, however, in this initial picture.
In any hotel the maid is one of the most carefully watched employees
because of her unusually good opportunities to engage in petty theft,
spotting for real burglary, and prostitution. She rarely controls which
floor she will work on any given day, being assigned where she is
most needed. She usually has a floor master for the area, as many
as 15 to 18 rooms on one or two floors. The Floor Housekeepers are
responsible for keeping each maid under close supervision while she
works and for checking her work carefully. A maid is likely to be
not overly intelligent and is relatively expendable; she can be fired
without much ceremony if her immediate superiors are at all dis-
satisfied with her work. In summary, both her low status on the staff
and the closeness with which she is watched limit her utility.
Floor Housekeeper. This is a senior maid who controlls several
floors during the day, overseeing the ordinary maids there. She makes
out various daily reports for the housekeeping and front offices, record-
ing rooms occupied, the number of people in each room, and other
data. She is a cut or two above her maids in natural ability and is
usually experienced in the hotel as well. Unlike the maids, she always
supervises the same floor. Her access to keys is on a par with other
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maids'-floor masters for her area. Her salary is rather low. She
has an operational potential similar to that of a Bell Captain in con-
trolling the activities of several maids. But she has more mobility
herself and can enter guests' rooms on her floors with comparative
ease. Within the limits of her floor assignment, her access is sur-
passed only by the Head Housekeeper's.
Night Maid, Night Floor Housekeeper. These perform the same
general duties as their daytime counterparts, but there are usually
fewer of them. This means that they will ordinarily have larger
areas of access and be freer from direct supervision.
Head Housekeeper. This seems to be one of the best positions in
the hotel for operational exploitation. The position is always filled
by a woman, usually one between 30 and 50. Often she will have
got her experience in other hotels, and she may even be entirely
foreign to the country, having been brought in especially to fill this
job, considered quite an important one by hotel management. Thus
she may belong to the small segment of the staff which is profes-
sional, not just recruited from local labor sources. She may be wid-
owed, divorced, or single; she usually lives in the hotel. She is prob-
ably more a woman of the world than other women on the staff and
more susceptible to approach and cultivation than a maid.
As a department head, the Head Housekeeper has her own grand
master key. She is very knowledgeable of hotel activities and plan-
ning. Above all, she has unlimited access to the guest floors and
need never explain her doings there, for she must keep constant check
on the Floor Housekeepers' and maids' performance. Anything the
maids or Floor Housekeepers report concerning the guests comes to
her 'before anyone else, and at her discretion she may deal with it
herself or pass it to the Assistant Manager. Another noteworthy fact
is that she controls all room furnishings, lamps, and appliances, which
are replaced by her department as necessary. Her position is of such
importance in the hotel and her cooperation with Security so
in controlling the maids that she herself is almost immune
security observation. Her 100% access to the guest rooms is,
ever, pretty much limited to daytime; she rarely works at night.
Management
close
from
how-
Assistant Managers. This position is somewhat ambiguous, ranging
from a glorified floorwalker's in some cases to one ranking above the
Front Office Manager in others; it all depends on the Manager's
desires. But even when he has no power to make any real decisions,
the Assistant Manager remains one of the more attractive operational
targets. During the day he will always be in nominal control of the
security officers on duty and will be the man to whom the Head
Housekeeper reports any problems that need investigation upstairs.
In addition, he usually makes at least one room inspection daily to
check on the Housekeeping Department. His access to keys is not
as good as that of a department head, in that the on-duty grand
master which he uses is passed to his relief, who must see and sign
for it. But during his time on duty each Assistant Manager has
complete control of the key. His position in the top echelon of
management-even though at the bottom of it-also gives him quite
a bit of freedom from direct supervision. His superior may be either
the Executive Assistant Manager or the Front Office Manager, depend-
ing on the hotel's policy, but he has more or less a free hand in deal-
ing with daily problems, calling in his superiors only if something
quite serious occurs. His pay is usually the lowest at management
level. Although he is normally on duty in the front lobby, lie is
free to visit and investigate the upper floors as the situation requires.
Night Manager. During the day there are usually three or four
Assistant Managers who follow one another on duty somewhat like
changes of a military guard. But at 11 p.m. the Night Manager
takes on the combined duties of Manager, Assistant Manager, Front
Office Manager, and Chief Security Officer until 8 a.m. He thus
rolls more functions into one person than any of the other managerial
officers. Working at hours when most of the remaining staff are off,
he has complete control while on duty. It is evident that he is one
of the most promising recruitment targets in any hotel. His access
with the rotating grand master key is limited only by the fact that
he must not be away from the lobby too long at a time. Any serious
action the hotel takes against a guest at night is initiated and con-
trolled by the Night Manager. The security officers on dirty, like
the rest of the night staff, answer to him for all their activities. He
is usually a professional of some years' experience in the hotel busi-
ness. He almost invariably likes this position for "the freedom of action
and decision it gives, and the challenge of handling the many varied
problems that develop in a big hotel at night.
Executive Assistant Manager. Usually the number two man in
the hotel, this is another attractive target. He has unquestioned
access to all parts of the hotel with his own grand master k
d
ey, an
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he takes part in all hotel planning. There is operational potential
in the fact that he-along with only the Manager and the Front
Office Manager-can arrange special accommodations for VIP's, par-
ticular friends of the hotel, and other special guests. His opera-
tional limitations lie in his very authority, for he is almost too senior
to appear upstairs on the guest floors and is tied almost constantly
to executive tasks at his desk.
Manager. Little need be said about the Manager, who, being the
top man, is clearly of great interest as a possible recruit. His power
is akin to that of a ship captain, almost absolute. He is personally
responsible to the owners for the profitable and orderly functioning
of the hotel and within that framework is more or less at liberty to
run it as he sees fit. Like anyone in such a top management position,
however, he is somewhat removed from the hotel's day-to-day routines,
and. much of his activity will lie outside the hotel proper.
Proposed planning guide in four
phases of "national liberation" wars.
THE INTELLIGENCE ROLE IN
COUNTERINSURGENCY
Walter Steinmeyer
Experience during the past decade in Cuba, the Dominican Repub-
lic, Indochina, the Congo, and other such hot spots has been varie-
gated enough to provide some ground for generalizing about the role
an intelligence agency should play in the U.S. effort to combat "wars
of national liberation." This is the field in which U.S. security is
for some time to come, under conditions of nuclear stalemate, most
likely to be challenged, as the Soviet Union, Red China, and Cuba
exploit for their own purposes dissension, turmoil, and impatience
for reform in Latin America, Africa, the Near East, and Southeast
Asia. No set of rules can be universally applicable to all the diverse
situations that now exist and will arise, but an outline of the part
a civilian clandestine service should take in helping meet these chal-
lenges can at least serve as point of departure in preparing, to con-
front a particular one of them. To suggest such an outline is the
purpose of this article.
Cadre Phase
The Communist-instigated "war of liberation" begins with a period
in which the local Communist party or the local residenturas of
the KGB or Chinese or Cuban intelligence service are spotting, assess-
ing, and recruiting candidates for guerrilla training and political
indoctrination. When such an agent has been recruited he is sent
for his training to the Soviet Union, China, or Cuba, usually via a
devious clandestine route. A Peruvian traveling to the guerrilla war-
fare schools in Cuba, for example, may fly, using his Peruvian passport,
first to Paris, where his contacts from the Cuban intelligence service
meet him and give him a Cuban passport with which to travel Paris-
Prague-Havana. The record in the bona fide Peruvian passport thus
shows no travel to Communist countries. After three to six months'
training in Cuba he reverses these steps and returns to Peru as one
-
of the hard-core cadres charged with preparing the insurgency.
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In this phase six aspects of the clandestine service mission can be
specified:
To find out what persons and procedures are used in selecting
candidates for training and then to penetrate this spotting,
assessment, and recruitment machinery in order to identify
the cadres. This effort will include penetration of the local
Communist party.
To identify and counter, using counterintelligence techniques,
cadre-phase operations of the Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban intelli-
gence residenturas.
To expose publicly what the Communists are doing and how,
and to show how the people of the country can contribute
to resisting them.
To seek by political-action measures to orient and motivate the
host government to cooperate in clandestine operations against
the cadre buildup and in preparations for combatting later
phases of the insurgency. This means that the government
must have or develop an effective security agency with arrest
powers and counterintelligence competence, sufficiently secure
for liaison with the U.S. service. Ideally this agency should
maintain travel controls over all citizens going abroad.
To conduct, if necessary, political-action programs to put teeth
into the country's anti-subversive laws. The government must
be able to neutralize subversives not by sending them into
exile but by putting them in jail.
To help the country's military or police forces establish and train
a crack guerrilla-killer unit to be deployed tactically in later
phases. The unit should not exceed battalion size, about 200
men; its strength should lie in the quality of its personnel,
their training and leadership, and in its mobility, fire power,
communications, and tactics.
Incipient Phase
When the guerrilla trainee returns to his homeland he is usually
tied into the local Communist party or the Soviet, Chinese, or Cuban
intelligence residentura to get funds and guidance in developing the
support structure for an active guerrilla campaign. (Sometimes his
support and guidance come from an adjacent country.) In this incip-
ient phase the returned agent begins his procurement of weapons,
ammunition, and safehouses and settles on a rural area for his initial
operations. Within this area he picks a location for his base camp
and begins to cultivate the sympathies of the peasantry around it
within radius of a six-hour march. Ile will need these peasants for
logistical support and tactical intelligence.
