STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

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• Document Page Count: 258
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 1, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1963
• Content Type: SINT

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STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
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VOL. 7 NO. 1 WINTER 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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P78T03194A000200010001-2 SECRET
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence community.
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declo sification
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
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The 1962 Studies in Intelligence Award . . faces 1
The Scientific and Cultural Exchange . . James McGrath 25
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Music mightier than masers. Confidential
-uJ ,.y J L O . . . . . . . . . . . .
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A neonhvte looks at finished intelligence. Secret
Operation Lincoln . . . . . . . . . Robert Vandaveer
69
A new probe for information on Soviet R&D. Secret
Project Ninos . . . . . . . . . . Lawrence E. Rogers
75
History of a mass interrogation program. Secret
The Libyan as Agent . . . . . . . . Titus Leidesdorf
85
Patterns in an Arab personality. Secret
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P7
UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
The Beginnings of Air Targeting . . . . . W. W. Rostow Al
History of an OSS R&A outpost in London.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Irish stories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A25
Soviet services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A28
Counteres ionag 0e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A33
8TO3194A00020001001-2
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community
or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should
be submitted directly to the E itor, Studies in Intelligence,
Room 1D 0011 Langley I I and need not be coordi-
nated or submitted through channels. They should be typed
in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Foot-
notes should be inserted in the body of the text following
the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be clas-
sified through Secret.
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call
your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,
For back issues and on other questions call the
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MORI'/HRP THIS PAGE
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THE 1962 STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
The Studies' annual award of $500 for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence was given in 1962
to
published in the Winter issue. a nalt dozen o er
articles competing closely for the award the editors distin-
guished two on economic subjects as particularly meritorious-
appeari
Winter and Spring issues respectively.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2 CONFIDENTIAL
Some slight scientific advantage
sacrificed to broader aims.
THE SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE
James McGrath
In a recent article in this journal' Mr. Amos Wylie takes
some well-aimed pot shots at the weaknesses inherent in
scientific exchanges with the USSR. He points out that So-
viet scientists who come to the United States are almost al-
ways dedicated Communists following a carefully prearranged
plan for collection of scientific intelligence of special interest
to the USSR. He sees these scientific mercenaries, "backed
by the full coercive power of the Soviet state," making sub-
stantial contributions to Soviet scientific intelligence, par-
ticularly in fields related to development of new weapons. On
the other side of the coin, he cannot see that U.S. exchange
scientists get anything like an even break information-wise
when they confront the language barrier, the closed areas,
and the closed laboratory doors of the USSR.
Let us grant at the outset that a very great deal of what
Mr. Wylie says is true. The case. against having scientific
exchanges with the USSR can be backed up by many other
facts than those he cites, and the Interagency Committee
on Exchanges acknowledges in its most recent annual report
on intelligence evaluations of the exchange program that the
Soviets could have realized a slight net gain in scientific ex-
changes except in the field of atomic energy, where carefully
negotiated exchanges were judged to have brought a net ad-
vantage to the United States. What, then, is the use of al-
lowing Soviet scientists to come to the United States? Or is
there any use?
The Larger Picture
The answer lies in part in an over-all look at the U.S.-Soviet
cultural exchange program, which includes provision for the
scientific exchanges and indeed could not have been negoti-
1 Studies VI 4, p. 9 if., "Unfair Exchange."
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CONFIDENTIAL Scientific Exchange
ated without them. The agreement for cultural exchanges
with the Soviets, first signed in 1958, was renewed for the
third time in March 1962. Under it, exchanges have taken
place in industry, technology, agriculture, medicine, educa-
tion, the performing arts, and sports, as well as science.
In addition, we have exchanged motion pictures, magazines
(Amerika and USSR), exhibits, and radio-television pro-
grams as part of the cultural exchange. Finally, the agree-
ment has encouraged the development of tourism by Soviet
and U.S. citizens visiting each others' country. According to
State Department sources, 7,000 U.S. and Soviet exchangees
have participated in over 615 exchange projects during the
four years, the USSR has opened its territory to more than
35,000 American tourists, and 1,200 Soviet tourists have vis-
ited the United States.
We have to consider this whole cultural exchange program
as an entity, recognizing that each side will look for profit
in some areas and accept losses in others. For example, on
the U.S. credit side, the program has made the territory of
the USSR accessible to U.S. citizens in a way that could not
have been imagined during the Stalin era. This has been
an intelligence advantage, as well as helping to normalize re-
lationships between the peoples of the two nations. Although,
as Mr. Wylie says, we still deal with a regime which maintains
strict control over the activities of its citizens, the U.S. policy
of promoting exchanges is based on the hope that it will lead
eventually to a still more relaxed attitude in the USSR.
We know that we risk losses in terms of technical and
scientific know-how when we allow Soviet scientists to visit
our laboratories and research institutes and talk with our
leading scientists. But the losses can be and are minimized
by, first, recognizing that this is a primary aim in the So-
viet exchange strategy, and second, doing everything we can
to reduce the risk. That the Soviet aim is recognized is evi-
dent in official pronouncements. In March 1961, President
Kennedy, defending the program, voiced his caution:
We are of course concerned that [exchanges] will be reciprocal
and national security will be protected... .
Scientific Exchange CONFIDENTIAL
The State Department similarly says in its April 1962 Review
of Exchanges:
As far as exchanges with the United States are concerned, Soviet
primary goals appear to be twofold: To obtain scientific and
technical information, and to paint a favorable picture of the
Soviet Union and Soviet politics. . . . Because the United States
is aware of this [first] goal it is able to take adequate steps against
a one-way flow of information.
In his commentary on the damaging effects of scientific
exchanges with the Soviets, Mr. Wylie has not recognized
the very considerable amount of checking, examining, and
evaluating that is brought to bear on each and every such
exchange. CIA, and in particular its Office of Scientific In-
telligence and Office of Research and Reports, plays an impor-
tant part in this process. The CIA opinions on a given ex-
change, often along with opinions of other elements of the
intelligence community and the Department of Commerce,
are coordinated into one intelligence estimate for submittal
to the State Department by the Interagency Committee on
Exchanges. The State Department considers these inte:lli?-
gence judgments in making its decision to accept or reject
an exchange, scientific or otherwise.
A Case History
That vigilance in the matter of scientific exchanges is ex-
ercised by all concerned is illustrated in a series of incidents
which occurred in 1962. The curious train of circumstances
began in January when heavy pressure was brought to bear
on the Computing Center at New York University by Soviet
scientist A. A. Dorodnitsyn, Director of the USSR Academy
of Sciences Computing Center, to accommodate two Soviet
scientists for a two-month exchange visit. This was followed
in rapid succession by a request from a Soviet student to at-
tend the Western Joint Computer Conference in Los An-
geles, a letter to Professor James Robertson at Illinois Uni-
versity asking about his willingness to receive one A. V.
Petrosian, described as a "Yerevan scientific worker," for ex-
tended study at Illinois on computer technology, and a re-
quest by a Soviet educational exchange delegation to add the
IBM headquarters at Rochester, New York, to its U.S. itin.-
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Scienfific Exchange
erary. The last request was unique in that a Soviet Embassy
official by-passed the State Department and went directly to
IBM with it.
The series reached a climax when the Soviets proposed that
economic expert M. M. Golansky, coming to the United States
as an exchange visitor sponsored by the American Council of
Learned Societies, be permitted to follow an extensive itinerary
calculated to get him into areas where he could observe ap-
plications of computer technology to economic planning. Mr.
Golansky, moreover, a very competent man in his field, had a
record of involvement with the Soviet intelligence services.
Although the Department of State of necessity handled
each of these proposals separately vis-a-vis the Soviets, inside
the government they were treated as a concerted Soviet ef-
fort to get needed information on all aspects of U.S. research
in automation and computer technology. In view of the
USSR negotiators' having refused to include an exchange of
automation specialists as part of the 1962-63 exchange agree-
ment, the Soviet play appeared to be an attempted end run
on the exchange program. After checking intelligence opin-
ions on the matter, the State Department took the following
actions:
Informed the Soviets that the proposed visit of two scien-
tists to the NYU computer center must be held up
pending a review of reciprocity requirements. To date,
despite continued pressure from the Soviets, this visit
has not been approved.
Declined to allow the Soviet student to attend the West-
ern Joint Computer Conference.
Took no action on the "Yerevan scientific worker's" re-
quest for admission to Illinois University pending an
examination of reciprocity requirements.
Reduced Dr. Golansky's itinerary to a brief swing through
certain eastern university computer centers doing com-
pletely unclassified research.
Refused the Soviet Educational Exchange delegation's re-
quest for a visit to IBM's Rochester plant and informed
the Soviet Embassy that future requests of this kind
were to be addressed to the State Department, not
directly to a U.S. industry or research laboratory.
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Scientific Exchange
CONFIDENTIAL,
From this history one can see that the State Department,
having assembled the necessary background information,
acted promptly and vigorously to blunt the Soviet drive to
exploit the exchange agreement to its own advantage. One
instance, of course, does not prove that we are always success-
ful in identifying such Soviet moves and taking prompt and
effective action. But it does illustrate that a working sys-
tem has been devised for assimilating information and acting
on it in the best interests of the nation.
Uncounted Blessings
We know that the Soviets expose their closed society to the
unpredictable impact of cultural exchanges with the United
States and other Western nations (France, West Germany,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom also have exchange treaties
with them) in order to get a crack at the latest develop-
ments in Western science and technology through scientific
exchanges. In pursuit of that end they will continue to
send to the United States mission-minded scientists and dedi-
cated Communists like Dr. Yuri Popov, who, as Mr. Wylie says,
"was probably instructed to absorb as much information as
possible" in the maser-laser field. At least some of the in-
formation they get will be balanced by the findings of U.S.
scientists visiting the Soviet Union under the scientific sec-
tion (II) of the exchange treaty. A similar balance is main-
tained by delegations exchanged under Sections III through
VI of the agreement, covering industry, transport, construc-
tion and trade, agriculture, public health, and education.
Sections VII through XII, however, covering the performing
arts, cinematography, publications, exhibitions, radio and TV
programs, governmental affairs, civil, social, and cultural
groups, athletes, and tourism, which have as their objective a
lowering of the barriers erected by the Soviet Union against
the West, are not subject to this kind of exploitation; and
it is apparent that even the USSR recognizes that the ad-
vantage rests here with the United States. These sections,
while they are not considered in the annual determination
of net intelligence advantage, certainly loom large in a general
appraisal of the program.
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CONFIDENTIAL Scientific Exchange
Not only the scientific exchanges but all those under Sec-
tions II through VI of the agreement are submitted by the
Department of State to all interested government agencies
for comment. The intelligence community plays a major role
in this appraisal, and its technical advice and suggestions are
largely followed by the Department. As in any negotiation
between adversaries, each must yield at some points and stand
firm at others. The programs arranged under the scientific
section, as under any other, represent in general the best
bargain obtainable in the opinion of those parts of the U.S.
government charged with implementing the policy on ex-
changes.
Almost any scientific or industrial field can be related to
war and weaponry. Every effort is made to isolate our visitors
from applied research and development and restrict their
exploration to basic science. We believe this effort is largely
successful. A still more restrictive posture would result in
retaliation that would prove generally disadvantageous and
might lead to the virtual elimination of U.S.-USSR exchanges.
It is difficult to visualize a better procedure than that now
used to ensure our getting the greatest possible benefit from
the program. Our performance under this procedure, as in
all other human endeavors, can almost certainly be improved.
But so long as we are not providing important assistance to
the Soviets in critical matters and are successful in keep-
ing scientific exchanges somewhere nearly in balance, it is
reasonable and prudent to consider the program on an over-
all basis and not draw large conclusions from individual ex-
amples.
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A newcomer to intelligence takes
an uninhibited look at the com-
munity's finished product.
POLICY BIAS
Janet Hill Merkle
The question of the extent to which the U.S. intelligence
assessment of foreign situations is biased by already estab-
lished government policy toward them is. a delicate one and
in all its ramifications too complex to be broached by a junior
trainee like the present writer. But any student with access
to the materials can sample one aspect of it by separating off
a particular fairly clear situation and examining the com-
munity's finished reports on it for signs that their objectivity
has been impaired by the policy makers' views. This is what
I have done, taking as sample the National Estimates, articles
in CIA's Current Intelligence Weekly, and State's INR pub-
lications concerned with the situation in Portuguese Angola
over a period of about two years.
Here the established U.S. policy, first publicly declared by
Ambassador Stevenson in the United Nations in March 1961, is
one of support for Angolan self-determination and of opposi-
tion to Portugal's resolve to keep the colony, which was le-
gally declared a "province" in 1951. Evidence that the finished
intelligence reports had been affected by this policy was found
in their phrasing and emphasis, in their omission of facts re-
ported from the field (by the U.S. and British attaches, the
American consul in Luanda, and the clandestine services)
which could be cited in favor of the opposing Portuguese pol-
icy, and in their measurement of Portuguese performance
against standards set up by the U.S. policy. In these respects
the National Estimates showed the least anti-Portuguese bias,
the INR publications the most.
National Estimates
Although the four estimates between 1959 and 1962 which
treated the subject of Portugal's overseas territories seem to
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be for the most part objective, they do contain a few manifes-
tations of bias. In an NIE of 21 July 1959, it is said that
Portuguese policy is a curious mixture of indifference to the lot
of the native, half-hearted efforts to elevate him from savagery,
repression of all dissident voices, and cheerful assertion that in
fact no problems exist.
Hyperbole and ridicule of this kind are clearly inconsistent
with objectivity. It is possible, however, since the estimate
antedates the public declaration of U.S.
that this is an
Policy, of personal rather than
policy bias
An NIE of 11 April 1961 estimates that Salazar
may take some measures designed to give the impression of liberal-
izing the colonial regime.
This statement implies, first, that no measures of reform had
theretofore been taken, and second, that any reforms in the
future would be made only in order to influence world opinion.
But reports from the field show that some reform measures
had already been taken and that currently schools for Afri-
cans are being built rapidly and public health facilities greatly
expanded and improved. It seems clear that the Portuguese
have concluded, whether reluctantly must be made if they are to stay in Angolan and they are e-
termined to stay. Given their lack of resources and the con-
servatism of the government at home and in Angola, it is not
surprising that the reforms are neither sweeping nor rapid.
But it is unrealistic to assume that what measures are being
taken are designed only to impress international opinion.
The Portuguese have never been terribly concerned by ad-
verse public opinion before, and it is unlikely that they would
now base their policy on it.
Several passages in the estimates also leave an exaggerated
impression of the "rigid, harsh, and penurious" conditions
under which the average Angolan lives.
gola are far from utopian for the African, but othet field reports
supply evidence that they are not so bad as generally believed.
This evidence is not presented in the NIE's. On the other
hand, it was only in an NIE, of all the finished reports, that a
reference was found to the "unusual cruelty on both sides"
in the rebellion.
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Many of the estimates' conclusions were the same as those
which have been reached by U.S. policy makers-that the
Portuguese are likely to have continuing troubles in Angola,
for example, and that reform will have to be considerable if
the situation is not to become explosive. One cannot say
whether this is because policy influenced intelligence, because
intelligence influenced policy, as it should, or because the evi-.
dente led both independently to the same conclusions.
Current Intelligence Weeklies
Examining seventeen articles in the Weekly from May 1960
to April 1962 covering the Angolan situation, I found no evi-
dence of a lack of objectivity prior to the U.S. declaration of
policy, but beginning in April 1961 there was a prejudicial omis-
sion of mitigating material contained in the field reports. In,
these articles there are several references to "brutal repres-
sion" on the part of the Portuguese armed services and civil-
ians. According to reports from State and Army personnel
on the scene, the attacks of the African terrorists have been
equally brutal. For example, one State despatch said that
Africans were "killing white families, mulatto families and
native Africans who had not joined their movement with equal
and impartial brutality." Reports of African brutality have
also appeared in the New York Times. This the Weeklies do
not mention anywhere, leaving the impression that there was
no provocation whatever for the Portuguese reprisals.
There is also considerable discrepancy between the articles
and field reports with regard to the extent of Portuguese bru-
tality. In the panicky month following the uprising, accord-
ing to the latter, there were indeed indiscriminate acts of
cruelty and reprisal on the part of the Portuguese authorities
and civilians in Angola, and some groups of innocent Africans
were killed or driven from their homes in both official and
vigilante-type actions. The reports go on to say, however,
that since the Portuguese army moved into Angola in force
there have been only isolated instances of such reprisals. The
army officers in the north, feeling that the natives in that
area had some reason for revolt, have instituted a policy of
"psychological rehabilitation." They are laying out new vil-
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Policy Bias
construction of homes and schools, and encouraging rebels
and refugees to return to their homes with no punishment.
The civilian Portuguese often regard all Africans as rebels or
potential rebels, but the army discourages this view and is
trying to avoid indiscriminate acts of violence. The Weekly
articles do not mention this effort of the Portuguese army to
deal with the situation; they make no distinction between
military and civilian actions. They also do not mention the
statements in field reports that Portuguese retaliation and
cruelty have been greatly exaggerated.
INR Publications
Although the INR publications carry a caveat that they do
not necessarily reflect Department of State policy, the two
Research Memoranda and the one longer Intelligence Report
covering the rebellion in Angola do seem to have been written
in support of policy. One of the Research Memoranda begins
by setting up the standard,
The US had hoped these reforms would set the stage for (1) a
marked improvement in the status of Africans, and (2) eventual
self-determination in the provinces.
and then proceeds to measure Portuguese performance against
this U.S. "hope," reporting for example that
the Portuguese seem to have little understanding of, or in-
clination toward, the positive programs needed to prepare either
the African for full participation in modern political or economic
life or the overseas provinces for ultimate self-determination.
and concluding that
The rigid attitude of the present government offers no hope that
the principle of self-determination will be accepted in the near
future.
Thus Portuguese policy is judged in the light of what the
U.S. policy maker thinks should be done in Angola. More-
over, the publications openly show their anti-Portuguese bias
throughout. They refer continually to "brutal repression"
without mentioning the provocation of African terrorism and
cite alleged traits of Portuguese national character:
The recently reinforced police, in conjunction with the large
military garrisons, can and have suppressed nascent subversive
movements with characteristic Portuguese thoroughness and
ruthlessness.
00010001-2
Policy Bias
SECRET
They speak of Portuguese reforms with tongue in cheek and
uand n-
point again and again to the disparity between principle
fact in the ld Angolan
is are tall wrong lreforms are really being
repo
less the fi p
undertaken.
It is interesting to see the great discrepancy between the
reports of the consul in Luanda and the INR publications.
The consul is not all-out pro-Portuguese; he is quite critical
of many aspects of the policy in Angola. But he also brings
out things that ? toward economic and educational lg
example reform,
the steps
the good race relations which obtained in Angola until 1961.
He stresses his conviction that statements about rPor Portuguese
brutality and the extent of rebellion have been reports greatly
the Bg-
gerated, a conviction substantiated by appear
points do not
ish and American attaches. But these
appear
in the Department's intelligence publications. ignored,,
explicitly discounted or denied; they are simply Conclusions
As a trainee, I have been led to believe that intelligence
ofacts i any ssiblen and furthe situation that at i
should present and analyze the
completely objective a way P
should present all of the relevant facts regardless of whether
or not they support a given government policy.
degrees the publications on the Angolan situation I examined
did not live up to this ideal but manifested an anti-Portuguese
bias and disregarded information favorable to the Portuguese
viewpoint reported from the field. On the basis of the ma-
terial that was available to_ me I would therefore conclude
that the intelligence community's coverage of the Angolan
situation has not been completely objective and has not pre-
sented all the relevant facts. If this is true, it raises a seri-
ous question in my mind: If policy makers do not receive com-
at them? the intelligence
plete reports and objective estimates
community, to whom do they turn
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 ,History of a purposeful legal-
travel collection operation run
from the united States.
OPERATION LINCOLN
Robert Vandaveer
SECFZET
CIA's organization
e United the collection Chas long directed a major
from sources in th
part of its effort toward Dexploiting the uri g the past seven or eight yea rs
of U.S. travelers abroad.
of increased tourist travel to the USSR and official exchaiageat deal
visits of experts in various fields
and debriefing those who may
of time and energy to briefing sen
thus have opportunities to make useful observations,
to exploit these sources of opportunity with reference to tar-
gets of opportunity. A departing traveler would be briefed
about what intelligence was needed in the field of his own
specialty; but beyond this the operation did not go.
After Sputnik I had intensified and focused attention
however, the
problem of the Soviet long-range missile threat, r, and
the location of missile sites became the number-one priority
ority
collection task of the intelligence community, wawwas recog-
nized that such travel had additional potential be tapped. It was decided that travelers whose dis ngtion
for
could be trusted and whose itineraries looked prom
and
the purpose would be so briefed as to be able recognize an
launching
sites and production facilities, without getting thems into
trouble with the Soviet authorities. In February 1959 the
new program, designated Operation Lincoln, began.
First Phase, 1959-60
It was not a simple matter of passing out the word; much
preparation was required. The domestic collection officers
were not expert in missile requirements and indicators, in the nice details of travel procedure in the
Closehca rdi-
the clandestine. or
ties of operations approaching
nation with missile analysts and clandestine offices was
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69
MORI/HRP PAGES
69-73
 needed. Since the traveler sources would be scattered all over
the United States, the domestic field offices would need central
direction from a headquarters staff competent in the Lincoln
program. And there was none too much time before the com-
ing tourist season, April to October.
Representatives from the interested scientific and economic
analyst offices were appointed to maintain liaison with the
directing staff, providing consumer support and guidance.
Ten contact specialists-domestic field officers-and three
headquarters officers were put through a crash training pro-
gram with the help of the analyst offices and the clandestine
collection staff concerned with the U.S.S.R. The ten became
the Lincoln officers in the field who helped recommend the
selection of travelers to be exploited and, when these were
approved, briefed them on requirements and procedures and
trained them in making observations; the three went into
the Lincoln Staff at headquarters which directed the program,
passed on field officer recommendations, arranged special
briefings and training as required, and processed the result-
ing reports for dissemination.
During the 1959 season the program was intentionally ex-
perimental and conservative. At its end 3,836 travelers had
been screened, preliminary assessments made on 612 and de-
terminate assessments on 159, and 64 been briefed. To keep
the risks within reasonable limits these travelers were lim-
ited to visual, photographic, or conversational observations.
They did not see any long-range missile sites, but they helped
map the deployment of antiaircraft missiles, and a number
of their reports were given high evaluations. Lincoln had
not been expected to provide answers to the major substan-
tive questions confronting the intelligence community. It
had been hoped, however, that its travelers could discover
clues to the presence of missile activity and, secondly, pro-
vide operational intelligence for clandestine operations against
likely targets. It was beginning to fulfill especially the first
of these hopes.
The value of the 1959 experiment was twofold. First, the
wrinkles which any new program is bound to have could be
spotted and ironed out. Second, the positive results were
promising. Some of the weak points were delays in reporting,
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SECRET
insufficient detail in reports, and dependence in areas of prime
interest upon people in exchange groups, who may have less
freedom of action than eltoists. With respect to
e too of en comp1 ed at
consumer guidance, requirements wer
the last minute, lacked background information, and were not
kept up to date after the travel criteria ostarted L ncoln reporting
On the positive side, the high for
raised the over-all quality of domestic-source reports, the op--source on tthe Unded , it demore of the monstrated that
domestic obse vationaly re-
on the U.S.S.R, and
porting is possible on subjects outside the observer's specialty.
however, was to show the
Lincoln's main accomplishment,
value of giving specific guidance to the observer, concentrated
on particular known or suspected intelligence targets
better r+
The 1960 travel season was expected to produce
porting, additional information on suspect areas, full cover-tions of
m
air age of specified air routes,
eGuided M ssileaTask For eofu ns hed and the de-
fense missile sites. The information and spe-
cific new handbook with expanded target crequirements on targets. But these hopes were
photog-
a ban on hy,
in May by the U-2 incident, which brought sketching, and note-taking by Lincoln travelers. Nev-
raphy,
ertheless, 90 cases were originated during 1960, 55 resulted in
re travel to the USSR, and 34 of the 55 produced reporting
c to missile tt ibuted to the better proportionally understandng o pro-
attributed
ductivity e-
was
quirements that resulted from close contact with the Guided
Missile Task Force. 1960 to May 1961 was an uncertain
The period from May
one for
mas to the wisdom of utilizing U.S.ttravelers
some policy makers a
to the Soviet Union for intelligence purposes. But the need
for information on the Soviet missile
both for supplying
and the operation now had a good
missile intelligence of significance and for avoiding
political difficulties. Its continuance was therefore hre aut or-
ized with tightened-up control with initial
the competent clndes-
elers, coordination of briefings
tine service offices, and a continued ban on, photography,
sketching, and note-taking. Plans were laid for expanded op-
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 SECRET
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erations in 1961. In April 1961, however, with further strains
in the international climate, the briefing of Lincoln travelers
was prohibited.
Second Phase, 1961-62
Meanwhile the community's technical intelligence had done
so well with missile deployment that the main focus of un-
fulfilled need shifted to pre-deployment missile activity, to re-
search and development. In this field no observations a trav-
eler could make would be likely to contribute much; the only
likely source of information would be a Soviet citizen employed
in the activity or a related one. It might be possible, how-
ever, for a U.S. citizen with whom such a Soviet citizen had
a common bond to draw him out in friendly,, conversation to
the point of revealing something useful-the process known
in clandestine tradecraft as elicitation.
Elicitation has the advantage of being operationally safe;
there is nothing illegal about it. It is most likely to be suc-
cessful if carried out in a secure and relaxed setting, with-
out a language barrier, using an approach which is indirect
but has a sense of direction, and working inductively from
peripheral manifestations toward the central question. If
necessary a silent partner expert in the particular technical
field can provide back-up. The elicitor can of course be de-
liberately deceived; but the possibility of deception is not
unique to elicitation. The important precondition of a com-
mon bond is satisfied if the American has a reputation in the
Soviet citizen's professional field or one related to it.
With these considerations in mind Operation Lincoln was
now radically reoriented, and approval was received for a pro-
gram of briefing U.S. scientists in missile-related fields to elicit
information from Soviet scientists. The intensive briefing
includes a broad summary of the organization of research
and development under the Soviet Academy of Sciences, a brief
summary of what we know of the Soviet missile program, a
detailed examination of the Soviet effort in the elicitor's own
scientific field, detailed data on the personalities and institu-
tions with whom he may be in contact, and information on
Soviet counterintelligence and provocation practices and how
to defend himself from them. Envisaged is the development
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P78TOt9*A0r0 kO 10001-2
of a relatively small number of well-trained, long-range U.S.
citizen sources whose information should be reliable because
of their own stature and the position of their Soviet inform-
ants. The program would concentrate on a directed search
involving a limited number of specific targets.
Experimental projects along these lines have brought prom-
ising results. The reporting on the 12th International As-
tronautical Federation held in Washington during October
1961 was evaluated outstanding as an example of what com-
prehensive elicitation techniques can accomplish. It gave
new as well as confirmatory information about the Soviet
man-in-space effort and the fundamentals of Soviet space
flight. There was consequently established for the 1962 Con-
ference on Space Research an ad hoc task force to coordi-
nate intelligence exploitation, and the results achieved com-
pared favorably with those from the 1961 conference. Some
important information was obtained in the field of bio-astro-
nautics, and the elicitation from Gherman Titov was consid-
ered quite good.
It is too early to judge what the ultimate value of the elici-
tation program will be; more time and experience are needed.
But the principal beneficiaries of the reoriented Lincoln re-
porting, the scientific analysts, are enthusiastic about the
prospects of this special collection effort mounted on their
behalf. They have drawn up a list of priority interests to
guide it and have attempted to point out individuals or types
of persons who may make good sources. And at the time of
writing there is a recommendation before the USIB for the
expansion of Lincoln into other fields of science than those
related to guided missiles. It is judged that the program has
already provided useful information and has a potential for
even more useful information in the future.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
History of an interrogation pro-
gram developed to exploit the
USSR's mass repatriation of
Spanish refugees.
PROJECT NIROS
Lawrence E. Rogers
At the conclusion of the Spanish Civil War, some 5400 Span-
ish citizens were stranded in the Soviet Union, 5000 of them
children nine to fifteen years old placed in "safe refuge" there
by their Republican parents, 150 the adult nurses and teach-
ers who accompanied them, and the rest student pilots sent
by the Republican government for training. For the next
twenty years the children and the pilots were treated not
as foreigners in the USSR but pretty much as guest citizens.
They were relatively free to travel about the country, and
they were afforded unusual opportunities for education and
then for employment. About 15 percent attended institutes
of higher learning, and another 20 percent were given tech-
nical or specialized training, half of these in scientific fields.
On reaching adulthood they were offered full Soviet citizen-
ship. Only about 35 percent accepted, but all were sovietized
in education and in attitudes. Their only real ties to Spain
were their families and the stories they had heard during their
formative years.
Nevertheless, when in 1956 these Spanish "citizens" were
given the opportunity to be repatriated, some 2400 took advan-
tage of it. They arrived back in Spain in seven expeditions be-
tween August 1956 and May 1957, plus an eighth in May 1960.
For the Spanish government the influx constituted a security
hazard, for U.S. intelligence a multitudinous potential source of
information on the Soviet Union. This common if somewhat
divergent intelligence interest in the re atriates resulted in
the establishment in March 1957 of interrogation cen-
ter in Madrid, staffed by representatives of
three U.S. government departments under a CIA a ministra-
tive head. The unique interrogation program lasted four
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Project Ninos
years, covering some 1800 repatriates and producing more
than 2000 positive intelligence reports.
From Prototype to Production Line
For the first half year the Center had only one CIA and
interrogators; in the fall of 1957 three U.S. Air
Force and two U.S. Army interrogators were added. During
the preliminary phase of the program, which lasted until Au-
gust 1958, files were set up on all the repatriates showing
their background of education and employment in the USSR
(information obtained through interviews conducted by
F officers in the provinces), workable arrange-
ments were negotiated for sup-
port and manpower, and the first interrogations were held.
These were devoted to obtaining information of sufficient va-
riety and detail to give Washington a basis for evaluating the
potential of the sources and determining what amount of ef-
fort should accordingly be put into the program.
A major obstacle at first to Washington consumers' recog-
nition of the significance of information the repatriates might
have was the disappointing yield from exploitation of Span-
ish Blue Division returnees a year or so earlier. These survi-
vors of the Blue Division, which Franco had sent to aid Hitler's
armies on the Russian front, had spent eleven years in Soviet
concentration camps, and because of their isolation and re-
sistance to the Soviets during their imprisonment their con-
tribution to intelligence on the USSR was small. The tend-
ency among consumers was to view the new repatriates in
the same light, a view that took some time to change.
The five interrogators added in the fall of 1957 were put to
work on several of the most promising sources, repatriates
whose background indicated knowledge of the Soviet missile
and aircraft program. The reports produced from these in-
terrogations gave Washington the first solid proof that the
repatriates could provide information in priority fields of So-
viet science and technology. At about the same time, scien-
tific, economic, and geographic intelligence analysts were fur-
nished lists summarizing the background of several hundred
repatriates, and a study of these lists indicated that the
sources had a potential value far greater than had been as-
Approved For Release 2005MIZ : C
Project Ninos
sumed. The guided missile analysts were the first to take ad-
vantage of this discovery: they made a selection of sources
to be interrogated in the missile field and dispatched two Mis-
sile specialists to Madrid to provide requirements and techni-
cal guidance for the interrogations.
then, the Center concen-
From August to December 1958,
trated its efforts on the guided missile sources and others
recognized by the newly-arrived requirements specialists as of
priority consumer interest. For this purpose the require-
ments specialists were integrated into the Center's staff not
as advisors but as full working members active in all phases
of the operation-the selection of sources, the preparation
and conduct of the interrogations, the reporting of the re-
sulting information. Initially they converted headquarters'
general requirements into questionnaires tailored for the par-
ticular repatriates under interrogation. They also prepared
a series of basic questionnaires on a number of subjects of
special interest to consumers, shaping them to suit the back-
ground and experience of the repatriates and the interroga-
tion methods used. They kept in touch with each interroga-
tion throughout its course, and they gave back-up and tech-
nical assistance to the reports officers who put the intelli-
gence yield into form for consumers.
The function of the requirements section thus developed
at this time as one of the cornerstones of the operation be-
came standard for the remainder of the program. It reduced
the need for constant requirements support from headquar-
ters, relieved the chief of the Center of many operational du-
ties, and gave the Center a focal point for all positive intel-
ligence, whether in the form of source potential, the substance
of interrogation, or reported product.
In November 1958 it became obvious that if all the repatri-
ates who seemed likely to have useful information were to be
questioned in any reasonable length of time an expansion of
the Center was necessary. During December additional per-
sonnel were selected and assigned, and by early February 1959
the Center had doubled in size. The number of interroga-
tions held per month grew from 25 in November 1958 to 60
in mid-1959 and 90 in mid-1960, and the number of reports
issued per month increased correspondingly from about 30
P78T03414)k'0700200010001-2
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in November 1958 to nearly 70 in the spring of 1959 and more
than 100 by early 1960.
1 TL 1 7 ]TI ~J
A.PPFGyed Far Release 2006904 912
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25X1
With respect to the security of the Center itself, secrecy
as to its location and purpose could be maintained only until
it became established and operational. As repatriates were
called in for interrogation it became known to them and
others, including the Soviet government; several hundred re-
patriates, many of whom had been interrogated, returned to
the Soviet Union. The security problem was then reduced, to
two basic elements: first, to keep the repatriates ignorant
of the extent of American involvement in the program, and
second, to maintain a reasonable degree of obscurity among
residents in the local vicinity about the existence and true
nature of the Center. Otherwise the interrogation program
25X1-- - ..
a mass program on any high level of secrecy.
The Call-In
A major management problem was regulation of the flow
of repatriates into the Center for interrogation. When, those
78T031 08.M6d9bb1ir1 a particular week had been selected by
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
Project Ninos
the requirements section, primarily on the basis of the pri-
ority of the information the seemed likely to have, they were
sent a ummons giving them ten
days a vance no ice of the date on which they were to ap-
pear. But the number failing to respond to the summons
ranged from a fifth of some weekly groups to as high as half
of others, and each name included in the call-in lists. which
turned out "negative," whether from failure to arrive or from
refusal to cooperate, would mean the waste of an average of
three days each of interrogator and requirement officer time.
Another primary objective of the flow management, in ad-
dition to minimizing fluctuations, was to maintain a balance
in the composition of each call-in list in terms of staff special-
ties in requirements preparation and interrogation. It was
not practical, for example, to call in at one time a large num-
ber of aircraft workers, because there were only two or three
interrogators with good qualifications for handling aircraft
technology. But account had to be taken also of places of resi-
dence and employment in Spain, of family and political rela-
tions, and of economic conditions. It was wise to avoid call-
ing a hard professional Communist along with potentially
good sources because his presence in the Center might se-
riously prejudice their cooperation. Sometimes it was impor-
tant to call husband and wife together to promote their co-
operation during, interrogation, while in another case it would
be a serious mistake because they had opposing views on co-
operation with the Center.
Job demands, care of children, pregnancy, and illness ac-
tual or feigned were frequent reasons for not responding to
the call-in. In many cases it was difficult or impossible for
the police to find the persons cited in time because of changes
of residence, absence on vacation or on trips, or residence in
villages difficult of access. Quite a few, mostly hard-core Com-
munists, bluntly refused to come to Madrid.
One measure tried in the effort to, offset call-in failures
was to call a greater number than could be interrogated, in-
sofar as this number could be forecast from week to week.
But this would result at times in having to double up inter-
rogators' assignments or in keeping sources waiting. Double
assignments were bad-only a few interrogators were capable
80 Approved For Release 20( /CAft1i-3
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SECRET
of handling two sources
became indignant. Mores
ir turn too the
who had to wait their others who
over, a protracted association while waiting
process would on occa-
had been through the mill or were in s "intelligence,"
sion lead to tactics of evasion,
or a decision not to collaborate.
The most effective way that was found to moderate ethe a un--,
even flow was to maintain, as long as it was possibl, re
serve list of repatriates who livvdrie or
reserverids n~,nooud
be called on shorter notice. the fluctuation problem returned and was never completely
solved.
Processing and Reporting
re-
Prior to the appearance of a source at the Center the re-
in-
quirements officer assigned
cluded in the outline werea
terrogation the basic
outline. intelligence
facts about the source's ene able to p ovide the information?
re-
targets on which he might
summary statements of specific consumer priority interests
targets,
spect to each target, the relative p y o f and the any ta special
which general- questionnaires
outline was then translated
questions. This interrogation
into Spanish. ester.
ete Industrial R books,
Reference materials on hand inclujournals,
index of Soviet plants, technical
rcraft
and
industry specialized guidance onri the
mamissile terial on a aiw de range of scien
volumes of other guida
tific and technical subjects. In general, there was too much
rather than not enough reference material, and it constituted the
a storage problem. The only excellent deta mainformap
Repatriates could provide needed to
tion on specific localities, and detailed maps were eed dio
locate secret or restricted spots. The Center had g
ficulty getting maps of adequate scale, but an even bigger
problem was getting ones with notations in Russian or Spanish,
particularly of the much-cited Moscow area.
On the assignment of the source to an interrogator, if the
latter was from the U.S~ea over to hingortistudytlan d di,a
biographic file were to
 25X1:
25X1
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Approved For Release'H09049s. CIi
cussion with the requirements officer, usual! two to five days
before the source was to a ear.
the equivalent of requirements officer,
passed the information to his interrogator. During the in-
terrogation, discussions were held between the requirements
officer and the interrogator
usually at the mid-point and after the conclusion of each
day's session. When the interrogator indicated that he had
completed his interrogation, he and the requirements officer
reviewed what had been accomplished, and if it was agreed
that nothing of real significance could be gained by additional
questioning, the source was released.
On completion of the case, the U.S. interrogator would re-
work his rough notes into finished report.
ave their rough notes to
i start winch urne em into a typed report and
returned it to the interrogator for review. In general, in-
terrogators spent half their time conducting interrogations
and the other half working on reports, a proportion that
worked out about right. The interrogation of an average
source lasted from two to five days, and generally an inter-
rogator was assigned a new source each week. If an interro-
gation lasted only one or two days and produced nothing of
value, the interrogator would be assigned a second source for
that week.
When the interrogator, had com-
pleted his report, it was sent to e U.S. reports section
for editorial processing and preparation in final form. After
logging it, the reports section sent it first to the requirements
section, where the requirements officer who who had handled the
case would review it, make sure it included all significant
points brought out in the interrogation, provide a prelimi-
nary evaluation of the worth and priority of the information,
and indicate any numbered headquarters requirements to
which it was responsive. It was then returned to the reports
section, and a translation priority assigned. Since the bulk
of the interrogators' reports were in Spanish, U.S. citizens
living in Spain had been hired under contract to help in
the translations.
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P78T03,t9 A1o66'?80010001-2
The reports officer gave the report an evaluation based on
advice in reports memoranda from headquarters, comparisons
with past production on the same subject, and further dis-
cussion with requirements officers when necessary. When
the rough translation was completed he put it into finished
form, and it was typed on mats for distribution to consum-
ers, except that reports of marginal value were generally for-
warded to headquarters either in rough translation or in
the original Spanish. The system functioned remarkably well;
a constant flow of reports was maintained, and no large back-
log accumulated.
I joint interrogation program meani25X1
primarily a - oroug and systematic attack on the security
problem posed by the sovietized repatriates. But what were
the positive fruits garnered by U.S. intelligence? On its num-
ber-one priority target, guided missiles, Project Ninos developed
a bulk of information of major significance. It obtained data
on the successive stages of Soviet rocket engine development
which created a basis for estimating rates of progress in mis-
sile development and production. It gave valuable new in-
formation on the location of static testing facilities for rocket
engines, guided missile testing and development centers, rocket
engine production plants, and several surface-to-air missile
sites. It furnished detail about rocket engine fuels and, trans-
port and identified many personalities in guided missile work.
It gave the first identification of several guided missile develop-
ment and production installations. It updated by eight years
much of the previous intelligence on the Soviet missile pro-
gram. The Project Ninos information had an immediate sig-
nificant effect on intelligence estimates and also established
substantial leads for further expansion of our knowledge in
this field.
With respect to strategic nuclear weapons, the number-two
priority, the repatriates did not have much information of
critical importance; but they did give supporting informa-
tion about Soviet nuclear power systems, the first data on an
atomic-associated plant, and leads to new information on
uranium mining and nuclear storage sites.
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A psychological framework to
guide the handling of a special
personality.
On military aircraft, the number-three priority, Project
Ninos turned out a large volume of information of consider-
able value in the preparation of estimates. It reported on con-
struction details and the production of Soviet fighter aircraft,
furnished detailed layouts of several aircraft development and
production facilities, gave the types and quantities of aircraft
produced at these facilities, and shed light on the aircraft in-
dustry's support to the Soviet missile program.
Outside the top priority fields, the repatriates supplied val-
uable reports about the Soviet civil defense and shelter pro-
gram, military medicine, higher technical education, and
conventional military installations and weapons production.
They furnished geographic data such as town plans. They
had considerable information on Soviet strategic industries-
locations and layouts, the construction of new facilities, and
the expansion of old ones. One group of returnees made
an extremely valuable series of detailed reports on the So-
viet electric power industry, including facilities for power dis-
tribution and its pattern.
The basic and priority intelligence yield of Project Ninos
will be useful for many years. It constitutes a reservoir of
information that probably could not have been achieved in
any other way, even at many times the cost in money and
manpower. The guided missile information alone, it is esti-
mated, more than paid for the entire project.
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THE LIBYAN AS AGENT
Titus Leidesdorf
Any attempt to characterize all members
indi-
toferr society in
common is necessarily a stereotype, subject
y personality in.
vidual application. This er of
cathe nnot be made a Procrus-?
relation to intelligence op
tean bed on which to scale every Libyan nor a basis or
acent.
g
lenging a case officer's assessment of his particular
the Italians
voted to their families,
25X1
d
e
But if the Chinese are
their loves, and the Irish to their
h t
o
to their wine, the Frenc
sod, then the generalities in this study have some such ap-
plicability. For the Mar-
the old hand embarking on a new development,
acteristics described here should afford a useful frame of ref-
erence.'
The Libyan Personality
The typical Libyan is an outward-looking individual,
acutely aware of other people, of events, of social pressures,
demands, and obligations; and he has difficulty concentrating
on any one event because there are too many other things
competing for his attention. He respects and admires in-
tellectual achievement, and he accordingly makes a particular
effort to acquire and retain information. But he lacks the
much
intellectual discipline to do very
information uncritically
tape recorder, absorbing masses without integration and depending on n fellows. it his ability
more play
them back to achieve status among
1 study is based on an analysis of psychological tests administered
to 100
January augmented Libyan workers at contacts `e and interviews with several educated
ns and discussions with American officers and supervisors
social Tripolitanians
who have lived and dealt with Libyans for periods from several months
to several years.
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85
MORI/HRP PAGES 85-97
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
The Libyan
portant to him to "know" something than to be productive,
creative, or skillful.
He is likewise conscious of the rules and procedures incul-
cated by his culture and experience, but also of conditioning
circumstances which affect the application- of the rules, so
that while he thinks in terms of rules he tends to be incon-
sistent in applying them. He has a tolerance for ambiguity
and for rationalization; he can "stretch" circumstances to
justify an action. His behavior thus is governed more by
reference points than by absolute dicta, and it is seldom
predictable; one can know the factors bearing on his deci-
sions but not the precise way in which he will rationalize or
resolve them.
In interpersonal relations he tends to suppress spontaneous
feelings and intuition in favor of an examined and deliberated
behavior. He tends to be suspicious and defensive, to "second-
guess" what is going on, and so to respond in a controlled
and calculated way. When he acts angry or charming, it may
be only because he thinks that's the way he should act at
the moment. Much of the time he is trying to be something
that he is not and behaving in ways different from the way he
feels. Beneath the superficial expression his attitude may
be a negative one of social insulation or withdrawal.
Acutely aware of the group, the family, the mass, and the
heritage of which they are a part, many Libyans struggle to
assert their individual identity. This defensive individualism,
coupled with suspiciousness and negativism, makes them poor
candidates for effective organization and group effort-the
more so since their tendency to rationalize and examine al-
ternatives makes it difficult for them to focus on a simple pro-
gram or a collective course of action. They do, however, have
a capacity for loyalty, particularly of the personal variety
based on the satisfaction of recognition and acceptance by
an admired leader. This loyalty is dependent on continuous
justification and reinforcement, being particularly frangible
in the face of rejection, humiliation, or "unfairness."
Much that the Libyan does is determined by the immediate
situation-by the need to take care of whatever is going on
at the moment. He can make a commitment for the future
Approved For Release 2H4/13
The Libyan
SECRET
because that's what's required at the present; whether he
fulfills will He will cron the conditions that prevail at oss that bridge when he gets to it. Y~at
future time.
The Worker
The ordinary Libyan workers have a low general level of ef-
fective intelligence. The overwhelming majority are oppor-
tunity, and the average worker is a man who, given
tunity, at best might struggle through the sixth grade. As a,
trainee, moreover, he comes from a technically impoverished
culture and lacks the general mechanical conditioning which
is part of the growing-up experience of the Westerner. He
has no basis for filling in the most elementary gaps in in-
struction. He can not be expected to do things on the basis
of "common sense," since he has had no opportunity to ac-
quire it in technical matters. Together with his capacity to
find exceptions to the rules, this deficiency can lead to se-
rious problems. He can fail to carry out a known action
solely because something is the wrong color, or
didn't because
l me
Thursday, or because he "didn't see it" or "you
this time."
He also lacks any preconditioning in the employment rela-
tionship of a sort to make him understand the simplest
plesteobli-
gations and expectations taken for granted by the
on even his first job. He is likely to feel that his obligations
are fulfilled merely by being hired or by being present. Partly
out of self-assertion and partly through naivete, me-too-ism
is a large factor in his expectations. If his co-worker is ill
for three days, he feels entitled to three days some special sick leave,
too; and if someone is granted a bonus for pecal effort,
he feels he should have the same reward, on the grounds
that he would have done just as well if asked. Sustained pro-
duction is a particular area in which the Libyan worker does
not share the American's sense of value. The fact that he is
able to do so much work in so much time carries no assur-
ance that he will. His failure is not necessarily perversity; it
is partly due to distractability, partly to unawareness of what
is expected, and partly to ineffective self-organization.
 Approved For Release TIMS113)IM
The Avant Garde
The elite rising middle class of educated and substantially
more intelligent young Libyans differ from their poorer, lower-
status countrymen largely in being confused at a higher
level.2 They are greatly concerned about their futures, their
diverse and manifold
opportunities, and their uncertainties.
They are thoroughly immersed in an uncertain effort to break
away from the "old" and to embrace the "new" and thereby
heavily involved in an intellectual and emotional conflict of
serious proportions. They are militantly individualistic and
anxious to carve out a unique and independent existence, one
of the criteria of which is to "make a million."
This young elite reflects at its level the workers' hyper-
awareness and distractability, omnivorous but undisciplined
intellect, avoidance of simplicity in favor of rationalization
and the perusal of alternatives, capacity for superficial, con-
trolled expression and emotion, pursuit of independence and
individuality at the expense of group identification and group
effort, and unwillingness (if not inability) to be consistently
productive in any one direction. With all their need to be
individuals, they have an equal need for emotional support
from outside, for someone to depend upon, to guide them, to
accept and understand them.
Americans are attractive to these people (albeit with sub-
stantial ambivalence) if only because they personify so thor-
oughly the New World to which they aspire in contrast to
the Old Order from which they seek to escape. But their
desire to change their ways and their recognition of the
need to change is exceeded only by their awareness of the es-
sential sinfulness of trying to change. This conflict brings
an earnestness, an eagerness, a sense of illicit passion to their
It is important to note the severe limitations of the sample on
which these generalizations are based: the investigator met some 30
of these avant-garde Tripolitanians and had lengthy conversations with
perhaps half a dozen. Undoubtedly these were all "selected," in some
way or other, by various factors-common friends or sources of intro-
duction, a more or less common milieu which may or may not represent
the "true" society of rising middle-class young adults, and other
fortuitous circumstances which brought them into view. Nevertheless,
as with the worker sample, the consistency of their psychological
pattern was so marked as to encourage broad generalization.
Approved For Release 2005/04/1:
DP7F--93(1 t9Q00200010001-2
intercultural relationships. They will approach new relation-
ships with trepidation even as they adopt new ways with a
vengeance; much that they learn will be superficial; much of
their behavior will be a veneer; much of their enthusiasm
will carry with it an underlayer of guilt or shame or at least
uncertainty as to what they should be about.
It is virtually impossible to deal with such people su-
perficially. Befriending a Libyan is much like acquiring a
mistress: once the cautious, tentative, defensive sparring is
over, the relationship grows progressively deeper, broader,
more involving, more consuming, more demanding. While the
affair can be gratifying, it will rarely be tranquil; and there
is always the risk that the wrong word, the wrong deed, the
wrong interpretation will bring everything to an abrupt halt
or a precipitous reversal.
Operational Implications: Mass Action
As we have seen, the Libyan is generally not an Organiza-
tion Man. He is too individualistic, suspicious, diffuse with
respect to goals, and vague about the mechanics of organiza-
tion. A group of Libyans, endeavoring as peers to organize
themselves for some purpose, could well start out with the
notion of a common task, but they would soon be over-
whelmed by alternative courses of action, competing organiza-
tional proposals, and wrangling for leadership. A strong
natural leader could impose organization and direction; but
the group's effectiveness would depend almost entirely on
his ability to perpetuate his control by commanding loyalty
on the basis of individual, man-to-man relationships.
A respected outsider gifted with organizational know-how
and capitalizing on admiration for intellectual prowess and
achievement could similarly infuse organization into a Libyan
group if he could keep all of the administrative reins in his
own hands. Such a master-minded group would ordinarily
be vastly more effective than any which Libyans could create
on their own, and Libyans on their own would have great dif-
ficulty countering it. By way of corollary, it is reasonably
safe, when any well organized and systematically effective
Libyan group ostensibly chances to emerge, to infer that
it has some outside direction.
 SECRET
Approved For Release72005 13
Inability to organize effectively does not imply that Libyans
will not organize at all. In view of their susceptibility to
charismatic leadership-especially when the appeal is intel-
lectual as well as sensory and emotional-it is not difficult to
imagine a Libyan mob. But it is one thing to precipitate a
mob, another to energize and direct it, and still another to
contain and control it. A Libyan mob would be like a herd of
c
tt
a
le-a collection of individuals rather than a real social
force; physically imposing and threatening, but individually"
rather docile, controlled, and even cowardly; capable of stam
peding, but also able to be deflected; incapable of any really
sustained collective action; and quite likely to scatter itself
aimlessly and dissolve into its component parts as other,
needs, interests, and attractions came to attention. Such
a mob is at best a limited and unreliable tactical weapon,
and no basis for any real social or political reorientation.
In general, Libyans are particularly susceptible to demogogic
leadership, the strong emotional appeal which plays upon
generalized hostility, sensed oppression, etc. But under such
stimulation they are more likely to be whipped into negative
action than positive. They have a greater capacity to de-
stroy what exists than to create something better.
Use of Nets
With respect to ordinary intelligence operations, whenever
there is a choice between handling Libyans as individuals
and using them in teams or groups the individual approach
is vastly more desirable. Both the operational direction and
the personnel handling are much more difficult in the group.
It is possible to make use of natural groups, pre-existing
cultural organizations like the family where control of the
head implies a degree of established control over the mem-
bers; but in general it is more realistic to think of Libyans
as singletons than as nets, as surveillants than as surveil-
lance teams, etc.
Except for such natural groups, any attempt to use Libyans
in pairs, nets, or teams for a group effort invites a host of
difficulties. The principal basis for motivation and control is
a direct personal relationship between the trusted case officer
Approved For Release 2005/04/1
-RDP70/3*,VR000200010001-2
and the Libyan agent, and anything which makes this re-
lationship less direct makes for more difficulty in handling.
Employed together, Libyan agents will be suspicious of each
other and jealous of their positions vis-a-vis the case officer.
Each will be out for all he can get, and in the ensuing com-
petition he will expend more energy quibbling over his proper
due than in accomplishing his tasks. The case officer will,
be continually harassed to render reassurance to each one in.
turn and will find it virtually impossible to set rewards or as-
sign tasks on the basis of merit and capability. A good analogy
is that of a man with several wives, each demanding assur--
ante that she is Number One.
When a relationship has been established with a Libyan,
any effort to impose another in the chain of command, whether
as a principal agent or as a cut-out, invites disaster. At
the least it creates a threat to the original agent's sense of
identification and personal security; if he doesn't lose all of
his motivation, he will at least make efforts to re-establish
personal contact, meanwhile nursing his jealousy, mistrust,
humiliation, and feeling of inferiority.
Handling the Singleton
Working with the singleton Libyan does not eliminate the
problems, but it makes it possible to handle them individually.
The Libyan's relationship to the case officer will be a very
personal one; the case officer may take an objective and
business-like view of it, but the Libyan won't, even if he makes
it look that way. The fact that the relationship exists means
that the Libyan is bringing to it a large capacity for personal
dependency in his need of guidance and support, and also
his personal loyalty, eagerness, enthusiasm, and his ver-
sion of conscientiousness-together with all the negative
corollaries of jealousy, suspicion, sensed rejection, humilia-
tion, and general sensitivity.
At any particular moment the most important thing to the
Libyan is to maintain the relationship at the most satisfy-
ing level. Hence his enthusiasm and willingness to agree to
anything that is asked of him; and hence also his propensity to
conceal any failures and if necessary to lie in order to de-
-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : Cl
The Libyan
liver what he thinks the case officer wants. In both cir-
cumstances, he is responding to what is most important to
him, now.
While his capacity to reach agreement and understand-
ing, now, is thus very high, his capacity to carry out what he
has agreed to do is likely to be less; and it is conditioned not
only by his real abilities but also by the "now" requirements
and relationships when the time comes for action. When he
is engaged in his operational tasks the pressure of the im-
mediate situation is much stronger than that of the require-
ments laid upon him earlier. He has a new set of personal
relationships to maintain, and he may find that the circum-
stances aren't "exactly" as expected and therefore the pre-
scribed rules and guidance aren't "exactly" applicable. Then
in reporting back to his case officer he is again disposed to
make the review as pleasant as possible. At the very least
he will be able to rationalize any failure to perform the task
as intended; at worst he may fabricate the procedures, the
conditions, and the results.
It should not be construed that the Libyan agent is there-
fore a pathological liar, or intentionally evasive, or wilfully
negativistic or misleading. On the contrary, he is enthusiastic
and conscientious in his way; but he is not objective, practical,
or self-disciplined. Thus he can overcommit himself, partly
out of eagerness and partly because he is ignorant of or de-
fensive about his own limitations. In carrying out his tasks
he is susceptible to distraction and deflection, and he is par-
ticularly a creature of the circumstances in which he finds
himself. Thus it is unfair to expect that he will do things
wrong in any intentional sense, but it is appropriate to ex-
pect that if something can go wrong it probably will. The
case officer has accordingly a more than ordinary need to ap-
praise his agent's skills and abilities and to evaluate the con-
ditions under which any operational task is going to be per-
formed. The reliability of the agent will depend in large
measure on the case officer's ability to judge independently
whether he can reasonably be expected to perform this task
under these circumstances.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RD
SECRET
The Libyan
SECRET
Obviously, the Libyan agent needs particularly detailed
guidance and direction. One of the case officer's continui4 g
will be to impress him with the need tocarry
tasks out
obligations precisely in accordance with detailed agreement.
nstruction
needs step-by-step procedural i and ticularokind of
he has neither the background nor the p through practical prob-
lems discipline necessary
manner on his own. p
lems in a logical, productive for sensing ex-
The Libyan agent has an unusual capacity
ceptions, nuances, ambiguities, etc. as reasons why he shouldn't
do something and as justification for his failures. He does
not share his case officer's system of values with respect to
commitments, productivity, or objectivity: for
obligations,
him a learned procedure,is not necessarily a blueprint for ac-
tion, an agreement to do something is not necessarily a is
mitment to carry it out, failure to carry out an agreement is
not necessarily a source of guilt or anxiety (particularly there is some "reason" for it), and lying about a failure is
ial
not necessarily bad, but r of t the lcan ittle ewhite lr iesd wh' ch oc~
propriety, an extension o eo le from
versally lubricate social communication and keep p p
getting mad at each
operational Characteristics
The Libyan is a good observer in that he is very much
aware of things that are going on around him. He is an
omnivorous spectator, with a natural ability to remember lso
;o
a events which he has witnessed.
and thushwill amake some efforsen-se
of the value of knowledge look knowle acquire information which larva Tetain informationag e
able. But while he can absorb
partic patee xtnve~ly
is less able to organize or intThusthe or
to govern his own actions. oin on,
tivities without necessarily understanding what ion By the
or he may actually misunderstand what is going he may
same token, while he is capable of absorbing details,
be dependent on others impart
His reporting, accordingly, l kely to be accurate as to de-
tail but confused or misleading as to context, organization,
and over-all meaning. If someone else has made an int.terpreta-
SECRET
78T03194A000200010001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/
The Libyan
tion for him, however, he is likely to be accurate in relay-
ing that. For example: His report of a political rally is likely
to be accurate with respect to who was there and what was
said. This may be inconsistent with his interpretation of the
implications of the meeting; but this interpretation may, in
turn, be an accurate report of something which was said
there, or of something told him by way of explanation.
His efforts to assess other. persons are particularly subject
to error, especially when there is room for coloration through
the influence of loyalty, suspicion, or other source of bias.
The Libyan should have little difficulty, relative to his in-
dividual mental level, learning the mechanics and procedures
of clandestinity; but his ability to learn them does not imply
rigor or discipline in applying them. There are few substi-
tutes for out-and-out conditioning, in the purest Pavlovian
sense, to insure that he will carry through a particular pro-
cedure under a particular set of circumstances: his training
should be practical, repetitious, and continuous in this re-
gard. Conversely, it would be a mistake to assume that be-
cause he has learned something in an academic sense he
can then be left to his discretion to carry through as ap-
propriate.
His attention to security will be compounded of natural sus-
piciousness, personal fears and anxieties, and status needs:
the Libyan is both self-protective and self-assertive. Ordi-
narily he will not do anything which he recognizes is a per-
sonal risk; but he may underestimate the risk involved in
bragging about his accomplishments and associations. How-
ever subtle the approach, the best means of keeping him dis-
creet would seem to be "to scare hell out of him."
Controls
As already noted, the best control over the Libyan agent is
the quality of his personal relationship with his case officer.
To the extent that the case officer is the One Man who has
understood him, respected him, been fair to him, trusted him,
etc., etc. (a condition which must be developed over time and
at the expenditure of much Christian Virtue, tongue-biting,
cheek-turning, and pride-swallowing), the Libyan can be
loyal, dedicated, earnest, and sincere. He will remain sensi-
Approved For ReleSzECR 2005/
The Libyan
SECRET
Live and thin-skinned, however; and while it is permissible and
appropriate for the case officer to be firm and legalistic, he
must scrupulously avoid slights, insults, and humiliations.
Reaching an agreement with the Libyan with respect to
conditions of employment, as in the task briefing, is af-
fected by his capacity to rationalize and be specific, legalistic,
or interpretive as suits his interest, and by the fact that he is
oriented toward the future while dominated by the present.
His assertion of Word and Honor is earnest enough, but it does
not connote the same specificity and quid-pro-quo as to the
Westerner. While being honorable in fulfilling an obligation
he retains a capacity for continually reinterpreting the mean-
ing and expectations of the commitment. For example, he
can insist on being paid "as agreed" even though his produc-
tivity for a particular period is nil, or he can insist on the
adequacy of an inadequate product by debating the criteria,
the circumstances, etc.
An agreement to pay a specified amount for general serv-
ices to be rendered therefore invites an inadequate product
and leaves the case officer no recourse against the agent's in-
sistence that he did what was required. Similarly, a guaran-
teed salary against tasks "to be defined" invites a continuing
reduction of effort or insistence on increasing pay for al-
legedly increasing requirements. Insofar as possible, the
whole scope of tasks, duties, and expectations should be laid
out in detail at the beginning. Otherwise the later elabora-
tion of duties can be construed as new requirements over and
above the initial agreement.
Perhaps the best payment-for-value control exists in a
graduated piece-work arrangement within which payment de-
pends on the effectiveness with which various criteria are met.
This will not eliminate haggling but at least confines it to
specifics and provides the case officer a basis for educating his
agent in what is expected of him. Escrow accounts have a
carrot-and-stick value provided precautions are taken against
any implications of automatic payment; and they should be
embellished with bank books or other concrete devices to give
the agent satisfaction in the "now" while encouraging him to
continue producing.
SECRET
CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/041,
The Libyan
Contracts are at least an ambivalent and at best a marginal
form of control. In his system of values, a Libyan's Word is
his Honor. Whatever the reservations in an Arab's use of
these terms, his Word is therefore as binding as any formal
agreement; and he may construe insistence on a contract as
an affront to his integrity. On the other hand, some con-
tracts play a part in his own legal structure (as witness the
marriage contract), and to some Libyans this formalization of
the agreement may have a reifying value. In this sense it is
worth pursuing. If obtained, it remains a reference point
(though not necessarily a binding one) in future haggling:
it is at least a way of reminding him of what he agreed to
"once," notwithstanding all the changes which he will note
have since taken place. Contracts are thus worth getting if
it can be done easily, but there is not enough intrinsic con-
trol value in them to risk damaging the relationship in going
after them.
The ability to conduct surveillance (technically, or with
third-nationals, in view of the difficulty of managing a Libyan
surveillance team) can be a real asset to the case officer.
Since the immediate circumstances, rather than require-
ments and agreements, have the greatest bearing on the
Libyan's behavior when on target, it follows that he has little
guilt, little. anxiety, little conscience about not following
through precisely as expected. He sees nothing wrong in do-
ing something wrong or in rationalizing or lying about it; the
only thing wrong is to get caught at it. Surveillance brings
him closer to being caught at it, and with a little conditioning
of this kind he may develop a substitute conscience, a big-
brother-is-watching-me concern which may make the case of-
ficer's admonitions and requirements more binding in the ac-
tion situation.
Application of the polygraph as a control mechanism is par-
ticularly complicated with Libyans. The mere introduction
of the device constitutes a personal threat, an insult, a ques-
tioning of his integrity; if this is true in general, it is more
intensely so with Libyans because of the particular emotion-
alism and defensiveness with which they regard such mat-
ters as Word, Honor, and Trust. The situation is patently
paradoxical: the Libyan cannot tolerate an objective test of
Approved For ReleasV M/04/'
The Libyan
SECRET
these qualities, knowing that they will be found in some ways
lacking; the very strength of the polygraph is thus its great-
est threat, constituting a risk to the relationship. The im-
plication of mistrust and rejection can mean to the agent that
the case officer is, after all, no better than all the other peo-
ple in the world he's never been able to get along with.
Aside from this very personal and very emotional reaction
to the use of the polygraph, there will be room for considerable
confusion in the interrogation in identifying what the Libyan
is reacting to. Within his over-all emotional reaction his
specific reactions can be very equivocal
different f thethvalues
va11 en
which they are based can be quite
inferred by his managers. It will require a great deal of cul-
tural as well as personal insight to know what he feels guilty
about; he is not likely to be defensive about many things he m defensive abcase officer out feels are
the case officer tisaunawa ea o f oe r ere.-
def e
gards as insignificant.
There may be some value in introducing the machine
lightly, with no intention of really probing, in order to expose
the agent to this aspect of the case officer's armament-not
to threaten him, but to reveal the potentiality of the threat.,
But for conventional applications, if it is necessary to test
the agent o but also
procedures preserve the case officer out of
possible p
the picture.
sen-
The Libyan is vulnerable to blackmail because of
Fors most
sitivity about his reputation and public image.
Libyans guilt is associated with being caught and exposed; all
will rail against an e:tposed culprit. The important thing for
the blackmailer is to choose a circumstance which represents
a violation of the Libyan's moral code, since many things
which are wrong to the Westerner axe of little significance to
him.
A-RDP781S 94TA000200010001-2
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Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: 9WP78T03194A000200010001-2
25X1
Articles and book reviews on the following pages are un-
classified and may for convenience be detached from the classi-
fled body of the Studies if their origin therein is protected.
The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr.
Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical Intelligence
Collection, in scanning current public literature for intelli:
gene materials, and of the intelligence officers who prepared
book reviews for this issue of the Studies.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-R
25X1
 Approved For Ro
Intelligence Articles VII 1
U.S. Only
Republication without
express permission pro-
hibited.
Release 20O RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
Intellectual gropings and intra-
mural contention over bombing
plans in London headquarters
during World War II.
THE BEGINNINGS OF AIR TARGETING'
W. W. Rostow
In World War I a certain amount of experience with tactical
bombing had been developed, and such conceptions as the es-
tablishment of local air supremacy, the isolation of the battle-
field, and direct attack on the enemy's troops and emplace-
ments were familiar. Neither these operations, however, nor
the German 1940-41 attacks on Great Britain and the Royal
Air Force's night offensive developing in 1942 had begun to
solve the problems of applying the power of a strategic air
force. In strategic bombing the target is the vast structure of
economic and civil life which supports the military effort.
Until 1943 both the German and the British bomber forces
had chosen to belabor that structure at many points simul-
taneously, both by attacks upon cities and by unsystematic
attacks on more precise targets, aiming to bring about some
vaguely defined collapse, either economic or political, which
would lead to military capitulation.
The American precision bombing forces beginning to arrive
in England knew that they would have to start operations on
a small scale, limiting themselves at first to attacking a rela-
tively small number of carefully chosen targets. The slow
rate of build-up of the U.S. forces in the European theater
thus had the virtue that it forced the Air Staff to forego dur-
ing the first year and a half of operations any such dreams
of causing a Wagnerian cataclysm; and by the time full
strength and capabilities were reached at the end of February
1944, a well-disciplined air doctrine had crystallized and
had been generally accepted.
It was appreciated by the U.S. air officers in London
charged with plans at that early period that a precision bomb-
ing program would be extraordinarily dependent on detailed
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MORI/HRP PAGES Al-A24
 Air Targeting Approved For Release 2005/04/13
Air Targeting
intelligence concerning the location and importance of ele-
ments in the enemy's. war production structure. They had in-
vestigated the sources of British intelligence and the forms
in which it was organized, and they had concluded that,
while the raw materials for guiding a precision bombing pro-
gram existed, an intensive search through these materials
and critical examination and organization of them would be
required if targets were to be well chosen. There was no
staff within the air force that could carry out the kind of
technical studies envisaged, and civilian aid was invoked.
The Economic Objectives Unit
The civilians in question were a group of scholar-analysts
posted to London from the Research and Analysis Branch of the
Office of Strategic Services,2 eventually augmented by three
people from the Board of Economic Warfare. In September
1942 they formed the Economic Objectives Unit, which served
the U.S. Strategic Air Force and other British and American
headquarters in a semi-independent, advisory status through-
out the war. Gradually developing its functions out of par-
ticular requirements and situations, EOU ultimately per-
formed four distinct types of services. First, chronologically,
were detailed studies of the layouts of targets and the objec-
tives within them whose destruction would cause the greatest
loss of production. Second were analyses of enemy industries
as target systems, furnishing the basis for calculating the
probable returns from systematic attack on alternative target
systems against the comparative costs. Third were occasional
but important ventures in drafting operational plans.
Fourth was the assignment of EOU analysts to particular
branches of the air and ground staffs to help guide their execu-
tion of the air offensive. These activities taken together con-
stitute the full range of functions for an air force target sec-
tion.
.As a result of the unorthodoxy of its organizational status,
however, EOU's contribution was more often informal than
formal, more often anonymous than identified; and its voice
'For an account of an earlier pioneering study done by the R & A
Branch, and by some of the same analysts, see "The Eastern Front at
the Turning Point" in Intelligence Articles VI 4 p 15 i~
Approved torelease 2005/
was but one of many in the shaping of bombing policy. Even
to the extent that bombing operations actually took the image
for which it argued, it could claim no unique responsibility
except perhaps for the tactical attack on the Seine-Loire
bridges in connection with the Normandy landings. With
this exception its position, until it finally won a place on the
Combined Strategic Target Committee in November 1944, was
that of serving those who carried the very great burden of
persuading the executive authorities to the desired course of
action.
Within the informal framework of the whole planning
group EOU's part had two distinguishing characteristics.
First, it was an intelligence organization at the working level,
and in fact the only organization in the theater devoted solely
to the development of target intelligence and target thinking.
It always remained close to the basic raw information; its
papers, even at their most theoretical, stood against a back-
ground of reading ground reports, analyzing targets building
by building, measuring bridges, cleaning and recording mark-
ings from a pile of German ball bearings. It had not only to
organize existing information in relevant forms but to guide
interrogations, photographic interpretation, and secret intel-
ligence and to seek out new sources to produce the appropri-
ate raw information.
Second, it had thrashed out in its first six months a group
of concepts which came close to constituting a general theory
of strategic air bombardment. These were refined over the
subsequent two years by fresh minds and enriched by experi-
ence with actual air operations both strategic and tactical.
Thus there grew up within the unit a set of criteria against
which any proposed program was explicitly measured. The
vitality of the concepts developed is attested by the entrance
into the common air intelligence vocabulary of such unlovely
but useful phrases as target system, interdiction, cushion,
depth, pattern of consumption, pipeline.
At the outbreak of war it was settled air staff policy in
both the British and American services that operations and
intelligence be sharply separated. In British practice Air
Ministry Intelligence and Air Ministry Bomber O
ti
pera
ons
A4=7aT9 `, 4#AAW,0A1901Wi er had any serious influence
A3
 Air Targeting
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on target policy within RAF Bomber Command. But it
was in the nature of precision bombing, as opposed to area
bombing, that close liaison between operations and intelli-
gence was required, and EOU's irregular status put it in posi-
tion to help forge that link. It was an evident lesson of the
European experience that classic staff channels and pro-
cedures are demonstrably inadequate for the effective con-
duct of precision air operations.
Aiming Point Reports
The EOU analysts soon discovered that although the British
were getting and analyzing a vast amount of data, they were
doing little work explicitly addressed to the needs of a pre-
cision bombing program. The Ministry of Economic War-
fare analyzed a large flow of assorted intelligence mainly to
throw light on the over
all G
-
erman economic position rather
than its target vulnerability. The Air Ministry was rapidly
improving its knowledge of the German air force and refining
its analysis, but the target aspects of the Luftwaffe were, with
certain exceptions, neglected. Arrangements were therefore
made for EOU to get the raw data, as well as products of
analysis, in order to organize it in forms required by the U.S.
air force.
The first assignment from the 8th Air Force was to analyze
individual industrial targets, specifying the importance of the
plant within the industry in question, the function of each of
its buildings, the vulnerability of the processes it carried on,
its probable rate of recovery after successful attack, and what
sections of it should be destroyed to obtain the greatest and
longest-lived effects on total output. No guidance was given
to EOU at this time with respect to the factories or the in-
dustries in which the Air Force was then operationally inter-
ested, so that the full range of industry in German Europe
was open to the first experimental analyses.
Such an analysis required not only all the data available
from ground reports, PW interrogations, and photographic
interpretation on the plant in question, but also a visit to at
least one British factory carrying out the same process. The
layout and operations of such a lant
w0 be thoroughly
examined and the judgment of the ma a
gerd obtained about
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the vulnerability and importance of different sections. Some
of the plants visited at this time and reported on in detail
were ones producing synthetic oil, ignition equipment, propel-
ler forgings, and motor cars. In November the first sample
analyses of German plants, including for example one on the
Siemens Cable Works, Berlin, were submitted to and ap-
proved by the 8th Air Force, which now indicated the chief
current air force target interests to be ball bearings, rubber
and tires, and oil. The period of groping thus ended and work
could begin purposefully on a relatively limited number of
plants. During the succeeding 18 months 285 so-called Aim-
ing Point reports were produced.
These reports were used by the 8th and 15th Air Force
bomber commands both as general intelligence summaries and
in setting operational aiming points for attack. They also
supplied a basis for damage assessment, and they served as a
guide to interrogators in the collection of further intelli-
gence. More broadly, they established a definite form for the
organization of intelligence for precision bombing purposes
and a mode of thinking about precise targets. In their detail.
and specificity they were an innovation, and British intelli-
gence regarded the EOU interest in particular buildings as an.
evidence of undue optimism and even of faint morbidity.
In a sense that scepticism was justified. For precision
bombing as carried out by the American heavy bombers was,
in fact, pattern bombing. Only a few targets, for example
synthetic oil plants, had a plant area larger than the mini-
mum bomb pattern, so that in most instances the physical
center of the plant could serve as an adequate operational
aiming point. Nevertheless these reports lent precision to
thinking on target problems and added a new element in
target intelligence work.
Theory of Target Selection
The Aiming Point reports involved collecting facts and or-
ganizing them in reasonable form, but they did not call for
elaborate thinking. They engaged the energy and inventive-
ness of the EOU staff but not its bent to look for first prin-
ciples and establish new concepts. It was evident, moreover,
lA-RDP78 1 A 66 M 1W0lQ reach the heart of the target prob-
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lem. For these reasons the unit began to interest itself in
the theory of target choice.
At the close of 1942 there were two conceptions of preci-
sion target choice current which called for critical considera-
tion. A gaudy well-illustrated handbook had been issued by a
British civilian attached to the Air Ministry which suggested
that the optimum form of attack would be on the largest
plants in a variety of industries. There was no formal ra-
tionale offered; the approach was an extension of that which
governed the occasional unsystematic, though sometimes bril-
liant, RAF precision raids like that on Renault in Paris. The
handbook's target list was simply a collection of important
but largely unrelated industrial installations. The second
theory of target selection was implicit in an air force request
to EOU that it
consider upon what industries-electric
power, for example-the whole of the German economy de-
pended.
By early January 1943 the framework of a target theory
had been crystallized and agreed on within EOU and with the
U.S. Strategic Air Force target officer, Colonel Richard D.
Hughes. Its principles required that targets be chosen in the
light of an explicitly defined military aim linked to the full
context of the war strategy and especially to its timing, not
just in order to weaken the enemy economy generally nor
to cause political disruption, that they be chosen by measur-
ing the specific damage to the enemy against the cost and
with a view to the ways a mature and resourceful economy
can divert the consequences of bomb damage away from the
military effort it supports, that the bombing be concentrated
on the minimum number of targets whose destruction would
achieve the goal set, and that the chosen target system be
persistently attacked and kept thoroughly crippled.
The next few. months were devoted to acquiring a quantita-
tive grasp of production, stocks, and consumption of key ele-
ments in the German war effort. The War Office and Ad-
miralty were badgered for rates of expenditure of German
tanks and submarines relative to production and first-line
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Air Targeting
strength; the resources of the somewhat reluctant Air Minis-
try Intelligence were probed; the Ministry of Supply pro-
duced figures on components like ball bearings and spark
plugs showing the amounts consumed in various military and
civilian uses; and a baffled Service of Supply colonel was forced
to consider for the first time his normal motor transport
wastage rate in the Zone of the Interior. Analysis of such
data yielded, not accurate measures, but order-of-magnitude
estimates that permitted a systematic comparison of the at-
tractiveness of various target systems. The way in which
they were applied to current planning problems is illustrated
by a report issued in March on "Production, Wastage, and
Military Strength Ratios" as affecting target selection, the
introductory summary of which follows:
1. Strength in any armament item may be regarded as a pool
which is being constantly depleted by current outflow (wastage)
and replenished by current inflow (production and repair).
Strength is being maintained when the inflow through production
and repair is just equal to the outflow through wastage.
2. If the item is quick-moving, the inflow and outflow in a month
bear a high ratio to the size of the pool. This situation is typified
by aircraft, where monthly production of combat types is more
than one-fourth of first-line strength; repair output raises the ratio.
3. In the case of durable items, the ratios of monthly production
and wastage to strength are low. Submarines are the most im-
portant item in this category, though the production-strength ratio
is several times higher than the wastage-strength because the fleet
is growing rapidly.
4. Action by the United Nations to reduce the German strength
in these items takes two forms: diminishing the inflow of new
production, and accelerating outflow through wastage.
5. There is a strong prima facie case for concentrating our efforts
on diminishing the production of quick-moving items like aircraft,
and on increasing the wastage of durable ones like submarines.
Another report, in April, addressing itself to the timing of a
bombing program in relation to the invasion of the continent,
pointed out that the disruption of ball bearing production, for
example, would cut down German strength in armaments in
the field at a rate dependent on the rates of wastage of each
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 Air Targeting
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type of armament in relation to existing field strength as
follows:
First
Monthly Monthly
Turn-Over
Line
Pro-
Wast
Ti
Armament type Strength
duction
-
age
me
(1)
(V4)
(2)
O
e
ti
(3)
(4)
(5)
p
ra
onal Aircraft .. 5
000
1
300
1
300
,
Fi
ht
,
,
4 months
g
ers ............ 2,000
Bomb
650
650
3 months
ers ............ 2,400
Subma
i
550
550
4 months
r
nes ........... 300
Tanks
22
6
50 months
..... . 10
000
1
000
1
0
,
Arm
T
k
,
,
00
10 months
y
ruc
s ......... 400,000
6,000
8,000
50 months
Considering also the several months' cushion of quantities in
stock and pipeline, it concluded:
Thus, in reply to General Arnold's query, It is of obvious im-
portance to carry out a concerted attack on one of the major com-
ponents [e.g., ball bearings] as long before an invasion of the
Continent as is possible. Even making the optimistic assumptions
above, fully 5 months would elapse between the ending of bearing
production and the reduction of first line fighter strength by 50%.
For tanks, it will be noted, the figure is 9 months, while no decisive
effect on field strength in other categories is to be expected within
reasonably short periods.
From the time of their arrival in Great Britain early in the
summer of 1942 to the last days of the war, the American air
forces were pressed from various sources and with varying
effectiveness to allocate a part or all of their effort to area
bombing. This was natural because RAF Bomber Command,
the senior air force in the theater, was devoting the bulk of
its effort to this type of operation, though RAF staff officers
were by no means unanimous in supporting this choice. EOU
consistently took the view that daylight flights could, under
almost any circumstances, be better devoted to precision op-
erations, and that area bombing could promise no decisive re-
sults. A paper in reply to a proposal in 1944 that the Ameri-
cans join the RAF in its massive attacks on Berlin and so
bring the war to an early end, excerpted below, is typical.
With respect to our capabilities, I do not believe we could create
social catastrophe in a sufficient number of cities within the narrow
span of time required for cumulative effectiveness to enlarge local
disasters into national disruption. In this context, the case of
Hamburg, which tactically was uniquely situated for this type
of attack, is informative. Despite maximum effectiveness, con-
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : C
Air Targeting
centration, and continuity, and minimum operational losses, the
Germans proved capable of coping with the situation, despite the
deep and permanent impression made. Because of its location,
size, and the structure of its buildings, Berlin is a very much
less attractive target. It is my private view that the rest of
Germany would take some modest pleasure in Berlin getting it;
and undoubtedly, provision has already been made for the dis-
persal of administrative centres.
If the German leaders choose to continue the war, there is no
reason to believe that they will be incapable of mustering suffi-
cient agencies of relief and repression to avoid a general loss of
control over the population. They have proved capable of main-
taining control and productive activity in Northern Italy and
France, against almost single-minded opposition. No evidence or
argument is offered in the paper to show why area bombing, even
on the scale envisaged, will cause anarchy or revolution; and there
is good reason to believe that the German leaders are governing
their view of the war on almost purely military considerations,
and would prefer, like the British leaders of 1940-41, that the air
superiority mounted against them be dissipated in attacks on
cities than against special targets of direct and immediate im-
portance to the war effort.
At an early stage of work on targets, we examined from official
German papers the history of collapse in 1918. It was concluded
that the collapse came when Ludendorf and others saw clearly
that they were defeated in the field and that their manpower
and material resources would in a finite time be inadequate to
hold any fixed front. These were the operative considerations,
not morale, and at a time when a vocal parliamentary peace party
was countenanced, when internal controls were childishly lax by
present standards, when the Fourteen Points offered the bulk of
the population an easy way out, and the food situation was very
serious indeed. I believe that collapse will come this time also
from the top, and as a result of the military and military supply
situation, literally defined.
Policy Planning
The Casablanca directive of 21 January 1943 had set forth
five primary targets for air attack and a priority among them:
1. German submarine construction yards
2. The German aircraft industry
3. Transportation
4. The German oil industry
5. Other targets in enemy war industry
 lease 2005/04/13 : C
It was soon agreed within the loose-knit target team in
London-representatives of the air forces and of the British
Air and Economic Warfare ministries and EOU-that the fol-
lowing changes were required to make this directive fit our
aims and our capabilities: the attack on the submarine yards
should be eliminated or drastically reduced in priority; the at-
tack on the aircraft industry should be narrowed largely to
single-engine fighters; an attack on ball bearings should be
introduced into the program as a means of affecting German
war production as a whole; and the attack on transport and
oil should be dropped from immediate consideration.
The submarine problem had begun to be dealt with effec-
tively at sea from the spring of 1943, and in any case it was
clear that the attacks on production and bases were making
no significant contribution to antisubmarine warfare. As the
bomber force grew it was regarded as imperative to remove
them from top priority and to clear the way for attack on the
main target systems.
With respect to the aircraft industry, it was appreciated by
both the Germans and ourselves that the single-engine fighter
was their principal hope for maintaining daylight air suprem-
acy over Germany and for continuing effective close support
of their armies. It was from our point of view the principal op-
ponent of our daylight bomber force, and its production was
steadily rising. It seemed necessary, if at a later date more
important sectors of German war production were to be at-
tacked, to remove the threat of the single-engine fighter force,
and the attack on SEF production seemed a necessary step for
that.
Since the attack on aircraft was essentially defensive, de-
signed to achieve a condition favorable to later offensive ac-
tions, it was conceived proper to devote some part of our
bombing program to positive attacks affecting other German
armaments. Of all the alternatives examined-in addition to
fighter aircraft, ball bearings, and oil, studies were done on
submarines, synthetic rubber, copper, aluminum, textiles,
steel, heavy engineering, grinding wheels and other indus-
tries-the ball bearing industry appeared to offer the most
economical and most operationally feasible point for imping-
ing by air attack on the whole structure of German war pro-
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Air Targeting
duction. It is doubtful that the reason for the ball bearing at-
tacks was fully understood at the time by many within the
air forces. They were generally linked to the single-engine
fighter: "SEF and ball bearings" was spoken like "damn-
yankee," a tribute to effective salesmanship but not clear
however, it was appre-
thinking. Within the planning team,
ciated that the Germans would almost surely be able to pro-
tect fighter aircraft production from the consequences of a
ball bearing shortage, especially since the direct attack on
fighter production simultaneously planned would diminish
the demand for aircraft bearings.
Finally, it was agreed to be essential that the air forces
narrow their aim to the target systems that lay within their
operational grasp, that they concentrate on a limited set of
targets and avoid any divergence. It was evident that seri-
ous attack on the German transport system or on oil produc-
tion, involving literally hundreds of targets, lay well beyond
our capabilities in 1943 and that these systems should there-
fore be dropped from the list of current target priorities. If
secondary targets were required for operational reasons, it
was suggested that the compact synthetic rubber system and
the major tire and motor transport plants be listed; relatively
few attacks on these might prove to be militarily significant.
On 10 June 1943, finally, the air force members of the target
team managed to get these modifications of the Casablanca
directive incorporated into a Chief of Air Staff letter, thus
clearing the way for the operations known as "Pointblank"
which focussed on fighter aircraft and ball bearings for the
next nine months. Although this precision bombing plan was
designed for both British and American air forces, the Air
Ministry failed notably to force RAF Bomber Command to
adhere to it, either in spirit or in letter. Through the rest
of 1943 and the early months of 1944 the RAF kept trying
to end the war by area raids.
To set priorities and provide week-by-week target guidance
in the concentrated attack on the German air force-its pro-
duction, repair factories, depots, airfields, and aircraft in be-
ing-and on ball bearings sanctioned by the 10 June letter,
the famous Jockey Committee was formed late in June, in-
cluding representatives from the working sections of British
 Approved For Release 2005/04/1
and American air intelligence and from the operational com-
mands. One EOU analyst sat with it from his position on loan
to Air Ministry Intelligence. This was the first of the target
system working committees. Its deliberations ended some 93
weeks later.
The German Aircraft Industry
Throughout the course of the war, no aspect of intelligence
received wider, more continuous, and more devoted attention
than the German air force, including aircraft production. It
was recognized early that aircraft production bore a more im-
mediate and direct relationship to fighting value at the front
line than other forms of armament manufacture, and it was
therefore treated rather as a military than an economic sub-
ject and handled within the Air Ministry rather than the
Ministry of Economic Warfare.
Intelligence on the aircraft industry was sharpened and in-
fused with a special vitality by the fact that photographic in-
terpretation both of aircraft types and of the aircraft indus-
try was in the hands of Flight Officer Constance Babbington-
Smith at the Central Interpretation Unit. From 1941 to the
end of the war she brought craftsmanship, enthusiasm, and a
creative imagination to the analysis. This was of particular
importance because the aircraft industry has shallow roots;
both the locations and the processes of production were under
continuous development and alteration, and the many impor-
tant changes could be followed with precision only by the
study of air photos.
The German air force as a target system thus antedated
EOU, and it had not hitherto been necessary for the unit to
study aircraft production in detail. Now examining the in-
dustry, it found that the airframe production target had the
disadvantage of containing few vulnerable or even highly spe-
cialized installations, so that damage was not likely to be long-
lived in its effects. Aero engines, moreover, seemed more
likely to be the limiting factor in German expansion of fighter
production, and they were therefore a superior target sys-
tem. But this target had to be tabled for 1943 because it in-
cluded a large production capacity in the Berlin area, which
we did not expect to be able to attack until late in the year at
Air Targeting
the earliest, and without the Berlin plants it was doubtful
any considerable effect on the single-engine fighter position
could be achieved through engines. In the event, Berlin was
first attacked in March 1944. identifi-
cations were therefore devoted both to building up
cations and analyses of the airframe factories for immediate
purposes and to the aero engine plants for the future. Some
116 Aiming Point reports were ultimately done on the aircraft
industry. Broader studies were also
and on the use of
with respect to the dispersal of production
floor space measurements in conjunction with other forms of
intelligence to figure quantities produced. At the same time a
full-scale exploration was made for future targets for the
15th Air Force soon to be based in southern Italy. EOU set to
work on the intelligence on southeastern Europe, which was
limited by the lack of systematic photoreconnaissance, to dis-area cover, evaluate, and array guide to reconnaissances as wellsas the
The results served as a g
foundation for 15th Air Force target work.
EOU's contribution to the attack on the aircraft industry
was thus substantial in the period before the attacks began.
But the bulk of the work of following the attacks themselves,
discov-
re-evaluating the industry and its target significance,
ering new targets, etc., fell to the analysts it had released to
work in the Air Ministry and with the 15th Air Force in the
Mediterranean.
