STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 271
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 29, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1961
• Content Type: SINT

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STUDIES
INTELLIGENCE
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VOL. 5 NO. 1 WINTER 1961
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not necessarily represent the official
views of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Office of
Training, or any other organizational component of the
intelligence community.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
prohibited by law.
EDITORIAL POLICY
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
EDITOR
PHILIP K. EDWARDS
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
Additional members of the Board
represent other CIA components.
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CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION
Contributions to the Studies or communications to the editors
may come from any member of the intelligence community or,
upon invitation, from persons outside. Manuscripts should be
submitted directly to the Editor Studies in Intelligence, Room
2013 R & S Building Il and need not be coordinated
or submitted through channels. They should be typed in
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For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call
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For back issues and on other questions call the
CLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Page
The 1960 Studies in Intelligence Award . . . . . faces 1
Great Frusina Revisited: The Problem of Priority Posi-
tive Intelligence . . . . . . . . . Wallace E. Seidel 1
Redesign for an obsolescent intelligence organiza-
tion. SECRET
The Yo-Yo Story: An Electronics Analysis Case History
Charles R. Ahern 11
Reconstruction of a Soviet missile-guidance system.
SECRET
Psywar by Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . Alma Fryxell 25
Black intelligence support for Sino-Soviet propa-
ganda. SECRET
Classified Listing of Articles in Volume IV . . . . . . 53
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UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLES
Page
Galahad: Intelligence Aspects . . . Charles N. Hunter Al
Combat intelligence, command problems, and the
OSS contribution to Merrill's Marauders.
Machines and the Chinese Name . . . . Guy P. Webb A29
Standards for the wanton romanization of charac-
ters.
The Progress of Pinyin . . . . . . . . . . J. N. Wong A35
A new endemic standard Chinese language system.
Edward Bancroft (@ Edwd. Edwards), Estimable Spy
John P. Vaillancourt A53
A high-level penetration that duped Benjamin
Franklin.
Intelligence in Recent Public Literature
World War II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A68
The Economic War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A72
Miscellany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A75
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The evolution of intelligence as
knowledge demands a redesign-
ing of intelligence as organiza-
tion.
GREAT FRUSINA REVISITED:
The Problem of Priority Positive Intelligence
Wallace E. Seidel
The first annual Studies award of $500, for the most signifi-
cant contribution during 1960 to the literature of intelligence,
has been made
pu is e in e a
issue. Although other contributions were considered more
significant in the historical sense, of broader general interest,
or more immediately applicable in the work of the community,
submission represents best the kind of construc-
tive thinking that the Studies especially desires to promote.
Among the several other candidates earnestly considered for
the 1960 award,
printed in the Winter issue, is distinguished
as particularly meritorious.
In 1949 Sherman Kent referred to strategic intelligence as
"the intelligence of national survival"' and elsewhere, more
lexicographically, as "high-level foreign positive intelligence." 2
This paper is focused in its particulars on one aspect of the
highest-priority positive intelligence problem of today, that
of the Soviet long-range ballistic missile, especially the ICBM.
In a larger sense, however, its subject is the change that has
taken place during the past decade in the kinds of knowledge
that constitute strategic intelligence and the meaning of this
change in terms of what kind of organization and activity is
needed to produce the intelligence of national survival.
The New Knowledge
When we first visited Great Frusina with Mr. Kent, the
evaluation of her strategic stature was presented as requiring
knowledge of "the situation, the non-military instrumen-
talities, the force in being, and the war potential" of the state.,
Now, little more than ten years later, the development of ther-
monuclear weapons and missiles able to carry them half way
across the earth in a matter of minutes has put a different
face on the last two of these concepts: the Soviet force in being
has taken on overriding significance as a constant threat to
our national survival; and the mobilization of war potential,
on the other hand, is now largely bereft of meaning in the
context of the general war. The enemy's military research
and development programs and his plans for making new
' Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy, p. 212.
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., p. 44.
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weapons operational have replaced his mobilization potential
as a factor in his strategic stature.
The effect of these changes on the nature of strategic in-
telligence activity is to elevate the strategic importance of
getting what used to be considered military departmental in-
formation-order of battle-on the force in being, and to re-
duce radically the time factor in all our intelligence-policy
equations, both for force in being and for weapons under de-
velopment. In "the long-range intelligence of ... grand strat-
egy" 4 the time range has been greatly compressed, both for
those who decide the policy and to an equal or even greater
degree for the collectors and producers of the intelligence. The
U.S. decision makers are currently faced with the prospect of
nuclear missile forces which can effect virtually immediate de-
livery of an almost annihilative blow and for which there is
as yet no active defense.