When the groundwork is completed, the agent moves in with five
to ten companions. After orienting itself in its surroundings, this
incipient guerrilla band begins its political indoctrination of the peas-
ants and the terrorizing with raids and burnings of all who remain
hostile. Gradually it gains new recruits, trains and equips them,
and puts them into the field. When it has grown to more than 20
men and survived what initial measures the conventional military
or police forces could take against it, it has matured as a guerrilla
unit and completed the incipient phase.
In this phase, the U.S. service, if feasible jointly with the govern-
ment's security agency, should undertake the following kinds of
operations:
Identify the guerrilla agent as he returns from training or as
soon thereafter as possible. Sources may be travel-control data
or penetrations of the Communist party or recruitment ma-
chinery.
Identify rural and urban safehouses established in support of
the guerrilla program. This can be done through surveillance
of the returning agent, through penetrations, or through inform-
ant nets set up in likely rural areas (see below).
Identify and block the guerrilla's channels for arms and ammu-
nition procurement. This can generally be done by the gov-
ernment's customs and border patrol forces. Intelligence pene-
trations will help.
Survey rural areas suitable for guerrilla bands and gather terrain
intelligence, with emphasis on such things as water sources,
potential ambush sites, and possible drop zones for the guerrilla-
killer unit. Bear in mind that the guerrilla usually cannot
operate farther than a six hours' march from his base.
Establish highly selective informant networks in potential guer-
rilla areas as a source of tactical intelligence for the guerrilla-
killer unit if guerrillas do begin operations there. Such a net-
work can be handled by the police units in the area in question,
or some other apparatus can be set up for this essential job.
Mount organized, professional civic-action programs to promote
loyalty to the government among the populace of potential
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guerrilla areas. Convince the people that steps are being taken
to right social, economic, and political wrongs.
Begin guerrilla-killer operations as soon as intelligence indicates
the presence of an incipient guerrilla band. Tactics are sus-
tained pursuit, ambushes, destruction of the base camp, denial
of water and supplies, and finally direct confrontation in a
fire fight. Nothing is so effective in stopping the development
of guerrilla bands as eliminating those who have just finished
training and taken to the field for the first time.
Operational Phase
If the guerrilla movement is successful, in spite of all countermeas-
ures taken during the cadre and incipient phases, in establishing
several bands of twenty or more men each in some region, it has
become a real threat to the country. In this operational phase, the
guerrillas try to consolidate their control of the region. Though they
keep the individual bands compartmented, they coordinate their
activities so as to make the maximum political and tactical impact on
the area. They may thus drive the government forces out of the
area completely; at least they break down the government's control
over it: at night. Area consolidation, in turn, enables the guerrilla to
expand his supply mechanism, improve his collection of tactical intel-
ligence, and obtain new recruits for his units.
This, in essence, is the tactic Fidel Castro used so successfully when
he went into the Sierra Macstra. It is also what the FALN did in
Falc6n state in Venezuela. The longer the guerrillas can keep operat-
ing in one area, the more likely they are to consolidate a political
and operational base there and then break out to other areas. When
they get to the point that they can move with some freedom at
battalion level in an area, the operational phase of insurgency gives
way to one of covert warfare.
During the operational phase, the U.S. clandestine service and the
host government need to take the following actions:
Intensify the effort to get intelligence on the guerrillas' strength,
disposition, and plans.
Step up counterintelligence operations against the guerrillas'
logistic support apparatus.
Mount psychological operations to keep the pro-government flame
of resistance alive in guerrilla-controlled areas. A portion of
the psychological effort should also be targeted against the
insurgents themselves, offering them rehabilitation if they sur-
render. (Those who do should be sent to training centers for
vocational and political reorientation.)
Intensify civic-action programs in the areas adjacent to those
the guerrillas hold in order to prove to the populace in both
that sustained cooperation with the government will produce
a better and freer economic and social way of life than the
guerrillas can offer.
Step up the number and intensity of guerrilla-killer operations,
using the killer unit at maximum capacity to eliminate guer-
rilla bands in fire fights. Give victories wide publicity in all
media throughout the country.
If the guerrillas are receiving logistical support from a contiguous
country, and if their supply depots there can be identified,
mount hit-and-run commando raids against them. Whether
the commandos are drawn from the military establishment of
the country in question or brought in for the purpose from a
third country, they should use bandit cover in order to provide
for plausible denial. Nevertheless the raids, in addition to
their primary objective of destroying the depots, are intended
to call attention to the supplying nation's interference in the
affairs of its neighbor.
Establish population controls, giving priority to districts adjacent
to the guerrilla area. The key item in the control system is
an identification document issued within a limited time to all
residents of a given area. This census certification, as it were,
not only makes it more difficult for guerrillas to pass themselves
off as innocent local farmers during the daytime but provides
a point of departure for systematic counterintelligence opera-
tions.
Organize popular self-defense forces, or citizens' militia, in dis-
tricts adjacent to the guerrilla areas. Controlled by the con-
ventional military establishment and properly motivated, these
forces can contribute to containing the guerrillas through a
strategic hamlet program, creating strong points for protection
of the people and as bases for offensive operations.
Bring the conventional military forces into full play in large
sweep and encirclement operations mounted in coordination
with the guerrilla-killer unit. As the guerrillas are dispersed
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by the sweep and are beading for safe areas the guerrilla-
killer force can both set up ambushes and engage in hot pur-
suit. With its superior training and equipment it should gen-
erally outrun and outfight the scattering guerrilla.
Covert Warfare Phase
When the insurgents get to operating in battalion strength in two
or more large regions and running raids and terror into other areas
in preparation for expansion, when pitched fire fights are held between
them and the government's conventional troops and the latter begin
to suffer heavy losses, when a guerrilla-killer force of battalion size
is no longer adequate, then covert war is in full swing, exceeding
the scope of a civilian agency's paramilitary capability. This means
that the U.S. military establishment must begin to provide the gov-
ernment forces with large amounts of equipment and send out advisers
to work with them at company level.
In this phase there is still, however, more than enough work for
the U.S. civilian service to do:
Provide airlift capacity, usually under commercial cover, to move
government forces and supplies to combat areas or to bring
in mercenaries as combat troops or as advisers.
Furnish demolition technicians and other instructors for expanded
training programs among the government forces.
Continue and expand intelligence collection, counterintelligence
operations, psychological programs to arouse a sense of national
unity and purpose, civic-action enterprises, and "bandit" raids
on adjacent-country supply depots.
Conventional Warfare Phase
When the enemy decides that his strength is sufficient to confront
the government forces in decisive battle, as at Dien Bien Phu, and
the United States decides to intervene in this overt conventional
warfare, then the U.S. manpower needed can come only from the
defense establishment. At this point the civilian intelligence agency's
resources in the country are put at the disposal of the U.S. military
commander. At his direction they will carry out intelligence collec-
tion, counterintelligence operations, and covert psychological and
political programs. Their paramilitary operations will be redirected
to raids and harassments, the promotion of escape and evasion, and
the development of resistance nuclei in the enemy's rear.
Apologia
Faced with almost any concrete situation, this general statement
will be found at many points inapropos. In some ways it is too
incomplete, in others too inclusive. It is not meant to imply, for
example, that a U.S. clandestine service should direct overt propa-
ganda or civic action campaigns if the appropriate U.S. agencies are
there to do these things. But in some times and places it must.
The outline calls for some actions that have been tried in the past
in concrete situations and have failed. But it may be the situation,
not the course of action, was wrong. Or maybe the actions were
carried out less than perfectly.
The outline concentrates on the rural aspects of insurgency. This
does not mean that urban terrorism is of little importance. But "wars
of national liberation" must take and hold territory if they are to
succeed, and there is established doctrine competent to deal with
urban terrorism as an adjunct to insurgency.
We hope, as we said, that our generalizations may be useful as a
point of departure. But if the essay even contributes to focusing
thought on the problems that occasioned it, it will, despite acknowl-
edged limitations, serve a purpose.
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National stereotypes and wishful
thinking as they impinge on the
intelligence officer's views.
PEARL HARBOR: ESTIMATING THEN AND NOW
A. R. Northridge
On Sunday, 7 December 1941, submarines and aircraft from a Japa-
nese fleet whose presence was totally unsuspected by our defense
establishment attacked American military installations and naval ves-
sels in the Hawaiian Islands. Achieving complete surprise, the attack
was a great success. It crippled our retaliatory powers for more than
a year, while the enemy escaped all but unscathed.
The name Pearl Harbor has become a symbol of our disastrous
failure to read rightly the many omens in the weeks preceding that
pointed to war and even to this attack. Reviewing the events and
the climate of opinion of those times, it seems clear to me that we
failed to foresee the Japanese assault largely because we were influ-
enced by a faulty stereotype of what was an adversary nation.' To-
day, progress in the arts of weaponry and technical intelligence col-
lection make unlikely another Pearl Harbor kind of surprise attack,
but the faulty stereotype that can lead to grave miscalculation of an
adversary's capability and intent remain with us, almost as a human
condition. This fact is one I believe every estimating intelligence
officer should keep in the forefront of his consciousness.
Among the more curious aspects of human relations is this stereo-
type, or "image," that one people forms of another. The assortment
of stereotypes it holds about others is an integral component of a
people's social myth-the collection of beliefs, however derived, by
'Of the extensive literature on Pearl Harbor, the most valuable single book
is Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, 1962), by Roberta Wohlstetter.