Few who were in any way associated with the air offensive
in Europe will forget 20 February 1944. For at least four
months a group of the major aircraft targets in central Ger-
many and northeast Europe had been scheduled for attack in
a single operation, a massive incursion deep into the conti-
nent. On 11 January a local break in weather had permitted
attacks on three of these targets in the northwest, and that
day was extremely significant in the success of the American
long-range fighter in combat over Germany. But the great
f
test of our capabilities was and still awaited; heavy losses were
impossible weather came
expected; the operation was accepted as a measure of the
feasibility of a mature precision bombing program in daylight.
Although some such test was overdue, the decision to mount
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it was clearly one of the great decisions of the war, comparable
to that of the British to allocate troops to the Middle East in
1940 and General Eisenhower's judgment on the weather evi-
dence of 6 June 1944.
On a Sunday heavy and gray in London but brilliant over
central Germany the operation took place. The losses-22
bombers-were far smaller than had been expected. The
enemy's fighters had largely been outmaneuvered, and those
that engaged were outfought. The Big Week was on. In suc-
ceeding days of freak clear weather the 8th and 15th Air
Forces struck with varying success, but on the whole effec-
tively, at most of their top priority targets over the range of
single- and twin-engine fighters and ball bearings.
The Big Week showed that the air forces could attack ac-
curately and heavily a considerable number of targets in a
mass operation, and at peak strength the German fighter
force had suffered tactical defeat over its own bases. The
damage done to fighter production was bound to weaken the
German force for several months at least. It was therefore
demonstrated that the air forces could now undertake to at-
tack additional target systems.
The Switch to Oil
In retrospect, the choice of oil was an. obvious next step. It
promised, if sedulously pursued, not only to affect the whole
German war production structure but also to limit the fight-
ing value of the ground and air forces, and with D day only
three months off this was a decisive factor. The oil industry
was so located as to offer an excellent distribution of targets,
and especially it offered scope for the growing capabilities of
the purposeful and efficient 15th Air Force. Although large
by older standards, it was a sufficiently limited target system
to offer a chance of cutting deep within a reasonably short
period of time and to leave some bombing capacity over for
containing aircraft and ball bearing production and for strik-
ing at attractive concentrations like tank engine production.
Oil as the next major target system was agreed within the
planning group before the week of consecutive attacks on the
aircraft industry had ended, and EOU's suggested draft of the
excerpts from which are reproduced below, was com-
plan,
pleted on 28 February.
The major question of regarding oil refineries and synthetic
plants as a target system is whether, in view of the very large
Until the present, it In be successfully attacked in its
number of targets, it can
appeared that a to get system of about 501 tot 60
app
targets was beyond Air Force capabilities. view of the su -
be wthin USSTAF
an fighter stantial destruction of this job may now production
quent lesser fighter opposition, and RAF capabilities. target system holds such great
if this be the case, Germanrdefeat. Stocks of finished petro-
promise for hastening for several months military op-
leum products are sufficient only would directly
erations. The loss of more than 50% of Axis
p capabilities through re-
and materially reduce German militarY
and front-line delivery of
ducing tactical and strategic mobility capabilities through
supplies. It would indirectly affect military to produce
weakening High Command morale and industrial ability weapons and supplies.
The extension of attacks to storage facilities ldeps in es ern E urope
might directly impair German mobility case result from over- any lord. Indirect benefit
lin Finland and Norway,
of German divisions
to Overlord the lessened mobility ity
Russia, the Balkans, and Italy. account
Twenty-three synthetic plants and Si refineries currently synthetic oil output.
ked,
for over 90 percent of total Axis refinery
if the 12 refineries in the Ploesti area are
ors partly workittg cmay
major refineries elsewhere whether fully
be followed up; and idle refineries in France, the Low Countries,
Cis large;
Italy and Germany must be watched. The u of all
destruction within the next three months of less than half
fi
lue In
oil production will not affect Overlord fOr e orce m fightiting v vaalue in
present
rcraft
the period D plus 30. With
oil offers the e most promising system of attack after fightlwhere
and ball bearings, to bring the German armies to the point
their defeat in the field will be assured.
This paper, which included a review of the history of the
t to Which
existing target directive, an evaluation
examination of tennalternative
it had been fulfilled, and an
was sent to Colonel Hughes, who,
possible target systems with
, from an opera-
tional Cabell, recently drawn into Planning of the era
tional group, was charged with the preparation
Strategic Air Force plan. The final version drew a dices on
the EOU draft and used in their entirety its app
amining oil and the main alternative target systems.
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 Air I argeting
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The previous history of attacks on oil had been one of disap-
pointment, and Air Chief Marshal Harris had never forgiven
the oil experts for recommending them early in the war. He
habitually referred to the proponents as the "oily boys." Car-
ried out with inadequate force, accuracy, and persistence-as
was inevitable in 1940-1941-the RAF attacks had obviously
accomplished little. Even the American attack on Ploesti of
August 1943 had achieved no evident military consequences,
despite its gallant accuracy. Above all, the enemy's oil posi-
tion was associated in the public and the military mind with
the classic miscalculations of 1939-1940 about the economic
weaknesses in the German war production structure. By
1944 it was a mark of sophistication to know that the en-
emy's oil position was very sound indeed.
On the evening of 5 March 1944, General Cabell and Colonel
Hughes presented the final draft to General Spaatz. Major
General Anderson had already read the plan and was an
advocate of it. Discussion began before dinner and ran into
the early hours of the morning around the Park House con-
ference table. Despite the paper's emphasis on completing
the attacks on the Pointblank systems, General Spaatz
quickly appreciated that it was to all intents and purposes
an oil plan. He explored at length the issues at stake, and es-
pecially the capabilities of the 8th and 15th Air Forces with re-
spect to the number of targets involved, and he ordered the
plan completed for prompt presentation to Air Marshal
Portal and General Eisenhower.
There followed a crucial sequence of events at top level
which held up the oil offensive for two months. General Eisen-
hower and Air Marshal Portal deferred decision on the oil plan
until a plan prepared by the tactical Allied Expeditionary Air
Forces for attacks on French rail targets in connection with
Overlord had been examined. On 25 March, therefore, when
the issue came to a head, General Eisenhower was presented
the false alternatives of the AEAF rail plan versus the
USSTAF oil plan, and the latter was turned down on the
grounds that it could not be guaranteed to have any effect
on German strength in the west before D day plus 30. In
retrospect it seems likely that some tactical effect would prob-
ably have been achieved in the west by the end of June, at
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Air Targeting
least in the form of lowered bi stocks
to held h' the field in interruptions lity sequently increased vulne rn the evidence available, however,
in local supply. Nothing
indicated that this outcome was certain.
USSTAF remained,~onvinced of
15th Air 1Force onh the Ploesti
and in April attacks by the 15 acent re-
marshalling yards were allowed to lap over onto adj
fineries. In mid-May, under special dispensation from the Su-
preme Commander, two days of visual bombing in central r-
were devoted to the synthetic oil plants. The impact
many already done to Ploesti,
these attacks, on top of the damage and oil moved in as a
was on clear evidence very considerable;
priority target system in the course of June 1944. profiting
of the Jockey Committee and the lessons
from the pattern planning, a working committee on
of errors in tactical target was set up
oil targets, in which EOTJ was directly represented,
on 29 June. primary target system had
The political battle for oil as a not ended, however. From the perspective of AEAF and then
SHAEF (Air), oil was a clamorous and unwanted child, com-
would have preferred to see used against
peting for effort they ht to the end of
rail transport, and a running battle was foug
battle was should be allalmo s confined
the war on the proportion of effort
to oil. It should be noted that this portion of the bomber force.
exclusively to the British-based p orably thOr-
In the Mediterranean the 15th Aotoethenoil target andystem
oughly discharged its responsibilities "and looked around for more when they were through."
an impar-
The decision to advocate the attack on oil was in the American sense the most significant one taken boil that they un-
doubtedly forces in Europe, for it was through the was as
made their greatest contribution to and more a
whole. In helping to guide them in that decision,
arative target analysis
broadly in developing a system of comp time, EOU
which indicated oil as the optimum s target
bombing program
probably was more useful the than at any other single point.
A17
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Tactical Targets
The strategic air forces operated under AEAF, later
SHAEF (Air), direction with respect to tactical targets, and
at an early stage General Spaatz had vetoed the advocacy by
USSTAF of any independent tactical plan. But when Air
Chief Marshal Tedder, as Deputy Supreme Commander,
backed a plan and a conception with which EOU disagreed,
the unit had to oppose it, seeking in diverse places channels
to make known its own ideas. This political battle raged
from the close of January 1944 to the end of the war in Eu-
rope, but most hotly in the four months that preceded D day
and the two that followed.
In the course of January the Theater Intelligence Section
of G-2 SHAEF issued a paper suggesting various particular
transport and army establishment targets which might use-
fully be attacked before D day in support of the invasion.
This document, while attempting soberly to relate air opera-
tions to the ground force problem of invasion, was clearly in-
adequate and, written by army intelligence officers, showed
an understandable lack of experience in target planning. On
22 January it was swept aside by a paper entitled "Delay and
Disorganization of Enemy Movement by Rail," written by
Professor Zuckerman, formerly Air Chief Marshal Tedder's
scientific advisor in the Mediterranean and now attached to
AEAF. This paper called for a very large-scale attack on the
marshalling yards of France and Belgium analogous to that
on the Sicilian and Italian marshalling yards in the summer
of 1943.
The Zuckerman plan was sent. to USSTAF, which invited
EOU's view. EOU saw, serious reasons for disagreement and
set about investigating the cited experience in the Mediter-
ranean and formulating an alternative plan. It developed
that the Sicilian experience was open to serious question as a
justification, for the attack on marshalling yards and that
tactical target thinking in the Mediterranean over the winter
of 1943-1944 had moved away from the concept of attack on
the whole railway system towards systematic attacks on
bridges and line, designed to deny the enemy through rail
transport to the front, over some distance behind the front.
At the moment when Professor Zuckerman, backed by Tedder,
was invoking the voice of Mediterranean experience in sup-
port of marshalling yards as targets, the air forces in Italy
were completing their first full experiment with "Operation
Strangle," a systematic attack on a bridge system, having
largely abandoned the attempt to achieve significant results
from attacks on the marshalling yards of northern Italy.
As a positive alternative to the marshalling yard plan, it
was agreed that the optimum pre-D-day tactical program
should comprise, first, attack on systems of bridges, junctions,
and open stretches of rail designed to deny the enemy through
rail access to the bridgehead area, and second, attack on am-
munition and fuel dumps, ordnance depots, and other mili-
tary establishments offering concentrations suitable for
bombing. This program would be superior because it would ac-
complish the disruption of military supply movements by rail
more thoroughly than the attack on marshalling yards, and it
would do so at much less cost in effort. As a result, heavy
bomber effort would be available to begin the strategic attack
on oil and to exploit the considerable concentrations of mili-
tary resources which the Germans had permitted to persist
in. the west.
To move from the conception of this program to adequate
target priority lists required a very considerable mobilization
of the intelligence. In one way or another the basic data were
collected, and by the end of March the Seine and Loire Bridges
and a large number of the more important dumps, headquar-
ters, and so forth had been fully analyzed and tactical aiming
point reports prepared. On 17 February an "Outline Plan for
Air Support of Overlord" incorporating the bridge and mili-
tary supplies program was submitted to USSTAF. USSTAF
remained reluctant to interfere officially in tactical policy,
however, and although urged to present the new tactical plan
in connection with the new strategic plan for oil, since the
AEAF plan had not yet been formally adopted by the Supreme
Commander, decided to put the case for oil forward separately.
Thus the oil plan, rather than the bridge and dump plan,
appeared as an alternative to the AEAF plan, and the Su-
preme Commander was never informed of the existence of a
full-scale rail program alternative to the marshalling yard at-
tacks. USSTAF, feeling unable to advocate an independent
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tactical policy and further limited by not having operational
control of the medium bombers and fighter-bombers of the 9th
Air Force, now decided explicitly not to set out a formal al-
ternative to the AEAF pre-D-day plan.
EOU turned then to an effort to press its view with compo-
nents of the Allied forces who were more directly concerned
with the formulation of tactical policy. One of its analysts
had in the course of his investigations into tactical targets
come into contact with the personnel of G-2 SHAEF, whose
function it was to represent the Army's needs and wishes with
respect to bombing targets at AEAF. There ensued a request
from G-2 that he be loaned to them, and at the end of April
he took over a desk there and became in effect a member of
the G-2 SHAEF staff. His job was to insure that ground force
intelligence was fully combed and organized in such a way as
to produce targets and evaluations of targets from the tangled
evidence; there had hitherto been almost no systematic analy-
sis of tactical targets for operational purposes. He was thus
in a position to assist the key figures at G-2 SHAEF in
evaluating the effects of the marshalling yard program then
under way and to urge that this should be supplanted by
tactical attacks on bridges and local supply concentrations,
along with strategic attacks on oil, tank factories, ordnance
depots, and similar large military concentrations in Germany.
His efforts in these directions, which were completely frank
and involved no elements of subterfuge, took the form of in-
numerable conversations, interim memoranda, and the other
paraphernalia of staff work. They were climaxed by two G-2
SHAEF papers issued on 20 May and 7 June 1944, in which
EOU had a direct hand, showing the inadequacy of the mar-
shalling yard attacks and putting forward positive alternative
proposals.
As with respect to oil, May brought a happy mitigation of
the defeat in March of the bridge program. As late as 1 May
AEAF had written to the Deputy Supreme Commander citing
the cost of destroying the Seine bridges and concluding that
this action "can be included in the programme of preparatory
operations only if the effort can be spared from other essen-
tial commitments." But shortly thereafter, in an experimen-
tal attack originally suggested for heavy bombers by General
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Air Targeting
Cabell of USSTAF and acted upon by General Smith at AEAF,
a handful of Thunderbolt fighter-bombers knocked out the
Seine bridge at Vernon and damaged several others. This
success stirred a wide realization of the possibilities of bridge
attacks and a wave of enthusiam; and by D day every Seine
bridge from Paris to the sea was inoperative, as well as a num-
ber of "cover" bridges on the Meuse and elsewhere. In addi-
tion, the B-26s and the RAF heavy bombers began to operate
against some of the oil and ammunition depots.
By D day some portion of the EOU program had thus in
fact been carried out. Before now, curiously, air planning
had given little thought to the use of the heavy bombers in
support of the fighting after the armies were fully installed
on the Continent. It was soon discovered that the same is-
sues existed as in the pre-D-day problem, and the same formu-
lae were supported in each camp. On the whole, the success
of the pre-D-day bridge and dump and depot attacks appeared
sufficient to justify their continuance. The destruction of the
Seine-Loire bridge line, including the connecting link from
Mantes to Blois, was completed and fairly held, and the dumps
and depots were attacked with greater regularity. The EOU
crusade failed, on the other hand, to end the attack on the
French marshalling yards; and as a result the full possibili-
ties of a double ring of bridge cuts were never explored, and
many known dumps and depots fed the German armies in the
field, unattacked.
Frayed End
In the fall of 1944, when the Allied armies were advancing
rapidly through France, the transport targets previously cur-
rent were literally overrun; and with this drain lifted, the
heavy bombers devoted themselves to oil as a clear-cut first
priority. In addition a Military Supplies Working Committee
was set up to formulate tank, truck, and depot targets. For a
time it appeared, as if the war might end with a straightfor-
ward program of bombing oil and weapons targets. But the
transport advocates at AEAF, which had now become SHAEF
(Air), and SHAEF G-2 recovered from shock and counterat-
tacked towards the end of October. The attack on military
supplies was sacrificed and the Working Committee disbanded
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on 23 October. It took the Rundstedt January counteroffen-
sive to revive an interest in German tanks and get the Military
Supplies Working Committee reinstated early in 1945.
In this period between late October and the Rundstedt coun-
teroffensive, bombing policy was affected by the belief that the
end of the war was imminent. SHAEF (Air) sponsored
throughout the period, and the Air Staffs acquiesced in, what
was believed to be a short-run heavy bomber policy, namely,
attack on German marshalling yards, both proximate and dis-
tant from the battle area. The exact mechanism by which
such attacks were expected to hasten decision on the ground
was not clear, but their sponsors undoubtedly hoped for gen-
eral economic and military confusion on a scale such as to
cause capitulation. Throughout this period oil, nominally still
in top priority for the heavy bombers, was somewhat neg-
lected. Very massive tonnage figures were piled up against
the German rail system, and the attack on military supplies
was virtually abandoned. EOU protested this deviation and
advocated a return to priorities which it had suggested late in
July 1944:
Offensive
Target Systems
Priority 1 Oil Production
Priority 2 (a) Bearing Production
(a) Tank Engine Production
(b) Ordnance De
ots
p
Priority 4 (a) Tank Production
(b) Motor Vehicle Production
(c) Synthetic Rubber Production
(d) Oil Storage
Defensive
Target Systems
(b) Fighter aircraft
production
(c) Flying bomb pro-
duction
(d) Rocket fuel pro-
duction
In the case of priority 1 and 2 targets, thoroughgoing attack on
all major elements in the system is required. Priority 3 and 4
targets, however, will be useful even if the target systems are not
fully attacked.
The Rundstedt counteroffensive had two sobering effects.
First, it showed that a concentrated attack on transport in a
limited area proximate to the front could achieve significant
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Air Targeting
military results. At the suggestion of Colonel Hughes the
whole of the bomber forces had been thrown in at the base
of the German salient when the weather cleared a few days
after the offensive was launched. These bomber attacks,
strongly supported by the fighter-bombers, were effective in
denying the flow of supplies forward to the spearheads, and the
lesson was read that transport attacks should be limited to
systematic efforts to wreck or interdict the transport system
in the area behind the front. The bogey of strategic general
attack on rail transport was almost, but not quite, laid.
Second, the counteroffensive, in suggesting strongly that
the war was not yet over, led to the reintroduction of tanks,
jet aircraft, ordnance depots, and other target systems of a
military character; and above all it brought oil back into
fairly effective first priority.
Because of the creation of the Combined Strategic Targets
Committee, EOU's contribution throughout this period was
more formal and straightforward than it had ever been be-
fore. Its representation here was supplemented by member-
ship on all the target working committees which fed their
weekly conclusions up to the CSTC-those on oil, oil depots,
and tank and ordnance depots, Jockey, now watching the
ominous but tardy German development of jet aircraft, and
the transport working committee. It was in the latter that
the controversy continued to center, for SHAEF persisted in
advocating strategic attack on transport, while the Air Minis-
try, War Office, EOU, and MEW fought for a limited tactical
program. The effectiveness of the Ardennes transport bomb-
ing noted above strengthened the hand of those opposing
SHAEF and resulted finally in the Ruhr interdiction scheme.
But no clean-cut victory was ever won on this issue; a great
many non-tactical transport attacks continued to be carried .
out.
The final issue of this period arose with the Russian ad-
vance to the Oder and the crossing of the Rhine by the Ameri-
can First and Third Armies. With these movements came the
evident approach of an end to formal hostilities. At peak
strength, capable of bombing anywhere in German Europe
without serious opposition, the heavy bomber forces sought
new means to bring the war to a close. The oil program now
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Air Targeting
contained relatively few targets, and these were battered and
unattractive. The Ruhr interdiction scheme was virtually
complete, and it was soon outmoded by the crossing of the
21st Army Group. Area raids on Berlin, Dresden, and
Chemnitz were carried out in conjunction with RAF Bomber
Command; a large number of small central German mar-
shalling yards were hit in two spectacular medium-level op-
erations (called Clarion) ; but no key could be found.
It was the EOU view that no key existed; that, since heavy
bombers could not be used, with existing techniques, in close
army support, they should continue to do thoroughly the oil
and military supply targets capable of affecting the battle
over short periods and if possible serve as transport aircraft to
fast-moving ground columns.
The last serious planning battle of the war took place be-
tween the old antagonists fighting with the old weapons on
familiar ground. In April SHAEF (Air) proposed attacking a
large number of marshalling yards throughout the length of
the central area of Germany still held by German forces. The
aim of these attacks was "to exert pressure on the enemy";
it was agreed that they could not stop military movements
south to the redoubt area in the Bavarian Alps or have any
other clear-cut military effect. EOU and the majority of the
CSTC advocated attack on the last of the oil plants and on
the ordnance depots on which the retreating Germans were
falling back and drawing for supplies. They felt it was in-
trinsic in the nature of strategic bombing that the heavy
bombers should end the war not with a bang but with a
whimper.
The issue was settled by the decision of the air commanders
that the SHAEF transport plan would be carried out. EOU
and the other dissident members of CSTC of course retired
from the fray, gaining some comfort, however, from the fact
that a sudden advance of the armies eliminated the bulk of
the proposed targets before the attack could be mounted.
INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
IRISH STORIES
BLOODY SUNDAY. By James Gleeson. (London: Peter
Davies. 1962. Pp. 212. 21/-.)
of a Re-
Bloody Sunday, 21 November 1920, was the climax
tle between intelligence elements of the opposing Irish pub
lican Army and British security forces in Dublin. Its san-
guinary quality derives for the British from the IRA operation
carried out in the morning in which fourteen undercover in-
telligence officers and other security agents were shot to
death simultaneously in their lodgings; it derives for the Irish
from a reprisal raid on a football game that afternoon, when
the Black and Tans fired several volleys among the player's
and into the crowd of spectators, killing about an equal num-
ber of the enemy people and wounding many times more. This
book sketches in rather hit-or-miss fashion the preceding
landing of rifles in minute for
course of the rebellion
Volunteers in 1914 and
ful Sunday and its aftermath in executions.
The reader is forwarned of the quality of the writing by the
author's prefatory reference to "the dull business of Pre-
paring the manuscript." Yet he is engaged by the direct-
ness and authenticity of what is largely a compendium of
first-hand accounts and contemporary reports.
a number of
much description of guerrilla action and quite
references to intelligence activity on both sides, but little en-
lightening on these hot topics of today. A matter of some im-
portance is Michael Collins' strategic principle of victory--to
provoke the security forces to generalized reprisals which
make them so hated by the people that their position becomes
untenable; but while the applicability of this principle in the
Irish rebellion is evident, the author's attempt to extend it in
explanation of the British defeats in Israel and Cyprus is
not convincing. Here the skill of Collins' chief propagandist,
Erskine Childers, in winning sympathy abroad seems to be a
better prototype.
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 Recent Books: Irish
Approved For Release 2005/04/1
GEHEIMAUFTRAG IRLAND (Secret Mission Ireland). By
Enno Stephan. (Hamburg: Gerhard Stalling Verlag. 1961.
Pp. 345. DM 19.80.)
This is an exhaustively researched and well presented study
of the attempts of the German Abwehr to establish agents in
neutral Eire during the war. One intended mission for such
agents was liaison with the underground Irish Republican
Army fora r
o
r
p
g
am of sabotage and uprisings in the six
northern counties of Ulster, particularly in connection with a
German invasion of England. Another was the reporting of
information--on weather conditions and convoy movements
in the Battle of the Atlantic, and later on the activities of the
American forces in Londonderry. But many of the infiltra-
tion expeditions aborted for one reason or another, and of the
dozen ill-prepared agents actually landed all but one were ap-
prehended almost immediately.
The one agent who remained at large for nineteen months,
a Dr. Hermann Goertz, established liaison both with the IRA
command and with other underground elements. He gained
great respect among the nationalists and himself fell in love
with the Irish, but he accomplished nothing. The nationalists
were too much absorbed in feuding among themselves and
with De Valera's security forces for any serious undertakings
against the common enemy, the English. For several months
Goertz had no regular means of communication home, and
when the IRA finally found him a radio transmitter and op-
erator the five minutes per day he was allowed by Berlin did
not give him enough scope to make headquarters understand
the situation or to justify his recommendations. Most of his
subsequent efforts were therefore devoted to finding a way to
get back to make a report in person. One of his several fail-
ures at exfiltration is characteristic of the whole Irish tragi-
comedy: the IRA procured a fishing boat and a volunteer crew
to take him to Brest, but the voyage had to be called off when
the crew couldn't agree on which of them was to be in charge.
The author makes a persuasive case that Goertz was left
unmolested only through the suffrance of the security forces,
presumably with the thought that this covert channel to a po-
tential ally might be useful if Churchill's threatening
speeches should be followed by a forcible seizure of Eire's
A26
MORI/HRP PAGES A26-A27
Approved For Release 2005/04/
ports. His arrest came by accident in the course of a dragnet
operation when after an internal IRA coup the deposed chief
of staff had gone to the police for protection. Goertz showed
that he had learned how to behave like an Irishman: interned.
together with the other captured German agents with officer
privileges and considerable liberty, he went on a hunger
strike, wrote letters to the newspapers complaining about
prison conditions, made repeated attempts to escape, and
finally, when after the war he was about to be deported to
Germany, swallowed a cyanide capsule and died.
Although the Goertz case forms the book's main thread, the
other Abwehr failures, including an attempt to return two
prominent Irishmen, Sean Russell and Frank Ryan, to Eire,
are reconstructed individually in detail. The case histories
are studied not only from the agents' point of view but also
from that of the headquarters desk most concerned, Referat 1
West of Abwehr II, and in the framework of relations among
the Abwehr sections, the Sicherheitsdienst, the Foreign Office,
and the German diplomatic mission in Eire. This comprehen-
sive treatment gives historical depth to what might have been
just another spy story.' It also makes the Abwehr look
bumblingly indecisive in its planning and haphazard and cow-
boyish in staging operations.
1 For a journalistic and inaccurate summary of the Abwehr's Irish
efforts see the chapter "The Germans and the IRA" in They Spied on
England by Charles Wighton and Gunter Peis (London, 1958). This
chapter is omitted in the American edition, entitled Hitler's Spies and
Saboteurs (New York, 1958).
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SOVIET SERVICES
THE TWO FACES OF TASS. By Theodore E. Kruglak.
(Min-
neapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 1962. Pp.
263
$5.)
.
This is a journalist's history and appraisal of Tass as a news
agency-the title unduly emphasizes a side aspect covered in
one of the thirteen chapters-and its motif is coexistence. It
points out that Tass's being under government control has
historically been the rule rather than the exception for news
agencies, that its now disappearing monopoly of the Bloc
audience had precedent in the monopolistic division of the
world audience among the Reuters-Havas-Wolfe-AP cartel,
that although news disseminated by Tass from Moscow is
severely slanted for propaganda purposes the Tass New York
bureau file to Moscow fairly parallels New York Times cover-
age except for slighting cultural and human items, as all for-
eign agency files tend to do, and for ignoring Hollywood gossip
and sensationalism, that Tass has honored over the years its
agreements with other news agencies.
The inaccurate and difficult-to-follow chapter on the
agency's second-espionage and black propaganda-face cov-
ers the involvement of Tass men in the espionage activities
divulged by Gouzenko and Petrov, the implication of corre-
spondents Pissarev and Anissimov in spy cases in Holland and
Sweden respectively, the testimony of Ismail Ege about the
prewar use of Tass cover, and Kaznacheyev's revelations about
Tass's part in placing black propaganda in the Burmese press.
The author notes, however, that no such cases have ever come
to light in the United States and that no Tass men have been
exposed as spies anywhere in almost a decade, and he believes
(wrongly) that the use of this cover as a general practice
must have been abandoned with the passing of Beria.
Mr. Kruglak is bullish about Tass's future. He points to its
progress in emulating the speed and breadth of coverage of
Western agencies, and he hopes that the new Soviet agency
Novosti may in time relieve it of most of its burden of dis-
seminating propaganda. He acknowledges that what re-
MORI/HRP PAGES A28-Aftproved For Release 2005/04/13
Recent Books: Soviet
mains is less comparable to a Western news agency than to
American technical and trade paper services, gathering legiti-
mate intelligence for its clients in Soviet government offices,
but he believes that coexistence in this kind of news communi-
cation is as important to us as to the Soviet Union and that
it will work as well as it has in the International Telecomrriu-
nications Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization.
VOM ROTEN TERROR ZUR SOZIALISTISCHEN GESETZ?-
LICHKEIT-DER SOWJETISCHE SICHERHEITSDIENST
(From the Red Terror to Socialist Legality-The Soviet Se-
curity Service). By Borys Lewytzkyi. (Munich: Nymphen-
burger Verlagshandlung. 1961. Pp. 302.)
The dust jacket of this book calls it the "history of the se-
curity organs of the Soviet Union from the October Revolu-
tion to the present day." It is not. More nearly it is a study
of the role of "terror" in the history of the Soviet security
services, especially in the internal field. The history of the
services themselves is rather superficial, and the story of their
operations, both at home and particularly abroad, is incom-
plete. In some ways the author appears to be much more in-
terested in "why" than in "what," and this leads to a form of
apologia. In his epilogue he writes (p. 252) :
The chronicle of the security organs is a part of the history of
the Soviet Union. Everything which has happened in the Soviet
Union since its founding and how it happened are inconceivable
without the participation of the security organs. We have tried
to describe the role of the security organs and their changes from
this domestic political aspect because we believe that in so doing
we are making an important contribution to the understanding
of the past and present of a country which today has risen to a
position beside the USA as the strongest power in the world.
As conceived by Lenin, the author argues, the security or-
gans were to be the "sword of the Revolution," to destroy the
enemies of Communism in Russia and tear down the barriers
to the erection of a new society. With Lenin, the necessary
terror in the early period was carefully segregated from the
concept of "socialist legality"; under Stalin, as the security
organs developed from an instrument of the Party into an
MORI/HRP PAGES A29-A32
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/
instrument of Stalin, the terror became a part of "socialist
legality," and
... an entire generation of Russian revolutionaries were executed
as criminals and agents of capitalism "in the name of Communism."
. . . It would be completely false to believe that Stalin merely
wanted to create an "intimidation system." Stalinism signified
a much deeper, qualitative change. Terror, which in Lenin's day
served as an extreme means in a time of emergency, was now in-
stitutionalized. The security organs developed into a machinery
of terror which was more and more removed from the Party, the
government, and the people. But that was not yet all. Stalin's
"genius" showed itself in the equation of terror with "socialist
legality." ... After Stalin had reached this goal and the cult
of personality was firmly anchored, he transferred the terror from
the purely political level to the field of economic development.
Terror became the "stimulating factor in the construction of the
economy." ...
[After the death of Stalin] the overthrow of Beriya and the
subordination of the security organs to the Party was one of the
most important steps ... This was followed by a series of other
measures which are described as the "restoration of socialist
legality." ... This course is either overestimated as a "democratic
development" or completely underestimated and covered up with
pseudo-anti-Communist phraseology by many Western observers.
The elimination of terror in the Soviet Union is actually much more
than a simple gesture by Khrushchev and the present leadership
of the CPSU. Gestures are of no help to the Soviets, for them
the fulfillment of economic plans is decisive. And the present
phase of development in the Soviet Union demands the elimina-
tion of terror .. .
As a piece of propaganda, this book could be dangerous. In
spite of protestations to the contrary, its overall effect is to
make the present-day KGB (the most recent of the series of
successors to the Tcheka) seem almost benevolent, an effect
which is probably heightened by the author's apparent un-
willingness to treat Soviet State Security's operations, aims,
and methods abroad (except in connection with the Russian
exile groups). Furthermore, Lewytzkyi leaves his reader
overawed by the omnipotence and perfection of the Soviet se-
curity machinery. He credits it with "masterstrokes" which
have virtually wiped out anti-Communist exile movements and
have foiled and continue to foil all Western subversive and
espionage efforts.
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Recent Books: Soviet
The culmination of this build-up is a plea for the virtual
abolition of secret services: development
For the peoples of the Soviet Union the present
rate an appreciable
of the Soviet security organs represents at any is not yet very
relief. We know that this developm,
deeply rooted, could break off again. The incident of the U-2 sub-
jected it to a difficult stress test. Do such actions really serve of man the cause of the West, of the defense of forces t the freedom East argu ?
Do they not rather furnish the reactionary in the -
ments to defend the principles of the Stalin era? He who strives
for disarmament and relaxation of tensions for the benefit of
question of
mankind obi msnoft stateusecurity fwithace uareoftenly
methods of intelligence services and the official and quasi-official
espionage organizations. The West should not allow the East to
steal a march on it in this regard. progress will do
it is undeniable that technical and scientific pits part. According to official American statements, Soviets
s
today obtain 95% of the information they legal
gal l me nts,
that is through publications, newspapers,
scientific conferences, and tourist traffic. The Soviets are not
quite so generous toward the West, but since Stalin's deathem~~a st
things have taken a positive turn over there. Apparently
today obtains about the same percentage of its information about
ist
the Soviet Union in the same manner. A sci ofist or
ljo n lan
today knows much more about many aspects
"adversary" than hundreds of agents and informers.
Perhaps in the future a small part of vital state information
will continue to have to be obtained through secret services. But
under no circumstances should intelligence
status r society dor ret
police claim for themselves a p ivil f
reason or even put themselves beyond the rule of law and order.
The Soviet system once permitted that in grand style and has not
yet recovered from it.
As a factual, objective history or even partial history of the
Soviet security services, Mr. Lewytzkyi's book leaves much to s for a re who
be desired. In fact, it could b round touassess andaevaluate
lacks the knowledge and backg
what it does offer. As a point of view, however, an attempt to
understand and interpret, even rationalize the terror organs
in the Soviet Union, it might well be of some interest to a
knowledgeable intelligence or counterintelligence officer.
For such a reader a question which comes to mind is,
in-
"Whose pitch is this?" It certainly is not harmful t Otto t Even
and
terests of the Soviet Union abroad today,
dP78TO3194A000200010001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
be the product of covert political action by the Soviets them-
selves. The author is not above suspicion. He has been em-
broiled in prewar and postwar emigre cabals (particularly
among the Ukrainians) to a considerable degree and has had
all sorts of clandestine relationships, including some with
Western security organizations. But he has also had ties
with the Trotskyites, including one "friend" who defected to
East Germany not too long ago and there exposed the alleged
operational involvement of the Fourth International with the
West German "Gehlen Organization." One wonders whether
this defector might not have been a Soviet agent all along, and
in any case what influence he had on Mr. Lewytzkyi's views
as expressed in this book. On the other hand, Mr. Lewytzkyi
himself has been caught playing footsie with Soviet intelli-
gence and has got his own toes burnt for his trouble. Per-
haps there is something more to this rather subtle presenta-
tion than meets the eye.-HANs ANDERSEN
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COUNTERESPIONAGE
THE SPYCATCHER OMNIBUS. By Lt. Col. Oreste Pinto.
(London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1962. Pp. 479. 18/-.)
This final work of the late Colonel Pinto is a reprinting be-
tween a single set of covers of material from his previous
books,' comprising principally a couple of dozen case histories
from his experience as a counterespionage investigator for
the British, SHAEF, and the Dutch government in exile dur-
ing the war. Three introductory chapters sketch his earlier
service as an agent and then as a counterintelligence officer
for the French Deuxieme Bureau, detail the qualifications re-
quired for counterintelligence work, and discuss the methodol-
ogy of interrogation. His precepts for the interrogator seem
generally sound, but the qualities he requires in a counter-
intelligence officer are superhuman, rather ingenuously re-
flecting his own opinion of himself. His dim view of women
in intelligence corresponds closely with that expressed in a
recent issue of this journal?
The individual case histories are good stories, genuine, in-
teresting, and not offensively dramaticized. They will be old
hat to most of the British public, not only because of the
earlier books but because they have been put on in a TV series
by the BBC. But the reader not previously acquainted with
Colonel Pinto's adventures will enjoy them if he takes them
one at a time with goodly intervals between. Otherwise the
author's self-importance and habit of repeating the same
background explanations and gems of doctrinal wisdom from
case to case will weary him.
' Spy-Catcher and Friend or Foe? (London: Werner Laurie, 1952
and 1953 respectively, plus a number of paperback and foreign edi-
tions) ; Spycatcher 2 (London: Landsborough Publications, 1960) ;
Spycatcher 3 (London: Four Square Books Ltd., 1960).
I VI 2, p. Al if.
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STUDIES
in
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 7 NO. 2 SPRING 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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 SECApproved For Release 2005/04-1
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
IA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001 SECRET
STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of iitelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
25X1
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R.. H:7UST0N
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13:T'? DP78TO3194A000200010001-2
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CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community
or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should
be submitted directly to the Editor- Studies in Intelligence,
Room 1D 0011 Langley and need not be coordi-
nated or submitted throug channels. They in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond pape re Fo t
notes should be inserted in the body of the text following
the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be clas-
sified through Secret.
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call
your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,
It For back issues nd on other questions call the
ce of he Editor,
SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/1
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Page
Chinese Growth Estimates Revisited. . Edward L. Allen 1
A critique of intelligence performance in the late
fifties. SECRET
Tonnage Through Tibet
Philip Vetterling and Avis Waring 13
Methodology for assessing Chinese logistics on the
Indian fronts. SECRET
The Intelligence Yield from ECE . . . . Ernest Chase 27
Making the most of an open economic source.
CONFIDENTIAL
Requirements and the American Scientist
Frank X. LaMountain 33
The lay collector's problem with the scientist as
source. CONFIDENTIAL
Communication to the Editors . . . . . . . . . . . 41
On the U.S.-Soviet scientific exchanges.
CONFIDENTIAL
The Theory and Practice of Soviet Intelligence
Alexander Orlov 45
Seven lines of clandestine operation. OFFICIAL USE
Countersabotage-A Counterintelligence Function
Eric W. Timm 67
Memorial for an old comrade. SECRET
Memoranda for the President: Sunrise . . . . . . . 73
Documentary record of Allen Dulles' 1945 coup.
OFFICIAL USE
25X1
UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Operation Uproot . . . . . . . . . Frantisek Moravec Al
The successful evacuation of Czechoslovak intelli-
gence to London in 1939.
Coastal Infiltration and Withdrawal . . Paul X. Kelley A13
Tricky aspects after the buoyant ascent.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature . . . . . . . A19
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"Lessons from errors past" re-
jected as inferred from false
analysis.
CHINESE GROWTH ESTIMATES REVISITED:
A CRITIQUE
Edward L. Allen
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for
publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the
two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal
merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently
outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year,
articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' pur-
view, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the
award. They will be judged primarily on substantive original-
ity and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Mem-
bers of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course ex-
cluded from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter)
of each volume for articles published during the preceding
calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nomi-
nations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence
in the decision.
Omphaloskepsis is a widespread practice, and nowhere does
it have more dedicated practitioners than among the mem-
bers of the intelligence profession. Indeed, national estimat-
ing procedures have institutionalized this self-contemplation
in their "validity studies." As in the production of the esti-
mate itself, a principal task in these post-mortems is to keep
the keenly honed scalpels of self-interest from carving the de-
fenseless corpus into an unrecognizable image of the original.
Recently the Second Conference on Intelligence Methods
held in Washington was privileged to hear the scathing results
nf an unusually thorough intelligence autopsy entitled
"Seldom has
25X1
Western intelligence been so awry," he said, as it was in as-
sessing the Chinese economy. There is no doubt that our
estimates in 1958-60 of likely future rates of Chinese economic
growth erred considerably on the high side. This reviewer,.!
however, finds rraying of the facts to be mis- 25X1
taken and his diagnosis of the reasons for the too high esti-
mates to be wide of the mark, at least so far as U.S. intelli.-
gence is concerned. If the purpose of the post-mortem is to
learn the lessons of experience, the record should be read
straight.
The First Five Year Plan
We may start by reviewing the estimative histor of the
First Five Year Plan period (1953-57), contrasting I
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I llegations with the language in the relative NIE, Chi-
nese Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
Through 1960, dated 5 January 1956. We find that what was
said is very different from what he says was said:
It has become customary within
the intelligence community, when
discussing the First [Chinese]
Five-Year Plan, to describe it as
"well conceived and impressively
implemented," with the connota-
tion that the able leadership of
the regime was a principal causal
factor. Knowing what we now
know about agricultural difficul-
ties, is there justification for per-
sisting in this formulation? The
Plan's neglect of investment in
agriculture is surely a serious
black mark against it.
When China first began to issue
over-all production figures ... we
tended to accept them with little
reservation ... .
NIE 13-56
33. In mid-1955 the regime, after
considerable delay, adopted a
comprehensive First Five Year
Plan (1953-57). The Plan is
fairly rudimentary . . . . Even
though the Russians have given
extensive technical assistance,
the Chinese Communists ad-
-RDPC7h8rT0 e1 m e300010001-2
Speaking of the shortfall in agricultural output, the same
NIE came to the very conclusion that re-
proaches us for not having drawn:
It behoved us to inquire
whether such a crash [collectivi-
zation] programme as China's in
1955 and 1956 could have been
achieved without detrimental ef-
fects on morale and production,
at least in the short term.
muttedly have encountered great One is puzzled as to why
22. Moreover, [agricultural] pro-
duction was adversely affected by
the disruption and confusion
which accompanied the rapid col-
lectivization of agriculture in 1955
and 1956. Agricultural growth
was also hampered as a result of
the regime's decision to minimize
state investment in this sec-
tor... .
difficulties in drafting their plan, bemused by Chinese progress in the 1953-57 period that our
Its delayed announcement was
officially attributed to the lack of intelligence estimates on the First Five Year Plan "provided.
resource data, difficulties in the a sufficiently biassed picture to make us vulnerable to the
collection of statistics, lack of claims of the Leap Forward.
skilled personnel, and inexperi- As the explanation for this "biassed picture" and later
ence in handling problems . . . , larger errors tells us: ". . . There existed in the
59-60. Although the regime is Western intelligence world a disposition to respect, or at least
planning to achieve a 23 percent a reluctance to disparage, Communist China's own claims and
increase in total agricultural pro- policies in economic matters." Throughout his paper he re-
duction during the Five Year Plan turns to this theme of his from time to time-the widespread
period, we believe it will be doing Western acceptance of false Chinese statistics. We must ask,
well to exceed a 10 percent in- first, whether the practice was widespread, and second,
crease, . . . The estimated in- whether it led Western intelligence into a trap.
crease in food output approxi-
mates the estimated Population What do the relevant NIE's say? In NIE 13-56 (p. 14),
growth ... , there was no disposition to accept, the Chinese claim:
Looking backward in 1958, after completion of the Plan, our In the crop year 1954-55, we estimate that the Chinese Come
munists produced about 158 million tons of basic food crops and
judgment was straightforward. We said in NIE 13-58 (13
about
and 1.1 million tons respectively. Communist claims of.
May), p. 5: 170
17. Although the regime has made a pretense of proceeding accord- Nor was there any heedlessness of pitfalls. For the first time,
ing to an over-all Five Year Plan, it has actually operated from in this estimate, a statistical table showing estimated Chinese
year to year on annual plans which have generally been aimed production of selected commodities for 1954, 1957, and 1960
at correcting the excesses and defects of the previous year. Never- was introduced (p. 12). The reader was warned:
theless, the regime demonstrated its capability to control the The figures in this table should be used with caution. The
economy sufficiently to limit consumption and to marshal re-
sources for investment .. estimates are subject to varying margins of error, some of which
f th
f
t
i
n o ese
or cer
a
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a es ese s rma es
commodities should probably be regarded as a maximum, par-
ticularly for pig iron and crude steel . . . . The estimated pro-
duction of industrial products, as projected for 1957 and 1960,
depends upon construction or improvement of capacity, the as-
similation of advanced techniques by the Chinese Communists, the
continuance of Soviet Bloc aid, and continued importation of
capital goods from the West ... . With the exception of pig
iron, steel, trucks and food crops, our estimates of 1957 production
are of the approximate order of magnitude of the Chinese Com-
munists' goals. With respect to crude oil and gasoline ... we
believe that the Communist goals are overly optimistic.
Thus the reader is given the best estimates possible of cur-
rent output-whether in agreement with the official Chinese
or not-and told the basis of future projections. He is also
told which estimates had not been cross-checked and there-
fore must be considered questionable although still the best
available. The analytical procedures were straightforward, ob-
jective, and fully explained. They would not seem to warrant
I Iview that "they provided a sufficiently biassed
picture to make us vulnerable to the claims of the Leap For-
ward."
The validity of the Chinese data continued in later years
to be a matter prominent in the estimators' minds; indeed in
NIE 13-59 (28 July 1959) a separate annex was devoted to the
reliability of Chinese Communist economic statistics which
pointed to their deterioration caused by the Leap Forward, a
deterioration 1nds noted only in hindsight.
Why Estimate Where Facts Are Scarce?
If he absolves us of the charge of unquestioning acceptance
of Chinese statistics, the reader may still ask, as
invites him to, why estimate the production of specific com-
modities in the face of great uncertainty? Why attempt to
aggregate these into totals of industrial production? Why go
further to the construction of estimates of levels of total out-
put (GNP) ?
If there had been no other reasons, policy considerations at
that time made it imperative that a complete picture of the
Chinese economy be developed. Anyone reviewing the tables
of contents of NIE's 13-56 and 13-57 would be struck by the
unusual amount of space devoted to international and domes-
tic trade and transport, the very detailed si r t'
Approve~oreie os$ ?004/13
quantities of goods moving over transport routes-rails, roads,
inland waterways, and maritime routes-which seems out of
place at the National Estimate level. But these were the years
of the "blockaders," those who strongly advocated a naval
blockade of the Chinese coast as an allegedly powerful weapon
to counter Chinese intransigence.
The intelligence officers who represented the services advo-
cating blockade based their case for the desirability and effec-
tiveness of such a measure on a view that the railroads were
capable of carrying only about half the tonnage announced
officially by the Chinese, a view which could be held only if
the level of economic activity in the country were granted to
be no more than about half of that claimed by the govern-
ment.2 With this low rail capacity only a small amount of
imports could be moved over the inland transport system, and
China would be heavily dependent on the import of goods by
sea. Thus a blockade of her ports would have serious conse-
quences for the economy and military strength of Communist
China.
Those who opposed this view rested their stand on CIA's de-
tailed and painstakingly constructed statistical arrays cover-
ing the Chinese economy, which showed that it had indeed
expanded very rapidly and that this growth must have been
paralleled by a sharp rise in internal freight movement, in-
cluding movements over rail connections with the USSR, on
which at least half of China's foreign trade flowed and more
could flow if Chinese ports were blockaded. The crucial ques-
tion to policymakers-would a blockade be effective or not?-
did not require an absolutely precise measure of Chinese eco-
nomic activity. But it did require the careful piecing together
of a consistent picture of the total Chinese economy-and
some elementary correlation analysis-to show that China
had grown very much larger in industrial output, had reori-
ented much of its trade to the USSR, and had developed. the
internal transport services needed. The construction of a
total picture of the economy is as essential to economic analy-
sis as the piecing together of skeletal structure in anthro-
pology.
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The entire statistical base of China, every fragment of data,
was thus subjected to microscopic examination and to serious
questioning long before the Leap Forward started. The intel-
ligence community was not either "belated" or "inconsistent,"
as charges, in recognizing the likelihood of statis-
tics error. Every NIE from 1954 to the present time has rec-
ognized the "numbers problem" and qualified its estimates
accordingly.
Faced with the same kind of intelligence problem in Cuba
today, we find ourselves turning to the same techniques of
analysis. The careful construction of a total picture of the
Cuban economy, admittedly from scarce and often inaccurate
data, is an essential to answer the key questions-what has
happened to the Cuban economy since Castro? how much
must the USSR put in this year to keep it going? The alterna-
tive to the quantitative estimate remains today what it was
in 1958-that is, reliance on impressionistic bits and pieces of
evidence that make the attempted over-all estimate no more
than a gallimaufry of trivia.
Stance for the Leap Forward
So much for the situation through 1957. Looking at these
estimates now, and considering that they were made in the
face of a scarcity of hard facts, this reviewer concludes that
they have stood the test of time. This judgment is a far cry
from Isomewhat condescending view that they
were no a y awry." As for the Leap Forward period,
1958-60, and the immediate years beyond, is cer-
tainly quite correct in stating that our estimates of likely
rates of industrial growth have proved to be very wide of the
mark. It is both legitimate and important to ask why this
was so.
Every intelligence estimate of future developments must rest
on one or more hypotheses basic to the projection. On the eve
of the Leap Forward a National Estimate, NIE 13-58, was pub-
lished. What were its hypotheses? They emerge clearly, as
follows:
1. "The leadership of the [Chinese Communist] party
continues to demonstrate cohesion and determination and,
at the same time, a considerabl de ree f
XppFove~ F ~~~ 'se 2 ~/b4/13
2. "Communist China will almost certainly remain firmly
aligned with the USSR.... Although there will almost cer-
tainly be some frictions, these are unlikely to impair Sino-
Soviet cooperation during the period of this estimate
[through 1962]." (p. 3)
3. Because the regime is determined to industrialize rap-
idly, it will have few material goods to offer its people; while
there may be increased peasant dissatisfaction, "we believe
the net effect on the regime's [social control] programs will
be no more than a complicating or retarding one." (p. 1)
The Leap Forward
Within two months of the publication of this estimate the
Chinese leadership had embarked on a completely unforeseen
course which has effectively brought her pretension to great
power status to an indefinite halt. The carefully considered
hypotheses on which our growth projections were based
proved to be very wrong indeed. --,i
First of all, the disruptive commune organizational change
and the useless backyard industry program upset the precari-
ous holding program in agriculture. The so-called Leap For-
ward eliminated the thin margin between agricultural produc-
tion and the population's minimum consumption needs, wiping
out the nation's annual savings increment and hence new in-
vestment, the indispensable ingredient of growth.
Secondly, the all-important economic gains from the alli-
ance with the Soviet Union-loans, technical assistance, in-
dustrial equipment-were sacrificed on the ideological altar
of Chinese pretensions to Bloc leadership. The exacerbation
of tensions reached a climax in mid-1960, when Khrushclzev's
patience wore thin and the Soviet technicians were precipi-
tately withdrawn from China. This action effectively ended
large-scale outside financial and technical assistance, the key
to rapid industrialization.
Thirdly, the Chinese leadership decided to try to keep as
many people as possible alive, which means that its small for-
eign exchange earnings were (and are) being used up largely
to purchase grain and fertilizer in the West. 'A rational policy
would be just the opposite-namely, to let the least produc-
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as severely as possible, and to use the very scarce foreign ex-
change to import the technical skills which are in short sup-
ply and are needed to get industry rolling again.
Finally, to the bungling of man was added the unkindness
of nature, which presented China with a series of subnormal
growing conditions for food crops. Nevertheless, the Chinese
have rebuffed Soviet attempts to patch up the ideological quar-
rel; indeed, the dispute has been inflamed nearly to the point
of open break. The result is that Mainland China, from 1949
to 1958 a shining showcase of Communist success in bringing
rapid industrialization and growth to an underdeveloped coun-
try, is now a very tarnished and discredited model.
This reviewer submits that the incredible blunders of the
Chinese leaders could not reasonably have been foreseen. In-
telligence estimates made by mere men cannot hope to be cor-
rect in every case; there is always an element of the unknow-
able about the future. Prescience, omniscience with regard
to the future, is a faculty denied to mortals.
laments that "the West was so slow in fully
appreciating the outrageous character of the Leap Forward."
But nine months after the initiation of this accelerated Chi-
nese program, a CIA report, Evaluation of Mainland China's
1958 Agricultural Production Claims (CSM 19/59, dated 30
March 1959), declared:
An examination of the practices instituted and a consideration
of their probable effects strongly suggest that production claims
advanced by Peiping have been grossly overstated.
This report also gave estimates of the likely levels of agri-
cultural output far below the Chinese claims. Similarly, NIE
13-59 (paragraph 26) said that "The official claims for agri-
culture ... are patently nonsense . . . ." With respect to in-
dustrial claims this NIE (paragraph 28) affirmed, "We believe
that total industrial output in 1958 increased by approxima-
tely 40 percent, about two-thirds of the amount claimed."
Further along (paragraphs 29 and 30) it concluded: "The pro-
duction records of 1958 were achieved at considerable economic
and human cost. The obsession with quantity and the spread
of the backyard furnace movement led to a great amount of
economic waste.... It is almost certain that they [the Chi-
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nese] cannot re-establish and maintain either the rate of in-
crease or the intensity of human effort attained in 1958."
Estimates of the likely future rates of growth were succes-
sively reduced in subsequent NIE's as the situation in China
became clearer, particularly the devastating impact on Chi-
nese industrial output of the withdrawal of Soviet technicians
and technical assistance. I believes that we
should have written these estimates down to zero rather
than merely cut back the Chinese claims rather sharply. He
also believes that the pattern making for stagnation and
chaos should have been visible early. How? By having the
analyst adopt "a frankly more intuitive and premonitory ap-
proach." We cannot, he warns us, use the inductive method
"to obtain confident generalizations about the . . . ability of
Communist China's leadership."
Future Research on the Chinese Economy
What guidelines for the future emerge from
analysis of past research failures? He is not optimistic. He
concludes that the three most important factors affecting
China's future are (1) the forces of nature, an imponderable;
(2) the state of Sino-Soviet relations, which is full of uncer-
tainty; and (3) the wisdom and realism of the regime, an in-
tractable subject. Therefore our estimates will have to be
"much less determinate than in the past," content with quali-
tative descriptions and "pointing out theoretical strengths
and weaknesses." What, if anything, useful to the policy-
maker would flow from such intelligence reports is not clear.
Nor does dismissal of the chances for success-
ful research on the main determinants seem to hold up.
By the "forces of nature" must mean (at least
very largely) future weather conditions and the effect on
crop yields. Although the weather in any single future grow-
ing season is not subject to precise measurement, certainly
weather-yield relationships over time are susceptible to analy-
sis, norms can be worked out, and future time periods longer
than a year can be predicted with some confidence.
The state of Sino-Soviet relations, to be sure, is full of un-
certainty. But the economic effects of a variety of possible
relationships-status quo, complete break, reconciliation--
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are doable research projects and need to be done before the
fact if the leadership's alternatives are to be assessed with any
appreciation of penalty or gain.
The "wisdom and realism of the regime" is a broad subject,
but, having laid out a research program to measure the con-
sequences of the various possible levels of Sino-Soviet coopera-
tion, we have made a good start on the foreign policy side.
With respect to other foreign economic activities affecting
growth, the impact of such a current policy as grain and fer-
tilizer imports on growth is measurable. With respect to do-
mestic economic and social policy, it is equally possible to iso-
late the factors of basic importance, such as programs which
would increase future agricultural output (fertilizer, machin-
ery, greater local autonomy) or decrease consumption (mas-
sive birth control) and to estimate what the regime's capabili-
ties are to carry out each.
This transgresses prescription for "a less
rigid and a less ambitious analytical approach." However, it
will enable intelligence to provide policymakers with "We
think China is most unlikely to become a world power in ten
years" rather than an unhelpful "We really don't know what
will happen." The needs for intelligence assistance do not
fade away because the factual data on which to base judg-
ments become scarce.
One should also stress, in the absence of key facts, the need
to work low-grade ores in order to lay the basis for improved
future estimates. This takes time and people. An example
in the Chinese context is the book published by Choh-Ming Li,
Statistical System of Communist China (University of Cali-
fornia Press, 1962). This very detailed analysis of the Chinese
statistical system, including what happened to it during the
Leap Forward and subsequently, was made possible by a re-
search grant from an intelligence service. The project, under
competent Western supervision, made use of the language
skills of native-born Chinese, who combed the press and pe-
riodical literature in exhaustive detail. Li's integration of the
thousands of individual references and examples of Chinese
statistical practices over time is "must" reading for anyone
who hopes to understand rece% gfd l a f JU4/13 :
interpret the current day-to-day statistical developments in
China.
An even more time-consuming project on agriculture is still
under way. The objective of this research is to provide the
intelligence community with the means to assess agricultural
developments in China, which are generally admitted to be
the key to economic success and growth. We currently col-
lect extensive weather data on China. In order to make maxi-
mum use of it, we need far more complete and reliable infor-
mation on land-use patterns and historical data on crop
yields-knowledge of past effects of climate, fertilizers, irriga-
tion, improved seeds, etc. on local growing areas. When as-
sembled and analyzed, the resulting yardsticks will enable
us to know with a good deal more precision, and on a much
more current basis, what success or failure China is having
as the crop year develops.
The Big Picture
believes the organizational set-up
'n 25X1
research was wrong. He tells us:
Fine divisions of research responsibility had been established
before the Leap Forward to pursue research in some depth. These
divisions served us ill as information dried up. More and more
analysts lost their moorings, fewer people had the big picture,
and in the scramble to keep up intelligence production more con-
jecture-fragmented, uncoordinated conjecture at that-went on
at all levels.
Finally,
apparently is unaware of the formal and in-25X1
formal mechanisms for coordination that exist in U.S. intelli-?
gence. Let me cite one-the China Committee of CIA's Office
of Research and Reports. To provide an opportunity for all.
the various functional and area specialists dealing with Com-
munist China to discuss problems of mutual interest, ORR,
established this Committee in 1954. By the end of 1962, it had,
met approximately 260 times. Members of the Committee
and other interested individuals from other offices (and some-
times other governments) used these meetings to exchange
views on developments taking place in Communist China,
The Committee is a vehicle for the informal exchange of in.
formation and ideas rather than for formal research. It pro.-
RDP78T03%1WA0GA&ZM1f6@0th2 discussion of research techniques and
 SECRET Approved Fore 65fl 13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2 SECRET
problems, a means for immediate group action on any prob-
lems of general concern to ORR, and a commons in which
analysts can develop closer working relationships. The meet-
ings are devoted generally to the discussion of current topics
concerning Communist China and to briefings by members
and invited speakers on research problems and other topics of
interest.
In view of I additional charge of "research con-
ducted in isolation" and exhortation to "benefit from the in-
sights of political scientists," it is noteworthy that the China
Committee was addressed by or had access to just about every-
one who knew anything about China and was clearable. His-
torians, geographers, area specialists, and political scientists
(as well as at least one anthropologist) often attended meet-
ings and participated in discussions. The Committee was par-
ticularly active during 1958-59, when the Leap Forward pro-
gram was at its height. Considerable time was devoted to
evaluations of the production claims of China. Long before
the official Chinese admission that errors had been made,
Committee members concluded that the Communists had ex-
aggerated their production achievements for 1958. Consider-
able attention was given in the Committee sessions to the
problems and consequences of running a planned economy us-
ing false statistical data. In spite of these successes, no one
foresaw far in advance that China was headed for economic
stagnation, that irrationality rather than reason would rule
in Peking. Prescience failed us in the Western world.
Probably even more important than the China Committee
was the extensive interchange between analysts needed to co-
ordinate papers before publication. This goes on all the time,
not only within disciplines but also among the specialized re-
search components.
To say that the U.S. analysts were isolated is untrue; to
say that they should have foreseen China's deep-seated eco-
-a,..
it is an unfair one, because in the absence of data they
were using his own recommended yardstick-"a more frankly
intuitive and premonitory approach." It proved to be a very
slender reed indeed.
A methodology for assessing
highway logistics applied in the
Chinese Communist attack on
India.
TONNAGE THROUGH TIBET
Philip Vetterling and Avis Waring
A more than routine interest has recently been focused on
problems of highway logistics by the Communist Chinese
threat along the northeastern border of India. The magni-
tude of this threat depends in large part on the Chinese ability
to move military supplies by road from railheads deep in
China to the areas of conflict; air transport, the only alter-
native, is at present not available to the Chinese in significant
capacity. It was therefore possible to make an estimate of
the threat, in terms of the size of the military forces that
could be supplied, by computing the capacity of the roads,
setting this against the supply requirements of the forces
actually in Tibet, and so determining what excess capacity
was available to support additional troops in operations
against India. Two other possibly limiting factors had also
to be calculated-the number of trucks needed to move the
supplies, and the amount of petroleum required to fuel the
trucks. The methodology for these calculations, described in
the following pages, can be used to estimate the size of mili-
tary force that can be supported in other campaigns depend-
ent on supply by road.
Roads to the World's Roof
The Chinese forces at the front lines on the Indian border
were at the end of roads that wind 700 to 1,800 miles over
high and rugged terrain. The three main access routes to
Tibet are indicated on the accompanying map. The most im-
portant of these is the Tsinghai-Tibet highway running south
from Golmo to Lhasa. Golmo can be reached by road either
from the railhead in the vicinity of Hsia-tung on the trans-
Sinkiang railroad or from that at Hsi-ning west of Lan-chou.
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The major route for the movement of supplies appeared to be
the former, from the Hsia-tung area southward through
Golmo for about 1,000 miles to An-to or 1,300 miles to Lhasa.
The average elevation of this road from Golmo on is about
14,000 feet. Troops along the western border of the North
East Frontier Agency, those in the Chumbi Valley opposite
Sikkim, and those located as far west as the southern part of
Ladakh were supplied by this route.
The other two routes, supplying the extreme flanks, are
about equal in importance to each other. The Szechwan-
Tibet highway, running west from the railhead at Ch'eng-tu
in Szechwan Province, served the troops in the Ch'ang-tu
area and the eastern border of NEFA. It goes on from there
to Lhasa, a total distance from Ch'eng-tu of about 1,200
miles, over extremely rugged terrain ranging to 12,000 feet
in elevation. The third route runs from the railhead in the
Urumchi area in northwestern China southwest to Kashgar,
then southeast to the Ladakh area. From Urumchi to Rudog
it covers about 1,340 miles at elevations ranging from 3,500
feet in the northern portions to between 11,000 and 16,000
feet in the south.
The combined practical forward capacity of these access
routes under ideal conditions was figured at 2,000 short tons
per day-1,000 tons delivered to Lhasa via Golmo on the
Tsinghai-Tibet highway, 500 tons delivered to Ch'ang-tu from
Szechwan for the eastern flank, and 500 tons delivered over
the Kashgar-Rudog road for the Ladakh front. These main
access routes are supplemented by roads leading forward to
the frontier and subsidiary east-west and north-south routes
to a total of some 7,500 miles.
Development of a Methodology
By the mid-1950's policy makers as well as transportation
intelligence specialists had become greatly concerned about
the wide divergence in estimates of the capacities of identical
transportation routes and facilities published in supposedly
definitive U.S. and UK intelligence reports. These estimates
were important to policy makers as a basis for determining the
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size of enemy forces that could be deployed and supported in
various areas of the world. Without a common understand-
ing of the factors which entered into the calculation of the
capacities of the various forms of transportation, however, it
had been impossible for the specialists who made the estimates
to arrive at reasonably uniform conclusions. The disparities
confused and irritated the policy makers.
As a consequence, the Subcommittee on Transportation of
the Economic Intelligence Committee, composed of transpor-
tation specialists of the U.S. community, undertook a series of
studies which led to the formulation of methodologies for esti-
mating the capabilities of railroads, roads, ports, and inland
waterways.' These were then sent to the
to get its views. After much consultation
and exchange of correspondence, working-level agreement on
the method for computing railroad capacity was reached in
1960 and on that for computing road capacity in 1961. These
methods were subsequently approved by the logistics special-
ists who provide intelligence support for SHAPE and are now
widely used by the intelligence components of NATO coun-
tries.
In the U.S. government the task of estimating road capaci-
ties for intelligence purposes is performed primarily by the in-
telligence components of the Department of Defense. The
estimate of 2,000 tons as the capacity of the major supply
routes into Tibet was made originally by DOD analysts by
these now standard methods and accepted by other compo-
nents of the intelligence community. The process is described
in brief below.
One begins with the ideal capacity of a road of a given type
of surface in perfect condition and good weather, straight,
and without traffic hindrances. On paved roads 5-ton trucks
' For a detailed explanation of these methodologies, see Department
of the Army Field Manual FM 55-8, Transportation Intelligence,
December 1961.
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are assumed to move at 25 miles per hour spaced 300 feet apart
to allow for the "concertina" (compression wave) action in-
herent in any continuous truck convoy operation. On un-
paved roads the dust hazard requires increased spacing and
decreased speed. A simple calculation gives the number of
trucks that can be moved in both directions during a 24-hour
period, considering only the speed, interval between vehicles,
and type of surface.
This basic capacity is then reduced to obtain what is known
as operational capacity, which makes allowance for the con-
straints imposed by driver inefficiency, vehicle casualties, es-
sential maintenance enroute, and unforeseen operational de-
velopments. These contingencies are estimated to reduce the
basic capacity by 20 percent. A practical capacity is obtained
by applying further reduction factors to the operational ca-
pacity to take into account the following:
Less than ideal road characteristics;
Turning and crossing operations, including delays caused
by convoys entering and leaving the highway and the
movement across the highway of other essential traffic,
civilian and military;
Operational phasing, including the constraints created by
administrative and civilian vehicles, stops for meals, re-
fueling, driver rest periods, and the reduced efficiency
of night operations.
The resulting practical capacity is expressed in vehicles per
day traveling in both directions. Multiplication by the net
load per truck, in this case 3 tons, gives the daily tonnage in
both directions, and half of this is the practical forward ca-
pacity of the road in tons per day.
The value of the several reduction factors has been derived
from engineering data on highway transportation and ca-
pacity, taking into account vehicle performance and road de-
sign, construction, and maintenance. Where precise data
were not available on certain types of roads, the experience of
highway transport specialists and engineers in truck convoy
operations was consulted in assigning values.
In formula form the calculation looks like this:
B=0.8A
C=B?a?b?c-d?e?f
D=gC
E=D
2
Where:
A=basic capacity (vehicles per
day)
B=operational capacity
per day)
C=practical capacity
per day)
D=practical capacity
day)
E=practical forward
(tons per day)
a=surface width reduction factor
b=shoulder width reduction fac-
tor
c=curves and gradient factor
d=surface deterioration and
maintenance factor
e=factor for turning and cross-
ing movements
f=operational phasing factor
g=load per truck in tons
Capacity to Tibet
The derivation of the capacity of the Tsinghai-Tibet and
Szechwan-Tibet highways will illustrate the application of
this methodology. The surface of the Tsinghai-Tibet highway
from Golmo to Lhasa is given as crushed rock and gravel with
some earth sections. The basic capacity of such a surface is
8,400 and the operational capacity 6,700 5-ton trucks per day.
The reduction factors are as follows:
Symbol Characteristic
a Surface width ......
b Shoulder width ....
c ........ Curves and gradient
d . . ...... Surface condition . .
e . . . ..... Turning and cross-
ing movements
f . . . ..... Operational phasing
g Load per truck .....
Reduc-
Description tion Factor
30 feet .................. 1.0
Less than 3 feet ......... 0.8
Over 7 percent .......... 0.6
Fair with moist subsoil .. 0.5
0.85
0.5
The practical capacity is then 6,700X 1.0 X 0.8 X 0.6 X 0.5 X 0.85
X0.5=683 vehicles, carrying, at an average load of 3 tons, 2,049
tons per day in both directions. Halving this gives a practical
forward capacity of 1,025 tons, which may be rounded to 1;,000
tons per day.
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The surface of the Szechwan-Tibet highway from Ch'eng-tu
to Lhasa via Ch'ang-tu is given as crushed rock, gravel, and
sand, this also having an operational capacity of 6,700 vehicles
per day. But the reduction for surface width and condition is
greater:
Reduc-
Description tion Factor
a ........ Surface width ..... 12 to 18 feet ............. 0.6
b ........ Shoulder width .... Less than 3 feet ......... 0.8
c ........ Curves and gradient Over 7 percent ...... . ... 0.6
d ........ Surface condition .. Fair to poor, with moist
subsoil ................ 0.4
e ........ Turning and cross-
ing movements ... ................. 0.85
f ........ Operational phasing ... ................. 0.5
g ........ Load per truck ..... 3 tons
The practical capacity here is 6,700X0.6X0.8X0.6X0.4X
0.85X0.5=328 vehicles or 984 tons per day, 492 tons forward,
rounded to 500 tons per day. The capacity of the third route,
that from Urumchi, as limited by the mountainous Kashgar-
Rudog stretch, was estimated to be the same, 500 tons, as the
Szechwan-Tibet highway.
The total capacity of the three access routes would thus be
2,000 tons per day under ideal climatic conditions. On some
portions of the roads in Tibet, however, traffic is seasonally
stopped by snow, floods, and landslides. A detailed study of
weather conditions undertaken by DOD analysts led to the
conclusion that they would reduce this capacity, on an average
throughout the year, by an additional 20 percent. The net
capacity of the access routes thus becomes 1,600 tons daily.
It should be emphasized that the capacity estimate thus
derived is for sustained deliveries over at least 90 days. The
capacity for a short-term or "crash" movement is much
higher, mainly because allowances are not made for mainte-
nance and repair of the roads, under the assumption that
they would be permitted to deteriorate in order to avoid inter-
ruption of immediate supply operations. How long such a
crash movement could be sustained depends on the type of
road surface. It was estimated that on the three major access
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roads to Tibet four or five times the sustained capacity could
be forced through, but only for five days on the Tsinghai-?
Tibet highway and only for two on the other roads. Then
the roads would not be usable for through truck convoys u.n--
til repaired.
Supply Requirements
The daily resupply requirement for troops in combat and
garrison units is the average daily tonnage required to replace
expenditures over an extended period. DOD analysts, by con-
sidering the normal requirements for the individual units
known to be in Tibet, arrived at a total requirement of about
430 short tons per day for the approximately 103,000 Chinese
troops fighting there during November 1962. They estimated,
for example, that some of the units were organized into in-
fantry divisions (light) at 85 percent of T/O strength, or
14,000 men. In general, such a unit is considered to require
86.4 tons of supplies daily during average combat conditions.
Military experts, however, after studying the type of fighting
on the Indian border, reduced the estimate of ammunition
used from 38.2 to 28.0 tons per division. This made the divi-
sion's resupply requirement in tons the following:
.............................
Class I (Rations)
23.6
Class II and IV (General Supplies) ......................
21.5
Class III (Petroleum Products) ..........................
3.1
Class V (Ammunition)
28.0
Total ................................................. 70.2
On the average, however, the requirements for the forces
in Tibet were lower per man than implied in this example.
Other troops organized in independent infantry regiments had
an estimated requirement for only 22.6 tons per regiment, and
border defense regiments required even less. Some troops in
garrison were estimated to be using no ammunition.
It is possible that the Chinese had stockpiled considerable
amounts of supplies during the summer in anticipation of
their fall offensive against India, and the amount transported
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to Tibet during November could therefore have been consid-
erably less than 430 tons per day. If, however, the fighting
had continued at that level for any length of time, the re-
quirement for road transport would have eventually reached
the estimated level.
Vehicle and Fuel Requirements
No coordinated methodology like that for computing the ca-
pacity of roads exists for estimating the number of trucks
needed to deliver the required supplies nor for computing the
fuel requirements of the trucks. Of the several methods used
in making such estimates, one which appears to give uniformly
good results is described below.2
In order to allow for fuel consumption along the supply
route, the route is divided into stages of varying length ac-
cording to the type of road and terrain, normally about 100
miles each, that can be covered in one day. Fuel consump-
tion for the round trip over each stage is estimated to be 5
percent of the load carried over each, which gives for an aver-
age load of 3 short tons about one gallon every 4 miles.3
The requirement for trucks and fuel to operate the supply
route is then calculated as follows:
1. The number of loaded trucks on each stage is obtained
by dividing the tonnage delivered over it by 3, the average
load, and this figure is doubled to include the number return-
ing empty. The sum of these for all the stages is the number
of trucks on the road at any given moment.
2. A figure is added for trucks loading at the start and un-
loading at the end of the road.
The amount of gasoline required for the
8 f t 15 t t 323 11 er ton about
n
t
3
3. Twenty percent is added for trucks temporarily off the
road or under repair and for other vehicles in convoy.
4. The delivered tonnage is subtracted from the beginning
tonnage to determine the amount of gasoline used en route?4
An example of the fuel and tonnage calculation for a 400-
mile trip follows:
Beginning of stage 1.
Tonnage of supplies and gasoline loaded
500
Beginning of stage 2.
500 tons minus 5 percent
(500-25)
475
Beginning of stage 3.
475 tons minus 5 percent
(475-24)
451
Beginning of stage 4.
451 tons minus 5 percent
(451-23)
428
Amount of supplies
delivered at end of
stage 4. 428 tons minus 5 percent (428-21)
Tons of gasoline used
en route.
ning of stage 1, and
(1-.05)?=5 percent decrease in load during each
Another method, used by DOD analysts, which gives approximately
the same results is to make a separate calculation for (1) the amount
of gasoline used to haul the supplies, (2) the amount of gasoline used
to haul the gasoline for the supply trucks, (3) the amount of gasoline
used to haul the gasoline used in (2), and so on until the figure becomes
insignificant. When the total amount of gasoline required has been
obtained, it is added to the tonnage of supplies, and the computation
for the number of trucks required is completed.
If more than a few stages are involved, use of the following formula
will greatly facilitate the computation of the tonnage delivered at the
end of the final stage.
D.=T(1-.05)',
where Dn=amount of supplies delivered at end of the nth stage,
n=number of stages,
T=amount of supplies and gasoline loaded at begin-
stage.
ons is 0. ons, or a S. o
Five percen
o
s p trucks used in n stages is T-Dn. 14 48 gallons for the round trip of 200A friisoved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA -RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
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Tonnage Through Tibet
Tonnage Through Tibet SECRET
The corresponding calculation of the number of vehicles
required is as follows:
Stage 1. 530 X2=167X2=334
Stage 2. 435 X2=158X2=316
Stage 3. 431 X2=15OX2=300
Stage 4. 438 X2=143x2=286
Total on road at given moment (sum of above) ........ 1
236
L
,
oading at start ................................ 167
U
nloading at end ........... ...... 143
..............
Total in use ................ ................ 1
546?
T
,
wenty percent allowance for repairs, off-road,
and non-load vehicles ...................... 309
T
otal vehicle park required .......................... 1,855
If the supply movement is continued for more than a short
i
per
od of time, five percent more should be added to the total
hi
ve
cle park to account for normal vehicle replacement.
Truck and Fuel Availability
Because Communist China is not yet self-sufficient in the
r
d
p
o
uction of motor fuel, trucks, and spare parts, both the pe-
tr
l
o
eum industry and motor truck transport being in com-
ar
ti
p
a
ve infancy, this aspect of the logistic problem was given
s
e
i
l
p
c
a
attention. The extreme length of the supply lines
fr
th
om
e railheads to the areas of troop concentration on the
Indi
an border made both the amount of gasoline required and
th
e number of trucks needed of significant proportions; the
? The following formulas can also be used to compute the number
of vehicles in use
:
~T
L
L
rV-
P_TV,+ ,,
2
Vn=Tf V1(1-0.05)'-i
TVti= Vl(1-0.95? 1
\\ 0.05 f
where n=number of stages
P=total vehicle park in use
V:=number of vehicles used in stage 1 ( starting tonnage x 2
V.=number of vehicles used in stage n\ tons per vehicle
TV,,=total number of vehicles in use In all n stages
gasoline required to haul supplies 1,300 miles was calculated to
be nearly equal to the tonnage delivered. The delivery to the
troops of about 430 short tons of supplies daily during Novem-
ber 1962 required about 400 short tons of motor fuel daily and
a truck park of about 7,000 vehicles.
It was estimated, however, that the total availability of pe-
troleum products in Communist China in 1962 was about 6.8
million short tons, about 1.4 million of which consisted of mo-
tor gasoline. The daily requirement for about 400 tons for the
Tibetan front, projected as an annual requirement of about
146,000 tons, would thus be only slightly more than 10 per-
cent of the motor fuel available in 1962. Refineries are located
near two of the major access routes: those at Leng-hu,
Yu-men, and Lan-thou, not far from the central route to
Lhasa, were undoubtedly the source of the gasoline used on
that route, and the Tu-shan-tzu refinery near the Karamai oil
field in Sinkiang was probably the major source of supply for
that used on the route to Ladakh. Thus it appeared that the
fuel requirements for the Tibetan fighting were tolerable and
the sources of supply convenient. Undoubtedly special mili-
tary allocations were necessary, however, with resulting cut-
backs in other sectors of the economy.
It was estimated that at the end of 1962 the military and
civilian truck parks of Communist China each consisted of
about 100,000 trucks in operating condition. The size of the
civilian truck park is believed to have been reduced from previ-
ous years because truck production nearly ceased during 1961
and 1962 and difficulties were experienced in producing or im-
porting spare parts. Present production and imports are
about sufficient, however, to maintain the combined park at
the 200,000 level. In the military regions of Tibet, Lan-chou,
and Sinkiang there were more military trucks available in
November 1962 than the estimated 7,000 required to transport
military supplies and gasoline. In addition several thousand
civilian trucks which are normally employed for economic ac-
tivities in the provinces of Kansu, Sinkiang, and Tsinghai could
have been diverted quickly to the military supply lines if
needed.
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tonnage roug if et
Leeway for Expanded Operations
The table on the following page was compiled by using the
methodologies described above; others broke the daily supply
requirement down into that required by troops engaged in
combat and that for those not so engaged. It was tentatively
concluded in November that military traffic occupied about 20
percent of the capacity of the roads to the front lines from
the supply bases in Tibet and about one-third of the combined
capacity of the major access routes. It was therefore esti-
mated that the forward roads could support the daily resupply
requirement of more than five times the number of troops
then in frontline combat units and that the access routes
from the railheads could handle more than three times the
quantity of supplies then required by the troops located in the
whole of Tibet.
More recently it has been estimated that the 105,000 Chi-
nese troops currently in Tibet would have a daily supply re-
quirement of 450 tons during the type of fighting that oc-
curred last November. It has also been estimated that the
Chinese may wish to reserve as much as 450 tons per day of
the capacity of the roads for support of an air force in Tibet.
These requirements, plus an allowance for the trucks that
would have to provide petroleum for the operation of the
trucks moving supplies, would leave a surplus capacity amount-
ing to about 400 net tons per day that could be used to sup-
port additional troops deployed to Tibet. The total ground
force strength that could be supported there, according to
this estimate, would be on the order of 200,000 men, a maxi-
mum of about 15 divisions.
U
W
U H
M H
C
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CO
00 co I L-
Q co L_
0 0 0 O
0O??
C: M COCO
-I .--1 rl -4
rr"co
oco'a'oi
CO L C- Lo
Co Cho
M co O
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Co
1-4
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O O
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~to to CD CD
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78T03194A00020001000WNFIDENTIAL
Working the sub-surface cham-
bers of an open economic source.
THE INTELLIGENCE YIELD FROM ECE
Ernest Chase
UNESCO's Economic Commission for Europe is the only in-
ternational organization to which all European governments
belong and which deals exclusively with problems of interest
to both Eastern and Western Europe. Each year it holds sev-
eral hundred meetings attended by government representa-
tives and experts from East and West. Its highly professional
Secretariat of economists and technicians includes an in-
creasing number of East Europeans, now close to one-third of
the staff. The Secretariat maintains contact on staff level
with other. international organizations in Europe, including
the Soviet Bloc's CEMA.
Because ECE is uniquely in a position to obtain economic
and related data from East European governments, its publi-
cations are an important source of information on the Soviet
Bloc economies. But the intelligence value of the published
data can be increased and additional unpublished information
can be obtained by participating in the work of the Commis-
sion. U.S. participation for this purpose has been effected
principally through the assignment to the U.S. Mission in
Geneva of an officer with a background in economic intelli-
gence, and it has proved worth while.
Organization and Operations
The Commission itself meets annually and its ten main
committees (Steel, Electric Power, Gas, etc.) periodically to
decide what projects are to be undertaken and to make a re-
view-usually rather perfunctory-of the resulting products.
At these policy-making meetings the typical delegate is a sen-
ior government official at the assistant secretary or division
director level, sometimes even a cabinet minister. The discus-
sions tend to be rather general and are often flavored by po-
litical considerations, but from them emerge the decisions
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CONFIDENTIAL MORI/HRP PAGES 27-31
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 1i6P78T03194A000200010001-2
CONFIDENTIAL Intelligence From ECE
Intelligence From ECE CONFIDENTIAL
which determine broadly what kind of information will be de-
veloped.
When a project has been approved for inclusion in the work
program, it becomes the task of the Secretariat to carry it
out, most frequently by preparing a questionnaire for member
governments, analyzing the replies, and publishing the results
in a study or statistical bulletin. Before publication the in-
formation furnished by member governments is for internal
Secretariat use only, and there are said to have been cases of
dismissal for prior disclosure to delegates from other coun-
tries.
This work of the Secretariat involves numerous meetings of
expert groups, some of them permanent bodies devoted to a
particular kind of activity, like the Statistical Working Par-
ties, and others formed ad hoc for work on specific projects,
sometimes even helping draft the publications. The members
of these are generally technicians, including national ex-
perts from East and West, and their meetings, devoted to tech-
nical agenda in which political considerations play little part,
are often distinguished by a rather free exchange of informa-
tion.
Data furnished by the East European governments for ECE
projects often leave much to be desired. Nevertheless, the
East Europeans try to appear cooperative in the meetings, and
in recent years their data have slowly improved under pres-
sure from the Secretariat and other member governments.
The main reason for the deficiencies is undoubtedly their con-
cern for security, but in some cases there may be bureaucratic
or other reasons: the new Soviet director of the ECE Steel,
Housing, and Engineering Division has declared that much of
the Soviet data missing from ECE publications is readily avail-
able and that he will work on the problem. It is possible, ac-
cordingly, that the growth of East European representation
on the staff may result in some improvement in the data on
Bloc countries.
In recent months representatives of CEMA and other East
European economic organizations have attended a number of
ECE meetings, and members of the Secretariat staff have re-
ciprocated by going to at least one CEMA meeting. These
contacts will probably increase.
Only about half the Secretariat staff works on projects
originating as described above within the committee structure
and thus specifically approved by member governments. The
other half compose a Research Division which conducts in-
dependent studies of European economic problems and pre-
pares an annual European Economic Survey and a Quarterly
Bulletin. Theoretically the Division is able to go to member
governments and get the information necessary for its
studies; but since the East European governments are not will-
ing to cooperate unless they can influence the conclusions, its
research on Eastern Europe has become virtually dependent
upon published data.
Intelligence Potential
There are several ways in which the intelligence value of
the ECE documents can be increased and supplemented
through U.S. participation in the Commission's work. Both
the policy-making committees and the expert groups offer cer-
tain possibilities; also important are the relationships estab-
lished with Secretariat members.
In the meetings of the Commission proper and its commit-
tees where the work program is established, attempts can be
made to steer the program along the lines of intelligence in-
terests. The procedure is to identify and develop the rationale
for projects that will yield data of interest and then seek ap-
proval from the appropriate committee. It is not easy to find
such projects that will be acceptable, but the United States
has had considerable success in the Steel Committee, where
it has been helped by the interest of the U.S. steel industry in
obtaining commercial intelligence. This interest has made it
possible to obtain the services of industry officials as delegates
and to brief them on economic intelligence requirements,
which have consequently had a significant influence on the
Committee's work program and in particular on its collec-
tion of statistical data.
But even when the work program has not been so influ-
enced, a number of the ECE projects under way at any par-
ticular time are of possible intelligence value. To take advan-
tage of this fact it is necessary to become familiar with the
program, evaluating the potential of the individual projects.
If a project appears promising, participation in the appropriate
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expert groups and close contacts with the responsible ECE of-
ficials are the important lines of action. To be of influence
in the execution of a project, the United States must play a
constructive role not only by providing requested data but by
participation in the expert groups assisting the Secretariat.
Such participation provides a legitimate reason to expect and
obtain cooperation from the Secretariat. One can then raise
questions regarding gaps in the data or designed to clarify it,
including questions of definition, coverage, methodology, and
sources. It can be asked, for example, whether the data were
provided by governments in the form used or were modified or
estimated by ECE, and if the latter on what basis.
It is difficult to assess the value of such participation in re-
lation to its cost. Some additional information has thereby
been developed, particularly in the areas of steel, energy, and
agriculture. Thus a project on the relative merits of various
steel-making processes provided some information on com-
parative capital and operating costs in East European steel
plants; a project on agricultural statistics clarified the
methodologies used in Eastern Europe for the collection of
meat and milk statistics; certain energy projects have devel-
oped information on forecasting techniques and criteria for
making investment decisions.
The potential intelligence value of its projects would nor-
mally be only a marginal factor in deciding on U.S. participa-
tion in ECE. For policy reasons the United States usually
sends delegates to Commission and Committee sessions even
though they are of little intelligence value, while because of
the absence of policy considerations it usually does not send
experts to the technical meetings which often have some in-
telligence potential. To take care of intelligence interests,
therefore, the U.S. Mission in Geneva has had for several
years, in addition to its foreign service officer, one with a back-
ground in general economic intelligence. He has the main re-.
sponsibility for identifying the ECE projects of possible inter-
est, familiarizing himself with their scope and methodologies,
participating in appropriate expert meetings, establishing con-
tacts with the ECE officials, and following up on specific ques-
tions and requirements from Washington reflecting its judg-
ment on the potential significance of particular projects.
The U.S. Mission's intelligence activities in ECE are not lim-
ited to the above. Its reports on meetings, for example, are
often the only record of the bits of information divulged. by
delegates during technical and economic discussions. It rec-
ommends that U.S. experts be furnished for the working
groups when such participation seems warranted, and it briefs
these to take full advantage of their participation. It reports
on trips by Secretariat members and others into Eastern Eu-
rope and participates itself in study trips. To the extent it
can within the framework of legitimate liaison, it questions
the ECE Secretariat regarding its contacts with Eastern experts
and Eastern organizations such as CEMA.
The degree and kind of U.S. participation in ECE thus to
some extent determines its value as a source of economic. in-
telligence. Participation 'in the Commission and Commit-
tees can influence the content of the work program; participa-
tion in the expert groups can influence the quality and cover-
age of specific projects. The U.S. Mission in Geneva is usually
the most efficient channel for such participation. The assign-
ment to it of one officer with intelligence background, though
not sufficient to cover all possibilities of intelligence gain., as-
sures that the more promising avenues are explored.
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Problems in the guidance of a
particular kind of intelligence
collection.
REQUIREMENTS AND THE AMERICAN SCIENTIST
Frank X. LaMountain
My job is the collection of intelligence information from Am-
erican scientists. To do it, I depend heavily upon written re-
quirements from the production offices of the community be-
cause I am not scientifically trained. But while requirements
are central to my effort, paradoxically they often impede it
because of deficiencies apparent to my sources which are not
apparent to me. Since requirements will continue vital to my
work, I should like to have them take a better part in it.
A requirement is something needed, and in practice scien-
tific requirements are predominantly a statement of intelli-
gence need. For the analyst this is a reasonable approach-
to state his need. But for the collector this impersonal kind
of statement seems often to ignore the complex human source
who must supply the need. This insensitivity of analyst to
source in the language of requirements is a communications
failure for which the collector cannot wholly compensate and
which, while not fatal to the collection mission, attenuates the
product.
Wherever possible, I try to adjust requirements to the par-
ticular source. I think all collectors of scientific intelligence
do. But this effort can have only limited success. The col-
lector's job is collection; it leaves little time for scrutiny of re-
quirements. Moreover, the technicalities and often the sheer
numbers of requirements preclude lay editing. If an improve-
ment in requirements is to come, then, I think it must come
at the point of origin.
In serving thousands of scientific requirements, I have ex-
perienced things about technical question-asking which I
would like to see applied in requirements composition. I shall
detail these shortly. But here let me state their sum: that
the great need is a new scientific requirements concept sen-
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sitized to the reasonable in the concrete collection setting,
sensitized, that is, to the scientist source.