Mr. Kent could state a decade ago that "as a general propo-
sition every country knows a great deal about all other coun-
tries' forces in being and a great deal about most of their weap-
ons." s As every intelligence officer concerned with the prob-
lem today knows, the verity of this generalization with re-
spect to Soviet guided missile systems leaves much to be de-
sired. The critical thing is that the decline in the quality
and quantity of our information on the enemy's weapon sys-
tems, in being and under development, is occurring at just
this time, when U.S. policy makers require a more immediate
and greater fund of information than ever before. This was
the point of President Eisenhower's statement of 25 May 1960,
following the loss of the U-2 and the collapse at the Summit:
Our safety ... [demands] effective systems for gathering infor-
mation about the military capability of other powerful nations,
especially those that make a fetish of secrecy. This involves many
techniques and methods. In these times of vast military machines
and nuclear-tipped missiles, the ferreting out of this information
is indispensable to free world security.'
Another time compression in the new strategic intelligence,
besides the prospective suddenness of attack and potential
' Ibid., p. 212.
Ibid., p. 47.
'New York Times, May 26, 1960, p. 16.
Great Frusina Revisited SECRET
brevity of war, is the continuing acceleration of change in
military technology. To the policy maker this brings a two-
fold problem-higher rates of obsolescence and increased costs
for weapon systems. The U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Na-
tional Policy Machinery has pointed out:
The statesman of a century ago was given more than a genera-
tion to adjust national policies to the change from coal to oil in
the world's navies. But today such adjustment must occur, in his-
torical terms, overnight. An example: National security planners
had scarcely begun to adapt policy to the fact of fission weapons in
the world's arsenals, when the vastly more destructive fusion
weapon entered upon the scene.... While the pace of technologi-
cal change has quickened, the cost of failure to make appropriate
policy adaptations has risen-exponentially'
These "appropriate policy adaptations" are dependent upon
information which only the intelligence community can pro-
vide. An intelligence problem of such magnitude and com-
plexity cannot be solved with the order-of-battle apparatus
of a decade ago.
A third point at which time is a factor is in the process of
translating a weapons system idea into the reality of a field
capability. Here management control techniques and
planning have succeeded, despite greatly increased complexity
and an esoteric technology, in compressing the development-
production-operation cycle in varying degrees, according to
the state of the art and the urgency of the requirements. The
USSR, as well as the United States, has employed such or-
ganizational techniques in its missile programs and thus fur-
ther shortened our lead time in the strategic intelligence
problem.
Although we have been thinking here primarily about im-
mediate prospects in the ICBM field, it must be recognized
that our new strategic intelligence problems are neither
unique thereto nor likely to diminish. The ever accelerating
rate of technological change has already thrust similar prob-
lems before us in such areas as anti-submarine warfare, anti-
missile weapons, and space systems for war and peace.
6 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Sub-
committee on National Policy Machinery, Report No. 1026, 86th Con-
gress, 2d Session, "Organizing for National Security," (Washington,
Government Printing Office, 19.60), p. 13.
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SECRET Great Frusina Revisited
Organizational Patching
A recognition of the fundamental change in the character,
increase in the importance, and decrease in the availability
of the positive intelligence necessary for the strategic equa-
tion leads us to revisit the analysis of intelligence as organiza-
tion. In doing so we may profit by using Mr. Kent's criteria
to ask ourselves some pertinent questions. Have we been "will-
ing to undertake heartbreaking reorganization when the bal-
ance sheet so indicates"? Have we permitted units or organi-
zational forms to achieve "a vested interest" in what is no
longer pertinent to our priority problems? Have we achieved
the "fluidity of structure" and "the ability to shift power .. .
as unforeseen [or even foreseen] peak loads develop"?S
The organizational history of intelligence research compo-
nents under the impact of the Soviet missile problem does re-
veal an effort to adjust to the new situation. In CIA, for ex-
ample, the question of Soviet technical developments in the
missiles field was attacked ten years ago by organizing a
Guided Missile Branch within one of the divisions of the Office
of Scientific Intelligence, and before the decade was half over
that branch had itself become a division. Outside the field
of technical development, in order to meet the more pressing
need for knowledge of the Soviet missile force in being or in
immediate prospect, there was meanwhile organized a small
Guided Missile Staff in one of the economic research divisions
of the Office of Research and Reports to study Soviet production
of the weapons for issue to the armed forces, and by the end
of the decade this staff had become one of the largest branches
in that Office. It managed to harness enough experience to
supply some of the information of broad scope required for
national estimates on the Soviet missile program. And most
recently there has been an effort to pool both scientific and
economic intelligence resources in a Task Force devoted to the
Soviet. LRBM program, particularly the ICBM threat.