In studying the circumstances of the intelligence failure she puts most emphasis
on the fact that our intelligence community was confused by a multiplicity of
irrelevant signals-noise that corrupted our data input. Certainly this is a valid
point, and in a sense my "stereotype" constitutes a particular kind of noise. But
my thesis is more closely related to the view, which Wohlstetter also treats, of
Joseph C. Grew, Ambassador to Japan at the time, who said, "National sanity
would dictate against such an event, but Japanese sanity cannot be measured by
our own standards of logic." M R~/Hpp pgRF
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which it orders its political life, including its relationships with other
national states. Some parts of a stereotype, though rarely the entire
construct, are uniformly the same throughout the society holding it;
some are different, even contradictory. Objectively, some parts of
it are quite true, some partly true, and others totally untrue. The
willful, wishful, or purposeful may hold some parts true even in the
face of strong evidence to the contrary.
These stereotypes constitute the intelligence officer's greatest peril,
particularly in his estimative role, because he cannot escape their
influence. They form the greater part of his "input" on the problem
at hand. Even though he may shut out invalid elements that he is
aware of, as he reviews his materials he is bombarded by the stereo-
type's other elements. When he accepts a line of thought from an-
other, say an expert in some field, he takes the risk that this opinion
has been influenced by those very elements in the stereotype that
he himself has rejected. He is thus inevitably and to some degree
unwittingly more or less under the influence of ideas that he might
consciously reject.
The Japan Stereotype
What sort of people did Americans, at the time of Pearl Harbor,
believe the Japanese to be, and what did they believe about Japanese
intentions toward themselves? The American view was ambiguous
and shot through with inconsistencies. At the extremes it ran contrary
to observed data and to common sense, but its main lines might
be summarized something like this: "The Japanese people, given the
conflicts of interest between us, will quite likely-or maybe only
possibly-do us a mischief if they can; but they lack the capacity to
harm us seriously, and they know that this is so. On the other hand,
they are so cultivated and mannerly that it really is, after all, incon-
ceivable that they would even try to harm us.".
There was in the United States little doubt that Japan was an
adversary and one of some consequence. In seizing Manchuria and
invading China, the Japanese had acted in defiance of the League
of Nations. Americans cherished peace, opposed aggression, and
morally supported the League as "an instrument of peace." They
made clear their displeasure at Japan's aggressive acts.
The Japanese could not be deterred without the use of force from
their announced course of winning domination over eastern and south-
eastern Asia. As they pressed on, American interests suffered. Amer-
ican markets were preempted and some of our sources of comm:nodi-
ties became Japanese monopolies. American treaty rights were
abridged or ignored. Our Christian missions, not only evangelical but
educational and medical missions as well, were hampered and their
converts harassed. Living conditions for Americans in Japanese-
occupied Asia and throughout China became all but unbearable, and
the American presence there was much reduced.
These acts were, of course, greatly resented throughout the United
States. It was generally clear that the Japanese wanted to eliminate
our power in eastern Asia. Counteraction was often spoken of in
the press, but the country as a whole was generally reluctant to resort
to the use of armed force, the one thing that would inhibit our adver-
sary. Why was this so?
For one thing, the Japanese had their apologists. While there was
no denying that the general trend of their strategy was damaging our
interests, it was argued by many Americans that all of this was after
all going on in Asia. What real business had the United States in
eastern Asia, where its mere presence threatened to involve it in a
conflict between two other powers? The American in the Far East
should come home. If he chose to stay, he was not entitled to pro-
tection. These were the isolationists talking.
The Wishers-Well
Others dismissed as propaganda any reports of Japanese atrocities
or interpretations picturing Japanese action inimical to our interests.
These were partisans of the Japanese, sometimes so vigorous in their
partisanship as to deny known facts. I recall one instance when a
China missionary, a clergyman of some distinction, told in calm and
measured language how the Japanese had ravaged his parish and
horribly abused his congregation. Another missionary, this one from
Japan, after hearing out his colleague, proclaimed his disbelief. "I
have worked with the Japanese for over thirty years," he said, "and
I know that they simply would not act as you say they acted. Some-
how you have been deceived."
If there was some wishfulness in this partisan thinking, there was
more among the Far East experts in scholarly circles who believed
that there was a "liberal" group in Japan that would somehow prevail
over the fascistic militarists in power. These experts had a wide
hearing in this country, and their argument was particularly danger-
ous. The Japanese liberals, they said, being a minority group and
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very much at the mercy of the militarists, had to act discreetly, doing
nothing to arouse the military clique against them. Americans who
wished the liberals well had therefore to follow suit and avoid antago-
nizing the militarists. If they provoked them into retaliating against
the liberals it would destroy the last hope of rescuing eastern Asia
from military dictatorship. This was an exceedingly comforting line
of thought: non-involvement, without sacrifice or risk, was the way
to attain our aims.
There was another argument that was often related to this. The
militarists, if we were only patient, would have to slow down. Japan
had already swallowed more than she could digest; she could not
administer or profit economically from more conquests. She might
even have to disgorge much that she had already seized. This argu-
ment was heard when Japan moved into Manchuria; it was repeated
when she occupied vast areas of China, including those most devel-
oped economically; it was sounded again when her armies were
poised to take southeast Asia. Informed observers thus erected
another hypothesis based on nothing more substantial than their
predilections for a pleasant world that does not exist.
The Charms of Art
Another inconsistent facet of the stereotype was the warlike-peaceful
quality of the Japanese. One would have thought it well established
long before Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had demonstrated a great
aptitude for martial exercises and pursued them diligently, often with
relish. It should also have been clear that they were indifferent to
the sufferings inflicted on their foes, combatant and noncombatant
alike. That these were characteristic traits was clear enough to have
been accepted automatically by all who heard the word Japanese.
Yet their partisans managed to obscure this clarity, and here official
organs of the Japanese government played a role.
One device used in Japan's overt international program, one that
was extremely effective in countering the growing evidence that they
were a cruel and barbarous people, was a beautifully produced series
of publications on various aspects of Japanese art and literature.
These were widely distributed and in particular made available to
public schools at little or no cost. Of considerable artistic merit,
they did much to foster a sentiment that people capable of producing
such beauty could not have behaved so coarsely as they were being
accused of acting.
Another program in the cultural field was similarly successful. For
a number of years the quasi-governmental Japan Tourist Bureau
had offered group tours to Japan, mainly on Japanese ships, at. ex-
tremely low fares. There were six ships plying this trade from the
U.S. west coast, and through the summer months they carried a large
volume of American tourists. Few countries can show the foreign
visitor a fairer face than Japan, and in those days probably none could
give him more for his money.
In the autumn of 1938 my wife and I were exposed for several
weeks to a party returning from such a visit aboard a Japanese vessel
bound for Seattle. We were coming from a stay of several years in
China, a year of it under Japanese military rule. The Japanese had
often inconvenienced but never maltreated us, and neither of us
had ever witnessed a Japanese atrocity, other than the impersonal
atrocity that is an inevitable part of war. But by this time the
infamous Rape of Nanking had taken place and the American river
gunboat Panay had been sunk; and we were both deeply ashamed
at the pusillanimity of our government's response to these actions.
Indeed, we had taken passage on a Japanese ship only as a last resort.
We found ourselves totally unable to communicate with our fellow
passengers about the Japanese aggression in Asia. All on board
knew of Nanking and the Panay, but when we mentioned such things
as these we found that the hospitality of the tour had operated to
cancel any repugnance toward them. Although we attempted no
crusade, we were not popular. It was as though we had mentioned
before a gracious host and his guests some matter of no real concern
to us which was vastly embarrassing to him.
Thus at a time when the Japanese most needed it, literally -thou-
sands of Americans were telling their friends and neighbors that
first-hand observation had showed them a civilized, cultivated, honest,
and gracious folk who displayed no sign of any bent for the horrible
things being charged to them. Weren't we perhaps being misin-
formed, even by well-meaning people like our missionary clergy in
China?
Incompetent Nippon
Aside from this ambiguity in the American view of Japan's martial
proclivities in general, there was disagreement on the specific question
whether Japan might attack the United States; and here the con-
sensus was largely negative. It was thought that Japan would not
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make war on us because of her limited military capability; she could
never hope to succeed. There was some evidence, however, that bore
on this point, and it was mainly to the contrary.
The Sino-Japanese war was not conducted in private. Official quali-
fied observers from many nations were on hand, and their opportuni-
ties for observation varied from good to excellent. Large military
actions took place in the environs of cities where extraterritorial privi-
leges protected the foreigner. The hinterland was dotted with mis-
sionaries and, to a lesser extent, businessmen who could and did report
to the service attache what they had seen.
Generally speaking, the Japanese armies showed their competence
wherever their performance was observable. While their Chinese
opposition was inferior to most Western armies and not well sup-
plied, some Chinese formations as large as army groups fought credit-
ably, providing a fair test. Although there were some instances of
faulty Japanese generalship, foreign attaches were greatly impressed
by Japanese skill in retrieving victory from near-disaster in the cam-
paigns around Shanghai. They were impressed by the Japanese
ability to move large bodies of troops over difficult terrain where
transportation facilities were primitive at best. They were struck
by the power of the Japanese Army Air Force and by what little
they saw of Japan's naval air arm. The morale, physical endurance,
and the courage and state of training of the individual Japanese
infantryman were noted and often admired. Japanese weapons were
seen to be serviceable, if lacking the polish of comparable pieces
used in Western armies. Japanese artillery was observed to be accu-
rate in aim and surprisingly heavy in its destructive power.