The Scientific Attitude
The scientist makes a difficult source partly because of his
special language but mostly, I think, because of a special job
discipline which ramifies into all his judgments. This disci-
pline is characterized by a demand for consistency and sim-
plicity in the organization of objective truth. As the collector
confronts it, the psychology of the scientist in pure form is
something like this:
Nature, his subject, is external being, systematic and subtle
in structure. To investigate it his method must be objective,
logical and persistent. Confront him with a social or political
problem and he will unconsciously view it in terms of this
habitual scientific methodology. When the methodology
fails, he will register frustration with the social process.
For the scientist "politics," which includes government, is
too much a contrivance for securing advantage through re-
source. In his casual observation it is a bog of disarray and
ready makeshift, qualities which are foreign to nature and
foreign to the scientist's professional cast of mind. It is true
that his reaction to politics is reinforced by the broad popular
disparagement of the art. But his indictment would stand
anyway: politics is a logical riot. Like other social institu-
tions, it will not stand still and be counted.
This is not an attitude which will bear the light of intelli-
gent scrutiny, but it seldom gets that. The scientist lives the
world of his work, even socially, to a very great degree. Those
involved social things which are outside his interest and
which he lacks the motivation to assess properly he can, by a
device all of us use, simply disparage. So while viscerally he
may appreciate the order which government brings, politics is
an occupation he seldom remarks in any but a pejorative
way, and the intelligence function, that unquestioning con-
servator of the prevailing regime, can be its most repugnant
aspect.
The intelligence collector, then, walks into this mental par-
lor deficient in both language and prestige, and he must im-
he has to go or whether he can make the climb at all depend
in good part upon to what degree this simplistic mentality has
been modified in a given source by other experiential factors.
It has rarely been absent from my interviews. Occasionally it
is there in force. Nearly always, even with the friendly, long.-
time source, it is present in some degree, alert for the trivial,
the foolish, the dramatized, the sinister-in a word, the un-
suitable-in the intelligence approach.
The Role of Requirements
It is to this animus of his source more than to the peculiari-
ties of scientific language that the collector must address his
efforts in the interview. How successful these will be depends
upon the quality of his strategy, of which the intelligence. re-
quirements are the fixed and inescapable element. They
should be addressed, therefore, like his own efforts, first to
giving the source a better view of American intelligence, and
then to information objectives.
When they are broached the requirements show the sci-
entist three things-that they were prepared by a person of
some technical background, that they are scientifically
sound or not, and that they are reasonable in terms of his
experience or not. His first reaction is not an answer but an
impression: American intelligence is competent or it is not.
In a time order the requirements first draw a picture of Ameri-
can intelligence and secondarily express its needs. Unless the
scientist finds the picture better than his expectation, he is
emotionally barred from turning usefully to the needs. It is
my experience that he is so barred too often, that on the
average the American scientist is not impressed with intelli-
gence requirements. I take this reading from his typically un-
enthusiastic manner, his brief attention to the questions, and,
commonly, his criticism of some technical or rhetorical point.
All this in an atmosphere correctly pleasant, mind you, but
registering disapproval like a cannon.
There are, of course, other things than requirements to
queer an interview, most of them in the collector's own man-
ner, but it remains that requirements are the central thing,
the core of the interview. If the collection of information
mediately begin to work upward to a useful result. How far from American scientists is to continue in the present way,
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aen i is equiremen s
then let requirements ask the necessary, but for the sake of state of the art in controlled thermonuclear fusion in the
the American intelligence image and the information product USSR?", "Did the Soviet delegates at any time appear evasive
let them ask it suitably.
in responding to questions?", and "What are key facilities in
To this end I offer a few suggestions to analysts on tech- the Soviet space program and their positions in the organiza-
nique in scientific requirements writing. Each of the follow- tional structure?" are passed over by most sources because they
ing proposals reflects a significant and not unusual complaint have not the time to ponder where to take hold of them.
from scientist sources. Rare complaints and those which In general, keep requirements succinct in wording and few
seem badly motivated have been ignored.
in number. Sources react badly to wordy or numerous re-
Ask the Essential quirements unless they are uniformly superior. In my ex-
Before writing a requirement determine with care, when- perience, regardless of the importance of a target event to
ever possible, whether the needed information is available intelligence, sources are seldom able to cope effectively with
from other sources than the private scientist-from the litera- more than ten or so substantial questions. (The exception is
ture, existing intelligence data, research files or current activi- where they have been asked to review at leisure survey-type
ties of other government agencies, etc. Ponder seriously requirements aimed at no particular. event and covering needs
whether the need might be met by an arrangement of avail-
able data and careful thought.. in an entire scientific field.) The problem of condensing a
brief list ? of questions on a target event from the questions of
At writing, ask something scientifically big. Despite his de- several intelligence agencies remains. I can only suggest that
preciation of politics, the source expects in the intelligence all agencies hew to economy in questions as a matter of prin-
approach something reflecting a national interest in research ciple.
at the forefront. He is disturbed that the matter of questions Ensure that questions asked once are not repeated in es-
is so often technically humdrum-Soviet techniques in crys- sence in the same set of requirements. Ensure also that
tal growth for semiconductors, mental health concepts in multiple sets of requirements targeted against the same event
Moscow clinics, items of research at the 10 BeV machine in
Dubna. This kind of question must continue, of course, but do not duplicate questions. The collector may not have the
the scientist's mind is at the forefront and he expects some competence. to recognize the duplication, but the source will
inquiry at that point. I suggest he be asked, without regard recognize it with annoyance.
to what the Soviets are doing, where the forefront in his spe- Ask the Appropriate
cialty lies, where the specialty is tending, and what its future
configuration is likely to be. I predict he will be pleased and When writing requirements for a particular source or cate-
gory of sources (such as conference attendees), ask for
disarmed. But more important, his answer will be an expert things that they can reasonably provide from a knowledge
view of the future in his field, giving the analyst a stronger
base from which to evaluate current foreign effort and a of their specialties or can reasonably acquire at the target
event. They cannot query Soviet conference delegates about
gauge-a framework of the scientifically possible-with which
weapons research or near-weapons research and will not do so.
to measure the importance of Soviet research directions. If the weapon is something avant-garde-ball lightning, laser
Ask questions of substance only. The collector is practiced death ray, anti-matter-this applies doubly. I would suggest
at asking general questions appropriate to the collection set-
ting. Requirements questions should be essential to an es- that the analyst ask for evidence of Soviet standard research
which he knows will have application to weapons. Normally
sential intelligence objective and should convey a sure techni- this is the most a source can-get. Certainly it is the most he
cal perception. Cover-all questions, such as `? at is b1
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When a target event is not of enough importance to Intelli-
gence objectives to warrant substantial requirements, do not
ask routine coverage of it or suggest pre-existing, quite possi-
bly ill-fitting requirements. Many conferences and Bloc visits
to the United States are so covered now at the risk of com-
municating to sources an impression of trite or uncertain in-
telligence concerns.
Do not ask the ordinary scientific traveler to observe things
outside his field of interest. A microbiologist on an exchange
in Moscow should not be asked to report on the efficiency of
the Moscow sewage system, the placement of ventilators in the
Metropole, or the quantity of fumes emanating from auto-
mobile exhaust pipes. His rejoinder will be, "Don't we have
a military attache in Moscow?"
Ask with Tact
Try to avoid a tone of dogmatic judgment in requirements
writing. For example, do not precede a question with a
gratuitous (as distinct from a necessary) prefatory statement
regarding something which exists or could exist in science or
in Soviet science. It invites the source to disagree and may
shorten his patience and his answer. Example: "Q. There
have been no significant Soviet papers in metal physics since
:1957. To what do you attribute this silence? A. This is not
true. There have been significant papers, etc." The question
might better have been phrased, "Have there been significant
Soviet papers in metal physics in the last several years? If so,
would you try to recall them or at least their authors?" It
may be that the analyst is right and the source wrong about
the significance of Soviet papers in metal physics, but it is im-
portant not to irritate the source with analyst opinions which
do not directly contribute to the meaning of a question.
Make the requirements a communication to the source, at-
tending carefully to:
Courteous expression. When requirements are more
than several, or are of a complex character, it is natural
to hand them to the source to read, and they should be
phrased accordingly. Questions can be plain; "please"
and "we would appreciate" need not encumber them
tail" should be avoided. This consideration is valid, it
seems to me, even in composing requirements for gen-
eral use and only incidentally for domestic collection:
since a human being somewhere is always the source or
the channel for the information sought, courtesy in ad-
dressing him would not be wasted.
Attractive format and good syntax. Clear, uncrowded
print, cleanly blocked, is a rarity in requirements.
Blue ditto at its best suggests a casual effort, at its
worst is illegible. Typing, black mimeograph, or offset
would be preferable. A bad impression on sources who
are usually university graduates, often university pro-
fessors, is also created by the untidy sentence structure
that often slips into requirements.
In sum, I ask analysts for substantial need, awareness of
source, and economy of words in intelligence requirements in-
tended for the American scientist. Improved in these direc-
tions, requirements should project a better intelligence image
and elicit a better information product.
But commands such as "Specify" and "Ex 1 in in ~~PP~~
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COMMUNICATION TO THE EDITORS
Scientific Exchanges
Dear Sirs:
I endorse Mr. James McGrath's reply 1 to Mr. Amos Wylie's
complaint concerning the "Unfair Exchange" of U.S. and So-
viet scientific visits 2 and should like to make some additional
comments from the point of view of those of us in the State
Department who are concerned with these exchanges. As Mr.
Wylie phrases his challenge to defend "the proposition that
exchanges of visits by U.S. and Soviet scientists in fields re-
lated to the development of new weapons are in the U.S. na-
tional interest," one can scarcely take it up without labeling
oneself a traitor or a fool. It is like the old question, "When
did you stop beating your wife?" One can, however, quarrel
with much of what Mr. Wylie says on two kinds of grounds-
first, his often erroneous or incomplete set of facts, and sec-
ond, his ignoring of the broader policy issues involved.
On the first point, Soviet scientists and other exchange visi-
tors are admitted to the United States for specific itineraries
only after clearance with the competent intelligence and se-
curity agencies, and changes or extensions of itinerary are sub-
jected to a similar procedure. In the case of Oleg Roman
which Mr. Wylie cites, for example, no objection was posed to
his visit by the competent agencies, including CIA, Defense,
and Commerce, all of which were consulted. Mr. Wylie notes
that Roman attended the annual meeting of the Metallurgical
Society of the American Institute of Mining, Metallurgical
and Petroleum Engineers in New York City, a conference in
Philadelphia, etc.: these trips had been checked out with the
intelligence community, and no objections were posed. Yury
Popov's visit in the field of lasers was similarly checked and
cleared with the appropriate agencies. Mr. Wylie observes
with surprise that the participants in "so-called student ex-
changes" are not undergraduate students; but undergradu-
ate students have never been included in this exchange on
1 "The Scientific and Cultural Exchange," in Studies VII 1, p. 25 if.
2 Studies VI 4, p. 9 if.
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either side under any of the three U.S.-USSR exchange agree- This strategy looks to more than making a direct impact on
ments, nor was an undergraduate exchange ever intended, the relatively few (and carefully selected) Soviet citizens who
Mr. Wylie is anachronistic in painting to the doctrine of are allowed to come to this country. (although in private many
analogy in Soviet law and in describing the crime of disclosure of these are not the rigid nwe their advocates of the Soviet in public of state secrets. The doctrine of analogy was formally re- system that they may appear pudiated and the secrets law revised in 1958, and for some front of other Soviet citizens or most foreigners of short ac-
uaintance) . Probably of much more importance from the
time previous to that the former had been inoperative in prat- q
tice and the latter had not been applied in the manner de- standpoint of "impact" is the presence in the Soviet Union o
who and are sthere
scribed. This is not to say there are no sanctions or controls large numbers of foreigners, including speakers Americans,
on Soviet scientists, but it shows the inadequate factual back- is special advantage in having Russian-speakers
and superficial approach of the article. cialists on Soviet society there long epough to establish a cir-
The whole question of the advantages and disadvantages of cle of acquaintances. Still more im ortant are the indirect
benefits of the exchanges program, the mere existence of
exchanges is a complex one. There is much to be said in sup- which gives Soviet citizens a rationale and the courage to talk
port of the position that the disadvantages outweigh the ad- to for even to accept foreign ways. The regime it-
vantages, and there is much to be said in support of the op- self, foreigners e taking one step in this direction, is encouraged to take
posite view. It would indeed be a pity if the question were
approached on the level of a polemical debate with distorted more, because much of the iron curtain psychology is based on
facts and simplified, superficial views of both one's own posi- fear and feelings of inferiority toward the West.
tion and the other, as when Mr. Wylie attributes to advocates Mr. Wylie proposes that exchange be limited to such fields
of exchanges the naive contention that Soviet scientists will as the arts, literature, and athletics, that is to those where
be converted by visits to the United States. U.S. interest is great and Soviet interest is meager or even
In discussing this question one should also keep in mind cer- negative. But the exchanges are all of one fabric. You can't
tain political realities that limit one's freedom of choice in any abolish scientific exchanges without abolishing the Amerika-
case. With the gradual although limited emergence of the USSR magazine exchange, exchanges of exhibits, and other
Soviet Union from the iron curtain of the Stalin era, our task such informational activities. The Soviet Union is in the ex-
is made more difficult. in many ways. As Soviet scientists and change business primarily for the sake of industrial and sci-
other specialists are allowed or even encouraged to visit entific benefits and would see no reason to agree to a program
abroad, a U.S. refusal of visas on a massive scale would create restricted to fields advantageous to the United States and dis-
such anegative world public image of the United States as to
be virtually unthinkable. Furthermore, without an official advantageous to the Soviet Union.
(and controlled and limited) exchanges program such as we Moreover, now that we have exchanges-for 'better or for
have at present we would be faced with many more ill- worse-one would have to consider the political effects of
conceived invitations and even massive programs by often eliminating the program. In addition to the disadvantages
naive private groups that could be countered only by outright vis-a-vis a sizable part of the world public, an abolition of ex-
refusal of visas. On the positive side, the primary motivation changes would tend to throw the Soviet Union back onto itself
of the official program, initiated at the highest levels of the again-to strengthen the "Slavophil" element over the "West
government and approved by the National Security Council, ernizer" element in Soviet psychology and thus to reinforce
was not intelligence but a political-psychological strategy de- the cohesion of the Bloc, including communist China. Al-
signed to encourage, over a long period of time, liberalization though presumably not of decisive effect in present circurn-
of the Soviet system. stances, it would remain a force in this direction.
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42 CONFIDENTIAL CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2005/04113
CONFIDENTIAL To the Editors
Do we get anything out of the exchanges from an intelli-
gence standpoint? In the graduate student exchange it is
true we have few scientific graduate students in the USSR
and get little "hard" intelligence out of the program. (We
probably wouldn't get much more if we had more scientific
participants, in view of the levels of Soviet and U.S. compe-
tence in most fields and the Soviet restrictions.) There are
some advantages of a political and largely current intelligence
nature, however, in having a number of knowledgeable, ma-
ture Americans living in Soviet society and close, or relatively
close, to the Soviet pulse. This is a resource that the Ameri-
can Embassy in Moscow can draw on from time to time, and
its value is reflected in telegrams and airgrams, not in de-
briefings. Sometimes one sees direct reference to factual in-
formation obtained in this way (the Temir Tau riots, for ex-
ample) ; in other cases it is simply a matter of analysis being
given a somewhat broader base than it would otherwise have.
These remarks, written in reaction to Mr. Wylie's article,
put more emphasis on the positive aspects of the program
than is probably warranted. (I agree with his refutation,
for example, of the claim by some superficial exchange advo-
cates that since scientific information is available in pub-
lished, sources anyway the Soviets gain little or nothing from
scientific visits.) I hope that sometime some of us who are
familiar with the program at first hand may have time to
weigh all aspects of the exchanges in a really serious study
in depth.
Robert J. Martens
'IIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
A thoughtful former insider ex-
amines in depth the Soviet (and
Western) intelligence services.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF SOVIET
INTELLIGENCE 1
Alexander Orlov
Like the Western intelligence services, the Russians get in-
formation about foreign states from two principal sources,
from secret informants and undercover agents and from legit-
imate sources such as military and scientific journals, pub-
lished reference material, and records of parliamentary de-
bates. But the Russians regard as true intelligence (ra-
zvedka) only the first type of information, that procured by
undercover agents and secret informants in defiance of the
laws of the foreign country in which they operate. Informa-
tion obtained from legitimate sources and publications they
consider mere research data. In the eyes of Russian officers
it takes a real man to do the creative and highly dangerous
work of underground intelligence on foreign soil, while the
digging up of research data in the safety of the home office or
library can be left to women or young lieutenants just begin-
ning their careers. The Western intelligence services, on the
other hand, treat both types of information as intelligence,
often with a much higher regard for research than for un-
dercover work.
Fundamental Doctrine
It is in these variant attitudes toward the two types of in-
formation that the difference between Soviet and Western in-
telligence doctrine begins to emerge. The difference is not
just a theoretical one; in practice it affects every phase of
intelligence activity from operational planning and choice of
1 The material in this article has also been submitted to the Michigan
University Press as part of the manuscript for a book which may be
available by the time this issue appears. It is nevertheless of sufficient
importance to warrant this special presentation for the intelligence
community.
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strategy to evaluation of the reliability of information pro-
cured and its importance to policy makers.
Both Soviet and Western intelligence services strive to
learn the secret intentions, capabilities, and strategic plans
of other states, but they don't go about it in the same way.
The Russians believe that such important secrets can and
should be procured directly from the. classified files in offices of
the government in question and from informants among its
civil servants. When the Russians suspect that another coun-
try is trying to form a coalition directed against the Soviet
Union, they don't seek information about it in newspaper edi-
torials, panel discussions, or historical precedents, although
all these sources may shed some light on the matter; they
set out to steal the secret diplomatic correspondence between
the conspiring states or to recruit an informant on the staff
of the negotiators if they don't have one there already. When
the Russians want to know the number of bombers in the air
force of a potential adversary, they get the figure, not by doing
library research on the productive capability of airplane plants
or assembling educated guesses and rumors, but by asking
their secret informers within the foreign air force or war min-
istry and by stealing the desired information from govern-
ment files.
The Americans, on the other hand, and to a certain extent
the British, prefer to rely more heavily on legitimately acces-
sible documents. The American intelligence agencies are said
to monitor as many as five million words daily-the equiva-
lent of 50 books of average length-from foreign radio broad-
casts alone. From enormous quantities of open material like
this analysts derive a lot of information about foreign coun-
tries, their economies and finance, their industries, agricul-
ture, and trade, their population and social trends, their edu-
cational and political systems, the structure of their govern-
ments, their leaders' past lives and present views, etc. Draw-
ing on that colossal warehouse of encyclopedic data, intelli-
gence officers write reports and compose national estimates
of foreign countries for the benefit of policy makers.
Admiral Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Chief of Naval Intelligence
in the last war, wrote that in the Navy 95% of peacetime in-
telligence was procured from legitimately accessible sources
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another 4% from semi-open sources, and only 1% through
secret agents. Another authority on American intelligence,
Gen. William J. Donovan, who headed the Office of Strategic
Services during the war, expressed the same predilection for
"open sources" by saying that intelligence is not the "mys-
terious, even sinister" thing people think it is, but more a
matter of "pulling together myriad facts, making a pattern
of them, and drawing inferences from that pattern." This
predilection for open sources lies at the core of the American
doctrine of intelligence.
But how can intelligence officers pick out from the vast
amount of encyclopedic data that flows in to them the key
developments for their purposes? One of the chiefs of Ameri-
can intelligence, a distinguished professor and noted scholar,
had this to say on the subject:
How can surveillance [of the world scene] assure itself of spot-
ting ... the really unusual? How can it be sure of putting the
finger on the three things per week out of the thousands it ob-
serves and the millions that happen which are really of potential
import? The answer is ... procure the services of wise men-
and wise in the subject-and pray that their mysterious inner
selves are of the kind which produce hypotheses of national im-
portance.
In the Russian view, such an approach is but one step re-
moved from mysticism and metaphysics. What if the "mys-
terious inner selves" of the researchers and analysts fail to
produce the right hypotheses? How safe is it, in general, to
rely on hypotheses in matters of such profound complexity as
world politics, where nothing is stable and enemies of yester-
day become today's friends and fight together against their
former allies? A hypothesis may be wisdom itself, yet turn
out to be utterly wrong. Not only intelligence officers but
statesmen of the highest caliber have time and again been
proved wrong in acting on undeniably wise hypotheses.
In 1940-41 Stalin based his strategy on the calculation that
Hitler would not attack the Soviet Union. He knew that it
was not in Germany's interests to get into a two-front war,
and he thought that Hitler understood this too. In the spring
of 1941 the British Joint Intelligence Committee also estimated
that 'Hitler would not be so foolish as to add the powerful So-
880 ~nemies in the West. But these
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 ApproveddvFeorIR elpase 2005/04/13 :
logical hypotheses went up in all-too-real smoke on 22 June
that year.
Stalin, who was his own intelligence boss and liked to take
a personal part in the cloak-and-dagger business, warned his
intelligence chiefs time and again to keep away from hypoth-
eses and "equations with many unknowns" and concentrate
instead on acquiring well-placed informants and access to the
secret vaults of foreign governments. He used to say, "An
intelligence hypothesis may become your hobby horse on
which you will ride straight into a self-made trap." He called
it "dangerous guesswork." In 1932 he had ordered that our
quarterly intelligence surveys of foreign countries no longer
be sent him. Although based on secret data, these surveys
were interspersed with unsubstantiated hypotheses and sub-
jective views; they corresponded roughly to the national esti-
mates which the American intelligence agencies produce for
the National Security Council. After that the NKVD sent
him the cream of raw intelligence only-summaries of impor-
tant documents stolen from other governments and reports
from exceptionally valuable secret informants like foreign am-
bassadors and general staff officers.
During his periodic conferences with the chiefs of the intelli-
gence services Stalin would often interject: "Don't tell me what
you think, give me the facts and the source." But sometimes
he would violate his own rule and ask one or another intelli-
gence chief for an opinion. Such was the case during a joint
conference which Stalin and Voroshilov had in the summer of
1936 with the chiefs of the NKVD and the Red Army Intelli-
gence Department. Stalin asked Artouzov, deputy chief of mili-
tary intelligence, "With whom would Poland side in a war be-
tween Germany, Italy, and Japan on the one side and Russia,
France, and England on the other?" Without hesitation Ar-
touzov answered: "Poland will always be with France and Eng-
land." "You are a jackass," retorted Stalin. "If Poland didn't
side with Germany against us, she would be crushed by the
German mechanized divisions on their way to the Soviet Union
and would not live to see another day, whereas if she allied
herself with Germany she could hope to expand if things went
well, and if things went badly she might still get a negotiated
settlement." Artouzov did not live to see his illogical predic-
tion come true; he was shot in the gre9Ap drFaP3elease 2005/04/13 :
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Soviet Inte igence
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In the Soviet Union research on publicly accessible mate-
rials is conducted by the Academy of Sciences, the universities,
the scientific journals, and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, In-
dustry, Trade, Finance, and Statistics. The NKVD based its
work 100% on secret sources and undercover agents. The
Main Intelligence Department of the Army did study some
legitimately accessible sources, but only those dealing with mili-
tary matters, such as foreign military and scientific journals,
army and navy manuals, military textbooks, topographic ex-
plorations, and anything printed anywhere about the armed
forces of the world. But even in army intelligence the main
efforts, at least 80% of the total, were concentrated on building
and operating networks of secret informants and on the pro-
curement of secret documents.
Had the Soviet intelligence agencies put their main efforts
and resources into building up encyclopedias of world-wide in-
formation from overt sources and on processing and analyzing
that enormous amount of incoming raw material, they would
have never been able to acquire the secrets of the manufac-,
ture of the atomic and hydrogen bombs or the blueprints of
the American nuclear-powered submarines or to infiltrate the
key departments of the American, British, and European gov-?
ernments. Important state secrets and especially clues to the
intentions and plans of potential enemies cannot be found in
libraries or encyclopedias, but only where they are kept wider
lock and key. The task of intelligence services is to acquire
the keys and deliver the secrets to their governments, thus pro--
viding them with the foreknowledge and orientation needed
for the making of decisions.
When General Douglas MacArthur, who had been blamed
for not having foreseen certain developments in the Korean
War, was asked by the Senate investigating committee in 1951.
to explain why the North Korean invasion caught the An.ieri-
cans by surprise, he gave a classic reply from which many an
intelligence chief could take his cue. He said:
I don't see how it would have been humanly possible for any man
or group of men to predict such an attack as that ... There is
nothing, no means or methods, except the accidental spy methods--
if you can get somebody to betray the enemy's highest circles, that
can get such information as that. It is guarded with a secrecy
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48 OFFICIAI IMP nPi v
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Soviet Intelligence Soviet Intelligence
Thus, under the fire of the investigation, General MacArthur,
who was not an expert in intelligence, arrived with excellent
logic at an idea which touches the very heart of the intelligence
problem. "There is nothing, no means or methods, except ...
spy methods ... that can get such information as that." This
is the essence of the Soviet doctrine of intelligence.
Political Intelligence
While The Main Intelligence Department (GRU) of the So-
viet Ministry of Defense does only military intelligence, the For-
eign Directorate of the Committee of State Security (KGB),
successor to the NKVD, is actively engaged in at least seven
lines of intelligence and related work, not counting sabotage
and guerrilla warfare.
The first line, which is considered the most important, is the
so-called diplomatic intelligence, the purpose of which is to
keep the Soviet government informed of the secret deals be-
tween the governments of capitalistic countries and of the true
intentions and contemplated moves of each of these govern-
ments toward the Soviet Union. This information is to be pro-
cured from primary sources within the secret councils of the
foreign governments. The principal sources are the follow-
ing: foreign diplomats, including ambassadors; the staffs of
foreign ministries, including code clerks, secretaries, etc.; pri-
vate secretaries to members of the cabinet; members of parlia-
ments; and ambitious politicians seeking financial aid and left-
wing support. The life history of such officials is studied be-
ginning with their school years, and their character traits,
weaknesses and vices, and intimate lives and friendships are
analyzed with the purpose of finding the Achilles' heel of each
and securing the right approach to him through the right per-
son, say a former classmate, intimate friend, or relative.
These well-prepared approaches have often paid off. Some
politicians have been lured into the Soviet network by promises
that the Soviet Union would use its secret levers of influence
in their countries to further their political fortunes. Such
promises have often been accompanied by "subsidies," osten-
sibly to promote good will toward Russia but in reality a bribe.
A number of high officials have succumbed to outright offers
of money. Others, especially those whrAopthehdyfatlf2hbobe-2005/04/13
longed to Fabian and other idealistic circles, were influenced
by humanitarian arguments and persuaded that they must
help the Soviet Union stop the march of fascism. Consider-
able success was achieved among foreign diplomats tinted
with homosexual perversions; it is no secret that the biggest
concentration of homosexuals can be found in the diplomatic
services of Western countries. Those of these who agreed to
work for the Russian network were instructed to approach other
homosexual members of the diplomatic corps, a strategy
which was remarkably successful. Even when those ap-
proached declined the offer to collaborate, they would not de-
nounce the recruiter to the authorities. Soviet intelligence
officers were amazed at the mutual consideration and true
loyalty which prevailed among homosexuals.
It is usually supposed easier to lure into the Soviet network
a code clerk or secretary than a diplomat or statesman; a man
in an important government position is expected to know better
than to take the road of treachery, and he has much more to
lose if caught doing so. The experience of Soviet intelligence
has in many instances, however, not borne out this view. Hon-
esty and loyalty may often be more deeply ingrained in simple
and humble people than in men of high position. A man who
took bribes when he was a patrolman does not turn honest
when he becomes the chief of police; the only thing that
changes is the size of the bribe. Weakness of character, in-
ability to withstand temptation, lightmindedness, wishful
thinking, and bad judgment are also traits that accompany a
man to the highest rungs of his career.
The consensus of Soviet intelligence chiefs has been that de-
partmental and private secretaries in a foreign ministry are
often more valuable as sources of information than an ambas-
sador, because a well-placed secretary can supply documentary
data on a wider scale, covering the policies of the foreign gov-
ernment toward a number of countries. An ambassador is
considered a much bigger prize, however, because he can be
used not only as a source of information but also as a compe-
tent consultant for the Russian Foreign Office and even as an
agent who can influence to a certain extent the foreign policy
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : Cl -RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
OFFICIAL USE ONLY Soviet Intelligence Soviet Intelligence
Military Intelligence ately signaling to the Soviet government if an ally puts out
The second line of Soviet intelligence activity is to procure peace feelers and is gravitating toward a separate peace with
data on the military posture of Western and other countries, the enemy. It may be recalled that during World War II the
the quality and strength of their armies, navies, and air forces, Kremlin sounded an alarm when it intercepted rumors that
British representatives
their degree of mechanization, mobility, fire power, technologi- were about to meet in Franco's Spain
with emissaries of Hitler. During the worst days of the last
cal advancement, and modernization, and the productive ca-
pacity of the armament industries and the mobilization plans
allies were slow in opening a second front, there were moments
of the big powers. Soviet intelligence watches with a jealous when the Western leaders were jittery at the thought that Sta,-
eye every new invention in the field of arms and tries to steal lin might try to save what was left of the country by making
it while it is still in the blueprint stage or on the drawing board a separate peace with Germany.
so that Soviet inventors and engineers can be the first to apply
it. With the advent of the nuclear and rocketry age, which has While the residenturas abroad keep the government informed
completely revolutionized the material base, strategy, and very of the enemy's grand strategy and his capabilities and vulnera-
concept of warfare, Soviet intelligence strains all its efforts to bilities, day-to-day tactical or combat intelligence is taken care
obtain immediate information on the progress being made by of by the intelligence sections of the Soviet armed forces and
the leading Western countries in these advanced fields and to by the special detachments (Osoby Otdel) of the KGB attached
gauge the striking and retaliatory power of the Western world. to all army units down to the regimental level. It is their duty
As we have said, the KGB does not look for this information to supply the Soviet commander with data on the size, dispo-
in public documents. Neither is it interested in monitoring for- sition, and fighting strength of the enemy force with which the
troops under his command will soon be locked in battle. The
eign radio transmissions and distilling from them crumbs of standard sources of military intelligence are supplemented by
random information. It procures the military secrets of for- material obtained in raids the KGB guerrilla detachments
eign governments from the classified files of the general staffs make on enemy headquarters, by ground and aerial photo re-
of those countries, from the secret reports of foreign defense connaissance, and by the interrogation of prisoners, refugees,
ministries, from military research laboratories and proving who pose as refugees.
grounds, and so it knows that what it gets represents, even if and spies
incompletely, the true facts on which Soviet policy makers can Economic Warfare
confidently base their decisions.
The third line of Soviet intelligence is called economic intel-
In wartime, military intelligence becomes the principal funs- ligence, which contrary to what might be supposed has little
tion of every branch of the Intelligence Directorate of the KGB. to do with studying the economy of foreign countries. It was
The main task of its field posts, its underground residenturas created for the purposes of exercising State control over Soviet
abroad, is then to inform the Soviet government by radio and export and import operations and of protecting Soviet foreign
other means about the war plans of the enemy, his troop con- trade from the pressures and abuses of international cartels
centrations and movements, the size of his uncommitted re- and other organizations of monopolistic capital.
serves in men and materiel, and the extent of the damage in-
In the 1930's, for instance, the Division of Economic Intel.li-
flicted on the enemy by the air forces of the Soviet Union and gence discovered that the biggest electric concerns of the world
its allies. Diplomatic intelligence concentrates the efforts of had entered into a "gentlemen's agreement" according to
its informants and secret agents on watching the relations which they would not compete with each other in their deal-
among the governments of the enemy coalition, with special ings with Soviet Russia and would overcharge her on pur-
emphasis on frictions among them. The residenturas must chases up to 75% over current world prices. I myself saw a
keep a sharp eye also on Russia's gMedlFoV Iggp&aQ05/04/13: Cl4-RDP78T031 &%0,WQQ111 (a18 vice president of General Electric Co. ad-
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Soviet Intelligence
dressed to the presidents of the German AEG and the Swiss
Brown Bovery Co. which contained a list of prices made up
especially for the Soviet Union 60 to 75% higher than the regu-
lar market prices. General Electric tried to justify this extor-
tion by pointing out that Russia's credit standing was "not too
good." The gentlemen's agreement was finally broken up by
the Soviet government, but not before Soviet trade had suffered
losses totaling tens of millions of dollars.
Plants
The fourth line of Soviet intelligence is misinformation. The
Soviet government is interested not only in obtaining informa-
tion about the policies and impending moves of other countries
but also in misinforming and misleading the foreign govern-
ments concerning its own position and intentions. But
whereas in procuring secret information from abroad the in-
telligence officer is given free rein to steal whatever he consid-
ers valuable, the task of misinforming the outer world about
the Soviet Union cannot be left to the discretion of the individ-
ual officer or even of the intelligence service as a whole. What
false information or rumors should be deviously placed within
earshot of some foreign government is a question of high pol-
icy, since the purpose is to induce this government to do what
the Kremlin wants it to do, perhaps to bluff it into inaction or
into making a concession. In this area, therefore, Soviet intelli-
gence cannot act without specific directives as to the substance
of the misinformation and the way it should be planted.
When in the 1930's, for instance, the Soviet government
wanted to obtain a mutual defense treaty with France in order
to counteract the growing menace of Hitler's Germany, Soviet
intelligence was given instructions to introduce into French
General Staff channels certain pages from a German army re-
port which showed that Germany was planning to occupy the
Rhineland at the beginning of 1936 and invade France within
eighteen months after that. Similarly, at about this same
time, an effort was made to shake England out of her compla-
cency by slipping into British intelligence channels (through a
German double agent) inflated figures concerning German air-
craft production; these created quite a stir in the highest coun-
cils of the British government. Here the task of the misinfor-
mation desk of the NKVD had been to fabricate ostensible pho-
App(9M9gI~4r 4e eL4,005/04/13:
Soviet Intelligence OFFICIAL USE ONLY
tocopies of the German documents with such skill that they
would seem genuine even to trained military experts.
During the Spanish civil war, in which a Russian tank bri-
gade fought against the forces of General Franco and Russian
pilots flew the newest and best Soviet fighter planes (I--15 and
1-16) and medium bombers (CB) against the German air
squadrons supporting him, the misinformation desk was
ordered to introduce into German military intelligence chan-
nels the information that these Soviet planes were not of the
latest design, that Russia had in her arsenal thousands of
planes of second and third succeeding generations possessing
much greater speed and higher ceiling. In August 1937 Ger-
man experts had examined and tested two Soviet 1-16 fighters
when they landed by mistake on an enemy air strip in the Ma-
drid sector, and they had been amazed at the quality and per-
formance of the planes, which in some respects surpassed Ger-
man fighters. Now the false information that the Russians had
on the production line still better and more modern models
served Stalin's evident aim of impressing upon Hitler that the
Soviet Union was better armed than he thought and that it
would be wiser for Germany to have Russia as a partner than
as an opponent.
Penetration
The fifth line of Soviet intelligence is infiltration into the se-
curity agencies and intelligence services of foreign countries.
This activity holds a special challenge and a peculiar fascina-
tion for Soviet intelligence officers. Although they regard for-
eign intelligence officers as mercenary spies (while thinking of
themselves as devoted revolutionaries carrying out dangerous
assignments for the Party), the Soviet officers do have a feeling
of kinship with them and react to an encounter with one of
them with the same thrill and curiosity that enemy fighter pi-
lots feel on sighting each other across a space of sky. Their
hostile attitude toward their foreign counterparts becomes
sincerely friendly the moment the latter begin to cooperate
as informants.
The principal aims pursued in infiltrating foreign security
agencies are the following: to find out what these agencies
know about Soviet intelligence operations to the country in
question; to determine whether they have succeeded in plant-
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ing counterspies in the Soviet network or in recruiting anyone
connected with the residentura; to learn in good time of any
intended arrests of network personnel; and to use their facili-
ties to check up on persons in whom the Soviet residentura hap-
pens to be interested. The penetration of foreign intelligence
services is done to find out whether they have succeeded in
creating a spy network in Soviet Russia, and if so who these
spies are, what secret information they have transmitted, and
what lines of communication they use.
In some of the Western countries, furthermore, the intelli-
gence services have access to the confidential papers of other
departments of the government, including defense and foreign
affairs. This practice is justified on the ground that it helps
them evaluate the information from their own secret sources
abroad and render more accurate estimates of the intentions
and capabilities of other countries. Whatever the merits of
this argument, the NKVD was quick to take advantage of the
resulting convenient concentration in one place of secret docu-
ments from several government departments; it instructed its
residenturas abroad to try to procure from the intelligence
services not only their own information but also that which
they receive from other government departments, for example
military attache reports and the political analyses and esti-
mates of ambassadors.
Although the intelligence services of different capitalistic
countries do not always have harmonious relations with one
another, thanks to national rivalry and personal jealousies,
they do cooperate with one another to a certain extent in com-
batting Soviet espionage and subversion. Some of them ex-
change information in this field, forwarding to each other pho-
tographs of known or suspected Soviet spies. Soviet acquisi-
tion of this correspondence reveals what they know about Rus-
sian intelligence activities and may sometimes warn of an im-
pending exposure and arrest of an agent. In my time, how-
ever, the secret information procured from foreign intelligence
services rarely gave us cause for alarm. Much of it was in-
competent and out of date. As a rule the strength of the Soviet
armed forces was ridiculously belittled. The reports on So-
viet espionage activities were based more on hindsight than
foresight, and they frequently contained outright fantasies con-
56
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totted by unscrupulous doubles and falsifiers. But though
much of the information collected by the foreign intelligence
services about Russia was found to be worthless, it was by no
means worthless to Soviet intelligence to know about this.
It is generally said that knowledge of two things is indispen-
sable to the charting of foreign policy in a time of crisis-the
real power of one's own country and the power of the potential
enemy. But to these a third must be added: one must also
know what image one's own power creates in the eyes of the ad-
versary. This is very important, because however distorted
that image, it is what he is going to act upon. By infiltrating
the intelligence services of foreign countries Soviet intelligence
can learn and report to policy makers how each country as-
sesses the capabilities and deficiencies of the Soviet Union. It
is then up to the policy makers to figure out what mistakes the
potential enemy will be likely to make when the chips are down
as a result of the distortions in his view of the Soviet Union as
a world power.
The infiltration of a foreign intelligence service is a much
more hazardous operation than the acquisition of informants
in other government departments, because the foreign intelli-
gence officers are wise to such practices and may maneuver
the recruiting officer into a trap or grab him outright before
he can get away. The KGB therefore advises its residenturas
not to rush things but to approach and cultivate first a friend
or relative of the target officer and use him as a go-between.
Then the actual recruiting and all meetings until the recruited
officer has proved his sincerity (by turning over important in-
formation) should take place on territory outside the jurisdic-
tion of the target country.
The safest way to infiltrate a foreign intelligence service with-
out fear of being trapped is to transplant a completely reliable
agent into that organization, for example to induce an old, and
trusted informant in some other branch of the government to
seek employment with the intelligence service. Sometimes it
may be necessary for him first to cultivate socially for this pur-
pose a senior officer of the intelligence service. Agents planted
in a foreign intelligence service can be used not only to procure
secret information but also as a channel through which misin-
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ovie n eliigence
formation about the Soviet Union and other countries can be
introduced.
The intelligence and security services of none of the big world
powers have escaped infiltration by Soviet agents. Gen. Walter
Bedell Smith, as head of the CIA, was aware of Soviet suc-
cesses in this field, and in September 1953 he expressed his ap-
prehension in the following words: "I believe the communists
are so adroit and adept that they have infiltrated practically
every security agency of the government."
Political Action
The sixth line of Soviet intelligence is to influence the deci-
sions of foreign governments through secret agents occupying
important positions within them. In the last two decades there
have been quite a few instances in which highly placed Soviet
secret agents were able to tip the scales of policy in favor of
the Soviet Union. Some of these agents started out as junior
diplomats in the foreign offices of the West and climbed with
the help of their socially prominent families to high govern-
ment positions. Others were already mature politicians and
statesmen when they were seduced by money and other base
considerations. One of the leading members of Mussolini's
cabinet and the Fascist Grand Council succumbed to an offer
of money and agreed to collaborate with Soviet Russia.
A leading member of the parliament of a mid-European
country, who was not thought to be a friend of the Soviet
Union, would meet secretly with the Soviet ambassador and
take his instructions concerning the position he should assume
in certain matters affecting Soviet interests. In another Euro-
pean country an inspector of the national secret police, who
had become a Soviet informant, reported the police had docu-
mentary proof that an influential member of the cabinet was
a partner in a big narcotics ring and owned, together with a
famous racketeer, a luxury brothel a few blocks away from the
presidential palace in the center of the capital. This minister
was so powerful in the councils of the government, as well as in
the underworld, that the head of the secret police was afraid to
tangle with him. Moscow ordered the residentura to steal all
the incriminating documents, and photographs of them were
shown to the minister at the Soviet embassy, as a "friendly
gesture," by the Soviet ambassador himself, who happenddto.
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CIA-R
be a former chief of the Foreign Department of the OGPU, i.e.
of Soviet intelligence. The friendly gesture was well under-
stood, and it inaugurated a period of close collaboration be-
tween the minister and Soviet intelligence. His task was not
merely to provide information but to influence the policies of
his government as directed by the Soviet Foreign Commis-
sariat.
Another type of KGB political action is to pave the way in
ticklish international matters for later negotiations between the
Soviet Foreign Office and other governments. If exploratory
talks conducted, directly or through go-betweens, by Soviet in-
telligence agents with representatives of a foreign government
produce results satisfactory to both sides, the official diplo-
mats of both countries can then take over. If not, the Krem-
lin remains free to disclaim any knowledge of them. A Rus-
sian intelligence officer by the name of Ostrovsky who had se-
cretly negotiated the establishment of diplomatic relations
with Roumania became the first Soviet ambassador to that
country.
Another activity along this line consists of clandestine at-
tempts to induce leaders of a political opposition to stage a
coup d'etat and take. over the government. The inducement
would be a promise of political and financial support and, if
the state happened to border on Soviet territory, military aid
as well. In 1937, for instance, one of the chiefs of intelligence
was commissioned by Stalin personally to enter into secret ne-
gotiations with former Roumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Titulesku, who lived at that time in Menton, on the Franco-
Italian border, and persuade him to overthrow the reactionary
regime of Prime Minister Maniu. Stalin offered financial and
military aid against a promise by Titulesku that upon as-
sumption of power he would sign a mutual assistance pact; with
the Soviet Union.
Industrial Intelligence
Although intelligence activity is as old as society, this seventh
line of Soviet operation is something new, first begun in 1929.
Its purpose was to assist in the industrialization of the Soviet
Union by stealing production secrets-new inventions, secret
technological processes, etc.-from the advanced countries of
jica. Soviet intelligence organizations abroad
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began to recruit engineers, scientists, and inventors working
in the laboratories and plants of the big industrial concerns
of the world.
At this time the Soviet Union, besides buying big quantities
of machinery and even whole plants from the industrial com-
panies of the West, negotiated with them for the purchase of
patents and the know-how for production processes. A num-
ber of such purchases were made and foreign engineers came
to instruct the Russians in the application of the new methods.
But often, when the price demanded by foreign concerns for
their "technical aid" was too high-it always ran into many
millions of dollars-the head of the Soviet government would
challenge the Foreign Department of the NKVD to steal the
secrets in question from them. The response to these chal-
lenges was invariably enthusiastic, and after a number of them
had been successfully met the new Division for Industrial In-
telligence was created within the NKVD Foreign Department.
Sometimes the theft of all the necessary formulas, blue-
prints, and instructions would still not enable Soviet engineers
and inventors to construct a complicated mechanism or dupli-
cate a production process. They would need the human com-
ponent, the special skill or engineering know-how. In such
cases officers of the Division for Industrial Intelligence would,
with offers of additional rewards, persuade the appropriate for-
eign engineers to make a secret trip to Russia to instruct the
Russian engineers or supervise the laboratory experiments on
the spot. Precautions were taken to insure that the traveler's
passport should not bear any border stamps or other traces of
his visit to the Soviet Union: the engineer would travel with
his own passport only to the capital of an adjacent country,
where he would turn it over for safekeeping to the local Soviet
agent and get from him a false one on which he would proceed
to Russia; then on the return trip he would turn this in and
pick up the genuine passport where he had left it. The fees
paid by the Russians for such trips ran sometimes as high as
ten thousand dollars for a few days, but the savings realized
amounted to millions of dollars. The following is a typical
such operation.
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
A Worm Turns
In view of the fact that the Soviet government was spend-
ing huge sums of money on industrial diamonds needed for
the expanding oil industry, metallurgy, and various geologi-
cal projects, it was naturally interested in an offer made by
the German Krupp concern to supply newly invented artificial
diamonds almost as hard and good as natural ones. The new
product was named "vidi," from the German wie Diwmant,
"like diamond." The Commissariat of Heavy Industry bought
some of the vidi, tested them in drilling operations, and was
amazed at their high quality. It decided to buy the patent
from Krupp and have German engineers build a plant to pro-
duce them in the Soviet Union.
Soon a delegation of German experts headed by two Krupp
Rus-
directors arrived in Moscow. d amonds Knowing how badly the
the five-year plan, they
sians needed industrial demanded a staggering price for this technical aid. When the
deal was being discussed at the Politburo Stalin turned to
the head of the NKVD and said: "The bastards want too
much money. Try to steal it from them. Show what the
NKVD can do!" This challenge was taken up eagerly, and
one of the chiefs of the Foreign Department was charged with
the operation.
The first step was to find out the location of the vidi factory
and the names of the inventor and the engineers in charge
of production. This task was assigned to a German agent,
scientist Dr. B. In the Berlin Technische Hochschule, with
which he was associated, Dr. B. looked up all the available
treatises on achieving hard metal alloys and then approached
a noted professor who had written some of them. From him
he learned that a Krupp inventor had succeeded in attaining
the hardest alloy known and that this was being produced in
a plant on the outskirts of Berlin.
Dr. B. now went to the site of the plant and dropped in at
a beer hall frequented by its technical personnel. After visit-
ing the place a few times, he engaged some of the technicians
in conversation. He represented himself as a scientist who
was writing a book on hard metal alloys. "Oh, then you. are
working with our Cornelius," said one technician. Dr. B. said
no, but he had known a Professor Cornelius. "No," said. the
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technician, "he is not a professor, he is only a foreman in our
plant, but he is a man who could teach the professors how to
make industrial diamonds."
Through an inspector of the Berlin Polizei Presidium, an-
other secret Soviet informant, the Russian residentura ob-
tained information on Cornelius, including his home address,
and the next day Dr. B. rang the doorbell there. He was ad-
mitted by Cornelius' wife, who told him that her husband had
not yet returned from the plant. This Dr. B. knew; he had
come early on purpose, hoping to learn something about Cor-
nelius from his wife. He told her that he was a Doctor of
Science and was writing a treatise on hard metal alloys and
that his colleagues at the Technische Hochschule advised him
to see Herr Cornelius, who might be helpful to him. He
added that if Herr Cornelius was really an expert in that
field and if he was willing to contribute to the research he
might earn some money on the side.
Frau Cornelius, flattered that a scientist from the famous
Technische Hochschule should come to seek advice from her
husband and stimulated by the prospect of earning extra
money, began to praise her husband's abilities and high repu-
tation at the plant. She said that the engineer who had in-
vented the process for producing artificial diamonds had
trusted only her husband, because he alone knew how to han-
dle the specially built electric oven, and now that the inventor
had fallen out with Krupp and quit. her husband was prac-
tically in charge of the whole thing. He could demand from
Krupp any salary he wanted, and they would have to give it
to him; but he was not that kind of man. For him devotion
to the company came first.
When Cornelius returned home Dr. B. restated the purpose
of his visit and, in order to underscore his purely scientific
interest in the matter and allay any possible suspicion, in-
vited him to his personal room at the Technische Hochschule
for the following Saturday. On Saturday, after a talk at the
Hochschule, he took him for dinner to his luxurious ten-
room flat in the eight-story apartment house which he had
inherited from his father. He had seen at once that Cor-
nelius was too illiterate technologically to be able to explain
in scientific terms the secrets 1'POF849~1t o ' I~~T9aVeh10`681Q x'13 : CIA-R
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to. He was only a foreman trained by the inventor to operate
the oven. What Dr. B. wanted fi
outs, and the hisstory of his break
the inventor, his whereab
n. After an excellent dinner and a few
with the Krupp concer
glasses of brandy, Cornelius enjoyed telling the story to his
genial host.
abu-
The inventor's name was
The he saw , he
which he had created and which
of his own and real.izet some
decided to build secretly a plant
of these profits for himself. He borrowed money from the
bank, rented a little shop, made an oven like the one hhad
constructed for Krupp, installed the minimum equipment
needed, and made a few profitable sales of vidi to foreign cus-
tomers. With the proceeds of these he was able to pay off
part of the loan, and it looked as though he was on the way
to becoming a rich man. But at this point the Krupp con-
cern learned about his disloyal an industrial giant. swooped
He wassum-
f
on him with all the fury oa
fired. Customers were warned tha if the
nevey b 11 ught
hem
single ounce of vidi from him Krupp o anything. The bank suddenly became rigid and demanded
All doors engineer and
prompt repayment. talents
inventor politely
invWorm could not find work.
but firmly closed in his face. he contrived
Dr. B. hurried to see Herr Worm. Here too, he had
to ring the doorbell when the man was not at home; erica
unittalkative
found that women areomore
do a bit of advertising for
when they have an opportunity to
their husbands.- Frau Worm was overjoyed that somesomeone e was
s,
interesting himself in her husband. The Krupps were she said; they ruled the country. Her husband was a martyr.
They had driven him to desperation. All his savings had gone
into the enterprise, and it was ruined with one blow. He
Dr. B. listened to her story with unfeigned sympathy.
said he had an interesting proposition for her husband which
might get him out of his difficulties. From that save
became her trusted friend, the man
Krupps. gHegeft his tele-
husband from strangulation by the
hh ne number for Worm to call.
78T03194AuoO200010001-2
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 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved FoSggj? tAp 005/04/13 : CI
e ~gence
The next day they met at the Technische Hochschule and
from there went to Dr. B.'s apartment. Dr. B. suggested that
in order to escape from the Krupp stranglehold Worm would
have to offer his talents to a foreign concern. He said he
knew a big Scandinavian company which might be interested
in acquiring the secret process of vidi production and enter-
ing the field in competition with Krupp; he would check. A
few days later he informed Worm that the company was defi-
nitely interested; it had authorized him to advance the inven-
tor up to ten thousand German marks. He asked Worm to
submit a description of the vidi production process and fur-
nish data on equipment needed, cost, etc.
For the time being, Dr. B. declined to name the company.
This did not necessarily look suspicious, because as a go-
between he was entitled to a commission and would need to
protect his own interests. But Worm got a strange hunch.
"I want to warn you," he said, "that if my invention is
needed for the Russians I will have nothing to do with them!"
Dr. B., taken aback, hastened to reassure him that it was a
Scandinavian concern all right. It turned out that Worm
was a fanatical Nazi and Russian-hater.
Something had to be done to overcome that burning hatred
if Worm was to be maneuvered into giving his vidi invention
to Russia. While he was writing up his process Dr. B. would
supplement the advance, giving him another thousand marks
every week or so, which delighted Frau Worm. He also had
the Worms several times for dinner at his home. When Frau
Worm wanted to buy things which she had been denying to
herself for long, but her husband kept too wary an eye on his
dwindling advances, Dr. B. sensed this and immediately came
to her assistance. He privately gave her money for herself
with the understanding that she would repay it when her hus-
band struck it rich; he was convinced that a prosperous future
was just around the corner for them.
Worm's description of his process was sent to Moscow.
After a close study, the Russian engineers declared that with-
out the personal guidance of the inventor they would have
trouble constructing and operating the special oven required;
it was supposed to make several thousand revolutions a min-
ute under an enormously high temperature. Mo ow wa
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Soviet Intelligence
to have the inventor at any cost. Now the friendship Dr. B.
had cultivated with Frau Worm paid off. She cajoled her hus-
band and wrangled with him for a whole week and at last
brought him to the realization that they had no choice, that
this was their last and only chance.
The Soviet trade delegation in Berlin signed an official two-
year contract with Worm, under which he received a flat sum
in German currency, a monthly allowance in marks for his
wife-who preferred to remain in Germany-and a salary for
himself in Russian rubles. He was entitled to a suite in a
first-class Moscow hotel with restaurant and other services
and to a chauffeured automobile and two vacations in Ger-
many per year at Russia's expense. He took with him to Mos-
cow a German engineer by the name of Mente who had been
his assistant at the Krupp plant.
Worm's letters to his wife breathed hatred toward every-
thing Russian. He contracted rheumatic fever during his stay
and returned to Germany a broken and embittered man. But
he had fulfilled his contract with the Soviets to the letter,
turning over to them his cherished brainchild, the priceless
vidi process.
 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIRDP78T03194A000200010001-2 SECRET
COUNTERSABOTAGE-A COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
FUNCTION
Eric W. Timm
IN MEMORIAM-ERIC WALTER TIMM
The following essay on countersabotage operations is
adapted from a presentation made by Mr. Timm to OSS coun-
terintelligence personnel in 1944. It is appropriate that the
Studies should publish it in commemoration of the anniver-
sary of his death on 3 February 1962.
In the course of his career Eric Timm carried senior respon-
sibilities in all phases of clandestine operational work. But
his preferred activity was counterintelligence, and he was one
of the strongest advocates of an effective counterintelligence
program.
Although addressed to circumstances of some twenty years
ago, the still valid precepts here expressed reflect, all who knew
him will agree, his deep conviction and his genial accomplish-
ments in fresh and germinal thinking about counterintelli-
gence.
Richard Helms
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA
Counterintelligence in its most elementary form creates
channels through which enemy agents must pass. Port se-
curity control, censorship, and interrogation camps for pris-
oners of war are such channels. These control channels, how-
ever, can be made effective only when the enemy's potential
and our own situation have been analyzed and the balance
struck between hostile forces and friendly facilities.
Counterintelligence operations consist of obtaining and
analyzing information on the adversary and then using it
against him in accordance with the requirements of the situ-
ation and in the light of our knowledge of his practices and
psychological outlook. An ideal counterintelligence system
anticipates the enemy's move, notionally satisfies his needs,
and indeed operates a notional intelligence service for him.
This deception eliminates or at least minimizes the introduc-
tion of unknown enemy agents, lulling the enemy into a false
sense of security. When properly carried out, counterintelli-
gence operations will prevent the enemy from mounting intel-
ligence operations.
A store of accessible information on the hostile intelligence
system is necessary to realize this objective. We must know
well the organizational structure of the enemy's service, his
personnel in key posts, his methods of recruitment, how he
trains his agents and dispatches them on missions, and about
many other of his activities and functions, both specialized
and routine. Such a store is developed from a flow of accurate,
detailed information maintained in properly indexed files.
Sabotage
The term sabotage is of ancient origin, deriving from the
French sabot, or wooden shoe. In feudal times the peasants,
with whom the sabot was traditional, used it to stamp down
the landowner's crops. Later, during the industrial, revolu-
tion, they took off their shoes and threw them into the ma-
chinery, thinking thereby to eliminate their unemployment
DP78T03194A000200010001-2 MORI/HRP PAGES 67-72
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-
Countersabotage
by destroying its cause. Countersabotage is therefore coun-
ter-destruction in broad and varied senses. Almost every se-
curity measure we adopt has countersabotage implications.
Strategic sabotage is mounted against a specific critical tar-
get such as an essential production facility, though the im-
portance of the target may sometimes not be generally recog-
nized. A target of the German saboteurs sent to the United
States in 1942 was a little-known plant in Philadelphia which,
however, was the only source of supply for a necessary in-
gredient of aluminum; its destruction might have had serious
results. The physical appearance of an industrial plant is
not always an accurate indication of its importance.
Tactical sabotage operations are normally planned in con-
junction with military operations and usually precede them.
The destruction of railroad lines, bridges, and highways to
hinder enemy movements are examples of tactical sabotage.
A countersabotage officer must put himself in the position
of the saboteur. He must imagine what he would do if he had
been given the enemy's training and partook of his psychologi-
cal outlook. Ideally, every potential target should be pro-
tected in every possible way, but this ideal is obviously im-
practical. So we try to make the enemy sabotage agents come
to us, compelling them to pass through the channels we have
set up before they can reach our vulnerable points.
The saboteur operates under physical and psychological
handicaps. He must protect himself, and he can carry only
so much weight. For these reasons he usually prefers self-
destroying targets, such as ammunition dumps, gasoline
stores, and other inflammable or explosive concentrations.
The effects of a simple explosion can nevertheless not be dis-
regarded: targets which perform functions entirely dispro-
portionate to their size, like power plant generators, electric
turbines, and mine shafts, are highly strategic. But we may
assume that the saboteur will leave modern buildings, dams,
concrete roads, and similar structures alone; these cannot be
effectively sabotaged. All available targets must be thus
analyzed before protective forces and equipment are assigned.
Analysis of Vulnerabilities
Since knowledge of sabotage possibilities is the first requi-
site in forestalling them, countersabotage officers must know
Approved For Release cK M 4/13 : CIA
how to make security surveys. If a modern factory building
is most difficult to damage, it is still liable to what could be
called nuisance sabotage, which would not destroy the plant
but might curtail its operation for periods of time. A modern
fireproof plant located on an island might be effectively at-
tacked by blowing up the two bridges which provide access to
it. Early in the war the security of the bridges to such a
plant was completely overlooked while the most extreme pre-
cautions were taken to prevent unlawful entry into the plant
itself.
Many factories are vulnerable in their electric power supply,
and the destruction of power plants or lines can do grave dam-
age. The intelligence officer cannot devote all his effort to
protecting exclusively what he can see. He must determine
what keeps the factory running, what facilities if damaged
would cause it to close down. When these elements are identi-
fied, no matter how far they may be from the installation
itself, they must be protected against sabotage.
Any plant that houses large machines falls into the cate-
gory of a self-destroying target, and any complex system has
vulnerable nodes. A small explosion in the turbine of a power
station will throw the machine off balance and cause it to tear
itself apart. A train derailed on a bridge or in a tunnel will
tie up a. railroad line. The destruction of a single switchboard
can be more effective in tying up a communications system
than blowing up miles of telephone line. In planning coun-
tersabotage measures careful thought must be given to what
targets would be most profitable to an enemy and fit into the
complexion of his past activities.
The Counterintelligence Function
The countersabotage officer functions in almost the same
way as an expert in counterespionage, and there is normally
no difference in personnel qualifications for these assign-
ments. Counterintelligence officers must be trained in both.
Our best protection is to catch the saboteur before he be-
gins to operate, because perfect physical protection is impos-
sible.
We function most efficiently when we catch a saboteur, ob-
tain through interrogation the information he has, fit his
data into our mosaic of knowledge, and revise our operations
 App v : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET Countersabotage
to apprehend other saboteurs operating in the same manner.
This is the first line of defense in countersabotage. Guards,
gates, lights, and alarms are merely rear echelon defenses to
back us up in case we fail.
In the counterintelligence officer's eyes espionage agents
and saboteurs are virtually identical. Now and then the pos-
session of a sabotage device may lead to the capture of a sabo-
teur, but this is rare. Failure to find sabotage equipment on
an individual crossing the frontier certainly does not mean
that he is not a saboteur. Intelligence services have always
trained their sabotage agents to make equipment on the spot
and told them where the ingredients can be found. In some
cases the sabotage materials may be cached for later use.
Guards and security patrols should keep watch for suspicious
items, but we cannot rely on this defense. In addition to the
saboteur who comes in empty-handed and relies on cached
devices or his own construction, there are those recruited
from residents of the country who do not have to cross the
frontier.
Thus the central mission of a countersabotage officer is the
same as that of an expert in counterespionage-the utiliza-
tion of knowledge.to guide executive action. In order to per-
form this function efficiently we must strive constantly to in-
crease our store of information by interrogations and opera-
tional means. In addition, the countersabotage officer must
supply to security and plant-protection officials the data they
require to do their job; and in order to do this properly he
must be well acquainted with their job. In all cases informa-
tion concerning new sabotage devices and targets must of
course be handed on as quickly as possible.
Plant Security
Behind our first line of defense, the operations officer, is
erected the second line, consisting of obstacles placed around
possible targets. These obstacles may be animate or inani-
mate, and their number and character varies with the impor-
tance and nature of the target. Highest-priority targets
should be flood-lighted, patrolled, surrounded by fences, and
guarded by armed sentries. But most targets cannot be
given such elaborate protection, and many must rely on mere
Countersabotage
physical. defense-walls, ditches, electrified or barbed-wire
fences, locks and bars.
In theory, of course, these physical defenses can be
breached, as indeed any guard system can. In actual fact,
however, they are rather effective. The usual sabotage agent
will approach with qualms the execution of his mission.
When he was in training, failure to evade the obstacles put
in his way did not mean death; but now he faces the real
thing. He may rationalize his fears and substitute a less well
protected and less important target, especially if he lacks
strong ideological motivation.
Our saboteur may, instead of making a surreptitious breach
of the defenses, try to gain legitimate access by some strata-
gem. He could then plant fused bombs or other devices for
delayed-action sabotage and when the explosion or fire oc-
curred be many miles away. Our second line of defense,
therefore, includes measures to identify persons who are en-
titled to entrance and keep out the unauthorized. This de-
fense rests with the plant guard system.
The guards may be either civilian or military, but in either
case they should be thoroughly investigated. Once a guard
force has been established, some of the measures to be taken
for its effective operation are the following:
an identification or badge system;
limited points of access;
irregular patrols;
controlled package delivery and check of lunch boxes;
check of lockers and other private facilities inside the in-
stallation;
escort for all unauthorized personnel inside the installa-
tion;
inspection of unidentified or unordered deliveries before ac-
ceptance;
control of railroads and harbor facilities near the instal-
lation.
Employees should be instructed to keep their eyes open for
strange or unusual objects that may be lying about. They
should be instructed in sabotage camouflage techniques.
When practical, the installation may be compartmented and a
different-colored badge used for each section to reduce access
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : Cl
Countersabotage
to sabotage targets and limit the number of possible suspects
if sabotage should be attempted.
The countersabotage officer cannot know everything about
all types of installations, and he should of course not pretend
to knowledge he does not have. Officials of the installation
who know it intimately should be consulted, and it is always
well to ask them how they would go about sabotaging the
plant.
Investigations
Although the investigation of sabotage incidents is not,
strictly speaking, within the scope of the countersabotage of-
ficer's responsibility, he is interested in the results of investi-
gation, because a physical attempt at sabotage means that
our first line of defense has been breached. Someone failed.
The results of the investigation must be studied to see what
can be added to our store of knowledge. We must learn the
identity of the saboteur, the techniques he used, how his op-
eration was mounted, and by whom he was dispatched. He
may know the identities of other sabotage agents and some-
thing about other operations.
The following are some of the initial points that must be
examined in the investigation of an apparent act of sabotage.
Was the incident in fact sabotage or merely an industrial
accident?
Eye-witness and other first-hand accounts of the event
must be obtained.
An expert description of the explosion or fire must be pro-
vided and every effort made to determine whether it
was intentional or accidental.
The area must be examined carefully for remnants of sabo-
tage equipment, incendiary elements, or explosives.
(The investigator would be well advised to get himself
good and dirty in poking around the scene.)
If the damage was done by fire the color of the smoke must
be determined; it may show the type of incendiary
used.
As in all criminal investigation, sabotage incidents require a
tedious and exhaustive checking of all pertinent details. An
explanation must be sought for anything that varies even
slightly from the normal. Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-
Intelligence cables covering the
capitulation of the Nazi armies
in northern Italy.
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT: SUNRISE
Among the William J. Donovan papers are five volumes en-
titled OSS Reports to the White House containing carbons of
memoranda predominantly transmitting or paraphrasing in-
telligence reports for the President's personal attention.
They are characteristically introduced by a note to the Presi-
dent's secretary, Miss Grace Tully: "Dear Grace: Will you
please hand the attached memorandum to the President? I
believe it will be of interest to him." They begin in modest
quantity, the first volume covering a full two years and in-
cluding some administrative matters such as requests for
draft deferment; but those for the nine months beginning
with July 1944 occupy three volumes, almost exclusively in-
telligence. After President Roosevelt's death and the end of
the war in Europe they taper off in the fifth volume-bound,
curiously, in reverse chronology-and again include non-
substantive material, particularly concerning the formation
of a peacetime central intelligence agency.
The reports are for the most part not the finished intelli-
gence that the President might now be expected to examine
personally. They do include summaries of some Research and
Analysis Branch estimates-of the age distribution of German
casualties, for example, or the Soviet Union's population in
1970-but the bulk of them are unedited reporting from in-
dividual case officers on subjects of particular importance or
of particular interest to President Roosevelt. For the his-
torian this minute but choice fraction of the total of OSS
raw reporting constitutes a pre-selected documentary source
of considerable value.
Some of the historical developments that can be traced
through the collection are the evolution of monarchist Yugo-
slavia into Tito's, German resistance culminating in the 20
P78T0314*i b0 0~ t1 on Hitler's life, German peace feelers
vow
MORI/HRP PAGES 73-98
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 200 f,9,4133 : CIA- DP78T031% 9c90200010001-2 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
through U.S. intelligence channels climaxed by the German
surrender in northern Italy, the Nazi planning for post-
occupation resistance and its collapse, Japanese peace feelers
and delicate maneuvering toward surrender before Hiroshima,
the Thai maintenance of independence through Japanese oc-
cupation and postwar politicking, the beginnings of the Indo-
china problem still with us. The papers also reflect some
episodes of more exclusively intelligence interest-reporting
by the famous German agent Cicero, probes for the secrets of
the V-weapons, some spectacular infiltration and rescue opera-
tions, OSS's collaboration with the Soviet NKVD, the mystery
of a Himmler postage stamp, the OSS struggle for operational
independence from British intelligence.
In this issue we reproduce the story, as it unfolded before
Roosevelt's and Truman's eyes, of the negotiations that led
to "Sunrise," the surrender of the German forces in Italy.
The documents have been edited only to omit repetitious and
peripheral material.
Stirrings
9 February 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information has been transmitted by the OSS
representative in Bern':
Alexander Constantin von Neurath, German Consul at
Lugano, has just returned from a meeting with Field Marshal
Albert Kesselring, Commander of German Army Group "C,"
Italy; Rudolph Rahn, German Ambassador to the Mussolini
regime in North Italy; and Obergruppenfuehrer and General
der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police leader in
Italy and chief of Himmler's personal staff.2
Allen W. Dulles.
2 Earlier memoranda had reported Von Neurath in contact with Brit-
ish representatives in Switzerland, seeking to arrange peace negotia-
tions on behalf of SS Generals Wolff and Harster. Rahn had been
mentioned early in December in connection with a Catholic Church
plan for an understanding with the Partisans to facilitate the antici-
pated withdrawal of German forces from Italy with a minimum of war
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-
74 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Von Neurath declares that he did not gain the impression
at the meeting that an immediate withdrawal of German
forces in Italy was planned. According to Neurath, even high
German officials in Italy appear to be somewhat surprised that.
the bulk of the German reinforcements for the Eastern Front
have been coming from the west rather than from the south.
Neurath feels that a possible explanation for this is that the
German Army in Italy is being kept largely intact for eventual
protection of the southern flank of the German "inner for-
tress" which would be based on the Bavarian and Austrian
Alps. . . .
Neurath also reports that Kesselring recently saw Field
Marshal Gert von Rundstedt. The two men are on friendly
terms, Neurath declares, but neither is yet ready to come over
to the Western Allies. . . . Neurath has a contact with Gen-
eralleutnant Siegfried Westphal, Rundstedt's Chief of Staff,
but was advised by Kesselring not to attempt to see Westphal
immediately in view of the suspicions which such a trip might
arouse.
24 February 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, transmitted by the OSS repre-
sentative in Bern, has been supplied by a source of uncertain
reliability, but appears plausible in the light of information
from other sources available to the representative:
An official of the German Embassy in North Italy whose
name source did not disclose has come to Switzerland to con-
vert to Swiss francs some marks belonging to members of
Marshal Kesselring's staff. This official declares that Marshal
Kesselring and Rudolph Rahn, Ambassador to the Mussolini
regime in North Italy, are ready to surrender and. even to
fight against Hitler, if the Allies can make it worth their while.
Kesselring, according to the official, feels that under present
trends he is destined to retire to the Alps and, subordinate to
SS officials, to die in the final resistance or be killed for not
resisting the Allies. As long as Kesselring is still in Italy he
feels he still has power and is willing to use that power to sur-
P78T0319 o2 01e0001-2 r concessions. The official did not make
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 Approved For Release 201~5jprjsJ3 : CIA
it clear as to whether concessions to Kesselring and his staff
or to Germany in general are desired.
26 February 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, transmitted by the OSS repre-
sentative in Bern, is a sequel to a memorandum dated
9 February:
Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at
Lugano, while visiting his father (the former Foreign Minister
and Protector of Bohemia and Moravia) near Stuttgart on 10
February, received a telephone call from Marshal Kesselring,
advising him to go to a secret rendezvous where he found
Lieutenant-General Siegfried Westphal, chief of staff to Rund-
stedt, and Marshal Johannes Blaskowitz, former (?) com-
mander of Army Group "G" on the Western Front. Von
Neurath knew Westphal well, having served with him for two
years as liaison officer in North Africa; he knew Blaskowitz
less well.
The three frankly discussed the possibility of opening the
Western Front to the Allies. Westphal and Blaskowitz ques-
tioned the value of taking such a step, if they were merely to
be considered as war criminals. They added that it was in-
creasingly difficult to organize any large-scale move to open
the front because of the technical difficulties presented by the
SS and the state of mind of the troops. They said that their
armies included large elements of Germans from East Prussia
and eastern Germany whose fighting qualities had been stiff-
ened by the Soviet occupation of their home areas. These
troops, they explained, motivated by the feeling that they
have lost everything and having no homes or families to
which to return, consider it better to stay on and fight. West-
phal even declared that the troops sometimes refuse to obey
orders from headquarters to retire, stating that since they
are holding good positions and may not find as good ones in
the rear, they prefer to fight it out where they are.
Neither Westphal nor Blaskowitz made definite suggestions.
They appear however, (a) to be working with Kesselring, (b)
to have uppermost in their minds the idea of opening up the
Western and Italian Fronts to eFor I elease t2009/84/13: CIA-
DP78T03S1un94A~00020001rv 0001-2
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proaching the point where they might discuss such an ar-
rangement on purely military lines with an American Army
officer. Prerequisites to such a discussion would be adequate
security arrangements and personal assurances that they
would not be included in the war criminals list but would be
granted some basis to justify their action, such as an oppor-
tunity to help in the orderly liquidation and to prevent un-
necessary destruction in Germany.
Von Neurath, now back in Switzerland, plans to report to
Kesselring his conversation with Westphal and Blaskowitz
and to determine whether a routine reason can be found for
Westphal to visit Kesselring.
[The OSS representative comments that while von Neurath
may obtain further direct access to Kesselring without arous-
ing SS and SD suspicions, he must exercise the greatest care.
The representative doubts that von Neurath will be guilty of
indiscretion, since his own life is apparently at stake and since
his background is non-Nazi. The representative describes von
Neurath as not brilliant but a reasonably solid type who has
excellent relations with the Reichswehr as a result of his long
liaison work in North Africa. If Westphal makes the trip to
Italy he could probably stay only a very short time without
arousing suspicion, since Kesselring himself is already the sub-
ject of press rumors which may result in his elimination by
Himmler.
[ (The London Daily Dispatch on 24 February carried a
story from its Bern correspondent stating that Kesselring has
offered secretly to the Allies to withdraw under pressure, leav-
ing North Italian cities intact and preventing neo-Fascist de-
struction, in return for which he has asked for assurances
that he would not be considered a war criminal and would be
allowed to retire his troops to Germany to maintain order.)
[The OSS representative declares that while he cannot pre-
dict the chances of successfully persuading Westphal and Kes-
selring to open up the Italian and Western Fronts simul-
taneously, he judges them to be sufficient to justify careful
consideration of the idea. He believes that no political quid
pro quo's or impairment of the unconditional surrender prin-
ciple would be involved if conversations were held between an
P78T0314Ae(bc 08Thc0001 2 these German officers. Such conversa-
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 Approved For Release 205/04/13 : CIA
tions, which could be held in the Lugano area on the Swiss
side of the Italo-Swiss border, would have to await the out-
come of von Neurath's forthcoming meeting with Kessel-
ring.]
(The OSS representative in Caserta reports that AFHQ is
interested in obtaining positive and authentic confirmation of
Kesselring's disposition to negotiate with the Allies. AFHQ
feels that if Kesselring wishes to dispatch an emissary with
an official message, he could find means to do so.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, transmitted by the OSS repre-
sentative in Bern, is a sequel to memoranda dated 9 and 26
February:
Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl
Wolff, the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy, and a German
High Command representative presumably from General Kes-
selring's staff, arrived in Lugano, Switzerland on the morning
of 8 March. They are allegedly prepared to make definite
commitments in regard to terminating German resistance in
North Italy.
The OSS representative in Bern believes that, if Wolff is
really working with Kesselring, the two Generals might effect
an unconditional surrender. Absolute secrecy is essential to
a successful surrender, and the OSS representative is ready to
arrange with complete secrecy for the entry into Switzerland
in civilian clothes of fully authorized representatives of the
Supreme Allied Mediterranean Command.
It is not clear whether this move is separate from the
Neurath negotiations [described in the memoranda of 9 and
26 February] but the OSS representative in Bern believes
they will merge in so far as the North Italian situation is con-
cerned. Wolff is accompanied by Standartenfiihrer Doll-
man,3 who has in the past claimed that he represented Kessel-
ring, Rahn, Wolff, and Harster. Dollman and his aide, Zim-
' The correct spelling is DollnAp roved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-R
DP78T031$j 990200010001-2
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mern,4 had made indirect contact with the OSS representa-
tive on 2 March, and promised to return on 8 March with cre-
dentials and definite proposals. On the earlier date the sug-
gestion was made to Dollman that he bring with him an im-
portant Italian partisan leader as evidence of his good. faith
and ability to act. Dollman has reportedly brought along
Ferruccio Parri, chief of the North Italian Patriots Unified
Command.'
The above information has been given to AFHQ by our
Caserta representative.
9 March 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the follow-
ing information, a sequel to my memorandum of 8 March:
Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff
has shown willingness to attempt to develop a program to
take the German forces in North Italy out of the conflict.
He considers simple military surrender difficult and prefers
that capitulation be preceded by a statement by German
leaders in North Italy informing the German people that the
struggle is hopeless and will merely cause needless bloodshed
and destruction. Field Marshal Albert Kesselring has not yet
been won over, and his adherence is essential. Wolff is pro-
ceeding immediately to try to sell the program to Kesselring,
and will maintain contact with the OSS representative in
Bern. Wolff states that Rudolph Rahn, German Ambassador
to Mussolini's regime in North Italy, is in accord with the pro-
gram.
Wolff apparently controls all police and border forces on the
entire Swiss-Italian frontier and can arrange quick contact
with top German personalities in North Italy. Wolff, who in
his SS and Police capacity is directly responsible to Himrnler,
claims that Himmler is unaware of his activities. [The OSS
representative comments that this may or may not be true.]
The Italian partisan leader, Ferruccio Parri, whose delivery
in Switzerland was requested as an evidence of food faith, was
turned over unconditionally to the OSS representative even
2U WT00Wer after liberation.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RD
before the latter saw Wolff. Parri is in good health and does
not know the reason for his release.
A further meeting with Wolff was to take place during the
day, 9 March.
[AFHQ and SHAEF have been informed of the above.]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
General Karl Wolff, who has arrived in Zurich to dis-
cuss a definite program for taking German forces in North
Italy out of the war, is accompanied by the two men who made
the preliminary, contact with the OSS representative (Stan-
dartenfuehrer Dollman and his aide, Zimmern) as well as by
Wolff's military expert, Sturmbandfuehrer Wenner, and an
Italian intermediary, Baron Pirellis The OSS representative
consented to see only Wolff, who came to the former's apart-
ment with a Swiss intermediary on the evening of 8 March.
The OSS representative and an associate, a former German
Consul in Zurich,7 then talked with Wolff alone. The former
Consul later saw Wolff and Dollman together.
Wolff is a distinctive personality, and evidence indicates
that he represents the more moderate element in Waffen SS
combined with a measure of romanticism. He is probably the
most dynamic personality in North Italy and, next to Kessel-
ring, the most powerful.
Wolff stated that the time had come when some German
with power to act should lead Germany out of the war in order
to end useless human and material destruction. He says he is
willing to act and feels he can persuade Kesselring to coop-
erate, and that the two control the situation in North Italy.
As far as the SS is concerned, Wolff states that he also con-
trols Western Austria, since his authority includes the
Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and the Brenner Pass with both its north-
ern and southern approaches. Wolff declares that joint action
by Kesselring and himself would leave Hitler and Himmler
Baron Luigi Parrilli.
' Gero von Gaevernitz, who had emigrated to the United States in the
thirties and was now one of Allen Dulles' principal assistants. There
seems to be no record, however, of the consular service here credited
to him.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP
80 OFFiriei -icr-
powerless to take effective countermeasures like the ones
they employed in the 20 July crisis. Also Wolff feels that
joint action by Kesseiring and himself would have a vital reper-
cussion on the German Army, particularly on the Western
Front, since many Generals are only waiting for someone to
take the lead. Wolff made no request concerning his personal
safety or privileged treatment from the war criminal view-
point.
Wolff envisages the following procedures to bring about ac-
tion: (1) He will meet Kesselring during the week-end of 10
March in order to obtain a definite commitment to joint ac-
tion. Wolff says he has had the closest possible personal re-
lations with Kesselring for several years, and indicated that
Kesselring's problem was to reconcile such action with his
oath of allegiance. Kesselring has insisted that, after a long
military career throughout which he had always kept his
oath, he was too old to change. Nevertheless Wolff believes
he can be won over to see the senselessness of the struggle
and admit that his duty to the German people is higher than
that to the Fuehrer.
(2) With Kesselring, Wolff will draft an appeal to be signed
by themselves, Rahn . . ., and others. The appeal will set
forth the uselessness of the struggle and the signers' respon-
sibility to the German people to end it, will call on military
commanders in particular and Germans in general to disas-
sociate themselves from Himmler-Hitler control, and will
state that the Germans in North Italy are terminating hostili-
ties.
(3) Wolff will make preparations to get this message to the
German people and military commanders via radio and. wire-
less.
(4) Provided Kesselring is won over, Wolff believes that he
and Kesselring would come clandestinely to Switzerland
within the week in order to meet Allied military men and co-
ordinate purely military surrender moves with the appeal.
Apparently no one on Kesselring's immediate staff is suited to
represent him for this purpose, his chief of staff not yet hav-
ing been acquainted with the plan.
As evidence of his ability to act, Wolff has already uncondi-
tionally delivered Ferruccio Parri . . . and Major Usmiani, a
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 Approved For Release 2005104/13 : CIA-
Sunrise
former OSS agent in Milan, to the OSS representative in
Bern. Parri had been imprisoned in Verona, Usmiani in
Milan. . . . Both men assumed at the time they were taken
away by the SS that they were being led to execution. Neither
yet knows the reason for the release. Wolff fully realizes
Parri's importance, and remarked to an intermediary that he
was giving up his most important hostage.
Wolff is prepared to demonstrate further his ability to act
by: (1) discontinuing active warfare against Italian partisans,
merely keeping up whatever pretense is necessary pending
execution of the plan; (2) releasing to Switzerland several
hundred Jews interned at Bozen (Bolzano) ; Wolff claims he
has refused any ransom money offered in this connection, al-
though some has possibly already been swallowed up by inter-
mediaries; (3) assuming full responsibility for the safety and
good treatment of 350 British and American prisoners at
.Mantua, of whom 150 are in the hospital and 200 on the south-
ern outskirts; Wolff claims that these are all the British-
American prisoners held in North Italy, since they had. been
currently transferred to Germany; (4) releasing to Switzer-
land, if he can be found, Sogno Franci, an Italian patriot work-
ing with CLNAI and the British; his release is particularly de-
sired by Parri; (5) facilitating as much as possible the return
to North Italy of Italian officers presently held in Germany,
who might be useful in the post-hostilities period.
In reference.to Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the Ger-
man Consul at Lugano . . ., Wolff will welcome von Neurath's
help since he feels that von Neurath has considerable influ-
ence on Kesselring. Wolff will invite von Neurath to join him
in Italy on 10 March.
Wolff claims that Himmler knows nothing of his present ac-
tivities. He saw Himmler and Hitler early in February and
advised them of the general hopelessness of the North Italy
situation, but received no definite instructions from them.
The OSS representative has made no commitments, merely
listening to Wolff's presentation and stating, with no refuta-
tion from Wolff, that unconditional surrender was the only
possible course. The OSS representative comments that, if
the results of the Wolff-KeWolWe & Kege 60 10t#is3 : CIA-R
78TO319IA000200010001-2
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plan may present a unique opportunity to shorten the war,
permit occupation of North Italy, possibly penetrate Austria
under most favorable conditions, and possibly wreck German
plans for establishment of a maquis.
The OSS representative in Caserta has advised AFHQ of the
information transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern.
General Alexander has outlined to Marshal Brooke 8 the pro-
cedure which AFHQ proposes to follow, including a plan for
two senior staff officers to go to Switzerland to meet with
German representatives. Apparently Alexander has furnished
this information to Brooke as a matter of courtesy and will
go ahead on his own initiative, although he will cooperate
with Brooke if London wishes to send other people to join in
the meeting. OSS has been directed to submit a plan to carry
out all necessary steps, including arrangements for a Swiss
meeting place, transportation to and from that place to the
French-Swiss border, as well as transportation from the An-
nemasse airport or vicinity to French-Swiss border. In addi-
tion, OSS will be called upon to provide communications,
clerical assistance (including interpreters), and all necessary
safeguards for the security of operations. The OSS repre-
sentative in Bern will select a safe meeting place, arrange
transportation from Annemasse to and from that place, and
issue appropriate instructions to secure and provide arrange-
ments for meeting the party at the Annemasse airport and
supervising arrangements to and from the French-Swiss bor-
der. The total number of the party is unknown at this time,
but all plans are being made to include arrangements for 15
to 20 people. OSS is withholding all these plans from the Ger-
man representatives until directed by AFHQ to suggest a date
for the meeting.
William J. Donovan
Director
The following note is added by hand: If it looks feasible I plan
to go to Italy as our OSS group has been designated to set up
communications etc.
78T03194A066Sgfb6 1i sh Imperial Staff.
82 OFFICIAL USE ON[ v if ^rr"-1A1 "CC ^kll
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
12 March 1945
? . . Acting under instructions from AFHQ, OSS is going
ahead with plans for the impending meeting between German
and Allied representatives to discuss a definite program for
taking German forces in North Italy out of the war. OSS
Bern has been requested to secure from Obergruppenfuehrer
and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff statements that Wolff
and his associates, equipped with acceptable credentials, will
proceed to the Bern meeting-place when AFHQ selects the
date.
Final word has not yet been received from Wolff, and suc-
cess in the operation depends on assurance of Marshal Kessel-
ring's cooperation.
Complications
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
13 March 1945
The OSS representative in Bern has transmitted the follow-
ing information, a sequel to my memoranda of 10 and 12
March:
The Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli, has just returned
with word from Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen
SS Karl Wolff, that Kesselring has just gone to Hitler's head-
quarters. Wolff expects Kesselring back in three days, but
there is a chance that he may never come back. [The OSS
representative surmises that, unless Kesselring convinces Hit-
ler and Himmler that he will cooperate in their plans for
North Italy, Kesselring will be given a new command or will
be imprisoned.] Therefore, the meeting with Allied repre-
sentatives has been postponed pending information from Kes-
selring, although AFHQ had decided to move at once and at
noon 13 March dispatched two representatives a (accompanied
by an OSS represenative) for Lyon.
The OSS representative in Bern suggested to Baron Pirelli
that Wolff indicate (1) what he proposes to do if Kesselring
does not return; (2) what he will do if he is ordered to re-
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer and British General Terence Airey.
ApproveQ df &Id M?1404/13 : C
port to Hitler; (3) if he should refuse an order to report to
Hitler, what are his plans and the forces with which to carry
them out; (4) what areas he could temporarily control for
possible contact with Allied forces even if the principal Ger-
man Army commanders did not cooperate.
Upon his return to Italy, Wolff received a telegram from
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Chief of Security Police and Security
Service, advising him to avoid establishing contact with the
Allies in Switzerland since it would hinder, perhaps catas-
trophically, Kaltenbrunner's plans. Wolff discovered upon in-
vestigation that Generalleutnant der Polizei Wilhelm Harster,
commander of the Security Police in Italy and Wolff's subordi-
nate, had telegraphed Kaltenbrunner that an attempt to
make contact with the Allies in Switzerland was probable.
According to Pirelli, Wolff believes Harster is dependable
and was merely trying to cover the tracks of Wolff's inter-
mediary, Standartenfuehrer Dollman.
[In November 1944 Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the
German Consul, at Lugano, declared that he was acting as
intermediary for Harster, who had been given a special assign-
ment by Himmler to contact the Allies. It appeared signifi-
cant~ at that time that such a mission should have been
given to Harster rather than to his superior in the SS hier-
archy, Karl Wolff.
[At the end of February 1945, an Austrian industrialist in
contact with Austrian SS leaders, asserted that Kaltenbrun-
ner had asked him to make contact with the Allies in Switzer-
land. According to this source, Kaltenbrunner claimed that
he and Himmler were extremely anxious to end the war and
were contemplating the liquidation of ardent Nazi "war
mongers."]
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
. . . The OSS representative in Bern understands that the
plans, under way for some time, for Carl Burckhardt, retir-
ing president of the International Red Cross and Swiss
Minister-designate to France, to discuss with Himmler inter-
nee and possibly prisoner-of-war questions, may very shortly
result in a meeting between the two men in the vicinity of
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Feldkirch, on the northeastern Swiss frontier with Germany.
The OSS representative comments that Himmler may seek to
use this occasion for peace feelers.
The representative has learned that Fusto Pancini, an old
friend of Mussolini, recently has arrived in Switzerland with
letters from Mussolini to his daughter, Edda Ciano, and to
the Papal Nuncio. Pancini indicated to Edda that Himmler
wishes the Nuncio to advise the Vatican that Germany de-
sires peace and is disposed to facilitate the entrance of Anglo-
American but not Soviet troops.
The representative states that while he has no definite
proof, he believes that Kaltenbrunner's telegram to .
Wolff, advising the latter not to establish contact with the
Allies in Switzerland, was prompted by the prospect of a meet-
ing between Burckhardt and Himmler. . . .