Helpful as these adjustments are, I submit that they rep-
resent half-way measures, an ad hoc response of vested inter-
ests rather than the heartbreaking reorganization for a uni-
fied weapons system approach to the whole strategic problem
that would demonstrate fluidity of structure. Even the "Task
4 SECRET
Great Frusina Revisited SECRET
Force," really only a coordinating mechanism, is not a device
that can weave together the scientific and technical research
done by one component and the study of weapons system
programming, costing, production, and operational deploy-
ment done by another. The continued division of line control
and supervision still prevents any integrated approach to the
research problem.
To conceive the kind of organizational measures that could,
and in my view should, be taken, we might draw by analogy
from outside of intelligence, from the typical development pro-
gram for the missile system itself. This, like the missile in-
telligence problem, has all the attributes of complexity, spe-
cialized knowledge, high priority, and unmatched urgency.
Here specialists organized according to their component of
the problem work on assigned tasks with no certainty whether
and how soon they will be accomplished. Nevertheless the
requirements for each task are so organized and the specifica-
tions for each component product so calculated that all will
be compatible in the final assembly, the finished system. It is
therefore necessary, as the program proceeds, continuously to
modify the design of the overall system as the original re-
quirements for individual components cannot be met or on the
other hand are modified by favorable findings that had not
been foreseen. To carry out such a program requires cen-
tralized planning and line control of contributing components
working as an integrated team, so supervised as to assure
that all elements being developed at any given time will be
compatible in the system as then conceived.
The missile intelligence problem, indeed the entire Soviet
strategic intelligence problem, requires a similar set of organi-
zational controls. The endless adjustment of its interwoven
elements can be achieved only by central definition of the
objectives of individual intelligence components engaged in
research, support, and collection and a constant evaluation of
their progress toward these objectives. The integration of
the complex and specialized tasks involved cannot be relegated
to a committee, a special assistant, or a "gadfly" with any
hope of carrying out an effective program. It can be accom-
plished only by a working organization composed of special-
ists from the several components and a management center
,r.ith the power of direct control.
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The House Divided
We have seen that the nature of strategic intelligence
knowledge has changed considerably, particularly in its time
component, and that the compression of time has been ac-
companied by an increase in substantive complexity and spe-
cialization which our research organizations have failed to
counter with a planned and integrated program. We have
also noted a decline in the quality and quantity of informa-
tion on the enemy's strategic capabilities in the weapons field,
a decline for which there has been a tendency for those en-
gaged in intelligence research to blame those engaged in col-
lection activities, and vice versa. The fault lies rather in an
imperfect understanding of the nature of the problem.
At the heart of this problem, as far as the CIA effort is con-
cerned, lies the fact that the Agency is a house divided be-
tween intelligence collection and intelligence research. Mr.
Kent noted a decade ago that the segregation of covert col-
lection activities was dictated by the need for secrecy, and he
pointed out that "unless this clandestine force watches sharply
it can become its own worst enemy. For if it allows the mech-
anisms of security to cut it off from some of the most signifi-
cant lines of guidance, it destroys its own reason for exist-
ence." 9 In today's highest-priority intelligence problems, I
suggest, the segregation of intelligence collection from re-
search is a luxury we can no longer afford.
The difficulties of integration are undoubtedly manifold and
great, but they cannot be more cogent than those of continu-
ing to stumble along our separate ways. First among these is
that of compensating for the time compression we have noted,
of meeting the urgency of the key problems. Segregation re-
quires the interposition of a duplicative liaison structure, with
an inevitable loss of precious time and in many instances an
attenuation of the specialized substantive data required for
the intelligence product. collection
--b?t,~Second, CO11 ~tu resources cannot
be brought into full play on the esoteric, complex, and chang-
ing requirements for data without interaction between the
progress of the research effort and the peculiarities of collec-
tion tradecraft. Finally, the insulation of research specialist
from collection specialist prevents the comparative analysis of
Great Frusina Revisited SECRET
collection resources essential to an integrated, centralized,
problem-oriented effort and to coordinated planning research
for such an effort.
In a word, the segregation of the collection activity can
but prevent a truly integrated approach to the priority stra-
tegic intelligence problem. Its need for secrecy must be
weighed against the urgency of this problem. In the inte-
grated research and collection effort with the best-known ac-
complishments of the recent past, the U-2 program, the risk
to our national security was considerably greater than in any
ordinary covert collection operation one might conceive. Yet
secrecy was forced to yield to need, and relatively large num-
bers of both research and collection personnel worked to-
gether on the centrally directed task.