The Japanese navy remained something of an enigma. It was
involved in no fleet actions. It was observed only in convoy work,
in the bombardment of shore targets, and, more rarely, in exercises
by larger groups of ships. It was known, however, that the Japanese
were a maritime people whose merchant shipping could be seen
throughout the Seven Seas. They built and operated their own mer-
chant marine, and in this activity they were a match for any country.
Against the evidence of this performance, together with the little that
could be discovered about their fighting ships, it would not be prudent
to count their navy less capable than their ground and air forces.
Thus what the professional and other observers saw of the Japanese
military, and presumably reported to the appropriate offices, did not
square with the prevailing stereotype. Here the gap between image
and reality was enormous. Three separate facets of the former come
to mind. One was the often repeated statement that the Japanese
people lacked inventive powers. They could imitate but not innovate.
Their arms were no more than copies of Western models. An often
told, widely believed tale had it that the latest Japanese capital
ships were built from plans stolen from British naval shipbuilders,
but British intelligence had learned of the theft plot in advance and
substituted faulty blueprints. The Japanese followed these meticu-
lously, so when the new ships were launched they turned turtle and
sank, just as MI-6 had planned.
Another widespread belief was that Japan's industry could not -urn
out a durable product. It did turn out shoddy ones wherever the
world market would absorb them, and these were cited, despite plainly
visible evidence to the contrary, as showing the best it could do.
It was, for example, the cheap Made-in-Japan light bulb which burned
out after a few hours that found a place in the stereotype, not the
magnificent hydroelectric systems which Japanese talent designed and
built for the home islands, Korea, and Formosa.
The third fable entering the stereotype was that the anatomy of
the Japanese was deficient. He was not physically able to use the
weapons of modern war, particularly aircraft. His vision was so poor
that he could not see to fly or bomb. His nervous reactions were
faulty, limiting him to the most elementary aerobatics. Airborne; he
was bound to be a total failure. On the day of Pearl Flarbor we
were often offered this comforting thought by the radio announcers
who told us over and over again that this was going to be a short
and easy war.
On the evening of 5 December, an American university professor
making a public address asserted, in response to questions, that he
believed Japan would attack the United States, probably that week-
end, and that the attack would almost certainly include a diversionary
naval raid against Hawaii to deter us from reinforcing the Philip-
pines, where the main weight of the assault would fall. The speaker
had no formal military training nor access to classified information.
He had lived in eastern Asia and had seen the Japanese army in
action. He drew these conclusions from what he saw in the daily
press, relating it to his current courses on the politics of the Pacific.
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But on that same weekend a number of well-known figures in
private and official life-both civil and military, area experts, journal-
ists, businessmen, diplomats, and so on-were holding a colloquium
sponsored by one of the leading journals of a midwestern city. The
announced subject was "Peace in the Pacific," and there was general
agreement among the speakers that for the United States there was
little or no likelihood of military involvement in the Pacific.
A military intelligence appreciation of about the same time prog-
nosticated concerning what would transpire in the event of Japanese-
American hostilities. The omens, as the oracle read them, pointed
to gigantic fleet actions here or there in the Pacific. There was a
reference to the possibility of Japanese cruisers raiding our merchant
shipping in the Gulf of Panama. There was none to the possibility
of Japanese surface ships approaching the Hawaiian Islands.
What chance was there that the professional intelligence officer
assigned to estimative duties could predict the Japanese assault on
Hawaii, hampered as he was by the weight of public opinion and
"expert" opinion voiced loudly in public? As I see it, only a little
chance. The stereotype overcame him in the end. Since that time
the practice of intelligence in the United States has improved greatly,
but the opportunities for self-deception are at least as great as ever.
Machinery has been built up where there was almost none before.
Its effectiveness, however, still depends on the human element. No
one has yet found a cure for our tendency to believe what we find
most congenial and reject what seems repugnant.
New Stereotypes
In today's world, the catastrophic consequences of unbridled war
make it unlikely that one great power will launch a massive surprise
assault on another. The condition that gave rise to Pearl Harbor,
however, remains unchanged or, if anything, exacerbated. This is
the system of national states, under which the globe is partitioned
among sovereign political entities, each dedicated to the principle of
self-interest, seeking to expand its power at the expense of others
and willing to resort to force to protect its position, prospects, or
prestige. The struggle among these rival entities is carried on by
means short of all-out war, and the political clash has become a more
intricate and sophisticated battle than ever before. The main battle-
field is now the new, needy, underdeveloped nations.
In the postwar struggle for power the Communists are the ag-
gressors. They make no secret of their intent to number the new
nations, along with the rest of the world, among their adherents.
Their campaign employs every weapon in the arsenal of politics,
including force or threat of force when they assess as small the risk
of escalation into a conflict where the new weapon will be used.
This renunciation of the ultimate force for political purposes is an
historical novelty, a kind of warfare to which we are only gradually
becoming accustomed. Some Communist tactics and elements of
strategy we have probably not yet discerned, at least not clearly
enough to devise countermeasures, and for others we have found no
adequate defense.
One of their current successes reminiscent of Japanese strategy in
the years before Pearl Harbor is the promotion of their own stereotype
of the newly emerged nations. In part it is the familiar aesopian
language of Communist discourse, the use of nomenclature that
reverses accepted definitions and the persistent perversion of truth
in the face of objective evidence. With this particular perversion
their success has been phenomenal. The stereotype pictures a land
that has been thoroughly victimized by a ruthless imperial power
whose only motive in its relations with the colony was greed for gain.
And this picture is imposed regardless of whether the colonial. rela-
tionship ever really existed in fact. The "colony" may be a sovereign
state, and the "imperialist power" need not hold or even desire
hegemony over it.
Further, the Communist stereotype justifies behavior on the part
of the so-called colony, or Communist-affiliated political elements
within it, that they would call intolerable in an "imperialist" power or
in a political party independent of their control. Any politically
organized fragment affiliated with the Communists is hailed as a
force for "national liberation," while its native political opponents
are no better than the foreign colonizers, creatures of the imperialists
dedicated to the suppression of freedom. The Communist bloc has as
its historic mission and trust the support of wars and other efforts
of liberation.
It is true that this stereotype is not wholly accepted in the non-
Communist world, particularly the Communists' nobility in promot-
ing wars of national liberation, but much of it is evident in the more
"liberal" writings on underdeveloped countries. English and Ameri-
can writers about these countries have tended automatically to ex-
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plain their great tribulations in independence as simply the result
of their colonial experience. This attribution, often of dubious
validity, leads them to refuse any credit-if they do not explicitly
deny it, they omit to mention it-to colonial powers for actions bene-
ficial to colonial populations. And their acceptance of this part of
the Communist stereotype tends to lend credence to the rest.
In other matters one can see terminology creeping into our studies,
or being excluded from them, in a way that suggests we are being
influenced to think in concepts the Communists would like us to use.
Our own writers, non-Communists, criticize a monarchial government
as inappropriate to the times and cite its neighbor, a "people's
democracy" that is in fact a repressive autocracy, as one the United
States should cultivate. We use the word "capitalist" only as a
technical term in economics, not to describe ourselves: the pejorative
flavor imparted to it by the Communists has taken hold. Similarly,
the Communists have given the word "bloc" an unpleasant connota-
tion in its meaning of a political combination against a common
adversary. Thus the term "capitalist bloc," the consolidation of
which is certainly an American policy objective, we seldom use except
in quoting a Communist document. These two examples of Com-
munist tactical victories in our home field may not bring any tangible
gain to the adversary, but they do tend to confuse and obfuscate the
analyst, whether man in the street or intelligence officer.
As we pointed out, the intelligence officer now operates in a world
of interstate relations immensely more complicated than anything
he has known before. His guideposts are few and often misleading,
and his experience tables are of little use to him. At the same time,
his mistakes have a potential for damage undreamed of hitherto
by man.
Order of battle, courtesy of help-
ful medics and the loyal press.
INTELLIGENCE STORY IN THREE PARTS
Contributed by
Edward M. Zivich r
Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:
Camp Near Falmouth, Va.
April 21, 1863
I would respectfully call your attention to the inclosed extract
published in the Washington Morning Chronicle of April 17, 1863
with the correspondence of the medical director of this army in
regard to same. Already all of the arithmeticians in the army have
figured up the strength of sick and well, as shown in this published
extract, as belonging to this army. Its complete organization is given,
and in the case of two corps the number of regiments. The chief
of my secret service department would have willingly paid $1,000
for such information in regard to the enemy at the commencement of
his operations and even now would give that sum for it to verify
the statements which he has been at great labor and trouble to collect
and systemize.
By the inclosed correspondence it will be seen that it was not put)-
lished by this army. I trust that the matter may receive attention and
investigation at your hands.
Very respectfully, &c
JOSEPH HOOKER,
Major-General, Commanding
'From the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, War of the
Rebellion, Series I, Vol. XXV, part II, serial No. 40, pp. 239-241 and 790.