21 March 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information . . . is a summary of statements
made by Wolff to OSS representatives and representatives of
Field Marshal Alexander at a place near Locarno on 19
March. Marshal Alexander's representatives gave no name or
rank but represented themselves to Wolff as advisors of the
OSS representative. The OSS representative makes no at-
tempt to predict whether Wolff's plan can be realized, but re-
ports that Wolff, himself, appeared determined and that those
who have had close contact with Wolff since he made his first
approach ten days ago are inclined to believe that he is sin-
cere in his expressed desire to effect an immediate German
surrender. Wolff has stressed particularly that it would be a
crime against the German people if the "reduit plan" 10 were
realized, since it would merely cause untold further useless
destruction and slaughter.
This information has been transmitted by the representa-
tives in Switzerland of Field Marshal Alexander by direct
radio to AFHQ.
10 For continued resistance from a fortified redoubt in the Bavarian
Alps.
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8T03194A000200010001-2
Sunrise
Wolff stated that as a clear duty to his country he had
been prepared to proceed with his plans to effect the surrender
of the German Armies in Italy. The absence of Marshal Kes-
seiring, however, compelled him to change his course of ac-
tion. . . . Wolff said that his next step now depends upon
the time at his disposal for action. If he had virtually no
time at all, he would be forced to see what he could do alone.
If he had less than a week, he would deal directly with Gen-
eraloberst Heinrich von Vietinghoff, who was returning to
Italy to take over Kesselring's command and probably reached
his Italian headquarters on 19 March. If he had seven days
or more, Wolff said he would go at once to Kesselring, whom
he more than ever considered the key to the situation both
in Italy and on the Western Front.
Kesselring, Wolff reported, has been assigned to Marshal
von Rundstedt's command in the West, and had not even
been allowed by Hitler's headquarters to return to Italy to
pack up his effects. Thus Wolff had not been able to see Kes-
selring since Wolff Is first meeting with the OSS representa-
tive ten days ago.
Vietinghoff, who acted as deputy commander in Italy for
Kesselring while the latter was recovering from his injuries,
had gone to Germany on leave in mid-January, and. subse-
quently had held a brief command in Kurland on the :Eastern
Front. After a brief conference at Hitler's headquarters he
was ordered to return to Italy to assume command.
Wolff said that if he were compelled to act alone he had
only the following heterogeneous forces, equipped only with
light arms and a few old tanks, at his disposal. In his ca-
pacity as Higher SS and Police leader, a post which he has held
.since 1943, he commands some 15,000 Germans; 20,000 Soviet
troops, mostly Don and Kuban Cossacks and Turkomans;
10,000 Serbs; 10,000 Slovenes; 5,000 Czechs; an Indian legion;
and 100,000 Italians. As Bevollmaechtigter General der
Deutschen Wehrmacht (plenipotentiary for the German
Wehrmacht), a post which he had held since the 20 July
putsch, he is in direct command of 10,000 Germans, and has
under his tactical command some 55,000 German services of
P78T031 N*Ww 1i 4r2troops, all north of the Po River.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-FT
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Wolff admitted frankly that the non-German forces under
his command are not very dependable, and that were he to
take action alone, without prior coordination with the OKW,
he ? would probably be caught between German armies to the
north and south of his forces.
Asked whether a direct approach to von Vietinghoff might
meet with success, Wolff said that von Vietinghoff is a non-
political soldier who would not take political action without
support from others in the Wehrmacht. Wolff declared his
relations with von Vietinghoff to be excellent, but said he had
not prepared the ground with von Vietinghoff as he had with
Kesselring. Hence, Wolff proposed that he proceed at once by
car to Kesselring's headquarters, since he could not fly there
for technical reasons, and seek to persuade Kesselring and
Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal to join him in common
action. If they agreed to do so, Wolff said he felt sure that
von Vietinghoff would cooperate.
If he were successful, Wolff said that he hoped to bring
back with him within a week qualified military representa-
tives of both Kesselring's and von Vietinghoff's headquarters
to discuss the details of a military surrender. Wolff declared
that he realized that the rapidly developing military situa-
tion left him little time for action. He added that German
Headquarters in Italy expected an Allied offensive there be-
fore the end of the month (to one person he said the attack
was expected by 25 March). Wolff crossed back into Italy on
the evening of 19 March.
. . . No further word had been received from Wolff by the
night of 26 March. . . . Wolff's aide, Zimmern, however, re-
ports that both Rudolph Rahn and Generalleutnant der
Polizei Wilhelm Harster . . . have been recalled to Germany
for conferences at Hitler's headquarters. Harster probably
has some knowledge of Wolff's activities. . . . The OSS repre-
sentative comments that it is becoming increasingly apparent
that Hitler intends to use the bulk of the German forces in
Italy for the defense of the German "redoubt."
Desperation
1 April 1945
The following triple priority dispatch has just been received
from the OSS representative in Bern relating to the most re
cent developments in connection with the possible surrender
of German Forces in Northern Italy:
"1. Wolff arrived Fasano 11 Friday morning and immedi??
ately summoned Parrilli and Zimmer to Fasano where
they spent Friday afternoon together. Zimmer was then
sent here by Wolff, Parrilli remaining Fasano.
"2. Wolff endeavored contact Vietinghoff before he went
to see Kesselring, but was unable to reach him.
"3. Trip to Kesselring most difficult and when he
reached Kesselring's headquarters, hell had already
broken loose. First conversation took place only 15 km .
from our advancing forces. Wolff presented his plan for
Italian surrender and Kesselring advised him to go
through with it. He, Kesselring, regretted he was not
also in Italy.
"4. In a second conversation with Kesselring, latter
again expressed his agreement with Wolff's plan and that
he should so advise Vietinghoff, but said that on his
front he could not go along (mitmachen). Kesselring
found himself largely surrounded by strangers whom he
did not trust. Zimmer gained impression from Wolff Kes-
selring was half a prisoner (Our representative in Bern
comments that no mention was made of Westphal).
"5. Immediately on his return, Wolff had tried to reach
Glazier 12 but he was on an inspection trip at the front
and was returning to his headquarters only night of 31.
Wolff proposed to see him immediately and would spend
Sunday with him. Wolff gave this message to Zimmer
for our representative in Bern: I am ready to come to a
final conversation in order to arrange matters. I hope to
" His headquarters on Lake Garda.
12 Vietinghoff, inadvertently left in code.
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 OFFICIAL USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/04Lunr"~ eIA-RII178TO3194A000200010001-2 Sunrise OFFICIAL USE ONLY
come with Rahn, Dollman and either Vietinghoff or a
staff officer.
"6. Rahn had been called back to Germany but avoided
the trip by alleging serious strike conditions North Italy
which he had to handle. Harster did return Germany,
but apparently on account of a row with Gauleiter Hofer
of the Tyrol. Neither summons believed to be connected
with the main subject in question.
"7. While in Germany and one of the reasons for delay,
Wolff was summoned by Himmler, who asked him to ex-
plain his surrender of British agent Tucker. Wolff replied
that he was arranging an exchange and he wanted to
give the Fuehrer Wuensche 13 as birthday present.
Himmler also accused him of having been in Switzerland
and asked the reasons. Wolff answered that he had a
contact in Milan who promised to bring him in touch with
Allies and that he was acting pursuant Fuehrer's recent
secret order to seek any possible contact with Allies.
Wolff had heard that many efforts had failed and wanted
to see what he could do. Himmler ordered Wolff to wait
around for couple of days as he wanted to think the mat-
ter over. However, Himmler was suddenly called urgently
to Hungary and referred Wolff to Kaltenbrunner.
Himmler told him that he should now 14 leave Italy and
particularly that he should not go to Switzerland. Wolff
did not see Kaltenbrunner but left for Italy.
"8. In his conversation with Kesselring, latter said to
Wolff our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell truth
to Fuehrer who surrounded by small group of advisors
who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which
they call `Verzweiflungs' 15 weapon. Kesselring believed
this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, but
might cause terrible blood bath on both sides. Kesselring
said if Fuehrer gave him order to use weapon he would
surrender his command. End of Zimmer report.
"9. Under foregoing program and assuming no further
delays which may be inherent in situation, Wolff should
1e A German general close to Hitler.
14 Typo for "not."
"Desperation."
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come to a meeting sometime Monday or early Tuesday.
Any action by Kesselring via Wolff seems excluded.
Whether Wolff will win over Vietinghoff is still matter of
conjecture, despite Wolff's apparent optimism. Zimmer
understands Wolff has support of one of Vietinghoff's
chief subordinates."
4 April 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
. An Italian emissary, Parrilli, arrived in Switzerland on
3 April with the following report from . . . Wolff, who is cur-
rently at his headquarters in Fasano:
Himmler has returned to his German headquarters from his
urgent trip to Hungary, and on 1 April peremptorily ordered
Wolff by telephone under no conditions to leave North Italy.
Himmler told Wolff that he would telephone him periodically.
Himmler chided Wolff for having moved his family to the
vicinity of Brenner, and declared that he had moved Wolff's
family at once back to St. Wolfgang, near Salzburg, and could
take "better care" of it.
Wolff is convinced that if he were now to make a false
move or to leave his headquarters for Switzerland, his whole
project for a surrender in North Italy would fail and he would
be liquidated. He believes that Himmler has given special in-
structions that he be watched. Accordingly, he feels it is im-
possible for him to come to Switzerland now.
Wolff has discussed the whole surrender plan with Rudolph,
Rahn . . . and declares that Rahn is in full agreement. On
the night of 1 April he conferred with . . . von Vieting-
hoff . . . and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's
Chief of Staff. Wolff claims that both agreed with him, and
quotes von Vietinghoff as saying that "it is nonsense to go on
fighting." Wolff declares that von Vietinghoff has been in-
structed, in the event of a general Allied attack, to carry out a
"fighting" and scorched-earth withdrawal to the Alps. Wolff
reported fully to von Vietinghoff on his recent conference
with Kesselring, and told him that in Kesselring's judgment
the fighting on the Western Front might last ten or fifteen
78T0319$ =b2M1 @I 1 t aat Germany is facing catastrophe.
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Wolff instructed Parrilli to tell Allied representatives that,
given ten more days, he and von Vietinghoff and Rahn would
be able to hand over North Italy.
Parrilli has returned to Wolff's headquarters with a message
from Allied representatives acknowledging receipt of informa-
tion that Rahn and von Vietinghoff have been won over to the
plan, but stating that if there is to be a military surrender, it
must be effected quickly. With the approval of AFHQ repre-
sentatives, the OSS representative also asked Parrilli to re-
mind Wolff (1) that it is vital that he and von Vietinghoff
prevent the destruction of North Italy as ordered by Himmler
and Hitler; (2) that he (Wolff) had previously promised to
restrain action against Italian partisans and to protect Al-
lied and partisan prisoners and hostages in his hands; (3)
that he (Wolff) and his associates now have a last opportu-
nity for action and that action alone counts, and (4) that fur-
ther delay would not help but might even complicate the pic-
ture, since from the "redoubt" Himmler may exercise an in-
creasingly terroristic influence.
(The OSS representative comments that Wolff and his asso-
ciates probably want to wait in the hope that complete chaos
will develop in Germany, enabling them to act in Italy without
serious risk to themselves and their families. The threat to
Wolff may be real. In view of the time which has elapsed
since the original approach from Wolff, the number of meet-
ings which have been held relating to the surrender proposal,
and the number of persons who have been brought into the
picture, some inkling of the plot has probably reached Himm-
ler's ears. The OSS representative cannot predict what ac-
tion Wolff and von Vietinghoff will now take, but declares that
everything possible has been done to impress the Wolff group
with the realities of the situation and the need to act at
once.)
10 April 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The following information, transmitted by the OSS repre-
sentative in Bern, is . . . a summary of a more comprehen-
sive report which has been corA' W6 06P Fk'I Ae 2005/04/13 : CIA-
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Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff,
the Higher SS and Police Leader in Italy; Generaloberst Hein-
rich von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German forces in
Italy; and Generalleutnant Roettiger, von Vietinghoff's Chief
of Staff, have requested the text of the Allied surrender for-
mula, but have made certain stipulations regarding "military
honor" and the disposition of forces to be surrendered.
Wolff reports, through his emissary, that he held long con-
ferences with von Vietinghoff and Roettiger on 5 and 7 April
at which the principle of unconditional surrender was not
questioned provided such surrender be "honorable." All
three recognize that since the German armies in Italy soon
will be isolated, von Vietinghoff is justified in acting on his
own initiative. Wolff recognizes the futility of further fight-
ing, but reports that von Vietinghoff, an old-line soldier, in-
sists that the surrender be "dressed up" so as to be compatible
with his "military honor" and to avoid placing him in the
position of a traitor.
Subject to solving this "military honor" problem, the 'three
men have proposed a point on the front lines through which
Allied representatives may pass safely to conclude the sur-
render, and they have promised again to do everything pos-
sible to prevent destruction, to limit warfare against Italian
partisans, and to protect prisoners and hostages. They state,
however, that Admiral Doenitz has ordered marine destruc-
tion and they doubt whether they can effectively prevent this.
18 April 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
One of Wolff's emissaries, Zimmer, arrived at Lugano on 18
April with a three-page letter from Wolff to the OSS repre-
sentative written in Wolff's own handwriting and dated 15
April. In this letter Wolff expressed his regrets at President
Roosevelt's death and assured the OSS representatives that,
no matter what may happen, the OSS representative may
count upon him . . . and that in spite of difficulties which
have delayed the achievement of results, he is convinced of
P78T031139A4nt effort.
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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Zimmer reported that he arrived at Wolff's headquarters in
Fasano on 11 April (from his last trip to Switzerland) and left
immediately with Wolff to visit Generaloberst Heinrich von
Vietinghoff . . . . Von Vietinghoff received them coldly,
stating that he had been informed by the Ligurian Corps at
Genoa that a British official, whose name he did not know but
whom he understood to be an officer, had made contact with a
Ligurian Corps staff officer named Vogel, and had asked Vogel
to be presented to von Vietinghoff to discuss surrender. Von
Vietinghoff said that the Englishman referred to the fact
that negotiations had already been started between von
Vietinghoff and the OSS representative in Bern and gave the
correct name of the OSS representative.",
Von Vietinghoff told Wolff that he did not see the English-
man. Believing he had been betrayed, von Vietinghoff pre-
pared a letter to Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, Chief of the
Armed Forces Operations Staff of the OKW, stating that
Wolff was in contact with the Allies and that Allies wished
to press negotiations.
Von Vietinghoff added, however, that he did not want to
enter into negotiations until he had received Jodl's approval.
Von Vietinghoff suggested to Wolff that he carry the letter
to Jodl, but was persuaded by Wolff, Generalleutnant Roet-
tiger (chief of staff to von Vietinghoff), and Rudolph
Rahn . . . not to send the letter at all.
On the night of 13 April, Himmler telephoned Wolff and or-
dered him to leave at once for Berlin by the fastest possible
means. Wolff did not do so, but instead sent a letter by spe-
cial courier in which he reminded Himmler (1) that at their
last meeting he had told Himmler that since an Allied invasion
of Germany would be completely successful, it was futile to
continue to sacrifice the German people, and (2) that Himmler
had then insisted that the West Wall would hold. Since he
(Wolff) now had been proved right, the letter continued, no
purpose could be served by his seeing Himmler. Instead he
advised Himmler to come to see him and to arrange for the
surrender of all of Germany through the Allied contact which
"This approach is presumed to have been a provocation. engineered
by Himmler or Kaltenbrunner.
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he (Wolff) had already established. Wolff further stated in
his letter to Himmler that if Himmler were not prepared to
follow this suggestion, he (Wolff) would dissociate himself
completely from Himmler.
Himmler telephoned both the morning and afternoon of 14
April to ask why Wolff had not arrived. In each case one of
Wolff's aides took the call and reported that Wolff was not at
his headquarters but had sent a message via special courier to
Himmler.
Wolff's letter reached Himmler on the evening of 15
April. Later that night Himmler called Wolff several times
and Wolff finally decided to leave by plane for Berlin to see
Himmler.
Before he left, Wolff sent a message to the OSS representa-
tive, explaining that he was going to Berlin because he
thought he had an opportunity to do something for the Ger
man people, and that he expected to return to his headquar-
ters at Fasano on 17 April. Wolff also instructed his emissary
Zimmer to remain at the Chiasso frontier to await develop-
ments.
(The OSS representative comments that Himmler appar-
ently plans either to eliminate Wolff or to use Wolff to estab-
lish contact for himself with the Allies. The OSS representa-
tive believes that there is still a chance that Wolff, if he is not
eliminated by Himmler, could be used to effect a general
capitulation or one for the Italian theater only.) . .
20 April 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have today directed that all con-
tact with the German emissaries mentioned in my memoran-
dum to you of 18 April 1945 be terminated.
This action came about as the result of dispatch by the
Combined Chiefs of Staff of a message to the Supreme Allied
Commander, Mediterranean Theater, stating that in view of
(1) their belief that the German Commander in Chief, Italy
did not at this time intend to surrender on acceptable terms
P78T03.,fl4A 1j02N"IIWftdhs which had arisen with the Russians
94 OFFICIAL USF nNI V
 Approved For Release 20054/13 : Cl
on the matter it had been decided by the Governments of the
United States and Great Britain that the contact should be
broken off.
Orders to this effect were immediately forwarded by this of-
fice to the OSS representative in Bern.
28 April 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
. . . Wolff reached Berlin on 16 April. After conferences
with Kaltenbrunner, Himmler and Hitler, he returned to his
Fasano headquarters on 19 April. On 21 April, he called on
Generaloberst von Vietinghoff, Commander of the German
forces in Italy, and on Franz Hofer, Gauleiter of Tirol, and
received assurances of their full support. He arrived in Swit-
zerland on 23 April with his adjutant, Wenner, and with Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Victor von Schweinitz (who had powers to act
for von Vietinghoff) .
Meanwhile, on 20 April the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed
OSS to break off all contacts with Wolff, and the Combined
Chiefs of Staff approved a message to this effect to SACMED,
stating that von Vietinghoff clearly did not intend to surren-
der his forces on acceptable terms at that time.
On 20 April, the OSS representative was unable to comply
with these instructions since no representative of Wolff was
at hand. On 23 April, an emissary arrived, and the OSS rep-
resentative told him, in the presence of Swiss intelligence offi-
cers, that the matter was no longer of interest to the Allies.
Wolff's intermediary stated that Wolff and von Schweinitz had
come to Switzerland to negotiate a surrender, and said that
another emissary had been sent to Marshal Kesselring to try
to persuade him to surrender simultaneously.
As a result of the OSS representative's refusal to see him,
Wolff returned to North Italy on 25 April, leaving Wenner
with full powers to sign or act in his behalf. Wolff declared
to Swiss officers that his presence in Italy was imperative in
order to control the situation there, and to persuade von Viet-
inghoff, Rudolph Rahn . . ., and Gauleiter Hofer to join him in
a joint proclamation to the German forces in North Italy.
The proclamation would iceedb~`tR~~[~Se60~1'1'~ : CIA-
P78TO3194A000200010001-2
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theater now is separated from the High Command, independ-
ent action will be taken to end hostilities.
On 26 April, the CCS directed SACMED to instruct the OSS
representative to hold no conferences but to re-establish con-
tact, and that arrangements would be made for Wolff and
von Schweinitz to proceed at once to AFHQ. Wolff was already
enroute to his new headquarters in Bolzano, but Wenner and
von Schweinitz were intercepted in Switzerland. . . .
28 April 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
. . . Weather permitting, Lieutenant-Colonel von Schwein-
itz [von Vietinghoff's deputy, with full power to act for his
superior] and Sturmbannfuehrer Wenner [Wolff's adjutant,
with full powers to act for his superior] were scheduled to
arrive in Caserta on 28 April.
There have been no discussions with von Schweinitz or
Wenner in Switzerland, except in regard to communications.
The OSS representative believes that von Schweinitz is ca-
pable and that Wenner, although not a forceful character,
might be useful to "rubber stamp" the surrender of Wolff's
forces. OSS representatives are being sent to Buchs [on the
Swiss-Liechtenstein frontier], and preparations are made to
infiltrate a communications unit to Bolzano [headquarters
of Wolff and von Vietinghoff], if required.
A message from Buchs via Zimmer [one of Wolff's interm.e-
diaries] states that Wolff had reached Bolzano safely on 27
April [after leaving Switzerland on 25 April], and had a long
talk with his associates, all of whom adhere to the previous
decision to surrender. They are awaiting results of the trip
to Caserta by von Schweinitz and Wenner.
2 May 1945
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
. . . After every possible vicissitude, the surrender negotia-
tions appear again to be progressing. There is some prospect
of results within the next 48 hours or less. OSS Bern has
been in almost hourly contact with AFHQ on almost all de-
P78T031 W 661068"I ( a'Ie1 a vital part in keeping up essential lines
 OFFICIAL. USE ONLY Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP
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25X1
of communication. OSS Bern has succeeded in getting Lieu-
tenant-Colonel Victor von Schweinitz (von Vietinghoff's dep-
uty) and Sturmbannfuehrer Wenner (Wolff's deputy) back to
I3olzano with the surrender terms which they had signed at
Caserta for their respective commanders. Final acceptance
and execution of these terms now rests with von Vietinghoff
and WolfF.1
'' They had in fact been executed, after tense days of uncertainty on
Allied side and confusion on the German, by the time this memoran-
dum was written. The full story is told in Forrest Davis' "The Secret
History of a Surrender" in The Saturday Evening Post, September 22
and 29, 1945. Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP
Articles and book reviews on the following pages are un-
classified and may for convenience be detached from the classi-
fied body of the Studies if their origin therein is protected.
The editors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mr.
Walter Pforzheimer, Curator of the CIA Historical ]Intelligence
Collection, in scanning current public literature for Intelli-
gence materials, and of the intelligence officers who prepared
book reviews for this issue of the Studies.
 SECRET Approved For Release 20G /13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
Intelligence Articles VII 2
U.S. Only
Republication without
express permission pro-
hibited.
Approved F?r Release CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
;SECRET
 Operation Uproot
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : C
and the loss of the Sudeten German territory. On 1 March
1939 I received hard information from a well-placed and re-
liable agent that Bohemia and Moravia were to be occupied
on 15 March and Slovakia made a German protectorate-the
end of the Czechoslovak state.
Precautionary Measures
During this period of increasingly evident danger, modifi-
cations were made in the organizational structure of Czecho-
slovak intelligence to ready it for war and any eventualities of
the situation. One of the principles of self-protection for an
intelligence organization is decentralization. Naturally, there
has to be a center to direct and control operations, but its di-
mensions should be limited to the practical minimum. The
concentration of too many intelligence personnel in one place
gives the enemy an opportunity to identify them. This is
bad enough in peacetime: enemy identification can do serious
damage if the headquarters intelligence officer is engaged in
an operation and has direct contact with a source of informa-
tion, and it can do even more if he should be sent to the field.
But from the viewpoint of possible enemy occupation of the
country its effects could be disastrous. Therefore everything
having to do with clandestine operations that could be sep-
arated had to be detached from the headquarters and put
under deep cover outside.
Another matter closely connected with organizational cover
is enforcement of the ancient basic principles of security:
that every intelligence officer should know only what he needs
to know for the fulfilment of his task, nothing less, but noth-
ing more; that every individual operational file should include
a list of persons who know about it; that operational person-
nel should be indoctrinated by extreme measures against di-
vulging secrets to wives, friends, or relatives; that case offi-
cers should write all operational papers personally, not en-
trust this to a female secretary; etc., etc. Everyone knows
these ABC's of intelligence security and knows how often
they are violated. In peacetime the violations can damage in-
telligence operations and the security of the country, but
when enemy attack and occupation are imminent, sins against
security committed in the past could bring calamity.
MORI/HRP PAGES A2-A11 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
A2
IRAGUEf
F'I_ZEN
F, 1~e n)
\?'BRNO,
!ZNOJMO
4
As the German-Czechoslovak crisis reached its climax, the
discipline of our service had been tightened up in these re-
spects, and its basic organization had become the following:
In Prague was the headquarters, the Second Department
of the General Staff. Here in full strength were sections not
involved in operational matters-sections for research and
analysis, military attaches, technical support, codes and ci-
phers, finance, administration, legal affairs, and archives. But
the headquarters operational section, that charged with the
planning, direction, and control of clandestine operations?
was numerically very small. Officers responsible for mount-.
ing and conducting operations were detached from headquar-
ters and kept under strict cover in various places scattered
around the country.
There were three regional field stations-at Prague in Bo-
hemia, Brno in Moravia, and Banska Bystrica in Slovakia, with
corresponding operational spheres. Each field station di-
rected and controlled such outposts in its territory as were
required by geographic considerations and operational needs;
these are indicated on the map below. The cover of the field
c1 Department of General S aff
A Regional Field Star ons
M _4
KRI
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 Operation Uproot
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personnel was really deep, carefully prepared, and continu-
ously controlled. Contact between the field stations and the
Prague headquarters was also under strict cover.
Apart from these home intelligence bases there were bases
abroad-Zurich in Switzerland, The Hague in Holland, Copen-
hagen in Denmark, Warsaw in Poland, and Stockholm in
Sweden. In addition to mounting and conducting their own
operations, they maintained communication with important
agents who for security reasons could not be handled from
Czechoslovak territory. Moreover, they were assigned
stand-by communications with other important agents in
case of need. These foreign bases played a major role in en-
abling us to continue our work from abroad after the occu-
pation of the country.
We never entrusted our military attaches with clandes-
tine operational tasks; we expected from them information
gathered only by legal, diplomatically acceptable means.
They were not intelligence professionals and were totally in-
experienced in operational matters, and in the countries of
potential enemies they were under strict observation. By
eliminating them from the operational field we avoided the
frictions with the Foreign Ministry which trouble many other
countries' intelligence services. For the same reason we never
used our embassies and legations as cover for our personnel.
From the administrative point of view, the management of
such a decentralized and deeply covered structure in peace-
time presented certain difficulties, but its advantages security-
wise far outweighed these. Moreover, the service could now
easily adapt itself to almost any turn that Czechoslovakia's
delicate situation in Central Europe might take, and the tran-
sition to a wartime organization would be relatively simple.
Since 1937 we had had reliable documentary information
on the Wehrmacht's plan in case of war against the French-
Czechoslovak coalition. The Wehrmacht's basic idea was to
stay on the defensive against France and concentrate all its
might against Czechoslovakia in order to overrun the coun-
try as quickly as possible. The Czechoslovak counter-plan
was to hold Bohemia as long as possible but if the pressure
became irresistible to evacuate and concentrate all defensive
effort in Moravia, hoping to hold there until the outbreak of
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-
Operation Uproot
an anticipated general European conflagration should divert
the enemy forces.
Under this plan the core of our intelligence was to be evac
was
uated to Slovakia. A detailed scheme for the eva stati behind
elaborated, including a chapter on establishing Y-
Realistically, we had to anticipate losing the majority
net. nut
of minor agents, but our most important agents would ould
have been affected seriously by such an evacuation;
through
tested our bases
have contin ari el their production
these bco cumr
through channels prepared
stances.
Changed Plans
After the Germans occupied Austria my doubts about
whether France would intervene in case of German attack on
us began to grow. In our daily contacts with the French
fail-
there were ominous indications that she would not. The
ure of France to come to our aid would mean the complete
occupa-
isolation of our country and inescapable defeam and superiors
tion. Unfortunately, I was unable to per
problems arising
to take seriously this eventuality and the p
from it. They refused to believe that France would not ful-
fill her treaty obligations and kept their hopes tied to a. Eu-
ropean conflagration in which even Soviet Russia would be in-
volved. plans and preparations
I was therefore forced to make new p roval for the intelligence service without knowledge
not Wharf
my superiors. I conceived my plan absolutely alone,
ing it with anyone, even among my closest colleagues. Then
came the culmination of the Sudeten crisis and the Munich
dictate. It was clear to me that the Munich arrangement was
only temporary, that German occupation of the whole coun-
try was only a matter of time. I had to utilize the weeks left
to me as fully as possible. ara:
The circumstances under which I had to make my prepara-
tions were most difficult. President Benes, on whom I could
have relied, resigned and left the country. He was replaced was
by the figurehead Hacha, under whom a new government
formed to "create new relations" government was to stop any with Germany. One of the
first orders I received from this g
P78T03194A000200010001-2 A5
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-
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intelligence activities against Germany. Collaboration blos-
somed everywhere. The morale of the population sank to un-
believable depths. No one trusted anybody. My position as
head of intelligence fell into jeopardy, and I had to bribe the
Minister of National Defense to keep my post. I even received
both direct and indirect offers from the German Abwehr to
collaborate with them. My personal safety and that of my
close associates was in great danger.
I had already decided to go abroad and continue intelligence
activities against Germany. I was convinced that war was
near and that my service's operational potential, even though
weakened in transplantation, would be of value to the common
anti-Nazi effort. The problems to be solved were where to go,
whom and what to take with me, what arrangements to make
with the operational net, and what to do with staff personnel
left in the country.
Theoretically there were three possible places to go. But
France, after Munich, was out of the question; Soviet Russia
was not to my liking politically; and that left England. We
had no formal alliance with the English but collaborated
closely in the intelligence field. Through these contacts I
began negotiations.
If you want to undertake intelligence activities abroad when
your own country is on the verge of occupation by the enemy
and you don't have the backing of your own government, you
need money. Without money you would become a mere agent
of the foreign organization with which you work. This prob-
lem, however, had fortunately been solved for me in advance.
When our bases abroad were established it was anticipated
that in case of war communication with them could become
difficult or, even impossible, and considerable sums of money
in good foreign currency were therefore deposited in safe
places to be put at the disposal of the bases on my order.
Nearly a million British pounds was originally banked in Zur-
rich, Paris, The Hague, Stockholm, and Riga. When the Rus-
sians were about to take over Latvia that in Riga was trans-
ferred to Stockholm. I now concentrated all this money in
London except the Paris deposit, which was used in the evacu-
ation of Czechs from Nazi-threatened Poland. Personnel and
operational arrangements remained to be made.
Operation Uproot
Staff personnel. I decided not to leave the country until
It German was still Only MY own nt, when the act begun or
the last wa obviously imminent. of
estimate that the Germans would go on to occupy the whole
of Czechoslovakia, and I did not want to act prematurely; be-
sides, I had many, many things to do before s leaving. re we e - d parture would therefore have to be by
plane.
12 seats in the plane that was available to me, so I could take
only eleven persons. Who they should be was a very difficult
choice; I had hundreds of able and devoted co-workers. After
long and painful deliberation I dropped all personal and senti-
mental considerations and made a strictly objective choice
based on two criteria-who would be most useful in the work agent nets. These
abroad, and who in the last1 hours before rdeparture, to come
be
would
along.
The rest would have to be left behind. Some of the opera-
tional personnel were advised to escape from the country by
whatever means they could. Some did and joined me later in
London. Several score of others I managed to place in civil
affairs ministries-Agriculture, Posts, and Transportation--
with antedated appointment papers. Personnel not involved
in operational matters I considered relatively safe. (In the
event these arrangements worked out satisfactorily. For our
activities in London I had a sufficient number of experts; and
those that stayed in Czechoslovakia on the whole did
def a rly
well. Some were ? put into concentration camps,
of their intelligence connections, but because they became in-
volved in underground .activities. Onl The who h d be n wou
members of an analytic group, peried.
not believe that they had had nothing to do with operations
and tortured them into suicide.) se m Agents. In such a crisis you have expect to to because nab df
your agents. You lose them by
likes to work for the losing side. You lose them by arterinrest, be-
cause some of them are sure to be listed by enemy
ligence for arrest in case of imminent war. But these are for
the most part low-level agents, and in the light of the coming
German occupation I was not interested in the kind of o for
imp
rn was
mati conc
rtant agents t t oethoroughpro ly c ouce. My mpromi ed to dareedefect or s op col-
agents
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Operation Uproot
laborating with us. I put all my efforts into saving as many
as I could of these. It was mainly a matter of providing for
communication, not a simple thing under the circumstances
but not impossible. We succeeded in arranging continued com-
munication with about fifteen important sources, the princi-
pal assets with which we could begin to operate in England.
(We later had difficulties when Poland, Denmark, and Hol-
land were occupied by the Germans and our bases there can-
celed out, but by then we were already established firmly else-
where and were able to continue our work quite effectively.)
Stay-behind net. As a matter of routine, I took care of
establishing several nuclei of informants with whom we would
make contact after the German occupation. These people
were selected, of course, not only with a view to their poten-
tial but also in consideration of security; none of them had
previously been connected with any intelligence work. (These
nuclei were later supplemented by various underground or-
ganizations. For at least three years of the war they were
able to provide much information important for the Allied
cause.)
Last Days
While I was making these feverish preparations and ar-
rangements in early 1939, Der Tag was approaching. The
whole atmosphere reflected the fact that what was left of the
Czechoslovak state was completely at the mercy of Berlin.
Preparations for a radical reduction of the Czechoslovak army
were in full swing, the Slovakian crisis was mounting, the
Jewish question raised its head, and the economic situation
was deteriorating rapidly. In the highest governmental cir-
cles complete helplessness reigned; everyone was trying to
guess what the Germans would want them to do about every-
thing. There was practically no one to whom to turn for
advice. The numbers and the activities of Nazi collaborators
were increasing every day. In this environment I had mo-
ments of doubt whether I would be able to execute my plans.
On the first of March I received my information that the
occupation of the country was scheduled by the Germans for
15 March. There was no doubt about the authenticity of the
report: it included the identity and battle orge
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man armies to be used, the names of their commanding gen-
erals, the routes and timetable of the advance. Serious re-
sistance on the part of the Czechoslovak army was not antic-
ipated. Slovakia was to become an independent state under
German protection.
I immediately informed the government. They did not be-
lieve me, or they did not want to. I was forbidden to dissemi-
nate such an alarming report. I therefore had to do by my-
self what I had planned, without help from anyone and even
against the instruction of my government-which I could. not
consider a true government acting in the interests of the
people.
My first concern was the intelligence archives, which with-
out doubt would be of the greatest interest to the German
Abwehr and the Gestapo. The most important and most
needed part of the operational material had already been
sorted out and packed for shipment abroad. It had to be
transferred to the British embassy, from where it could be
pouched to London. This was a very delicate operation be-,
cause it had to be kept secret not only from our own people!
but from the German spies who were now swarming about the
neighborhood of the General Staff building. We managed.
this successfully.
The rest of the files had to be destroyed. This was no prob-
lem at the field stations and their outposts, because under
their strict cover they were out of reach of observation by un-
authorized persons. But the massive archives stored in the
General Staff building could not be disposed of secretly, and I
was unable to get permission to do it from my superiors. It
was only at the very end, when they were at last convinced
that the occupation was imminent, that they gave their con-
sent. Then we managed to burn everything in special fur-
naces we had constructed for the purpose, finishing the job
on 15 March only a few hours before my departure.
The material destroyed included the official code in which
we communicated with the military attaches-it was known
to too many people about whose behavior under occupation
conditions I could not be sure-and all other codes except
-RDP78TQ?1t94AOQr399Q1' QR1w h our bases abroad and the agents we
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were going to keep. (Even these we changed shortly after
our arrival in London.) Similarly we destroyed any opera-
tional equipment which could be of much benefit to the Ger-
mans, saving to take with us only a few things that incor-
porated innovations in intelligence techniques-some radio
transmitter components and samples of invisible ink. The
rest we left as it was; the total destruction of everything was
not feasible under the circumstances.
Meanwhile I had seen to firm arrangements for the flight
to London. It was agreed that the plane, a Dutch one, would
be on the airfield from 14 March on, prepared to take off when-
ever I was ready. I wanted to leave only when it was firmly
established that the German armies had entered Czechoslo-
vak territory: I did not want to give the impression that I
was deserting or running away from danger, but to make clear
that this was a necessary evacuation of personnel whose cap-
ture would be of value to the enemy. I was convinced that
my action was morally right, and this conviction was
strengthened when the government issued orders not to resist
the advancing Germans, not to destroy anything, and to be
friendly to the invaders. That was not a government I felt
obliged to obey.
During the last days I found time to get into contact with
friends in other ministries whom I trusted and inform them
of the coming occupation. Some of them who in their official
positions were engaged in anti-German activities were able
to escape from the country, and others could at least destroy
material which would compromise them in German eyes.
On the afternoon of 14 March I called one by one the per-
sons whom I had selected to accompany me, told them about
my plan, and asked them if they were willing to come. All of
them agreed promptly. They gave me their word of honor
that they would tell no one, not even their families, and that
they would not leave the building without my permission.
All kept their word. At 5:30 the following morning, when
the reports came that German troops had crossed our borders
at several points, we all left for the airfield. The plane took
off at six o'clock.
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Operation Uproot
Reflections
considered h
I have always
a successful one.
operation and
vakia in 1939 an g
We succeeded in organizing in England an intelligence group
adean
that started
is not boasting to say that this group mthe
end of f it. . It
effective contribution effort was the purpose
became of the
became a gigantic world affair. That evacuation operation.
s
If an intelligence organization leaves he country like is
and starts to work abroad without a government,
political center to which it is subordinated, it falls into great
danger of becoming mercenary, and there is inevitably bound
to be a moral decline. We were lucky in that soon after our
arrival in London President Benes came there from the United
States, and his provisional Czechoslovak governm was
political, legal, outbreak of
war. moral
That by h to our activities immediately
war. That gave
background.
From the counterintelligence point of view also everything
went well. No information fell into enemy hands that would
benefit him. No persons except the two I have mentioned suf-
fered because of their connections with my organization.
I have pointed out that we were extraordinarily lucky that
early warning gave me time to prepare for the extreme even-
tuality. But I had also an extraordinary handicap : during
the most critical period of preparation the country had a gov-
ernment collaborating with the enemy and inimical
most
designs. It was from this that the greatest danger and
of my worries came. In the final days before 15 March 1939
my hair grew grey.
in the end the results justified the action. There had been
painful decisions, anxious moments, and risks involved; but
in such a situation you have to take risks. I would not do it
differently if I had it to do over again.
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Complications in using the
buoyant ascent technique
COASTAL INFILTRATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Paul X. Kelley
Lieutenant John A. Hurley's article, "A Technique for
Coastal Infiltration," in the summer 1962 issue of this jour-
nal, suggested the application of the buoyant ascent escape
technique to the debarking of agent personnel from a subma-
rine submerged off the coast. He was apparently unaware
that such an application has been made in practice, that in
fact Marine Corps reconnaissance teams have been using the
technique successfully in training exercises since 1958. These
exercises were made public in the excellent CBS television
presentation "The New Marine," shown on "Twentieth Cen-
tury" in February 1961.
Lieutenant Hurley's brief exposition, however, glossed over
some of the. difficult aspects of the infiltration and withdrawal
operation, leaving perhaps the impression that such operations
could be carried out with only perfunctory effort. I should
like to point out here some of the complexities that must
be fully understood and provided against in order to assure
any reasonable degree of success. It is not the buoyant
ascent in itself that is difficult. This requires, as was said,
only half a day of training; and training to a depth of 50 feet
is quite adequate, for this is deeper than the escape trunk
when the submarine is operating at periscope depth. But the
real problems commence after debarkation.
Landing on Target
There are many questions which must be answered correctly
before you can expect to step ashore at a predetermined spot.
Consideration must be given to local tides and currents and
the effect they will have on the swimmer's course, so that the
proper point for debarkation can be calculated. A decision
must be made whether or not to employ scuba. Personally,
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 Approved For Release 2
I do not like scuba for infiltration or withdrawal missions, and
I believe that the majority of those who advocate its use do so
for exotic rather than practical reasons. Be the latter as it
may, here are the reasons for my preference.
First, underwater navigation is more difficult than surface
navigation. A submerged swimmer not only is denied the use
of visible reference points on the coast but is also at the mercy
of changing currents. While extrapolation can usually provide
a fair estimate of the effects of these, changes in the contour
of the sea bottom caused by storm action or other unpredic-
tables can result in variations that might well move the un-
derwater swimmer appreciably off course.
Next, the value of open-circuit scuba is severely restricted
by the limited underwater time it provides, the phosphores-
cence at night of the bubbles it emits, and the requirement
to cache the equipment once ashore. Realistically, from a de-
tection viewpoint the most critical time in amphibious infil-
tration is in crossing the beach from waterline to hinterland.
Picture, if you will, an agent waddling across a beach with
a double or triple tank block weighing some 60-80 pounds on
his back in addition to the equipment he needs for his tasks
ashore. If he cached his scuba under water at some distance
from the shore, how useful would it have been? He would still
have to swim on the surface to the waterline. Moreover, he
would have the additional problem of locating it again for
withdrawal.
The use of closed or semi-closed circuit scuba would over-
come only the disadvantage of emitting visible bubbles. The
navigation and caching problems would still exist. Another
difficulty, though not a decisive one, is that the use of this
equipment requires rather extensive training.
For those not convinced by these arguments, I recommend
an experimental analysis of both techniques under proper en-
vironmental conditions. Remember, you are not going to at-
tempt infiltration in a densely populated or heavily defended
area. Normally it will be done at night over a fairly remote
beach.
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Infiltration and Withdrawal
Maneuvering the Submarine
Restrictions on submerged operations for moder ei subma-
rines rines affect both the launching recovery of
shallow water. If
First, a submarine is highly
detected, it needs deep water for evasive maneuvers.
Chow dee p
is deep? I honestly don't know, but would guess
submarine captains would like a minimum depth of is 00ofeet:
since the submarine itself is over 50 feet from pe p
keel, this would give only 50 feet more to the bottom. How
many coasts in the world have a steep enough profile to allow
a submerged submarine to come safely within swimming dis-
tance of the shore?
Second, although the possibility of radar detection seems
always to be mentioned exclusively as the primary reason for
submerged operations, is it not reasonable to presume that
an enemy having a sophisticated surface radar system on his
coast line will also have effective underwater sound detectors?
One sensitive hydrophone in the water can detect a subma-
rine at a considerable distance.
Third, the presence of essential and expensive
fleet on,
equipment on the hulls of present and programmed marines precludes bottoming. Therefore a submerged subma-
rine must either hover or maintain some speed in the water
during launch and recovery. Hovering, h however, requires
to
o
skilled crew and a thoroughly experienced diving
maintain proper trim, so one cannot count on it. In almost
all ordinary operations the submarine must maintain a speed
of 1 to 2 knots. When you realize that the average you swimmer
with fins can attain only a speed offabout t 1 kn t, y g
to understand some of the problems
Effecting Withdrawal
in withdrawing the infiltrators, location is the first step.
Here we must decide whether it is easier for the the swimmer
find the submarine or the submarine
Both methods have been tried, and I believe that the latter is
not only easier but requires less equipment. Here is how it
works. At a prearranged place and time the submarine
searches with its organic hydrophone for a signal which the
swimmer can transmit by a simple mechanical or electronic
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : Cl
Infiltration and Withdrawal
device. Since the hydrophone is highly directional, the signal
when detected yields a precise bearing to the source. The
submarine then moves along this bearing to effect rendezvous.
Because of the submarine's inability to bottom or hover, ren-
dezvous can be the most difficult task to carry out. It is par-
ticularly so when you introduce the added problems of dark-
ness and wave action. How can a swimmer locate and reach
a submarine periscope that is moving faster than he can swim?
There is, of course, an answer. There may be other tech-
niques which are better, but here is one that is simple and
effective. While it suggests a minimum of two swimmers,
with a little ingenuity it could probably be employed by one.
After the swimmers reach the preplanned rendezvous area
off shore, they stretch a 100-foot line between them perpen-
dicular to the prearranged direction from which the subma-
rine will approach. When the submarine, constantly check-
ing course to home on the signal, reaches the swimmers, its
periscope, extended above the surface of the water, snags the
line and rendezvous is made.
Re-entry, or "lock-in," as it is most often called, is the final
step. For this there are three methods which the Marines
have tested and found feasible.
First, without breathing apparatus. Since the escape trunk
is only 32 feet down when the submarine is at periscope depth,
the free swimmer can reach it after very little training. To
obviate the effect of the submarine's speed during the swim-
mer's descent, a guide line should be pre-rigged from the peri-
scope to the escape trunk. The swimmer uses this for a hand-
over-hand descent into the submarine.
Next, the use of scuba. Attached to a trolley, a single tank
block is floated to the surface along a line pre-rigged from the
escape trunk to the periscope. The swimmer, using the scuba,
goes hand over hand down the line into the submarine. The
tank is then sent back up the line to the next swimmer, if
required.
The third method is essentially the same as the second
except that instead of a scuba a high-pressure line with a full
face mask is rigged inside the escape trunk and sent to the
surface via the "cable car" system described above. This pro-
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infiltration and Withdrawal
vides a continuous flow of air for the swimmer during his
descent. problem aspects to
There are, needless to say, many more I have purposely cited only these salient
such operations; Underwater sound,
points in order to simplify the discussion.
for many situations it is
is a science in itself, and in
example, , is a
signswimmer's
difficult or impossible 's
attempted to illustrate
coastal infiltration and withdrawal by this technique are pos-
sible, thorough planning and careful execution are required if
the operation is to be successful.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
THE TENTH FLEET. By Ladislas Farago. (New York: Ivan
Obolensky. 1962. Pp. 366. $6.50.)
This is the best comprehensive account of U.S. antisubma-
rine operations in World War II that has come to this re-
viewer's attention,' putting many aspects of them into print
for the first time. It is based upon meticulous research into
a wide range of source material, including U.S. Navy and cap-
tured German Admiralty documents and records, and just
about everything that has been published on the subject.2
The main criticism that can be directed at the book arises from
the author's dramatic compulsions, the most annoying of
which is to portray the good guys as supermen and the bad
guys as villains. As one of the good guys remarked on read-
ing the book, "My friends are going to feel damn embarrassed
for me and my enemies are going to say, `Why, that SOB must
have written it himself.' "
The total unpreparedness of the United States for opera-
tions against the German submarines was quite apparent
when Admiral Doenitz began his American offensive with only
five of them in January 1942. In just ten days of action, be-
ginning with the sinking on 11 January of the British
freighter Cyclops 160 miles south of Nova Scotia, these five
U-boats destroyed twenty-five ships of about 200,000 tons.
Not a single U-boat was as much as shaken by a stray depth
charge. By May 1943, U-boats had operated in the Western
1 Reviewer Knowles was in effect the Tenth Fleet's chief of intelligence
and is the number two hero of Farago's hero-oriented book.
2 A glaring if peripheral exception is The Secret Capture (London,
1959) by S. W. Roskill (whose other writings Farago frequently cites
and admiringly quotes) which tells of the Royal Navy's 1941 boarding
and capture of the U 110. After describing the U.S. capture of the
U 505 in 1944 and mentioning the earlier captures of one British and
one Italian submarine, Farago writes, "From early in the war, board-
ing parties were established in all the Royal Navy's antisubmarine
ships . . . But no effort was ever made to actually board a disabled
U-boat . . ."
MORI/HRP PACES A19-A23
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A19
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
How Czechoslovakia, alone
among the countries overrun by
the Nazis, succeeded in evacuat-
ing an intelligence organization
to operate in exile.
OPERATION UPROOT
Frantisek Moravec
As Hitler's forces occupied one after another of the coun-
tries of Europe from 1939 through 1941, refugee officials from
many of them assembled in London and formed governments
in exile or liberation organs which tried among other things
to organize intelligence activities. They were handicapped
in this by having lost all the assets-agents, files, communi-
cations-of their pre-occupation intelligence organizations.
They had to start from scratch, and with almost exclusively
amateur staff personnel. Those that achieved a measure of
success-most notably the Norwegians and the Free French-
owed it to British help, geographical proximity, relative ease
of communication, and effective resistance movements in their
countries.
The exception was Czechoslovak intelligence. We were the
first of the European services to operate from London, and
the only one to have maintained a continuity of professional
staff, of established field stations, and of agents active in Ger-
many and elsewhere.
We had had the advantage of ample warning that the Nazis
were going to move in, and we therefore had time to prepare
ourselves for eventual evacuation. The indications grew pro-
gressively more definite. Beginning in 1935 German espionage
increased continuously until it far exceeded peacetime needs.
In 1938 the Austrian Anschluss half encircled Czechoslovakia
on the south and exposed to enemy attack our most vulner-
able border, that with lower Austria. The growing restless-
ness of the Sudeten German, population finally took the form
of open rebellion inspired and financed by the Nazis, and this
led at the end of September 1938 to the Munich agreement
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MORI/HRP PAGE Al
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA
Atlantic for seventeen months with virtual impunity, sinking
more than seven million gross tons of shipping.
It was no wonder that Admiral King was worried. In his
hard look at the problem he conceived the idea of centraliz-
ing antisubmarine warfare at Cominch (Commander in Chief,
U.S. Fleet) Headquarters, having in mind, according to the
author, four major considerations:
(1) Antisubmarine warfare needed a commander of the highest
rank, whose prestige and influence would be paramount and who
could make his decisions prevail.
(2) The organization he had in mind would have no ships of
its own, but would have recourse to every vessel of the United
States Navy with inherent and explicit power to commandeer
whatever forces when and where needed for antisubmarine op-
erations.
(3) It had to be a small organization with assured and easy
access to any and all agencies of the Navy, and especially to the
various existing intelligence services and their resources.
(4) It had to have the status of a fleet, partly to simplify its
personnel and administrative structure in a headquarters-type
organization, partly to function along operational lines, and mainly
to be able to use the channels of fleet communications.
It was an inspired and fortunate decision that Admiral King
chose to wear a third hat as Commander, Tenth Fleet, in ad-
dition to those he wore as Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
and as Chief of Naval Operations. Although he seldom exer-
cised personally the functions of this command, his name lent
it the authority it needed. Rear Admiral Francis S. Low, as
Chief of Staff in the new organization, in fact ran the show
and imbued the Tenth Fleet with his own high standards of
performance and conduct.
The Tenth Fleet was formally established on 20 May 1943.
In the previous eighteen months American forces had sunk
only thirty-six U-boats, but by the end of 1943, when the
Tenth Fleet was six months old, our sinkings totalled one hun-
dred and one. With respect to ship losses, between January
and June 1943 the U-boats sank 229 ships of 1.5 million gross
tons, but during the following six months the sinkings dropped
to sixty-six ships of about one-third million gross tons.
The outstanding feature of the Tenth Fleet was that intelli-
gence and operations were completely welded. Looking back
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Recent Books
after an interim of some twenty years, this reviewer does not
recall a single operation that was laid on without full review
and use of all intelligence factors. In most cases it was, intel-
ligence that initiated the operations. We were fortunate in
having direct and immediate access to all sources of informa-
tion affecting the Battle of the Atlantic, from the high-fre-
quency direction-finder bearings on the latest U-boat trans-
mission to the most detailed interrogation reports on recently
captured U-boat crew members. We were working closely
with the British and exchanged estimates several times daily.
Intelligence was never so vital nor so well used.
The efforts of thousands of unsung heroes went into every
move in that amazing chess game which to its players seemed
to have no beginning and no ending. Round the clock, day
in and day out, for more than three years-nearly six. years
for our British colleagues-the ebb and flow of the battle con-
tinued. Just when we thought we had the U-boats on the run
they would come back hard with some improved device or
tactic that would give them a new lease on life to start the
cycle anew. Even at war's end the Germans still had 336 of
them, and deliveries from new construction were exceeding
twenty per month. These were the new prefabricated Types
XXI and XXIII, equipped with a greatly improved telescopic
snorkel and capable of high surface and underwater speeds
to outflank any but the fastest escorts.
Shortly after the close of the European War ths reviewer
r
visited the various German submarine building yards, one that impressed him most was at Bremerhaven, housed
in a huge, monolithic concrete complex and capable of turn-
ing out a completed, ready-to-run, 1,200-ton Type XXI boat
every other day. Even direct hits with the heaviest block-
buster (and several such hits had been scored) could not pene-
trate the 20-foot-thick reinforced concrete overhead. It was
fortunate that these U-boats developed a series of teething
troubles, including badly vibrating periscopes, before they
could be put on war patrols. Actually only one finally set out,
and it did not reach its operating area before the German sur-
render. Had the war lasted another six months the onslaught
of these radically improved submarines could well have
changed the whole balance of sea power in the Atlantic.
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In an Epilogue Mr. Farago makes an impassioned case for
an all-out effort in the present U.S. antisubmarine program,
pointing out that a few Soviet Polaris-type submarines could
mount a devastating attack on the United States. He notes
that even at their peak of efficiency the American defenses
could not prevent the World-War-II-vintage U-boats from
penetrating to our Atlantic seaboard on the eve of Germany's
surrender, and he emphasizes how far greater is the problem
of finding and killing a nuclear-powered submarine equipped
with 1500-mile missiles. He pleads for a Tenth-Fleet-type
organization to bring together under single management the
whole U.S. antisubmarine development effort now scattered
among semiautonomous bureaus in the Navy Department
and elsewhere.
The Tenth Fleet was indeed a unique organization well
suited to its time and place in history. In this reviewer's
opinion, however, it is not the answer to today's problems.
It was primarily a war operations activity, tuned to the fast-
changing situation in the Atlantic and bringing intelligence,
research, and development into close rapport with operations.
In the Tenth Fleet the intelligence input to the command
problem was greatly assisted by the extensive use of radio by
the German U-boats. Literally every convoy sighting. and
ship sinking on their part required a report to the BdU head-
quarters, which directed all wolf-pack attacks by remote con-
trol. This radio traffic was monitored by several score of
Allied high-frequency direction-finder stations located on the
periphery of the North and South Atlantic. As refinements
were made during the course of the war, fixes of considerable
accuracy were achieved. The efficiency of the HF/DF nets
and their communications linkage frequently enabled op-
erating forces to receive the locations of a U-boat within an
hour after it had signalled.
It is not to be anticipated that the Soviet Navy will be so
cooperative or so talkative. The task of intelligence in the
next Battle of the Atlantic will have to be borne in large meas-
ure by the operating forces. To locate a modern nuclear-pow-
ered submarine in a very large and very deep ocean is unb
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lievably complex and difficult. The solution we seek is not
the Tenth Fleet, ever so gallant a part though she once played.
-Kenneth A. Knowles
CONNOISSEURS AND SECRET AGENTS in Eighteenth Cen-
tury Rome. By Lesley Lewis. (London: Chatto & Windus.
1961. Pp. 282. 30/-.)
The eighteenth century was the heyday of the antiquarians,
when the great houses in England and villas on the continent
were being furnished with-sometimes erected primarily to
house-collections of antique work of art, and antiquarians
shared with artists the patronage and cultivation of the no-
bility. It was also a century of great political complication,
putting a Hanoverian on the throne in England while letting
a Stuart in Rome hold court as King of England under the
protection of the Ecclesiastical State, seeing France some-
times allied with England and sometimes at war with her but
always supporting the Pretender, suffering the separate Ital-
ian states to quarrel among themselves, witnessing a tem-
porary break-up of the Holy Roman Empire, exchanging a
conquering Sweden for a new aggressive Prussia, and pock-
marked by the War of the Spanish Succession, the War of the
Polish Succession, the War of the Austrian Succession, its
English offshoot the 1745 Rebellion, and the Seven Years' War.
It was therefore natural to the times that the international
antiquarian business should become not only a garnishment
for international diplomacy but a cover for international
espionage.
This book is a scholarly review of intelligence reporting
from Rome to London over the middle six decades of the cen-
tury, mostly concerning the plans and activities of the Jaco-
bite court. The two principal correspondents were first the
antiquarian Baron Philip von Stosch and later Cardinal Ales-
sandri Albani, a power in ecclesiastical councils and builder of
the villa-museum bearing his name which is still a tourist at-
traction outside the Salaria gate; but the activities of a num-
ber of lesser agents are hinted at and in part revealed in, the
documents preserved in London and Vienna. Albani's secre-
a Cardinal Giordano, was reporting, like
ple
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his chief but without his knowledge, to Horace Mann in Flor-
ence and doing his best to undercut Albani, and Albani was
called upon to smooth the way for a large number of English-
men, some of them agents, in Rome.
Stosch's papers had been worked over before, mostly from
the antiquarian viewpoint; the importance of his intelligence
work for the first ten years had been obscured by the increas-
ing triviality of his reports after he was forced to leave Rome
for Florence in 1731. But this is the first exploration of the
Albani correspondence. Unlike Stosch, an officially commis-
sioned and salaried spy, Albani was what we would call today
an ideological agent, motivated by admiration for the English
and a community of antiquarian interest with Mann and his
friends. Officially, among his other responsibilities, he repre-
sented the interests of the Imperial (Austrian) Court in
Rome, and when Britain and Austria turned up on opposite
sides of the Seven Years' War Mann and his superiors in Lon-
don suspected that he was withholding information from
them. But he remained "staunch as a heretic" throughout.
His last major service was a matter of political action: when
the Old Pretender died on New Year's Day of 1766 it was
Albani's political skill and influence that brought about the
Pope's decision not to extend to "Bonnie Prince" Charles the
royal prerogatives his father had so long enjoyed.
If the international milieu a mere two centuries back seems
strange and unreal today, there is an almost dreary famili-
arity about its version of the intelligence game. The fact that
it was Stosch who was reporting under the pseudonym Walton
was kept secret even from British officials in Italy, and one
of them warned that he was an emissary of the Dutch Re-
public plotting in favor of the Pretender. But he foresaw ex-
posure either through communications or through double
agents. It was likely his mail would be tampered with, and
the cipher would make people suspect that it was not merely
commercial. Moreover, it was impossible, he wrote, that a
man could serve well in Rome without employing spies, as he
did every day, and it could not be avoided that some of these
were in the pay of the other side too. Even these were useful
to a man who knew how to manage them and hide his own
hand, for they could provide a means to introduce into the
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Recent Books
mind of the enemy whatever it was desirable for him to think.
Nevertheless one was bound in the end to be betrayed by his
own instruments.
When these forebodings had been realized and Stosch had
by otherpower governments
been strong-armed out Rome,
uneme British
"having rendered him quite unemployable
and helped to encompass
for the rest" had
26 years to "go on paying
life, long after his information had ceased to be of any real
value."
ANATOMY OF SPYING. By Ronald Seth. (New York: E, P.
Dutton & Co., Inc. 1963. Pp. 368. $5.95.)
In 1937 Richard Wilmer Rowan published The Story of Se-
cret Service, a history of espionage from the beginnings to
the period before World War II. This book still remains the
best over-all historical study of spying that has been written,
despite Rowan's lack of professional background and the fact
that his research often leaves much to be desired. Others
have tried their hand in this field without much success, the
latest being an Englishman, Ronald Seth, whose Anatomy of
Spying 2 has now been brought out in an expanded American
edition under the same title. The English edition has been
unfavorably reviewed in this journal,3 but the additional ma-
terial in the American edition requires more pointed comment.
Seth's limited intelligence experience was gained as a mem-
ber of the British Special Operations Executive, into which
he was recruited for his knowledge of Estonia. Parachuted
into Estonia as a secret agent in 1942, he was at large for only
twelve days before being captured and was kept in various
German prisons for the remainder of the war. Whatever vir-
tues his book on his wartime experiences 4 may have, he soon
discovered that even poor books on spying sell quite well.,
he has been turning them out at a rapid rate ever since.
New York: Literary Guild of America, 1937.
2 Originally published in London: Arthur Barker, Ltd., 1961.
3 VI 1, p. A21.
' A Spy Has No Friends. London: Andre Deutsch Limited, 1952.
A25
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There is doubtless some useful material in The Anatomy of
Spying, but it is basically a rewrite of other sources and it
contains enough errors to mislead the unwary student at
many points; it cannot be recommended for uncritical use.
It begins by rewriting a story of the French Resistance which
had been told in much better form by the original author,
Richard Collier.5 In describing the activity of the "Cen-
tury" network in France, one of hundreds of sources of infor-
mation on Hitler's Atlantic Wall, Seth extravagantly claims
that "on the information supplied by Century, the Allied com-
manders based their invasion plans.... The work of Century
stands out head and shoulders above the rest." He cites an
incident in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 to show that it
was the Japanese "who first treated captured spies with any
show of chivalry," ignorant of or ignoring the American treat-
ment of Major Andre in 1780. He declares that until the
end of the seventeenth century "the spy was employed exclu-
sively in times of war," apparently unaware of the writings
of Kautilya at least three centuries before Christ. In this he
has also recently turned skeptic of the stories that Moses
had sent spies into the land of Canaan to reconnoiter the ter-
rain and its economic potential: in 1961, in the British edition,
he had said, "Moses was as fully alive to the value of knowing
the economic potential of a selected victim as knowing his
military strength." One can, I suppose, pass over without
comment his statements that CIA reputedly has a staff of
40,000 official personnel and 100,000 secret agents and that
there have been no cases in the past few years of British and
French spies being caught. It is statements of this sort, how-
ever-and such citations could be multiplied at length-which
so weaken the structure of what might have been a passable
book that one must warn against it.
Bad as these errors are, it is another feature of the Ameri-
can edition that is downright reprehensible-the reproduction
of several pages of clumsily fabricated "expose" of the back-
ground of Allen Dulles. For this material Seth relies almost
completely on the pamphlet A Study of a Master Spy (Allen
Dulles), a favorite Communist source-book for attacks on CIA
written in 1961 by a far-left-wing British Labour Party MP,
'Ten Thousand Eyes. New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1958.
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Without for d
Bob Ed e he and copies nfrom unne.
this sourc
word-and error for error. Some of the minor mistakes he
thus perpetuates are saying that Allen Dulles' "mother's
brother-in-law, Robert Lansing, became Woodrow Wilson's
Secretary of State in August 1915" rather than in June of
that year, pulling out of context and misrepresenting a sen-?
tence from the Dulles memorandum of 30 December 1918 en-
titled Lithuania and Poland-The Last Barrier between Gen.
many and the Boisheviki, and misspelling the name of Dulles"
superior Ernest Dresel as "Dressel."
Seth carbon-copies a more serious error of the Edwards
pamphlet in writing that "Dulles was also a director of the
Schroeder Trust Company and of the J. Henry Schroeder
Banking Corporation, American offshoots of the great German
banking house of Schroeder," and going on to point out the
role of the German Baron von Schroeder in Hitler's rise to
power. This canard stems from a Russian propaganda gambit
which first appeared in 1948 and after being utilized by Ed-
wards and Dunne was further spread by Andrew Tully 8 and
Fred J. Cook' before Seth picked it up. Actually, the firm of
which Mr. Dulles was a director was the J. Henry Schroder
Banking Corporation of New York, which was formed in 1923
by J. Henry Schroder and Company, a London firm established
in 1804. Neither Baron von Schroeder nor the German bank-
ing house of Schroeder had any connection with the British
and American firms of J. Henry Schroder.
Seth also spreads on his pages the misbegotten story of
meetings in Bern during World War II between Mr. Dulles
(under the cover name of Mr. Bull) and the German repre-
sentative Hohenlohe, going by the cover name of Mr. Pauls.
The Bull-Pauls memoranda are an old Soviet propaganda dis-
tortion repeated by many subsequent attackers of CIA and
its former director, including Edwards and Dunne in their
pamphlet.8 It is of interest that Seth's direct quotations from
these memoranda differ in a few details from the text used
6 CIA: The Inside Story. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1962.
"The CIA." Special issue of The Nation, 24 June 1961.
'For a detailed discussion of these attacks see Lester Haj ek's "Target:
CIA" in Intelligence Articles VI 1, p. 29 ff.
 Recent Books
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by Edwards and by the Soviet New Times (No. 27, July '1960).
Perhaps this was a device to obscure his copying; more likely
it was pure carelessness.
Seth concludes now that in spite of major failures "Allen;
Dulles must be given a place in any consideration of outstand-
ing directors of espionage," a tactful switch from his equally
pontifical judgment in the London edition that Mr. Dulles "has
certain qualifications as a spy-master, but is not in the tradi-
tion of the great spy-masters."
For his ill-starred drop into Estonia SOE agent Seth was
given ("somewhat ironically," he says) the code name "Blun-
derhead." A reading of his recent books makes one wonder if
this was very wide of the mark. After Anatomy of Spying,
in particular, "blunderhead" may be one of the kindest things
one could say of the author, and there would be little irony in
saying it.
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STUDIES
0
kn
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 7 NO. 3 SUMMER 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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 Approved
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence community.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
GROUP t
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final: responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an. article rests with the Edito-
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The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
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l I)ITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
Additional members of the Board:
represent other CIA components,.
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CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community
or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should
be submitted directly to the Editor, Studies in Intelligence,
Room 1D 0011 Langley I and need not be coordi-
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in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Foot-
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the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be clas-
sified through Secret.
Page
Intelligence in the New Japan . . . Adam Jourdonnais
Delicate growth amid traumatic inhibitions. SECRET
Wanted: An Integrated Counterintelligence
C. N. Geschwind 15
For an all-out counterattack on the Communist
services. SECRET
Half a Million Wanted Persons . . Earl D. Engeljohn 39
Progress in using information on the adversary.
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DISTRIBUTION
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call
your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,
1 Fnr hnnlr
An All-Purpose Data Handling System
Ellen Grosmere 9:5
Means for manipulating CI and other information.
CONFIDENTIAL
For a Standard Defector Questionnaire
Earl D. Engeljohn 53
Recording raw CI biographic data. CONFIDENTIAL
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The Joint Debriefing of a Cuban . . . . B. E. Layton 57
A precedent in overt-covert staff collaboration.
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Documentation of an obscure history. OFFICIAL USE
A Study in Indications Methodology
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Quantitative experiment with alternative hypotheses.
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Open Sources on Soviet Military Affairs
Davis W. Moore, Jr.
101
Survey of periodicals and other public sources.
CONF
Communications to the Editors
Not UNESCO ... Policy bias. SECRET . . .
IDENTIAL
. . . .
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Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
Kaznacheev. SECRET . . . . . . . . . .
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World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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To burn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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The psychological and historical
antecedents of a rudimentary
national service.
INTELLIGENCE IN THE NEW JAPAN
Adam Jourdonnais
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the
contribution to the literature of most significant
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two or more best articles s. Th
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no article is deemed sufficiently
Except as may be otherwise
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Japan stands today impressive at the gateway to Asia, a
nation not simply rehabilitated from the physical disasters
which capped its military adventures of the thirties and forties
but with an economy reoriented and modernized in a way that
commands respect throughout the world. Although not a
formal part of the framework of Western alliances, it has
been governed consistently since the war by anti-Communist
leaders and it provides base facilities for U.S. forces in north
Asia. Its business and political leadership, while obliged to
give due heed to the strong emotional urge for some kind of
accommodation with mainland China, has overwhelmingly
recognized that if Japan is to have a future as a prosperous
and influential nation its basic interests lie in and with. the
West. There is no similar emotional link to Russia; indeed,
the history of Russo-Japanese relations offers a consistent
pattern of suspicion and distrust.
In most respects Japan's governmental structure has been
modified and expanded to keep pace with the nation's growing
international interests. The postwar Japanese foreign serv-?
ice is now in action in respectable force on all the continents
and particularly in the developing nations of Africa and.
South and Southeast Asia. Defense attaches are posted in,
the major Western countries. And at home a well-disciplined
bureaucracy is back at work among the pile drivers and bam-
boo scaffoldings that mark the modernization of one of, the
world's great capitals.
Conspicuously missing in this picture of Japan's resurgence
as a world power is a comprehensive intelligence establish-
ment. With their well-deserved reputation for energetic ac-
quisition of the trappings of a modern Western society
why
,
have the Ja rently failed to fit themselves out with
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e
MONIfaNP o~- ?
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The New Japan
ties of international politics? What has happened to the in-
dustrious bands of Japanese agents who served the expansion-
ism of the China and Pacific wars with their various espionage
and subversive apparatus?
To some extent the romantic wartime image of the Japanese
spy is a false point of reference. In a sense, also, the current
absence of a Japanese intelligence mechanism is more appar-
ent than real. Nevertheless the discrepancy remains: there
is little evidence that Japan has established or intends to
create an intelligence system appropriate to its current in-
volvement in world affairs. Among the reasons for this, we
suspect, are some historical, psychological, and institutional
influences on which we propose to touch in these pages.
Symbolical Tabus
Semantic examination of some pertinent Japanese termi-
nology may be useful in providing insight into the Japanese
practice of intelligence. The word most broadly approxi-
mating "intelligence" in Japanese is john, a term even more
ambiguous than its English counterpart, connoting, among
other things, either "intelligence" in our technical sense or
"information" in the form of publicity or propaganda. Sig-
nificantly, its only appearance in the postwar bureaucratic
glossary is in the title of the Foreign Office's Information and
Cultural Bureau, Japan's USIA. "Espionage" is more straight-
forwardly rendered as choho, but the word is a historical relic;
it is not used by even the most hardheaded professionals
among today's Japanese intelligence officers. Similarly, bor-
yaku, a difficult word to translate which was used profession-
ally during the war to describe the activities of the Japanese
units scattered throughout Asia for covert political action
and subversion operations, is not a part of even the most
arcane postwar professional jargon.
All these words are indeed dirty words today, offensive to
the ear and reminiscent only of wartime abuses of power.
Two words which can be heard, at least in professional intelli-
gence circles, without undue damage to the sensibilities bet-
ter illustrate the current psychology of the Japanese intel-
ligence officer. The closest approximation to "agent" is kyor-
yokusha, meaning at most "collaborator" but more literally
"cooperator," a word that nicely suggests the delicacy with
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The New Japan
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which the Japanese approach the concept of controlling intelli-
gence sources. (Agents of foreign services, however, are likely
to be called a name borrowed from English, supai.) And the
prevailing term for the mission of Japanese government agen-
cies engaged in intelligence work---a word fit even for public
consumption-is chian, ,the public peace and safety." This
word, as we shall see, reflects accurately three aspects of, and
limitations on, today's Japanese intelligence activity--sensi-
tivity to public attitudes, an overwhelmingly internal, orien-
tation, and domination by professional police officials.
From Isolation to Conquest
We do not propose to trace how the Japanese got that way
or even very definitively whence they came, but a few obser-
vations on the development of a Japanese intelligence tradi-
tion seem necessary. The central and obvious historical fact
is that Japan has been an utterly closed society for most of
its existence. The feudal lords and the shogun had their spies,
of course-essentials in the interminable military campaigns
which now provide material for Japanese movie and television
thrillers analogous to our "westerns' -but these were all do-
mestic quarrels which brought no need for international es-
pionage. It was after all a "divine wind," not a triumph of
intelligence indications, that repulsed the only threat of for-
eign military invasion in Japanese history prior to the Oki-
nawa operation of 1945. The economic and cultural "inva-
sions" which came after the opening of Japan to the world
in 1858 were eagerly welcomed in the suddenly awakened de-
sire to catch up with the rest of the world. If we consider the
reports of Japanese students returning from abroad during
this period to represent espionage, this loose system can then
be considered the beginnings of Japanese secret foreign intel-
ligence. police state
It was really, however, only the evolution of a p
at home and the eruption of military adventurism abroad in
the 1930's that prompted the creation of intelligence and se-
curity agencies in the government. They came, not as the
institutionalization of a Japanese tradition of intelligence col-
lection, but rather as an adaptation of imports necessary to
keep the military regime in power at home and to precede,
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expand upon, and consolidate the military occupations in Asia
and the Pacific. The importation was eclectic: the German
general staff system provided the pattern for development of
the military intelligence system, and a Home Ministry in the
European tradition set up a pervasive police system which
could rapidly be specialized into the Special Higher Police
(tokko), economic police, etc., needed to sustain an authori-
tarian regime and control the economy in support of the mili-
tary effort. Of today's world powers surely only the United
States was competing with Japan in this turtle's race to estab-
lish an intelligence mechanism adequate to its international
aspirations and commitments.
The lines of a national policy, however unpraiseworthy,
were at least clear during this period, and with characteristic
vigor the Japanese developed the intelligence formations they
needed for its implementation. In many areas, as we know
to our sorrow, they were successful. Their failures, however,
may be more significant in that they often reflected charac-
teristics which are still in evidence in the Japanese approach
to intelligence. It must be said, despite all the literature about
wartime Japanese exploits of espionage and subversion and
the undoubted accomplishment of individuals, that Japanese
intelligence during World War II presented a most irregular
and diffuse pattern.
The Wartime Apparatus
There was a certain valid division of labor in the field of for-
eign collection, with Imperial Army units generally predomi-
nant in China and mainland Asia, the Navy in the South Pa-
cific and to some extent in Europe, and the Foreign Office in
the West. Personal and inter-service rivalries in Tokyo, how-
ever, tended" to water down the accomplishments of the opera-
tives stationed abroad. Perhaps the most disastrous example
of this is to be found in the sad history of the naval intelli-
gence negotiations in Europe which sought during the months
before Hiroshima to end the Pacific War but foundered on For-
eign Office incredulity and unwillingness to entrust the mat-
ter to Navy hands.'
Butow, Robert J. C., Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, 1954),
pp. 103-113.
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Most of Japan's wartime intelligence and covert action work
was of course done in Asia, where the immediate requirements
were the greatest, the military were in predominant force,
and a full selection of covers was available. Here there were
the conventional tactical and headquarters G-2 units, the
kempei handling counterintelligence and securfunctions,
and a great profusion of tokumu kikan ("special service latter agen-
cies")
cies") for clandestine operations (boryaku). The charged variously with softening up and penetrating target
national groups, supporting and training puppet national
armies, and assisting the conventional forces in maintaining
the subjugation of conquered areas; some of them were organ-
ized as task forces for specific covert purposes-even peace
negotiations-and then disbanded when their missions were
accomplished or aborted. These tokumu kikan tended to ac-
quire the best trained personnel, both military and civilian,
drawing on the Nakano School in Tokyo and the Toa Dobun
Shoin in Shanghai among others, and from them have come
most of the professional veterans who still find their ways
into-and out of-Japanese postwar intelligence organiza-
tions.
Most of the tokumu kikan were known during the war only
by the names of their commanders, a curiosity peh ps si d
nificant in that these organizations in particular
the factionalism and diffusion of authority which in other
ways still plague their profession. They tended to be most
successful where they had strong leadership and a clear and
independent line of authority back to Tokyo. The Fujiwara
Kikan, based in Singapore, is credited with the creation of the
Indian National Army, which for a time was effective in ohar-
assing the British in India. (Fujiwara, incidentally, is
of the few wartime intelligence chiefs to have. been rehabili-
tated successfully in the postwar intelligence system;
headed the Ground Self-Defense Force Intelligence School in
recent years.) The Minami Kikan was a joint Army-Navy op-
eration mounted in Tokyo to establish the Burma Independ-
ence Army, but it suffered rather seriously
more notorio s n (-
Navy split and soon gave Y
fort under Col. Iwakuro.
Military intelligence operations in China at one period suf-
fered from another flaw not unknown to occidental services--
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undue yielding to the temptation to dispose of hotheads and
mavericks by dispatching them to field establishments. Pre-
mier Tojo availed himself of this luxury to a degree that for
a time threatened the functioning of the China Expeditionary
Force Headquarters at Nanking. Many of the younger officers
who had participated in the ultranationalist uprisings of the
thirties found themselv
es exiled to intelligence outfits in
China, and by sheer numbers they exerted a primary influ-
ence in military operations until reassignments put opera-
tions staff (G-3) people back in the driver's seat. Duplication
of effort among Army, Navy, Foreign Office, and Greater East
Asia Ministry intelligence officers also disfigured the China
operation. In tactical and combat intelligence, however, it
was for the most part highly effective.
The Occupation
Scoring its successes and failures, youthful Japanese intel-
ligence lived out the war and then quite thoroughly died with
the surrender in 1945. Some individual officers managed to
integrate themselves locally into the newly independent na-
tions of Southeast Asia-after all, they considered themselves
to be important instruments in the creation of these na-
tions-and a few others found employment with the Chinese
Nationalists. But the cold winter of defeat and demobiliza-
tion in 1945-46 found the profession of arms, and with it that
of intelligence, the most utterly discredited trade in Japan.
The thoroughgoing mechanics of the Occupation broke up the
returning military units and scattered their bedraggled per-
sonnel to family farms and stores. The armed forces, the
Home Ministry, the Foreign Office, and the Imperial General
Staff were abolished and all their principal officers purged
from public office. (Some made a lucrative, if temporary,
profession of peddling cached general staff documents to the
intelligence services of the occupying powers.) In 1946, with
the adoption of a new constitution and new elections to the
Diet, the formation of such national policy as an occupied
nation could afford shifted uncertainly and somewhat unwill-
ingly from what was left of an entrenched bureaucracy to the
national legislature and the revived political parties. There
could be no place in this policy for a national intelligence
system.
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These institutional changes, of course, did not individually
annihilate the motley corps of Japanese intelligence profes-
sionals which had been developed over the past twenty years.
Some simply gave up and tried chicken farming or apple-rais-
ing. Sentimentalists formed societies which met once a
month to reminisce uselessly over past intrigues and exploits.
A good many found demeaning but regular employment in the
operational and historical intelligence departments of the Oc-
cupation's headquarters and its burgeoning local establish-
ments. Their skills and their remarkable adaptability to
what in effect was their new government made them, in fact,
the blood and bone of a somewhat more orderly and compre-
hensive intelligence system than Japan had ever had, now
provided free of charge by the occupation forces. But in gen-
eral (and in distinction from the German experience) their
services were contracted for individually, and they gave their
loyalties, opportunistically but completely, to the temporary
and alien authority which had replaced their Emperor. Their
employment was not the preservation intact of a function-
ing intelligence mechanism but the recruitment of a diverse
group of jobless professionals who were, in a large sense, start-
ing all over again.
The Occupation thus set the institutional pattern for such
indigenous intelligence work as went on in Japan during the
immediate postwar years. The psychological climate in which
Japan shivered at that time comprised such a complex of ad-
verse factors as to stifle any significant attempt to retain an
intelligence system proper in the Japanese Government.
Many of these factors remain the same today, or their altera-
tion has been such as to keep on inhibiting the development
of an intelligence system eleven years after Japan's return to
national sovereignty.
In a sense, Japan in 1945 returned to the familiar insularity
once imposed by its own xenophobic leaders, now enforced by
foreign conquerors. Economically broken, its leaders and its
people, under Occupation tutelage, turned their thoughts
inward to the staggering work of relieving food shortages, re-
building shattered industries, and rehabilitating a peacetime
economy. This had to be accomplished outside the context of
the now forbidden Zaibatsu-government partnership which
8T031 91lAAG. 29f l1f 9@1v2r economy and in the face of a massive re-
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : C
The New Ir,r,...
distribution of land holdings under Occupation directive. The
idea of foreign intelligence collection was not only unpromis-
ing but little short of ludicrous in those years.
The shift of the locus of power in Japan's limited political
sovereignty from the civil service to the National Diet brought
with it a both opportunistic and to some extent honest wave
of anti-bureaucratic feeling, abetted not only by the ambi-
tions of the lon
-su
g
ppressed political leaders who avoided the
purge but also by the SCAP directives which abolished both
the government-sponsored parties of the wartime period and
the most entrenched of the government ministries. There
was understandably no public or popular urge to establish
an internal security program-this was in any case in the
hands of the Occupation-and a psychology of dependence on
foreign protection from both internal and foreign enemies
seemed the only possible attitude the defeated nation could
adopt.
Identification of these enemies was in itself a psychological
as well as practical problem for the bulk of the Japanese. The
wartime images of the Western foes were quickly shattered
not only by the exigencies of the situation but by the behavior
of the occupying powers, and the Emperor was "humanized."
Democratization became the rallying cry. The imprisoned
local Communist leaders, rubbing their eyes, found them-
selves back in the political arena. The police state was dis-
credited, and the exercise of police power seemed suddenly
not only immoral but unnecessary.
The philosophy that floated into the vacuum in the Japa-
nese national psyche in these times was first anti-militarism
and then a broader pacifism. Japan's great national distinc-
tion became the fact that its people had been the first to suf-
fer the horrors of the atomic age. With all the militarist gods
from the Emperor on down exposed supine and broken on their
rubbled altars and no equivalent available to take their places,
a widespread national masochism grew up about the new and
unlikely shrines of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the dull-
ness of defeat which fostered this affliction could not persist
after things slowly fell into their new places and economic
weal and national pride returned, the Communists have seen
to it that the atomic Meccas remain holy, and nowhere else
outside the Bloc do so many on-Co
1Xpprov'8HHlei/4113
P78T03194A000200010001-2
The New Japan
grimages of the Peace Movement. They do not need an. in-
telligence system to help them find their way.
Steps Toward a System
In this psychological milieu, it is thoroughly understand-
able that such organized Japanese intelligence work as was
carried on between 1945 and 1952 was done by scattered
groups or individuals, mostly under the direction and control
of Occupation authorities. The only investigative service, as
such, which evolved within the Japanese Government during
this period was the Special Investigation Board created under
SCAP directive and influence within the Attorney General's
Office. The main cadre of this organization came, not from
trained military or foreign intelligence ranks, but from among
the procurators of the prewar Justice Ministry. In this con-
text of judicial investigation the Special Investigation Board
was able to don a mantle of respectability which permitted
its survival and indeed growth as a security agency with some
intelligence and gray propaganda functions. A few of the
mainland operatives of the tokumu kikan, mostly from the
China theater, joined this service, which emerged in a sov-
ereign Japan in 1952 as the Public Safety (chian) Investiga-
tion Agency, taking on as well some senior military intelli-
gence analysts who at last were no longer proscribed from
such duty by the purge.
The PSIA continues as a nationwide security agency, but
with inherent disabilities which restrict its effectiveness in
the intelligence picture. It has no police powers of arrest, a
lack which renders hollow its frequent boast that it is the
"FBI of Japan." It does conduct extensive investigations of
Communist, rightist, and foreign subversive activities, but ac-
tion on its findings is hampered officially by a timid executive
and legislature and unofficially by intense rivalry with the
National Police Agency. Its analytical product is both volumi-
nous and of respectable quality, but is more likely to be used
in massive annual "White Papers" or thinly disguised propa-
ganda blasts at the Communists than in the orderly identifi-
cation of subversive elements and counter-action against
them. And its placement in the Justice Ministry makes it
subject to a constant turnover of procuratorial personnel
,
-RDP78 49 04& ttt W gtelligence techniques.
 Approved For Relea,Sa 2005/04/13 :
I he New Japan
In contrast to the PSIA, the police resumed quietly and
without apparent Occupation support their place in the inter-
nal security structure. The return to sovereignty, of course,
made the reconstitution of a respectable police force a prac-
tical necessity, and it became again a national service. Many
of the most experienced police intelligence officers had lost
their seniority while sitting out the purge, and their places
in the reassembled hierarchy were at first taken by tempo-
rarily more fortunate colleagues who had had no service in
the Special Higher Police or other sections directly affected by
the purge. One such officer, Murai Jun, whose good fortune
and undoubted energy was compounded by service as Prime
Minister Yoshida's secretary, was instrumental in creating in
the National Police Agency the Guard Division (now a Bureau),
which remains the police element directly concerned with the
control of internal Communist activity and the surveillance
of foreign intelligence operations by Bloc and other govern-
ments in Japan. A subsequent irony finds many of the now
rehabilitated former Special Higher Police officers in key
posts in the National Police Agency and particularly in the
Guard Bureau and its regional counterparts, while Murai is
now more profitably but less dramatically devoting his ener-
gies to the complexities of staging the 1964 Olympics in Tokyo.
The National Police Agency is an impressive and effective
service. Virtually all of its senior "commissioned officers" are
graduates of the law department of the Tokyo or other top-
flight Imperial Universities. They, and their postwar coun-
terparts in more junior positions, are well trained and well
disciplined, have a sense of mission and esprit de corps which
dates back to the origins of the Home Ministry, and as a group
were less disrupted by the abolition of the Ministry than any
other bureaucratic complex. For the most part not vulner-
able to the lingering popular distaste for military activity
which has characterized Japanese public opinion since August
1945, and discreetly underplaying their internal security role,
they formed and continue to form the overwhelmingly domi-
nant force in the Japanese postwar intelligence apparatus.
The great paradox of this setup is that, while no Home Minis-
try has resumed its place among the other principal govern-
ment departments since 1945, the disciplined cadre of former
Home Ministry bureaucrats pl the mdjF?
Approve6rrFe ~O?!/(I&LX13
DP78T03194A000200010001-2
The New Japan
of today's Japanese security and intelligence agencies, whether
internally or externally oriented.
The two chief outward-looking government offices are the
Defense Agency and the Foreign Ministry. The Defense
Agency (still frustrated in its ambition of attaining ministry
status) grew out of a National Police Reserve created by SCAP
when the Korean War suddenly sheared the Occupation of its
combat units. Since few of the senior imperial military and
naval officers had been rehabilitated from the purge at that
tim , Home Ministry alumni of the police system were called
in, put in military uniform, and given charge of the Reserve.
While this peace-preservation organization in due course
evolved into a military force (because the constitution is in-
terpreted as prohibiting any army, navy, or air force, the mili-
tary services bear the euphemisms Ground, Sea, and Air
"Self-Defense Forces") and while officers with wartime mili-
tary service have been given senior command positions, it is
significant that police officers have continued to staff the in-
telligence components. Most of the army G-2's, for example,
have been former Home Ministry officials, and the civilian
bureau which controls the three military intelligence services
has consistently been headed by a police officer. This is not
illogical, in that the police have little qualification for the
tactical command posts. And it is not inappropriate, consid-
ering the fact that no Japanese troops are stationed abroad
and there are few attache offices from which foreign collec-
tion can be undertaken. Thus even within the Defense
Agency the emphasis tends to be on internal security.
The Foreign Ministry has cautiously and very circumspectly
provided for foreign intelligence collection of a sort, but its
"service" is simply a small, personally and informally organ-
ized group of regular diplomatic officers who have unusually
aggressive instincts and a penchant for acquiring informants.
It is still unfashionable to admit to even a diplomatic research
and analysis function in Tokyo, so the only analytical body
in the Foreign Ministry is actually an intradepartmental com-
mittee composed of senior officers from the various bureaus,
who meet periodically to consider information received from
diplomatic posts abroad along with contributions from other
foreign and domestic sources. In several of the key embassies
-RDP78 > 'K 0W2WMM 11 the peripatetic police have stationed
 Approved For Releasee205/04//13 :
officers commissioned temporarily as foreign service p
sonnel.
The Foreign Ministry has also provided the deputy chief
of the intriguingly-named Cabinet Research Chamber ever
since it was formed in. 1952. This small group is the only gov-
ernment body which has an officially (but delicately) acknowl-
edged foreign intelligence function. The CRC, like the police
Guard Bureau, owes its existence to the busy Murai Jun, who
became its first chief when it was created a "chamber" of the
Prime Minister's Office in Yoshida Shigeru's first post-occupa-
tion administration. Now an adjunct of the cabinet as a whole
and responsible to the Chief Cabinet Secretary, it is staffed
primarily by police officers on two- to three-year assignments,
along with some former military personnel and representa-
tives provided by other government agencies having a security
function. It has slowly and painfully attempted some foreign
collection, mostly from Japanese travelers to Communist areas
(a form of collection in which neither the PSIA nor the police
have left the CRC an open field), but it has devoted much of
its effort to the analysis of the varied product of these com-
peting services. It has always been headed by a senior police
official.