Agency and Community
The change in the character of strategic intelligence has
had a marked effect on departmental intelligence organiza-
tions, activities, and policies, and these would be fruitful sub-
jects for separate discussion in detail. After more than a
decade of central intelligence, however, CIA is legally and by
established precedent the only organization whose primary
business is intelligence coordination and integration. It is
therefore the proper one to take the lead in solving the stra-
tegic intelligence problems of today, which, however analo-
gous to the order of battle of a bygone era, transcend in their
implications and complexity the responsibilities of any single
departmental intelligence organization. If the Director of
Central Intelligence is to advise the National Security Coun-
cil on these topmost questions of national security, he must
have an organization capable of providing him with the re-
sults of integrated collection and research. The matter has
become too large and complex for post facto integration
through the intuitive applications of staff officers and the ad
hoc considerations of joint committees. As the Director Of
Naval Intelligence wrote recently, "This is a critical level of
intelligence production . . . where intelligence usually trig-
gers the broad changes in defense policy that can set off a
whole series of national programs." 10
'Laurence H. Frost, "Intelligence as a Support to and a Responsi-
bility of Command," ONI Review, Vol. 15, No. 9 (September 1960), p. 388.
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SECRET Great Frusina Revisited
In our quite proper concern in recent years with the threat
of Soviet economic and political offensives, we should not lose
sight of the ultimate fulcrum of strategic power, as pointed
out by a recent study prepared for the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee of the United States Senate:
As long as the cold war continues, American foreign policy must
be based on a defense policy designed to ward off Soviet threats
against the free countries of the world. While military defense
needs to be supplemented by economic, psychological, and other
policies, the provision of adequate appropriate military strength
is the precondition of free world security."
The provision of adequate military strength is in large part
dependent upon adequate intelligence about Soviet weapons
systems, present and prospective; and the provision of this
intelligence, we have suggested, requires a problem-oriented
program bringing together existing research and collection
resources into a centrally controlled unit.
There is still one further requirement. This unified organi-
zation must contain, as an integral part, a working-level group
concerned with problem analysis and planning. This type of
unit, analogous to the R & D and "Advanced Projects" units
in the creation of weapon systems, has been conspicuous in
the intelligence community by its absence. There has been a
tendency to put the planning function on the policy manage-
ment level, in isolation from the detailed substantive realities.
The planning group here contemplated is one of experts, con-
versant in detail with the problems of today and of tomorrow.
It must be not only substantively qualified but at the same
time cognizant of the comparative capabilities of the resources
it can call upon to accomplish its objectives. Its work must
be at a tempo corresponding to the urgency of the problems it
has to deal with, and its solutions must be given force by rep-
resentation in policy management.
"U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Con-
gress, 1st Session, United States Foreign Policy, "Developments in Mili-
tary Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and For-
eign Policy," A Study Prepared at the Request of the Committee on
Foreign Relations by The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Re-
search, The Johns Hopkins University, No. 8 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1959), p. 1.
Great Frusina Revisited SECRET
Such an integration of intelligence planning, production,
and collection should provide for the definition of objectives,
a rapid response to requirements, the constant evaluation of
progress, and adequate control over a dynamic process. It
should make possible a more economical and thorough exploi-
tation of our finite resources. It would not, of course, guar-
antee success; but with current organizational forms clearly
an impediment to success, a refusal to reorganize would aug-
ment the possibility of failure, along with the prospect of
higher expenditures and greater risks.
It is time for us to give new meaning to the production
of "high-level foreign positive intelligence" and bring all our
resources to bear on the first-priority national intelligence ob-
jective through positive action. Soviet security is only half
our enemy; the other half is the flight of time, our most pre-
cious commodity. Whether we shall waste it or use it wisely
seems in large part to depend upon our ability to recognize
the deficiencies in our current efforts and overcome our pa-
rochialisms. Upon our success or failure could ultimately
hinge the survival of the nation.
SECRET 9
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Exemplary but unusual history
of the detection and reconstruc-
tion of a Soviet missile-guid-
ance system.
THE YO-YO STORY:
An Electronics Analysis Case History
Charles R. Ahern
Electronic components are a critical part of modern weap-
ons systems, less dispensable than some of their more obviously
important features. It is possible to conceive of an air de-
fense system without interceptor aircraft, for example, but it
is not possible to conceive of one without electronic devices,
systems, and techniques. Intelligence on the electronic por-
tions of Soviet weapons systems has therefore become a key
item in our knowledge of these systems. Here is a case history
of community teamwork in gaining such intelligence on an un-
precedented type of radar control for surface-to-air missiles
in the Soviet air defense system. The story features a con-
certed effort to obtain observations, an imaginative analysis,
a lucky break, and an excellent follow-through by research
and development.