MORI/HRP PAGES 75-76
1
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Surgeon-General's Office
Washington City, D.C.,
April 23, 1863
Brig. Gen. W. A. Hammond
Surgeon General, U.S. Army
General: To your inquiries in reference to the publication of a
report of Surgeon Letterman, and my knowledge of the same, I have
the honor to reply that about a week since the report referred to
was received at this office, and read by me as an ordinary sanitary
report. Soon after its reception, a newspaper reporter came into the
office, and to his entreaties for news as to the health of the army,
I let him copy the letter, directing him, however, to omit the address
and signature, and any marks which might denote the official, and
thus attach to it importance or credibility. . . . In this connection it
might be stated the only newspaper reporters who visit this office
belong to the New York Times and the Washington Morning
Chronicle, both of which I believe to be loyal papers, and incapable
of using to the public injury information that they might obtain .. .
Jos. R. Smith
Surgeon, U.S. Army
Head Quarters Army of
Northern Virginia
May 10, 1863
Hon. James A. Seddon, Secretary of War:
Sir: ... We are greatly outnumbered by the enemy now. Taking
the report of Surgeon Letterman, medical director of General Hooker's
army, the number of sick reported by him and the ratio of the sick
to the whole number, his aggregate force, by calculation, amounts to
more than 159,000 men ...
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE
General 2
'Lee could have used this information to advantage before his great battle at
Chancellorsville, May 1-5. He did actually get an advance on it during the last
week in April from the Signal Bureau, Richmond, but he was not given the
source and so discounted it in favor of his own much lower estimate.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
New Light on Old Spies
A Review of Recent Soviet Intelligence Revelations
Espionage is needed by those who prepare for attack, for
aggression. The Soviet Union is deeply dedicated to the
cause of peace and does not intend to attack anyone. There-
fore it has no intention of engaging in espionage: -Ni:kita
Khrushchev to Saneo Nozaka, Chairman of the Japanese
Communist Party, 1962.
Until recently the average Soviet citizen, had he been asked, would
have denied that his Government engaged in espionage against other
states. Such a dirty practice, he could have added if he faithfully
followed the official propaganda line, was employed only by the
imperialists, with the USSR as their target. Had not the Soviet
Union been compelled to create and maintain a state security service
to protect itself from just such imperialist machinations?
The average Soviet, if he was ever so naive, is now disabused of his
illusions. His government has reversed a policy in force since Lenin's
day to admit that it has been practicing espionage abroad all the
time. For reasons not yet clear, it has created a new hero: the
intrepid intelligence agent spying abroad in peacetime for the Soviet
fatherland at great personal sacrifice and danger.
By this action the Soviet regime has in effect surfaced the military
intelligence service (GRU) to its own citizens. The hero intelligence
operative has joined the hero Chekist in the Soviet pantheon. More-
over, the hero Chekist, hitherto portrayed as the valiant defender of
the regime against foreign and domestic enemies, has now become
an aggressive collector of intelligence abroad. For the first time
since the Revolution the espionage exploits of the Soviet military in-
telligence service and state security have been officially acknowledged.
True, the official accounts of these exploits must seem inadequate to
any Soviet mind bold enough to reflect on the matter, but their
quality is not the point at issue. The crucially significant fact is that
Soviet espionage activities were surfaced at all. An official policy
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dating back to the Revolution has been dramatically and unaccountably
revised.
Richard Sorge
When surfacing the GRU, the Soviet authorities chose to highlight
Richard Sorge, the German citizen whose exploits for Soviet military
intelligence in China and Japan before the second world war, although
never revealed in the Soviet Union, have been known in the West
for almost two decades. Sorge's career in espionage, and especially
his penetration of the Japanese government and the German embassy
in Tokyo, had been earlier examined in detail by General Charles
Willoughby, Hans Otto Meissner, and Chalmers Johnson.' Their
works, although differing in detail and interpretation of events, are
largely based on reports of the Japanese investigation of the Sorge
network and certain memoirs and secondary publications. All are
inaccurate in varying degrees. The Japanese investigation, the prin-
cipal non-Communist source on the case, was inadequately handled
and left :many unanswered questions but did supply the broad outlines
of the affair. David Dallin, it should be noted, has barely mentioned
the case.2 As of 1965, little had been added to our knowledge of
the operation.
Richard Sorge has been surfaced in the Soviet Union by means of
a series of newspaper articles and popular books. His glorification
was begun in late 1964 with an article by Viktor Mayevskiy in
Pravda.s Written after a visit to Sorge's grave in Tokyo, this article
is an unrelieved panegyric on its subject. Other articles on Sorge
in the Soviet central and provincial press quickly followed. Ya. Gorev,
who is said to have served in the GRU with Sorge in Berlin, pre-
'Major General Charles Willoughby, Shanghai Conspiracy, The Sorge Spy
Ring (New York, 1952); Chalmers Johnson, An Instance of Treason (Stanford,
California, 1964); Hans Otto Meissner, The Man With Three Faces (New York,
1955). A German edition of Meissner's book, the title of which indicates its
partially fictional character (Der Fall Sorge: Roman Nach Tatsachen) was pub-
lished in Munich during the same year. Several short accounts of the Sorge case
have appeared in espionage anthologies. Branko Vukelic, a member of Sorge's
network in Japan, has been the subject of Yugoslav newspaper articles. See
Dushan Cvetic, "Ko Je Branko Vukelich?" in Politika Ekspres, 4-20 November 1963.
'David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven, 1955).
' Viktor Mayevskiy, "Tovarishch Zorge" (Comrade Sorge) in Pravda, 4 Sep-
tember 1964.
sented what seems to be an official account of Sorge's career.4
Gorev claims to have helped prepare Sorge for his Far East assign-
ment and to have operated near him there. His use of Sorge's letters
and messages indicates that he had access to official files, but he has
furnished little new data on the case. Sorge is presented as a
paragon of virtue; his weakness for alcohol and women is ignored.
Gorev's version of the Sorge operation generally corresponds to that
presented by Meissner and Willoughby. In all probability he drew
heavily on these sources.
Although Moscow has for some reason suppressed Gorev's account,
the glorification campaign has continued unabated since late 1964.
Persons who knew Sorge even slightly have given interviews for
publication. On occasion, these individuals have admitted they
did not know Sorge was engaged in intelligence work. Gerhardt
Eisler has contributed a short memoir.5 V. Kudryavtsev, a Tass
correspondent in Tokyo during 1931-1937, told of meeting Sorge and
Branko Vukelic in Japan.6 He had no knowledge of their intelligence
work at the time. Gerhard Stuchlik and Horst Pehnert, East. German
journalists, wrote a series of articles drawing on those by Mayevskiy
and Gorev, interviews with Max Klausen, Sorge's radio operator, and
with Gerhardt Eisler, and such Western sources as Meissner and
Willoughby.? Except for certain details on Sorge's early life, these add
relatively little.
Several people living outside the Soviet Union have recently con-
tributed reminiscences of Sorge. Kai Moltke and Richard Jensen,
former Communists, have written of Sorge's stay in Denmark during
in Iunge
a , 15 Oct. 1964 to 2-3 Jan. 1965.
` Ya. Gorev, "Ya Znal Zorge" (I Knew Sorge) in Komsomolska ya Pravda, 8
October 1964-1 November 1964. The Gorev articles were issued as a pamphlet
under the same title in an edition of 240,000 copies (Moscow, 1964), but this
publication was withdrawn from sale shortly after it appeared and has not been
reissued up to this time. Gorev may be identical with Petr Aleksandrovich
Skoblevskiy, a Soviet citizen who was arrested in Germany in 1923 and was
tried in Leipzig two years later on charges of attempting the overthrow of the
Weimar Republic. Skoblevskiy was later exchanged for Karl Kinderrnann and
Theodor Wolscht, two German citizens who had been arrested in the USSR.
Gerhardt Eisler, "Errinerrungen an Richard Sorge," in Neues Deutschland,
2 November 1964.
V. Kudryavtsev, "Vstrechi c Rikhardom Zorge" (Meeting with Richard Sorge)
in Nedelya (The Week), 1-7 November 1964, p. 14.
Gerhard Stuchlik and Horst Pehnert, "Wir Kannten Genossen Richard Sorge,"
l
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1928.8 Sorge's wife Christine has published a short and uninforma-
tive memoir in a Swiss periodical." None of these accounts makes
any significant contribution to an understanding of the Sorge operation.
A popular, semi-fictional version of Sorge's career was carried by
the Soviet periodical Ogonek, beginning on 28 February 1965. Its
authors, Sergey Golyakov and Vladimir Ponosovskiy, fail to throw
new light on the case. They present Sorge as declaring himself a
Soviet citizen to his Japanese jailers. A sizable paperback edition of
this series (300,000 copies) was published early in 1965.10
It is clear that the Soviet authorities wish to present Sorge as a
popular hero but have no desire at this time to publish an accurate
history of his intelligence operation. By decree of the Presidium
of the Supreme Soviet, on 5 November 1964 he was posthumously
awarded the title, Hero of the Soviet Union. In January 1965, Max
Klausen was awarded the Order of the Red Banner and his wife
Anna received the Order of the Red Star. Branko Vukelic was
posthumously awarded the Order of the Patriotic War (First Degree).
The East German Government has conferred on Max and Anna
Klausen the Gold Medal of Merit of the National People's Army.