While subject to the centripetal forces that seem to impel
all Japanese intelligence bodies toward domestic and quasi-
political problems, the Cabinet Research Chamber has made
some admirable efforts to become a national foreign intelli-
gence agency. Although it has never approached the image
of, a sinister "Japanese CIA" which both the Communist and
the avowedly objective Tokyo press recurrently attempt to
give it, its movement in the direction of a broader national
function was evidenced in 1960, when an Estimates Division
was formed. The purpose, achieved with spotty success, was
to bring senior estimative attention to bear on problems of
major foreign and security policy interest. The estimators,
however, are a group of relatively prestigious and thereby
busy private citizens, who have neither the time to devote to
concentrated study nor the access to highly classified material
essential to success in such an effort. Even in this select
group (first headed by a respected lawyer who is now Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court) are to be found several retired
Home Ministry officials no v9dbVo e PaA Y0R V1 a CIA
SECRET
noted. Because of presumed popular disapproval of the lodg-
board of
rnent Of such to within
the public as the boardiof"diirecttors
estimates" is presented of a private research society. It meets as such tooVcrnmder l-time
g papers drafted by cotiny staff mplementtofethe lEst ma es Division
employees), the
of the CRC.
The comments of a frank and perceptive senior official of
the CRC in late 1962 on the problems faced by the organiza-
tion to which he (like most of his colleagues) was temporarily
assigned provide a good catalog of the difficulties of h in ell -
gence organization in the new Japan. He noted: (a)
placement as a staff office available to the Chief Cabinet Sec-
retary for such odd jobs as he, the Cabinet's overworked chief
of staff, might wish to assign it; (b) Prime Minister Ikeda's
"low posture," a slogan which refers to a remarkably success-
ful administration policy of avoiding controversial govern-
ment programs; (c) bureaucratic rivalry, specifically mani-
fested in the tendency of the National Police
lack Agency a o con-
sider the CRC as one of its branches; (d) the service for CRC officials; (e) Japan's system of parliamentary
responsibility, as a result of which each cabinet minister fos-
ters and protects his own intelligence organization as a the
essary resource for meeting Diet interpellations; and (f)
pervasive absence of a need for national intelligence in the
minds of higher government officials.
To this thoughtful list of disabilities might be added. the
complete lack of security legislation for protecting the opera-
tions or, in fact, establishing the legitimacy of a Japanese in-
telligence system. Taken together, these clouds darken the
view toward any effective national intelligence center. If the
targeting is centripetal, the organizational forces are all cen-
trifugal in Japan's intelligence complex.
The Future
Thus the prospects for an integrated Japanese national in-
telligence service remain poor. Apart from the negative pres-
sures of public unreceptivity and institutional tradition, it
cannot be expected that an orderly intelligence mechanism
will be developed in the absence of an emerging national policy
which demands it. While preoccupied with economic expan-
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78TO3194AO
SECRET
The New Japan
sion-and adequately supplied with the commercial intelli-
gence required for it-Japan is still largely and remarkably
immune from the foreign responsibilities and commitments
which would make felt the lack of a political and military in-
telligence collection system. If a demand for one were created
by disaster in Southeast Asia or a significant shift in the com-
portment of Communist China, one cannot help judging that,
in its delightfully irrational way, Japan would probably move
quickly to supply it.
For aggressive prosecution of
the clandestine war under a dis-
tinct and unified command.
001-2
SECRET
WANTED: AI INTEGRATED COUNTER.
C. N. Geschwind
The nature and seriousness of the debility that pervades
our counterintelligence efforts are obscured by many p lie-
. The The Communist secret
their covert attack. noisey
hide the strategy underlying
lessness of the covert war between them and our forces lets
success and failure alike remain concealed. Our forces are in-
compartmented that they do not register their aggregate n
ability to deal with the world-wide coordinated enemy
ability
Moreover, although the enemy's home front in the covert war
is fundamental to his campaigns abroad, we have been con-
ditioned to view a nation's foreign actions as distinct from its
domestic activities and therefore do not mount all-out aggres-
sive covert action aimed at the Communist interior. The most
blinding 'factor, however, has been the deceptive semantic
linkage between intelligence and counterintelligence: this in-
telligence terminology of the past inhibits the development
of the new concepts needed in today's situation. Many of the
participants in our effort are also inhibited by concern for
their particular pieces of the counterintelligence pie in. any
radical revision of our strategy. provide
Only a recognition of present shortcomings can p
the stimulus for a new effort. The difficulty of making these
convincingly manifest under the circumstances cited above
is aggravated by the confusion of the many different theaters
of covert war and the endless variety of tactics and compo-
nents engaged. Yet the same political and strategic concepts
oppose each other in every theater, and the fundamentals of
the covert conflict in one theater should hold for the tactical
due allowance being made for local peculiarities, the
situation, and the stage of the conflict's development in each.
It should therefore be possible to produce a usable if crude
14 SECRET 1 zi r DG7 MORI/HRP PAGES 15-38
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 SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/13
For an Integrated CI
picture of the general war situation by examining a
lar
lar specimen theater of operation
particu-
s as typical of all.
in Germany
Here we shall undertake a preliminary examination of the
situation in the German theater, almost an ideal specimen.
Germany is physically as well as ideologically split, each por-
tion reflecting faithfully the strengths and weaknesses of its
sponsoring major combatant; the sponsors have large covert
forces of their own in the theater; the situation there has
matured; and the history of the covert war in Germany is
long and heavily documented. And in spite of the fact that
we have had almost every natural advantage we have done
very poorly there.
The Enemy Forces
In 1945 the massive, fully mobilized Soviet security appara-
tus, maintaining its wartime momentum, began to build East German security system to gain full control of the East
Germans and use them in covert warfare against the rest of
Germany. The East German Communists stood to gain _
mous Power from a successful local security control system.
distrust and fear such a system creates among the people
prevents them from combining against the regime and en-
ables it, playing one segment of the government machinery
off against the others, to establish a vertical organization
with power concentrated at the top. The security system de-
tects and destroys hidden opponents. It provides the means
to monopolize information, control propaganda, conceal blun-
ders, and eventually raise the young to blind obedience.
The power thus acquired makes it possible for the regime
to undertake expensive foreign ventures with great flexibility
and disregard for public opinion. The national investment
can be concentrated on industrial might and war potential
by holding living conditions for the people to the lowest tol-
erable level. Abroad, the security system is used to control
partisan and other covert forces and to infiltrate and subvert
adjacent areas. It steals foreign inventions and cultural prod-
ucts, making possible industrial progress that could not other-
wise be achieved.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
The security system is the real secret of Communist power
and the real secret weapon of the era. Fundamental to the
system is the skillful exploitation of informers; Communist
power is ultimately based upon the intimidated covert collabo-
ration of a portion of the population. It is understandable
that the Communists from the beginning put utmost zeal
into the development of security systems in East Germany
and the other new Satellites and call these secret services "the
sword of the party" while attempting to conceal their real
significance from the rest of the world.
Today, with fewer than 200 officers, the Soviets are "coordi-
nating" the monolithic, well-organized East German secret
service. This organization is staffed by at least 20,000 offi-
cers and NCO's, who deploy about 90,000 secret informers
(Spitzels) at home to keep the people under control and have
infiltrated at least 15,000 secret agents into West Germany
in performance of their share of the Communist mission of
covert warfare against uncontrolled adjacent areas.'
Now that the wall has split Berlin, effectively sealing in the
East Germans, the process of communizing the people and
reducing them to sundered helplessness can go forward at
full pace. So long as these people have not been thoroughly
subjugated, the Communist program to use them as a weapon
against the West and as a counterbalance against restless Po-
land and other Satellites is blocked. The East German Com-
munists still cannot control the area unaided; if the Red Army
were eliminated a spontaneous revolution could still develop
among the East Germans. Judging from the supineness with
which they accepted the splitting of Berlin and expropriation
1 readers. They should not.
has on file the names of some 70,000 persons against whom. sub-
stantial charges of informing have been made by refugees and
other sources. In 1961 the West German Ministry of the Interior
publicly announced that there were at least 15,000 secret Communist
agents in West Germany. in 1961 more than 2,100 persons in con-
tact with an Eastern intelligence service were "identified and neu-
tralized" Of these about half come forward voluntarily
and the rest were detected in the process of trying to carry out their
missions. These statistics, even allowing for some inflation
25X1
25X1
25X1
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SECRET
SECRET
from the farmers, however, the day cannot be distant when
they will have followed the Russians and Chinese in reaching
full subservience to the Communists.
The Communist task of covert warfare against West Ger-
many is now performed almost entirely by the East German
secret service,2 leaving the Soviet and other Satellite services
free to create difficulties for us in other places such as Cuba.
The East German service is beginning to dispatch agents out-
side the continent of Europe, clearly intending to operate
among and through Germans and German communities every-
where.
Although the Communist security systems, with their
virtual blank check on manpower, may seem to be enormously
costly enterprises, they are really cheap in terms of percent-
age of population employed and net power and capabilities
for covert warfare delivered, providing leverage for the estab-
lishment of a tremendous empire: The East German secu-
rity pyramid looks about as follows:
200 Russian "advisers"
20,000 German officers and NCO's
105,000 informers and transborder agents
As adjuncts to this 125,000-man apparat there are a sub-
structure of about 100,000 regular police with its own in-
former system and a party membership of 1,500,000, ipso facto
informers. This establishment is the instrument for con-
trolling a population of 17,000,000.
To what degree these figures are paralleled in the other
Satellites and the USSR itself has not been determined. Al-
lowance must be made for the fact that East Germany has
been the object of an intense Soviet effort. Nevertheless, it
would be surprising if the percentages reflected in the fore-
going fairly solid statistics did not apply more or less to any
Communist country being used as a base for further covert
attack on the West (and what Communist country is not so
used?). Applied to the 280,000,000 inhabitants of the USSR
and its European Satellites, they would indicate that about
21 85% of the job of infiltrating West Germany
with Communist agents and subversives is now in the hands of the
East German service.
For an Integrated CI
350,000 Soviet and Satellite secret service officerrsl and aNC O'ss
350uSe 1,750,000 informers and transbordans on of the empire.
basic instrument for the control expansion
or the police
These figures do not include party
forces and their inform ere at home or the dupes, and covert
, and influence
Communist parties, fellow travellers,
agents 3 abroad. do not of
Figures on the strength of the Soviet secret army
course reflect the kind substance
operatives are not Only wort Mess
lar armies. Many confusion, and o
but counterproductive. The friction, reatly lower the
difficulties t semanbleNever he ess, if ctoion nly gone informer or
efficiency p in the covert war, the
agent in ten is productively engaged combined with the officer es, net retinue of 175,000 effectiv rt all categories, of over
and NCO corps, gives us a covert force,
half a million persons in the European theater and USSR-
controlled areas fully mobilized for covert action.
The Western Counterf orce ime is steadily
While in East Germany
population and moulding it ginto an instru.-
suppressing the pselected
ment of war against us, at the same time infiltrating Western
targets in the West, the logical counter-weapon owe West
to
counterintelligence and other covert forces, seem to reflect not
interfere preventively. West Germany an excellent
only all our strengths-a booming economy,
overt force, a solidly democratic form of government--but all
our weaknesses as well, among the most important of which
operatives who support Communist
3 ory of sympathizers and
operations within target governments without having much, if any,
operational contact with the Party or a secret service. Those in
a position to influence appointments arrange to have e f snow travellers
or counterproductive persons picked for key jobs. Those who can
influence activity see to it that either counterproductive or worthless
projects sidetracked. In the etc cultural
work is pushed and useful p and
field they can sidetrack anti-Communist literatMotivation appears
-
subtly push the party line in a variety of ways. black-
to ou
urges
control m from means. vInfluence agents aretpractically not convict-
to range
mail il or or other means.
able. The most they can be charged with is "honest error." Their
activities add up to subtle sabotage.
Approved For Release 206 f4i13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
 Approved FoFReWgpt38Pd?N/8
is persistent inability to cope adequately with the drives of the
Communist secret apparatus.
In 1945, almost immediately upon cessation of hostilities
with Germany, the United States dismantled the Office of
Strategic Services, its
gan the own covert counterattack force, and be-
leisurely and haphazard development in West Ger-
many of a political and security system loaded with civil liber-
ties safeguards. Covert action, such as continued at all,
concentrated upon pacifying the area by ferreting out the
more heavily compromised Nazis. Eventually the Army Coun-
ter Intelligence Corps, which was for several years the only
security organization of any consequence in the U.S. Zone of
Germany, made increasing efforts to build up a security sys-
tem against the infiltration of Communist agents. At first
most of the low-level Communist agents were so inept that
it was the fashion to joke about them in counterintelligence
circles. Then as the Western hare saw the Eastern tortoise
making unexpected headway and the Korean War created
heavy political pressures, the West Germans established coun-
terintelligence and clandestine services of their own and the
U.S. services pushed the development of special covert action
organizations. In 1953, however, a series of exposes of covert
action undertaken by these hastily assembled organizations
reverberated throughout Europe, and the development of new
organization largely subsided.
By 1959 the Western security and counterintelligence struc-
ture in the German theater was about as follows. The Ger-
man services were split into a federal intelligence service
(BND) responsible for transborder operations including ag-
gressive counterintelligence, a federal security service (BfV)
responsible for defensive counterintelligence, 11 semi-
autonomous Land security services (LfV's), a federal police
service (BKA), and 11 semi-autonomous Land police forces,
Neither the BND nor the BfV and LfV's had executive action
(arrest and interrogation) powers; these were reserved to the
police forces. By this time the British forces had turned over
most of their counterintelligence responsibilities to the Ger-
man services in their area. In the U.S. Zone the backbone of
the security structure w
as provided by the CIC and the CIA,
DP78T03194A000200010001-2
For an Integrated CI
J
n a heavy pressure for reorganization had been built
up by the manifest incapacity of this setup to handle the se-
curity problem and deal with the growing East German in-
filtration capabilities. The CIC was subordinated to the Mili-
tary Intelligence Service in a complex arrangement which
greatly reduced its coherence and competence for counter-
intelligence operations. There appears to have been some ex-
pectation that the West German services would develop pro-
grams and coordination adequate to fill the gaps created by
this reorganization. The expectation was of course not real-
ized, because West Germany is not centrally organized. From
then on the counterintelligence components in the German
theater, Allied as well as German, have been able to effect only
ad hoc coordination. CIA's attempts to establish coordina-
tion by agreement, because the Agency was regarded by
most other counterintelligence components as a competitor,
ran into enormous difficulties.4
By and large, the German and to a lesser degree the U.S.
services have continued trying to function independently of
one another and have done little to fix responsibility for spe-
cific counterintelligence targets on specific components. Un-
der the concept that covert war, like any other war, calls for
coordinated effort with a subdivision of functions and targets,
the shortcomings of the present setup in the German theater
and the reasons for its inability to repel the Communist in-
filtration and launch an effective counterattack become
clear. In the covert war it makes no more sense to have a
chaos of autonomous counterintelligence units than it would
to disband NATO and let each army, navy, and air force make
its own arrangements to deal independently with an overt So-
viet attack.
There are of course many other factors besides inadequate
organizational concepts obstructing counterintelligence opera-
tions in Germany. There is a great East-West disparity in
agent-control capability:. the Communists can inflict hor-
Sherman Kent's Strategic Intelligence, pp. 94-5, had warned of this
danger with respect to a coordinating agency's production of positive
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
For an Integrated CI
rendous punishments on hostile and recalcitrant operatives,
while the Western states, under a variety of legal concepts,
impose almost trivial sentences even for treason. The West
German legal system, in particular, leans over backward to
such an extreme in giving a rascal every chance to beat the
law that obtaining convictions for espionage, subversion, and
treason is exceedingly costly in man-hours. With the defend-
ing counterintelligence services so burdened in carrying
through each hostile agent case, it pays the adversary system
to send out, just for their nuisance and distraction value,
agents practically certain to be caught. Moreover, the Com-
munist operatives are therefore easily motivated to enter the
West, while agents of a Western service are very reluctant to
undertake prolonged clandestine tasks in a hostile area. The
defensive networks of the Communist services have deployed
a dense and practically impenetrable screen of informers,
while the West German defenses are so weak that hostile op-
eratives have had little practical difficulty entering and main-
taining themselves by posing as refugees.
The persistent interservice sharpshooting of the last decade
has not improved the situation. Very few in the counterin-
telligence services are now prepared to undertake risky ven-
tures for fear of being picked off by competitors in the event
of a flap. In effect, a high premium has been placed upon un-
enterprising and timid operations, since the errors of omis-
sion and defeats therefrom go unnoticed while the repercus-
sions from misfire of aggressive action would be painfully
evident.
The Western publics, finally, egged on by the press's recur-
rent exploitation of the Gestapophobia of the average Ger-
man citizen, have been more hostile than friendly to their own
counterintelligence personnel, withholding important moral
and material support, while Western legislators seem to suf-
fer from a blind spot which prevents their seeing the
desperate need for counterintelligence legislation.
In one sector of covert activity, information procurement,
the Western secret services have performed adequately,
largely because the floods of refugees from East Germany have
provided information for the asking. But the Berlin wall has
now stopped that flood and it would seem that an information-
procurement crisis also impends. The opportunities of past
For an Integrated CI
years to establish far-flung sleeper-agent networks having
largely been wasted and the East German security service
now being ready in great force to interdict Western covert
operations, it will take immense effort to procure clandes-
tinely the information that used to fall into our hands.
In assessing the disparities between the Communist covert
forces and those of the West in Germany we must bear in
mind, furthermore, that the Western services have had al-
most every moral and financial advantage. The Western econ-
omy has been booming, while the Communist economies have
uniformly failed to produce adequately. The East Germans
have overwhelmingly opposed the regime. The West German
population at our disposal, 50 million, greatly outnumbers the
17 million East Germans. In spite of these advantages we
have not achieved any notable victories in the covert war.
The principal deficiencies in our setup in the German
theater appear to be the following:
Lack of aggressive task-force-type counterattack pro-
grams, and indeed the lack of a covert war concept en-
visaging counterattack and psywar operations on such
a scale as to neutralize the adversary apparatus within
its own areas.
Inability to infiltrate Communist-held areas.
Inability to prevent Communist infiltration of our areas.
Defensive stance and lack of initiative in such operations
as are mounted.
Progressive inability to deal with growing case-loads, ob-
structive organization, inadequate information manage-
ment, and the depressing effects of continual reverses.
Interservice rivalry with case-grabbing, sharpshooting,
target-hogging, information hoarding, and other side
effects.
A Diagnosis
The primary cause of our infirmity is governmental inatten-
tion to the course, significance, and necessities of the covert
war. It has been the curse of parliamentary governments
since the days of Kerensky that they have failed to see the
importance of meeting the Communists full force in the
covert as well as the overt struggle. They have consistently
22 Approved For Release 20RF 113 : C
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not attempted to counter, in their concentration on physical
weaponry, the Communists' possession of a new and decisive
organizational weapon, their secret service apparatus.5
Democracy's Blind Spot
Parliamentary governments and their political interpreters
simply do not think of the secret control system as a piece of
organizational engineering which is the basis of Communist
power, nor do they think of it as a vulnerable point for attack.
Nevertheless, the security system is the Achilles' heel of the
Communist movement, for without it the Communists would
have to rule by persuasion, seeking the consent of the gov-
erned. To the rulers themselves its existence is a loathsome
incubus, a constant source of guilt feelings and an ever-
present threat to individual and collective security. The se-
cret apparatus, many of whose chiefs have been assassinated
by the Party in the course of the years, is a brittle, over-
extended undertaking which has all it can do to maintain
its control over the people under present conditions. It
owes most of its success to the fact that no correctly mounted,
sustained counterattack against it has ever been delivered.
Why are the parliamentary governments so oblivious to
this vulnerable secret weapon and its implications? Because
our intelligence and counterintelligence services have failed to
tell them the facts in terms that laymen can understand.
The spates of spy stories and other scandals that erupt in
public view from time to time place the whole matter in a
mere "spy nuisance" light, actually helping to conceal the fact
that the Communist security system is the control instru-
ment whereby entire peoples are mobilized for war against us.
' For cogent descriptions of organizational weaponry and its potential
see The Organizational Weapon by Philip Selznik (Free Press, Glen-
coe, Ill., 1960) and The Continuing Struggle (Chapter V) by Richard
Louis Walker (Athene Press, Inc., New York, 1958). These books
are at least on the right track. For the oblivious side compare
Central Intelligence and National Security by Harry Howe Ransom,
which reflects the blindness of intelligence-minded men to the
counterintelligence problem, and the willfully.. blind Protracted
Conflict by Robert Strausz-Hupe and others (Harper, 1959), whose
authors take one frightened look down the counterintelligence
corridor and scuttle on.
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The presentation needed is an "Ugly American" kind of real-
ism in the counterintelligence field.
Conceptual Red Herring
Our inability to see and report the facts about the covert
war is in large part due to our being in a semantic rut, accept-
counterintelligenc ea
"a and
ing "intelligence" as the root of "counterintelligence"
therefore thinking in distorted terms. It is no exagg
to say that the word "counterintelligence" has become one
of the most dangerously misleading in our language because it
enshrines the concept that in counterintelligence we are
countering the operations of a hostile intelligence organiza-
tion. The fact is that in attempting to counter the opera-
tions of a Communist secret service we are operating against
an immense covert-war machine which resembles an intelli-
gence organization about the way an army resembles a
sheriff's posse.
The Communist secret services are gigantic, multiple-
purpose organizations which break the will of whole peoples,
mass-producing home front and invasion agents. They do, of
course, also procure intelligence, but only as one of many in-
tegrated secret activities. We cannot adequately counterat-
tack or defend against such a monster under the impression
that it is an intelligence organization, or judge our results by
intelligence criteria.
The inadequate concepts and confused semantics with
which we are operating have so many points of unfavorable
impact on our activities as to require a tabulation:
Impact on aggressiveness. It is the job of intelligence to
collect and analyze information. Espionage for this purpose,
insofar as it is aggressive, acts only with the objective of
getting past the opposing counterintelligence and security
forces as uneventfully as possible. Since the gathering of
intelligence is a secret. preparatory function, agents doing it
are not supposed to undertake executive action, agitate, or
otherwise risk attracting attention. Counterintelligence, on
the other hand, is engaged in covert war, all-out and immedi-
ate. It has to take action-at home by investigating, arrest-
ing, interrogating, doubling, and prosecuting Communist op-
eratives, and abroad by carrying out recruitment, neutraliza-
tion, harassment, diversionary, and psywar operations against
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78
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For an Integrated Cl
their secret service system. These diverse concepts of re-
sponsibility for action not only are fundamentally incompati-
ble but call for agents of fundamentally different tempera-
ment and attitudes. For the intelligence-minded man, to
know about the opposition and his installations is the whole
goal; for counterintelligence, knowing is only the beginning of
the road-something has to be done about the information.
Impact on information management. The product of in-
telligence collection, no matter how voluminous, presents few
handling problems: the espionage organization simply passes
it on to its customers. The data the espionage organization
itself uses and files is largely confined to information about its
own agents, projects, operations, and operational conditions,
together with so much about the target as is needed to run
agents against it and to understand what they are reporting.
It is quite satisfactory for an espionage organization to store
its operational information in ordinary files indexed by 3 x 5
cards: there is no manipulation problem, and 90 percent of it
is retirable once an operation is over and the agent disposed of.
Counterintelligence, on the other hand, uses information as
its ammunition and is its own best customer. This informa-
tion must be so stored and managed that it can be continu-
ally updated and mobilized to serve as the basis for further
action.
While intelligence information tends to deteriorate rapidly,
counterintelligence information retains its value for lifetimes.
Since the Communist secret service apparatus is tremendous,
it follows that information about its operatives (the main
ingredient of counterintelligence information complexes) is
correspondingly vast and will accumulate at many times the
rate of obsolescence. 'Attempts to solve the information stor-
age problem by setting up arbitrary destruction programs
based on frequency of use or other ordinary concepts of in-
formation management are comparable to cutting off part of
a man's liver because he is too fat. Counterintelligence needs
all the meaningful information it can get concerning its
targets.
Impact on security. Intelligence procured by espionage-
for example, information derived from such an agent as
Vyacheslav Molotov were he recruited-has to have maxi-
mum protection. It must be compartmented, perhaps for
Approved For Release 2086QiR#113 : Cl
,,any years, and it may so pinpoint the agent that it cannot
be used at all for fear of exposing him. Even lists of require-
ments, revealing as they do national ignorance, estimates,
intent, etc., have to be severely controlled. Counterintelli-
gence information, on the other hand, concerns the officers
and retinue of a covert force which must be fought by many
people. Much of it is fragmentary and must be "married"
with other data before it can be used or even understood. The
only type which requires the kind of handling that nearly all
espionage data must have is that pertaining to and derived
from agents who have penetrated the interior of a hostile in-
telligence or security service. The loss of a counterintelligence
agent is ordinarily like any other battle casualty; the loss of
an intelligence agent can be a catastrophe. Any clandestine
services organization attempting to handle counterintelli-
gence and espionage information along the same lines is there-
fore bound to have grave difficulties. The continual churning
up of the former wherever the counterintelligence effort is
at all alive messes up the machinery and channels that han-
dle highly sensitive data.
Impact on targeting. It is essential that espionage organi-
zations be compartmented because security is crucial, and
compartmentation is possible because these organizations op-
erate against discrete targets. Operational coordination is
not essential, for example, between components operating
against a political intelligence target in East Germany and
those operating against a military intelligence target in Ru-
mania. Espionage targets tend also to vary with the times,
the emphasis of national policy, and ignorance of a given
enemy activity. Counterintelligence, however, operates
against one or another part of a single permanent, giant
target, the Soviet and Satellite secret service system. The
various components of the counterforce have to subdivide the
job, coordinate their operations, and exchange a bulk of in-
formation just as any other army must.. The conflict which
arises between managerial concepts in selecting espionage
targets (What's the current, priority?) and counterintelli-
gence targeting (What's the next move in the plan of cam-
paign?) is obvious.
Impact on planning. An espionage organization generally
makes its plans operation by operation. Counterintelligence
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or an Integrated CI
services should plan whole campaigns on both strategic and
tactical levels. They need to lay down an integrated strategy
for perhaps years of struggle and correlate the efforts of
armed forces, police, security, psywar, and defensive and offen-
sive counterintelligence elements in composite groups or task
forces.
Research and analysis. Espionage organizations pass their
products along to customers who do the research and exploit
the information. Counterintelligence, on the other hand, has
constantly to re-collate and re-evaluate, study, and act upon
the data it acquires: Most action it initiates will be based on
its research for leads and vulnerable spots in target persons.
Espionage components, when intertwined with counterintel-
ligence personnel, complain that the latter are forever mull-
ing over fragments of information instead of "getting out and
recruiting someone": counterintelligence requires great
amounts of office space and clerical man-power, while espio-
nage operates best under utmost emphasis on outside activity.
Counterintelligence action must conform with a_ formal
strategy and research must support this strategy, whereas
espionage efforts are directed by the requirements of customer
agencies
Th
.
e efficiency of both is lowered by attempts to
merge them along command and area lines.
Public relations. Espionage organizations naturally shun
the light of publicity. Counterintelligence must have public
support and an understanding legislative backing. One of the
most disturbing aspects of the present situation, we have
noted, is the unawareness of Western governments of the
role played by the Communist secret services. Counterintelli-
gence should carry on publicity to make the people and their
representatives aware. The espionage case officer, having to
function within complex environments under cover, where
the mere fact of his becoming known for what he is may be
totally incapacitating, is justly hipped on the matter of per-
sonal security. A counterintelligence officer, like his police
counterparts, can often operate almost unhindered blown.
Review and control. Espionage services cannot be super-
vised by any kind of lay board such as a congressional com-
mittee because espionage operations require extreme security
precautions. Furthermore, they are so much a matter of
luck and operational techni ue is s
proved he$eOSVO-: CI
78T03194A000200010001-
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ion that from practical considerations supervision has to be
left to experts. Since espionage organizations, when con-
fined to their proper sphere, are relatively small, function only
against foreign targets, involve no massive organization or
other mass aspects, and have little effect on politics, lack of
outside supervision, if it is a deficiency, is a relatively unim-
portant one. Counterintelligence organizations of modern de-
sign, however, will be massive, complex structures which not
only cross national borders but have effects at home. They
must be supervised by some independent reviewing authority,
just as the armed forces must be so supervised; and the super-
vision will be of positive benefit in making the lay authority
aware of the importance of their work.
Operational technique. Espionage agents are usually re-
cruited through the so-called professional or "classic" covert
approach in which one agent is used to recruit another., This
practically never works in counterintelligence operations
against a Communist secret service officer. The officer vul-
nerable to recruitment would be one in trouble and. already
thinking seriously of seeking protection from his service.
Knowing its suspiciousness and the machinations it employs
and being by now at least mildly paranoid and very fright-
ened, he fears that everyone around him is reading his mind
and so views any covert approach as a provocation by his own
service. Any Communist secret service officer attempting to
recruit a colleague in a vulnerable condition can accordingly
expect to be turned in.
The underlying idea of our present operational concept has
been precisely that we can accomplish such recruitments on a
sufficient scale to warrant a substantial effort. In the Ger-
man theater this concept has not paid off. Whenever agents
have been "recruited" from within the East German security
and intelligence apparatus they themselves have personally
taken the initial step by presenting themselves to us. The
only function performed by the "recruiter" has been to be on
hand to accept the agent's application. Most of the volumi-
nous information that has been obtained on the East German
security system has been derived from defectors who either
had been or were about to be thrown out because they were in
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78TO3194A
ficers to cooperate is to concentrate on psychological and neu-
tralization actions which will get them into trouble, making
their careers so shaky that they come to the point of ap-
proaching one or another Western service. This is a concept
involving the use of large organizations able to maintain ma-
jor psywar programs and is at marked variance with the no-
noise mentality of the espionage agent handler.
Organizational Accident
Why, if there are so many conflicts of interest between in-
telligence and counterintelligence groups, are they so often
yokemates? The teaming up appears to have been a side ef-
fect of peculiarities in the evolution of our covert operations
system. The FBI, developing separately from intelligence as
an element of the Attorney General's Office, was given only
"defensive" counterintelligence functions. CIA, created to
prevent a possibly fatal repetition of the Pearl Harbor attack,
acquired counterintelligence functions along with its respon-
sibilties for coordinating intelligence activities, for protecting
sources and methods, and for running secret transborder op-
erations. The CIC, a military organization, had responsibility
for the security of the U.S. Zone of Germany thrust upon it
and found itself embroiled with a vastly stronger Communist
secret service system.
The development of these primary organs was warped by the
extremely limited concepts underlying the laws and regula-
tions controlling them. Moreover, the preponderance of con-
trolling positions were occupied by intelligence-minded men
who gravitated into them from other intelligence organiza-
tions. OSS men of the Wild Bill Donovan stamp and regular
counterintelligence officers did not play much of a role on the
levels where policy was made and organization formulated.
The predominance of intelligence-minded influence led both
to the hamstringing of the psychological warfare program
and to the fragmentation of the counterintelligence effort.
In the formative period 1950-60, and especially after the Ko-
rean War, strong voices in the government were able to
streamline the covert action organizations and many other
Government components, removing built-in competitive fea-
tures which the Roosevelt administration had developed to
keep super-government functioning on democratic lines.e
No group likes competition, and intelligence groups are no ex-
the dominant fwas therefore quite natural on this ground
for sure
ntelligence-minded element to makealone
for the
that counterintelligence should not get out of hand. In the
German theater, rivalry and conflict between the CIC and
er,
CIA resulted the eventu e effects disingration
the ocof the urse f ofnthe
with potentially incalculabl
covert war.
There is also a vociferous faction that an effective counter-
intelligence the moment it is suggested ea people, the
intelligence organization be established. These p p
Gestapophobes, profess to see the threat of creating a t
tarian state in any effective attempt to close the dangerous
gap between the capabilities of the Communist secret service ligence. Still
system and those of
that nothing c houldl be ldone to make our jerry-built others are determined
-
the Communists angry, failing to understand that the Comake
munists will do anything they dare to us whether we m1e e
them angry or not. However varied their motives, t
seem all to agree on the necessity of keeping counterintelli-
gence decentralized and subordinate.
It is of course true that there is real danger to democracy
in any government-sponsored covert action organization.
Making counterintelligence independent from intelligence
functions, however, is actually a way to reduce this danger.
Giving the responsibility for both covert and overt war to the
same organization would also be hazardous. What we ac-
tually need is a triple setup-an overt war authority, an in-
telligence service, and an organ frofor m our covert action organs
to our liberty today comes arlorgan-
but from the increasing inability of the remaining p
tary governments to deal with the Communist thrusts.
A Prescription
The first step toward mounting a sustained covert counter-
attack upon the Communist secret
concepts and organ gza-
tion of the fact that existing Western
phenomenon is well described on pp. 158-160 of Presidential
Power by Richard E. Neustadt (John Wiley & Sons, 1960).
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 Approved For F jea ?n999/ 1 h 3 3C/
tion are obsolete and inadequate. It is true that CIA, within
an intelligence framework, is attempting to coordinate the
type of action called for and has here and there had some in-
cipient or momentary success. The rate of achievement, how-
ever, makes the prospect remote that anything worth while
can be accomplished without substantial changes in organiza-
tion, new concepts, and the infusion of new drive. The exist-
ing setup is even a deficit in that it lulls people into thinking
the underground conflict is being handled adequately, whereas
in fact all that Western counterintelligence now does is bite
the stick that prods its ribs, ignoring the hand that holds it.
The United States has to accept responsibility for leader-
ship in the international covert war as well as in prepara-
tions for an overt one. Intelligence-mindedness, with its em-
phasis on knowing rather than doing, is out of place in covert
war. The rationale underlying the terms counterintelligence
and counterespionage should b
di
e
scarde
cepts d and replaced by con-
Of covert counterattack and terminology reflecting
them. The Communist secret service system is a major
weapon, and the Western counterweapon has so far not been
forged.
Elements of a Counterweapon
After this recognition of inadequacy, concrete measures
could be taken-the separation of intelligence and covert war
functions and the establishment of a covert war organization
led by action-minded men. This organization should be char-
tered to mobilize, not to supplant, the existing counterintelli-
gence components, U.S. and foreign, that are attempting to
deal. individually with the Communist system. The aim would
be to establish coordinated covert task forces on a scale
roughly comparable to the collective overt forces organized in
NATO and SEATO.
Such a reorganization must perforce be preceded and accom-
panied by an information campaign designed to make the pub-
lic, the Congress and other government organs, and NATO
and SEATO understand the nature of and necessity for the
proposed action. It must be brought home to those who in-
fluence the course of Western polic
th
y
at an adequate covert
counterattack would also open up a new strategy of ~'
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attack 7 upon the entire Communist power structure that
could help break up the present stalemate.
The proposed organization, an old story in Communist
areas, will be essentially new for the West, and it will have to
be fitted into the framework of democratic government. That
fitting will require experimentation. A pilot model could first
be assembled to carry on the covert war in the German
theater. Germany would appear to be the ideal area for test
runs, not only because of the full-blown state of the covert
war there but also because we have there a large margin for
error and a reserve of good will. The required specialized man-
power and volumes of compiled information are there in quan-
tities as adequate as are likely to be found anywhere. The
West Germans are .still willing to accept our leadership; the
East Germans are not yet communized. Certain components
of our own organization which could readily be integrated
into a streamlined U.S.-German covert counterforce are al-
ready on the spot in embryo.
Regardless of where the new organization is assembled or
under what auspices, it will need the following operational
components in addition to the support elements that all
covert organizations need:
A General Staff, composed of representatives of all par-
ticipating services under a U.S. chief, to develop strat-
egy and tactics and to plan and coordinate operations.
An Information Mobilization Division,8 to apply the most
advanced methods of electronic data processing to the
problem of achieving instantaneous theater-wide colla-
tion and interchange of information on the Commu-
nist covert apparatus, its personnel, and its victims and
to supply thus the ammunition needed for operations.
A Neutralization and Corrosion Operations Division,8
responsible for the engineering of psywar operations,
including the mobilization of informer resistance,
against the Communist secret services.
A National Operations Ofce, creating special task forces
and groups of forces to operate against the secret serv-
For a lucid exposition of the advantages of indirect attack see
Strategy, by B. H. Liddell Hart (F. A. Praeger, N. Y., 1960).
-RDP78TO~lfga'A0?btbm1tlgiQX2ents already exist in the German theater.
 ices of countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
the USSR which have no Western counterparts as in
the split countries. (Note that the German area of-
fers good bases for operation against most of the Euro-
pean Satellite services.)
Strategy and Tactics
The strategy of the covert counterattack can be kept simple
by confining it to a single mission, the unseating of the Com-
munist security system by all methods short of hot war. The
generic tactics can be equally simple: use the multiple vulner-
abilities of the system to undermine and negate it, principally
by mobilizing its informer and agent networks against it.
With respect to the ruling Co
mmunist parties this effort
would be in the nature of an indirect attack, striking at the
war basis in of direct their power in a way that reduces the danger of hot
proportion to
unsuccessful its success without increasing it if
.
Tactics that could be pursued can be described in detail.
The East German security apparatus, for exam
ous internal vulnerabilities. Many of its officerslhave d vel-
nerable oped to paranoid characteristics and vices which make them vul-
personalized psychological measures.
centrated efforts the regime makes to insulate these ffice s
bear witness to their fear of this type of assault.
We
are in
possession of thousands of items of information which can be
used to conduct this kind of attack.
rity officers can be reached by The East German secu-
secu-
the easiest of all East Germans tony
each, because it is pa taof
their job to watch the West.
It is important to bear in mind that the Co
secu-
rity system-despite its weapons and its prisons essentially
a Psychological weapon: it works because it generates and
maintains a high level of fear and inter-citizen distrust. It
will begin to crack the moment the people recover the ability
and the will to conspire against it. This fundamental vulner-
ability cannot be removed or offset by the Communists; all
those involved with it, including the Communists, hate the
system.
The informers of the system are the ultimate basis of its
power, and they hate it most of all. For them it is
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respect-eroding, bone-wearing, ceaseless imposition, forcing
them to betray their friends in order to enslave themselves.
A person forced to become an informer conceals his plight as
he would VD and seeks somehow to arrive at an accommoda-
tion with the security service. He winds up as a stool pigeon
for life without pay-a Judas without 30 pieces of silver.
The system counts upon the informer's concealing his sta-
tus. The Western world has played into its hands in this
crucial matter by directing a stream of condemnation and op-
probrium at the hapless informer, not lifting an effective
finger to help him defend himself. A psychological program
aimed at removing the stigma and depicting the informer not
as a Judas (Judas was a volunteer!) but as a victim entitled to
his neighbor's sympathy would, if successful, do more to un-
dermine the security system than any action undertaken
against it since Lenin and Dzerzhinsky set it up. The in-
formers can be mobilized, encouraged, and coached in many
ways to frustrate the system. The security apparatchiks
know this and have devised ingenious provocation programs
to keep them in line. But the system has been able to con-
trol its informers largely because these victims have been left
to shift for themselves.
If the informers and other captive citizens can be mobilized
to engage in counter-judo in East Germany, the security sys-
tem will be plunged into cumulative difficulties which will
radiate through the entire Communist power structure.
Many competent analysts maintain that the Communist
Party itself must be attacked effectively and directly if the
Communist regime is to be overthrown. Ultimately this is
true: what is in question here is means to disarm the Party.
The secret service system is what gangsters call "the differ-
ence," i.e., the weapon that keeps a man on top. A man hav-
ing what it takes to become a dictator does not have to use
a Gestapo to get power, but a Gestapo enables him to keep it.
So long as the Communist security system is intact, the Party
behind it cannot be destroyed.
Prospects
In the past, Western agencies have individually launched
small and ineffective psychological campaigns aimed prima-
RDP78TlY?f9eci 29pse0og4ple-who are helpless to do anything
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but try to revolt as in Hungary-and the Communists them-
selves, who are beyond the reach of any but the ultimate argu-
ment. A correctly conceived, manned, and mounted interna-
tional counterattack against the secret service system has
never been attempted.
What can reasonably be expected. of an international covert
counterforce once it were established? We cannot expect
from it the kind of dividends the Communists draw, because
we cannot use it the same way. We can construct only a
mongoose-like organization to destroy the Communist cobra.
But it should be able to produce at least the following re-
sults, cited in the probable order of appearance:
We should put the Communists on the defensive in the
covert war. This is a development they fear. They feel
guilty about the security system and its need for
secrecy, and this is one of the reasons they persistently
refuse to allow any form of that inspection upon which
the Western powers insist as a condition for disarma-
ment.
The joint international effort would mobilize and collate
information exposing networks of- secret service opera-
tives now protected by the dog-in-the-manger file sys-
tems of the many American and European counterintel-
ligence components operating independently of one an-
other.
It would substitute beneficial competition among the
participating CI services for the hamstringing cross fire
of today, putting pressure on the timid to act rather
than react and attack the adversary rather than seek
advantage in the flaps of other services.
The spreading knowledge of the new organization and its
purpose would raise the morale of the captive peoples
and tend to inhibit security service action through
dread of the day of reckoning.
As harassment tactics became effective, their impact on
conventional operations aimed at penetrating the vul-
nerable interior of the security services should be such
as to restart the flow of defectors and eventually yield
penetrations which would supply the "missing 20 per
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cent" of information we need to bring the security sys-
tem to the ground.
The agent inundation which ices would be oreduced, and their e fending Western with petty drudgery could de-
operatives now tied down p h-level de-
vote their talents to the detection of hig
munist agents in the West.
s the mobilization of the East German informers agaonst
A the security system became effective, the system
culties
get into cumulative diffi which
t of breakdown. al:lt
lower its effectiveness to the p
has to maintain a bcertain reached, islalmostsmpos possible tonre-
cience which, once
store in the face of persist United Statest the Western
Under the leadership of the on the world has attained a level have international in
overt fronts which would eration similar
level of other tr cove. f ?ont ail
Posses-
to to quiesce in the Communi ts' on the covert to strike it from
sion of a decisive weapon without even trying
their hands.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T0A4E6R200010001-2
Aims and methods of manipulat-
ing CI biographic information.
HALF A MILLION WANTED PERSONS
Earl D. Engeljohn
On 21 February 1963 a gunman wearing a stocking mask
held up the Metropolitan National Bank of Wheaton, Mary-
land, and escaped with $12,000. The Montgomery County Po-
lice and FBI agents rushed to the scene to investigate. Wit-
nesses were questioned, a physical description of the fugitive
was assembled, and clues to his identity were sought. Files
were searched, one may assume, against the descriptive data
and other clues, and on tentative identification his asso-
ciates were interrogated for leads to his whereabouts. If he
had fled to another city or state, the help of other police de-
partments would have to be asked for, if out of the country
that of foreign police organizations or Interpol.
The same kind of effort is required in counterintelligence.
All persons now or formerly employed by Sino-Soviet Bloc in-
telligence and security services, either as staff members or as
agents, and all persons connected with them are material
witnesses on the espionage and covert action, including violent
action, directed against us by the Bloc. Without exception
each of these persons, conservatively estimated at 500,000 in
number, can supply pertinent information. They will all
know something about the organization, location, or activity
of the adversary services, how they operate against us, who is
planning or conducting operations. They can name other
informed persons, some of them accessible in the West for
questioning-ex-colleagues, ex-agents, ex-contacts, or old vic-
tims. A striking example of the apprehension of one such
wanted person through another is the arrest in 1957 of Rudolf
Ivanovich Abel, made possible by the questioning of KGB de-
fector Reino Hayhanen.1
In pursuit of these half a million persons wanted for ques-
tioning, some of them at large in the West and some for the
'The Abel story is told in Studies III 4, p. I f f. MORI/HRP PAGES 39-44
SECRQpproved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194 0000200010001-2
39
 Approved For Release 2005/0
Wanted Persons
present inaccessible behind their Curtain, thousands of per
sons must be interrogated in minute detail, and records, both
public and private, all over the world-registries of city resi-
dents, vital statistics, visa applications, social security regis-
tries, the holdings of U.S. agencies and allied foreign intelli-
gence services-need to be checked. The mounting accumula-
tion of information must be so stored that it can be rapidly re-
trieved and collated in many different ways. Then if we
launch successful operations on the basis of this information
to get staff officers of Bloc services like Hayhanen or their
agents to defect or collaborate with us in place and as we con-
tinue our routine investigations of agent suspects and our
double agent operations, the yield of information from these
multiplies our knowledge of the still wanted persons-and our
need to manage and manipulate the data skillfully.
We have made a good, if modest, beginning in the manipula-
tion of our information. We learned years ago that a manual
index card system is inadequate to cope with data ranging
through a number of different categories on half a million
persons. We have devised machine programs to handle some
of our information, letting the machines do the "coolie labor"
of collation and freeing analysts and operatives to exploit the
information; but the present machine programs must be con-
siderably augmented and made to handle all of our wanted-
persons information if we are to pursue these persons success-
fully. In the following we review some of the things the ma-
chines should be able to do for us.
Rosters by Category
Machines can file, sort, and retrieve information (note that
we are speaking of information, not documents) ; they can
print out rosters of our wanted persons grouped according to
any of several categories of data about them, for example:
Last name
First name
Location
Occupation
Destination of travel undertaken
Relatives in the West, if any, and where
Employer
Vulnerabilities
Using index cards, we have only one "handle" by which to
retrieve information-the last name of the person, filed in
alphabetic order. With machines, we caj. use 20 ha les~/13
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IA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
Wonted Persons
SECRET
more depending upon our planning and our needs. Mucoran
embers of , a
and we use a
our information on the staff iri achine langut gee, East
help-
clandestine service is
which have
to the West.
tioning g of sthosm been e that have fled to exceedingly
number of category rosters
f ul in the ques ues-
wanted person should, once he is available for q
FOr a ated about his wanted colleagues. The
tinning, be interrog going down the ost effective by interviewer can do tT vious inforrmat on indicates should have
roster of those whop This exercise, besides producing new in-
been his colleagues. s and other inaccurate
formation, often corrects misspelling
n 1959 in fall Of
entries and helps purge the files-
snber ofethe EasthGerman sere-
for instance, a former staff me
Max Heim, helped us correct the name of one eifh ke can
ice,
leagues, which we had listed as Hans would not e,
entry which an alphabetical trace would frauds and fab p-
Rosters used in this way also quickly expose
to have information on a Sino Soviet Bloc c
cators claiming
service; their ignorance becomes evident under intensive q
tioning based on the rosters.
Flushing Leads
to turn up operational leads are easily de-
Machine listings pick out all staff members of B oc
West,
vised. The machine can p
services who are known to have
t questioned some m y be able the at to least sag-
when to
gest when these relatives are q
means to lure their kinsman over to us or a
neutralize him. A West German anlserd service was one such valu-
ranking officer of the East Germ Or a list could
able lead uncovered through a machine listing' records or past af-
be made of staff members havin A criminal list of those whose photo-
filiations with the Nazi party. ature or a sign graphs we have on file wor from ould whom
the mostefeasible targets
handwriting specimen
for a smear campaign by forgery.
Our program for indexing all
..vsometof thfrom ese ale intelli
tries is another search
we may get clues from other
en for
Bence -
officers or ag
sources as to which they are. A defector from the East Ger-
man service, Guenter Maennel, said that he had once re-
RDP78T03194A00020'0010001-2
 Approved For Release 20,1 9tVJ3p: CIA-
ersons
cruited a Kurt Hoffmann, who was later sent to Havana:
Sure enough, the name Kurt Hoffman
n appears on our list
of East German travelers to Cuba. Maennel and other defec-
tors from his service
scannin
thi
,
g
s list, may be able to spot
the names of other East German agents going to Cuba; simi-
larly Polish defectors working with the travel list of Poles to
Cuba. Moreover
the monit
i
,
or
ng of travelers will have re-
corded bits and pieces of information on the background of
those that turn out to be agents or perhaps are recruited sub-
sequently.
A relatively new use of machine capabilities contributing
to leads and other purposes is to keep track of who knows
whom. We are just beginning to manipulate this type of in-
formation, but it is evident that knowing who among the per-
sonnel of the Bloc services has connections with which others
will be valuable in the questioning of informed sources. It
would be a weary task to cull this data from the files manu-
ally.
Indices Abroad
It is often of critical importance to have information avail-
able at the place where a man is being questioned; he may not
be able to recall some name or event with
out being questioned
on related incidents or persons to stimulate his memory. It
would be awkward to carry around an index of 100,000 cards;
machines make our information portable. Rosters of wanted
persons should be located strategically at our stations around
the globe and suitably edited versions made available to
friendly foreign services to take advantage of the principle of
"many eyes." A complete roster could be taken to the scene
of an operation for quick checks when there is not time to
get a headquarters trace, as we did with our East German
service listing in Rome during operations connected with the
Olympics in the summer of 1960. For browsing purposes such
rosters at the field stations would in large measure remove
the annoying bottleneck of having to write cables or, dis-
patches, with the usual delay in releases and transmission,
to get it done at headquarters. A complete trace to clear a
subject for action such as recruitment
must of course include
checking the main index at headquarters; this i
Approved For Release- kuu iu' i IA
8T03194~4O0p3rgag4 0001 -2
Wan e
thing than browsing in a portable field "library" to flush addi-
tional information from a source being questioned nearby.
Quite another problem is posed by the valuable wanted-
persons information dispersed all over the world in record
holdings that do not belong to us. A photograph may be in
Italian. Foreign Ministry hands, a criminal record in police
files in Rio de Janeiro, a Nazi Party card in the Berlin Docu-
ments Center, a visa record in the immigration files in Mel-
bourne, an espionage case record in the archives of the Brit-
ish secret service, and miscellaneous relevant information in
the holdings of the National Security Agency-all on the same
person. Is it ever all assembled? Only in the rare case that
we do a full trace and know in advance which repositories
have information on the person. Our habit is to trace only
after our interest is aroused and then only in the usual places.
If we traced in all the places in advance of any particular
stimulus to our interest, the assembled information might
provide that stimulus with respect to a number of wanted
persons. A trace of the names of several thousand staff mem-
bers of the East German service in the files of the Berlin
Documents Center, for example, established that over a dozen
of them had records of membership in the Nazi Party, an item
of information that any East German official would like very
much to erase from his past.2 What we need, then, is a con-
venient means for checking blocks of names in the thousands
against other record holdings, and machine techniques can
furnish such a means.
Unsolved Cases
Probably the most difficult category of information to deal
with, and yet sometimes the most critical, is the data on un-
solved cases. Let us say that a Soviet defector has told us of
the recruitment of a waitress in Paris, about 35 years old, of
Polish extraction, to gather information on our embassy
there. Without a name, there used to be no good way to file
this information and recover it for collation with other scraps
of data. But by using machine-manipulated categories it can
East German Farm Chief Kicked Out; Bartsch Is Fired After Revela-
tion That He Was Nazi, read a headline in the Washington Post
78T03194RRd6T661Wd0Y-'
 Wanted Persons
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-
be registered under Occupation
Nationality (Polish (waitress) , Location
and A ? )~ Service (Soviet) Tar et (I's'is),
Age (about 35 , (U
years). Then if we are'questioning sEmbassy),
one who knows something about Soviet Operations
the roster of in ?nle_ ,
ress, and it wanted persons in Paris will i
m
P
a
nclud th
wait_
eis
il
er
ar
unl Th
.soved cere are a num_
have been lost for all d ies in our German holdings
which
no way to keep purposes because we have had
chinesystem would them under review; putting them int
r
o the
curity considerations
eactivate them. To the extent that se-
unsolved cases to friendly we could also
pass
listings on
.'_
the y foreign services
possibilit of
so
a
y
soluti
ons. augment
Fringe Benefits
TWO advantageous by-products of the
economy and the ready machine file are cable
`'teas availability of statistics. _
and a field station both have copies of the same rosters,
trace requests can be si
roster number designating the subject . shortened by citing the
"REQUEST TRACES WILHELM On receipt of a simple
teas can get from the roster the identifying data '? n Mueller
which otherwise would have had to be included in the cable.
From the Mueller
machine listings one can also determine
matically, for example, how many
service have been dismissed, how of the staff of the Sov eo-
or how many there are altogether that wevknow criminal records,
ures such as these may be used to about. the
Fig-
total strength and give us some idea r of then estimate of the
sonnet problems of morale
where a service. We have reached a posand for_
East
we can provide some of these statistics on the East
German service.
We have thus made a beginning
road ahead of us before all our C' but we have a very
incorporated into biographic information long
is
incur-and machine systems. Meantime
hostile and, hopefully, intensify--our operations a a g we con-servic host be seen es the scope and nature of our work may the
in' if half a million wanted persons.f we regard it as the y per-
pursuit of
Approved For Release 2%/R .13 : C
Outline of a procedure for storing and
manipulating a variety of different files
in a standardized computer program.
AN ALL-PURPOSE DATA HANDLING SYSTEM
Ellen Grosmere
The central CIA counterintelligence biographic files de-
scribed in a Studies article last year 1 are supplemented by
individual dossiers-analytical files and indexes-on persons
of particular and abiding intelligence interest, most notably
officers and agents of foreign intelligence services. These dos-
siers are in general maintained and used by geographic area
desks and therefore vary in scope, content, organization, and
degree of mechanization according to the needs of the differ-
ent users. Other area desk files, like those of sources of posi-
tive intelligence, may vary still more.
With the mechanization of the central counterintelligence
files, the separate area files can also take advantage of the
microstorage capacity and speed and flexibility of the new
machines. The kind of manipulation to which it should be
possible to subject them would be to produce, for example,
data on all couriers of the East German intelligence and se-
curity services having the initials RW or a list of all female
Jewish cryptographers known to have worked for the Polish
UB. In order, for such purposes, to accommodate these di-
verse files in a standard input procedure, computer program,
and output format, the generalized system outlined on the
following pages has been worked out.
This system, although designed primarily for counterintelli-
gence files, could be used for other purposes, for instance to
maintain current records of the capabilities and experience
of an agency's own personnel. Nor need it be restricted to
personnel files; it seems well adaptable to data, say, on ships
or missile sites, or to any body of information that is sus-
ceptible' of being broken down into a limited number of dis-
tinct categories, requires rather frequent updating, and needs
' Walter Jessel, "A National Name Index Network," VI 2, p. 1 if.
DP78T03194A000200010001-2 MORI/HRP PAGES 45-50
CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
., w4noCN I IAL All-Purpose System
to be searched against sets of criteria drawn from several dif-
ferent categories.
The system is such that new information can be added and
existing records corrected or brought up to date with little
effort and at whatever intervals desired. Output is in the form
of print-out listings and aperture cards carrying microfilmed
pages of the file. Special lists governed by particular cate-
gories of information can be compiled regularly or on de-
mand. In addition, the entire file can be searched quickly
against criteria set up in one or more categories and all rec-
ords matching these criteria printed out. With the exception
of a few common abbreviations such as M or F for sex, the in-
formation is printed in clear text and requires no reference
to preassigned codes or symbols.
Input
The input form illustrated opposite is used to enter a new
record in the system. It is a single sheet with lettered hori-
zontal lines accommodating 71 characters. These are divided
vertically into as many as four numbered boxes or fields, each
containing a category or subcategory of information on the
subject person. If extensive information on an individual is
to be recorded, several input forms may be required. The let-
ters designating the lines and the numbers with their vertical
reference act as coordinates to identify each field on the sheet,
B1 for example being the first field on the second line.
On any line the first three fields may be combined to form
a single one of 62 characters, leaving the line with only two
fields, say H1 and H4. The data in any field cannot of course
exceed the indicated number of characters but may be less
than the maximum. The user desk determines what cate-
gories of information are to be recorded in its program and
the most convenient order-i.e., the selection of fields-in
which to record them. Each field is labeled accordingly on its
forms. The categories may be grouped for convenience under
general headings such as personalia, location, contacts, and
source data.
Each program is identified by a letter preprinted on the
input form and followed by a five-digit number for future
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All-purpose System
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identification of the data on a particular input sheet. The
basic unit of each program is a record, comprising all the in-
formation recorded on a particular individual. The user
desk assigns an arbitrary number to each record, normally
in chronological sequence as new individuals come to be repre-
sented in the file. Field Al is reserved for this five-digit arbi-
trary number, and the file is maintained in its ascending
sequence.
A record can thus comprise a single or multiple subrecords
(input sheets) concerning the same individual and bearing
the same arbitrary number. The arbitrary number, the pre-
CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03A000200010001-2
printed subrecord number, and the coordinates identify each
item of information in the program.
The input is rendered in machine language by keypunch-
ing, one lettered line of the input sheet corresponding to one
80-column card. Records are maintained on magnetic tapes,
stored separately for each program. Computer programs
for IBM 1410/1401 equipment for the functions described
here can easily be duplicated for use elsewhere; they oper-
ate on the coordinates only, with no reference to specific items
of information.
Output
A master list is made by printing out all information in the
file. Variants of this may be produced for special purposes
or distributions by suppressing individual fields of informa-
tion or types of data. The list is organized, as illustrated in
the simplified extract below, in arbitrary number sequence.
Each item of information in the record appears in the same
order it was in on the input sheet, and the lines are identified
by their alphabetical coordinates. The list is therefore read
with the program's labeled input sheet at hand for ease in
identifying categories of information. Each line carries also
at the right the subrecord number in order to distinguish
among different entries in identical categories, e.g. two or
more addresses or telephone numbers reported at different
times from different sources for the same individual and en-
tered on different input sheets.
A
12345
C
SMITH
, JOHN
08
M
00001
G
IS/3
NEW YORK
54
00001
L
CAPTAIN
47
47
11112
N
FORMERLY SALESMAN
00001
0
MAIN STREET
22223
A
12346
C
JONES
JAMES
15
00011
D
JONES
JIM
A
00011
G
IS/A
BOSTON
58
00011
L
IST LIEUTENANT
46
12122
All-purpose System
CONFIDENTIAL
A
12347
MARY
26
00111
C
ROBINSON
,
NEW YORK
60
00111
G
IS/A/12
22222
N
O
FORMERLY TEACHER
WEST AVENUE
23233
The master list, which may become voluminous, can be re-
produced through automatic photography on aperture cards
in order to reduce storage space requirements and provide
more convenient access to the information. The aperture
card will hold four microfilm, images, here four p gleft-hand
master list. The cards are ientified in the upper
the four
corner by the firstarbitrary
arbi-
ornerebyr the flast arbi-
right-ha number
pages and in the upper The file can be updated,
trary number an the fourth page.
corrected, or expanded where substituting changes have t oc curreds
for those containing pages
This reduces computer printing requirements. --~_
345 I
I r rr I nn of
II I
I
I I r r
r I I
r
I I
T12365
" l
For locating individual complete records in a master list,
ro-
a cross-reference list by surname alphabetic order is pt he
vided, as illustrated below. This list gives, and
name, as much identifying information as space permits
ABLE , MARY. B-26 APR 34 NEW YORK USA. IS/II 12345
BAKER , JOHN. B-14 MAY 26 CLEVELAND USA. IS/IA 1; 45
CHARLES , CARL. B-14 MAY 26 BALTIMORE USA
DOGWOOD ANNA. B-03 SEP 13 PARIS FRANCE IS/IV 11345
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
CONFIDENTIAL All-Purpose System
the arbitrary number which determines the record's place in
the master list. Other cross-reference lists, as by date of
birth, location, given name, or any other standardized cats
gory of information, can be produced if desired. Cross-refer-
ence lists are kept up to date with cumulative supplements
at intervals and reprinted in entirety as required. The en-
tire file may be searched, as will be described presently, for
information matching one or more criteria and a special list-
ing made of all records satisfying the requirements.
As a by-product of computer processing, the subject of
each record in the file is represented in the central counter-
intelligence file index by a card which gives, in addition to his
name and identifying data, the arbitrary number of his rec-
ord and a reference to the machine program which contains it.
Updating
The change form shown opposite or an ordinary input sheet
may be used to update the file by changing, adding, or delet-
ing information. The change form can be used for minor
changes to as many as five records per sheet by writing in
the arbitrary number (in field Al), the subrecord number,
the alphabetical coordinate, and the new information correct-
ing or adding to the record. The input form is used for more
extensive updating-for new information in the same way as
for an original entry, and for changes by writing the number
of the subrecord to be changed on an unnumbered form (or
crossing out the preprinted number).
Either the change form or the input sheet can similarly
be used to delete data from a record by entering its arbitrary
number and the subrecord number and writing the word
DELETE in the field to be excised. To delete an entire rec-
ord, its arbitrary number is entered in field Al and DELETE
written in the subrecord number field.
At intervals determined by the rate of activity of a file, say
every two to four weeks, the pages of the master list on which
changes have been made are printed out. From this print-
out aperture cards are made and distributed to holders of the
file as replacements for the corresponding cards in the deck.
These are accompanied by a verification listing of records or
All-purpose System
50 CONFIDENTIAL , CONFIDENTIAL
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 `CONFIDENTIAL
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subrecords added or deleted and changes in recorded data such
as the following.
VERIFICATION LISTING
ARBITRARY NO Z00652 HAS BEEN ADDED
SUBRECORD NO 00273 HAS BEEN DELETED FROM ARBITRARY NO Z00732
FIELD B2 OF ARBITRARY NO Z00890 SUBRECORD NO 00007 HAS BEEN
CHANGED FROM JENA TO BERLIN
Special Search
It is possible to search the entire file with respect to any
category of information or combination of categories. Such
an inquiry as for data on everyone with the given name Fried-
rich known to have worked with the East German internal
security service in Leipzig can be answered very rapidly. This
we may call an and capability-first name and service and
location. A search request may have up to nine discrete and
requirements. In addition, a search request may specify al-
ternative criteria or or requirements, and data on all those
with the given name Friedrich or Fritz or F. known to have
worked with the MfS in Leipzig or Dresden can be listed.
Each and requirement may be accompanied by up to 10 or
specifications. Retrieval may be triggered either by an exact
match or, if desired, by the absence of information in any
category.
The input sheet is used for search requests. If, for example,
information is desired on individuals with the given name
Friedrich or Fritz or F. working for the MIS in Berlin and pre-
viously located in Jena or previous location unknown, these
data are entered in the appropriate fields of the input sheet
and the sheet marked "Search Request." The requester will
receive a listing of all records matching the search require-
ments and a printout of all the data in these records. Spe-
cial searches for which experience shows a recurring need
can be met by periodic cross-reference lists.
MORI/HRP PAGE 52
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A suggested way to streamline
the handling of raw Cl bio-
graphic data.
CONFIDENTIAL
FOP A STANDARD DEFECTOR QUESTIONNAIRE
Earl D. Engeljohn
In these days of amazing technological sfor recording h and 11 we
dis-
still cling to a horse-and-buggy system
seminating raw biographic information of counterintelligence
significance obtained from defectors and refugees. Nothing
could be more routine and unequivocal than name, age,
dress, occupation, personal description, etc., but we treat this
information as an exercise in composition, to be mulled over,
polished, revised, and rewritten several times.
An interviewer at a field station, during his questioning of a
refugee about acquaintances of CI interest, jots down in. note
form the biographic data and any significant remarks. He
then returns to his office and rewrites the notes as a draft
dispatch. This goes to a typist, who puts it into final form.
Thus the information is written out three times before it ever
leaves the field station; and if the source has to be reques-
tioned still more rewriting may be necessary. When the dis-
patch arrives at headquarters, it often contains cryptonyms
or references to previous correspondence which have to be
eliminated or clarified before passing to other agencies: an-
other rewrite here. When the other agencies finally get it,
they have their own processing and indexing to do.
Is all this multiple rewriting and handling really necessary?
Or could a way be found for the interviewer to record the in-
formation in the first place in a form in which it could be used
by all agencies that have a caunterilthat a responsibility?
Let us look at an example. Suppose
Cuban clandestine service defects in New York City and, in-
terviewed by a counterintelligence officer, gives biographic in-
formation on 50 former colleagues still residing in Cuba, 10
of whom travel abroad on missions for the service. Could not
the interviewer, using forms comparable to the Civil Service
Form 57 but with adjustments to accommodate the special
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questions required in pri basic information on these c50eCo1 eanuesn them the source's
m -
each? If the usual challenging g and , cross filling ere
one fr rer
sulted in changes in the data he could m
examination ments
wer
e nece
ake wht
aever ad u
ssary by erasing tries. For any or obliterating his st
form he additional significant remark sin arrt ve
could attach as many sheets of co narrative
once he (and his supervisor) deemed the comple
could merely equired, and
interested be reproduced for immediate distribution tto the
t
agencies. We have excellent reproduction
chines nowadays.
ma-
If such a
t
s
andad
rmation from u esrocedure for handling bio ra
would be the benefits: were adopted in coordinatponc infor-
these
Economy of labor. The interviewer would have to record
the information once only, and he
labor
labor of writing would also be spared the
of birth," repetitively the topical head'
n s <
so on Address, Occupation,,, a Name,
Perhaps no typing at all would be n Education until and
information were actually exploited by ecessar
considerable typing utithe
The agency, and
yping labor would be saved ceiving
be numbered in such a wa The forms could
grams, in inter-agency y as to be cited as reference in tele-
ports. in er correspondence, and perhaps
produce cum one agency could in re-
companion index cards to perhaps arrange to
ing
ing other agencies of the burden of carding accompany the foem, reliev-
of rnczterials, or indexing,
same information The elimination of rewrites of the
reduce would conserve paper and filin space Paper handling. g pace and
Speed of distribution. It is far better to
a day or so after it is recorded than to
wait get information
wait is being rewritten several times and for weeks while
comprehensive report for distribution. incor
information pora into a
were distributed immediately f routine bio biographic
could be screened and traced upon ac
to determine acquisition
any additional action were necessary.
Efficiency in interviewin
agree on the basic bio ra 9. Although the CI agencies could
has particular areas of pnterest a required by all, each agency
is being done b If the routine questioning
y the CIA, for example, the FBI may wish to
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : Cl
CONFIDENTIAL
T031 B gA0pfil089199-1ri3ire
add certain routine questions to be asked of the source. At
present the Bureau can do this only through case-by-case :re-
quests or by arranging for further questioning by its own iin-
terviewer. If a standard questionnaire were adopted it could
include questions of particular interest to each agency as well
as the questions of common interest.
Other benefits. A completed standard questionnaire on a
person is a good beginning for a file on the person. The 50
forms of substantial biographic data from our Cuban defector
would each become the nucleus of a dossier. By their very
nature, moreover, forms categorize information so that it can
conveniently be converted into machine language for auto-
matic manipulation, if such a program is under way.
The use of a standard questionnaire in routine interviews
of refugees and defectors has already proved itself in Germany.
After years of duplication of effort and delays, CIA and the
U.S Army agreed on a biographic data questionnaire printed
in quadruplicate, and this form is used routinely for record-
ing information on staff members of the East German clan-
destine service. With this successful precedent and the mani-
fest inefficiency of present rewrite methods, it would seem
logical for all agencies using biographic information of CI sig-
nificance to meet and agree on a standard procedure for han-
dling the raw data.
CONFIDENTIAL
 SECRET
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A valuable precedent in coopera-
tion between clandestine service
and intelligence production ofces.
THE JOINT DEBRIEFING OF A CUBAN
B. E. Layton
The difference in the disciplines governing clandestine op-
erations on the one hand and analysis and the productiont of
finished intelligence on the other is the root cause of the many
difficulties with which we wrestle in the management of re-
quirements, the establishment of collection priorities, the full
and economical exploitation of sources, and the evaluation
of reports. The separation of the overt and covert compo-
nents is in part an organizational and security necessity, but
it is unnecessarily deepened by a lack of understanding be-
tween the two elements, with their so different concepts of
the essential skills, methods, importance, and even goals of
their respective work. To this extent it has always seemed
that the difficulties could be alleviated by more contacts at
all levels, within the limitations imposed by security consid-
erations, between the operational and overt analytic staffs.
Over the past year there has been some progress in this sense.
One of the best and easiest ways to establish meaningful
contacts and facilitate mutual understanding is to mount
joint projects such as that at the Madrid interrogation cen-
ter, whose fruitful operations were described in a recent issue
of this journal.- Another more recent project, being less elab-
orate and less a product of unique circumstances, deserves
therefore particular attention as a precedent in collaborative
enterprise that could to advantage be repeated and multiplied.
A Successful Experiment
Detailed information on Cuba is hard to obtain, and when
a knowledgeable Cuban defects he must be thoroughly utilized
as a source. One such source-we will call him Carlos-who
had excellent contacts in Cuba was after defection intensively
debriefed in the field. The reports based on his information
'Lawrence E. Rogers, "Project Ninos," VII 1, p. 75 if.
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SECRET MORI/HRP PAGES 57-61
 Approved For Rele.t20Q51{Aa
were among the most useful received in Washington. Initially
Carlos was handled according to the procedures standard for
defectors who are not to be surfaced. But later, in view of his
past position and contacts in Cuba, the amount of informa-
tion he possessed, and the critical need for information about
Cuba, a precedent-setting decision was made to give him joint
overt-covert staff debriefings under semi-clandestine condi-
tions. The secrecy added flavor to the meetings but was not
germane to the debriefing process and does not affect these
observations about it.
In March and April of this year representatives of succes-
sive sections of four CIA production offices and the NPIC, to-
gether with the clandestine services staff concerned, had
six sessions with Carlos on subjects ranging from general
political matters to geography. Then three additional ses-
sions using aerial photography were held. Permanent overt
and covert representatives, one each, provided session-to-ses-
sion coordination. All the meetings were taped. Reports
based on them were prepared by the clandestine staff with
the assistance of the permanent overt representative.
The debriefings were a success, and they demonstrated the
value of joint projects. Although Carlos had already been in-
tensively debriefed in the field, both new and corroborative
information concerning Cuba was obtained. For run-of-the-
mill defector debriefings, requirements and questions sent to
the field are usually suflicient
b
t
;
u
when a source has detailed
knowledge, expert substantive questioning can often unearth
and develop information that t
he less specialized field inter-
rogator might miss. Selectivity in questioning and subject
expertise compensate for the analyst's lack of training in in-
terrogation. Specialized knowledge can also lead to more prob-
ing and exact questions and is more likely to produce a co-
herent pattern from the bits and pieces of information ob-
tained.
Pointers in Procedure
The Carlos experiment pointed up some considerations for
hopeful future joint debriefings. Any debriefing must take
its substantive character from the potential of the source;
a careful scrutiny of the source's background in advance will
avoid scheduling sessions inappropriate to his range of knowl-
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edge. As a rule the sessions should begin with the more tech-
nical subjects and conclude with the general. This allows the
defector to work up to the subjects he probably considers most
important and may increase his cooperation.
The use of aerial photography with Carlos proved very fruit-
ful; much detailed information was acquired from it. Aerial
photography would not always be applicable, but where the
source has geographic information and where security con-
siderations permit, it should be used from the beginning.
In preparation for the debriefings the analyst personnel
must, first, familiarize themselves with the source's back-
ground and, second, develop a line of questioning and make
some outline of it. During the sessions they should keep notes
on the responses they think deserving of dissemination. The
first two steps would reduce repetition during the debriefings
and between them and the field interrogations, and they would
allow points to be developed more coherently and completely.
The note-taking would facilitate reporting: unaided use of
tapes may result in some confusion.
If at all possible, the debriefings should be held soon after
defection. In Carlos' case there was a time lag of four months
which reduced somewhat the value of his information. Opera-
tional considerations may preclude early joint debriefings, but
in any event, once it is decided that a defector should be de-
briefed jointly, the sooner it is done the better.
Broader Considerations
The value of the joint debriefings cannot be judged solely
by the number of reports produced. There are both tangible
and intangible gains from such. debriefings, and they vary from
component to component according to its interests. The Na-
tional Estimates staff is only peripherally interested to learn
that a certain building is a factory, but operational and geo-
graphical components may find this an item of importance.
The clandestine services may be keenly interested in where
oil is stored in Cuba, while the economic analyst may be more
concerned about how long the oil will last. The ideas, per-
spectives, and impressions gained by all participants may not
be reportable, but in the long run they may prove very valu-
able.
4-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET I SECRET 59
 Approved For Release 0 4Ff%g
The most broadly important potential
from
briefings is an increased understandin gain
clandestine g and rapport between
services and intelligent- joint de-
n
The latt
er can d
see some of the operationalprob ems of deal-
ing with the human factors of .
the difficulty of obtaining personality and temper
information from continuit temperament,
defectors, the rang and completeness of y tleties involved in debriefing. of vagaries and sub-
turn, get a clearer g? The operational personnel, in
t anal sis picture of the type of information needed
y and see the difficult -
ports into a composite picture. Y of integrating defector re-
mutually educated The two components are thus
mutually ed , and the rapport gained should contribute
g good working relations and lead to a
ful interchange. The partnership cannot full more use-
sources in pursuit of the intelligence objective ntd eath com_
ponent understands the workin
s
Oth
g
er
.
and th
e problems of the
If joint debriefings are to be fully components should know when a given def ctorlis ein uproc-
essed
essed and help determine whether he should be jointly boned. p g proc-
formal and informal communication ques
the operating components for this Purose
with
to both parties. The analysts are better abl
e to is e valuate e the
information from a source if more detail is available about hie
background and access than
has in the his
by the usual CS source description
? past been provided
from this improved evaluative and the operators benefit
made of their product. guidance and find more use
Steps to provide better information
about fact taken, with just these considerations in mind, last Spring.
All clandestine reporting elements were
for making more revealing statements, consistent with olinas
tional security, concerning sources' character,
and access to information. per-
the result of This innovation which competence,
consultation between analytic elemnts con-
cerned with Cuba and the responsible clandestine components,
is still experimental and limited to reporting on Cuba
from anywhere in the world;
but n affairs
successful it could well
be extended to clandestine reporting generally.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/1,11
It is to be hoped that the increase recently achieved in mu-
tual understanding between clandestine collection and produc-
tion components will continue. Joint debriefings, besides pro-
ducing substantive gains, contribute to this end. The joint
debriefings of Carlos have established a good and valuable
precedent. The groundwork laid by them should be built upon.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP0319AODDM001041-2
Strange bedfellows in the
wartime world.
MEMORANDA FOR THE PRESIDENT:
OSS-NKVD LIAISON
William J. Donovan's voluminous memoranda to President
Roosevelt' include half a dozen concerning collaboration be-
tween the U.S. and Soviet intelligence services, and these are
supplemented by a few addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and one recording a conversation in the NKVD offices in Mos-
cow. Originally proposed as an exchange of representatives
to each other's headquarters, this liaison was reduced by po-
litical considerations to communication between heads of serv-
ices through General Deane, chief of the U.S. Military Mission
in Moscow. The documents are reproduced below.
Negotiations
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
Would it meet with your approval if we could persuade (and
obtain authorization for) Sydney Weinberg to go to Russia
openly as the representative of OSS? 2
Described in the first of this series, subtitled "Sunrise," in Studies
VII 2, p. 73 ff.
'The answer was yes, and it cost Weinberg's life when the convoy
on which he sailed was attacked off the Norwegian North Cape
and most of the ships sunk. The proposal that OSS send a repre-
sentative to Moscow had been initiated a year earlier by the head
of the British SOE mission which had been established there
promptly after the German invasion of the USSR. It was first
presented as an exchange of representatives in General Donovan's
conversations with the Russians at the end of 1943.
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liaison
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION AT THE COMMIS
SARIAT FOR INTERNAL A
Major General J. R Dea
Moscow, December 27, 1943
Brigadier General Wm. J. Donovan
Mr. Bohlen
Lt. General Fitin 3-Head of the Soviet External Intelligence
Service
Col. Ossipov 4-Head of the Section Conducting Subversive Ac-
tivities in Enemy Countries
General Donovan opened the conversation by saying that
the day before yesterday he had been taken by dor to call on Mr. Molotov to whom he had outlined the aims,
scope and operation of the Office of Strategic Services and he
would be glad to supplement or repeat that information to
General Fitin. It would first be useful to ascertain what par-
ticular phases of the work of OSS General Fitin was inter-
ested in.
General Fitin replied that they were interested in all
aspects.
General Donovan then outlined the organization, aims,
scope operations, etc. Of OSS, giving details of specific types
of operations, means of communication, organization of groups
within enemy countries, etc.
General Fitin listened with the closest attention and asked
a number of questions of a technical nature, specifically re-
garding the methods used in introducin
countries t g agents to enemy
ype of training and equipment given these agents,
8 Misspelled, apparently by
memorandum. y y phonetic error, as "Sitin" throughout the
addressed to A 30 December memorandum from Donovan was
General Setin."
'Apparently soon promoted. Shortly after the war
were identified in the press as Lt. Gen. P. the two Russians
Aleksandr P. Osipov. As late as 95 M. Fitin and Ma'.
to be associated with each other as chief and still r respectively
s re f section 12 (foreign intelligence services) of the My ctively
to the NKVD. VD, successor
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DP78T03194A000200010001-2
OSS-NKYD Liaison
and whether they were trained primarily in the United States
or elsewhere.
General Donovan explained that all available methods were
used to dispatch agents to enemy countries. Submarines,
small boats and by parachute from airplanes. He said that
by parachute was the principal means of sending agents and
that special planes of the B-24 type had been assigned to his
organization for the purpose. He added that experiments
were being made with use of small planes of the Stimson s type
and also helicopters.
General Donovan explained in detail certain types of equip-
ment used such as the suitcase radio and mentioned, without
going into detail, use of new plastic explosives which had. so
far given good results.
Col. Ossipov appeared particularly interested in the possi-
bilities of plastic explosives. General Donovan promised to
send to General Fitin through General Deane a standard type
small radio which was used by the OSS operatives.
General Donovan emphasized, in concluding his description
of the functions and aims of the OSS, that he had come to Mos-
cow to give this information to the Soviet Government and
to tell them that his organization was prepared to cooperate
fully with the equivalent organization in the Soviet Union if
the Soviet Government considered it in the national interest
to do so. He emphasized that he was not attempting to make
their decision for them but merely stating his willingness to
cooperate in whole or in part in any part of the world where
the OSS maintained individuals or organizations.
He said that for this reason he was prepared to designate
an officer to be a member of the United States Military Mis-
sion here under the orders of General Deane and would wel-
come the appointment of a Soviet official in Washington to
maintain liaison with the OSS.
General Deane at this point said that, having been present
at both the Moscow and Teheran conferences, he wished to
emphasize that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff genuinely
desired to establish close contact and the fullest cooperation
with the Soviet Government in any field which would hasten
the defeat of our common enemy, Germany.
IA-RDP78T0AJM92gQAs101-2
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OSS-NKVD Liaison
General Fitin asked what specific lines of cooperation Gen,
eral Donovan had in mind.
General Donovan re
li
p
ed first th
e exchange of intellig
information. There was information which ence regard to enemy countries we possessed in
value to the which would be, he thought, of great
Soviet Government.
Soviet Government undoubtedly On the other hand the
had certain
which would be of real value to the U
duct of the war.
nited States then on-loll
Consequently, he thought it was important that in any
areas where both countries had agents there
should be some form of coordination in order to prevent these
agents working at cross purposes. He said, for example i
Bulgaria his man mi
ht b
g
n
, which the Soviet Go e dealing with an individual or group
Government knew to be untrustworthy, and
it would be of utmost value to have th
e benfit
e of their advice
and counsel in the field of moral subversion.
Also in regard to physical subversion it would be most use-
ful if each country knew what the other had in preparation.
General Fitin said he thoroughly understood and
with General Donovan and on his own initiative agreed
ample where such cooperation
gave ex-
for or examp
He said,
, that if Soviet agents were prepari
tage
an important industrial undertaking orraillroad in Germany
it would be very desirable to have the A
informed thereof in order to pAmerican Government
infor e. revent any unwitting inter-
ference. it would be helpful for the Soviet Gov-
ernment to know of any similar undertakings in preparation
from the American side.
He then asked General Donovan if he had come to the So-
viet Union for the sole purpose of giving tion and making the proposal for cooperation, rhhad her had
some other intentions.
General Donovan replied that the only reason he had come
to Moscow was to give them this information and make the
proposals he had made.
General Fitin then said of course they heartily Donovan's information and proposals and he wished
to express their thanks. Y welcomed
points in regard to cooperation sin various fields which wouI f
d
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OSS-NKVD Liaison
have to be decided by higher organizations of the Soviet Gov-
ernment but that one question could be considered as decided
and that was the appointment of a representative of General
Donovan's organization in the American Military Mission
here.
General Donovan then explained that he had in mind. Col.
Haskell 6 and gave a brief sketch of Col. Haskell's past career
and emphasized the fact that he was a man of fine character.
General Deane then said that .in the interval between the
final decision of the Soviet Government on certain aspects of
this work and the return of Col. Haskell it would be necessary
to establish some channel of communication for the exchange
of certain types of information.
General Fitin said he agreed and that the exchange of cer-
tain information should begin right away.
ADDENDUM:
General Fitin inquired whether as a measure of cooperation
it would be possible for American facilities to be used to send
Soviet agents to Western Germany or France or to other
areas which were so far from the Soviet Union as to be inac-
cessible from the Soviet side.
General Donovan replied that in his opinion that would be
entirely possible and they would be glad to help in any way
they could.
22 February 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Averell Harriman advised you from Moscow about six weeks
ago of the conversation that he and I had with Molotov con-
cerning operations in Bulgaria. At the same time, there was
an exploratory discussion as to the possibilities of our work-
ing with the intelligence and subversive counterpart of OSS.
This matter was discussed from the standpoint of the military
advantages accruing to the United States in the field of in-
telligence, both insofar as Germany and Japan were con-
cerned. The operational advantages of working together with
subversive elements and resistance groups in South Eastern
B John H. F. The man designated to head the reciprocal NKVD
mission in Washington was a Colonel Grauer, head of the American
or perhaps the British section under Fitin. Defectors have said
that he was sent to England in 1946 and died in 1953.
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 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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OSS-NKVD Liaiso
Europe and a reciprocal exchange of certain types of new d
vices and weapons were also discu
ssed.
Already, although this has not
received
the a
yet pproval
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, th
o
ry
f
e appreciation
b
the advantages to be gained by the Russians o1
y such i a reciprocal undertaking
are quite apparent.
They have -
their i
t
t
d
n
hat certain of
elligence material on Bulgari
n
i
is
a
be
n turn have asked us for information
to us and
se
concern
the
espionage system which we may g tGerrnax
of the German Embassy in Istanbul
11 Liom whom we tain members
the Briti
sh, have induced to come over to our side. tly with
are particular fields of intelligence that are open to the here
sians and heretofore denied us which the proposed relation-
ship would now make available to us.
in the economic and political field. This is especially true
I find the suggestion made that such a proposal would open
the door to the OGPU here. I don't need to suggest to you
that the OGPU came here with the comin of Amtor
already here under the protection of the E g and is
want to do is to deal with the militar mbassy. What we
cerned with intelligence relatvn y elements that are con-
ing. If we should turn down g
his opportunity, enemies we are fight-
t
great handicap in anythin pportunity, it will be a
nrional way. g we may wish to do in a military or
This is especially true since they are prepared
to give us direct access on all these matters, and it is the first
opening we have had with the Russians for an insight their foreign intelligence system. Our whole discussion into
on a basis of reciprocity with a thorough understanding n was
we would see what we could do together in penetrating Ger-
G-
many and German occupied areas, and with the suggestion
that, when the opportunity came, this might be exteJapan.
It had been suggested to us that this
taken up with been sugg
General Biddle. I did this, and he
7Abwehr staff members Willi Hamburger Erich Vermehren, and Karl
Alois Kleczkowski, the latter two with their wives
beginning at the end of January, but on their own initiativedw th ut
inducement.
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QSS-NKVD Liaison
suggested that we talk directly with you about it. I was not
unmindful of someone's trying to make capital of the OGPU's
coming here; but I think the complete answer is:
1. They are already here, and
2. The military people who come here are in the open and
under such rules as are imposed by us and are here solely and
only for military reasons and joint operations against our
common enemy.
25 February 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Following my memorandum of the other day relative to the
proposed exchange of representatives between the Russians
and our organization, it should be called to your attention
that a similar exchange exists between the British and the
Russians and has been in existence for over two years. A like
exchange between the Russians and ourselves was suggested
by the head of the British mission in Moscow.
7 March 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY:
Subject: Interchange of Representation with Soviet Union
Since my appearance before the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the
matter of OSS-Soviet representatives, there have been some
developments which I feel I should report to you.
The British have informed us of the status of the N.K.V.D.
representation in London, which is the counterpart of SOE's
representation in Moscow. The Russian group in London con-
sists of three N.K.V.D. officers headed by a Colonel attached
to the Russian Embassy. Although matters of importance
are customarily handled by- the British through their own
representative in Moscow, SOE maintains liaison with the
N.K.V.D, officers in London and has provided them with a
radio station for direct communication with Moscow.
The State Department suggested that I confer with the At-
torney General in regard to that part of the proposed re-
ciprocal arrangement which contemplates a liaison represen-
tation from N.K.V.D. with OSS here. When I spoke to Mr.
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 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Biddle, he thought that I should take the matter up with the
President
hi
h
, w
c
I did in the form of a memorandum.8
Fruits
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Attached is a list of questions from the Russians to be asked
of the former Gestapo agents now held by us in Cairo.
These questions give us an index of the things the Russians
look for and also of the way they work.
LIST OF QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE RUSSIANS: ?
1. The personal characteristics of the cadre staff operators of the
below listed intelligence organizations in Turkey, to include duties,
identification data, nicknames, and character on work: Naval Intelli-
a But on 15 March Admiral Leahy recorded the "decision . this
date that an exchange . . . of missions
is n
t
. .
o
appropriate . "
A staff had already been readied for the mission and equipment
shipped to Mosco
i
w
n anticipation of approval.
The Soviet questions were included in the interrogations, and during
the spring and summer "somewhat edited" versions of the complete
interrogation reports on Hamburger and the Kleczkowskis were sent
to Moscow, giving a mass of detail on the Abwehr organization,
methods of operation, and individual agents in Turkey and the
Middle East. By this time there had begun a considerable, if some-
what ill balanced, exchange of information with the NKVD which
lasted through March of 1945. Dozens each of OSS field reports
(not only on Germany and Japan but including some downgraded
Top Secret cables from China and factory marking and other
targeting data obtained in Rumania), R & A studies and estimates,
and captured German documents were furnished the Russians. In
return OSS received (in response to a rather too broad request for
"everything the Soviet authorities are in a position to supply with
respect to the current military, economic, and political situation in
Bulgaria") a 43-page paper comparable to but less comprehensive
than and adding little to the corresponding U.S. JANIS (forerunner
of the National Intelligence Survey), a set of unenlightening answers
to some apparently overcautious questions concerning sabotage
methods, a 76-page listing of German indu
t
i
l
s
r
a
targets evidently
derived from POW interrogations and other casual sources rather
than a directed i
t
n
elligence effort, and data on German plants manu-
facturing poison gas and shells for it and the layout of a poison gas
pipeline on the eastern frontier. A selection of specimen agent
weapons and sabotage devices was also exchanged, and the NKVD
was presented an OSS-developed outfit for agent use in microfilming
documents.
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gence; Military Intelligence, including 1st, 2nd, and 3rd dept. of
Abwehr; The Gestapo; SD (Security Service) ; Diplomatic Intelligence;
Economic Intelligence. What is interrelationship and structure of
above listed organizations?