Herringbones and Ventilators
In the early 1950's U.S. and British intelligence posted a
lookout for signs of the Soviet deployment of surface-to-air
missiles in readiness for defense against air attack. Toward
the end of 1953 some unusual road networks were seen out-
side of Moscow, which, although they did not have the an-
ticipated configuration of missile sites, were at least located
at points where missile installations might be expected. As
the pattern of these locations began to develop a more intense
search for them was made. By the autumn of 1954 quite a
number of reports consistently described the networks as com-
prising three more or less parallel roads a mile long inter-
sected by some ten cross roads about a half mile in length in
a herringbone pattern. There was nothing in the reports that
would particularly excite the curiosity of the specialist in elec-
t conics intelligence.
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SECRET The Yo-Yo Story
During the last quarter of that year U.S. and UK attaches
began to report details of other features around the herring-
bone complexes in the Moscow area. In September a British
observer, without making specific reference to it in the body
of his report, indicated in a sketch that there was a "barracks
area" some distance away, more or less in line with the axis
of the herringbone and connected with it by a road. After
a couple of weeks this report was amplified and a different pos-
sible barracks area located. The original "barracks," accord-
ing to the revised description, seemed to be a long grass-cov-
ered bunker with a concrete hand-stand at one end. The
observer noted that large ventilators at this end of the bunker
flapped with what seemed extraordinary violence, even when
the fairly high wind blowing at the time was taken into con-
sideration.
A week later, when two U.S. attaches were a half hour out
from Moscow on a plane bound for Leningrad, one of them
noticed an unusual installation on the ground. It had a look
of newness and activity about it. He didn't get a very clear
impression of any buildings on the site; his eye was caught by
the motion of two large wheels installed in a pit with a ramp
leading down to them. Each wheel, he reported, was like a
thin yo-yo, with twin flat disks spinning at an angle to the
horizontal. He estimated their speed at about 60 rpm and
said they appeared to wobble on their axes. He had difficulty
describing the nature of this wobble; it appeared to be a kind
of "even undulation throwing the outside edges [of the disks]
a foot or two from their planes of rotation." His sketch is
shown in Figure 2.
12 SECRET
The Yo-Yo Story
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SECRET The Yo-Yo Story
This report proved to be a remarkably accurate description
of the device thereupon nicknamed the Yo-Yo,1 considering
that the observer had only five or ten seconds to take in the
details of something never before seen or heard of. His com-
panion on the flight, seated on the other side of the plane,
had in the course of the trip spotted one of the herringbone
sites, and when he returned to Moscow a few days later he
reported it in response to the standing order for observations
on these. When the two men checked their observation times
they realized that the Yo-Yo and the herringbone had been
seen simultaneously, and that there might be a connection
between them. They astutely guessed that the Yo-Yo might
represent some kind of missile guidance system, and this com-
ment in the report brought it to the attention of electronics
intelligence analysts.
A month later, about the beginning of December, British
observers riding on a train southeast of Moscow noticed a
fenced area with a microwave antenna on a pole at one end.
In the center of the enclosure there was an earth bunker with
one open end facing the pole. There they saw a "double ro-
tating disk array," each disk, they judged, about ten feet in
diameter and making about 120 revolutions per minute. The
plane of the disks was inclined at about 45 degrees from the
horizontal. The observers had the impression that the disks
either had serrated edges or were polygonal structures given
a disk-like appearance by the rotation.
In February 1955 this same site was observed and photo-
graphed by U.S. personnel. Their photography was not of a
scale or quality to convey any clear idea of the shape of the
Yo-Yo, but their observations, erroneous in part, did correct
and refine some of the earlier information. They reported
that the two disks were each about 20 feet in diameter and
about 12 inches thick. They thought them both vertical, at
right angles to each other. They were not sure whether they
were double, and if so whether the two halves rotated in the
same or opposite directions. They estimated the rotation to
Soviet Bloc electronics items are assigned nicknames, as opposed to
code names or cover names, to provide a common nomenclature in the
collection and production of intelligence. These nicknames are selected
and agreed upon on a tripartite basis among electronics intelligence
representatives of the United States, the UK, and Canada.
The Yo-Yo Story
Figure 3. Sketch of Disks Seen One on Edge and One Full-face.
be about 40 rpm and stated that there was no wobble, an opti-
cal illusion of one being given by the viewing angle and the
serrated edges. Figure 3 is a sketch supplied with this report.
At this stage it was by no means clear that the herringbone
complexes had anything to do with missiles. No missile had
been seen on the sites, and the road arrangement would have
been equally suitable to housing development or crop or am-
munition storage. Even if they were surface-to-air missile
sites, it was not firmly established that the Yo-Yo was uniquely
related to them. Further, there was nothing about the Yo-Yo
to indicate that it was an electronic device; the reports on it
did not even convey any clear idea of what it looked like. One
offhand opinion received from British experts was that it
might be a rock crusher.