But perhaps the most significant honor bestowed on Sorge was the
issuance, early in 1965, of a Soviet stamp bearing his portrait. He
thus joins Nathan Hale as an intelligence agent who has been paid
philatelic honors by his government. No further proof is required
of the intention of the Soviet authorities to add Sorge to the Soviet
pantheon.11
Other GRU Cases
Soviet authorities have also seen fit to give publicity to an obscure
officer of the GRU surfaced under the name of Colonel Lev Yefimovich
Manevich. This man was made posthumously a Hero of the Soviet
"Kai Moltke, "Da Mesterspionen Drak Bajere i Kobenhavn, in Politike, 27
December 1964; Richard Jensen, "Jeg Sa Sorge Sidst," Ibid., same date.
'Christine Sorge, "Mein Mann-Dr. R. Sorge" in Die Weltwoche, 11 December
1964. According to Weltwoche, Christine Sorge's article was written ten years
earlier.
" Sergey Golyakov and Vladimir Ponosovskiy, "Zorge, Dokumentalnaya Povest"
(Sorge, a Documented Story), Ogonek (Light), 28 February-17 April 1965.
'llIn 1937, 1951 and 1962, the Soviet Union issued postage stamps in various
denominations with the portrait of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy. He is the only chief
of Soviet state security who has been so honored.
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Issued in March 1965
In Honor of Richard Sorge
Hero of the Soviet Union
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FELIKS DZERZIIINSKIY, 1877-1926
Issued in 1937 to commemorate the
tenth anniversary of his death
In 1951 for the twenty-fifth anniversary of his death
KW1
In 1962 for the eighty-fifth anniversary of his birth
CONFIDENTIAL
Union in early 1965,12 presumably for wartime services. He is
credited in the Soviet press with service in an unidentified foreign
country, possibly Germany or German-occupied Europe. According
to the Soviet accounts he was betrayed through the cowardice of an
assistant and imprisoned in German concentration camps, where he
was known under the name Ya. N. Starostin. Before his death from
tuberculosis at the Ebensee camp in Austria on 12 May 1945, he is
said to have confided to a fellow inmate, one Grant Gregoryevich
Ayrapetov, that his cryptonym was Etienne and to have asked that
the Soviet authorities be notified.
Manevich is portrayed as a devoted intelligence agent who continued
his work despite serious illness. According to Ayrapetov, Marevich
compiled files on Soviets in Vlassov's unit, on followers of bandera,
the Ukrainian nationalist leader, and on other collaborators, all of
which he turned over to one F. N. Dontsov for transmittal to the
Soviet authorities. Interviews with Manevich's sister and Ayrapetov
have appeared in the Soviet provincial press.13 The reason for sur-
facing Manevich in particular is unclear, unless the script called for
an intelligence agent whose activities could be related to the second
world war. This criterion could also be applied to Sorge.
One former chief of Soviet military intelligence, a victim of the
great purge, has recently been rehabilitated, apparently as ;part of
this publicity campaign. Yu. Geller has written a brief account of
the career of Semen Petrovich Uritskiy, chief of the GRU between
1935 and 1937 until he was purged and executed by Stalin. Only
the most general information on Uritskiy's career is given. His in-
telligence work is passed over with the excuse that it cannot yet be
made public, but he is credited with having directed officers of the
caliber of Sorge and Manevich.14
The German portion of the loosely connected Soviet wartime espio-
nage operation now known as Rote Kapelle has been surfaced in the
" Pravda, 21 February 1965.
18 Sovetskaya Latviya, 25 February 1965.
Yu. Geller, "Nachalnik Voyennoi Razvedki. K Semdesyat Letiyu so Dny
" a
Rozhdeniya S. P. Uritskogo" (Chief of Military Intelligence Agents, On the
Seventieth Anniversary of the Birth of S. P. Uritskiy) in Krasnaya Zvezda, 2
March 1965. Yan Karlovich Berzin, chief of Soviet military intelligence 1924-1935,
has been mentioned as the teacher of Sorge. See O. Millers, "Estikos Ar Riharda
Zorges Skolotaju" in Dzimtenes Balss, 5 January 1965. This nis pub-
lished in Riga. newspaper
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guise of a German resistance movement. Through the device of an
interview with Greta (Margareta) Kuckhoff, a member of the group
and presently a banking official in East Germany, the Soviet authorities
have lifted a corner of the veil that still covers their wartime mili-
tary intelligence operations in Europe.13 Rote Kapelle (the Nazi
origin of this name is admitted by the Soviets) is portrayed as an
antifascist group that began to take shape before the Hitler dictator-
ship was established. Although the upper-class origin of its leaders,
Arvid Harnack and Harro Schulze-Boysen, and of other members is
admitted, a determined effort is made to show that it also contained
many persons of working-class origin. The espionage role of the
group is presented in rather incidental fashion, without emphasis.
No mention is made of the GRU networks that existed in France,
Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. Greta Kuckhoff presents East
Germany as the heir to the cause for which the Rote Kapelle fought.
State Security: Abel
The admission to the Soviet people that the state security service,
long portrayed as a defensive, counterintelligence arm of the state,
does in fact engage in peacetime espionage abroad is equally dramatic.
By virtue of its internal, repressive activity, the security service is
only too well known to the Soviet population. Few Soviet citizens
can have avoided some brush with the heavy hand of the security
component, but equally few of them have known until recently what
every literate Westerner has long known, that the state security service
is also a principal arm of Soviet espionage abroad. In keeping with
the dogma that only aggressive imperialist states engage in espionage,
the existence of the First Chief Directorate of the security service, the
foreign arm, was never admitted. The surfacing of its espionage in
foreign countries, therefore, represents a major shift in Soviet intelli-
gence policy.
This policy shift was signaled by an article on the career of Col.
Rudolf Abel that appeared in Nedelya (The Week) during May 1965.16
is L. Bezymensky, "Po Tu Storonu Fronta. Rasskaz Grety Kukkhof o Podpolnoi
Antifashistskoi Organizatsii, Deystvovavskey v Gitlerovskoy Germanii" (On That
Side of the Front. An Account of Greta Kuckhoff Concerning the Underground
Anti-Fascist Organization That Was Active in Hitlerite Germany), in Novoye
Vremya, 9 May 1965, pp. 28-31. This interview also appeared in the English-
language edition of this periodical of the same date.
1e Major-General V. Drozdov, "Tovarishch Abel-Soldat Nevidimogo Fronta"
(Comrade Abel-Soldier of the Invisible Front) in Nedelya, 2-8 May 1965, pp.
6-7. Nedelya is the Sunday supplement of the newspaper Izvestiya.
According to its author, Abel was born in a city near the Volga, en-
tered the state security service about 1927, and worked before and
during World War II as an intelligence agent against Germany, being
covered as a member of the German minority in Latvia. It is sig-
nificant that Abel's espionage activity after the war is shown as :moti-
vated by a personal desire to neutralize the activity of "fascist crimi-
nals" who had taken refuge in the West. The theme of working
against Nazi criminals presumably would be popular with the Soviet
people and fits the time-honored portrayal of state security as a de-
fensive organization.
Colonel Abel is also the hero of a novel by Vadim Kozhevnikov now
being serialized in Znamya, the organ of the Union of Writers.17
Kozhevnikov's novel has not yet appeared in book form in the USSR.
It is also being serialized in the Yugoslav newspaper Borba.
According to the author, Abel's true name is Aleksandr Ivanovich
Belov. Since the work is frankly fiction, however, none of the data
it contains can be accepted without verification. The significant fact
is that the Soviet government has thus belatedly chosen to portray
Abel as a hero Chekist employed in espionage abroad.
The theme of work against postwar Nazis, it is interesting to note,
also appears in the purported memoirs of Gordon Lonsdale (Conon
Molody), the state security officer who was convicted of espionage in
the United Kingdom and later exchanged for Greville Wynne, a
British subject involved in the Penkovskiy trial. Lonsdale claims
that he wished to operate against former Nazis who were employed
in the United Kingdom. The Lonsdale "memoirs," which have been
serialized in the British press 1s but not published in the USSR are
clearly designed as a deception operation. Their accounts of his
Canadian birth, a childhood spent in Poland, and intelligence work
with Colonel Abel in the United States before going to the United
Kingdom are, from evidence on hand, complete fabrications. They
are designed to confuse Western intelligence services, sow dissension
between the British and American governments, and denigrate both
British security and British justice. Any truth they may contain is
merely incidental to these purposes.
" Vadim Kozhevnikov, "Shchit i Mech" (Shield and Sword), in Znamya (The
Banner), No. 3, 1965.
"Gordon Lonsdale, "How I Spied for Russia in Britain," The People, 7
March-25 April 1965.
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Dzerzhinskiy
For several decades the Soviet regime has endeavored to justify
the counterintelligence activity of its security service, calling it the
"punishing sword of the Revolution," the defender of the Soviet nation
and state against foreign and domestic enemies. Its intimate relation-
ship to the party leadership was deliberately blurred; its full role
in intra-party struggles for power has been concealed.
The participation of the security service in these struggles and
the purges they brought forth, events that are well remembered by
the Soviet people, made difficult the task of investing it with any
sort of glamour. In practice it was necessary to concentrate on
the earliest period of its history, the period of revolution, civil war,
and early post-revolutionary years, when it was headed by Feliks
Edmundovich Dzerzhinskiy, the Polish revolutionary idealist, friend
and associate of Lenin, who died before Stalin began his purges.
The Dzerzhinskiy period of the service is portrayed as a time of high
idealism, a golden age.