2. In working from Turkey against USSR a description of the actual
tasks and scope of work of German espionage and counter espionage.
Results of German espionage work in USSR, including methods of com-
munications and methods.
3. Detailed characteristics of agents of German Intelligence in Turkey,
also those working for Germany who are of other nationalities.
4. The operating points location in Turkey of German Intelligence
who try to smuggle agents into USSR.
5. For operations against Russia to what extent does German Intelli-
gence try to use Ukrainians, Russians, Azerbaidzhan, and other nation-
alities who have immigrated to Turkey?
6. As a screen what German firms in Turkey or other countries do
German Intelligence or espionage agents use?
7. What contacts do the German espionage Intelligence have with the
leadership of the Turkish Intelligence and espionage activities? Who
of the Turkish group are connected with the Germans personally?
How do they work together?
8. To Iran from Turkey what is the extent of German espionage, in-
cluding its director, methods of communication to German Intelligence
Hqs in Turkey from Iran, composition and location of operational
points, name of agency, and assignments given to such agencies in Iran.
9. Request any information regarding German propaganda in Turkey,
including agencies, its leaders, connections with the Turkish press, and
methods.
10. Hitlerite party activity and organization as well as other German
organizations in Turkey.
11. Any information regarding the activities in Istanbul of the German.
Teutonia Club.
12. Information regarding the personnel and structure of the central,
organ of the Abwehr.
13. Information regarding any differences there might be between
representatives of the Nazi Party in Turkey and Von Papen.
14. Information regarding German espionage schools out as well as in
Germany, including methods of planting spies in foreign countries,
numbers trained, and methods of training.
27 April 1944:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
There is attached as an appendix paraphrase of cable which
has been sent to General Deane in response to CM-IN 17105
(23 April 1944) in which General Deane stated that Ossipov,
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chief of Russian subversive activities, was offended because
Russian personnel had not been included among American
and British agents who were being sent into Rumania. Both
General Deane and Brigadier General Hill, SOE representa-
tive in Moscow, strongly recommended that the Russians be
invited to participate.
8 May 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF:
With further reference to our memoranda to you of 27 April
1944 and 5 May 1944 on the above subject, we have now re-
ceived an answer from General Deane. He states that he
does not intend to do anything further on the matter since
he has been informed by Brigadier Hill that the Soviets re-
fused a British offer to include the Russians in the Rumanian
project.
29 September 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:
On 24 September I wrote you of Marshal Tito's order re-
stricting British and American intelligence activities. The
next day we received word from our intelligence team in Bul-
garia that the Russians had ordered it and the British to
leave.
I immediately cabled General Deane in Moscow, and last
night received word from him that he was advised by General
Fitin, Chief of Russian Secret Intelligence, of the issuance of
instructions to withdraw the order requiring the OSS team
to leave Bulgaria. I have passed this on to the field. In order
to prevent future misunderstandings, I am sending General
Fitin lists of OSS personnel in Bulgaria and Rumania as re-
quested by him.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.
20 October 1944
On 22 September, we sent you a report of a discussion be-
tween a representative of this office and an agent of Neu-
bacher, Ribbentrop's political and diplomatic representative in
the Balkans.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DP78T8JJ9 ZLQ9jqaf001-2
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Previously, on 13 September, we had sent to General Deane
in Moscow a report of two earlier conversations between these
persons, to the following effect:
"Neubacher's agent contacted our representative on 5
September, stating that if the Allies would allow the Ger-
mans to retreat to the line of the Danube and Sava rivers,
Germany would use her troops to fight the Soviets. Our
representative immediately replied that he would not
enter into any conversation founded on deceit and Allied
discord, but that he would discuss the termination of Ger-
man resistance in the Balkans and would forward any
business-like German proposal. Subsequently Neubach-
er's agent stated that Neubacher was planning to see
Hitler and would contact our representative again, al-
though it was out of question for him to discuss sur-
render. He went on to say that guerrilla fighting would
continue in Germany after the surrender and that many
Germans, being nihilist already, were ripe for Commu-
nism."
This information was communicated to the Russians by
General Deane. You may find it significant that General
Deane has notified us that General Fitin was grateful for the
information and has requested more information as it be-
comes available.
18 November 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF
. . . The relevant portion of General Deane's dispatch is
attached (Appendix A) . . .
APPENDIX A
Fitin, whom I saw today, states positively that for an OSS
unit to enter an occupied country approval from the Soviet
Foreign Office will be necessary.
It is my opinion that wherever we have an Allied control
commission, authority for OSS units to operate should be Ob-
tained through our representative on this commission. I
1DP78T0 A880201a01a1y01 2 can obtain approval for their presence
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Approved For ReleaM&V_0W,04/13 ; C
without going through the Soviet Foreign O
which is an endless process. Fitin su g ffice in Masc88
gested personnel could come into occupied countries that stensilbly as
part of our representation on the Allied Control Commission,
in which cases his organization would be prepared to cooperate
with you.
A first experiment in quantifying
the relevance of indicator patterns
to different types of hostile action.
A STUDY IN INDICATIONS METHODOLOGY
Diane M. Ramsey
and
Mark S. Boerner
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
The intelligence mission of the National Indications Center
is to provide strategic warning of a possible attack upon the
United States from the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Strategic warning
differs from. tactical warning both in timeliness and in deriva-
tion. Tactical warning relies exclusively upon mechanical de-
tection devices and could not be given until the attack had
been set in motion, thus providing no more than a few hours--
and probably much less-for U. S. forces to react. Strategic
warning, given before the strike is launched, is derived from
estimating enemy intentions as well as actions, and while it is
to some extent dependent upon signals from mechanical. de-
tection devices, it also involves the analysis of a great deal of
other data less easily quantified and correlated.
Because the indications officer attempts to determine in-
tent from observed actions, he must rely heavily upon infer-
ence. The basic inferential structure used by the NIC is con-
tained in its revised indicator list, which defines 123 types of
action that a Sino-Soviet Bloc country might take if it in-
tended to wage war. The specific occurrence of one of these
indicators is called an indication, as the indicator "Active re-
connaissance by aircraft, submarines or surface vessels" was
realized as an indication in last winter's overflight of the U.S.
carrier Constellation by a Soviet TU-95. The list covers
virtually all phases of Bloc activity (with emphasis on the
Soviet Union), and all the assets of the intelligence commu-
nity can through it be brought to bear upon the task of de-
termining whether-and then when and how-the Bloc plans
RDP78T0 1 4A 1D 02DG6td0.1-2
 Approved For Ralebakc3R65d001*1
Alternative Hypotheses
Historically, the NIC has been principally concerned with
giving warning of premeditated surprise attack on the United
States by the Soviet Union. Although other possible courses
of hostile action have been considered from time to time,
there appears to have been no consensus as to what the range
of alternatives might be. The present study, which became an
experiment in quantitative differentiation of indicator pat-
terns, originated as an attempt simply to define the compo-
nent aspects of these alternative hostile actions with the same
precision that had been applied to defining NIC's 123 warning
indicators.
Seven general hypotheses of actions hostile to the United
States were postulated as a first, rough approximation of all
possible alternatives:
Hl-Premeditated surprise attack
H2-Pre-emptive attack
H3-Escalation (limited war to general war)
H4-Limited war
H6-Guerrilla warfare
H6--Diplomatic crisis with no military intent
H7--Military suppression of internal conflicts
Each of the 123 indicators might or might not have a bear-
ing on the acceptance or rejection of any one of these seven
hypotheses as the true explanation for a series of observed ac-
tions. In order to represent this concept in a systematic
fashion, a two-way chart was prepared with the seven hy-
potheses of hostile action across the top and a selected sample
of indicators listed down the left-hand side. (It was decided
to work with a sample rather than all 123 indicators because it
was not obvious a priori whether this sort of approach would
yield useful results.) The sample consisted of twenty-eight
indicators considered to be highly important and representa-
tive of the three sectors of Soviet activity covered by the in-
dicator list. Six were chosen from the 28 in Sector A bearing
on intercontinental strike force capability, thirteen from the
62 of the general military Sector B, and nine from the 33 con-
cerned with civilian activities in Sector C. These are listed
in Table 1.
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SECRET
TABLE 1
INDICATORS USED IN THE WEIGHTING EXPERIMENT
A2e
A2i*
A3d
A3g*
Blf
B2f
B4g
B5i
B6b*
B6e
B7b
Deployment of MRBMs, IRBMs and associated equip-
ment to satellite nations.
Rapid increase in number of orbiting earth satellite
vehicles.
Unusually large and realistic maneuvers of LRA units.
Major deployment of tankers and long-range bombers
to forward bases.
Intensive maintenance activity at submarine bases.
Expanded submarine barrier operations.
Cancellation of leaves or marked restriction.
con-
ll
i
y
a
Release or delivery to combat units of spec
trolled weapons and equipment. or
Widespread appearance of new cryptographic
transmission systems.
Extensive interference with key Western telecom-
munications. level or
Abnormally large maneuvers at inter-army
higher.
Tightening of military security, such as new travel
restrictions, etc.
Abnormally high levels of activity in airborne forces
units.
Withdrawals of significant naval surface units from
Black and Baltic Seas.
Intensive naval active defense measures.
Major standdown in TAF for maintenance.
General alerting of Soviet air defense forces.
Increased intelligence collection efforts against key
targets.
Active reconnaissance by aircraft, subs or surface
vessels.
Progressive reduction in size of Bloc missions in West-
ern countries.
Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with Mos-
cow and Peiping.
Increased belligerency in official Soviet pronounce-
Increased
and propaganda.
P78T03194Ab 0~&&l10001a 2 i table.
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 Cad
C4b
C4g
C5b
Approved F&F"696 2D0610403
TABLE 1 (Continued)
Sudden shifts, especially in crises, to softer propa-
ganda themes.
Imposition of abnormally heavy censorship measures.
Widespread construction
or expansion of shelters.
Evacuation of government, military and technical
personnel.
Conversion of industrial production from civilian to
military items.
Cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet scientists
outside the Bloc or their recall.
* These eight were used subsequently in constructing profiles and in
statistical transformation.
The next step was to obtain a measure of the relevance of
the sample indicators, and this was accomplished by weight-
ing each of the 28 selected indicators for each of the seven
hypotheses. The weight was designed to vary directly with
the acceptability of the hypothesis, given the indicator as
evidence; the larger the weight the more likely the hypothesis.
Since these kinds of judgments had never been made before
(and it was not by any means clear that they would be useful
or even meaningful), it was decided that several analysts in-
timately experienced in evaluating warning data should make
independent judgments about the effect of each indicator on
the credibility of each hypothesis. If a group of experts agreed
among themselves, then it would be reasonable to accept their
consensual judgment as a basis for further experimentation.
Five persons familiar with the warnin
asked to make independent judgments o f hePrblem, were
r ele a~ ceeof each
of the 28 indicators to each of the seven hypotheses, a total of
196 judgments per person. Each indicator was evaluated on
a five-point scale, as follows:
+2=Strong positive indication of credibility of hypothesis
+1 -Some positive indication of credibility of hypothesis
O=No influence on credibility of hypothesis
-1=Some negative indication against credibility of hy-
pothesis
-2--Strong negative indication against credibility of hy-
pothesis
78 Approved For Release 2005/04/
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The agreement among the five judges was very close on
many of the 28 indicators. Sometimes one judge might be
consistently conservative in fixing indicator weights with re-
spect to a particular hypothesis, avoiding the strong weights
both positive and negative, while a second would weight in the
same direction but use the extreme +2 and -2 more often.
With allowance for this individual conservative or radical bias,
the level of agreement gave some general basis for confidence
in the rating procedure as an experimental tool.
On a number of indicators, however, there was little or no
agreement among the five judges. In an attempt to reconcile
or adjudicate these differences the judges were asked to set
down their reasons for assigning the weights they had. From
these explanations it could be seen that although some dif-
ferences of opinion were deep-seated and not reconcilable,
others were caused by divergent interpretations of the terms
used in defining the several hypotheses. Once the ambiguity
was resolved, new weights were assigned which eliminated
much of the earlier discrepancy.
This exercise of attempting to locate and explain the areas
of disagreement proved to be extremely useful. It immedi-
ately pointed up the need to go back and redefine the reper-
tory of possible alternative courses of hostile action with
much more detail and precision. The discussions showed it
necessary to define each hypothesis with respect to at least
seven component features. An effort was made to list under
each component all admissible possibilities that came to
mind. The elaborated taxonomy for defining hypotheses of
hostile action appears below:
S-Element of surprise
0--Irrelevant
1-Premeditated surprise attack
2-Pre-emptive attack
3-Deliberate unconcealed attack
4-Accidental attack
5--Other
 V-Area attacked
0-Irrelevant
1-Continental United States
2-U.S. Possessions and bases
3-U.S. formal allies
4-Western-oriented countries not formal U.S. allies
5-Uncommitted nations
6-Bloc-oriented nations
7-Bloc members
8-Other
A-Attacker
0-Irrelevant
1-Soviet Union
2-Communist China
3-European Satellites
4-Asian Satellites
5-Bloc-oriented nations
6-Other
F-Forces employed
0-Irrelevant
1-Strategic missiles
2-Strategic air forces
3-Strategic naval forces
4--Tactical missiles
5-Tactical air forces
6-Tactical naval forces
7-Ground forces
8-Special forces
9-Clandestine agents
l0-Police
1l-Other
W-Weapons used
0-Irrelevant
1-Thermonuclear
2-Nuclear
3-High explosives
4-Chemical, bacteriological, or radiological
5-Other
80 Approved For Release 2005/04/1
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RDP78T,Q3NAA0O MditW01-2 SECRET
T-Targets attacked
0-Irrelevant
1-Military installations
2-Concentrations of military forces
3-Population centers
4-Key production and support facilities
5-Other
D-Diplomatic and economic measures
0-Irrelevant
1-Ultimatum
2-Warning
3-Embargo
4-Blockade
5-Travel restrictions
6-Expulsions
7-Treaties
8-Negotiations
9-Other
This formulation cannot of course be considered all-
inclusive or necessarily complete. It could be expanded to
cover additional components as well as to list additional al-
ternatives within components. The "Other" listing allows
for the inclusion of an unusual circumstance that does not fit
into the more conventional alternatives, for example the Ber-
lin wall in the "Weapons used" component. The general for-
mula used to express an hypothesis in terms of the seven
components is as follows:
S on V by A employing F and using W against T (after
or accompanied by D).
In order to test the suitability of this formula for describ-
ing hostile action, several past periods of international crisis
were subjected to a corresponding analytic breakdown. The
following statements show how two of these, the Pearl Harbor
attack and the outbreak of the Korean War, would be defined
by this technique.
Pearl Harbor: S1 on V2 by AB employing F2, 8 and using W8
against T1, 2, 4 (after or accompanied by D8).
A-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
 Or in expanded form:
A premeditated surprise attack on U.S. possessions and
bases by Japan employing strategic air and naval forces
and using high explosives against military installations,
concentrations of military forces, and key production and
support facilities (following negotiations in Washington
with Japanese envoys on the Far Eastern situation).
Korea: S1 on V4 by A4 employing F5, 6, D and using W3 against
T1, 2 (after or accompanied by D2) .
Or:
A premeditated surprise attack on South Korea by North
Korea employing ground forces, tactical air and naval
forces and clandestine agents and using high explosives
against military installations and concentrations of mili-
tary forces (following several propaganda warnings of an
attack).
After the formula proved reasonably successful in describ-
ing past hostile events, it was applied to a plausible hypothesis
of potential Soviet action against the United States. (Evi-
dence to substantiate this particular hypothesis is extremely
difficult to detect, and for this reason it is of major concern
to those charged with strategic warning.)
World War III: S2 on V1, 2 by Al employing F1, 2, 3 and using
W1, 2 against T1, 2?
Or expanded:
A pre-emptive attack on the continental United States
and its possessions and bases by the Soviet Union em-
ploying strategic strike forces (missiles, air, and navy)
and using thermonuclear and nuclear weapons against
military installations and concentrations of military
forces.
Excluding the open-ended "Other" category in the elabo-
rated taxonomy, several hundred thousand hypotheses could
be generated through permutation and combination of the
alternatives under the several components. Although prob-
ably fewer than fifty of these are plausible, the number of
conceivable related warning patterns is staggering, for a
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
variety of combinations of the 123 indicators is relevant to
each hypothesis and individual weighting of the indications
from - 2 to +2 raises their number to its power of five. It is
this high order of complexity of events in the real world which,
until the development of electronic digital computers, pre-
cluded mathematical simulation of any but trivial war prob-
lems.
Hypotheses by Indicator Profile
One possible approach to evaluating indications would be to
construct the patterns of indicators and weights most likely
to occur under particular plausible hypotheses. In the event,
say, that the USSR was going to launch a surprise attack on
the United States, the patterns would presumably differ from
those to be expected if it were preparing to start a limited
war. Probably yet another set of combinations would be likely
to appear if the USSR were simply taking steps to defend. it-
self. These various groups of general warning patterns could
be compiled into a warning outline, which could then be used
by indications analysts as a standard against which to meas-
ure accumulating indications information. Indications offi-
cers do employ subjectively such comparison techniques al-
ready, but the warning pattern used as the standard is not
expressly stated and may change frequently, even for the
same analyst.
Following this line of reasoning, the next step in the study
was to investigate whether it is possible to differentiate
among the various hypotheses by their patterns of indicator
weights, and if so which indicators are of primary significance
in this discrimination. If the weights assigned to certain in-
dicators should be highly similar for two or more hypotheses
it would be difficult to use these indicators as criteria for ac-
cepting one of the hypotheses over the others, and other indi-
cators would have to be identified to give the necessary dif-
ferentiation among them. But if the patterns of indicator
weights assigned for different hypotheses are quite distinct,
they provide a means for deciding whether to accept or reject
a particular hypothesis on the basis of indications data re-
ceived.
-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/0
SECRET An Indications Study
In order to illustrate this concept, let us consider a simple
example. Suppose we had only three indicators (I1, 12 and
13) and only three hypotheses of hostile action (111, H2 and
H3). Let us say the three hypotheses have the following sets
of average indicator weights:
H,
H2
H3
1,
1.5
0.0
0.5
12
1.5
-0.5
0.0
I3
-0.5
1.5
1.5
If we drew a pattern or profile of the indicator weights for
each hypothesis, the three would look like this:
From these profiles we can see at a glance that H2 and H3
are similar but Hl is quite different from the others. We
might further observe that 13 provides no basis at all for dis-
tinguishing H2 from H.I. Graphic display techniques fre-
quently offer considerable assistance in summarizing unor-
ganized data and may reveal relationships which are not ob-
vious when there are large amounts of data; perhaps it would
be useful to represent the profile information in geometric
form. To portray geometrically more than two of the indica-
tors, however, would force us into an n-dimensional space
which is beyond our ability to represent easily on a flat sur-
face. If we therefore take only indicators 1 and 2 from the
Approved For Releas?04/13
A-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
An Indications Study
SECRET
example and graph their weights with respect to the three
hypotheses, the result is this:
12
? H1
-2 -1 0
Figure 2
Even though this geometric representation has lost the in-
formation contributed by Indicator 3, it still makes clear that
H, is remote from H2 and H3, which are comparatively close to-
gether.
It was basically to this sort of statistical analysis that the
study subjected the indicator weights assigned by the five
judges. Because more complex computations were planned,
however, the number of indicators had to be reduced once
more to keep the experiment within reasonable time limits.
The 28 indicators previously chosen as a representative sample
of the original 123 were carefully studied and eight of them
selected for this analysis, as follows:
I,.-(A2i) Major deployment of tankers and long-range
bombers to forward bases.
I2--(A3g) Expanded submarine barrier operations.
I3--(B3c) Widespread appearance of new cryptographic
or transmission systems.
A-RDP78 %T4A000200010001-2
 Approved *rl fin20*S 1 IA-RDRir8Md$'Wq @0 0'010001-2
14- (B4c) Tightening of military security such as new
travel restrictions, etc.
Is-(B6b) Major standdown in the Tactical Air Force for
maintenance.
Il;-(C1e) Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with
Moscow and Peiping.
17- (C2f) Sudden shifts, especially in crises, to softer
propaganda themes.
I8-(C6c) Cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet
scientists outside the Bloc or their recall.
The seven original hypotheses were all retained. An aver-
age was taken of the weights assigned by the five judges to
each of the eight indicators with respect to each hypotheses.
Seven profiles of the average weights were then drawn, one
for each hypothesis. They are shown in Figures 3 through 9.
Of these profiles it can be seen that H4 and H, (Figures 6 and
7) are the most highly similar of all, reflecting the logical
similarity between the situations of limited war and guerrilla
war. H6 and H7 (Figures 8 and 9) also have some, less strik-
ing similarity and thus corroborate our intuitive feeling
that diplomatic crisis with no military intent should have
many aspects in common with military suppression of internal
conflicts. The other three hypotheses (premeditated surprise
attack, pre-emptive attack, and escalation) appear to have
unique profiles. These results appear to support the applica-
tion of indicator pattern analysis to discriminate among
hypotheses.
Graphic Discrimination
In order to show geometrically all of the information con-
tained in these seven profiles it would be necessary to use an
eight-dimensional space, which is impossible to represent
clearly in two or even three dimensions. Fortunately, a
powerful statistical technique 1 permits one to transform the
'The use of canonical variates. For a full explanation of the tech-
nique see C. R. Rao's Advanced Statistical Methods in Biometric
Research (NY: John Wiley & Sons, 1952), chapter 9, especially
pp. 364-370.
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SECRET SECRET 111
Indicator No.
1 (A21)
1 2
Avg. Indicator Wgt.
 Approved For Re?eA9t2d6WW+1 (y
Profiles of Averege Indicator Weights Aselgned by Five Judges
88 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
SECRET
eight axes of this space to a new set of eight in which each
is a linear combination of all the original ones. This means
that each of the original indicator weights is represented in
each of the eight new dimensions. It is now possible to select
the two most significant of these dimensions as the axes for
portraying graphically in one plane most of the information
contained in the seven profiles.
This statistical transformation having been performed with
an IBM 709 computer, the resulting eight new dimensions were
called variables Z1 through Z8 to distinguish them from the
original indicators Il through 18. Z2 and Z,,, the two largest,
were seen to account together for 76% of the information in-
herent in the set of seven profiles, ZG for 52% and Z2 for
24%.2 The next largest, Z1, accounted for another 16%. All
five other Z variables together contributed less than 8%.
With Z2 and Z6 accounting for a little more than three-
fourths of the information in the profiles, it becomes mean-
ingful to graph the relationships among the seven hypotheses
using them as axes. This two-dimensional plot is shown in
Figure 10.
Here the positive and negative signs do not signify probabil-
ity and improbability respectively, but the position ,of an
hypothesis along each axis is determined by the pull of the
positively and negatively weighted indicators that are com-
bined in the axis. On Z2 the positively weighted indicators
exert a pull to the top of the space and the negatively
weighted a pull downward. On Z6 the positively weighted in-
dicators exert a pull to the right of the space and the nega-
tively weighted a pull to the left.
On the vertical axis Z2 there are large positive coefficients
for indicators 1, 6, and 8, and the largest negative coefficients
are for indicators 4 and 5. On the horizontal Za the only
large positive coefficient is for indicator 6, but there are fairly
large negative coefficients for indicators 2, 3 and 7. These in-
'The mathematical expressions for the two are as follows:
Z2-1.58 I1-0.19 L-0.20 I,-0.67 Is-1.29 I,-x-1.04 I,-0.30 I,+0.68 L
Z,-0.13 I,-0.86 I,-0.34 I +0.03 Is-0.04 Ig-{ 0.56 I,-0.45 I,+0.07 Ig
-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-?1
SECRET
 dicators with important positive and negative coefficients are
the following.
orward bases.
(Is) Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with Moscow
.-A
P'
Z,: (Ii) Major deployment of tankers and long-range bombers
to f
eiping
.
(Is) Cancellation of scheduled visits by Soviet scientists
side the Bloc or their recall.
(Is) Consultation by regional Satellite leaders with Moscow
and Peiping.
Negative Coefficients
Z2: (I6) Major standdown in the Tactical Air Force for mainte-
? nance.
(Ii) Tightening of military security such as new travel
restrictions, etc.
(I2) Expanded submarine barrier operations.
(I,) Sudden shifts, especially in crises, to softer propaganda
themes.
(Is) Widespread appearance of new cryptographic or trans-
mission systems.
Examination of Figure 10 reveals a distinct cluster of the
three hypotheses describing a limited war situation (limited
war, guerrilla warfare, and military suppression of internal
conflicts). The distance between this cluster and a fourth
hypothesis, diplomatic crisis with no military intent, is less
Forward base deployment 2
Bloc consultation
Bloc personnel recalled
TAP standdown
Security tightening -2
-3 -2
Expanded sub operations
Softer propaganda
New crypto-systems
i Z6 (52%)
2
Approved For Release 2004/13
than the distance between any pair of hypotheses outside
the cluster. The diplomatic crisis hypothesis might therefore
be linked with the limited war cluster in a "confined crisis"
category.
There is only one indicator which can have pulled this clus-
ter toward the positive end of the Zs axis-Communist Bloc
consultation. It seems consistent with Bloc activities in a
limited war situation.
The split along the Z6 axis between the total war situa-
tions on the left and limited war situations on the right can
be more fully explained, however, by noting the three indica-
tors which have a strong negative pull along the horizontal
axis. These are expanded submarine barrier operations, wide-
spread appearance of new cryptographic or transmission sys-
tems, and sudden shifts, especially at a time of crisis, to
softer propaganda themes. The expansion of submarine op-
erations is a relatively unambiguous action which would in-
crease Soviet ability to wage general war. The introduction
of new cryptographic systems could be a protective prepara-
tion for surprise attack but by itself is susceptible of a nurn-
ber of other interpretations. The sudden shift in propaganda
could be an attempt to lull the United States into a posture
of reduced alert. The element of deception contained in this
last indicator may be a sufficient explanation for the differ-
ence in position between the hypotheses of pre-emption and
premeditated surprise attack on the left and that of escala-
tion about midway between them and the limited war cluster
on the right.
Along the vertical axis, escalation and pre-emption are at
opposite ends and premeditated attack lies approximately mid-
way between them. The indicators operating negatively
which apparently favored pre-emption and rejected escalation
are the tightening of military security and a major stand-
down in the Tactical Air Force. An increase in military se-
curity, one of the more difficult indicators to identify, would
in fact be more likely to accompany pre-emption than escala-
tion. A standdown in the Tactical Air Force does not seem
to argue strongly for pre-emption, but it seems to explain the
negative position on the Z2 axis of the limited war cluster, be-
cause tactical rather than strategic air forces would probably
be used in a limited action.
SECRET 91
 Approved For Relea '&167 ow
The indicators whi h
c exert a positive pull u
Z2 axis and thus separate escalation from upward along the
major deployment of tankers and lon
-
ward
r
g
range
areas,
bombers to for_
scheduled Communist Bloc consultation, and cancellatio
visits by Sovi
n of
et scientists outside the Bloc. Uach
of these actions could logically be associated with pre-emp ion
except that their likelihood of detection i
the fa
vor
s great; this is wh
y the escalation hypothesis
strategy conference . The convening of a Bloc
would explain the , a familiar Soviet pressure technique,
Positive location of th
hypothesi
e diplomatic crisis
s along the Z2 axis.
The position of premeditated surprise attack on the verti-
cal axis is the most difficult to explain; it was expected that
this hypothesis would cluster with pre-emption.
indeed the closest pair along The two are
indeed g the Ze, axis, but evidently the
Positively weighted and negatively weighted indicators on
the Z2 axis exerted an equalizing
r
p
emeditated surprise. Its central .V upon the hypothesis of a
2 axis
P on n-
may be a reflection of the ambivalence oof the judg sec concer
ing the role of deception in this situation. The cleaner p~
zation along the ZQ axis rests on an unambiguous d stinoctiiin
between limited war and general war.
Critique
The encouraging thing about this analysis is that a totally
objective and dispassionate statistical arraying of the rela-
tionships among the seven hypotheses
roborates our intuitive explanation of the role played b ch
various indicators in distinguishing amon y the
surprising and reassurin g theg It is both
assignment of indicator weights discover that the independent
lack of full consensus, disclosed so much information. judges, despite a
The sources of ambiguity in the experiment may be sum-
marized as follows:
The use of indicators rather than indications data, i.e. s _
cific occurrences of indicators, means that the time factor
was not precisely stated ~ pe
etc. , quantities of troops, equipment,
were expressed in general terms such
as heavy, etc., and the geographic areas involved were not
specified.
SECRET
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DP78TRJ,R4"Pg4P0}1a9901-2 SECRET
The state of international relations was not described; the
general strategic setting was left to the judges' imagina-
tion. The present world situation might best have been
explicitly assumed.
Each indicator was considered by itself, whereas few if any
indicators are in practice evaluated in a vacuum. They
are considered not only against the general background
noted above but some of them in pairs or clusters with
others. These groupings should be defined and treated to-
gether.
The list of indicators was incomplete. It is economical to se-
lect a sample for experimental purposes, and the sam-
pling used here may have been valid; but the reader should
recognize that only a portion of the problem was under
study.
No attempt was made in this first trial to account for the
probability of occurrence and the likelihood of detection
of each indicator. These characteristics have been de-
scribed for the entire indicator list and they form an es-
sential part of the complete indicator definition. Per-
haps the indicators should be grouped according to the
ease with which the Bloc can manipulate them. Another
possible classification scheme would be a chronological
listing broken down by probability of occurrence.
Terms likely to occur in describing indicators and hypotheses
were not standardized by any authority such as the Dic-
tionary of United States Military Terms of Joint Usage.
It became clear during the process of adjudicating weights
that many of the original differences resulted from varia-
tions among the judges' definitions of key concepts.
Now that the validity of this approach seems to have been
established, the statistical analysis should be done with the
entire set of 123 indicators and the elaborated statement of
hypotheses. If the eight indicators used before were truly
representative of the total set of 123 and if the seven hypothe-
ses used were a reasonable generalization of the elaborated
statements, the full analysis should give a configuration simi-
lar to that of Figure 10. But it should have more precision
IA-RDP78TO3194A00020001 bt1 0001- nuances in the roles played by the
 Approved F6mFUWaeti 05fQQy1 i-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
An inverted pyramid of respon-
sibility rests on its apex in the
lone officer at a small overt
domestic post.
chief indicators. Such a complete portrayal of the associa-
tions among alternative hypotheses in relation to the full
complement of indicators could, one may hope, serve as a
basis for the development of more sophisticated and ad-
vanced decision models.
YOUR MAN IN OHIO
E. S. Rittenburg
In CIA's apparatus for gathering foreign intelligence from
personal sources in the United States, the operating elements
are organized in Field Offices maintained more or less overtly
in regional centers of the country. These correspond to the
covert field Stations for collection overseas and like them may
each have one or more outposts in other cities, called resident
agencies in the domestic organization, which of necessity op-
erate fairly independently under the remote control of the
parent Field Office. A resident agency is likely to be staffed
with a single or perhaps two intelligence officers supported in
a modest office by one or sometimes two stenographers. The
work of the resident agent (or his counterpart in one of the
smaller Field Offices) has a flavor and a challenge of its own,
stemming from the convergence of a broad spectrum of intel-
ligence interests and representational responsibility onto the
lone operator.' It has not been lightened by the increase dur-
ing the past decade in international travel, exchanges, profes-
sional meetings, and correspondence and in requirements for
domestic support of covert activities.
Representation
The resident agent openly represents U.S. intelligence and
in particular the CIA to tens of hundreds of people who have
been cleared for contact in his geographic area. He may be
responsible for an urban area of 750,000 persons, for example,
The reader may be interested in comparing the problems of the
resident agent with those of the covert officer at a small overseas
post as described in C. R. Drave's "Production at Small Posts,"
Studies V 4, p. 21 if. The differences, deriving principally from
the overt status of the resident agent, are considerable, but they
lead to no considerable difference in the qualifications desirable
i ch an officer. MORI/HRP PAGES 95-100
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'J 4
 SECRET
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Your Man in Ohio
and work with all the diverse strata of its society. In his'con-
tacts with persons from all levels of life and all professions
who are of potential interest for intelligence collection pur-
poses he is expected to demonstrate a reasonable competence
in specialized subjects ranging from atom-smashing to the
Zambezi river. He must also be knowledgeable in making
semi-overt approaches to properly cleared members of the
community, either as individuals or as officials of business
concerns, for assistance in support arrangements designed
ultimately for entirely covert CIA operations. These support
negotiations demand an experienced working knowledge of the
various components of the Agency and of the intricacies of
banking and fund-handling processes, the latter including
the requirements of our friends in the Internal Revenue
Service; the local field representative might be the first
man they would call in the event of some administrative or
security mishap involving a CIA employee or intelligence op-
eration.
To key members of the local community the resident agent
is the CIA, and this personal contact may largely determine
what impression of the Agency and of U.S. intelligence is held
by a member of Congress, an executive of a large concern
with influence in Washington, or a future political appointee
of importance. Locally, the effectiveness of his personal con-
tacts determines how successful the resident agent will be in
obtaining, as need arises, free technical advice, access to
plants and research laboratories for visiting analysts seeking
a frame of reference for the assessment of foreign technology,
and nonofficial cover positions for staff agents overseas.
The field representative must further maintain a cordial
yet correct relationship with the local offices of other U.S.
government agencies, offices usually larger than his by far.
He needs their help in such matters as making a quick local
check on some person not previously contacted but now ur-
gently wanted as a source, muffling possible flaps and imper-
sonation-of-federal-officer cases when some covert or head-
quarters officer in town on leave spooks someone inadvert-
ently, and calming down disturbances created by former em-
ployees or agents resettled in the city. Occasionally a Soviet
Bloc intelligence operation may be detected in the area and
_. Your Man in Ohio
SECRET
to be reported urgently to the local FBI without overt
need pots wanting to shoot the President,
CIA involvement. Crackgunmen carrying "credentials" as federal representatives, and
the like must all be referred promptly to the Secret Service,
the FBI, or the Department of State or Comm
tierce as pe tions propriate. There are few government org
local offices are not brought into contact with the resident
a ent at one time or another on routine latter natio l busi-
g With competent handling even the usually
ness.
be settled cietly.
Intelligence Collection
Yet the basic function of the domestic g to enceprioroi.cty,
remains that of collecting and reporting, subject, and information on any countruations eor oearthy eXp anyeriences with
be it ethereal aerospace equations
Now that thousands of
counterintelligence implications. country"
andvisithundredsthe of ero
profes-
year cities
travelers from each of our larger
behind the iron curtain back and forth regarding their spe-
sional people are writing ntry
So-
cialities, playing host to Soviet Bloc travelers, visiting
cialities, the S
international meetings
viet Bloc themselves, and attending
with their Soviet counterparts, this collection effort muster be gence
exp highly selective. The individual a d lhis efforts aided by t o f
enced judgment is supplemented cases and
work of headquarters case officers inet to gad case rand of
headquarters analysts in forwarding sj other guidance-
ments, designating priorities, and furnishing ishing for unusual op-
But the resident agent must always rt in usual op-
portunities in his town not anticipated by anyone
ton. He may have to handle these according to his immediate
judgment based on the currency of histy nt llig n attention ge,
significance promp to the Of
bringing items of sign ud judgment as a
headquarters. In any case he must use his j g
matter of routine in deciding what potential avenues of col-
lection to pursue, how to pursue them, and how to make the
less im-
most of good opportunities while keeping n happy a be the more less im-
portant sources of information who happ and a
tant individuals. His work is thus both interesting
growth-inducing challenge.
96 Approved For Release 20MO 1i3 : CIA t$P78T0319S 26200010001-2
 Approved For Release ZQ05/04fto
Security
Aside from the physical safeguards required by the fact
that the field office, generally located in
d
a
owntown commer-
cial building, has in its safes information and files cutting
across the organizational structure of a compartmentalized
headquarters and intelligence community, the domestic collec_
tion officer must maintain a constant awareness that he is in
contact with the public in some fashion every hour of the
day (and often at night) on matters reflecting intelligence
activities and interests. He must keep up a guard such as
headquarters personnel need to wear only on social occasions,
and then only if they are known to be intelligence officers.
When the listed phone number rings, it can be a crackpot, a
genuine walk-in or defector, a job applicant, or just a regular
source who has forgotten the unlisted number. When the un-
listed number rings, it can be any one of hundreds of people
interviewed in past years asking about or offering informa-
tion on a possibly highly specialized subject discussed with
him perhaps last evening and perhaps five years ago. Woe to
him who lacks a keen memory or an effective quick-reference
file !
With all his need for a constant security alert, the officer is
at least blessed in not having any criminal or counterintelli-
gence investigative function, and it is helpful for him to be
able to affirm this to a source from whom he is attempting,
for example, to obtain an assessment of a recent Soviet visitor.
Even the routine security investigation of citizens applying
for positions or undergoing periodic security checks is handled
by others, whose comings and goings, however, are inevitably
brought to the attention of the collection officer from time
to time.
Personnel
Thus the resident agent, whose basic duties are no different
from those of other domestic collection officers, must, by
virtue of being more remote from his Field Office than the
others assigned to it, be an especially experienced, able, ma-
ture, and self-reliant person. If he fails, the effect is felt
quickly all the way up the line. At times it has a way of being
felt in the field only when it has come back down the line after
SECRET
having reached some upper level by another channel. Luckily
such embarrassments are infrequent and usually cleared up
quickly; but they too have their challenging aspects and add
to the requirement for stature in a resident agent. A pax-
allel requirement for a mature and self-sufficient secretary,
especially when there is only one officer and no other stenog-
rapher in the resident agency, is singularly important, for it
is she who 'must know how to act and what to say in emergen-
cies that can arise when the resident agent is out on business
calls, as he often is.
In spite of the relative insularity of his operations, the resi-
dent agent bears a direct responsibility to his immediate su-
perior, the Field Office chief, stationed as much as hundreds
of miles away and perhaps even in another state. This re-
sponsibility is not only operational but administrative, includ-
ing that for evaluating the performance of the second officer,
if there is one, and the stenographer in the resident agency
with reference to possible promotions and other personnel ac-
tions. The chief is usually kept informed on the work of his
outpost by having all reports and memoranda channeled
through him for his signature and all case actions and other
headquarters directives forwarded via the same channel, and
this flow of paper is generally supplemented by periodic per-
sonal contacts.
When military personnel are assigned to a Field Office, and
especially when they are loaned to a resident agent for pri-
ority work, it is important that they also be mature and com-
petent. They are responsible to the Field Office chief and to
the resident agent to the extent that he represents the chief,
but only to their own military superiors in the final analysis.
Here self-sufficiency is again the key. Temporarily assigned
military personnel have demonstrated their ability to make
first-class informational contributions to the intelligence com-
munity and to perform excellent representational services for
U.S. intelligence before other government organizations and
the public in local communities.
The small domestic station or resident agency, in sum,
though free of some of the problems associated with a larger
staff, may have some unique ones, the seriousness of which
varies with the calibre of its staffing. In such a detached
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 Approved For F 61n"c2005/@
element of the Field Office, on the other side of the coin, the
challenge, self-involvement, and sense of accomplishment in
the work seem to be greater
Lik
.
e other members of the do -
Field Office
the resid
,
agent,
ent agent represents you who are
in Washington and is proud of what he c
d
an
o for you, whey-
ever you are in the intelligence community; at some time or
another he has quite likely acted directly on your behalf.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
SECRET
RDP78T03194A000200010001-2 CONFIDENTIAL
A survey of periodicals and other
public sources of military intelli-
gence on the Soviet Union.
OPEN SOURCES ON SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS
Davis W. Moore, Jr.
Open sources useful in the production of military intelli-
gence on the Soviet Union are many and varied. They are
available in great quantity within the intelligence community
and to a smaller extent in the academic world. The Library of
Congress, the Army Library, and the Navy Department all
have good collections of Soviet publications on military affairs.
In the academic world there are some 20 research establish-
ments having more than ten thousand and another 40 or more
having between one and ten thousand Russian titles each.
More than 35 non-government libraries regularly receive over
one hundred Russian periodicals each, and 13 subscribe to
ten or more Russian newspapers.' If no more than one-tenth of
these publications contain information on military affairs they
constitute an abundant resource. An exceptionally good col-
lection of Soviet military publications is in the Hoover Insti-
tution at Stanford University.
The value of such material is less easy to establish than its
abundance. For current intelligence, open sources are used
only rarely, one reason for this being that there is some lag
in the receipt of Soviet publications here. They can, how-
ever, be quite useful in supplying information on military doc-
trine, order of battle, and specific weapons. They can be
and are used in the production of basic and estimative mili-
tary intelligence, and they contribute data on the develop-
ment of weapons systems. In aggregate, open sources prob-
ably furnish the greater part of all information used in the
production of military intelligence on the Soviet Union, al-
though the figure would not be so high as ninety per cent.
Melville J. Ruggles and Vaclav Mostecky, Russian and East European
Publications in the Libraries of the United States, pp. 299--300,
-RDP78T03194AO00?000and 10001-2 MORI/HRP PAGES 101-108
CONFIDENTIAL 101
 CONFIDENTIAL Approve d-nRM#,MR,290f9e4s[
The principal types of open sources dealing at least in part
with Soviet military affairs are discussed below with respect
to their availability in the United States and their value rela-
tive to one another.
Soviet Military Regulations and Manuals
These are concerned for the most part with standard meth-
ods of military operation common to all armed forces, but
they do occasionally furnish insight into Soviet doctrinal con-
cepts and administrative procedures that differ from those of
the West. Their chief value lies in the fact that the issuance
of a new regulation or manual usually reflects a change in
military thinking. They are also useful lexicographically, to
establish precise meanings and connotations in Soviet mili-
tary terminology.
Although the circulation of official military regulations and
manuals in the Soviet Union is generally not restricted, they
require special effort to procure because they are issued in
very limited quantities. There are therefore likely to be only
a few copies of any particular regulation available in the in-
telligence community and probably none at all in non-gov-
ernment repositories. If a regulation is in especial demand
it is translated-usually by the Department of the Army-
and reproduced for distribution to all intelligence agencies.
Soviet Books and Pamphlets
These include anything from a specialized pamphlet on
street fighting to a 100-column doctrinal treatise on "war" in
the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. The Soviets are prolific pro-
ducers of publications on military-or rather politico-mili-
tary-affairs, and there are many Russian works on all man-
ner of subjects from national strategy and objectives to de-
fense budgetary problems and night combat. Raymond L.
Garthoff's Soviet Military Doctrine includes a bibliography of
about 350 of the most valuable titles up to 1953,2 and in 1959
The Department of the Army published a bibliography en-
titled Soviet Military Power containing 1,300 selected refer-
ences (to periodicals as well as books), at least one-third of
them in Russian.-'
2 Pp. 514-537.
8 186 p.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
CONFIDENTIAL
It should not be assumed that the value of these publica-
tions is commensurate with their quantity. In the first place,
many are merely translations of Western military works, and
while these may be of passing interest in showing the pains
the Soviets take to interpret Western concepts in Marxist
terms, they throw little light on proper Soviet concepts. In
the second place, Soviet military works are filled with political
propaganda; by far the greater part of a typical Soviet mili-
tary publication is concerned with the application of ideologi-
cal tenets to military concepts. It has been estimated that
only about ten per cent of the Soviet military literature is
devoted to purely military matters.
An exception which has created something of a stir in the
intelligence community is the recently published Voennaya
Strategiya (Military Strategy), a collection of essays edited
by the former First Deputy Minister of Defense, Marshal V. D.
Sokolovskiy. This is apparently the closest the Soviets have
come to publishing a complete and up-to-date analysis of stra-
tegic and tactical concepts applied in the practices of their
own and the U.S. armed forces. The Air Force was the first
to translate the book into English, but the demand for copies
soon exceeded the supply, and last spring three editions were
published commercially.
Soviet Periodicals
Soviet newspapers and magazines, whether aimed primarily
at a military or a civilian audience, probably yield more mili-
tary information per unit of time spent on them than any
other open sources. The two main non-military sources are
the central party and government organs Pravda and Izve-
stiya. Although they carry relatively little purely military
material, they are valuable for two kinds of information. The
first is official party and government pronouncements on mili-
tary matters, which, if they are of major import, appear first
in the central press. The second is the reported order of prece-
dence of individuals at official functions, which provides an in-
dication of the current status of different leaders, countries,
and policies in Kremlin councils.
Another non-military daily which is often a good source
of military information is Komsomolskaya Pravda, the news-
Laper of the Young Communist League. It often carries fea-
-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
 CONFIDENTIAL
tures not found in either Pravda or Izvestiya such as reports
of trips through Soviet military installations or articles,
sometimes complete with pictures, on newly developed.
weapons.
Although often not regularly available, the Soviet provin-
cial press occasionally contributes some choice bit of infor-
mation. Sometimes items censored out of the central press
will, through bureaucratic inefficiency, appear in one of the
republic newspapers. A good example of this occurred last
fall: while the central press published only unidentifiably dis-
tant side-on pictures of the dignitaries attending the Novem-
ber 7 anniversary parade, the Byelorussian paper carried a
good full-face photo of the reviewing stand which revealed
the whole order of protocol.
By far the most useful Soviet military publication regularly
available in the United States is Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star),
issued daily by the Chief Political Administration of the Min-
istry of Defense.4 It is received here by air the day after pub-
lication and examined promptly. It contains all types of in-
telligence information, from low-level order of battle up to
politico-military matters of the greatest significance. Like all
Soviet newspapers, it is quite small by American standards,
often not more than four pages, and its content is considered
the more important for this tight selection. Even its propa-
ganda commentaries are carefully analyzed to determine in
what directions the Soviet authorities are trying to shape the
thoughts of their military personnel.
Krasnaya Zvezda was formerly the organ of the Soviet
Army, while the Chief Political Administration of the Soviet
Navy published a similar daily entitled Sovetskiy Flot (Soviet
Fleet). It was in about mid-1960 that the naval paper was
discontinued and Krasnaya Zvezda, transferred to the Min-
istry of Defense, became the daily newspaper for all the So-
viet armed forces. It still devotes more attention to the
ground forces than to other branches.
Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), a monthly journal
put out by the Historical Division of the General Staff of the
'For a discussion of the Soviet military periodicals see Garthoff, op.
cit., pp. 508-509, and the same author's Soviet Strategy in the
Nuclear Age, pp. 254-258.
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IA-RDFa190 A4 A(0d2d 0001-2
CONFIDENTIAL
Soviet Army, is the USSR's most important military publica-
tion. It contains articles written by high-ranking officers on
subjects of the greatest doctrinal and strategic import. It
bears a classification comparable to our Official Use Only-
"For Generals, Admirals, and Officers of the Soviet Army and
Navy Only"-and usually circulates no lower than the field-
grade officer level. Copies therefore have to be procured clan-
destinely, and it can not be regarded as an open source. Ar-
ticles in Voennaya Mysl' accepted as doctrine by policy
makers, however, usually appear eventually in other military
publications.
The Soviet Navy has its own theoretical monthly publica-
tion, Morskoy Sbornik (Naval Journal), which is also re-
stricted and equally difficult to acquire.
Until recently each service branch, or its chief administra-
tion, published a monthly journal devoted mainly to tactical
matters of interest to personnel of the branch. These were
received in the United States more or less regularly. Now
some of these journals have been discontinued and replaced
by the publication Voenniy Vestnik (Military Herald), previ-
ously the journal of the ground forces. Although this now
serves the armored, artillery, and ordnance branches as well,
its chief emphasis-and hence its main interest to military
analysts-continues to be on subjects of tactical relevance to
the ground forces. Other branches still publish their own
monthly journals, and these, when available, continue to be
excellent sources of information on tactical doctrine and
order of battle.
Recently two new monthly military publications have ap-
peared, one named Starshina-Serzhant (Warrant Officer and
Sergeant) after its intended NCO audience and the other en-
titled Sovetskiy Voin (Soviet Warrior), aimed at enlisted men
in general. These mass-audience magazines contain no doc-
trinal information of any kind, but they occasionally furnish
some useful order-of-battle information or a photograph of
some new piece of equipment.
In the field of paramilitary publications, the Soviet Volun-
tary Society for Aid to the Army, Aviation and the Fleet
(DOSAAF) publishes the semi-weekly paper Sovetskiy Patriot.
This has recently become an extremely valuable source on the
civil defense and paramilitary instruction given to boys and
A-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL
n Mi''ll',.
Approved For go ease Zt&g/&k!GC esC
girls in the USSR. Since many retired military participate in these training activities, it also serves personnel asn a
source of OB information
eral military journals, . DOSAAF publishes in addition sev;
the most valuable of which, because
it contains articles written by Soviet military
Voenniye Znaniya (Military Knowledge). leaders, is
These publications are of course more valuable to an analyst
who has a reading knowledge of Russian than to one who does
not. Selections from th
em, however, are made available in
translation by CIA's Foreign Documents Division
translations can be obtained on request. , and further
Another useful
source is The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, edited by
Leo Gruliow under the direction of the Joint Committee on
Slavic Studies of Columbia University. translation of important current a
This
ti
f
r
cles,
and although
or a
ented mostly toward political developments, it does contain
occasional items of military import. It should be used to
supplement the FDD publications, which do not as a rule in-
clude items that have already appeared in the Current Digest.
Less information on Soviet military matters comes from the
Satellite press, naturally, than from the Soviet. The Soviet
forces in the Satellites are less active publicly and more segre-
gated from the populace than they are at home, and the Satel-
lite press is in any case reluctant to
a military nature until it has a publish information of
publica-
tion. If an analyst regularly followsr thein
press ofl a Satellite
country, however, he will occasionally find an item of OB in-
terest or an "exclusive" report dealing with some activity of
the Soviet military there.
Soviet Broadcasts and Press Transmissions
Although radio broadcasts cannot be regarded as one of the
major open sources of military information on the Soviet
Union, they can nevertheless be useful from time to time.
Their great advantage is in being made available to Western
analysts much more quickly than newspaper or journal arti-
cles. In matters of urgency the translated text of a broad-
cast Soviet statement can be in an analyst's hands within an
hour of broadcast time, whereas he will not receive a published
article until at least twenty-four hours after publication, and
should he want a translation of it he will have to wait even
106 Approved For Release 2005/04/13
CONFIDENTIAL
longer. In routine matters the difference is that between a
day or two and several weeks.
Texts of Soviet broadcasts published daily by the Foreign
Broadcast Information Service are widely distributed through-
out the intelligence community and to some public institu-
tions, but they are of limited use in the production of military
intelligence because the Soviets broadcast far less military
information than they print. Moreover, the FBIS analytic
work is therefore oriented chiefly to political rather than mili-
tary subjects. . On the other hand, much of this political
broadcasting can have military significance, and it is cata-
logued in FBIS in such a way as to be of great use to the mili-
tary analyst, with separate files, for example, of Soviet leaders'
pronouncements on strategy, capabilities, and war themes
and Soviet threats of counteraction.
Western Sources
Into this category fall such diverse informants as Soviet de-
fectors, Russian exile groups active in the West, former Ger-
man military personnel who have had contact with the Red
Army, and Western experts on military affairs. Some of these
can be regarded as primary sources of information and others
only as useful to help interpret data from primary sources.
Soviet defectors can be a copious source of information:
most of them have had at least some experiences with the
Soviet military and are eager to tell what they know. Their
public statements and writings, while they may be sensation-
alized, affected by whatever bias led to the defection, and
limited by the particular situations the authors had experi-
enced, can be valuable confirmatory sources and may contain
new information for which confirmation can be sought else-
where.
The publications of Russian exile groups can often provide
assistance to the Soviet military affairs analyst, not so much
as a source of raw information but as a help in interpreting
open-source data available to exiles and analysts alike. One
such group, the Institute for the Study of the USSR, head-
quartered in Munich and headed by Nikolay Galay, puts out
a monthly Bulletin which often contains excellent articles on
Soviet military affairs. This and other exile publications, such
as the New York newspaper Novae Russkoe Slovo (New Russian
 CONFIDENTIAL
Word), are generally available throughout the intelligence`
There are numerous German open sources of militar
i
y
n-
formation on the Soviet Union. Some are accounts by Ger
man prisoners of war returned from imprisonment in the
U.S.S.R. Useful information can be derived from these if they
are treated with the same caution as refugee and defector re-
ports. Others are formal, rigorous German analyses of Soviet
military doctrine and capabilities by wartime generals on th
e
eastern front or in the general staff. These tend to manifest
a national bias and doctrinaire approach similar to that in
the corresponding products of Soviet generals, but the analyst,
by making allowance for this, can derive some valuable ana-
lytical material from them.
The last group of sources in this category consists of West-
ern authorities on Soviet military affairs. Prominent within
this group are Raymond L. Garthoff, a former researcher for
the Rand Corporation who has produced three excellent books
on Soviet military theory and operating techniques, Herbert
S. Dinerstein, the author of War and the Soviet Union, B. H.
Liddell Hart, the noted British military authority, and Han-
son W. Baldwin, the New York Times military specialist. Al-
though these men rarely have access to any information not
available to the intelligence analyst, they use many of the
same sources he does and consequently can make contribu-
tions to the analyst's interpretation of the raw information.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
108 CONFIDENTIAL
COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS
Caught Napping
Dear Sirs:
The acronym UNESCO which introduced your article on
the Economic Commission for Europe 1 is erroneous in refer-
ence to the UN's Economic and Social Council, the ECE's par-
ent organization. UNESCO stands for the United Nations Ed-
ucational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. ECOSOC
is the correct designation for the economic body.
Bias and Probity
Dear Sirs:
We in INR's Office of Research and Analysis for Africa have
read with interest your recent article on "Policy Bias." 2 As
a sometime contributor to the INR papers from which it
quotes and for the past five months INR analyst for the Por-
tuguesgj African territories, it is perhaps appropriate that I
attempt to comment on the views it puts forward. While I
cannot claim to be as recent a newcomer to the field of intelli-
gence as the author, a graduate of one year's experience, I
have not yet lost the feeling of wonder and trepidation with
which one must approach the task of intelligence evaluation.
Let me begin with the specific and proceed to the general.
The article asserts that Research Memorandum RAF-21 of
January 31, 1962 ("The Portuguese Overseas Reforms: An
Appraisal of the First Six Months") seems "to have been writ-
ten in support of policy." In one sense, I concur wholeheart-
edly. INR deliberately shaped the paper to support policy by
answering a high-level request for evaluation of the reforms
thus far undertaken by the Portuguese in their overseas ter-
ritories. These reforms resulted in large part from direct
' Studies VII 2, p. 27.
2 By Janet Hill Merkle, in Studies VII 1, p. 55 ff.
RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2 MORI/HRP PAGES 109-111
SECRET 109
 SECRET
Approved For Releasget260?5#VT3
pressure by the U.S. Government, which felt that drastic
changes were required to improve Portugal's image in the
world community and to construct a base upon which Angola
could become politically and economically viable in the future.
An evaluation of the reforms was important to the policy
maker primarily as a means of assessing the extent to which
they were contributing to these objectives.
It seems to me that any evaluation of these or other re-
forms must have some such standard of reference. A charge
of bias could be brought if the standard of reference were con-
cealed; but the authors of this Memorandum took care to
indicate at the outset that the evaluation was being made in
the context described. To this extent, therefore, the paper
supported policy exactly in the way intelligence must if it is
to be useful.
To say that the evaluating was done in the context of U.S.
policy is, however, far from admitting that we supported policy
by coloring the facts and the evaluation in favor of the policy.
We firmly believe that this should not be and has not been
the case. To support its charge of bias, the article presents
passages out of context and ignores other passages which note
Portugal's positive efforts, the physical problems facing it in
embarking upon this ambitious program, and its accomplish-
ments to date. Indeed, one wonders what would have hap-
pened if, in order to avoid seeming anti-Portuguese, we had
evaluated the reforms against the standard of Portugal's own
extremely optimistic claims when they were introduced. I
think that in the final analysis we may have been kinder to
the Portuguese-and equally objective-in doing it the way
we did.
The article further attempts to show that INR's evaluation
has consistently been at variance with that of the U.S. consul
in Luanda. I trust there is no suggestion that INR would be
less biased were it to accept one source's evaluation as defini-
tive? In any case, a key point incorporated into the introduc-
tory section of the Memorandum was drawn almost verbatim
from a Luanda report: "Reports from the overseas provinces
indicate that the status of the African still has not changed
significantly, despite earnest attempts to expand educational
facilities." Furthermore, nearly all recent reports from Lu-
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SECRET
RDP78TO3 Adder2b0010001-2
anda, Lourenco Marques, and even Lisbon have tended to con-
cur in the basic INR assessment-i.e., that Portugal has
shown neither the resources nor the capacity for implement-
ing far-reaching reforms. This is, I feel sure, not an "anti-
Portuguese" position; the article itself at one point implies
that it is anti-Portuguese not to mention Portugal's lack of
resources as an impediment to reform. The INR evaluation
is made on the basis of present and past performance--the
only valid evidence by which we can judge intention and
capacity.
In effect, the article seems to be saying that because we do
not in every paper point out that poor little Portugal is doing
its best and is suffering as well as inflicting unhappiness, we
are biased. Every paper cannot have the whole story in it. As
it happens, the issue of Portugal's resources has been care-
fully studied and much thought given to ways of meeting the
problem. But intelligence would surely be doing itself dam-
age if it refused to analyze any one facet of a subject in the
light of explicitly stated assumptions and reference points.
The reforms could be written about in terms of Portuguese
capacity, Portuguese will, African receptivity, human rights,
Latin American relations-and any number of other refer-
ence points. We wrote about them in the light of two pros-
pects-improved status for the African and eventual self-
determination-that chiefly concerned the United States at,
the time, and we carefully explained that we were doing so..
I do not believe this approach is biased.
Perhaps the article is basically concerned over the concept
of policy-oriented research which underlies INR's production.
This concept does not involve corrupting data to make policy
look good. It does mean a constant attention to the unspoken
estimates underlying policy and an examination of these for
their accuracy. Thus if U.S. policy was based on an expecta;
tion that the reforms would produce certain results, the re-
search analyst must ever be re-evaluating the likelihood of
this expectation's being fulfilled.
We perceive no reason why a basic dichotomy should exist
between policy and intelligence. Frequently the policy maker
receives from the intelligence community an indigestible com-
pendium of all possible considerations and consequently feels
DP78T03194A000200010001-2
 SECRET
SECRET - - - -- . _.. - __ra McMairol'i
constrained to shape his own estimate of a particular situa-
tion. If the community is to play a meaningful role, we be-
lieve it must be prepared to present not only such undoubtedly
necessary round-ups but also selectively focussed papers that
bear directly on specific and limited policy questions in terms
of implications, alternatives, and outlook. This is another
thing than permitting policy to color intelligence evaluations.
Joanne Curtis
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
KAZNACHEEV
INSIDE A SOVIET EMBASSY. By Aleksandr Kaznacheev.
with an Introduction, by Simon Wolin.
Edited, 250. $4.95.)
incott. 1962. Pp.
phia and New York: J. B. Lipp
Intelligence operations officers generally tend to odiscount
unt
books and articles published by defectors-and for god a-
son. All too Often the defector's story (frequently prepared
conscious public by a hack writing ghost) is lost in
for a spy
is so ti Or-
a welter of self-justification Worthless to the see serious reader.
fetched as to be completely or pure
The veteran case officer, w the defector's account tasea highly ut of real cynicism, is likely to vie eve" as
a expurgated version of the
ebeing h mselfrtaken in
use without
-
ganda ploy which he can by it. In the words of one CIA chief of station with 'e consid
great
erable European experience, "As a rule,
when you're chasing them; but once they have come over and gone through the mill and are ready f or resettlement, ehethey
become for the professional a very large
a bore." articular to the generalization that
To this rule-and in p
defectors write more fiction than fact, more trash the ptu b-
stance-Aleksandr Kaznacheev is a whopper of an n.
At the age of 25, fresh out of Moscow's Oriental he t ue:~ nt
embodiment of the heralded "New Soviet Man," nee so en
in early 1957 as a junior Foreign Service probatio
USSR's embassy in Rangoon. As the only Burmese-speaking
member of the embassy staff, he was soon recruited (during a
short trip back to Moscow) for Soviet intelligence; and from USIS rary
then until June 1959, when he walked of colo'pted
in Rangoon, he was a rising young
Junior Officer Trainee-in the huge intelligence complex op-
erated by the KGB in Burma.
78T03194A000200010001-2
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 cERET
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Approved For Release 2005/04/ ~e
Inside a Soviet Embassy chronicles Kaznacheev's own ex-
periences as a student intelligence offi
h
cer
.
is less Tht
ons well is evidenced both ba he learned
rank-.ironically, on the very da y his promotion to attach
feetb y he made up his mind to de-
-and the wealth of operational data he includes, al-
most unconsciously, in recounting the circumstances which
led to that defection. His is a relatively simple story, with a minimum of melodrama and without attemptingtto
to
inflate the author's own importance. What is more Kazria_
cheev wrote it entirely by himself, in English; editorial ad-
vice and organization obviously came from Simon Wolin, but
the style is unmistakably that of Kaznacheev and very
simplicity is a quality some of his Western counterparts tmight
do well to emulate. For in a sense the book is really a collec-
tion of contact reports-as it were an operational file-which,
although not without a certain appeal to the lay reader, can
be savored fully only by a case officer or operations chief.
is a story of the personalities and personal relationships which
are central to ninety percent of the daily routine of a field
operator in any service. Admittedly a worm's-eye view, it
nevertheless provides a fairly accurate and realistic assess-
ment of the then current Soviet situation in Rangoon, by an
unusually gifted observer.
In his very unpretentious way, Aleksandr Kaznacheev has
produced a fascinating and informative report, worthy of de-
tailed study by case officers concerned with operations in
Southeast Asia, particularly in neutralist countries such as
Burma where the Soviet stake is equal to, if not greater than
ours. We can allow him the moderate amount of cold war
philosophizing probably insisted upon by his
publishers.
remarkable achievement is to have given us an intimate pis
ture of Soviet intelligence life by a series of well-related episodes documentingseldom
the develop-
ment and training (as well as the disillusionment) of a junior
intelligence officer-and, not incidentally,
considerable insight into an operational systemawhicchvi r -
pro-
' Also note Kaznacheev's testimony before the internal security Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary: Soviet intelli-
gence in Asia, Hearing, December 14, 1959, and conditions in the
Soviet Union, Hearing, January 22, 1960.
SECRET A'
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78T031 AO062O 11666itcyheev
ductive though it may have been, was exceptionally cumber-
some and inept.
As seen by Kaznacheev, Burma during the late 1950's was
not a particularly happy place for the Soviets. Their aid pro-
gram, in the face of Burmese bureaucracy, was poorly admin-
istered and seldom appreciated; their position as the spokes-
man for all progressive forces was being undercut daily by
the Chinese; their relations with U Nu's government were
never cordial; and, toward the end of Kaznacheev's tour, they
suffered a number of propaganda blows (one being Kazna-
cheev's own defection) which brought Soviet prestige in
Burma to its lowest point in postwar years. Morale in the
embassy was non-existent; the clique-ridden atmosphere,
punctuated by frequent squabbles between the ambassador
and the KGB units, made life, in Kaznacheev's words, "defi-
nitely abnormal and unhealthy." To a man, none of the So-
viets ever really liked Rangoon. The crowded living condi-
tions-worse, if anything, than Moscow-the unbearable heat,
and the inability to communicate with the Burmese or even
any non-Bloc diplomats combined to create an environment
in which the major preoccupation for the Soviet officer be-
came the regular, rapid achievement of a state of absolute
inebriation, and the next morning to count up once again the
days remaining before rotation back to Moscow.
Of more than passing interest is Kaznacheev's appraisal of
the Soviet political action program. Surprisingly enough, the
Soviets had not had the degree of success in Burma with which
most Americans are likely to credit them. Despite the pleth-
ora of Communistic parties and individual pro-Communists
there (it was a mark of distinction among many Burmese
intellectuals to be considered a "fellow traveler"-this con-
veniently made one a "progressive" without absolutely com-
mitting one to either side), the Soviets were never able to
weld all the leftist groups into a single effective mass organi-
zation. Kaznacheev gives an interesting reason for this: the
men who staffed the KGB's Political Intelligence Unit simply
refused to believe that any Burmese Communist was loyal
enough to be trusted with anything more than the overt
Moscow line. The aura of mutual suspicion which pervaded
the embassy itself was projected in an even greater suspicion
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13:
Recent Books: Kaznacheev-
of those outside who declared themselves friendly to the Soviet
Union. That this distrust was still more pronounced among
the Referentura's intelligence personnel was reflected in Kaz
nacheev's instructions from his superior to be careful of "prov-
ocations."
This reviewer had on several occasions opportunities to talk
with Burmese politicians who had been (and in some cases
still are) active in Communist organizations. Invariably,
whenever the subject came up, the Soviets in Rangoon were
roundly criticized, not for their over-all policy, but for their
hostile attitude "toward the masses," that is their lack of
empathy and support for Burma's progressive forces. Curi-
ously, the Chinese Communists were never regarded with quite
the same dislike, although they were even more inaccessible
to Burmese leftists.
One very bright and capable young Burman, more candid
than most, confessed that in the course of several years' ex-
posure to Marxist indoctrination as a member of an extremist
youth organization he had been sincerely ambitious of be-
coming a full-fledged member of the Communist Party and
doing more for the Soviet cause. After some difficulty he suc-
ceeded in getting in touch with Ivan Rogachev, whom Kazna-
cheev describes as a leading KGB officer in Rangoon during
the late fifties. Then there began a long drawn-out series of
meetings during which Rogachev assiduously pumped his
young acquaintance for "information" but never bothered to
establish any real operational, let alone a personal, relation-
ship. After nearly a year, the Burman grew tired of what
he felt was only casual interest and drifted away. He was
looking for guidance, for development, for a chance to assist
the Communist movement in any way his mentor might sug-
gest. All he got, in his own words, were "a fishy eye and a lot
of bloody questions they could have answered well enough
themselves."
To Aleksandr Kaznacheev this incident would not have
seemed unusual. The Soviet intelligence officers he knew had
very little understanding of their indigenous targets and a
surprising lack of concern for classic agent development. Ap-
parently vetting procedures in the Referentura were both
clumsy and unreliable, and this, combined with the ever-
Approved For Release 200?bg4J : CIA-
78T03194A000200010001-2
Recent Books: Kaznacheev
SECRET
present fear of provocation, frequently inhibited them from
making important operational contacts.the Soviets -old d con-
flict between security and effectiveness,
applied the
such a rigid and
cally opted for security, and they aIn-
stultifying manner that it was often c un erprf uctthe host
formation reports could of course be gathered
of fellow travelers who openly reported to the embassy. The
how-
with the Burmese
lack of real communication
the elements in people,
Burma that
ever, prevented a marshaling could have been of invaluable assistance. Kaznacheev's departure a good many changes have
occurred in the Soviet Union's Rangoon installation. A new
and dynamic ambassador with an intelligence background,
Andre Ledovsky, took the place of the bumbling, ineffectual
Schiborin. Many officers are now permitted to live outside
the Soviet compound. In Kaznacheev's own place there are
now four or five Burmese-language officers, some of them in
-
the upper echelons. Intelligence operations, too, have obvi-
ously been redirected. The intelligence personnel, although
just as distinctive by their mode of living and cliquish behavior
as they were in Kaznacheev's day, are now assiduously culti-ese vating key personalities at has levelseen termed tjhe Sov et cou.n-
Inside a Soviet Embassy
terpart of The Ugly American, and there is, whether by acci-
dent or design, a similarity in the attitudes and personalities
d
described in the two books. And just as authors a e Aerreeriand
Burdick caused an agonizing review of the
serving overseas, one can assume that Aleksandr Kaznacheev
has been at least partially responsible for an outwardly y appar-
ent change in the Soviet method of conducting intelligence
operations. It is hardly likely that any future probationer
will be able to fabricate intelligence reports and receive com-
mendations on them from Moscow, as Kaznacheev did; with
Andre Ledovsky in charge, it is doubtful that code clerks like
Viktor Kabin will continue to insult their ambassadors; one
can only speculate on the future effectiveness of Soviet black
letter operations,
mechanically disseminated f without pa Esping e
in Moscow and
change by the Rangoon Referentura.
78T0319460200010001-2
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
Recent Books: Kaznacheev
This is not a deep book, and it would be too much to say that
it should become a standard reference work for professionals.
Nevertheless, it is highly useful for an understanding of the
atmosphere in which the opposition had to conduct its busi-
ness. It is also a book that can be enjoyed, if for no other
reason than to give the case officer the feeling that the other
side can be just as frustrated and confused as he may be.
With respect to its author, it offers ample testimony that he
was an able student of intelligence operations and a keen ob-
server of the modus operandi that gave those operations their
peculiar Soviet imprint.
WORLD WAR II
PEARL HARBOR: Warning and Decision. By Roberta Wohl-
stetter. (Stanford University Press. 1962. Pp. 426. $7.50,.)
,,If our intelligence systems and all our other channels of
information failed to produce an accurate image of Japanese
intentions and capabilities, it was not for want of the rele-
vant materials. Never before have we had so complete an in-
telligence picture of the enemy.
Thus does Roberta Wohlstetter start the seventh and last
chapter of her magnificent analysis of the circumstances lead-
ing to the disaster of 7 December 1941. Winner of the Ban-
croft Prize for 1963 and now in its third printing, her book is
cul-
She makes failure
the most objective
yet r published.' intelligence
Harbor examination
extensive
minated at t
The chief previously published works that deal significantly with the
intelligence aspects of the Pearl Harbor disaster are the fo l owingg:
The Road to Pearl Harbor (Princeton University
Herbert Feis, who had been a State Department officer at the time
of the attack and in writing the book at the Princeton Institute
for Advanced Study had access to official U.S. documents and the
papers of several of the participants; Admiral Kimmel's Story (Chi-
cago: Henry Regnery, 1955), the naval commander's own apologia;
G. E. Morgenstern's Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair, 1947),
a journalist's portrayal of the attack as the result of a deliberate
plot engineered by President Roosevelt; The Final Secret ofa Pearl
Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair, 1954) by
ordinate commander of Kimmel's at the time of the attack and
a good
his
of t the blame should have gone tot the top argues that military
share assistant
and civilian, in Washington; What Happened at Pearl Harbor?
(New York: Twayne, 1958), a compilation of documents bearing on
the event, including extracts from the congressional investigation,
edited by H. L. Trefousse; and the Report of the congressional Joint
Committee itself (USGPO, 1946). The 39 volumes of this Report
include not only the testimony (Parts 1-11) and exhibits (Pasts
12-21) placed before the Joint Committee but also the evidence
developed in the earlier investigations by the (Supreme
Admiral Thomas CtHart
tice) Roberts Commission '(Parts 22-25), by Army Pearl C.
rt
for the Secretary of the Navy (Part 26), by the Har
Approved For Release 200WQ4: CIA
 'proved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA--R
use of the 39-volum
e
ort of the onal r,
mittee on the Investigatjo
e HJ nt
n of the P
rAttack
basic source material, but works out her n '
,
earlarbc exception
fine study of the intelligence reporting, processing and est{f.
i
l
lia
s aLemnent in Chapter Seven, UM
Wohlstetter ? qualifies i.
t. She points out that "no
son or agency ever had at an
le Pea
y given meg
oment all th existing." And while the decision-makers had at hand an
pressive amount of information on the enemy, "they did not
have the complete list of targets [esti
mated t b
oe the
Lives of an evidently immin
obieo.
t
en
seabot
rne atack since
none
of the last-minute estimates included Pearl Harbor.
not know the exact hour and dat
They did
e
for o
Opening
They did not have an accur
attacX
t
a
e
knowld
ege of Japanese capabili.
ties or of Japanese ability to accept very high risks.. .
could enumerate accurately the B
we
it
r
ish and Dtf
uch targets
[o attack
either N
... onovember 30 or Decem.
ber 7, why were we not expecting a specific danger to our-
selves?"
Several reasons are offered. `?t is much easier after the
event to sort the relevant f
r
fore
om the irrelevant signals ... co Bne-
the event [a signal] is obscure and pregnant with -
flicting meanings In Washi
t
ng
on Pl H
,eararbor signals
competing with a vast number of signals from the Euro-
pean theater ... In short, we failed to
l
a
t
e
n
materials, but because of a pleth-
ora of irrelevant ones.-
Board (Parts 27-31), by the Navy Court of Inquiry
by colonel Carter W. Clarke for the Arm (Parts 32-33),
by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen su y Chief of Staff (Part 34),
pplementi
Boa
d Col.
r
ng the A
iti
aonrmy Pearl Harbor
g (Part 35) , and by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt sup-
plementing the Navy Court of Inquiry results (Parts 36-38). Part 39
contains the summary reports of the Roberts Commission, the Army
Pearl Harbor Board, the Navy Court of Inquiry, and the Hewitt
Inquiry. A study of the intelligence aspects of the Joint Commit-
tee's findings, in the form of a memorandum written for the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence under date of 22 August 1946 by Walter
L. Pforzheimer, is available in the CIA Historical Intelligence
Collection.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13:
examples are cited which "illustrate . . . the very human
tendency to pay attention to signals that support current ex-
pectations about enemy behavior." There were other p:rob-
gems for the analysts: there had been previous alert situations
and false alarms; the enemy tried to keep relevant signals
quiet and conducted an elaborate deception program; there
was such careful control over the most important informa-
tion that "only a very few key individuals saw these secret
[MAGIC] messages, and they saw them only briefly. They had
no opportunity or time to make a critical review of the ma-
terial, and each one assumed that others who had seen it
would arrive at identical interpretations."
There were intraservice and interservice rivalries and a gen-
eral disregard for intelligence. "The most glaring example
of rivalry in, the Pearl Harbor case was that between Naval
War Plans and Naval Intelligence. A general prejudice against
intellectuals and specialists, not confined to the military but
unfortunately widely held in America., also made it difficult
for intelligence experts to be heard ... Low budgets for Ameri-
can intelligence departments reflected the low prestige of this
activity, whereas in England, Germany, and Japan, 1941
budgets reached a height that was regarded by the American
Congress as quite beyond reason."
The doctrinal conclusions the author arrives at in her study
are not optimistic. These include:
"The fact that intelligence predictions must be based on
moves that are almost always reversible makes understand-
able the reluctance of the intelligence analyst to make bold
assertions."
"In spite of the vast increase in expenditures for collect-
ing and analyzing intelligence data and in spite of advances
in the art of machine decoding and machine translation, the
balance of the advantage seems clearly to have shifted since
Pearl Harbor in favor of a surprise attacker. The benefits to
be expected from achieving surprise have increased e:nor-
mously and the penalties for losing the initiative in an all-out
war have grown correspondingly."
"If the study of Pearl Harbor has anything to offer for the
future, it is this: We have to accept the fact of uncertainty
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78T
Recent Books: World War II
and learn to live with it. No magic, in code or otherwise, will
provide certainty. Our plans must work without it."
While such disturbing conclusions are justified by the his-
tory of the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, in which the lack of any
capability for systematic analysis and unified estimates loomed
large, they are perhaps less fully applicable today than Mrs.
Wohlstetter believes. Nothing, to be sure, will "provide cer-
tainty," but the postwar development of the U.S. intelligence
effort has substantially eliminated many of the problems
and weaknesses, horrendous to contemplate in the brilliance
of our 20-20 hindsight, which she describes.
The preceding chapters of the book make a careful analysis
of the intelligence organization at Pearl Harbor and a much
more penetrating study of Washington intelligence. Particu-
lar attention is devoted to signals intelligence, notably to
MAGIC intercepts, the "Winds" messages, Japanese espionage
reporting, and frequency analysis. There is a look at the
three earlier alerts in 1941-June 17, July 25, and October
16-and the effect these had on reactions in December, and
careful consideration is given both to diplomatic reporting
and to the able press coverage of the deterioration of Japa-
nese-American relations. Finally there is a good study of the
Japanese planning which highlights the fact that the Pearl
Harbor attack was not finally settled upon until the last min-
ute, a circumstance that did not make the problem any easier
for U.S. intelligence.
This is a required textbook for intelligence officers-a little
slow-going in spots, but on the whole exceedingly well done.
-L. B. Kirkpatrick
THE QUIET CANADIAN: The Secret Service Story of Sir Wil-
liam Stephenson. By
H. Montgomery Hyde.
(London:
Hamish Hamilton Ltd.
1962. Pp. 255. 25/-.)
Also under
title ROOM 3603. (New York: Farrar Strauss & Co. 1963.
$4.50.)
On 8 November 1962, in the British House of Commons, Lt.
Colonel Cordeaux, Conservative member from Nottingham,
Central, arose to ask the Attorney General whether he would
authorize the prosecution of Hamish Hamilton, Ltd. and Mr.
Montgomery Hyde on the ground that The Quiet Canadian
contains breaches of the Official Secrets Act. Sir John Hob-
son, the Attorney General, answered "No."
Lt. Colonel Cordeaux persisted: "Is my right honorable and
learned friend really telling the House that no breach ofthe
Official Secrets Act has taken place in the writing and publi-
cation of a book that describes the work of one of the head
agents of the British Secret Intelligence Service? Can he as-
sure us that the publication of this book had the full approval
of the present head of the Service, and if it did, will he say
what advice one should give to former members of the Service
who will now, of course, be encouraged to cash in on their own
tst-
personal knowledge of similar sensational events ~andi intere ar
S Stu
ing and intriguing bits of information,
Menzies' successors?" The Attorney General replied that he
did not have any evidence of an offense having been committed
and referred the other questions to the Prime Minister.
On 11 December in the House, Lt. Colonel Cordeaux asked
the Prime Minister if he would consider amending the Official
Secrets Act to strengthen it, and Mr. MacMillan replied that
he thought the provisions of the Actl honorable atadequate. , Cold-
nel Cordeaux then said, "If my rigY will he agree
ers that the Act is adequate for its purposes,
that it has not been enforced? For instance, does he agree
that . . . The Quiet Canadian discloses the most flagrant
breaches of the Official Secrets Act by one or more people,
showing that the Act is not being enforced in the way
after the First World War? If no action is taken under the
Act as a result of the publication of this book, will it not be
impossible to prevent other secret agents exploiting their own
experiences for money and, moreover, impossible to prosecute
them if they do?" did
The Prime Minister: "I am informed that this book ...
not in fact prejudice current security in any way. I am in-
formed also that any breach was inadvertent and due to a
misunderstanding. In general, the requirements of the Act
are widely understood and are well observed."
To this reviewer the discourse above presents in a new light
what had seemed the enviable quiet effectiveness of the British
Official Secrets Act in protecting intelligence operations from
public knowledge. Having been concerned with the frustrat-
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA
ing and often futile effort to restrain or restrict under Ameri-
can laws what appears in public media concerning U.S. intel-
ligence operations, I felt a bit of sympathetic shock on learn-
ing that our British counterparts have their problems too.
The publication of this study is shocking indeed.
The work done in New York for British intelligence by
"Little Bill" Stephenson was known to some of "Big Bill" Don-
ovan's employees in the O.S.S. Exactly what British intelli-
gence was doing in the United States, however, was closely
held in Washington, and very little had hitherto been printed
about it. Robert Sherwood, in editing The White House Pa-
pers of Harry L. Hopkins, had made a reference to it which
gives the Hyde book its title:
There was established, by Roosevelt's order and despite State
Department qualms, effectively close cooperation between J. Edgar
Hoover and British Security Services under the direction of a
quiet Canadian, William Stephenson. The purpose of this was
the detection and frustration of espionage and sabotage activities
in the Western Hemisphere. . . . It produced some remarkable
results which were incalculably valuable. . Hoover was later
decorated by the British and Stephenson by the U. S. Government
for exploits which could be hardly advertised at the time
Nor should they have been advertised now.
In a rather disjointed history, Mr. Hyde reveals how Stephen-
son, with the agreement of the FBI but unbeknown to the
State Department, established a base for intelligence activi-
ties in the United States, creating an organization that op-
erated first under the cover of the British Passport Control
Office and later as the Statistics and Analysis Division of the
Office of British Security Coordination. One of his first op-
erations was concentrated on persuading the U.S. government
to conclude the destroyers-for-bases deal with Britain. This,
according to Mr. Hyde, "became inextricably a part of the
broader purpose of promoting American intervention" in the
war, an aim pursued by the use of covert propaganda among
other means. Stephenson used the American press to advan-
tage in exposing the activities of German Abwehr agents in
the United States, in revealing that material prepared by the
German Library of Information was being mailed under con,
Approved For Release 2005/0
-L. B. Kirkpatrick
Recent Books: World War 11
gressional franks, and in fighting the America First organizes.
tion. He also worked against the German cartels and their
organization here.
After the United States entered the War, Ste r
cipal efforts turned to intelligence s s collection, counteres io in,
page, and covert action against the Axis Stephenson p-
P
France. He worked close l Powers and Vichy
muds, the Royal Canadian with British censorship in, aB r-
Mounted in
British intelligence in South A
merica, but his Ownnadand
tion ultimately embraced about 1000 men and women the
a orgniza-
United States and another 2,000 elsewhere in the hemis here. r His countersabotagebein P
war
materials officers worked on security controls for
tain
taking protective act ondinto their for B hands), (On occasion more than 30,000 anti-sabotage inspections on British ships,
and placed observers on neutral ships in U.S, po. C?ndt
a fascinating story of operations against the rVichy Fe t e embassy in which the sexual lure played a
Stephenson's employment Part, y French
of fabricated letters and false docu-
ments, indicates that one of his collection re
information on internal U.S. Politics, and
version
vof the organization and development of the office was
the Coordinator of Information gives the British
ce of
Strategic Services, and its successor Office of
One may suppose that Mr. H
the "inside" stories of U.S yde's account, unlike some of
rela-
tively accurate but the wisdom of intelligence operations, is ord is extremely questionable. g it on the public rec-
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : Cl
TO BURN
A SHORT HISTORY OF ESPIONAGE.
(New York: David McKay. BY Colonel Allison Ind.
1963. Pp. 337. $5.50.)
In the field of intelligence literature probal
most, the poor books outnumber the good ones b more than y dous margin, and this quickie by Colonel Ind, a retired Army
a tremen-
Intelligence Reserve officer, belongs to the regrettable ma-
jority. The professional intelligence officer, young or old,
need not read it.
An accurate over-all history of espionage is much needed;
no really acceptable such work has appeared since Richard
Rowan's The Story of Secret Service,, which badly wants up-
dating. Because of Colonel Ind's care
i
er in intelligence, includ-
Bureau (a duty as Deputy Controller of the Allied Intelli-
gence
clandestine service which performed, under
General MacArthur in the Pacific, some of the same opera-
tional functions as the OSS in other theaters of war), and
because he had written
perience a fairly sound book based on this ex-
,2 one might have hoped that the present volume
would at least partially fill the gap. ar into it before any such hopes are ash dt one need not read
The Short History appears to be largely other published works, containing little, if an
Yrewriin from
re-
search. The author's imaginative style hides too any, oanyfaults
of substance for a reviewer to correct. His chapter many
Rich-
ard Sorge, for example, repeats a number of the errors tht
have appeared before in stories about this famous case.
acknowledges that his association with the case was He
tal," but his having been a member of General MacArhu "inthu is
Intelligence Section under General Willoughby v s
given him an incentive to make a proper stuy f might have
' New York: Literary Guild of America, 1937.
'Allied Intelligence Bureau. (New York: David McKay, 1958.) Re-
viewed in studies III 1, p. 135.
126
MORI/HRP PAGES 126-127
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Recent Books: Burn
The superficiality of the book is particularly evident in its
final chapter, dealing with the current intelligence organiza-
tion in America. CIA is said to have
got into everything, including other people's hair. It set out to
control the entire intelligence effort. In many fields it was doing
a tremendous job in a superior way; it sought to do all jobs
everywhere. Obviously it couldn't hope to do tactical intelligence
for combat units, big or small. The ponderous permission granted
the services, allowing them to retain a function that was so obvi-
ously a property of command in the first place, certainly irritated
more than it soothed.
The hyperbolic image of a CIA controlling everything includ-
ing tactical combat intelligence outdoes even the Cooks and
Tullys of recent notoriety.
Colonel Ind is worried about anti-military bias in estimates
which he says are "prepared by" the United States Intelli-
gence Board. He thinks there is a "law . . . demanding the
inclusion of minority reports" in them, but he considers the
military representatives on the USIB-perhaps unaware that
they constitute a majority-threatened by the fact that "close
ties exist between the CIA and the State Department, so close
that most citizens do not try to distinguish between them."
He has learned, in his retirement in England, that "the State
Department representative on the United States Intelligence
Board is a civilian," who might therefore exercise in collu-
sion with CIA "a disproportionately heavy vote." He insists,
in curious terminology, that an estimate should be "a con-
sensus of all independent and contrasted sources."
It is obvious that the author, however good a combat intel-
ligence officer he may have been, is not in a position to deal
with . problems of national or strategic intelligence; and he
has not contributed to the literature of intelligence history.
His book is a prime candidate for that wonderful class.ifica;
tion, "Burn Before Reading."
-Walter Pforzheimer
 Approved For
STUDIES
n
INTELLIGENCE
VOL. 7 NO. 4 FALL 1963
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECReT roved For Release 2005/04/13 Of RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
25X1
 25X1
STUDIES IN INTELLIGE-M]IF
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other
component of the intelligence community.
WARNING
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
Way be written on any theoretical, doc-
'.rinal, operational, or historical aspect
J) f intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITORIAL BOARD
Hx1
LYMAN B. 9 IRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
 SE9Wroved For Release 2005/04/
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CONTRIBUTIONS
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence communitd
or, upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should
be submitted directly to the Editor. Studies in Intelligence,
Room 1D 0011 Langley and need not be coordi
nated or submitted throdgm F
channels. They should be typed
in duplicate, double-spaced, the original on bond paper. Foot-
notes should be inserted in the body of the text following
the line in which the reference occurs. Articles may be clas-
sified through Secret.
DISTRIBUTION
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call
your office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,
For back issues and on other questions call the
Office of the Editor, II
Approved For Release 2005/041
SECRET
CONTENTS
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Page
Estimating the Soviet Gold Position . . Paul R. Storm 1
The unravelment of an economic deception opera-
tion. SECRET
The Estimation of Construction Jobs
Vincent Renntauskas 11
Building times and costs for Soviet missile sites.
SECRET
The Intelligence of Literature . . . . . James V. Ogle 23
Tracing the renewed literary rebellion in Hungary.
CONFIDENTIAL
The Pitfall of a Latin Quirk . . . . . M. E. O. Gravalos 31
When to believe the wishful revolutionary? SECRET
Centralized Requirements in the DIA . . Lowell E. May 33
Real unification in the guidance of collection.
SECRET
Domestic Collection on Cuba . . . . . Judith Edgette 41
Mass interrogation ahead of the October '62 crisis.
SECRET
Letter from a Staff Agent . . . . . Louis Boifeuillette 47
A personal case history from black Africa. SECRET
Agent Hazard in the Super-Het . . . M. J. Angelicchio 57
Receiver radiation as a DF target. SECRET
A Name for Your Number. . Thomas W. Marcquenski 6.1
The "reversal" of telephone directories. CONFIDEN-
TIAL
Communications to the Editors . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Quantified indicators . . Agent relations. SECRET
Aspects of Counterinsurgency Intelligence
William M. Hartness 71
Intelligence needs of the Special Action Forces.