Nevertheless, under the good-humored assumption that "if
no one can figure out what it is, it must be electronics," the
Yo-Yo reports were laid before the joint gatherings of com-
munity electronics specialists at that time sponsored by the old
Military Electronics Working Group. Beginning in Janu-
ary 1955, the Yo-Yo was brought up at each meeting of the
MEWG for many months. For the present, however, there
was little that the electronics analyst could do but speculate
as to what the observers had really seen and request more
detailed information, especially photographs.
By the summer of 1955 it had become more or less clear
t hat the Yo-Yo did bear a specific relationship to the herring-
bone complexes. The herringbones were arranged so that
their length was always along a radial line from Moscow. The
Yo-Yo bunker was situated on this same line, centered on the
!u'rringbone, and always about a mile nearer to Moscow. The
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Yo-Yo itself was invariably at the herringbone end of the
bunker. But the true shape and appearance of the Yo-Yo re-
mained uncertain.
Early in August 1955 a packet of photographs was brought
to CIA electronics analysts. Picturing a Yo-Yo southeast of
Moscow, they had been taken, happily, from several different
angles. These photographs revealed, at last, what the Yo-Yo
really looked like. The observers had for the past year been
more or less correctly and accurately describing what they
had seen, but the descriptions were incomplete. The "disks"
were truncated equilateral triangles assembled in pairs in the
Star of David configuration. There were two such assemblies,
one in the vertical Moscow-herringbone plane and the other
(of which an edge is visible in the accompanying reproduc-
tion) at right angles tilting up 45 degrees from the horizontal
toward the herringbone. The early "violent flapping of the
ventilators" and wobbling wheels were now comprehensible
optical interpretations of the two assemblies in rotation.
Analysis and Synthesis
The analyst, as is usually the case in electronics intelli-
gence, thus found himself confronted with a fully developed
Soviet device deployed in the field. In these circumstances
his task is one of unravelling what the Soviet designer was
Figure 4. Photograph of Bunker with Yo-Yos at Right End
The Yo-Yo Story SECRET
attempting to achieve, the reverse of the original design proc-
ess. Whereas the Soviet designer is given a set of performance
specifications and proceeds by selecting available techniques,
components, and production processes and by making the in-
evitable technical compromises to reach his final design, the
analyst must work backward from the finished design to ar-
rive at the designer's objective. In this process he must also
take care that his thinking is not controlled by concepts of
how an item would be designed in the United States: the So-
viet concept of equipment use is usually quite different from
ours, at least in electronics.
In the absence of any similar, previously known piece of
equipment from which to extrapolate, the analysis of the
Yo-Yo problem had to begin with a basic assumption as to
the general purpose of the device-that it was designed to
control surface-to-air missiles launched from the herringbone
area (though no missiles had yet been seen). Granted this
assumption, the problem became that of figuring out how mis-
siles could be guided by an apparatus with such an appear-
ance as that shown in the photos and the placement and be-
havior described in the observer reports. The analytic point
of departure was the consideration that, however the Yo-Yo
v: orked to guide the assumed missiles, it would have to provide
information with sufficient accuracy on both the missile's tar-
get and the missile itself in three coordinates-range, eleva-
tion, and azimuth.
In virtually all surface-to-air missile guidance systems this
tracking of the missile and its target is done by a system of
radar antennas, say of parabolic form, that point toward mis-
sile and target and focus beams of radio energy on them, much
as a searchlight does with its visible beam. Before the Yo-Yo
photos were received the possibility could not be ruled out
that it too was such a large parabolic reflector imperfectly
observed and poorly described; but the form shown in the
photos was clearly no conventional variety of antenna sys-
tcm. All the available descriptive information indicated that
the Yo-Yo disks retained their relative position while rotat-
n This meant that only the edges of the disks could point
upward and away from Moscow, the direction in which radar
,intennas should be looking for enemy aircraft and should
,aide missiles to attack them. The straight sections of these
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edges seemed the most likely portion for antenna apertures.
This reasoning provided the germ of a solution.
The straight sections were about 20 feet long and perhaps
8 inches wide. An aperture of these proportions could be ex-
pected to produce a transverse fan beam about 30 times as
broad in the plane of its short dimension as in that of its
length.2 Given the orientation, arrangement, and rotation
pattern of the disks, it appeared that on each rotation of each
two-disk assembly six of these narrow beams, one from each
straight edge, would scan a volume of space extending above
and beyond the herringbone complexes. The size and num-
ber of the apertures had apparently been one of the require-
ments on the mechanical designer: since six would have made
a huge, unwieldy single disk, he had divided them between two
Star-of-David triangles.