The exigencies of Soviet internal politics have made it impossible
to glorify Dzerzhinskiy's successors, who were either nonentities
(Menzhinskiy ), more tools of Stalin (Yagoda, Yezhev) or latter-day
villains in their own right (Beriya). Soviet party leaders will do
nothing that might undermine the effectiveness of the security service
as the defender of the regime, hence the history of the service under
Stalin's dictatorship is not likely to be revealed. Their efforts to
refurbish its image will never be allowed to endanger its internal
efficiency. It is unlikely, therefore, that any detailed history of state
security will appear in the foreseeable future.
Historical material on the service nevertheless continues to appear.
As noted above, much attention is given to the life and personality
of Dzerzhinskiy, so much in fact that something of a cult of per-
sonality seems to have grown up around him.' In 1956, selections of
his diary and family letters, all pre-revolutionary in date, made their
appearance.20 P. G. Sofinov published during the same year a popular
Robert M. Slusser, "Recent Soviet Books on the History of the Secret Police,"
in Slavic Review, March 1965, pp. 90-98.
-n F. Ya. Kon, et. M., trans., Dnevnik i Pisma (Diary and Letters), Moscow,
1956. A second revised and enlarged edition, prepared by the same trans-
lators, Dnevik. Pisma k Rodnym (Diary. Letters to Relatives), appeared in
Moscow in 1958. An English translation of this second edition, Prison Diary
and Letters, was published in Moscow the following year.
biography of Dzerzhinskiy that made use of certain hitherto un-
published archival material.21 In the following year, a selection of
Dzerzhinskiy's writings that emphasized his work in other components
of the Soviet government such as the Commissariat of the Interior,
Commissariat of Transportation, and Supreme Council of the National
Economy made its appearance.22 A more rounded view of his career
is thus now available.23
During recent years Soviet authors have continued to mine the
ore of Dzerzhinskiy's life and career. A. Khatskevich published, a
careful biographical study of him in which he uses his subject's pre-
revolutionary documentary files.24 On the other hand, N. Zubov has
produced another popular biography repeating well-worn facts and
stories .25' Dzerzhinskiy's eighty-fifth birthday was commemorated by
the appearance of a rather barren volume of reminiscences that adds
little or nothing to our knowledge of the man.26
Perhaps the most interesting volume on Dzerzhinskiy to appear in
recent years is Mme. Dzerzhinskiy's memoirs, published in 1964. She
gives the texts of letters never before published or previously pub-
lished only in part. She also provides an interpretation of her
husband's background and development based on an association of
many years that should contribute significantly to an understanding
of the man.27 It will be interesting to see whether Soviet historians
" P. G. Sofinov, Stranitsy iz Zhizni F. E. Dzerzhinskogo (Pages from the Li:Fe
of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy ), Moscow, 1956, edition of 200,000 copies.
22 Institute of Marxism-Leninism F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, lzbranniye Proizvedeniyra
v Dvukh Tomakh (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, Selected Works in Two Volumes), Moscow,
1957. An earlier volume of Dzerzhinskiy's writings, lzbranniye Staty e Rechi,
1908-1926 (Selected Articles and Speeches, 1908-1926) had been published in
Moscow in 1947; a translation into German of this latter item (Ausigewahlte
Artikel and Reden, 1908-1926) was issued in Berlin in 1953.
Slusser, op. cit., states that the editors' choice of material indicates that they
were under orders to avoid his work in the security service, but he does not
prove the point.
'A. Khatskevich, Soldat Velikikh Boyev: Zhizn i Deyatelnost F. E. Dzerzhin-
skogo (A Soldier of Great Battles: The Life and Activity of F. E. Dzerzhinskiy )?
Minsk, 1961, edition of 5,000 copies. A second reworked and expanded edition
of this volume in 17,000 copies was published in Moscow during 1965.
' N. Zubov, F. E. Dzerzhinskiy: Biografiya (F. E. Dzerzhinskiy: A Biography),
Moscow, 1963, edition of 100,000 copies.
2BVospominaniya o Dzerzhinskom: K 85-Letiyu so Dnya Rozhdeniya (Memories
of Dzerzhinskiy: For the 85th Anniversary of his Birth), Moscow, 1962.
' Sofiya Sigizmundova Dzerzhinskaya, V Gody Velikhikh Boyev (In the Years
of Great Battles), Moscow, 1964, in an edition of 31,000 copies.
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produce additional significant material on Dzerzhinskiy's career as
chief of state security. If, as one authority contends, the Cheka
archives were destroyed, that task may be diffrcult.211
Other Chekists
Few other officials of state security have been honored with biog-
raphies. I. V. Viktorov's rather sparse and matter-of-fact biography
of Mikhail Sergeyevich Kedrov, an old Bolshevik and associate of
Dzerzhinskiy, is unusual in that it covers in part the period of the
great purges. According to Viktorov, Kedrov's son Igor and a friend,
one Volodya Golubev, both employed by state security, discovered
in early 1939 that Beriya and his associates were betraying the USSR
in the interest of Hitler. The two young Chekists, after consulting
the elder Kedrov, who by then was out of the service, decided to
make the facts known to Stalin and the Party Control Commission.
When the young men were arrested, as they anticipated being, M S.
Kedrov was to approach Stalin, reveal the facts of the matter, and
call Stalin's attention to a letter accusing Beriya that he (Kedrov)
had written to Dzerzhinskiy in 1921.
But Igor Kedrov and Golubev were arrested in late February 1939
and shot. The elder Kedrov was arrested several months later.
Despite the fact that he succeeded in proving his innocence, he was
not freed, and in late 1941 Beriya disposed of him also. This story,
which also serves to denigrate Stalin, is reported without details or
substantiating facts. Viktorov's book perhaps serves to rehabilitate
M. S. Kedrov, but it adds little or nothing to our knowledge of the
state security service.29
An Estonian official of the Cheka, Viktor E. Kingisepp, has also been
honored with a biography.30 Kingisepp took a prominent part in
the investigation of the attempt on Lenin's life in August 1918.
Memoirs of old Chekists are rare in Soviet literature. The memoirs
of F. T. Fomin, a retired member of state security, were published
" Slusser, op. cit., quotes Boris Nikolayevskiy, the Menshevik historian, as
citing an unidentified emigre source to the effect that the Cheka archives had
been destroyed in order to prevent historians in future from studying the Cheka
terror and Lenin's part in directing it.
" 11. V. Viktorov, Podpolshchik, Voin, Chekist (Underground Worker, Fighter,
Chekist), Moscow, 1963.
" D. Rudnev, Viktor Eduardovich Kingisepp, Leningrad, 1962. Another fic-
tionalized biography of a Cheka official is that of D. N. Medvedev. See A.
Tsessarsky, Chekist, Moscow, 1960.
in 1962 in an original edition of 350,000 copies, certainly a very large
printing for a book of this type. A second, revised edition appeared
in 1964.31 Fomin, it is interesting to note, admits that Chekists could
misuse their authority for personal goals, citing the activities of a
Baltic baron in the Ukrainian Cheka to prove the point. Perhaps
it is significant that the miscreant was of noble birth. It is also note-
worthy that Fomin presents a highly favorable picture of V. R. Men-
zhinskiy, Dzerzhinskiy's successor as chief of state security, a weak
man whose tour at the head of the service is considered an inter-
regnum between Dzerzhinskiy and G. G. Yagoda. Fomin, however,
does not mention the much more significant Yagoda, whose role in
state security until he was purged by Stalin was considerable.
Operations
Histories of the state security service and its operations have been
even more rare. When they do appear, such volumes cover the
early period of the service, the time of the Cheka. The most sig-
nificant historical study of the Cheka to appear in recent: years is
P. G. Sofinov's volume, Historical Sketches, published in 1960.32
The Soviets have also seen fit to surface in part the highly successful
TRUST operation of the mid-twenties. This counterintelligence opera-
tion, which was mounted by state security, was designed to neutralize
the anti-regime activities of Russian emigres and the intelligence
operations of European services. Using as decoy a national organi-
zation, the "Monarchical Organization of Central Russia," usually
called TRUST, Soviet state security was able to deflect and control the
attempts of its enemies to overthrow the Soviet regime during the
time of its greatest weakness. A new and untested service thus
succeeded in misleading the most experienced intelligence services
of Western Europe and in almost completely neutralizing the dedi-
cated work of its emigre opponents.
Not the least of its achievements was the enticement into the Soviet
Union and seizure in 1925 of Sidney George Reilly, an able British
intelligence officer who had operated in Russia with Robert Bruce-
Lockhart in 1918. Lev Nikulin has described the enticement and
91 F. T. Fomin, Zapiski Starogo Chekista (Notes of an Old Chekist), Moscow,
1962, 2nd revised edition, Moscow 1964.
"P. G. Sofinov, Ocherki Istorii Vserossiiskoi Cherezvychainoi Komissii (1917-
1922) (Sketches of the History of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission),
Moscow, 1960.
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seizure of Reilly in an article in Nedelya.33 Not unnaturally, Nikulin
shows great pride in this achievement of the security service and its
young officers. He undertakes to smear the image of Reilly, how-
ever, quoting what purports to be Reilly's offer to Dzerzhinskiy to.
give full information on the organization and staff of the British
intelligence service, members of the Russian emigration with whom
he had worked, and-significantly-the American intelligence service.