CONFIDENTIAL
The Assessment of Insurgency
Edward T. Schwarzchild 85
For a composite field intelligence team. SECRET
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature . . . . . . . 91.
IA-RDP78TOlf6itAr666 3 'f0w'fgre. CONFIDENTIAL
 Approved For Release 2005/04/1
UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Geographic Intelligence . . . . . . . . Louis Thomas
A first conceptual portrayal of this functional sector.
The Intelligence Department . . . Garnet J. Wolseley
Handbook for the nineteenth-century officer.
PP78T03194A000200010001-2
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 SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/04/1
Tools found to cut a world
trade bogey down to size.
ESTIMATING THE SOVIET GOLD POSITION
Paul R. Storm
THE STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE AWARD
An annual award of $500 is offered for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for
publication in the Studies. The prize may be divided if the
two or more best articles submitted are judged to be of equal
merit, or it may be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently
outstanding.
Except as may be otherwise announced from year to year,
articles on any subject within the range of the Studies' pur-
view, as defined in its masthead, will be considered for the
award. They will be judged primarily on substantive original-
ity and soundness, secondarily on literary qualities. Mem-
bers of the Studies editorial board and staff are of course ex-
cluded from the competition.
Awards are normally announced in the first issue (Winter)
of each volume for articles published during the preceding
calendar year. The editorial board will welcome readers' nomi-
nations for awards, but reserves to itself exclusive competence
in the decision.
SECRET Approved For Release 2005/04/1
The cloak of secrecy that covers so many Soviet activities is
drawn especially tight about statistics on the production and
consumption of nonferrous metals and minerals in the USSR.
The State Secrets decree of 9 June 1947, as amended in April
1956 and again in 1959, makes it a criminal offense to divulge
absolute figures on productive capacity, production plans, and
plan fulfillment for nonferrous, precious, and rare metals.
Apparently the decree is strictly enforced, for since World
War II there has been no known instance of publication of the
proscribed data.
If the Soviets forbid the release of information on the produc-
tion of metals like copper, lead, zinc, and aluminum, it is not
surprising that gold production and the size of the Soviet gold
reserves should be treated with the utmost secrecy, and these
secrets in fact appear to be kept even from many high-ranking
officials of the Soviet government. Absolute production fig-
ures have not been released since 1927, and gold reserve figures
have never been published. In the face of this almost total
blackout of official data, anything better than a guess at the
size of the Soviet holdings was long considered impossible.
A meaningful assessment of the USSR's financial position,
however, requires that a reasonably accurate value be placed
on its reserves of gold. The Western estimates which have
traditionally ranged from US$6 billion to $12 billion-in a
self-confirming circle that does little to inspire confidence in
their validity-were not good enough. Better estimates had
to be made on, the basis of a reasoned examination of all infor-
mation available to the intelligence community.
First Questionable Construction
The approach that seemed to offer the best chance of suc-
cess was to begin with fairly reliable estimates that have been
made of the Czarist gold reserves as of the end of 1920 and
IA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
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MORI/HRP PAGES 1-9
1
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-
Soviet Gold
then compute the changes by addition and withdrawal over
the following 40 years. An obvious weakness of this method- .
ology is that the results depend upon the accuracy of the 120 ..
component estimates of annual production, consumption, and
sales, plus those of other, irregular acquisitions and disposi-
tions. But although the number of errors small and large
would undoubtedly be great, it appeared reasonable to expect
that those on the high side might roughly compensate for
those on the low.
A preliminary survey of available information revealed that
satisfactory estimates could be made of gold collections from
the population and acquisitions from foreign sources-nota-
bly the Spanish gold transferred by the Loyalist government
to the USSR "for safekeeping" during the civil war and that
of the Baltic and East European countries which came under
Soviet control when these became Soviet Republics and Satel-
lites. Information on Soviet sales of gold outside the Bloc
was also quite good for all but a few years of the 1920-1961
period. Consumption, almost negligible during the early
years, was easily estimated for the period since 1950. Gold
production was left as the major stumbling block.
The USSR had published figures on production through 1927
and there was enough additional information to carry the esti-
mates through 1933, but after that the ground was not so
firm. Soviet announcements of quarterly and annual percent-
age increases for the years 1934-1939 had been reported and
analyzed, however, by the American Legation at Riga, Latvia.
These reports were studied, and with some modifications the
estimates were tentatively accepted.
For the period 1940 through 1961 there was almost a com-
plete blank of information, and for a time the problem of esti-
mating annual production in these years seemed insurmount-
able. But after a number of false starts and some wheel-
spinning, data was obtained from a sensitive source that even-
tually led - to the development of an accurate series of pro-
duction figures for most of the 1940-61 period. With this
major obstacle out of the way and various minor problems
00200010001-2
Soviet Gold
SECRET
cleared up, a tentative estimate of reserves as of the end of
1961 could be reached.
Only it seemed this estimate could hardly be right. It was
far lower than any made in the past, almost unbelievably low
even to those who had never taken the $6-12 billion guesses
of Western financial circles seriously-under US$2.5 billion..
Moreover, the reconstruction showed Soviet gold sales in re-,
cent years to be considerably larger than current production?
es,
requiring the USSR to have been drawing
such heavily on r ' ves
to finance its annual trade deficits, and
seemed incredible if the reserves were.really so low.
A reexamination of the whole construction was thus called
for. Now a shortage of several billion dollars in the reserves
figure would have to derive from systematic error in a large
number of component estimates over a considerable time; no
single estimate or small group could possibly account for such
a deficiency. Only estimates of production met this criterion.
For a number of reasons that cannot be recounted here, the
accuracy of production estimates for the period after 1940 was
established within too narrow limits to leave room for any
but a small discrepancy, so attention was concentrated on
those of the prewar years 1934-1940. Although a close exami-
nation of the Riga analysis covering these years showed it to
be closely reasoned and the estimates apparently w
there were several questions that had not been adequately ex-
plored when its figures were tentatively accepted for this study.
The first unresolved incongruity lay in announcements
made at the time by the Chief of the Main Administration of
the Gold Industry, one Serebrovskiy. Serebrovskiy had de-
clared that gold production increased from about 2.7 million
ounces in 1933--a figure also mentioned by Stalin in an inter-
view with a Western journalist-to 10-12 million ounces in
1936 and 14 million ounces in 1937. These latter figures were
yield years, and
approximately twice the Riga estimates those
the difference cumulated over 5 or 6 years would in-
crease in reserves of about US$1 billion. Serebovskiy's claims
had been disregarded on the assumption that he was either
indulging in propaganda for Western ears or exaggerating
his own ends, as Soviet managers have been known to do;
but now it seemed possible that they were true.
2 SECRET I SECRET
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 SECRET
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ovie old
The Dal'stroy Problem
The possible vindication of the Serebovskiy figures would lie
in the production of "Dal'stroy,
"the only gold-producing or-
ganization not under the Main Administration of the Gold In-
dustry (Glavzoloto). Dal'stroy, the Construction Trust of the
Far North, was organized by the NKVD to make use of the
horde of largely political prisoners in the middle thirties for
forced labor on the mineral resources of northeastern Si-
beria. Reports leaking out of Russia told of a vast gold-bear-
ing region along the Kolyma river that was rich beyond the
wildest imagination.
rigors of the northern .Prisoners who managed to survive the
winters and the tender mercies of the
NKVD told of the death of millions of their fellows in the fran-
tic production of fantastic quantities of gold for the Kremlin's
vaults in Moscow.
For all their fiction-like. quality, some of these reports
sounded credible. One popularized t
l
a
e of Dal'stroy was a dis-
tillation by a Polish army officer of the testimony of over 60
prisoners, including their estimates as to- the size of the labor
force and the quantity of gold recovered per man. This esti-
mate put Dal'stroy's output at almost 13 million ounces in
the year of highest production. Another account, written by
a former prisoner assigned to a Dal'stroy factory
boxes for shipping the gold, used the quantities s which made
duced to calculate that more than 6 of boxes pr gold
was shipped in the peak million ounces of gold
a similar nature gave estimates of theesame eorder.o Th of
ese
stories had been discounted for a number of reasons, but now
the suspicion arose that they might be somewhere near the
truth. Although production in Dal'stroy could hardly have
matched the exaggerated guesses of 10-20 million ounces an-
nually, it might have reached the more conservative reports'
5-6 million ounces. If so, the Riga estimates obviously were
low.
Doubts about the Riga reports were increased by the fact
that, in spite of the sensational
eration and the certainty aspects of the Dal'stroy op..
made no and honlthat it was producing gold, they
down of production b Even more significant, Riga's break-
r
d
Y
o
p
ucing area left no room for
Dal'stro
Y, as though the analysts were not aware of the o
Approved For Release 05/04/1
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Soviet Gold
tion or else deliberately ignored it. Most of the data used for
the Riga estimates were those published by Glavzoloto, and it
could be argued plausibly that Glavzoloto's production figures
would not include Dal'stroy production because Dal'stroy was
not under its administration. If this was the case, Dal'stroy's
production was not represented in the Riga estimates, and if
Dal'stroy's production had been very large, as large say as
that of Glavzoloto, the total annual gold production in the
USSR would have been on the order of the 10-12 million
ounces that Serebrovskiy claimed.
. These considerations launched a search for some way to
establish the magnitude of Dal'stroy's output in the 1930's
and, concurrently, for any proof as to whether the Riga esti-
mates were really estimates of total Soviet production includ-
ing that of Dal'stroy or estimates of Glavzoloto's production
only.
Resolution
It was known that Dal'stroy's output in the 1950's, prior
to its dismemberment in 1957, had been approximately 1.25
million ounces annually. Finding some link between this level
and the magnitude of its output in the 1930's was therefore
a possible approach to the determination of the latter. An
intensive search was begun for a Soviet statement comparing
Dal'stroy production in the two periods. Such a comparison,
it was felt, might have been made quite innocently; there
would be no reason to suspect in the USSR what a revelation
it would be.
The search succeeded in uncovering two partial links. The
first was a statement that in 1958 the Western Directorate
of the former Dal'stroy, now of Magadan Oblast, produced
"not less" than it had produced in any of the previous 30
years of its existence. The Western Directorate's 1958 pro-
duction was on the order of 385,000 ounces, roughly one-third
of total output in the former Dal'stroy region in that year.
Now if the Western Directorate, in accordance with this state-
ment, produced not more than about 385,000 ounces annually
in the 1930's, a total Dal'stroy production in the 1930-'s on the
order of 5-6 million ounces annually would require produc-
A-RDP78V@ 1 Ab#e240ft6A4r2other gold-producing directorates in
 Approved For Relea&'OO5 W
Dal'stroy to have been very much greater than that in the
Western Directorate, averaging more than 1 million ounces
each. While not impossible, this asymmetry seemed highly
improbable. Every scrap of evidence available suggested th
at
all five had occupied positions of almost equal importance in
the Dal'stroy structure
ri
t
p
or
o 1952. If, on the other hand,
production in the other four directorates in the 1930's had
averaged about the same as, that in the Western, total pro-
duction in Dal'stroy in the peak prewar year could not have
been more than 2 million ounces.
The second link between the thirties and fifties was found
in the gross industrial index of Magadan Oblast, where three-
quarters of the Dal'stroy gold was mined in the postwar pe-
riod. This index showed that the Oblast's industrial produc-
tion in 1950 was slightly greater than in 1940 in spite of the
fact that the output of large-scale industry had remained at
the same level and the output of a number of industries, in-
cluding timber and brick, had declined by 1950. It is unlikely
that the 1950 gross industrial index could have shown an in-
crease over 1940 if the output of gold in Magadan had fallen
significantly over the decade, particularly when that of other
fairly important industries had declined. Production of gold
constituted much too large a share of Magadan's total indus-
trial output not to affect it.
It therefore seemed unlikely that Dal'stroy's production in
the 1930's could have been 5-6 million ounces annually. The
foregoing evidence, felt to be considerably stronger than the
hearsay of prisoners who had at best a very limited view of the
operation, indicated that Dal'stroy's major extraction areas,
including the famous Kolyma, produced from 1.5 to 2 million
ounces in the prewar year of highest output. At $35 an ounce
Dal'stroy's contribution to Soviet reserves over the crucial
6-year period in the 1930's was thus more nearly on the order
of US$300 million than a billion.
Although this conclusion leaves Serebrovskiy's claims unex-
plained, it reinforces the earlier supposition that they had
some other motivation than diligence in honest reporting. In
retrospect, Serebrovskiy's behavior opens his reliability to
serious question. On 1 May 1935 he declared that the USSR
would achieve first place in world gold output in 1940. Six
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DP78Jg4l4Qp200010001-2 SECRET
months later, 11 November, he said that first place could be
reached in 1937. Then just 17 days later, on 28 November, he
claimed that it would be reached in 1936, the coming year.
Thus in less than seven months he moved attainment of the
goal of 10-12 million ounces annually ahead four years.
Either a bonanza of incredible magnitude had been discovered
or he was a thoroughly misled or frightened man. That it
was the latter may be indicated by events a little more than a
year thereafter, when Serebrovskiy, along with many other
senior officials of Glavzoloto, was removed from office and never
heard of again. Soviet statements at the time supplemented
the usual accusations of anti-state activities against these
officials with specific charges of exaggeration, mentioning in
particular the practice of counting gold believed to be present
in mined but unsmelted ore.
Although Dal'stroy's peak production now appeared to have
been no more than 1.5 to 2 million ounces a year, the question
whether this output was included in the Riga total of 5 to 6
million ounces for the peak prewar years was still of some im-
portance. Against the negative evidence in Riga's failure to
mention Dal'stroy and listing an "all other" category in the
distribution of production not large enough to include
Dal'stroy output, it was discovered that this distributive break-
down was "forced," that is total production was estimated in-
dependently of any area figures and then distributed, some-
times quite arbitrarily, among the various sectors. The size
of the "all other" category was therefore not a valid test of
whether Dal'stroy's output had been included. Moreover, if
the Soviet announcements of annual percentage increases on
which Riga based its estimates referred, as must be supposed,
to total production, Dal'stroy's output would have been in-
cluded in the Riga estimates whether or not Riga was aware
of it.
There is also positive evidence that Riga's estimates :in-
cluded Dal'stroy production. An American engineer, Arthur
Littlepage, who had been Deputy Chief Engineer in Charge of
Production in Glavzoloto through mid-1936, returned then to
the United States and collaborated with a professional writer
in preparing an account of his years in the USSR. Not long
after the book was published he died, but his collaborator was
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 :
Soviet Gold
Soviet Gold
SECRET
analysis indicated that Soviet 1961 gold holdings were short
of US$2.5 billion, nothing like the $6-12 billion estimate still
held by Western financial experts.
The experience gained in reaching this assessment does not
point to the development of any standard technique or method-
ology. The important thing seemed to be a thorough exploi-
tation of all sources and pursuit of every however unpromis-
ing lead. Though only about five percent of the leads proved
fruitful, those that paid off did so handsomely. Sources ran
the gamut from the observations of a Yakut panning for gold
in one of several thousand streams in Siberia to reports from
the highest levels in Moscow.
One lesson learned in the research was the unreliability of
low-level eye-witness reports. Only a small percentage of
those bearing on this problem were accurate, and there was
no way, except in retrospect, of distinguishing these from the
many inaccurate ones. Published Soviet data, too, proved at
times inaccurate and conflicting, although there was no in-
dication that figures put out by Soviet statistical offices were
intended to mislead.
Statements by government officials, however, were another
matter. As we have said, Soviet officials have in no known
instance revealed publicly the true order of magnitude of
either gold production or reserves. On the contrary: from
the days of Serebrovskiy to the Khrushchev visit here in 1959,
when members of his entourage declared that Soviet gold re-
serves amounted to US$8 billion and were being increased by
$650 million annually, the consistent goal of official utterances
has been to create the image of wealth.
Yet in the realm of deeds Soviet behavior has been much
more appropriate to a nation with limited and dwindling gold
reserves. The USSR has frequently foregone attractive trade
offers when its efforts to obtain long-term credits failed, has
lost desired deals by insisting on barter arrangements, and
has been searching among its products for additional foreign
exchange earners. And finally, during certain negotiations on
an international gold reserve to which each nation should
contribute ten percent of national reserves, Soviet representa-
tives offered, not the $1 billion appropriate to these public
claims, but $250 million, around ten percent of our foregoing
estimate of their reserves.
interviewed in the hope that Littlepage might have left notes
with him or at very least told him something about levels of
production. He was unable to provide any additional infor-
mation; he said that Littlepage had purposely avoided pub-
lishing production figures out of concern for the safety of his
Russian colleagues, many of whom had already been arrested
or were under suspicion in the purge of the gold industry that
began just after he came back. This fear of hurting his col-
leagues would have been misplaced if his published statements
regarding production would have confirmed theirs, but if his
testimony would have contradicted the high production claims
of Serebrovskiy, his concern is understandable.
Littlepage did leave one concrete piece of evidence on pro-
duction levels. A memorandum of conversation describing his
debriefing by members of the Federal Reserve Board records
his saying that he had seen the final official plan figures for
gold production in 1936, that production did not reach 6 mil-
lion ounces in that year, and that he did not believe it could
have expanded very much in the following years, partly on
account of the purges. Moreover, Littlepage at this debrief-
ing was shown an article in an American mining journal
which estimated the production of gold in the USSR and broke
it down into Glavzoloto and Dal'stroy output. Its figures were
in line with the conclusions we have reached above about the
magnitude of Dal'stroy's production and with Riga's estimates
of total production. Littlepage read the article and declared
that it was essentially correct.
A monograph published in 1958 by a Soviet authority on
gold production, furthermore, used the same index on which
the estimates in the journal article were based to show the
increase in the USSR's gold production in the 1930's. This
citation of the index in 1958 is probably another confirmation
of the article's estimates of production and, indirectly, of the
Riga estimates: it is highly unlikely that an authority writing
almost 30 years later would use an index that reflected only
one-half of Soviet output.
Conclusions
With the acceptance of the validity of the Riga estimates
of production in the 1930's, the last serious question regarding
the estimate of reserves was removed. Incredible or not, the
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The building project estimator
plays distant sidewalk engineer
on behalf of intelligence.
THE ESTIMATION OF CONSTRUCTION JOBS
Vincent Renntauskas
The questions most frequently asked of the construction
estimator are how long it will take to build an installation,
how much it will cost, and how soon he can answer these
questions. The answering requires some kind of estimative
process, which may vary from what seems a mere intuitive
guess to a time-consuming analysis of extensive data by com-
plex methods. Among the more important determinants of
the process are the qualifications of the estimator, the avail-
ability of data, and the methodology employed.
The process as carried out for intelligence purposes is gen-
erally similar to that used by the construction industry itself.
In the construction industry, however, estimates are made
primarily to determine the best and most economical way to
do the job, whereas intelligence wants to know the actual cost
and the time required, given the materials and construction
methods in fact used. This distinct approach sets the intelli-
gence process apart from that common in pre-bid estimating
for construction projects. Moreover, the paucity of data avail-
able to intelligence usually precludes detailed analysis and
requires a large measure of extrapolation and approximation.
Especially in intelligence, therefore, the validity of an esti-
mate depends in large part on the estimator's practical expe-
rience and maturity of judgment. He should be thoroughly
familiar with all aspects of the work involved in the project at
hand. There is no substitute for the know-how imparted by
long and varied experience on field construction jobs, and the
estimate prepared in the office must reflect this field experi-
ence. Ideally, in view of the considerable differences in con-
struction technology in different countries, the intelligence
estimator should have obtained some of his field experience in
the country in question. Since this is seldom possible, he must
consciously adapt his experience to the building methods pre-
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vailing there and minimize the use of direct analogy with U.S.
practice.
On construction projects in the USSR the best single source
of basic working data is found in the Soviet Norm Books for
Construction, which list labor and equipment requirements
and the cost for such units of work as excavating a cubic me-
ter of earth or rock, placing a cubic meter of concrete, and
erecting a ton of steel. Composite cost and time requirements
for constructing various types of residential, industrial, and
public buildings per square meter of floor area are also given.
Architectural journals furnish a great deal of helpful infor-
mation on building construction; similarly transportation
publications in the field of railroad, highway, and waterway
construction and maintenance. Soviet handbooks give specifi-
cations for construction machinery and equipment and for
building materials, and construction journals and newspapers
place these specifications in practical context for the experi-
enced construction estimator by discussing difficulties in the
actual performance of equipment and materials on the job.
Newspaper accounts of operations on current projects shed
light on specific problems and how they are overcome.
Much of the data needed with respect to particular Soviet
projects is derived from classified documents and publications
which range from defector reports to the National Intelli-
gence Survey. The latter gives geologic, meteorologic, and
terrain information which can be of great value in determin-
ing the rate of progress to be expected in the work. Some-
times a refugee who had worked on the job can supply de-
tails about dimensions, materials used, methods of placement
or erection, problems encountered, numbers and types of em-
ployees, and other things.
So much for the estimator's qualifications and his sources
of information. His methodology can best be illustrated in a
case history.
Men at Work on Missile Complex
The following report of information from an escapee is
received:
1. A HIGHLY SECURE MILITARY INSTALLATION WAS UNDER
CONSTRUCTION IN AN ISOLATED, FORESTED AREA NORTHEAST
OF YURYA, KIROVSKAYA OBLAST, IN JUNE 1961. ALTHOUGH THE
MEMBERS OF THE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION HAD NEVER BEEN
Construction Jobs
ICBM CoM PLEX
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 .StC HET Construction Jobs
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The problem is to determine how long it would take to build
the four launch sites and how much it would cost. It is sim-
plified by the fact that their description fits previously known
launch sites for which such estimates have been made. In
particular, Site A seems to conform with the prototype launch
area C at the Tyuratam missile test range, for which a de-
tailed estimate has been prepared. Since Site A is in the most
advanced stage of construction and shows the greatest detail
of the fdur, the time sequence and breakdown of operations
with respect to it will be studied first, and then the times and
finally the costs can be extrapolated to cover the other three.
The Time Estimate
The first step is to divide the construction operation into
its major components. For purposes of illustration a some-
what simplified listing distinguishes the building of access and
intra-site roads, clearing and grubbing the land, excavation
and drainage, building construction, launch pad construction,
backfill and embankment, and finish grading. To these may
be added, as making the site operational, a non-construction
activity, installation and checkout of equipment.. In each of
these major components the estimator then sets about carry-
ing out the work on paper, taking into account the informa-
tion given in the Yurya report, what is known about the
Tyuratam prototype and deployment sites of similar config-
uration, and all other available data. This is the critical
phase of the estimating procedure because the validity of ex-
trapolations to the other three sites and subsequent cost es-
timates depend on a correct reconstruction of the sequence
of operations at Site A. It is here that the estimator must
draw upon all of his past experience to make the practical
judgments called for and adjust standard construction data
to suit the particular circumstances.
Access roads are considered first because they are prerequi-
site to getting work started at the sites. Clearing starts at
the same time, because the road right-of-way has to be cleared
of trees and debris ahead of grading operations. The roads
are rough-graded to carry equipment and supplies for start-
ing work at the launch pad areas, and then the final grading,
construction of culverts, and putting down of gravel sub-base
is done. Paving is not usually begun until backfill and em-
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Site A
Access and Site Roads
Clearing & Grubbing
Excavation C. Drainage
Building Construction
Launch Pad Construction
Backfill & Embankment
Finish Grading
Installation & Checkout
Total Period
Time in Months
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Grading , Psving
Figure 1. Operational breakdown showing time requirements and
phasing of component operations.
bankment around the site buildings is well under way and
finish grading has started. The new pavement is thus less
liable to damage from heavy loads of materials, heavy con-
struction equipment, and cuts for utility lines.
Clearing and grubbing, starting at the beginning of the job,
should be completed at the first site in four months. It can
be done more rapidly than this or spread over the full period,
using a smaller crew and less equipment, without noticeably
affecting its total cost. It should be completed for the entire
project by the end of the fourteenth month, when excavation
at Site D is about half done.
Earth moving and drainage is a part of all the construction
operations (not including installation and checkout). That
for access roads, however, is included in the roads estimate.
The time required to do the remaining excavation is estimated
on the basis of the area to be worked and the amount of earth
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 SECRET
to be moved per hectare. Each site covers about 35 hectares.
From a study of terrain maps of the locality and from knowl-
edge of grading requirements on other sites of this type it
can be estimated that the earth moving averages 3,500 cubic
meters per hectare, for a total of nearly 125,000 cubic meters
at each site. It appears to have proceeded on a normal sched-
ule, having probably been started about one month after the
access roads and clearing and grubbing were begun and com-
pleted for Site A at the end of the seventh month to fit in
with the building construction schedule.
Building construction. A comparison shows that the build-
ings are of similar size and construction to those at the Tyura-
tam prototype, and the estimates made for these can there-
fore be used. They include two missile buildings, a bunker,
and small ancillary buildings. The three types are figured
separately in both time and cost estimates although built con-
currently at each site. They are begun as soon as the first
excavation has been done, estimated at the end of the second
month at Site A.
The launch pads are begun at the same time. The estimated
time required to complete them is six months. The pads and
ancillary buildings at Tyuratam took considerably longer, but
only because of the experimentation and changes character-
istic of an R&D project.
Backfill and embankment begin as soon as the structures
rise above finished grade elevations and the utility service
lines are in place. It continues well beyond completion of the
buildings and launch pads because many areas must be back-
filled after the structures are completed and excess materials
and debris removed. .
Finish grading consists of replacing topsoil, fine-grading,
and sodding or seeding. This final step in construction is
not completed until after the paving is done and the site be-
comes operational.
The Cost Estimate
Much of the calculation necessary for determining cost has
already been done in the time estimate. Quantities of work
have been estimated and variations from the norm taken into
account in order to fix the time required for each category of
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activity. All that remains is to arrive at adjustments for the
standard costs per unit and make the arithmetical extensions.
From past estimates, which have proved to be quite close,
120,000 rubles per kilometer is assigned as the cost of grading
and paving the access roads.
Clearing and grubbing has a wide range of costs, depending
on methods and equipment used and the type and density of
forest. In this area it has been found to run nearly 700 rubles
per hectare, counting in the cost of clearing access roads.
Common (earth) excavation, usually a combination of
truck-and-power-shovel method and tractor-scraper method,
averages about 40 rubles per hundred cubic meters. Classi-
fled (rock) excavation, which usually costs about two and a
half times as much, was probably unnecessary here. Trench
and foundation excavation, which must be done by hand and
is three to four times as expensive as machine excavation, is
included in the unit cost of buildings.
For building construction it is impossible, unless a set of
detailed plans is at hand, to figure every piece of material
and every unit of labor required. But experience has shown
it possible to estimate quite accurately by square meter of
floor area for a particular type of structure; once the cost per
square meter has been worked out it is used for all structures
of the same type. Here the unit costs that have been care-
fully worked out and checked for the prototype structures at
Tyuratam are used.
Launch pad unit costs are similarly taken from those at
Tyuratam. The normal learning-curve allowance for experi-
ence gained in building the prototype is not granted for this
project because it is probably the first one carried out by its
crew. The experience factor would be an important considera-
tion, however, in the costing of a whole missile site construc-
tion program.
Backfill and compaction can vary in cost considerably ac-
cording to what percentage can be done by machine and what
has to be done by hand labor. By and large the unit cost runs
about 25% greater than for excavation.
Finish grading, which can be very expensive if a great effort
is made to "dress up" the project, is usually costed as a lump
b
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01-2
 SECRET
Quantity
Unit Cost
(R
bl
Total Cost
u
es)
(Rubles)
Access Roads
25
120,000
3,000,000
Clearing & Grubbing
140
690
97,000
Excavation & Drainage
500,000
0.40
200,000
Building Construction
Bunkers
4
55,000
220,000
Missile Buildings
Each
8
40,000
320,000
Ancillary Buildings
Lump Sum
120,000
Launch Pads
8
85,000
680,00o
Backfill & Embankment
Cubic
Meter
0
.50
75,000
Finish Grading
Lump Sum
50,000
Total
Direct Cost
4,762,000
Overhead (20%)
Total Cost
952,000
5?714,000
sum. Here, however, it can be figured on an area basis, the
cost per hectare on sites of this type averaging 350 rubles to
give about 50,000 rubles for the 140 hectares.
These unit costs, the result of much more detailed compu-
tation than can be indicated here, are then multiplied out and
the results totaled as shown in Figure 2. To this total of di-
rect costs it is necessary to add 20 percent for overhead-on-
site engineering, move-in and move-out expense, and admin-
istrative costs like salaries of supervising engineers and book-
keeping.charges. Overhead costs thus amount to 17% of the
grand total.
What is the range of error in this estimate? In the United
States bids for construction jobs may range 20% above or
below the engineer's estimate, that prepared by the designer
and his staff prior to advertising for bids. A low figure re-
flects the contractor's conviction that he has found shortcuts
for doing the job. (An interesting sidelight is the fact that
about 2,700 U.S. contractors go bankrupt each year because
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they were low bidders and their shortcuts weren't shortcuts
after all.) The intelligence estimator, however, is not trying
to make a low bid, but the equivalent of an engineer's estimate
of reasonable average cost. In a country which lacks most
of the elements of competitive bidding among construction
organizations, a figure in the low-bid range would not nor-
mally represent actual costs. On the other hand, there is no
reason to suppose with respect to an individual project that
a figure in the high-bid range is the best approximation.
Nevertheless, Soviet construction organizations do vary con-
siderably in experience and efficiency, and the effect of this
variation on costs, although extremely difficult to quantify,
should be kept in mind as one moves from static considera-
tions to dynamic and from microeconomics to macroeconom-
ics. If a program of missile site construction is judged to be
of moderate size relative to the number and capabilities of
experienced construction organizations and personnel that can
be called upon, the cost per site, in general, is likely to tend
toward the low-bid range. But if such a program seems mas-
sive enough to require, as it gathers steam, the employment
of more and more construction organizations of less and less
experience, the cost per site should settle in the high-bid range.
In many estimates of the construction costs for new weapon
systems we cannot expect to keep uncertainty within the
plus-or-minus 20% of U.S. practice.
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A case history in the analy-
sis of literary rebellion.
THE INTELLIGENCE OF LITERATURE
James V. Ogle
The controversy in the Soviet Union involving nonconform-
ist writers like Ilya Ehrenburg and Yevgeniy Yevtushenko and
reaching into the highest levels of party and government has
dramatically illustrated for the Western public the close
link between literature and politics in Soviet society. To one
who has been watching for years a similar drama played on
the small stage of Hungary, this is a gratifying development.
When I became responsible for Hungarian political and cul-
tural journals in 1958, it was with the conviction that the
trends there which culminated in the 1956 revolt could not
have stopped dead, that they must re-emerge in some form.
This paper is an account of how the re-emergence was dis-
covered and includes a description of the course taken by
these trends as evidenced in the open literary sources.
Rationale
Perhaps it is still necessary to justify the study of such
matters as an intelligence concern. Obviously, persons like
Yevtushenko cannot be regarded as likely recruits for covert
operations: the fact that they publish indicates a degree of
acceptance by and commitment to the system. The stance
and the influence of dissident and liberal writers is an ele-
ment in and one index to the stability of a society, however,
and a study of their ideological motivations and the group-
ings among them can be rewarding for intelligence. Changes
in the party line, softening or hardening on a wide range of
questions, are often indicated by shifts in the treatment of
literary dissidence, and these shifts cannot be detected if one
does not know who the dissidents are. If a political upheaval
should occur, like Hungary's in 1956, such a study will have
given in advance some indication of the direction it might
take-the aspirations of the rebels, those likely to join them,
their attitudes toward the West, etc. In any case it will lend
fR
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 CONFIDENTIAL
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precision to the description of a key target for specialized
propaganda and appeals.
It may be objected that reading between the lines in open
sources is a terribly indirect method when personal contact
is becoming increasingly possible. But the one does not re-
place the other. This, kind of dissidence does not reveal itself
to outsiders (fear of provocateurs and a marginal commitment
to the system or a devout commitment to the homeland for-
bid it) ; in fact the discreet and effective dissidence that is
important, as distinguished from the lunatic fringe, can be
identified only as it is manifested in internal action and
reaction.
The first step in such a study is to locate the areas of am-
biguity, areas in which the party line is ill defined or laxly
enforced. The second step is to identify the writers making
the greatest use of the freedom this ambiguity permits-press-
ing for freer publication rights or for freer contact with the
West, reviving interest in previously suppressed writers or tra-
ditions, or expanding permitted criticism into tabu matters,
as by linking consumer shortages to the agricultural policy.
Third, although not always necessary, it is sometimes possi-
ble and helpful to identify language differences, "open codes"
whereby liberal or dissident groups set themselves off from
the party line while paying it lip service as necessary. The
fourth step is to divide the rest of the writers into "good guys"
and "bad guys" on the basis of attack and support patterns;
the "good guys" need not express liberal or dissident ideas
themselves, but they support and defend those who do. Fi-
nally, analyzing more deeply the writings of those identified
in this manner, one can define the ideology of the liberals, the
forces and direction of change. In the normal flow of events,
of course, this final step does not complete the work of the
analyst, because partial victories of the dissidents or a change
in the party line make it necessary to begin again.
Revival of the Ferment
The Hungarian regime's cultural policy in 1958 was charac-
terized by personal vendettas and a desperate search for allies.
Except for those in prison or in the West, the leading writers
were populists, and they were "on strike." They were ineligi-
ble as allies anyway: populism in Hungary is a "third road"
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ideology, which the Kadar regime then regarded as the most
immediate danger. In the first half of 1958 the Central Com-
mittee published a massive attack on the populists, and the
high-level campaign against them continued into the follow-
ing year, abating only in the latter half of 1959. But in the
meantime, seeking allies, the party rehabilitated the urbanist,
avant-garde tradition personified by the poet Attila Jozsef.
Once a communist but expelled from the party, he had com-
mitted suicide in the 1930's. It would be an understatement
to observe that the party line in this maneuver was ill defined.
The result was a great wave of poems, essays, and short
stories which revived and carried forward the ideology of the
1956 revolutionaries. I noticed first that many stories and
poems were permeated by an existentialist despair far removed
from the optimistic socialist realism which the party sup-
posedly desired. Looking more closely at the essays written
by the existentialist poets, I found certain positive values
which were receiving a different emphasis than in the party
press. Technological efficiency and subjective freedom were
posted as supreme values, and it was clearly implied that these
were better realized in the West. The materialist dialectic of
this ideology argued that the evolution of societies is deter-
mined by the economic-technological base but that this base
itself is the creation of free, individual minds. An "open code"
consisting of allusions to science, time, the atomic age, and
humanism was developed so that the protestations of Marxist
purity made by the liberals took on entirely different mean-
ings from those of the conservatives.
Patterns of mutual attack and support revealed that two
leading literary editors were associated with the rather lim-
ited group of talented liberals, which also enjoyed the support
of many older writers and virtually all the youth, as evidenced
in the activity of the "literary theaters." Almost immedi-
ately, but with increasing effort as the party awoke to the
danger, these liberals looked for justification and support to
the modernists then emerging in the Soviet Union. Thus,
contrary to what one would expect after the Soviet crushing
of the 1956 revolt and contrary to their own positive evalua-
tion of the West, the "good guys" had a pronounced Soviet
orientation.
 CONFIDENTIAL Approved FfttE eR?fieJPQ?/0
Confused by the apparently Marxist character of the mod-
ernists and by their Soviet orientation, the party was slow to
react. Through 1959 the conservative-liberal debate took the
form of an esoteric discourse on the meaning of "modernness"
and "modernism." 1 The "bad guys" attacked modernism as
Western and decadent while the "good guys" either discounted
it (as a "stylistic trend" and "not an ideology") or defended
it for its Soviet origin. The modernist writers, became' in-
creasingly political and increasingly outspoken, and in April
1960 they were unanimously predicting a "new spring" in
world politics. The events of May 1960, the failure of the sum-
mit meeting and the subsequent hardening of the party line,
crushed these hopes.
Party Crack-Down
By the end of 19-60 or the beginning of 1961 the party had
reevaluated the situation, offered the hand of friendship to
the more passive populists, and proscribed modernism as the
chief danger. As they re-emerged, the populists had developed
their own dissident ideology. Human dignity was made the
supreme value, and the third-road political stand was subli-
mated into a passive support for the communist regimes in
Hungary and the Soviet Union, viewed as necessary evils
within the framework of an ideological fatalism. This proved
to be more acceptable to the party, partly because it was less
attractive to the youth. Indeed, the modernists eventually
became the severest critics of the populists.
Acting with a restraint more indicative of weakness than
of wisdom, the party did not take "administrative" action un-
1 At first the party insisted on the purely Hungarian word for modern.
ness, korszeruseg, condemning even modernseg as tainted by the bour-
geois concept of modernism. It now accepts modernseg, defined as
adherence to "progressive" ideals, but it still condemns nwderntzmus
as decadent. Similar hair-splitting took place with the three Hun-
garian words for "peaceful coexistence." For years the party writers
used egymas mellett eles, literally "living one beside the other," for
coexistence in the Khrushchovian sense while condemning koegziszten-
cia as revisionist or Titoist. The liberals consistently used egyutteles,
literally "living together." At the time of the Moscow peace congress,
which seemed to mark a general broadening of the Khrushchovian
term, the party adopted egyutteles and the liberals began to shift to
koegzisztencia.
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til it had appropriated the slogans of both dissident groups.
Party spokesmen reiterated the need for acceptance of what
t,
is useful from the West, the need for freedom to exp
But
and the need for modernness (as opposed to modernism).
in November 1961 several liberal literary editors were removed
or demoted. Coming as it did on the heels of the 22d Congress
of the CPSU, this move was misinterpreted in the Wesst, by
part
as
those who had not been following Hungarian events,
of a "destalinization" process. Nothing could have been
farther from the truth. But it is probably true that its fortui-
tous juxtaposition with the Congress prevented the swift ad-
ministrative consolidation of the situation evidently planned.
The ranks of the modernists were swelled by those reacting
to the Congress just at a time when their coherence as a group
was being broken.
Throughout 1962 confusion reigned as the party sought,
with little success, to re-establish control and as the liberals
and dissidents sought, with almost as little success, to find,
an area of ambiguity or modes of expression not contami-
nated by the changing party line. It is indicative of the mag-
nitude of the problems faced by the party that the party or-
ganization of the Writers Federation was not formed until
May 1962, a late enough date at best, and the secretary of
this party organization, writing in February 1963, admitted
that it could not be expected to function fully until mid-1963.
The Hungarian modernists never reattained the level of
purposeful ferment which preceded the change in the party
line in 1960. But isolated events indicate their continuing ac-
tivity. Most dramatic, perhaps, was the organization of the
"Work Community of Young Writers" early in 1963. Appar-
ently the young modernists organized this group independ-
ently in order to develop a common program by interjecting
the "generation concept" (which opposes the "pure" younger
generation to those tainted by the Stalinist past) into the
modernist ideology described above. This time, however,
events in the Soviet Union were against them. The "genera-
tion concept" was immediately attacked, and some months later
the "Work Community" was transformed into an organ of
the Communist Youth Federation and new leaders were
elected.
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Literary Rebellion
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Survey (137), Summary No. 2915, 26 January 1961, pages 37-55, con-
ideological
however, will (proHungarian
bably be
tains a detailed l the
populism and modernism- ntly published works
satisfied with the following exaples, all from rece
by a young Hungarian physicist.
Excerpts from a poem:
Time splits within me, into past and present.
I am the point of impact, as are all who live... .
I bet on ... knowledge of material, not on faith... .
I see a new law of a new stellar system and i create it
So that I can violate it for a newer law.
There is no mercy for me....
Excerpts from an essay:
I belong to that generation which matured in no-man's land. d. .but. .
I felt that socialism was not only the collectivization of
also the good public feeling of the citizenry. . . The socialism of
microworld the faith and
the poetry of Attila Joksef represented in my
morality, the only possible socialist behavior....
Excerpts from a travel report:
"To your homeland," Yevtushenko raised his glass. And I could
not think of another answer except: "To the new poetry."
At the time of this writing, the Hungarian regime seems
motivated by an overriding concern to present itself as the
most liberal force in Hungary. This is being accomplished at
great cost in terms of ideological purity. The rank-and-file
party members are being alienated by the party policies in
many areas. Thus, although they have been broken as a co-
herent group, the modernists have won a victory because it
was their pressure, in addition to foreign policy considera-
tions, which has determined the party line. It is now neces-
sary to identify new areas of ambiguity. Perhaps the most
curious is the putative link between dogmatism and national-
ism which liberal, or at least anti-dogmatic, historians and
literary critics have pretended to discover. The party line
on this is not yet clear, but neither is it clear where such a
hypothesis would lead the liberals. It would probably deepen
the break between populists and modernists and might alien-
ate the youth. One thing, however, is clear. The young lib-
erals are on the move throughout Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, and even if the modernist banner is ripped from
their hands they promise to be the spiritual leaders of the
future.
Literary Politics Elsewhere?
It is a question whether such studies are applicable to other
societies than the Soviet and East European, which appear
peculiarly prone to links between literature and politics. But
it would seem that any society with a relatively sophisticated
tradition could develop such a link when a more primitive po-
litical system is forced upon it. Thus the trend toward one-
party systems in many areas of the world might lead to
what one might call non-party politics, or literature as poli-
tics, bringing the development of subtly oppositional pro-
grams and elites whose very existence modifies government
programs and which offer a potential for change. In this
case, the intelligence of literature might be a more broadly
useful pursuit.
INSTEAD OF A BIBLIOGRAPHY
Readers interested in reading the original documents on which this
brief analysis is based are invited to look into the more than 250
Issues of the Eastern Europe Press Survey which have been published
so far by CIA's Foreign Documents Division. Eastern Europe Press
CONFIDENTIAL - , 1 CONFIDENTIAL
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 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T031g200010001-2
Recurrent problem for the
analyst who follows south-
of-the-border restlessness.
THE PITFALL OF A LATIN QUIRK
M. E. O. Gravalos
A problem of interpretation recurs from time to time in cur-
rent intelligence on Latin America. The set-piece situation
is created by spot reports of statements from a Latin national
"in a position to know" to the effect that events in his coun-
try have passed into a critical stage. Of unimpeachable au-
thenticity and alarming content, these reports are immedi-
ately disseminated in raw form at the cabinet or presidential
level. At the same time, fill-in and assessment are urgently
demanded of the area specialist. The analyst whose expertise
is primarily Latin American is thus brought into contact with
the higher levels of current intelligence-men whose back-
ground tends to give them a particular familiarity with Eu-
ropean and Sino-Soviet problems-and it is often extremely
difficult for him to explain to them his grounds for recom-
mending caution about accepting reports whose authenticity
he does not question.
During the mid-1950's, for example, a series of cables were
received from Bolivia reporting conversations among leaders
of the anti-Marxist opposition to the government. The op-
position leaders declared that their plans for violent overthrow
of the government were well under way and told of the mili-
tary, police, and civilian elements making up their revolu-
tionary forces.
The men quoted were in fact leaders of the most important
opposition group. The conversations reported were authentic.
But no revolutionary attempt was made. Analysis of the
situation revealed what the plotters also knew-that they
hadn't a ghost of a chance. They had been indulging in audi-
ble daydreaming.
In Venezuela, some months after the overthrow of the
Perez Jimenez dictatorship, a new cabinet was installed. Sev-
eral days later a report of undoubted authenticity was re-
ceived recording a conversation held between a member of the
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SECRET 31
 Approved For Release 2005/04
A Latin Quirk
Venezuelan Communist Party's boss triumvirate and a Soviet
citizen attached to the Soviet embassy in Mexico. (Vene-
zuela had no Soviet embassy.) In the course of the conversa-
tion the Venezuelan Communist leader told the Soviet rep-
resentative that three members of the new cabinet were dues-
paying Communists.
Because of the strategic and domestic political importance
of Venezuelan petroleum, events after the overthrow of the
Perez Jimenez dictatorship had been followed in exceptional
detail. One could not of course exclude the possibility that
three cabinet members were sleepers, but the information
available made it seem doubtful. Because the analyst had to
admit the authenticity of the report, however, it was difficult
for him to explain his reservations about its truth. In fact,
as it turned out, the Venezuelan Communist had been grossly
exaggerating his hopes into a boast before the Soviets.
More recently, an authentic report was received from a
close associate of Brazilian Marshal Denys, whose anti-Goulart
plotting had been under observation for some months. It said
that the Marshal would move within a few days to overthrow
the Goulart government by revolutionary action. The source
of the report was unimpeachable; a plot against the govern-
ment was known to be under way-and was of great intelli-
gence interest because of Goulart's leftward trend; and the
action was reported imminent. Nevertheless, the report was
found inconsonant with other evidence. The fact was that
the source was stating a hope as if it were a plan.
The Latin American tendency to express the most nebulous
of ideas in an extremely positive fashion and describe dreams
as if they were reality makes it difficult for the analyst himself
to assess an unexpected report. He can never be sure im-
mediately whether he has in a particular instance an example
of this tendency.
The phenomenon would actually be easier to deal with in
respect of making one's doubts understood if it happened more
of ten. But the field reporters eliminate most occurrences by
checking for additional information when there is time. This
very fact leaves the analyst to encounter the problem almost
exclusively under intense deadline pressure. He can only
hope that those who have the last say in intelligence produc-
tion will retain his due caution in putting out the report.
32 Approved For Release.94/13 :
Real uni fication in the guid-
ance of military intelligence
collection.
SECRET
CENTRALIZED REQUIREMENTS IN THE DIA
Lowell E. May
The Defense Intelligence Agency, organized in the fall of
1961, includes a Directorate for Acquisition which is respon-
sible for functions relating to intelligence collection. With
respect to community-wide programs this responsibility means
representation on the four USIB committees devoted to col-
lection problems (the CCPC, SIGINT, IPC, and COMOR), man-
agement of the Foreign Materiel Exploitation Program,
participation in interagency activities such as the Travel
Folder Program and special collection projects. With re-
ng of intelligence it
spect to Department Defense
means a centralized processing
This latter function is performed by the Directorate's Office
of Requirements. This office is responsible for validating the
requirements and assigning relative collection priorities. It
allocates and levies them for collection action. maintains
publishes
a Central Requirements Registry. Inuree prepares documents. and
requirements manuals and related guidance . It
provides the DoD items for inclusion in interagency require and
ments programs as on travel, clandestine procurement,
the several kinds of technical collection.
the secretariat
The Office of Requirements also provides
ofhick phas estaeb-
and staff work for a DIA Priori~~snBoard
lished a standard far the assign
in consonance with the Priority National Intelligence Objec-
ents
tives, called the Defense Intelligence Collection
ande uirem LANTCOM
Priority Assignment Base. PACOM, to requirements
are using the Base for assigning priorities
originating in their commands and levied directly on their
components. The other unified and specified commands uwilll
be using it as they centralize their processing
ments. An Ad Hoc Priorities Panel of the Board meets weekly
to review extant requirements in the light of current USIB
-RDP78T0310200010001-2
33
MORI/HRP PAGES 33-40
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
Centralized Requirements
Watch Reports, Special National Intelligence Estimates, and
developments of immediate import in order to insure that
priorities assigned particular requirements are consistent
with national and DoD interests.
The Integration of Requirements
In the development of the centralized requirements pro-
gram those existing in the Services were carefully considered.
Each Service had general and specific requirements and re-
lated guidance material, though requirements and guidance
were intermingled in various combinations and a variety of
terms were used to describe them. Each had organized its
material differently, but the substance was much the same
in all. They were unanimous, for example, in their interest
in early warning, missiles, atomic energy, and electronics.
Centralization of these separate service programs was not a
mere linking of them as it were in a confederation. The best
features of each were adopted for an integrated, single pro-
gram.
The integrated program, designed to satisfy the needs of all
DoD intelligence activities and using a consistent terminology
throughout, has already eliminated considerable duplication
and reduced very substantially the number of Defense De-
partment requirements documents, When fully developed it
will replace all Service guidance documents in the field. The
new media for the guidance of collection are three:
The Defense Intelligence Collection Requirements Manual,
which states general requirements.
Defense Intelligence Collection Guides, which develop infor-
mation needs related to general requirements in the
Manual.
Specific Intelligence Collection Requirements, which levy
specific requirements for collection action.
The Manual. Published in August 1962, the Manual is the
cornerstone of the requirements program. All general re-
quirements for which Defense has collection responsibility,
previously stated in 61 separate requirements documents, are
consolidated in this single volume. It provides a stable basis
for collection activities by all elements of the DoD intelligence
structure. It serves as the framework both for the planning
Centralized Requirements
SECRET
and for the management of collection. Each requirement is
keyed, for management purposes, to the Intelligence Subject
Code used in DoD, as elsewhere in the community, in regis-
tering requirements and in evaluating and retrieving re-
ported information.
The Manual lists world-wide requirements, defining the
scope of information desired on each subject. It gives cur-ements rent guidance with respect
its seven chapters. re It rcarr es a :~ume
beginning of each o the
wary of the Priorities Assignment Base established by
DIA Priorities Board and a lectors table of leffo is uon
j t and area, enabling co
scheduled for periodic
first things first. It lists requirements needs,
coverage or levied to meet specific one-time production rn n
The Guides, Particularizing on the general requirements
of the Manual, the Guides are being issued and consolidated, the chapters of the
in a series of loose-leaf binders
others more detailed according
Manual. Some will be them, confer-
ences the complexity of the subject. In planning
se-
ences were held with the Services and seventeen th
lected as embracing their priority
the Services has continued and 'Service contributionsibil s it y for
Guides have been received, but the primary ction
contributions has now shifted to the new DIA 1964 idil uco er
Center. Guide production programmed in FY FY
all subjects on which DoD collectors need guidance.
of
Guidance on Factory Markings has been issued as a part
a Military Economics binder, superseding an Army Intelli-
gence Collection Manual, a Navy Guide, and an Air Force Man-
ual devoted to the subject. sectiA on ide Scientific land Technical
Radiological Warfare, one Pamphlet, two Navy Guides
binder, has superseded an Army indicators,
and an Air Force Manual. Guides on early warning
military weapons, electronics, telecommunications, mapping
and geodesy, ports and naval bases, coasts and landing areas, are
planne industrial recognition, and transpeted,110 binders will replace
the long-range program is comp
17 Army Guides, 27 Air Force Guides, and 6 Navy Guides, plus
Navy guidance covering 52 separate subjects. The entire
34 SECRET SECRET
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 Approved-pn&W0iegs gy&8[0Wa :
Guides series and the Manual will occupy a little more than
one cubic foot of file space when completed.
Specific requirements. Uniform policies and procedures have
been prescribed for the processing of all specific requirements,
and a single form has replaced the three separate Army, Navy,
and Air Force forms. Standard terminology has been adopted
to distinguish between a request for information, which might
be satisfied by referral to an existing store of intelligence
data, and a collection requirement, which can be satisfied
only through collection action. The former is referred to pro-
duction elements for satisfaction through research. If the
production element is unable to satisfy the request, it writes
a requirement for the collection of the information.
Such requests for information may be submitted to DIA
through appropriate channels by any user of intelligence.
They are submitted directly by the unified and specified com-
mands, other DoD agencies, and the other agencies of the
intelligence community. But collection requirements are
submitted directly only by headquarters of the Services and
non-DoD intelligence agencies in Washington. All collection
requirements originating in or addressed to the Defense De-
partment are processed as described below through DIA, spe-
cifically in the Office of Requirements, for levy on DoD or
non-DoD agencies.
The Validation Process
When a specific requirement arrives in Acquisition, it is
assigned a number and put under machine control in the Cen-
tral Requirements Registry. Validation officers then check it
for duplication, adequacy of research, consistency with origi-
nator's field of responsibility, and specificity and clarity. Each
validated collection requirement is assigned a collection pri-
ority and allocated for levy on appropriate collection activi-
ties. Collection, reporting, dissemination, evaluation, and
notification to cancel or continue collection complete the re-
quirements control cycle.
The screening to eliminate duplication includes checking
against the latest Registry IBM listing of current require-
ments, looking up any similar requirements in the Case File
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P78T031*"6902Ob O rh 2ents
(to be described presently), coordinating with personnel in
the geographic and special intelligence areas who may be
handling similar requirements, checking lists of requirements
or specific targets compiled for specialized interagency pro-
grams, and comparing, if a requirement borders on the gen-
eral, with published general requirements.
Adequacy of research is controlled by requiring DoD agen-
cies to indicate what research facilities have been consulted
prior to their submission of the requirement. The validator,
in the light of his experience and judgment, decides whether
all appropriate facilities are included. If in his opinion the
indicated ones are questionable or other likely ones are not
included, he personally discusses the possibilities with the
originating officer. This check, although it cannot be exhaus-
tive, does assure that the minimum of required research has
been done. Moreover, it acquaints originators, over a period
of time, with the fact that their requests are subject to care-
ful scrutiny in this respect, and it builds up a knowledge in
the validating officers of what repositories hold different types
of information.
When it is evident that research has not been adequate the
requirement is not validated for collection but forwarded as a
request for information to the appropriate research facility
for reply to the originator. If it is not fully satisfied by the
research results the originator may resubmit his remaining
requirement for collection.
The validator assures himself that the essence of the re-
quirement is stated specifically enough to be understood by
the collector. Normally he reformulates it only if he has in-
formation which will help the collectors understand or fulfill
it better. In some cases he may have collection information,
perhaps concerning transitory opportunities, of which the
originator could have no knowledge.
Approved requirements are validated, a collection priority
assigned, and allocation for collection levy determined from
the collection capability inventory. Requirements not vali-
dated are returned to the originator with a complete state-
ment of the reasons, sometimes with the information re-
quested or a notation of where it can be found.
 Approv lr{pc-l, ~e"j 2005//04x/1
Control Devices
Case Files are maintained on all specific requirements proc-
essed. These contain a copy of the requirement, the internal
routing sheet which records all the processing data on it,
copies of any correspondence with the originator, notation of
significant reports in response to the requirement, and ex-
tracts from the originator's evaluation of the response. The
Case Files, containing thus the life history of each specific re-
quirement, are located centrally for reference. Special card
files are maintained on collection requirements related to
photographic reconnaissance objectives.
The Central Requirements Registry exercises centralized
control of all Department of Defense collection requirements
and provides a standard system for the registration and con-
trol of requirements in the Services and unified and specified
commands. The Registry maintains machine control records
on both general. and specific requirements on an all-source
basis. The Divisions of DIA supply the data needed on each
specific requirement for recording on IBM punch cards. Card
decks are exchanged with the unified commands and other in-
telligence agencies. Machine listings of all active require-
ments are compiled both periodically and on request.
IBM punch cards, prepared and updated as changes occur,
are manipulated automatically to print out data organized
for use in research, validation, and management. Listings
may be made by priority, country, subject, or collector, as well
as numerically or chronologically by date of receipt or expira-
tion.
The format for machine registry of requirements evolved
from meetings held with CIA soon after the Office of Require-
ments was activated. The coordinated format insures com-
patibility with any future National Registry. It accommo-
dates the control number, country code, Intelligence Subject
Code, classification, a subject brief, collection priority, expira-
tion date, collectors, and other Registry data on the status of
the requirement. Consecutive numbers are assigned, DIA
using the first 50,000 and CIA the next 50,000.
A suitably ordered requirements listing produced monthly
for originators as a bookkeeping led
er
g
permits them to
identify and eliminate or update old and obsol1ette re
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DP78T03194A000200010001-2
Centralized Requirements
ments. It thus becomes a management tool throughout the
Department of Defense. It enables collection managers to
direct collection assets toward the highest priority needs, and
it aids the unified and specified commands in the control of
requirements originated by or submitted to them for collec-
tion.
The Directorate for Acquisition reviews all incoming intelli-
gence reports which refer to DIA control numbers to deter-
mine which requirements have been satisfied and can there-
fore be canceled. Concurrence of the originator prior to can-
cellation is obtained in each instance.
Gains and Prospects
The channeling of the requirements flow through one
clearing house has reduced duplication of effort to a mini-
mum. The total of specific requirements levied has been. held
low and fairly steady, indicating on one hand a conscientious
research effort on the part of originators and on the other a
continuing need for centralized validation. The direct chan-
nel created between DIA and the unified and specified com-
mands has improved the handling of their intelligence re-
quirements. A system has also been developed to insure that
the intelligence collection needs of these commands will be
met in time of war.
As the nerve center for intelligence requirements, the Office
of Requirements can often anticipate the need for levying spe-
cific requirements and take the initiative in soliciting and con-
solidating them in order to minimize last-minute emergency
collection. Weekly reviews of requirements provide that
higher collection priorities are assigned when warranted by
changing conditions.
The unified requirements program has been developed
within the relatively short time since the activation of the
DIA. Experience with the system has shown how important,
even imperative, it is that all requirements, regardless of se-
curity classification, be registered, validated, assigned priori-
ties, and allocated by a central office if collection resources
are to be fully and economically utilized.
At the other end of the cycle, it is also necessary that re-
-RDP78TQ3"4A600=04bW t1 maintained in codified files for ready
 sr_CRET ApVEq lr"eArwRiA95/0
access and retrieval against users' needs; and the availability
of relevant information impinges directly on the validity of
collection requirements. The ultimate goal is to tie together
the requirements system and the storage and retrieval sys-
tem in a common language. A contract project now under
way is studying methods of linking the requirements process-
ing to the storage and retrieval elements of Project 438L i or
any other system used in the military departments. Pro-
grams are being written for the 1410 and 7090 computers to
process requirements and provide a collection evaluation
system.
After the centralization of requirements processing, an ex-
pansion of related computer operations will be a principal fac-
tor in improving the efficiency of our operations. The conse-
quent fuller use of our resources, in turn, will offer almost
unlimited opportunities for further improvements in the
processing systems.
The Air Force Intelligence Data Handling System was described in a
Studies article in 1959, 111 3, pp. 57-59.
Approved For Release 2005/04/1
SECRET
A mass interrogation program
launched and shaken down in
time to play a useful role in
the 1962 missile crisis.
DOMESTIC COLLECTION ON CUBA
Judith Edgette
Early in 1962 the intelligence community, under the coordi-
nation of CIA's apparatus for collecting foreign intelligence
from sources in this country, began a greatly stepped-up effort
to tap the knowledge of Cuban refugees. Since the beginning
of the year, 1,700 to 2,000, refugees had been arriving weekly
in Miami. Attempts had been made to talk to as many of
the more knowledgeable as possible, but nothing like the full
intelligence potential of the influx was being realized; there
were not enough trained interrogators, no proper physical.
facilities to handle such numbers of people, and insufficiently
comprehensive guidance from intelligence consumers. The
fact that a large percentage of the refugees spoke only Span-
ish, and that the Cuban variety, added to the problem.
What clearly was needed was a large, well-staffed interro-
gation center in Miami and a controlling office in Washing-
ton to be the channel for the community's coordinated needs.
In March, therefore, with the almost unlimited support of the
military services and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, there was established at the former Marine Air Base
at Opa-locka a Caribbean Admission Center as a service of
common concern under CIA direction but staffed mainly by
Department of Defense personnel. A teletype link for secure
priority communications with Washington was installed in
July.
Processing at the Center
From the establishment of the Center in March to the ces-
sation of regular airline flights in October approximately
55,000 people came in from Cuba by air. A smaller number
arrived irregularly by boats, rafts, and other means. Be-
cause of the physical impossibility of interviewing all of them
IA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2 MORI/HRP PAGES 41-45
SECRET 41
 as they arrived, the Center limited its interrogations to males
between the ages of 16 and 60 whose preliminary interviews by
I&NS at the airport indicated a need for further questioning.
Each of these was first required to fill out a standard (ostensi-
bly immigration) form, listing biographic data such as past
addresses, employment history, service in military or intelli-
gence groups, and membership in revolutionary organizations.
There were also questions of immediate intelligence or coun-
terintelligence interest such as knowledge of Sino-Soviet Bloc
personnel and activities in Cuba and names of members of the
Cuban internal security forces. The form concluded with
questions on relatives already living in the United States.
Then each man was put through a preliminary screening
to determine his intelligence potential-his knowledge of mili-
tary construction and activities, his familiarity with denied
areas, any unusual observations he had made, his knowledge
of Soviet personnel or of conflicts between Soviets and Cubans,
and any information of operational or counterintelligence
significance. This was the full processing for about two-thirds
of the 11,500 men screened during the period. The remainder
were formally and intensively interrogated at the Center
against current intelligence requirements. More than 5,500
information reports were produced and 3,000 documents and
other printed matter collected.
An effort was made to complete both the screening and the
interrogation in one day in order to maintain a continuously
flowing operation without backlog. It was desirable also for
the sake of the intelligence yield to interrogate the refugees
before they had become "contaminated" by advice from others
as to what they should say, stress, or suppress. Some of them,
however, had to be held longer, notably those with a great deal
of information and those whose background warranted a call
for special requirements from Washington. With I&NS assist-
ance, facilities were provided at Opa-locka to keep these until
they had been thoroughly debriefed.
These refugees were of much lower occupational, social, and
educational levels than those who had left Cuba earlier. Be-
cause the Castro government was attempting to retain its
most valuable- professional people it rarely issued them exit
permits. As a result, most source descriptions on reports from
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DP78T@gAPM~Oa~OpgA9001-2
the Center were depressingly similar: "Cuban national, so
many years of age, six years (or seven or nine or four) of edu-
cation, bus driver (or waiter or maintenance man ? or stu-
dent)," etc. At first the substance of the reports was fre-
quently depressing too. But after the first months, during
which the interrogators acquired factual background and ex-
perience and the interrogation became a smoothly organized
process, the reports improved substantially in quality, detail,
scope, and over-all importance. Some of the refugees who had
lived or traveled in out-of-the-way places furnished reports of
unusual activity which turned out to be the only information
available on these areas.
Requirements Management
To provide a central channel for community guidance to the
Center, a special CAC Staff was established by CIA in Wash-
ington. One responsibility of this staff was to solicit require-
ments from members of the community, coordinate them, and
transmit them to the, Center. Requirements were received
not only from USIB agencies but from other government
offices and F_ I Many of these
were quite general questions about economic, military, social,
and political aspects of Cuban life. But special requirements
tailored to the background of particular refugees were often
served on other sources having the same general background
with excellent results. Reinterrogation requests came fre-
quently from the military services and the Department of
Commerce.
Each of the Center's interrogators was required to be fa-
miliar, at least broadly, with all current requirements. .A
comprehensive selection of both open and classified material
was compiled as general backing for the requirements. The
presence of interrogators from the military services insured
that sources with detailed military knowledge could be given
interviewers familiar with terminology, background, and re-
quirements in that field. Three senior intelligence officers
were made responsible for the handling of requirements on
socio-economic, military, and political subjects respectively.
T
hese requirements
offficers could formulate specific, detailed
1
g
u
CIA-RDP78TO3194A00020001 aaooul lZnowledgeable sources and personally
25X1
 Approved F6AIf6ase Q0?6F4/13
conduct the interrogation of those with extraordinary intelli-
gence potential.
As requirements began to come flooding in there was a dan-
ger that the interrogators would become swamped with them
and lose sight of old needs in the rush of new ones. A Watch
List was therefore published every Monday calling atten-
tion to selected requirements, not necessarily the most recent
or the most important, in an effort to see that no require-
ments were ever simply forgotten. To keep the interrogators
up to date, briefings in depth were occasionally held by State,
Commerce, military, or CIA personnel, and some of these were
recorded for the benefit of interrogators unable to attend the
live presentations.
A consolidation of the requirements of the entire commu-
nity was prepared by CIA's Office of Research and Reports.,
and this Guide was put to immediate use at the Center and at
CIA domestic field offices in areas where Cubans had concen-
trated. In January 1963 a revision of the Guide (now called
Collection and Reporting Handbook: Cuba) was disseminated
to all domestic field offices because of the wide dispersion of
the Cubans. The Handbook proved so successful, from both
collector and analyst viewpoint, that another revision was
being prepared at mid-year.
Follow-Up
Another responsibility of the CAC Staff in Washington was
to maintain complete records on all Cuban refugees arriving
after March 1962. More than 75,000 documents concerning
them are now on hand, including the screening forms they
filled out at the Center, their regulation Immigration Service
cards, and miscellaneous information they provided in apply-
ing for aid to the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami. These rec-
ords, filed both by name and by alien registration number,
have been valuable in answering questions from USIB and
non-USIB agencies. They are also used as a source of back-
ground information for the CIA domestic field offices which
undertake follow-up interviews.
The domestic field offices had responded early to the in-
creased requirement for information on Cuba. From 12 Feb-
ruary to 6 November 1962 they issued 1,358 reports on Cuban
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
RDP78TP;AR0@qtg001-2
matters. In addition to interviewing U.S. citizens who had
knowledge of Cuban life and the Cuban economy, they were
used to track down and reinterrogate Cubans who had given
some information in Miami and then had moved to other
parts of the country. A collection officer would spend many
hours finding, calming down, and questioning an elusive refu-
gee to determine whether he really saw a rocket forty-five feet
long in the mountains. More hours have been spent talking
to the Americans who have been writing, calling, and tele-
graphing the Director that they have vital information on
Cuba, information which may turn out to be indeed impor-
tant or only a frenzied warning that Armageddon in the per-
son of Fidel Castro is just around the corner.
After the President's speech of 22 October 1962 making the
crisis public, the CAC Staff was requested to make a review of
the reports on missiles, military installations, etc., that had
been furnished by the Center and the ordinary domestic field
offices. The resulting 45-page report showed that as early as
June and July refugees were reporting suspicious Soviet ac-
tivities and rumors that offensive military weapons, espe-
cially long-range missiles, were to be introduced into Cuba.
Reports concerning denied areas and unusual construction
made it possible to pinpoint probable main areas of Soviet con-
centration. It has since been stated publicly that refugee re-
ports usually gave the first indication of abnormal activity
and were often used in plotting the flights of surveillance air-
craft. It can be said here that this reporting played a sig-
nificant role in alerting the U.S. government first to the pos-
sibility and later to the existence of offensive Soviet weapons
in Cuba. Two such reports were among the factors that led
to the critical, timely resumption of surveillance flights.
After the flow of refugees was stopped in October, the Carib-
bean Admission Center's operations were skeletonized and
moved to Miami, from where it continues to supplement the
reporting from the regular Miami collection office and other
CIA field offices around the country. If regular refugee
flights should resume, Opa-locka could be reopened and op-
erated on the old scale to provide significant amounts of
CIA-RDP78T03 e94A0001001000~ these fresh sources.
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2
SECRET
Challenge and response under
deep cover in black Africa.
LETTER FROM A STAFF AGENT
Louis Boifeuillette
This is a sort of open letter to prospective staff agents and
those who are responsible for them. It is a personal story
with some personal reflections attached. But because deep-
cover operations are still a developing thing 1 and much
needed in the small new countries where the size of embassies
is limited, a sharing of my experiences and observations as a
staff agent in West Africa may be of value to others. The
names herein have ill been changed, of course, but everything
else is real.
Chronology
In early January 1961 I left CIA headquarters after eleven
years of duty there and overseas to take a deep-cover assign-
ment with the Hefner Brewing Company. Hefner's headquar-
ters is in Milwaukee, its export division in New York. I was
"hired" in New York but reported first to Milwaukee for orien-
tation. I was there two months, another at the principal ex-
port brewery in Saint Louis, and then three months in New
York.
Hefner has been exporting beer for 50 years to Songhai, a
former French colony in West Africa. In 1960 the firm signed
a contract with the Songhai government to construct a $3.2-
million brewery at Sagressa, the capital. It was to be a joint
venture, Hefner putting up 75% of the capital and the gov-
ernment 25%. I was to go to Songhai to work on this project.
Five persons in Hefner were witting-the chairman, the
president, the chief financial officer, the vice-president in
charge of export, and the general manager of the New York
office. Subsequently Harry Dodge, a member of the New York
office, because he was slated to be general manager of Bras-
serie Songhai-Hefner, the projected joint company, was also
1 For a doctrinal treatment of them see C. D. Edbrook's "Principles 1
of Deep Cover," Studies V 3, p. 1 if.
M O RI/H RP PAGES 47-55
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 Approved For Rele'2,Q95(94/13 "Cl
"
made witting. My job was to be deputy manager in charge of
public relations, labor relations, and any other loosely-
defined duties I could dream up to give me as many contacts as
possible. I left for Songhai in June.
Hefner had been represented in Songhai by commission
agents. The latest one, Jean Massu, was an erratic French-
man. He drank heavily and had irregular work, habits. It
was planned to ease him out and not employ him in the new
project. His assistant was a young, hard-working Italian,
Mario Tozzi. An African clerk, Francois Dieng, and a mes-
senger completed the office staff. In practice, Tozzi and
Dieng did all the work. Tozzi, under his commission ar-
rangement with Massu, actually made more money than his
boss.
Because my presence symbolized the new brewery and an
uncertain future for Massu & Cie, I was not greeted with
open arms. We settled down, however, to an uneasy truce.
I spent a good deal of time talking to government officials and
lawyers about the formation of the joint company. I was
soon to have more than enough to keep me busy.
In November 1961 Tozzi went on leave and Massu's inade-
quacy became immediately apparent. At the same time a re-
quirement for import licenses was imposed, and a number of
small importers were unable to take delivery of their ship-
ments because of a shortage of cash. We had huge inventories
on hand, and several lots of beer spoiled (the bottle caps leak).
It was a first-class mess. Moreover, Hefner had installed, as
large corporations do, a rather complicated accounting sys-
tem. It gave them tight financial control, but it involved a
great deal of extra work locally. Since we had not actually
formed Brasserie Songhai-Hefner, I still operated under the
aegis of Massu & Cie and had the stocks under my control.
I did not, however, have control over the office staff and had
to do much of the accounting myself. Massu was having wife
trouble and blew up several times in the office; once he
hurled a (small) hop sample at me.
It was a very trying period until mid-January, when
Harry Dodge arrived to take over. The general manager of
the export division and his accountant also came on a short
visit. They straightened things out and helped put the ac-
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RDP781pa 9 %990200010001-2
counting system, which had never been adequately explained,
in order. Tozzi and Massu left in April. Dodge and I then
formed our own import company, Societe Hefner, and took
over Dieng and the messenger as staff.
About this time the Songhai government, which had been
showing a decidedly leftist trend and was also in financial dif-
ficulties, decided not to go ahead with Brasserie Songhai-
Hefner. They simply told us that the conditions of the con-
tract had been frustrated. So the brewery project ceased to
be active, although there were still lots of odds and ends to be
cleared up. Societe Hefner continued to import beer.
My job over this first year had been primarily that of
salesman. This is an excellent cover in one respect, since it
does not require sitting at a desk all day. During the first
four months of my tour I did not handle any agents but was
able to elicit a fair number of reports. With the arrival of
Dodge, who was extremely understanding and accommodat-
ing, I was able to spend more time on my clandestine work.
In December 1961 I took over an agent from an official-cover
case officer. This agent, who had just been recruited, worked
in a government department in Lokko, about 160 miles from
the capital. Since my sales trips took me to Lokko, it was a
convenient arrangement. In February 1962 I took over an-
other agent in Bounkala, 50 miles from the capital. Fortu-
nately this man, who also worked for the government, was
transferred to Sagressa a few weeks later.
I went on leave in the summer of 1962, returning in Septem-
ber. The Hefner work continued to go well until in October,
just before two large shipments were due to arrive, the gov-
ernment suddenly imposed a 50% duty on beer. We were
stuck with stocks worth $475,000. We had to borrow $230,000
to pay the duty, making our inventory worth nearly three
quarters of a million dollars. We had to try to sell it at a
price roughly 50% higher than was being charged for the
large stocks in the country before the duty was imposed. The
next five months were grueling. Milwaukee or New York was
on the telephone at least once a week. We had to sell on
credit-always a risky business. By late March, when we had
IA-RDP78fg40 b161)6'r2loss was close to $80,000.
49
 SECRET Approved For Rele 2,Q8g/94/13 : CIA=RDP78T /H994A X0200010001-2 SECRET
On top of that, the sale of beer was put under stricter
license control. The market for new orders was cut by
about one-half, and the volume of our business declined con-
siderably. Dodge was recalled. Except for the arrangement
with me, Hefner would probably have closed down Societe
Hefner and turned the business back to a commission agent,
but since they were being reimbursed in full for my expenses
they could still operate it at a profit. Also the Songhai gov-
ernment was showing signs of changing its alignment back
toward the West-the Bloc countries had proved singularly
inept both in trading with Songhai and in establishing indus-
tries there-and having me on the spot ready to take ad-
vantage of any opportunity to revive the brewery project was
an advantage. The African clerk, Francois Dieng, had devel-
oped enormously and was promoted to assistant manager, so
Dodge's departure didn't leave the gap it might have.
During the second year the volume of my clandestine work
had increased. A vigllance campaign against U.S. intelligence
mounted by the Songhai government scared off the two agents
I had taken over earlier, one for several months and the other
perhaps permanently; but I took over a third-national who
has worked out quite well and also recruited an African in the
foreign office and finally another third-national. Recently I
got a job as stringer for a French financial magazine. This
appointment was not arranged from above, it just came, and
the editor in Paris of course is not witting. A press card
should be a wonderful entree.
Reflections
Much has been said of the strain of dual existence, one of
the classic features of espionage. Case officers are cautioned
to keep in mind its abrasive effect on their agents. But the
staff agent can be under still greater strain. The indigenous
agent is a native of the country and fits in; he is at home
among his people. He carries on his normal work, and often
his clandestine activity consists merely of reporting what goes
on in his office. His worry is that he is breaking the law and
if caught will go to prison (the law in Songhai specifies 12
years for espionage). But this applies equally to the staff
agent, who has no diplomatic immunity. It is at the back of
Approved For Release 2005/04/13
his mind a great deal of the time. In addition there are other
pressures to which he is subject.
A real problem lies in the fact that the staff agent is
largely cut off from the milieu of his primary job. He is a
professional intelligence officer. When at headquarters, or
abroad under official cover, he is associated with other intelli-
gence officers. He is completely immersed in his job. In-
telligence work is intensely stimulating and, unlike selling
farm machinery or beer, has virtually unlimited horizons.
At headquarters we spend all our working hours, many of our
social hours, and even the hours in the car pool with our as-
sociates. Maybe some do not like this, but it is certainly a
very high exposure to a powerful stimulant. The staff agent
is suddenly cut off from all this. He sees his case officer for
perhaps one hour a week, other official-cover people from time
to time, and occasionally a visitor from headquarters. It is
this being cut off from my associates, from the milieu of my
life's work, that I have found most difficult. I have not been
in a CIA office for two and a half years. Even having Dodge
here for a time was a great help. I couldn't discuss operations
in detail with him, but it was an enormous benefit to talk to
someone who knew my true status and be able to let off
steam.
There is another thing that affects the staff agent. It is a
matter of guilty conscience. I believe this bothers even peo-
ple under official cover, but because of his exposed position it
hits the staff agent very hard indeed. In Songhai, to be
sure, as in many of the new countries, the practice of bribery
and corruption is a hallowed custom, it's a way of life. Every-
one from the president on down dips his fingers into the pub-
lic purse, or anyone else's purse for that matter. My col-
leagues in other ? firms think little of bribing a government
clerk to bring them information they need for their business?
(Graham Greene's novel The Heart of the Matter offers bril-
liant insight into this sort of mentality.) But when we start
bribing people we run into all sorts of road blocks-biographic
questionnaires, operational approvals, project outlines, and all
the rest of the paper work. The other fellow is merely, as
Greene's heroes in Nigeria say, "dashing" some "small. boy."
I'm engaged in espionage. It shouldn't be this way but it, is.
 MdONor
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Running a cover business can be a great deal of work. Dur-
ing the six months before Dodge arrived I worked myself
down to the bone. I had not realized how far down until I
read the fitness report prepared by "ex-
haustion" was the word he used. After Dodgecase
came and took
the responsibility off my shoulders things improved enor-
mously. But when we had the import duty crisis and the
$80,000 loss I became involved again. You cannot avoid hav-
ing such things happen and they take up a great deal of time
and energy.
To illustrate the burden of a cover business I am listing be-
low some of the Hefner problems which now occupy my time.
These are just matters that are out of the ordinary, not the
scores of routine things I work on eight hours a day.
1. We missed a $60,000 contract. It was largely New
York's fault, but it is a loss for Societe Hefner.
2. Accounts receivable stand at over $100,000. We will
certainly collect most of this, but one African firm
owes us about $20,000 and we may have to go to court.
3. Our lease expires in six weeks and we must find an-
other office.
4. One dealer has a quality complaint against us. We
suspect that it's a bogus one but we can't be sure un-
til we receive the laboratory report from Milwaukee.
In the meantime the dealer has complained to the
Chambre de Commerce and the president of that or-
ganization is a busybody anxious to make a name for
himself as a great trouble-fixer. He's siding with the
little man against the big foreign company. And this
gives the matter political overtones.
5. The long-range cover situation has never stabilized it-
self. If beer licenses are cut further for the last half
of 1963, our business will dwindle to the extent that
others in the trade will begin to wonder why Hefner
keeps an office in Songhai. We are exploring other
possibilities and there is an excellent chance that some-
thing will show up, but it is doubtful that I will still be
in this position a year from now.
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SECRET
If the first four items made tedious reading for an intelli-
gence officer, carrying them out is even more tedious. I could
have listed several more. Every businessman in Songhai is
facing similar problems, but the others don't have to run
around trying to recruit and handle agents.
The problem is not just the amount of work but the fact
of being in charge of something. Since Dodge left I've had
not only to put in more hours for Hefner but to take respon-
sibility for the operation. If I make bad decisions or don't
work hard enough Hefner will lose money. They are depend-
ing on me and I have to give it the old college try. This is bad
because it means that I must work harder for Hefner than
from my professional point of view I should.
There is much talk about targeting staff agents, placing
them where they have access to what you want. Naturally if
you can get your man a job in the local government (there
are still a number of foreigners working in the West African
governments), you will have him well placed for making con-
tacts. He may even be working in an important, though al-
most certainly not vital, target office. But this is seldom pos-
sible. In so many of these countries cover possibilities are
few and far between you almost always have to take what you
can get. But the selection of, the man is infinitely more im-
portant than the cover. Of course the cover must hold water,
but as long as it keeps the man there in a feasible occupation
he will work out well if he is a good man. The capitals of
these countries are quite small. The size of the targets--the
government, the trade unions, the party organizations--are
minute by European or American standards. So if your staff
agent has a job in the capital, if he can crank himself up each
morning, if he gets along well with people, and if he works at
it, he will know a very wide range of important people within
a year or so. If he stays for several years, he will eventually
know so much about the place that he can answer half the
questions without having to go out and ask an agent.
Yet even a good man operates better under one cover than
under another. An academic type should not be put under
A-RDP78TO 6b62bP0r0 1iT versa. Some experience in the type of
 Approved For Release 9 5p4/13 : C
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P78T03194A000200010001-2
Staff Agent
cover activity is most necessary. Here are some points con-
cerning cover jobs I think are important.
1. Either the man should be his own boss or his superior
on the spot, the man to whom he reports, should be
witting. The only exceptions I think of are a job with
the local government and that of the academician, who
is pretty much his own boss anyway.
2. In using business covers you must be prepared for sur-
prises. Plans made by the cover company will be
changed and you may find your man is not able to
do as much as you had hoped. But once he has been in
the country for a while, he can either make a new ar-
rangement with the company or find something else.
3. If it can be avoided, the staff agent should not be in
charge of an office where the cover company is really
expecting to make money.
4. One of the very best kinds of cover job is that of public
relations man for a large company. There is little desk
work and a great deal of floating around meeting peo-
ple. Furthermore, there is magic in a big business
name. No matter how socialistic and egalitarian these
people fancy themselves, such a name will give you a
terrific entree.
5. Another advantage of being with a big
that housing problems (rent, electricity, company is
re-
pairs, telephone, etc., etc.), which consume inordi-
nate amount of time in th
e company. e are taken
.
Before coming out on his assignment, the staff agent should,
of course, take all the training he can et.
who intends to stay in one count
rY under g Bue fora man
time the training cover for a long
g he receives while on home leave is most im-
portant. Perhaps it is not really training, but reorientation
or refreshment. Most staff agents on home leave get only a
few days in a headquarters safe house. I would recommend
that they be given at least a week at the main covert training
station. They can of course take courses there.
main thing is that it will get them back into the swBut
things. This is most important.
imt of
The deep-cover agent fills a unique need. He has an impor-
tant job, and a good one. My story sounds like a recital of
horrible woes. But I have found my two years in Songhai far
and away the most rewarding I have ever had. And I hope to
stay here for many years to come.
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SECRET SECRET
 Approved For Release 2005/04/13 : CIA-RDP78T031?200010001-2
Receiver radiation as a real
concern of operational security.
AGENT HAZARD IN THE SUPER-HET
M. J. Angelicchio
An agent is not likely to worry about counterintelligence
direction-finders when he is merely listening to a blind trans-
mission from his radio base. Yet most radio receivers radiate
a measurable amount of radio-frequency energy, which can be
detected at distances ranging from a fraction of an inch to
many miles according to the design of the receiver and the
sophistication of the detection apparatus. It is thus possible
under the right circumstances to locate an agent receiver
through an extension of the techniques long used in the locat-
ing of transmitters. The seriousness of this hazard varies so
greatly with circumstance that no general rules can be made
to deal with it, but it should be taken into account as one of
the many considerations in an agent's security. An under-
standing of the phenomenon and some broad parameters will
help one to assess the danger in a particular case.
The Super-Het
In the evolution of radio receivers, the early crystal set was
soon followed by the Tuned Radio Frequency receiver, which
amplified the signal in the same form in which it was received
by the antenna. The radio-frequency amplifiers, when tuned
to the frequency of the desired station, would to some extent
reject unwanted stations. But as the frequency. bands grew
crowded with transmitters it would have required additional
components of excessive size and cost to keep the TRF suffi-
ciently selective, and it became obsolete.
The super-heterodyne, which solved this problem of the
TRF, became immediately popular and today is used exclu-
sively in both radio and television. It mixes the incoming sig-
nal with another radio frequency it generates itself and so
transforms it to an "intermediate" frequency on which most
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 The S e~ eg/04/1
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of the amplification can be done with high selectivity.
Schematically, the process looks like this:
Antenna
Tuned
Radio-
Frequency
Amplifier
Mixer
or
Frequency
Changer
Local
Oscillator
Fzz
Speaker
or
Headphone
Intermediate-
Frequency
Amplifiers
Detector
and
Audio
Amplifier
The tuned radio-frequency amplifier tunes in the signal as
received by the antenna, amplifies it, and sends it to the
mixer, where in combination with the signal generated by the
local oscillator it takes on the intermediate frequency. This
is then amplified before the superimposed audio frequency is
brought out and amplified further. The intermediate fre-
quency of a particular receiver is fixed, the frequency of the
local oscillator being varied to produce it by subtraction.
If the desired transmitter is on 3,000 kilocycles, for example,
and the intermediate frequency is 455 kilocycles, the oscillator
is tuned to 3,455 kilocycles. 455 kilocycles is the standard in-
termediate frequency in the United States; many foreign
countries use other frequencies.
It is the local oscillator that creates the hazard; it is in ef-
fect a low-power transmitter. Although its signal is intended
only for the mixer, a portion of it, if power is excessive or the
receiver otherwise poorly designed, is radiated outside the re-
ceiver. A portion may also be introduced into electrical power
lines if the receiver is plugged in or even close to them. It
may therefore be possible to detect it at some distance with
an intercept receiver using either an antenna to pick up the
radiation or a coupling to the power lines.
Detection in Practice
When the super-het was first introduced, radio listeners
began complaining of whistles and "birdies" which interfered
with their reception; the source of this interference was the
local oscillators in their neighbors' super-hets. In 1934 the
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SECRET
-RDP78 1x600010001-2
Federal Communications Commission established maximum
local oscillator radiation levels for all radio and television
receivers manufactured for use in the United States. These
ceilings are such as to keep the radiation within tolerable lim-
its at a distance of 100 feet, but they do not ensure that it can-
not be detected by a sensitive receiver at greater distances.
There are in fact both government and private operations
that take advantage of this otherwise objectionable radiation.
The British General Post Office employs mobile detection vans
to determine whether a radio or television set is being op-
erated in households without a GPO receiver license. The
technique is also used in the United States by audience-survey
organizations to determine how many television receivers in
a neighborhood are tuned to particular channels. It is true
that in both of these operations the intercept vans are operat-
ing against a clearly defined target wherein times, frequencies,
locations, radiation levels, and equipment requirements are
predictable, whereas many of these factors cannot be prede-
termined if the search is for agents using radio receivers. But
the interception and location of an agent's receiver might be
facilitated by correlative intelligence on the general area in
which he is operating, his base station's frequency and sched-
ule, and the intermediate frequency and radiation level of
the receiver.
Precautions
These considerations point to several ways in which the
danger can be minimized:
If an agent tunes to his base station at certain hours daily
the risk is increased. Infrequent listening at irregular
dates and times decreases it.
Since the frequency of the radiation can be determined
arithmetically by adding the intermediate frequency when
the base station frequency is known, the risk depends in part
upon the communications security practices of the base sta-
tion. Base frequency changes, use of the the same frequen-
cies to serve a large geographical area, dummy traffic, and
lack of identifying characteristics all help reduce it.
Changing receiving locations will reduce the risk. Urban
and rural locations present distinct types of risk, which
CIA-RDP78TO3194A000200010001-2
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 Approved For Pe j?e24.K I04/1
varies also with types of detection conveyance: aircraft are
particularly effective against targets in the countryside.
Proximity to a hostile intercept station is of course a danger.
Mere proximity to power lines increases the risk. It is best
to operate from batteries at some distance from all wire car-
riers.
If the agent is using a manual radio transmitter, he is of
course already taking a far greater risk than that created
by the comparatively weak signal from his receiver.
Receiver Choice
The range at which local oscillator radiation can be inter-
cepted varies enormously among types of receivers, from a
matter of inches for some transistor sets designed especially
for agent use to some two miles on the ground and up to
twenty in aircraft for poorly designed vacuum-tube makes.
But one cannot always make the obvious choice: there are
sometimes overriding operational considerations that. require
the use of indigenous short-wave radios.
Five categories of receivers are listed below in descending
order of radiation levels.
Foreign vacuum-tube receivers.
Vacuum-tube receivers manufactured in the United
States or abroad (Japan, Germany) for U.S. markets
under FCC specifications.
Vacuum-tube receivers designed for agent use.
Commercially available transistor receivers.
Transistor receivers built for agent use. Transistor sets
with high battery voltage, say 12 volts, normally have
higher radiation than those using low supply voltages.
New advances in fashioning
a simple operational aid.
A NAME FOR YOUR NUMBER
Thomas W. Marcquenski
For a variety of operational purposes it is useful to have a
"reversed" city telephone directory, that is one in which you
can look up a telephone number or street address and get the
name of the subscriber. It was once possible, for example, by
identifying the subscribers to which a certain telephone num-
ber was assigned in the Moscow directory, to assemble a list
of officials and offices concerned with the Soviet nuclear en-
ergy program. The production of such reversed listings is
the subject of this paper.