The six beams from the tilted Yo-Yo would thus scan the
air approaches to Moscow in azimuth and those from the ver-
tical assembly would scan it in elevation. Both sets could
provide range data on any target or missile in the volume of
space scanned. With the whole volume covered, the antennas
would not need, like a searchlight or parabolic radar, to stop
scanning in order to follow a target or the defense missile, but
would provide position data on these in the course of continued
scanning. In such a system, therefore called "track-while-
scan," memory devices would be needed to develop the track
by maintaining continuity of information during the inter-
vals between the individual antenna scans. Such devices were
considered possible.
A series of calculations, based on guided missile performance
requirements as well as radar needs, were then undertaken.
Guided missile analysts furnished estimates of the probable
range of Soviet surface-to-air missiles and the size of their
warheads. The former provided limits for certain technical
characteristics affecting the range requirement of the radar;
the latter helped define its accuracy requirements. In all,
two dozen or more technical factors entered the calculations.
These had to be weighed against one another in reaching the
compromises that are always forced upon the system designer:
' The dimensions of the beam are inversely proportional to those of
the aperture that produces it.
The Yo-Yo Story
for example, if the operating frequency were too low, accuracy
would be poor and transmitter power requirements excessive;
if it were too high, the rapid scanning rate of the antennas
and the narrowness of the beams would make too few pulses
hit the target.
As the design for a missile guidance system evolved from
this process, a check was made with analysts in the field of
vacuum tubes and other electronic components to insure that
it did not call for techniques or components beyond Soviet
capabilities. Finally a design was established that took into
consideration the missile, the operating principle of its guid-
ance, the technical characteristics of the radar, the accuracy
of the system, and its anticipated capabilities.
One task remained-to re-examine the entire solution
against any possible alternatives in the light of all reports and
photographs, inquiring whether everything reported could be
accounted for in the solution and whether anything required
by the soluticn and not reported would seriously weaken it.
Each alternative solution that came to mind failed to account
for some aspect of the reported data or required a capability
on the part of Soviet technology that appeared unreasonable.
One suggestion, for example, was that the Yo-Yo antennas
would simply radiate energy to illuminate the target for a
homing system in the missile. Such a system might work,
but because of the discontinuous nature of the radar signal
it would require the inclusion of memory devices in the hom-
ing gear of each missile. This elaborate provision seemed un-
likely. Furthermore, the homing illumination theory was
inconsistent with the configuration of the Yo-Yos: a single
pair of disks should give adequate illumination, so the two at
right angles to each other would be an unnecessary compli-
cat ion.
Testing the tentative answer to a problem is a fairly stand-
,irci procedure but testing this answer was a particularly de-
manding task because of its startling implications. If it was
ri(.ht, the Soviets had not continued in the direction taken
1)v the original German wartime development of surface-to-
a111' missile guidance nor in that of postwar Western efforts,
% hirh were based on extensions of the German work. Instead,
making a clean break with precedent, they had arrived at a
(I sign that was inherently capable of dealing with multiple
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targets simultaneously. The data on the target or targets
were apparently translated automatically into missile com-
mand guidance; there were no indications of a homing system
on the missile.
This analysis, which required some three weeks from the
time the photos were received, was made the basis for a Pro-
visional Scientific Intelligence Report incorporating its conclu-
sions and presenting a list of probable technical parameters .3
The publication of the report would ordinarily have been the
end of the matter; but the Yo-Yo story is unique. For one
thing, the report found, with its unprecedented conclusions,
a by no means unanimous initial acceptance among the ele-
ments of the intelligence community concerned with elec-
tronics and guided missiles. For another, it was brought in
December 1955, through a series of steps initiated by Army
intelligence, before the Technical Advisory Committee on Elec-
tronics of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research
and Development, and the Committee recommended that a
project be initiated to build a prototype or mock-up of the
Yo-Yo as therein conceived. The mock-up technique, used
during World War II, had led to an assessment of the capabili-
ties of the German radars and was invaluable in developing
electronic countermeasures to foil them, but its use had not
been common in the decade following the war.
In March 1956, at about the same time it became fairly
well established that missiles were actually emplaced on the
herringbone complexes, the mock-up contract was let
through Army Ordnance and work on it begun.
Exploitation of a Break
Meanwhile the Dragon Returnee Program had been work-
ing on repatriated German scientists and technicians who had
been taken to the U.S.S.R. after the war. Many of these gave
information of some value to electronics and guided missile
intelligence, but it appeared that the Soviets had carefully
kept the German electronics specialists insulated from de-
velopmental work in military electronics, especially in the
heavy radar field, where the results of Soviet efforts were be-
coming increasingly evident from other sources. After sev-
' Provisional Scientific Intelligence Report, CIA/SI 51-55, 6 Oct. 1955,
"YO-YO, A Possible Soviet Missile Guidance System."