Since U.S. intelligence was moribund by the middle twenties, any
information thereon supplied by Reilly, if indeed he wrote such a
letter to Dzerzhinskiy, would have been historical.
Nikulin's article was described as a chapter from his forthcoming
"novel-chronicle" on TRUST. This book, Mertvaya Zyb (The Swell)
apparently has not been published up to this time.14
Soviet Motives
As is often true of Russian policy, the objectives to be served by
the surfacing of Soviet espionage activities abroad are not immediately
evident. The reasons for the adoption of such a policy are difficult
to disentangle. Perhaps the interplay of personal ambitions and
jealousies among Party and government leaders has played its part.
Although no evidence on the point is available, this unusual Soviet
frankness may reflect the growing influence of Alexander Shelepin,
former chief of the KGB who has played an increasingly prominent
role in Soviet affairs since the overthrow of Khrushchev. It may be
assumed, in any case, that the decision to admit to the Soviet people
that their government also engages in actions hitherto credited only
to bourgeois and fascist states was not lightly reached on the spur
of the moment. Undoubtedly it was made at the highest Party levels,
after lengthy and possibly acrimonious discussion. Party leaders must
have agreed that the advantages of such a revelation outweighed any
ill effect on the Soviet population.
"Lev Nikulin, "Konets Sidneya Dzhordzha Reili" (The End of Sidney George
Reilly) in Nedelya, 2-8 August, 1964. Another article by Nikulin, "Istoriya
Odnogo Voyazha" (The Story of a Voyage) appeared in Nedelya, 11-17 October
1964, pp. 10-11. This article, presumably another chapter in Nikulin's book on
TRUST, describes the clandestine visit to the USSR made by Vasiliy V. Shulgin in
1925-1926 under the auspices Of TRUST, that is, under state security control. On
his return to Western Europe, Shulgin described this visit in his book, Tri Stolitsy
(Three Capitals).
"An uneven and not completely satisfactory account of the TRUST operation,
largely drawn from Western sources, is contained in Geoffrey Bailey (pseud.),
The Conspirators, New York, 1960.
What are the possible advantages of the revelation?
Such foreign espionage operations as have been surfaced up to
this time are related to the Germany of Hitler and the second world
war. The work of Manevich, if that was in fact his name, is pre-
sented as having been done in Eastern Europe, probably in Germany
or a German-occupied area, and in a Nazi concentration camp. A
series of paperbacks on the frontier guards and wartime partisan
operations continue the anti-Nazi defense theme.3' Abel, it is said,
worked against the Germans; his postwar activities were motivated
by a desire to get at former Nazis who were active in the West.
Lonsdale is made to admit the same motivation. Although Sorge's
prewar operational activity cannot be denied, his intelligence targets
were obvious-the German embassy in Tokyo and Japan, Germany's
ally. Work against the Nazi, at whatever time it was undertaken,
would be applauded by Soviet citizens. Such espionage operations,
although carried on abroad, can be interpreted as defensive in intent
and purpose. The Soviets, it must be noted, have not yet admitted
that their postwar operations were directed primarily against the
British and Americans.
The Soviet authorities may believe that revelations of Western
espionage against the Soviet Union in recent years call for defensive
action. Operations such as the U-2 flights and the Popov and
Penkovskiy penetrations have certainly resulted in talk and specula-
tion within the USSR. The Powers and Penkovskiy show trials must
have convinced even optimistic Soviets that, despite official dis-
claimers, some harm had been done to Soviet security. Many must
have asked, why don't our people do that same thing? It is: possible,
therefore, that several terminated espionage operations have been
surfaced to assure the Soviet people that their government is also
active in such operations abroad. The first line of Soviet defense,
they are being told, is in good hands.
"Since this article was sent to press an anonymous Soviet study of the role
of the state security service in the fighting on the German front has become
available. By Soviet standards rather copiously footnoted, it gives the service
a most significant part in the victory and reproves Stalin for not accepting state
security intelligence reports on German intentions and military plans. It is
published tinder the title "Sovetskiye Organy Cosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti v
Gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny" (Soviet Organs of State Security in the
Years of the Great Fatherland War) in Voprosy Istorii (Problems of History)
No. 5 (May) 1965, 20-39.
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The new publicity is probably designed to improve the image and
morale of military intelligence and the state security service. The
Penkovskiy case (and the Popov case as well, although it received
little publicity) must have been disastrous to the morale of military
intelligence officers. State security officers must have been affected
adversely by previous efforts of the Soviet authorities to create a
bland image of their service. Public acclaim of service heroes, even
of those who at first glance appear to have failed in their missions,
has undoubtedly improved the tone and morale of both services.
Such revelations can also be made to serve operational purposes.
It will be noted that the Soviets use fictionalized biographies to sur-
face both operations and intelligence agents. Fictional techniques
permit the telling of a lively story without need to adhere to the facts
of the case. Embarrassing aspects and significant operational details
may be distorted or omitted without endangering the seeming integrity
of the account. Even though not so labeled-possibly because they
were intended for foreign consumption-the Lonsdale "memoirs"
are largely fictional. The Soviets have enlisted fiction as an intelli-
gence weapon.
Although at first glance it would seem to be a pointless task, these
fictionalized memoirs and biographies should be subjected to expert
counterintelligence analysis. Such accounts must contain at least a
substratum of fact. This may be discovered through analysis. Sig-
nificant omissions and distortions may be ascertained by comparison
of the fictionalized versions with data available in counterintelligence
files. But the most important purpose of such analysis is the discovery
of the disinformation objectives that these accounts may serve. We
must assume that all memoirs, biographies, and historical studies of
the Soviet intelligence services are prepared with the aid of disin-
formation experts.
A careful watch must be kept on this new Soviet program of con-
trolled intelligence revelations. Although their goals are not yet
clear, for the Soviets it is a new technique and one that may do
serious injury to Western morale. It must be analyzed and closely
followed.
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ecent Books
CAMARADE SORGE. By Nicole Chatel and Alain Guerin. (Paris:
Julliard. 1965. 380 pp. 24 francs.)
This is a French Communist treatment of the famous spy whom
the Soviets last year so pridefully acknowledged to have worked
for them in the Far East before and during World War H. Little
is known of Chatel, but Guerin has for some years worked for the
Party organ L'Humanite. An "afterword" is written by Yves Ciampi,
a Party sympathizer and director of a movie on the Sorge case that
has been well petted in the Communist press. Ciampi's Japanese
actress-wife, Keiko Kishi, who had a role in the film, is said to have
helped the authors in their researches.
Chatel and Guerin acknowledge that the book is not a history of
Sorge and his case but rather a history of their inquiry into it. The
six chapters are each in two parts, of which the first, chatty and
discursive, treats some aspect of Sorge's life, usually by describing
interviews with supposed acquaintances, and the second is called
a dossier documenting the foregoing. Thus they do not tell a con-
secutive or by any means complete story.
Perhaps the authors hastened into print to beat a scholarly study
of the case by two distinguished Oxford dons, Profs. F. W. Deakin
and G. R. Storry; they allude to this forthcoming work in their text.
But Camarade Sorge has little to offer in the way of important new
material. Rather it is a rehash of Communist outpourings during
the past year, and it seems just another item in this campaign to
publicize the heroic activities of Soviet intelligence.
Walter Pforzheimer
I SPIED SPIES. By A. W. Sansom. (London: Harrap. 1965.
271 pp. 18/-. )
One approaches such a book hoping that the title was imposed
by the publisher and does not reflect the quality of the story. But
this one is even more swashbuckling than the title promises. The
author, a Cairo-born insurance salesman with an aptitude for lan-
guages, became Chief of British Field Security for the Cairo area
during the Second World War. He evidently adopted a strong-arm
approach to upholding the security of the British forces, and he re-
counts stories of fist and gun fights in the back alleys of Cairo with
1. 1
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For all his love of adventurous autobiographical anecdote, his book
is nevertheless a contribution to the operant literature of professional
officers engaged in personnel and installation security work. It
realistically surveys World War II cases of this kind in Cairo, and its
review of postwar cases is probably still more significant. In par-
ticular, Sansom's views and frustrations over British defector Donald
Maclean's activity during his Cairo Embassy tour (pp. 234-41) will
be shared by many security and counterintelligence officers who have
had to deal with that kind of problem.
THE BERLIN WALL. By Pierre Galante. (Garden City, N.Y.:
Dcubleday. 1965. 277 pp. $4.95.)
This is the story of the Berlin Wall told in terms of the experiences
of many little people on whom the barrier had, as it is still having,
an impact ranging from inconvenience to tragedy. It is made up of
isolated incidents loosely linked around a fairly detailed account of
the adventures of one `Pimpernel of the Wall" who escaped from
East Berlin and returned repeatedly to engineer group escapes.
The author, a French journalist, offers much interesting material,
giving insight into the motives of escapers and escape organizers,
illustrating the variety of methods of escape, and picturing in general
the battle of wits between those who would cross the wall and those
who guard it, a battle in which the guards' advantage inevitably
increases as loopholes are blocked and new ones become harder to
find. On the debit side, parts of the book suffer from over-dramatiza-
tion and contrived suspense, and its illustration is meager, being
limited to one tunnel diagram and a sketch map of a small section
of the wall. More graphics, including at least one map of the whole
wall, would have added interest and helped readers find their way
through a clutter of local names.
The West can only gain by having the story of the Wall widely
told. Galante's book, though in no sense a definitive work, con-
tributes to this end.
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