For some years we have used a simple and relatively inex-
pensive method of listing the entries in ascending order of
telephone number, but until recently an index by street ad-
dress. had been almost prohibitively expensive. A variety of
processing and computer techniques are now available, how-
ever, to speed up the production of street address listings and
make it cheaper. The operational value of these aids can be
judged by the demand for them, since the cost of producing
them comes out of the user's budget. The original customers
always come back for more, and new ones gather as the word
spreads.
By Telephone Number
The process for telephone number listings entails key-
punching only the telephone, page, and column numbers from
the latest directory. The telephone numbers are then auto-
matically put into numerical order and printed out with the
corresponding page and column to their right. If you have a
telephone number and want the name of the subscriber, you
need search only the indicated column in the directory. For
example:
Havana Telephone Book
Aguilar Manuel-Baraqua 181 V Alegre ...........
9-3919
Aguilar Moreno Dr Santiago
F n? 106 Vdo ...................................
32-8552
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60 SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL 61
 CONFIDENTIAL Apprfte lfer I@tqaft,a,G@5/04/17GIA-RDP7A1 Q4AQQ9?QQQ Q1-2 CONFIDENTIAL.
Havana Telephone Book (Continued)
Aguillar Vdo de Blanco Ismenia
Calzada 1053 Vda .....
30-3709
Telephone No.
Reversed Listing
Page No.
Column No.
93919
1
3
303709
1
3
328552
1
3
Telephone number reversals cost around $15 per 1,000 en-
tries. Thus a telephone book containing 100,000, names would
cost approximately $1,500 to process.
The Address Problem
Listings by street and house number as well as telephone
are about three times as expensive and time-consuming under
the best of conditions. The main cost is keypunching the
additional data. But what made such listings almost impos-
sible economically in the past was the problem of distinguish-
ing the data to be punched. GS-3 keypunchers must follow
the simplest, most ironclad rules to maintain economical pro-
duction, but the directories of different countries, and often of
different cities within a country, have different styles for en-
tering the subscriber's name, his address, his profession or
enterprise, his district, and his telephone number. In order
to eliminate unwanted terms one must adopt a set of conven-
tions suiting the conditions in a given directory for the key-
puncher to follow.
A method much too costly in professional manpower was
used once in 1957 on the East Berlin telephone directory.
Analysts with knowledge of the language went through the
book deleting unwanted terms such as designation of pro-
fession or enterprise in each entry and writing in a code num-
ber for every street name. The resulting index, which could
be put in order of either phone number or street code and
house number, included the full name of the subscriber-a
luxury which most users now recognize to be unnecessary.
Reversed East Berlin Telephone Book
Phone No.
Name
St. Code
House No.
654215
SARGE GERTRUD
3473
15
854218
GABRIEL FRANZ
3169
31
654220
GAGE BRIGITTE
4703
103
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62 CONFIDENTIAL
In the past year we have developed new approaches to the
job, using simplified computer or human editing, simple con-
ventions in the keypunching instructions, or a combination of
these, which bring it down to a reasonable cost and require
little or no commitment of professional staff time. Brief de-
scriptions of three devices found satisfactory in different
cases are given below:
Computer Editing. The problem with the Havana directory
was to get rid of a single irrelevant word following the sub-
scriber's name and preceding the street name:
Abraham Lincoln-Acad Calzada 302 Vdo ........ 32-8920
Calzada 308 Vdo .............................. 32-7842
Abreu Juan-Cafet S Rafael 1209 ................ 7-5078
Abujasen Jose A-Mueb Cda Cerro 1810 .... .... 4-9234
The solution found was to punch the entire entry after the
subscriber's name and instruct a computer to edit out the
unwanted term. After the first 10% of the cards had been
punched at random, a machine listing was made and Spanish
linguists underlined the word in each line to be excluded--
Abog, Abogs, Agoq, Acad, Ace, Acum, etc. These words were
punched and put into the computer look-up table as items to
be ignored, and on the basis of this random sample such
terms were eliminated from all entries. The listing could
then be printed out in alphabetical order of the next following
item-the street name:
Name
Street
House No.
Tel. No.
Page
No.
HERNANDEZ ORESTES
RECREO
00719 CERRO
42-5983
193
HERNANDEZ ELOISA
RECREO
00922
40-1078
190
ROMEO ENGRACIA
RECURSO
00022
40-5715
356
JORGE ROUANDO
RECURSO
00027
42-1711
208
Keypunch Convention. The computer approach was en-
tirely successful on the Havana job, but not on others. The
Warsaw directory presented the same problem of identifying
terms for occupation and the like, but here they often con-
sisted of multiple words, complicating the computer look-up
to delete. It was found, however, that these were not capi?-
 CONFIDENTIAL Name for Your Number
talized, whereas all or almost all street names began with
capital letters:
9
46
97
Berlowicz Matys, dr. med.,
Al. Stalingradzka 52 bl. 72
22
93
67
Berlowicz Michal, inz.,
Opaczewska 25, Ochota
8
23
35
Berman Leon, Hota 64
The keypunch operators could therefore be told to begin
punching with the first capital letter following the subscrib-
er's name. This device, however, could be used successfully
only by keypunch operators of some skill and experience.
Expert Help. To distinguish the beginning of the street
name in the East Berlin directory, a "coding" step was found
to be the most economical. Contract personnel familiar with
German underlined each street name for the keypunchers-
this being cheaper by two or three thousand dollars than the
complicated computer program required to edit out the thou-
sands of unwanted terms. It took about 120 man-hours to
code the 64,000 entries for keypunching. If the directory had
been three or four times that size other solutions might have
been more economical.
These rather crude but reasonably accurate approaches to
mass data processing with the help of business machines
yield a product which may have more daily operational utility
than any of the more sophisticated machine programs so far
developed for operational support. Its great virtue is its sim-
plicity. Anyone can use the product with a minute's briefing,
and its usefulness is apparent immediately to the greenest of
intelligence officers or analysts. The development of new
procedural and computer tricks for listing by telephone num-
ber and address has brought costs down by as much as two-
thirds from what we used to pay. It looks as though the
intelligence community could afford to produce, and exchange,
a good deal more of this type of support material.
:ICIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2 SECRET
COMMUNICATIONS TO THE EDITORS
Quantified Indicators
Dear Sirs:
There is a logical inconsistency toward the end of your
otherwise well-reasoned Ramsey-Boerr er "Study in Indications
casually, the
Methodology." 1 In interpreting, perhaps a bit graphic distribution of seven hypotheses with respect to
eight indicators in Figure 10, the authors say that "A stand.-
down in the Tactical Air Force . . . seems to explain the
negative position on the Z2 axis of the limited war cluster,
because tactical rather than strategic air forces would prob-
ably be used in a limited action." But reference to Figures
6, 7, and 9 shows that a TAF standdown was judged to indicate
against all three hypotheses in the cluster, most strongly
against the likelihood of limited war. This indicator should
therefore tend to drive these hypotheses toward the positive
end of the axis in Figure 10.
If there was no mathematical or graphic error, the opposite
interpretations presumably arose from different assumptions
as to timing: during standdown for maintenance the avail-
ability of the tactical force would be decreased, but thereafter
its readiness would be greater. This discrepancy calls into
question the validity of the "intuitive explanation" of the role
of the other indicators, since these were apparently not
checked , against the quantitative judgments used. More
broadly, it points up the need, which the authors themselves
stress, for .exhaustive definition not only of indicators but also
of hypotheses.
Anthony Quibble
Dear Sirs:
Mr. Quibble is quite right that our prima facie interpreta.
tion describes erroneously the relevance of a TAF stand-
down to the limited war hypotheses. Two other statements
in the interpretation of Figure 10 are also inconsistent with
the judges' weights. We said that a TAF standdown "does
'Studies VII 3, pp. 75-94.
65
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not seem to argue strongly for pre-emption" as against pre-
meditated attack or escalation, but Figures 3, 4, and 5 show
that it was indeed judged to favor pre-emption. And we sug-
gested that the Bloc consultation indicator "would explain the
positive location of the diplomatic crisis hypothesis" along the
vertical axis, although this indicator, shown in Figure 8 to
weigh against the hypothesis, would tend to repel it toward the
negative end of the axis.
We should of course have seen to it that the interpreta-
tions were consistent with the quantitative ratings. But a
systematic correlation would have required an examination
into the judges' reasons for their weights, and these had been
developed only with reference to initial disagreements. The
superficial inconsistencies do not in any case invalidate our
central conclusions from the experiment-that it is possible
to distinguish among alternative hypotheses by the patterns
of associated indicator weights, and that it is possible to con-
struct a meaningful geometric representation of the relation-
ships.
Diane Ramsey
Mark Boerner
Agent Relations
Dear Sirs:
In reading "A Mirror for Agent Handlers," which appeared
some time ago in the Studies,2 I was impressed not so much by
the parallel in the two agents' dissatisfactions with their case
officers as by the way they reflect universal attitudes most
of us have toward our bosses.
Much research has been done in recent years on the broad
problem of interrelationships among people who are working
together, and some generalizations have been reached on the
subject, usually called "human relations." The Department
of the Air Force, for example, in its booklet The Management
Process (AF Manual 25-1) lists a number of observations
("Applied Human Relations," pp. 75-78) intended to help
bosses develop useful attitudes toward themselves and other
' III 3 p. 29 if.
MORI/HRP PAGES 66-69
66
people. These precepts are not markedly different from the
agents' remarks. For example:
Air Force Manual: People will work best for a supervisor whom they
trust.
Agent from Germany: We have not found common ground on the
point of trust.
Agent from Korea: A false promise should never be given to an
agent.
AF: People are different; they expect and deserve to be treated as
individuals.
G: There has been nothing human about these meetings ... in
this sort of relationship a person gradually becomes a robot
it forces a person to lose his individuality.
K: It would be a lot easier for everyone concerned if [the case
officer] would just concentrate on ... making the best use
of the Koreans as they are rather than trying to ... convert
them to the American way of life.
AF: People work best when they know that their chief is interested in
them . . . and manifests an interest in their personal affairs.
G: I feel the need of some comradeship ..., friends to talk things
over with.
K: You kept saying ... that you would come out to my home for
a Sunday visit ... but you never came or even called me.
AF: People like to be told, in the right way, when they are doing
something wrong.
G: I certainly would not condemn anyone for criticism; in fact,
I think such is necessary and I would be thankful for it.
K: Had the case officer received the group at the gate and repri-
manded them, they would appreciate him more.
AF: People like to know where they stand.
G: Not one of my case officers has given me an assessment of my
efforts.
K: The indifferent attitude of the case officer . .. forced the men
into an attitude of resentment and revolt.
AF: People's behavior is caused to a very great extent by habit and
emotion, and to a much lesser extent by reason.
G: The method of investigation not only aroused my
moral depression and disrespect for the officer.
K: How could you possibly hope to get away with
the feelings of the local government?
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AF: People work best when informed of matters that concern them.
G: I should be assured that the clandestinity is adhered to for
this or that reason, not because of me; the affair should not
be left unclarified.
K: I believe that a good working relationship with the local gov-
ernment has not been possible because of the somewhat over-
emphasized clandestinity on the part of the Americans.
AF: People work best when they feel that they belong and are using
the abilities they have.
G: The Germans . . . never permitted us to believe that we were
ordinary, paid, untrusted agents.
K: I know of several cases where agent ' personnel were used for
all-round household duties and so produced far less in their
main work.
AF: People resent public criticism; they dislike "losing face."
G: To my astonishment, [the polygraph test] was given in the
presence of the case officer ... it was an error from the
psychological standpoint.
K: I have listened to so many complaints about . "those goddam
Koreans."
AF (p. 39) : Productive output of humans is not the result of a mechani-
cal process and therefore cannot be approached mechanically by
the manager.
G: The human aspects cannot be fulfilled with material rewards
... The whole transaction became a business deal, not a matter
of human relations.
K: Human relations should receive a greater emphasis in dealing
with Korean agents ... The sooner the Americans . ... work
at the whole thing from a human give-and-take attitude, the
better off they will be.
When these agents talk about human relations, they seem
to have in mind the same basic concepts as are outlined in a
well-known text on Human Relations at Work: $
a) Some mutuality of Interest exists between employer and
employed.
b) Human relations begin with the individual, because each in-
dividual Is different.
c) Each individual behaves according to the way that he sees his
needs can best be satisfied.
d) People want to be treated with respect and dignity-to be
treated as human beings.
To The Editors
SECRET
is it then so remarkable that two widely separated agents
should speak so much of the establishment of trust, the
preservation of individuality, the satisfaction of needs, a ad
the upholding of human dignity? It is quite possible
agent handlers might benefit from greater familiarity with
currently developed concepts of interpersonal relations, moti-
vation, and leadership; they might do well to make a prac-
tice of assessing their own attitudes along with those of their
agents.
Robert B. Shaffer
69
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The pPiTYary intelligence officer
reaches into other fields in
anti-guerrilla operations.
ASPECTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
INTELLIGENCE
William M. Hartness
Insurgency may be considered a phased process of insurrec-
tion against a constituted government, beginning with ini- !
tially insidious and then gradually more massive subversive
activity, which lays the groundwork for a phase of guerrilla
warfare and may finally lead to full civil war short of recog-
nized belligerency. In Communist-inspired insurgency the
first phase can take many, many years, and it is during this
period that the insurgency could be contained and eliminated
with relative ease; afterwards a pitched battle must be fought
to put it down. U.S. intelligence thus has a big job to do long
before the advent of guerrilla warfare-spotting instabilities in
the society, detecting the subversive activity, tracing it to its
Communist leadership, and methodically collecting the infor-
mation that will be needed if U.S. counterinsurgency forces
are committed to assist those of the country in question.
But here I shall concentrate on its later tasks when the
U.S. forces have been called in.
Basic, Estimative, and Operational Studies
Steps in the counterinsurgency intelligence process as de-
veloped veloped at the Army Intelligence School at Fort I3olabird,
in coordination with the Special Warfare Agency at Fort Bragg,
begin with an Area Study, a thorough basic survey of the
country in question from all aspects-geographic, socio-cul-
tural, political, economic, and military. Ideally, such a study
is begun long before insurgence becomes' active; in any case
it is essential for counterinsurgency planning. This is up-
dated
and particularized, when the U.S. commander has
reached the scene, by an Area Assessment, which serves as a
broad base for operational and logistical planning.
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Then a Counterinsurgency Intelligence Estimate is prepared,
addressed to the specific objectives of the U.S. forces. This
usually requires the designation and collection of a group of
essential elements of information. The estimate is more com-
plex and sophisticated than the ordinary military intelligence
estimate, involving subtle considerations and non-military
factors of a political, social, and economic nature. It describes
the strengths and weaknesses of the insurgent forces and
exploitable features of the situation. It clearly distinguishes
between fact and any conjecture or opinion it may offer.
On the basis of this estimate the commander chooses his
course of action. In weighing a particular action he has to
consider not just its primary and secondary results but its re-
moter consequences. The complications were brought home
to me by something I saw last year while flying over the
delta area of Vietnam-several villages cut off from vehicular
travel by blown road approaches. The Viet Cong, who con-
trolled these villages, had blown the approaches to prevent a
surprise mechanized attack in spite of the fact that it thereby
betrayed its presence.
Here was a dilemma for the counterinsurgency commander.
If he ordered a paratroop attack the enemy would evacuate
along booby-trapped paths into the dense rain forests. If he
ordered a sudden air attack, it would probably injure and
kill many innocent civilians, virtual captives in their own vil-
lage. Since winning the support of the people is one of the
main goals in any counterinsurgency program, he would have
to put great weight on the side effects of such an action. He
would also have to weigh the effect of his military actions on
other operations, say civic or psychological, which might
have been mounted to regain the village.
Once a course of action has been chosen, an Intelligence
Annex to the operational plan is developed. This intelli-
gence plan addresses itself to the individual objectives to be
achieved and the immediate and ultimate results of actions.
It requires an intimate knowledge of the arena of conflict.
The measures envisaged in the operational plan may be clas-
sified into four types-preventive, reactive, aggressive, and
remedial.
Preventive measures are intended to forestall the develop-
ment of insurgency in the area of operations. They include
the application of standard operating procedures with respect
to the following: the security, discipline, training, and indoc-
trination of the forces; public information programs; the
maintenance of public order; population and movement con-
trols; control over sources of material support. for guerrilla
operations; surveillance or control of access to marshalling
areas, rendezvous points, and areas suitable for bivouacs; sur-
veillance or control of access to possible points of contact be-
tween the civilian population and the insurgent force. These
may be regarded as passive measures to impede the enemy.
Reactive measures, those taken to counter insurgent ac-
tivity when it threatens the mission or the security of the
command, are characteristically intense and sometimes ex-
traordinary actions to suppress and eradicate subversion
and reestablish the situation. Examples are investigations,
intercept-seizure-search operations, and coordinated police
and military action. They are a response to specific insurgent
activity.
Aggressive measures are those designed to strike at the core
of the insurgent organization or the subversive apparatus which
controls it, destroying enemy morale and leadership. They
generally require great sophistication in conception and in
execution. Typical are clandestine penetration, deception, pro-
vocation, and psychological operations.
Remedial measures, finally, are designed to change the con-
ditions that fostered the development of insurgency in the
first place and so go deeply into economic, social, and political
matters. They may be, the proclamation, of a new regime or
new objectives, agrarian reform, other economic or political
reforms, new systems of public order, or educational programs,
especially concerning the subversive ideology. Intelligence
is less intimately concerned with these than with the others,
but the civil affairs staff, which has predominant responsi-
bility, would be greatly handicapped without intelligence upon
which to base sound civic action programs.
Korean Application
I'd like to illustrate these concepts from personal experi-
ence. In the fall of 1960 I was assigned to organize, train,
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and tactically advise a native counterguerrilla force to com-
bat enemy activity in the I Corps area in Korea. My orders
read, "You are hereby authorized to capture or destroy, as
the situation warrants, hostile armed enemy agents in the
I Corps (Group) area." I was both Intelligence and Opera-
tions for this mission.
My first step was to get hold of an area study and area as-
sessment. Though these were sketchy, they acquainted me
with the general situation. Small groups of North Korean
guerrillas., accompanied by spies and saboteurs and assisted
by local sympathizers and collaborators, were moving into and
out of South Korea almost at will. They had been instructed
to gather military, economic, and political intelligence, re-
cruit informants and collaborators, prepare the ground for
widespread sabotage to be carried out on order, and subvert
the population. As a sideline, they occasionally attacked re-
mote border outposts, killing and kidnapping South Korean
personnel.
With this and other background information at hand, we
drew up a list of nearly 500 EEI as a basis for the intelligence
estimate. These were carefully prepared to develop a com-
plete knowledge of the enemy and his activities. Little was
actually known except that he was there: villagers had seen
armed bands in the mountains and there had been sporadic
skirmishes with ROK forces and national police. But which
hostile agencies had sent him? How was he trained? What
were his methods of operation? His travel routes? We had
to have answers to these and many other questions before we
could intelligently prepare a plan for counteraction.
Both U.S. and ROK agencies had manifested acute interest
in these clandestine activities, but no one had methodically
gathered information about them as a whole. Even the U.S.-
operated Joint Interrogation Center had not prepared com-
posite and comparative studies. ROK security files held many
reports, but they dealt mostly with separate individual ac-
tions. Excellent interrogation reports lay in the files of sev-
eral agencies, but no one had assembled and evaluated the
information they held.
We gathered from the ROK and U.S. agencies this mass of
unsorted and uncollated reports and examined, analyzed, and
carded the information. Four Korean interpreter/tran.sla-
tors were assigned each to a particular aspect of the re-
search-respectively background data, travel routes and
methods, modus operandi, and mission. It was three months
before most of our EEI had been satisfied, but then we had
for our intelligence estimate a fairly complete picture of the
enemy and his activities, including his relations with the peo-
ple in our area. We made only a very few changes when we
began formal operations.
The nature of the mission and my double assignment served
to merge the intelligence and operational plans into one. Its
concept was to avoid reacting on a day-to-day basis to enemy
activity, letting him call the shots; we thought that we had
enough sound information to predict what he was going to do.
Without tipping our hand, if possible, we planned to wrench
the initiative from him by responding correctly on the first
move and suddenly inflicting failure where he had scored suc-
cess after success for years. It took a lot of detailed staff'
work to build the intelligence/operational plan, which called
for measures in all of the four categories, preventive, reactive?
aggressive, and remedial. One example from each type will.
show how each contributed to the success of the operation.
A preventive measure was to deny the enemy access to our
area. Since we had what we considered reliable information
about his travel routes, one of the first steps planned was
to set up ambush points from which our people could detect or
stop him. But there was a catch: our information indicated
that the infiltrators had developed an uncanny acuity of
sight, hearing, and smell, such that they had foiled past at..
tempts by sensing and by-passing the ambush positions under
cover of darkness. We needed some sort of interception equip-
ment to prevent these escapes. We couldn't use fixed or lethal
devices such as anti-personnel mines: the villagers, though
they stayed away from the mountains at night, carried on
some activity there during the daytime. We needed some-
thing we could set up every night-the enemy was known to
travel only at night-and deactivate in the morning, some.
thing portable, fairly simple to operate, and available in suf-
ficient quantity.
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We decided to test the M49 trip flare. Easy to rig and de-rig,
this flare produces. about 40,000 candle power, enough light to
make a man easily visible within a radius of 300 yards. It
proved to be the solution to the problem. Within a week of
the time it was issued two enemy agents were captured as a
direct result of its use, and more than half of all later cap-
tures and kills were credited to it.
Our reactive measures were conditioned by the enemy's
practice of heading back to his sanctuary in North Korea im-
mediately after making a strike. Since we couldn't follow him
across the 38th parallel, we had to react quickly. We knew
his travel routes (he used only mountain ridges, avoiding
valleys and populated areas), and we computed his speed at
an average of three miles an hour. Under pressure he could
push this up to four and a half miles for the first hour, but
over a four-hour period of night travel he would average only
three. We worked out interdict formulas and enlisted the aid
of all U.S. and ROK military units in setting up immediate-
response forces. As soon as we got an initial report of enemy
action, our control office calculated the maximum distance
the enemy could have travelled and phoned all the units
through whose areas he might pass. The immediate-response
force in each of these units moved to its prearranged posi-
tion and waited for him to walk in.
With respect to aggressive measures one of the problems
was the enemy's resistance to interrogation.. This was
stressed, we had learned, in his training program, particu-
larly resistance under physical coercion. So important was
this subject and so realistic the training that some enemy soI-
diers had been disfigured for life when subjected by instruc-
tors to brutality to test their resistance.
A typical situation requiring rapid and productive interroga-
tion was the capture of a subversive agent before his rendez-
vous with the guerrilla escorts who were to take him back to
North Korea on completion of his mission. If we could learn
the time and place of the planned rendezvous we could bag
the escort too. We decided to try the polygraph. We would
confront a captured agent with a large map of the area, di-
vided into quadrants. When he was oriented to the map,
place. When one quadrant would provoke an emotional re-
sponse on the polygraph, we divided a large map of that quad-
rant into quadrants and questioned him again. This would
be repeated until we had learned the exact location of the
meeting place. In one case, I recall, in which the rendezvous
was to take place in a remote village, we showed the prisoner
enlarged aerial photos of the village, and after proper orienta-
tion his polygraph response betrayed the very hut to be used.
He hadn't spoken a word during the whole examination and
must have been pleased with himself for having withheld, as
he thought, the information we needed to neutralize his escort
force. The polygraph was 100% effective in the more than 50
cases in which it was thus used.
The use of remedial measures can be illustrated in our ci-
vilian orientation program. The program contributed to our
reactive and aggressive measures, but it was essentially re-
medial. No consistent effort had previously been made to use
propaganda or other means to acquaint the villagers with the
danger the enemy presented to their country and themselves.
No one had tried to cultivate their friendship systematically
or get their help in detecting and neutralizing the enemy.
There seemed to be a wide gap between the rice-roots elements
of the population and their official agencies. Though there
were rewards for information leading to the capture or elimi-
nation of an enemy agent, few villagers in the remote coun-
tryside knew of them. Their reporting was sporadic and usu-
ally several days after a sighting, too late to be of any value.
Under our program both military intelligence and national
police personnel from the counterguerrilla force made liaison
visits to all villages. They told the people that not only was
it a patriotic duty to report strangers in their area immedi-
ately but it would also bring liberal rewards if it led to the
arrest or elimination of an enemy agent. They told them
what to report and where and how to report it, and they
stressed the importance of doing it promptly. We also passed
out a million leaflets with the same message, carrying the
guarantee of reward italicized in red ink.
Finally, we set up in the village centers large signs depict-
ing the national danger of enemy subversive activities, and
we asked in which quadrant the rendezvous wa to t a k e tc hestt hhe schools, giving prizes to the children
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who made up the best countersubversive slogans and posters.
The response was good: in the first three months after the
program began, villagers were responsible for the apprehen-
sion of 15 ROK civilians trying to defect to North Korea, 4
North Koreans defecting to South Korea, and 3 actual enemy
agents.
Application in Vitanga
In the Korea case some aspects of the intelligence role may
not stand out clearly because of being merged with opera-
tions. Let us take hypothetically a more complex counter-
insurgency mission and examine separately and in detail the
process of collecting information for a particular tactical op-
eration it undertakes. You are the senior U.S. military ad-
visor to the commanding general of the indigenous 1st In-
fantry Division of Vitanga, a hypothetical country where
U.S. Special Action Forces are helping to combat active in-
surgency in its guerrilla stage. The division commander is
contemplating military counteraction against a recent buildup
of guerrilla forces in Nam Binh province, which had been rela-
tively quiet before.
You recognize that command responsibility for the proposed
operation is vested exclusively in the division commander.
Nevertheless your responsibilities to your own superiors are
great: you must insure that the operation is soundly planned
and executed, and you must do this by such devices as sug-
gestion, recommendation, influence, and demonstration and
by drawing on the capabilities of the entire U.S. advisory
setup. You have in fact established a relationship of mutual
confidence with the division commander and his staff such
that the planning of the operation is truly bilateral.
The intelligence officer on your staff, together with his in-
digenous counterpart, has maintained an area assessment of
the province. Its original basis was an Area Study prepared
five years ago by the American Embassy in Vitangaville, the
capital, which supplied the following facts:
Nam Binh province is equally divided into Dinh and Moc districts.
The western border, constituted by the ridge lines of a high moun-
tain range said to be impassable, adjoins the country of Matavia,
whi
h
t thi
c
a
s time was an Independent, anti-Communist kingdom
Ti. i. Al
t
i
jungle vegetation; the Dinhs are an independent-spirited, primi-
tively tribal non-Vitangan people but had never constituted a threat
to the central government. Moe district, extending east to the
Green Sea, is flat country devoted to the large-scale cultivation of
rubber trees run by two foreign companies. The population is
Vitangan (referred to by the Dinhs as "Lowlanders") ; they work
the plantations. The climate is sub-tropical, with monsoon rains
from April to September. There were no known economic or politi-
cal difficulties in the province and no military forces were stationed
there; internal security was maintained by approximately 1,000
national police officers. Dirt roads serve most of the area.
This study has been updated by later reports from U.S.
military and civilian agencies in Vitanga:
1. In 1960 the King of Matavia was forced to abdicate when a
group of openly Marxist Matavian army officers staged a coup and
renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Matavia. Vitanga
then severed diplomatic relations with it.
2. Since January 1963 guerrilla bands have ambushed police
patrols along the Dinh-Moc district boundary and have entered
isolated villages to deliver propaganda lectures urging revolt against
the "U.S.-dominated" and "repressive" Vitanga government. These
guerrillas usually murder some of the wealthier villagers and take
their money "to finance the revolution."
3. The 1st Infantry Division, activated in Nam Binh in 1961,
is the government's only military force in the province. The 1st
and 2nd regiments are stationed in the provincial capital, Bo Nan.
The 3d, along with a U.S. Army Special Forces Detachment, is lo-
cated in the northern sector of Dinh district. No contact has been
made with the guerrillas.
4. Vitanga officials believe that the guerrillas, who are armed
with modern rifles and submachine guns of unknown origin, are
receiving from both the Dinhs and the plantation workers increas-
ing support in the form of food, shelter, and information on the
movements of the security forces.
The area assessment thus formulated provides general back-
ground but lacks the detailed data which must be considered
by the division commander in determining his course of ac-
tion. An intelligence estimate of the situation is required, and
this requires the development of essential elements of informa-
tion by the division 02 and your intelligence officer. Some
of the EEI can be satisfied by the division itself; others are
s
r
ct on the west is mountain s and c v ed i e forwarded to higher intelligence echelons in both the indigenous
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and the U.S. structure. A small sampling of them reads as
follows:
1. What will be the effect of the monsoon rains on the usability
of the dirt roads and on helicopter operations in the identified
guerrilla operational areas? Are relief maps and aerial photos of
these areas available or can they be procured?
2. What civilian communications facilities in the province can
be used in the conduct of the military operations?
3. What specific economic, political, or social wants are being
exploited by the guerrillas to elicit popular support?
4. Evaluate the reliability of the Vitangan police forces in the
province.
5. What is the nature and extent of foreign assistance given the
guerrillas? How does it reach them?
6. Identify internal groups and personalities sympathetic to the
guerrillas.
The division G2 channels the EEI through Corps G2 to the
J2 of the Vitanga Joint General Staff, and your intelligence
officer similarly sends them through Corps level to the J2 of
the U.S. command. The coordination of U.S. and indigenous
collection action is achieved by effective liaison.
On the U.S. side, your EEI are screened against the J2's cur-
rent holdings and the information found here returned to
you immediately. Because Nam Binh province had not pre-
viously been of priority interest, however, a number of the
EEI cannot be filled in this way. The J2 then focuses the
capabilities of a vast collection machine on these require-
ments of yours in a Collection Plan listing the unfulfilled
EEI and designating the collection agencies on which they are
to be levied. He has a wide range of sources on which to draw.
On his own staff he has representatives of U.S. Army Coun-
terintelligence, Collection, Order of Battle, Technical Intelli-
gence, and the Army Security Agency, as well as the Air
Force's Office of Special Investigations and the Office of Naval
Intelligence. He has access to the assets of the other staff
sections of the joint command. He can call on the individual
service components of the theater command and of the
MAAG advisory system and on the MAAG J2 and Provost
Marshal. The local facilities of USIS and AID and the cen-
tral registries of the CIA are available to him. In the Em-
bassy are the security officer, the personnel office, the politi-
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cal office, the economic office, and the military attaches of
each service. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service, the
FBI, the Secret Service, and the Bureau of Narcotics may be
operating locally. U.S. non-government agencies can also be
most helpful in providing area information. And through the
advisory system and liaison, both official and unofficial, the
J2 has access to many lucrative Vitangan sources.
From this network of sources the J2 responds to your EEI,
in summary as follows:
Detailed map study in the J2 shop indicated that the Vitanga-
Matavia border mountains appeared passable in two areas. Sub-
sequent aerial photography of these revealed trails and positive
indications of recent border crossings at two specific points.
J2, MAAG, declared that during the monsoon season all roads
except those in the immediate vicinity of the provincial capital,
Bo Nan, became impassable. Helicopter operations would remain
possible throughout the province but would be impeded by overcast
and poor ground conditions.
The 3d ASA Detachment reported unusual radio traffic originating
from three locations along the Dinh-Moc district boundary and
from a station located approximately 15 miles within Matavia.
The codes used were typically Matavian.
S-2 of the Special Forces Detachment in Dinh district, in a report
entitled "Internal Security Nam Binh Province," quoted Dinh ele-
ments friendly to Special Forces as saying that other Dinh were
smuggling ammunition and weapons into the district from Matavia
for delivery to three Dinh-led guerrilla bands operating along the
Dinh-Moc district boundary. These bands, numbering approxi-
mately one hundred fifty men each, were composed of dissident
Dinh and Vitangan "Lowlander" elements who had gone to Matavia
in 1960 for guerrilla training. They used code names and their
true identities could not be ascertained.
The U.S. Collection Detachment, operating jointly with the
Vitangan Collection Company, discovered that the Matavian army
was operating a guerrilla training school not far west of the
Vitanga border for Dinhs and "Lowlanders" from Nam Binh.
After training they were infiltrated back in to organize guerrilla
bands. The school trained approximately twenty students per
month:
The Technical Intelligence Division, J2, reported that a case
of ammunition found in a cave ? located near the Dinh-Moc district
boundary had been examined and identified as Matavian ordnance.
The Order of Battle Section, J2, had no information on guerrilla
units in Nam Binh. However, it reported on the interrogation of
a prisoner of war captured only two weeks before in an adjoining
province. A Nam Binh native,. the prisoner had been a medium-
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level cadre of the Vitanga Liberation Front assigned to a guerrilla
unit. He was pleased at his capture; he said guerrilla life was
very hard and he had recently been trying to find a way to sur-
render himself. As evidence of good faith he volunteered for
National Army duty. He stated that Mong Hai, the provincial Chief
of Police, had aided the guerrilla cause by providing advance
notice of police raids and searches.
The CI and Security Branch, J2, through its operational arm,
the 407th Intelligence Corps Detachment (CI), procured from U.S.
and Vitangan civilian agencies reports responsive to EEI on per-
sonalities, security, and economic, political, and social factors:
USIS reported increasing difficulty in attracting Nam Binh audi-
ences to field programs designed to explain U.S. assistance to
Vitanga; it was believed people were staying away because of
guerrilla threats. Areas where this attitude seemed prevalent
coincided with previously suspect locations reported by ASA.
The Public Safety Division of the U.S. Operations Mission,
which has advisors with the provincial police, reported that as
a result of a lack of initiative on the part of Chief Mong Hai,
the police were no longer capable of coping with the increased
insurgent activity in the province. Harsh working conditions on
the plantations were causing severe worker unrest, and Mong Hai
supported the plantation owners by jailing and beating workers
who complained. The foreign owners, fearing nationalization of
the plantations, were seeking maximum short-range profits and
disregarding worker welfare.
The Chief of the USOM Communications Division revealed that
the Mission had considerably developed Nam Binh's radio network
by installing 1,250 TR-20 radios in the province. The provincial
network was tied in with division headquarters at Bo Nan so
that information on guerrilla activities could be relayed instantly
to the headquarters concerned and appropriate counteractions
ordered.
CIA reported many recent manifestations of Matavian-inspired
subversive activity and Dinh unrest in the province. The Dinh
were upset at the arrest by the Vitangan government of their
district chief, Dong, who had been critical of the government,
blaming it for the poor living standards of the Dinh and alleged
discrimination against them. Chief Mong Hai of the provincial
police had urged the arrest, but the Province Chief, considering
Dong basically loyal to the government, was arguing for his release
to quiet the unrest.
The Foreign Broadcast Information Service reported that propa-
ganda broadcasts by the Nam Binh Liberation Front repeatedly
blamed poor working conditions in the rubber plantations on
American pressure for cheap rubber for military vehicle tires.
The broadcasts, which claimed to originate in Nam Binh, actually
came from Matavia. Although all the Vitangan rubber was being
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used in domestic manufacture, the Information Service of the
Vitangan government made no effort to counter this propaganda.
Finally, the Vitangan Central Intelligence Organization fur-
nished a summary of the internal security situation of the province.
Based on information obtained by penetration agents of the Na-
tional Police and the Military Security Service, it showed that
soldiers' families
res ure on the soldiers to desert the regular
being coerced ed to to bring ing
pressure
forces and join the guerrillas. The guerrillas were also contacting
military personnel directly to threaten reprisals espionage against their
families if they did not cooperate by performing sabotage missions. CIO estimated that approximately 25% of the
1st Infantry Division had been brought under guerrilla influence
by these measures.
The Vitanga situation, although hypothetical, closely paral-
lels conditions which the U.S. Special Action Forces face today
and which we may expect them to encounter for many years
to come. It shows how the American intelligence advisor at
division level, working with the division G2, can supply
through carefully formulated specific EEI the information
needed for division operations. It points up the importance
of his ready access, through the American J2, to a multiplicate
and vigorous collection network. More broadly, it illustrates
the essential role of intelligence in bringing a knowledge of
significant and many times obscure factors to bear on the de-
termination of a best course of action.
The Communist-sponsored insurgency environment has
created a new context for U.S. forces abroad, one in which
conventional military intelligence requirements must be
greatly expanded to include some matters formerly regarded
as nonmilitary and others unique to counterinsurgency, both
now of critical importance for military operations. The
U.S. Special Action Forces require concentrated, tailored intelli-
gence and counterintelligence support. They require informa-
tion like that illustrated above for the operational effective-
ness of committed forces, but also broader information as the
basis for pre-commitment planning and long-range intelli-
gence on insurgency potential. These requirements cover all
aspects of a potentially insurgent country and its society and
early recognition of incipient insurgency.
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Need for a joint intelligence
team in the field to sift and
synthesize the raw minutiae of
rebellion.
THE ASSESSMENT OF INSURGENCY
Edward T. Schwarzchild
Understanding and keeping abreast of the situation in an
insurgency is difficult in the field and even more difficult in
Washington. The military features are only one aspect of
the course of a social and political revolution, and the ques-
tions that must be answered range over all categories of in-
telligence, for example: What full-time guerrilla units are
there, and where are they? What heavy weapons do they
have? How many men deserted from them last month?
What is the price and the availability of basic foodstuffs?
What foreign advisors do the insurgents have? Has there
been a recent shift in their propaganda lines? How, and how
effectively, do they control the population in their areas?
How do the various tribal minorities think and behave? How
deep-seated are their grievances?
The volume of raw data bearing on these questions is often
very large. To ascertain the attitudes of the populace toward
the insurgents in a given province, one needs to scan the
records of defector interrogations and reports from agents,
patrols, central government officers, and U.S. personnel-re-
ports which may total tens of thousands of words. Similarly,
great volume is a prerequisite in developing order-of-battle in-
formation from individual reports which may be vague, frag-
mentary, unprofessional, and occasionally mistaken or self-
contradictory. It was possible in Laos, for example, using
only low-level, untrained or little-trained informants, to com-
pile a list of Kong Le units and strengths in most provinces
which proved to be ninety percent accurate and ninety per-
cent complete, but it required a multitude of reports over a
period of five months to do so. RI/HRp pp~E
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The Problem of Synthesis
The information on an insurgency that reaches Washing-
ton, under present procedures, is by and large not the answers
to the elementary questions but the raw minutiae. As the
field units of the several intelligence agencies concerned
with insurgents in a given country forward their reports (im-
mediately or ultimately), the Washington community is pre-
sented with data in enormous quantity and complicated detail.
Many reports are disseminated describing events down to the
village level. The problem is thus not the availability of data
but its meaning in terms of the questions to be answered.
Washington analysts are in a poorer position than people in
the field to sift such quantities of data and find the meaning.
They are not likely to have the familiarity with the situa-
tion or the feel for it which one can acquire in the field.
Consider a hypothetical case. A central government army
battalion in a remote area engages platoon-strength insurgent
patrols four times in six weeks. Every time the enemy flees
as quickly as possible; the firefights are brief and inconclusive.
As these actions are reported, they look to Washington like
routine, isolated skirmishes. But they occur in an area where
skirmishes have previously been only about half so frequent,
and they all involve the same company of the battalion, one
in a, river valley leading to a neighboring province. From a
village some distance inside that province's border it was re-
cently reported that a number of young men had vanished,
and in the battalion's area the villagers recently began beg-
ging the central government for rice. A field analyst in close
touch with the situation may recognize these coincidences
and deduce that local insurgent activity is concentrated on
infiltrating and recruiting in the neighboring province. The
harried analyst in Washington would not be likely to.
What is needed is an arrangement to collect in one place
in the field all relevant bits of information, sort out the sig-
nificant, and relate different kinds of information, such as eco-
nomic and military, to each other. Then it would be possible
to reduce the volume of low-level, immediately meaningless
data disseminated in Washington, and in the field as well, to
people who cannot devote full time to interpreting it, to in-
crease the proportion of obviously significant information re-
ported, and so to present a clearer picture of the situation.
A Solution
The best way to fill this need would be to create a small
intelligence staff reporting to the country team. The staff
should report to the country team so as to have both access to
command levels and enough latent bureaucratic horsepower
to encourage cooperation from the lower echelons of the col-
lecting agencies. It should include officers (workers, not
spokesmen) of the major agencies involved. A composite
group is necessary because a variety of professionals can
understand the complex problems of insurgency better than. a
group from only one organization.
Such a staff, clearly one logical solution with respect to in-
surgent countries where U.S. military operations are mini-
mal, as in Laos, would have advantages even under massive
U.S, military involvement, as in Vietnam, over the alternative
of centering all intelligence in the military, aided or aug-
mented by civilian elements. The composite group suggested.
would have a greater range of skills, be more likely to weigh
non-military factors fully, and enjoy in forming its conclu-
sions a greater detachment from the immediate worries of
those directing military operations.
The composition and functioning of such a staff in prototype
are described below, for the sake of concreteness, in some de-
tail. With adjustments to the peculiarities of different situa-
tions, the prototype should be suitable for use against insur-
gents anywhere.
The titular chief of the staff should probably be CIA's chief
of station, in his capacity of coordinator of intelligence activi-
ties. Its working director, however, should be chosen not by
his organizational affiliation but for his personal qualifica-
tions. He must be able to weld together a staff of people
from different agencies; he must know how to entice full co-
operation from all elements of the local intelligence commu-
nity; and he must understand a military campaign permeated
with political considerations.
The staff, drawn from the military services present, CIA,
USOM, and USIS, should be kept small, not to exceed Parkin-
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son's seven. CIA and the military will in practice furnish
most of the members. Its job is to produce regular assess-
ments of the situation and estimate the insurgents' capabili-
ties and intentions. It will produce monthly and perhaps
weekly studies covering the entire country by region or prov-
ince. If it fails to reach full agreement on any substantive
point, the dissents will be noted in its published report.
The staff will also produce occasional special studies as re-
quired, but' it should be wary of honoring requests to the point
of building up a workload that might force it to expand.
Similarly, it will sometimes want to make suggestions to some
of the operating intelligence units as it identifies gaps and
recognizes effective intelligence-gathering techniques, but it
should avoid getting involved in operations.
The staff members should be senior enough that their
parent organizations' people will respect and cooperate with
them but not so elevated as to be no longer workers. They
should have had upcountry experience in some capacity in-
volving contact with the farmers and ordinary townsmen so
as to understand their sources and targets. They should be
particularly interested and well read in insurgency. In ag-
gregate they should have or should develop a capability to
translate the major languages of the country.
The work should be so organized that each man follows the
situation in one particular area but his temporary absence
does not leave the staff without expertise in that area. This
requires overlapping areas of responsibility: if, for example,
there are six staff members covering six regions of the coun-
try, each should read also all the available information on
one or two regions adjacent to that on which he writes the
periodic reports.
The staff will require a support section of several clerks,
not only to type and reproduce its studies but to extract, file,
and cross-reference for easy recovery the tens of thousands
of bits of information to be used. It will need a war room, or
at least access to one nearby, where there are wall maps
showing the entire country at one or two fairly small
scales (say 1:500,000 and 1:1,000,000) and at least its critical
regions at larger scales (1:250,000 to 1:50,000). Also here
should be stocked individual sheets of the best maps at every
88
scale, plus any special-purpose maps available (for example
the Army Map Service's magnificent Tactical Commander's
Terrain Analysis series). It would be useful, though not es-
sential, to have as chief of the support section an Army spe-
cialist (E-6 or E-7) trained in order-of-battle reporting and
analysis. Such a man would know maps, would understand
what files are needed, and might prove useful in informal
liaison with Army elements.
Such a staff will not solve all the problems of processing in-
telligence on insurgents, but. it can solve some, if its members
are well chosen with an eye to their professional and personal
qualifications. To consolidate a group of men from different
agencies into an effective working unit will be an extraordi-
narily delicate task. But insurgency is extraordinary, posing
intelligence problems too large, too complicated, too detailed,
and too fast-moving to be handled by procedures de-
signed for other times and other information.
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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE
CONFLICT IN THE SHADOWS. By James Eliot Cross. With
foreword by Stewart Alsop. (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday. 1963. Pp. 172. $3.95.)
Subtitled "The Nature and Politics of Guerrilla War," our
ex-colleague's book is a remarkably fine, panoramic examina-
tion of insurgency and counterinsurgency. It belongs in the
first rank of general works on that intensely topical theme,
alongside Paret and Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (second edi-
tion) and Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, both published last
year. Moreover, Cross writes well: reading him is no chore.
Making liberal use of historical and current illustrations,
the book describes the kinds of environments and the synoptic
conditions in which insurrection may take root and flourish,
the character of the military conflict between guerrilla and
government forces, the critical struggle between the two for
popular support, and the roles, problems, and ramifying
burdens of foreign powers involved on either side.
The "guerrilla epidemic" of the current nuclear epoch is
diagnosed as deriving largely from the Communist move-
ment's need for a feasible mode of expansion. After early
postwar hopes placed on political action and national elections
had proved illusory and conventional war became a potential
prelude to holocaust, subversive insurgency or war-by-proxy
remained as a reasonably safe means for extending the Com-
munist domain. With a second from Alsop, the author takes
Khrushchev's January 1961 declaration of support for "wars
of national liberation" as a disclosure of the policy Commu-
nism had followed and would continue to follow, and he shows
how the immature or backward states are particularly at-
tractive targets for this policy. He concludes, however, that,
given American understanding of the nature of insurrection-
ary warfare and effective use of U.S. assets, there is good
reason to believe that over the next decade the Communist
strategy can be defeated. We will be able, he argues, to work
in harmony with the governments of states under attack and
to bring more Western nations "into what must finally be a
wide cooperative effort." MORI/HRP PAGES 91-94
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The author's passages on the intelligence function in guer-
rilla warfare are rather disappointing. One had hoped, tak-
ing account of his OSS-CIA experience as well as his impres-
sive research, for more than he gives in that area. He writes
expertly and at some length on tactics, targets, weaponry,
logistics, and communications. His evaluation of the non-
combatant and of the influences which move him one way or
the other is refined. But on intelligence he is distressingly
content with the axiomatic or the superficial.
To be sure, he emphasizes the importance of intelligence for
both guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations and adds that
"first-rate counterespionage or counterintelligence is critical"
for both sides. He goes on:
. In guerrilla war the military aspects of intelligence boil down
to a few crucial questions for each side. The guerrillas, who can
not fight except on their own terms, must know enough of their
enemy's plans and movements to avoid being trapped into battles
which they can not win, and enough of the enemy's weak spots
to make their own strikes as safe and effective as possible. Con-
versely, the military authorities must gain enough information
to find their foe and either to destroy him directly or to cut him
off from the supplies and information which enable him to fight
and live . . . The authorities must have accurate and prompt in-
formation of any significant concentrations and must be able to
avoid them or to concentrate their own forces in turn and seize
the rare opportunity of destroying a large group of rebels at once.
Failure to obtain or act on such intelligence can be disastrous .
(pp. 32-3)
The quality and quantity of intelligence available to either guer-
rilla rebels or to the government depend directly on the relation-
ship which the two sides enjoy with the population as a whole ...
(p. 35)
Cross quotes Magsaysay in testimony to the value of bribery
for obtaining intelligence and cites the "great success" of the
authorities in the Philippines and Malaya when they offered
generous rehabilitation programs and rewards to guerrillas
for deserting and providing useful information. The fact gen-
erally was, however, that these devices were notably effective
only after the tide had turned in favor of government forces,
when counterguerrilla operations had begun to raise the pres-
sure on the rebels, inflict casualties, work physical hardship,
erode morale, and shake the conviction of ultimate victory.
More generally, he argues that to the problem of finding the
guerrilla in difficult, poorly known terrain the
solution ... that still seems most effective is to employ natives
of the region who are willing to work with the government and
to use them as scouts and guides, or to organize them into units
which are better able to preserve the peace than even the most
efficient outsiders. (p. 30)
This, unfortunately, is not a universal solution. The British
in Kenya had success with counter-gangs against the Mau
Mau, and the Philippine security forces from time to time
made effective use of anti-Huk indigenes. The French, how-
ever, tried this procedure with little or no success in Indo-
china, and the British in Cyprus and Palestine found "willing
natives" simply unavailable as scouts, guides, or counterter-
rorist forces.
On urban insurrection, Cross aptly writes:
Probably the most effective instrument that a government can
bring to bear ... is an efficient police intelligence service ...
Then he adds the truism:
If the leaders, the plans, and the methods of the rebellious move-
ment are known to the authorities, the likelihood of its being able
to mount major demonstrations or to strike serious blows is sharply
reduced ... (p. 51)
Turning to espionage, he makes the negative point that
while all insurrectionists of course set up the most efficient
intelligence nets they can, they usually make relatively little
use of secret agents at the higher levels of government. This
is because guerrilla leaders concentrate on collecting informa-
tion for use in their own operations, rather than for the use
of a foreign power.
It is tactical rather than strategic stuff they are after, and pro-
curement of "national secrets" of the sort traditionally associated
with major espionage is only incidental to the direct advancement
of the rebellion. (p. 65)
The reader looks vainly for a few lines on the counterguerrilla
forces' use of agents and informers-for a treatment of classi-
cal espionage. Yet clandestine operations, run by professional
case officers, scored impressively in many counterinsurgency
campaigns.
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On the uses of an air arm for intelligence, it is not enough
merely to say:
Aerial photography ... can help an army faced with [the
difficulty of locating and pinning down elusive guerrilla forces.]
(p. 35)
One wants a brief discussion of the uses and limitations of
types of aircraft in obtaining essential information; there is
documentary material on this.
Indeed, exposing himself to the charge of gross preoccupa-
tion with his own dodge, this intelligence officer regrets that
such an otherwise good book does not clarify in more depth
and detail the character and the special difficulties of intelli-
gence operations in guerrilla warfare. It would of course be
flagrantly parochial to expect a work like Conflict in the
Shadows to take us on a grand detour through the bumpy
field of intelligence. One may still yearn, however, for an
expert study of the counterinsurgency intelligence function
as revealed in the guerrilla wars of recent years.
An enormous American effort has gone into the creation
and teaching of techniques and procedures for civic action
and military operations. Great sums have been spent on the
design, testing, and production of specialized combat and logis-
tical gear. In contrast, little persistent attention has been
given the development of sound doctrine and procedures for
acquiring intelligence, the vital need for which has been
stressed time and again by counterguerrilla force command-
ers. Even the research which would sum up the American
intelligence experiences in Laos and South Vietnam remains
to be done.
One wants to see sound conclusions, distilled from studies
of success and of failure, on how the intelligence process in
counterinsurgency can best be organized, directed, and con-
trolled; on how responsibility for the various collection and
analytical functions should be allocated among multiple se-
curity force elements; on ruses and deceptions; on working
with the intelligence components of friendly foreign security
forces; and on special training for intelligence personnel.
Such an exercise might help to shorten the next counter-
guerrilla action we get involved in.
B. T. Closeterides
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Intelligence Articles VII 4
U.S. Only
Republication without ex-
press permission prohibited.
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An experienced practitioner essays
a tentative conceptual portrayal
of his evolving discipline.
GEOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
The examination of any single functional sector of the intel-
ligence spectrum requires at the outset a choice between
looking at it in isolation and emphasizing its relationships
with the other sectors. The restrictive approach gives a pic-
ture so incomplete as to be misleading; the broad one may
obscure the focal point. This discussion of the geographic
sector will try to avoid the two extremes but will favor the
larger picture where this seems desirable. The term "geo-
graphic intelligence" will refer interchangeably to the process
or its product. These will be treated functionally, in abstrac-
tion from administrative organization, but with the entirety
of the scattered U.S. apparatus in mind.
Its Part in the Whole
The graphic device in Figure 1 symbolizes the whole of the
U.S. foreign intelligence effort. Divisions of the triangle rep-
resent the usual functional sectors of the intelligence spec-
trum. In the center is the geographic sector, as the focal
point of this discussion. Near the top of the pyramid, around
the dashed horizontal line, sector boundaries fade out and all
intelligence becomes in a sense politico-military. Importance
increases inversely with volume from the bottom to the top.
The lines between the sectors are lines of theory for orien-
tation purposes; they should not be thought of as clean divid-
ers, much less barriers to keep practitioners of one sector from
participating in the work of neighboring sectors. To the ques-
tion why sector lines, if uncertain and often crossed, need be
considered at all, the answer is that such theoretical lines are
essential to conceptual examination and in practice guide the
organizational dispositions required in intelligence as in all
group endeavors.
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POLICY
"Intelligence," which once denoted simply news or infor-
mation, has come to mean, among other things, informa-
tion procured and synthesized to serve uniquely the purposes
of statecraft. The science of geography studies the areal dif-
ferentiation of natural and man-made phenomena over the
earth's surface. Geographic intelligence is then this study
articulated through selection and evaluation to the policy for-
mation and operational guidance requirements of a national
government. At the margins it will not be easy to say where
geographic intelligence leaves off and some other kind of in-
telligence begins, but the lines can be made somewhat clearer
by reference to specific tasks and responsibilities.
The collection and use of geographic intelligence is a very
old activity, certainly as old as war. Moses' instructions to
the spies he was sending to the land of Canaan in about :1490
B.C. include requirements for geographic data: ,
... go up into the mountain; and see the land, what it is; and,
the people that dwelleth therein, whether they be strong or weak,
few or many; and what the land is that they dwell in,. whether it
be good or bad; and what cities they be that they dwell in, whether
in tents or strongholds; and what the land is, whether it be fat
or lean, whether there be wood therein or not."
In this ancient requirement for information relevant to the
strengths and weaknesses of a state-like entity of that time
and place we can discern some of the functional sectors of
today's intelligence. The several items might be classified by
sector as follows:
"and see the land, what it is" geographic
"and the people that dwelleth therein, military,
whether they be strong or weak, political (?),
few or many" sociological
"and what the land is that they dwell geographic
in, whether it be good or bad"
"and what cities they be that they sociological,
dwell in, whether in tents or in geographic,
strongholds" military
"and what the land is, whether it be geographic,
fat or lean" economic
"whether there be wood therein or economic,
not." geographic
It will be noted that geography appears above both as a
pure element standing alone and in association with the mat-
ter of 'other sectors. So does today's geographic intelligence.
More generally, the breakdown indicates that different func-
tional sectors have long been closely related, and useful pieces
of intelligence often straddle sector boundaries.
Mission and Duties
The basic mission of geographic intelligence is to tell "what
the land is," as formed by nature and by man. The telling
is done in three main ways: as bearing directly on a specific
policy problem and thus contributing to the formation of
policy (analyzing routes of access to Berlin, for example, at
a time when - measures involving the possibility of having to
relieve the city are under study) ; as filling a particular need
for data in the conduct of operations (delineating, for ex-
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ample, cross-country routes between drop sites on island X) ;
and as anticipating with general or background information
a number of potential problems or data needs (as with a trans-
portation map of Southeast Asia). Two subsidiary missions
warrant particular mention-to monitor geography, map-
ping, and related earth science developments in foreign coun-
tries, and to provide a variety of geographic support and coordi-
nation services to the whole intelligence spectrum and the
government at large. Geographic intelligence draws upon in-
coming raw reports, finished intelligence studies, and open
source information as necessary to fulfill these missions.
The work processes of geographic intelligence are not un-
like those of other functional sectors. Put simply, these are:
procure, collate, hold ready, retrieve, focus on problems or
data needs, and present. Some of these processes are car-
ried out in much the same way as in other sectors, others dif-
ferently. Report handling, for example, is similar, but the
map bulk that must be held ready brings differences to store-
keeping.
Representative of the tasks geographic intelligence may be
called upon to perform are the following:
In support of the formation of policy-
Highlight the environmental factors influencing a po-
litical crisis.
Weigh the merit of a territorial claim.
Review the environmental aspects of a
proposal.
Assess the problems
boundary.
disarmament
of a particular international
Consider the geographic implications
tific development.
In support of operational activities-
In carrying out such tasks as these and in anticipation of
others like them, it engages in continuing procurement pro-
grams and does extensive map-making.
Individual tasks vary greatly in scope as in other respects.
A request to identify a single installation in a large city--
perhaps a five-minute job-might be succeeded by a require.
ment for a group of annotated city 'plans identifying and in-
dexing all important installations, an assignment that might
take five months.
Spheres of Competence
Some aspects of the role of geographic intelligence can be
brought out best by considering its main functional respon-
sibilities or spheres of competence and then looking at the way
it shares some responsibilities with other sectors of the intel-
ligence spectrum or across-the-board intelligence components.
For to fill the data needs of statecraft with pertinent informa-
tion concerning man in relation to his earth environment,
modern geographic intelligence must be prepared to go all the
way in some matters and at least a short distance in a great
many others. In general, the all-the-way spheres of compe-
tence include the following:
Mapping. Maps serve intelligence as spot fact sources, as
summary portrayals of the landscape, as reflections of the as-
pirations and plans of states, as analysis and reporting tools,
and as framework for presentations of finished intelligence;
thus they can be either means or end. Geographic intelli-
gence undertakes to procure the best maps, to make the best
maps (directly or by supplying data to others), to encourage
use of the best maps, and to procure, evaluate, organize, and
hold ready data needed to achieve these goals.
Basic Geography. Geographic intelligence must be able to
produce on short notice an up-to-date picture of the geog-
raphy of any area. Such compilations often include data on
climate, terrain, drainage, vegetation, boundaries, population,
main lines of communications, and principal economic activi-
ties. The capability of geographic intelligence in basic geog-
raphy is used by the whole intelligence spectrum and the U.S.
Government at large in the development of broad studies, for
briefing purposes, and as a reservoir from which the answers
Map routes used by such-and-such defectors.
Evaluate the suitability of an area for cross-country
movement.
Select maps suitable for guiding travel.
Pinpoint security features along a frontier.
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to spot questions can be obtained. Keeping the storehouse
full and up to date requires a constant effort to identify and
fill gaps.
Place names and place name problems. Geographic names
are an important map ingredient and the fix-points to which
much reporting is keyed. Without the facilities and person-
nel necessary to resolve name problems-names garbled in
transmission, minority language variants, conventional
names, obsolete names, incorrect transliterations, etc.-im-
portant intelligence interrelationships and the fruit of much
collection effort would be lost. Foreign geographic names and
the boundaries of civil divisions and other named entities un-
dergo continual changes which must be monitored, a task
especially difficult when names must be transposed from one
alphabet to another. Moreover, geographic names used in
official domestic and foreign publications, including maps, have
political or propaganda implications that must be taken into
consideration; the substitution of the old name now restored
by the Chinese Communists to their capital city for that used
by the Kuomintang might for example be read as a recogni-
tion of the new regime.
Access to geographic data and reference materials. The
geographic and related literature extant constitutes a vast
body of descriptive and analytical information, which, how-
ever, varies greatly in currency and areal and subject cover-
age. Only a small proportion of it is likely ever to be used in
intelligence, but there is no way of knowing where the light-
ning of events will strike, or to what depth. Thus geographic
intelligence must maintain considerable familiarity with the
whole body of geographic literature and with means of ex-
ploiting it quickly.
Systematic geography in foreign countries. The monitor-
ing of the systematic study of geography and. related earth
sciences in foreign countries, by means including participa-
tion in international programs, contributes to the assessment of
foreign capabilities and intentions, guides our own procure-
ment, and supports policy decisions on the release and ex-
change of scientific data. This work is of exceptional signifl-
cance with respect to Communist countries, which often url-
dertake geographic studies and mapping programs in direct
support of development plans.
Foreign techniques. Geographic intelligence follows the
techniques and methods of geographic research developed in
foreign countries in order to evaluate their technical progress
and to take prompt advantage for itself of promising innova-
tions.
In carrying out these functional responsibilities geographic
intelligence devotes special attention to ten categories of sub-
ject matter as the foci of a large proportion of the policy prob-
lems in which spatial aspects figure importantly:
Political status of particular areas, land or sea
Administrative divisions
Travel conditions
Land use
Causes and effects of recent landscape changes
Patterns of "little known" and "well known" regions
Location of natural resources
National frontiers and frontier zones
Locational aspects of communications
Urban areas
The last three of these comprise most of the critical regions
of an average national state. This is not to say that nothing
of intelligence importance exists in rural areas, but the more
complex problems of statecraft will focus more often than
not on the cities, lines of communication, and frontiers where
a majority of the population, most of the industrial capacity,
most military targets, the main trade routes, and the places
of contact with other nations are found.
Shared Responsibilities and Other Relationships
Many intelligence sectors and components of the intelli-
gence community contribute to or are served by geographic
intelligence. The web of intra-sector and outside links is par-
ticularly complex in the field of mapping. Here the main or-
ganizational relationships are "understood," but not always
in exactly the same way by all interested agencies and indi-
viduals. Theoretically, all U.S. official interests in the maps
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and mapping of foreign countries should be connected to the
stem of geographic intelligence, the better to serve the all-
purpose intelligence picture of "what the land is." This view
has general, if not universal, acceptance as a goal or ideal.
There are differences of opinion, however, on the extent to
which the goal has been or can be attained.
The very broad field of "maps and mapping of foreign coun-
tries" has two main components-foreign products (maps,
mapping data, and mixed data), and U.S. products (maps and
some related data). We have pointed out how geographic in-
telligence monitors foreign programs, procures foreign maps
and data, and processes these and makes them available to end
users from its depositories. But the situation is less clean-
cut with respect to the other category, maps of foreign areas
produced by U.S. agencies, particularly with respect to topo-
graphic and general maps. Since U.S. access to many foreign
areas is less than free, preparing topographic maps of these
is largely a matter of adapting foreign maps and data and cor-
recting or updating them from current field reports and pho-
tography, a process that falls within the very essence of the
geographic intelligence function. Because the preparation of
topographic maps of foreign countries has long been a tra-
ditional activity of U.S. military agencies, however, the affinity
of this work to the geographic sector of U.S. intelligence is
not universally recognized.
With respect to special-subject maps of foreign areas pro-
duced by U.S. agencies, the role of geographic intelligence can
be fairly well sorted out; many of the participating units are
clearly identifiable as operating within the purview of this
sector. The specialty map may be initiated within one sector,
developed with data from another or others, and executed-
compiled, drafted, checked, and edited-by one of these or a
third. A number of specialty maps to which geographic in-
telligence contributes are the products of other sectors, the
geographic intelligence contribution being mainly one of car-
tographic support. To clarify, there are listed below the titles
of some specialty maps with an indication of the sector or
sectors into which the content of each mainly falls and the
sectors of the actual cartographic executor, chief data sup-
plier, and initiator.
Approved
Carto-
graphic Data
Content Executor Supplier(s) Initiator
Bloc Air Defense Dis- military military military
tricts scientific
Administrative Eco- political military
nomic Regions of economic
economic military
geographic
the USSR
Bloc Participation in economic geographic economic economic
International political
Trade Fairs
Netherlands Realm political geographic political geographic
geographic
Rumania: Physio- geographic geographic geographic geographic
graphic Regions
Boundary Adjust- geographic geographic geographic geographic
ments Near Zalew political
Wislany Soviet Drifting Sta- scientific geographic scientific hic geographic
tions in the Arctic
Basin
Landform Regions of geographic military geographic military
Central Europe
Important to all U.S. mapping of foreign areas are the con-
tributions of geographic intelligence to coordinated, inter-
agency studies in which all available maps of an area (usually
a country) are weighed against each other qualitatively to
identify the one giving the best coverage in a subject field.
All maps likely to be of interest in connection with foreseeable
policy problems are normally examined, and they are con-
sidered in the context of background factors such as avail-
ability of fundamental mapping data (surveys, statistics, etc.)
and mapping capabilities and plans and programs.
Inter-sector relationships can be reviewed more systemati-
cally by taking each sector in turn and summarizing its as-
sociations with geographic intelligence.
Biographic. This sector alone has negligible links with geo-
graphic intelligence. It does, however, get geographic help
in ironing out biographic data such as birth places and other
facts recorded in terms of obsolete civil divisions or defunct
place names, and the two have a common interest in bio-
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graphic data on foreign geographers and other earth scien-
tists.
. Political. Geographic intelligence often contributes in a
support role to political intelligence, particularly where the
latter gets deeply involved in locational aspects, as in analysis
of territorial claims and transfers, in problems relating to in-
ternational and administrative boundaries, and in the map-
ping of political patterns and relationships of all kinds, for
example election returns.
Sociological. The frequent overlap between sociological and
geographic intelligence is especially apparent in the mapping
of population distribution and characteristics. - Other sub-
jects of common interest include settlement patterns, the dis
tribution of ethnic and religious groups, and culture regions,
to name but a few. Geographic intelligence takes leave of the
sociological at the point (never easy to identify) where loca-
tional aspects cease to figure importantly.
Military. Geographic intelligence has much in common
with the military when the latter focuses on environment,
as in "military geography" or "terrain intelligence," although
it does not share the military geographers' limitation of their
concern mainly to the influence of the environmental phe-
nomena on the use and functioning of particular weapon sys-
tems or types of forces. This difference of viewpoint disap-
pears only at the top of the intelligence pyramid, where as we
have noted the boundaries between sectors fade out and all in-
telligence becomes strategic, or politico-military.
Economic. Geographic intelligence is frequently a support-
ing contributor to economic intelligence, particularly in lo-
cating and mapping production centers, transportation fea-
tures, and physical relationships that influence productive ac-
tivity. Civil divisions, which figure prominently in many sta-
tistical analyses, are another subject in which the two have
strong common interests. Other important common ground
includes the mapping of major traffic and commodity flow
patterns. Location is the key; where it ceases to figure, geo-
graphic intelligence leaves the economic intelligence track.
Scientific. Geographic intelligence shares with the scien-
tific an interest in the basic earth sciences such as geophys-
Geographic Intelligence
and seismology. Their exploration in depth is the province of
scientific intelligence; the geographic intelligence task is not
infrequently to synthesize selected data from several or all
of the earth sciences and often to incorporate it into mixed
equations with political and military as well as geographic
and other elements.
To these one might add, not as a separate sector, an "his-
torical intelligence" to reflect the fact that all sectors of the
spectrum are to some extent articulating history to cur-
rent and future policy problems. In this articulating, geog-
raphy, the where of history, is often inextricably entwined.
The complex links between geographic intelligence and
components which operate horizontally across the spectrum,
particularly current and basic intelligence and the specialty of
photo interpretation, can be set forth best by representing
them graphically on the intelligence spectrum as in Figure 2.
Here it can be seen that all three concern themselves to some
extent with geographic intelligence. For purposes of current
and basic intelligence there is both original geographic intelli-
gence production and the processing or coordinating of con-
tributions from other sectors.
ics, geodesy, geology, oceanography, ,1imatolo mete rolo < orizontals"
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The relationship between geographic intelligence and the
geographic aspect of photo interpretation is unique and war-
rants special comment. Photo interpreters produce reports
that include substantive geographic intelligence, sometimes
in a pure state and sometimes mixed with data from other
sectors, as do practitioners of geographic intelligence. The
difference is that between an all-source approach and one re-
lying mainly on photography. The division between the two
is not now and in this writer's opinion should never be mu-
tually exclusive. Which is to say that those in geographic in-
telligence sometimes interpret photos for their own pur-
poses and sometimes incorporate into their studies the find-
ings of photo interpretation specialists, while photo inter-
preters in turn use maps and other geographic reference ma-
terials to aid their interpretive work. The question of who
concentrates on what and for what purpose is often decided
by source (photo and other) availability patterns. The all-
source approach permits geographic intelligence to speak in
some way to any area analysis problem, whereas photo in-
terpretation can contribute only if photography of suitable
date and quality is available. Geographic intelligence and
photo interpretation in the geographic field complement
each other; functional boundaries between them are still evolv-
ing.
Practitioners
A practitioner of geographic intelligence is one who regu-
larly devotes the bulk of his time to one or more activities of
geographic intelligence-procurement, processing, hold and
retrieve functions, analysis, or presentation. This broad
definition includes technicians at lower levels who perform
quasi-mechanical tasks and accomplished specialists and gen-
eralists who concentrate on analysis (the focusing of data
on problems) and presentation (the end product). Some at
all levels will devote their time almost exclusively to aspects
of mapping, whereas others will be concerned mainly with
data in text form. Many will have something to do with both.
Some misunderstandings regarding the role of geographic in-
telligence and its place in different organizational frame-
works revolves around the training of its practitioners. Most
of them are schooled mainly in geography and cartography,
but such schooling does not of itself make one a practitioner.
A person with identical training may be practicing in another
functional sector of the intelligence spectrum, for example a
geographer working mainly in the sphere of military intelli-
gence. On the other hand, one trained in fields other than
geography may actually be practicing in geographic intelli-
gence, for example a linguist working exclusively on prob-
lems associated with geographic names. The. test of prac-
titioner status is the activity to which the bulk of one's time
is devoted.
Another source of uncertainty about who is laboring in
what vineyard lies in the numerous lines that cross sector
boundaries in the execution of special tasks. A practitioner
of geographic intelligence, for the purpose of a particular task
that is mainly geographic, may delve deeply into scientific
matters or various economic, social, and political relationships.
When this happens, it does not mean that basic responsibilities
of the scientific, economic, sociological, and political sectors
have been picked up and conveyed to the house of geographic
intelligence, but merely that one whose normal activity is
geographic intelligence has gone afield to round out the unique
information requirements of a particular task, and that the
detour has been taken without changing the practitioner status
of the voyager. Similarly, if one who is normally a practi-
tioner of political intelligence comes to the geographic intelli-
gence sector to round out the information requirements of a
task, his practitioner status does not change, nor has the
basic responsibility for earth environment intelligence been
shifted to the political sector.
Practitioners of geographic intelligence are widely dispersed
throughout the U.S. intelligence community. Units in which
they operate sometimes have names including such words as
"geographic," "map," "mapping," "cartographic," or "environ-
mental," whereas others have regional designations. In gen-
eral, however, names are not a reliable clue to the existence
or absence of geographic intelligence activity. Such govern-
ment-wide unity of geographic intelligence as exists is main-
tained by inter-unit cooperation on. specific tasks, by repre-
sentation on committees, boards, etc. devoted to one or another
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phase of geographic intelligence, and through professional
organizations. A general directorate responsible on a nation-
wide basis for geographic intelligence, broadly interpreted,
does not now exist.
Products
The products of geographic intelligence comprise maps
alone, text alone, and quite often combinations of maps and
text augmented by photographs, graphs, and sketches. Some-
times they issue in oral form as orientation lectures and
briefings illustrated with maps and other graphics. Some
issuances are- mainline products of the geographic intelligence
production track, whereas others are supply or support items
for other components.
A mainline product may be a world survey presenting a few
relationships for each country, the study of a large region,
a country survey, or an intensive all-subject survey focusing
on a small area. Maps may or may not be the main vehicles.
Areas worked may conform neatly with -national or civil di-
vision boundaries or may take in parts of several sovereign
states and conform with no political boundaries. Some prod-
ucts, especially in the field of mapping and related earth
sciences, are functionally designed, not uncommonly reducing
technical matters to generalizations suitable for supporting
policy decisions.
The operational guidance products are many and varied.
Some are limited in scope to very specific operations or phases
of operations, e.g., a study weighing the relative merits of
drop sites or the detailed description of a particular drop site
and its environs. Products of this sort, essentially tools for
the execution of policy, might be represented as an additional
inverted triangle above the policy apex of the intelligence
pyramid. Others are broader in scope and of dual potential
use; they can contribute to policy formation as well as guide
operations in the execution of policy. An example would be
a .summary of the geographic background of a problem situa-
tion in a theater such as Laos.
U.S.-produced topographic maps portraying foreign areas,
which we. have noted are prepared mainly by military agencies,
are not usually thought of as geographic intelligence products, Princeton University, 1955 (p. 2-3).
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although some of them may deserve to be so regarded on
theoretical grounds. In practice there seems to be at present
little need for rigid lines separating topographic maps that
are products of the geographic intelligence sector from those
that are products of the military intelligence sector and still
others that are military products outside the purview of
intelligence, strictly interpreted. Eventually some line-draw-
ing in this sphere may become necessary, however, if only
to aid management of the ever-growing map bulk and to focus
intelligence attention on sensitive source items.
Some Problems
The problems of geographic intelligence are by and large
those of intelligence as a whole with a few distinctive varia-
tions. The main exception concerns its status as a sector of
the intelligence spectrum. This status has been obscured by
geographic intelligence's dual role as an important province
of inquiry in its own right and as an often essential aspect in
the work of other sectors. A parallel duality has given rise
to contention among academicians over the status of geogra-
phy. Some academic critics would break up the subject and
have problems now investigated at advance levels in depart-
ments of geography studied in departments of geology, eco-
nomics, political science, sociology, history, etc. Geographers
have many objections to this proposal. Most significant from
the intelligence point of view is their argument that if geog-
raphy's discrete tasks were scattered among other disciplines
the vital whole would be lost, the rounded picture of "what
the land is."
In general, where mission and function lines have developed
empirically in the U.S. intelligence community since the start
of World War II, geography has not wanted for a place. It is
true, however, that the precise configuration of its place re-
mains in some respects to be defined. One open boundary
faces geopolitics, the broad weighing of international power
patterns in which geographic factors sometimes figure im-
portantly. Some social scientists hold that in this field the
voice of geography is not as loud as it could and should be.'
'Sprout, Harold and Margaret, Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses
in the Context of International Politics, Center of International Studies,
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On internal lines geographic intelligence is thought by some in connection with intramural responsibility boundaries, of
observers to be in danger of becoming "map intelligence"; which there are many within the house of geographic intelli-
maps are of such central importance that there is a tendency gence, the overlap problem is as often one of too little as of
to focus on them rather than to keep in mind the whole too much. Units attached to the same administrative stem
inquiry into facts and relationships which they symbolically shy away from anything that might be viewed as an invasion
represent. of neighboring pastures, sometimes to the detriment of cover-
Geographic intelligence shares with other sectors and even age along critical boundaries. Even if such coverage is ade-
with strategic intelligence at the top of the pyramid the quate in a monitoring sense, thinking from both sides has a
problem of using its capabilities to best advantage of policy, tendency to stop too abruptly at the barrier.
of directing its finite resources to the most important ends. A Look Ahead
It cannot follow all relationships everywhere; areas, of particu- There is a trend toward greater overlap between geographic
lar importance must be selected, energies focused. In theory,
the consumer should tell what needs to be done and to what intelligence, military intelligence, and scientific intelligence
end; in practice, geographic intelligence must often tell itself. as military equations become more complex and require con-
Some are satisfied with this situation; others want more im- sideration of an _ ever-widening range of earth-related
mediate and specific direction from the consumer. Since it phenomena.
breeds doubt and disagreement, the interplay of views on this Geographic. intelligence must now look ahead with a pos-
question is itself a fairly persistent problem for geographic sible-in-our-time attitude to scientific and technological break-
intelligence. throughs that may alter long-established evaluations of the
What to retain in the information reserve is a pervasive potential use to man of extensive parts of the earth and thus
problem in intelligence, but to geographic intelligence, which create suddenly new geographic patterns with implications
must maintain an inventory of sorts of the surface of the of a most far-reaching sort for statecraft. Prominent among
earth, the keeping of the huge store of maps required is often the developments of this kind that might occur are effective
an irksome burden, sometimes impinging on production capa- climate control and the economical desalting of sea water.
bilities. Fast and inexpensive reproduction techniques, while The founding of some thirty-nine new states since - World
they have simplified and made more flexible the handling and War II, most of them relatively undeveloped former colonies,
dissemination of geographic data, also threaten to bury geo- has added new facets to world political geography that will
graphic intelligence under a deluge of paper. Machine storage influence conditions within the new states and also the affairs
and retrieval methods under development promise relief, but of other nations for years to come. Many of the developments
it remains to be seen whether these will solve the basic that can be foreseen will be very much within the scope of
problem. geographic intelligence, for example new foreign mapping pro-
Because of its numerous ties with different elements of the grams, new patterns of factionalism, civil division changes,
intelligence spectrum, geographic intelligence encounters a international boundary problems, and economic development
full quota of inter-sector and inter-component relationship programs in which locational aspects figure importantly.
difficulties. These often center on awkward 50-50 tasks repos- Improved communications have greatly increased the num-
ing squarely astride sector boundaries, for example a study ' ber and complexity of locational patterns of which statecraft
of the political status of an area wherein political considera- must take cognizance. Not long ago the precise distribution
tions and precise location are about equally important. Char- of the speakers of an obscure dialect in Central Asia was
acteristically, birds of mixed feather have much more difficulty largely academic from the viewpoint of U.S. foreign policy
getting off the ground than pure-bred types. interests. But now that some of them can be reached by
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 Geographic Intelligence
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Precepts for the nineteenth-cen-
tury intelligence officer not useless
for his counterpart today.
radio in a political context that makes reaching them desira-
ble, their geographic distribution and normal patterns of
movement warrant examination in detail.
In response to changes in warfare and weaponry also, the
gears of geographic intelligence have shifted and are still
shifting to new combinations and patterns of emphasis. Not
so many years ago, terrain evaluation for intelligence purposes
focused almost entirely on the ease with which mass armies
could move over the land. These judgments are still neces-
sary; but the land must now be assessed, among other respects,
as to its suitability for the activities of small groups bent on
mixed politico-military operations, a dimension requiring cri-
teria quite different from those of the mass army movement.
Stepped-up scientific investigation of earth phenomena and
improved access to remote areas have served in concert to
upgrade generally the standards of acceptable geographic in-
telligence. Everywhere more detail is needed and wanted, and
more is expected in the way of accuracy, currency, and
completeness.
The earth environment enters decision-making equations
only as it is perceived by the decision maker and included in
his deliberations. It is for geographic intelligence to see that
this perception is clear, keeping pace with technological change
and the ever-increasing need for accuracy and completeness.
To this task it brings geography's own peculiar and still evolv-
ing perspective, a perspective likely to come into greater use
with the foreseeable crowding of the earth's surface. The
widening outreach of communications and expanding scien-
tific horizons do not themselves solve the vexatious problems
associated with man's adjustment to his earth environment;
they alleviate a few, create new ones, and aggravate others.
Thus an end to the work of geographic intelligence cannot
now be foreseen. Its frames of reference, tools, techniques,
and approaches will change, but the basic function seems
destined to be carried out somewhere, in some way, under some
organizational arrangement as long as there are statesmen
who need to know "what the land is."
THE INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT'
Garnet J. Wolseley
From the moment that war is declared until peace is made,
it is of the utmost importance that we should know what the
enemy is doing. A general who has the means of always
learning the enemy's movements and intentions is certain to
annihilate an adversary to whom his doings are unknown, all
other things being equal. Napoleon said that a general operat-
ing in an inhabited country who was ignorant of the enemy's
doings and intentions was ignorant of his profession; in writ-
ing on this subject to his brother in Spain, he said that the
single motive of procuring intelligence would be sufficient to
authorize detachments of 3,000 or 4,000 men being made to
seize local authorities, post offices, etc., etc.
Until the troops are actually in the field, such information
must be gleaned by our Intelligence Department in London,
and by our Foreign Office people, who should also during the
war keep up a system of communication with the enemy's
capital, and if possible with his army. The means of starting
an intelligence department should, if possible, be taken with
you from England, or sent on before you. The purlieus of
Leicester Square could supply our armies with spies for every
country in Europe.
When war is impending with any country, a number of
officers should be sent to travel through it and collect infor-
mation, although if our Treasury would pay for it, this could
be much better done during peace. Once in the field, a knowl-
edge of the enemy's doings must be obtained by the Comman-
der in the best way he can. It is explained further on how
reconnaissances for this purpose should be conducted. The
other means of obtaining information are prisoners, deserters,
1 Chapter reproduced from The Soldier's Pocketbook for Field Service,
by Major General Sir Garnet J. Wolseley, Inspector General of Auxiliary
Forces (London: Macmillan and Company, WfdRI/HRP PAGES A19-A24
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 The Intelligence Department Approved For Release 2005/04/13: CIA-RDP78T03194A000200010001-2 The Intelligence Department
by questioning the inhabitants, by intercepted letters, tapping
telegraph wires, and by means of spies.
The 0--2
The general commanding an army appoints an officer as the
chief of his intelligence department, working of course under
the chief of the staff, and the utmost care should be taken in
the selection. If the army is a large one, one or two other
officers should be employed in a similar manner at the head-
quarters of corps or divisions that may be at some distance
from headquarters; it is advisable that the employment of
these officers in this manner be kept strictly secret from the
army, and that they should themselves at all times disown
having anything to do with spies, and profess utter ignorance
of the enemy's movements. It is easy to make them A.D.C.'s
and let them nominally attend to the general's private corres-
pondence, or to notify their appointments in G.O. as posted
to the A.G.'s or Q.M.G.'s department. As in some countries
proper officers cannot be found for this purpose who can
speak the language, English civilians taken from the consular
service may be given this work to do, and be attached to the
army professedly as interpreters.
Whoever conducts the work should be of middle age, and
have a clear insight into human nature, with a logical turn
of mind; nothing sanguine about him, but of a generally calm
and distrustful disposition. He should be intimately ac-
quainted with the manners and customs of the people of the
country. The organisation of the enemy's army should be
engraven on his mind, and the names of all officers com-
manding corps, divisions, etc., etc., should be in his possession.
He should be in constant communication with the central
office in London, to whom should be communicated at once all
reliable information obtained in the field, and from which in
a similar manner all information received from other sources
should be transmitted to the chief in the field.
Spies
The management of spies is difficult; out of every ten em-
ployed, you are fortunate if one gives you truthful information.
It is important that spies should be unknown to one another.
Care should be taken to make each believe that he is the only
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one employed. Some serve from patriotism, others for money,
some receive pay from both sides; if such an one can be de-
pended upon, he is invaluable. All should be petted and made
a great deal of, being liberally paid and large rewards given
them when they supply any really valuable information. A
few thousand pounds is of no consequence to a nation, but if
well laid out in obtaining information, it may be the indirect
means of adding to the victories of one's country.
It is very necessary that all bona fide spies should always
have about their persons some means of proving themselves
really to be whom they represent: a certain coin of a certain
date, a Bible of a certain edition, a Testament with the 3rd or
the 7th leaf torn out, etc., etc. These tokens should be
changed frequently. A spy who was employed by an officer
in a neutral state, making his way to the headquarters of the
army in the field, could thus at once make himself known to
the Intelligence Department there. In some instances, a
pass-sign or word is better, as it is less compromising, such
as putting up the right hand to the right ear and then to the
left ear, etc., etc.
The more extensive the system, and the greater its ramifi-
cations, both as to the numbers employed and the extent of
territory from which information is obtained, the better
chances you have of obtaining what you require. It is essen-
tial that one or more officers should, if possible, be posted in
some neutral state as near the theatre of operation as can
be done without exciting suspicion, with whom all the spies
and secret agents employed there should be in communication;
they should select towns or villages from which there is good
telegraphic communication with England, so that the infor-
mation obtained might be quickly transmitted to our head-
quarters in the field. These officers should be provided with
ample means to employ spies, and to pay well all those who
supply them with trustworthy information.
It is very necessary that specially prepared paper should be
provided for the use at times of all officers and agents em-
ployed in the Intelligence Department, upon which letters
can be written in ink that does not become visible until it has
been subjected to a certain chemical process. It is necessary
that a letter in ordinary ink should invariably be written on
 The Intelligence Department
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the same paper containing the information that it is required
to keep secret.
Prisoners and Peasants
All prisoners taken at the outposts should be led direct to
headquarters without being questioned elsewhere: the chief
intelligence officers there will examine each separately, taking
care that no one is present. It is much better that the ene-
my's movements should not be known to the army generally:
if they are, they will be canvassed by a host of newspaper
correspondents, and in the end the enemy will learn that his
doings are known, which will make him more watchful;
whereas it is a great matter to lull him into the pleasing
notion that we are a stupid people, without wit or energy
enough to find out what he is doing' or intending to do, and
that we have no spies in his camp.
As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to suc-
ceed by falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repul-
sive as slave; we will keep hammering along with the convic-
tion that `honesty is the best policy,' and that truth always
wins in the long run. These pretty little sentences do well
for a child's copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in
war had better sheathe his sword for ever. Spies are to be
found in every class of society, and gold, that mighty lever of
men, is powerful enough to unlock secrets that would other-
wise remain unknown at the moment. An English general
must make up his mind to obtain information as he can,
leaving no stone unturned in order to do so.
Much will depend on the disposition of the inhabitants; if
they are friendly, as the Spaniards were during the Peninsu-
lar war, it is easy to organise a good intelligence department,
for the great difficulty of conveying news from one army to
the other is got over; with good spies in the enemy's camps,
they can send their information by a trusty peasant, who of
course can pass without suspicion. The letter sent should be
written on a strip of very thin paper, which, if rolled up tightly,
can be put into a quill 11/2 in. long, the ends being sealed up;
this can easily be concealed in the hair, beard, or in a hollow
.made in the end of a walking-stick. It is a good plan to write
secret correspondence in lemon-juice across a newspaper or
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The Intelligence Department
the pages of a book, which, like a Testament, if found on the
person of a peasant, would excite no suspicion. Such writing
leaves no.mark, but if at any subsequent time it is held to the
fire, or a hot iron is passed over it, every letter becomes
legible.
In the article on Reconnaissances will be found lists of
questions to be put to prisoners, and lists of the ordinary indi-
cations of movements on the part of an enemy; but it is only
by studying his manners and customs that one can under-
stand what he means.
Deception
In all the wars of this and future ages, the electric telegraph
will be greatly used. It must be remembered that a telegraph
operator can, with a small pocket instrument, tap the wires
anywhere, and learn the messages passing along them. A few
such men living concealed within the enemy's territory could.
obtain more news than dozens of ordinary spies. Immedi-
ately before or during an action an enemy may be deceived
to any extent by means of such men: messages can be sent
ordering him to concentrate upon wrong points, or by giving
him false information you may induce him to move as you.
wish. The telegraph' was used in all these ways during the
American war between North and South.
Spies can be made useful in spreading false news of your
movements; indeed a general commanding should so keep his
council that his army, and even the staff round him, should
be not only in ignorance of his real intentions but convinced
that he aims at totally different objects from what are his
true ones. Without saying so directly, you can lead your army
to believe anything; and as a rule, in all civilised nations, what
is believed by the army, will very soon be credited by the
enemy, having reached him by means of spies or through the
medium of those newly-invented curses to armies-I mean
newspaper correspondents.
Collation
The intelligence officer should every morning report in
writing to his chief the information he has obtained from the
officers employed under him and other sources. All suspicious
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circumstances observed by the outposts to be reported daily
through the general on duty to the Q.M.G., who will at once
inform the chief intelligence officer. It is a great object that
a system should be established by which all information,
whether gleaned from individual officers out amusing them-
selves or from the outposts or from any other source, should
be placed at the disposal of the man to whom the Commander
looks for information. All officers should learn, accordingly,
that it is their duty to report anything they may discover to
the nearest staff officer, who must remember that he must
lose no time in informing the Q.M.G. Although trifling events
in themselves can tell but little, yet when they are collated
in numbers and compared with the information derived from
spies and reconnaissances, each small piece of news becomes,
perhaps, an important link in the chain of information.
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