The Yo-Yo Story SECRET
eral years of experience with returnees, the chances of find-
ing one who knew about the development of specific high pri-
ority electronics items were privately judged at about one in
ten thousand.
In the fall of 1956, however, a year after the publication of
the Yo-Yo analysis, one of the Dragon returnees, Christian
Sorge, who it was thought might have information on a dif-
ferent missile system, called attention during his routine pre-
liminary debriefing to a new development on which he had
worked from 1950 to 1952, a system for guiding surface-to-air
missiles called the B-200. He said that it used a very strange-
looking antenna system, which he then sketched on a sheet
of paper for the interrogator. The interrogator, looking at
Figure 5. Sorge's Sketch of B-200 Antenna
the superimposed equilateral triangles Sorge had drawn, re-
called the published Yo-Yo analysis and realized with consid-
erable excitement that Sorge had knowledge more important
than had been supposed. As the preliminary debriefing con-
tinued, the identity of the B-200 with the analytic concep-
tion of the Yo-Yo was established at some dozen points.
The intelligence community now organized a team of spe-
cialists to assist in Sorge's debriefing. Their efforts brought
out more and more technical details, especially of the memory
portion of the system, the complex electronic tracking cir-
cuitry made necessary by the adoption of a guidance system
dependent on the discontinuous data of scanning antennas.
It was this critical part of the B-200 system, fortunately,
that Sorge had worked on. By the time his debriefing had
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The Yo-Yo Story
been completed he had provided many new insights, as well
as having confirmed some 25 or 30 facts hypothesized in the
analytic reconstruction. One curious reaction to the initial
correlation between the analytic report of October 1955 and
Sorge's information had been the suspicion that the report
might have fallen into KGB hands, who through Sorge were
now feeding it back to the interrogator. This fear was quickly
dispelled by the amount of detail and consistency in Sorge's
data.
Sorge said that he and several others, having signed con-
tracts with the Soviet authorities for additional work in 1950
and 1951, had been assigned tasks on the B-200 system, which
had apparently been conceived by 1949. In addition to the
details of circuit designs, he described some of the testing
programs for the prototype that began in 1952, and his in-
formation was supplemented by that from some of the others
who had returned. But in 1952 they had all been removed from
B-200 development and placed in non-sensitive activities for
a cooling-off period of three or four years prior to repatriation.
Follow-Through by R&D
The group of specialists assisting in the debriefing of Sorge
included personnel from the Diamond Ordnance Fuze Labora-
tory, the contractor for the Yo-Yo mock-up project. As de-
tails of the tracking system and other portions of the B-200
were brought out by interrogation, they were promptly in-
cluded in the development work, effecting important changes
in its direction. As a major example, although the analytic
report had hypothesized a separate computer for each mis-
sile-target engagement, the DOFL people had decided that
the Soviets would use a single large digital computer. Sorge's
statement that separate analog computers were in fact called
for in the design now brought about a timely reorientation
in the mock-up project. It was fortunate that the project was
already contracted for and under way when Sorge appeared:
at least a year and perhaps more was saved by having a re-
search team assembled and working on the problem before
being overwhelmed by such a volume of detailed information.
As it was, the development project, begun in April 1956, did
not yield a prototype installation that could be tested until
early in 1958. The results of the test program showed the
Soviet B-200 to constitute a major technological advance in
radar tracking systems. An additional surprise was that it
performed much better than expected when tested against
electronic countermeasures, jamming; but the technique of
dropping chaff was effective against it if properly employed.
The B-200 was found to have an angle accuracy as great as
0.050 on strong targets and a range accuracy of 25 yards;
this meant that missiles in the range of 20 to 25 miles would
not need a homing radar of their own. Its low-altitude capa-
bility was much better than the Germans had estimated,
being limited only by the terrain around the installation.
The ability of the system to cope with multiple targets was
confirmed; the ability of one installation to direct as many
as 20 or 25 simultaneous target-missile interceptions, as
claimed by the Germans, seems to depend only on whether
the Soviets choose to provide the necessary computer for each
interception.
Thus the Yo-Yo story, which began with the reports of a
few alert observers who noticed some unusual installations
in 1953 and 1954, ends with the tests of the mock-up system
in the autumn of 1958. It raises some interesting questions,
for example how quickly the Sorge information would have
been believed if the Yo-Yo sites not been seen, reported, and
analyzed. Even with the analytic report in hand, some of
the specialists involved in the debriefing doubted much of
what Sorge said in the early stages. The approach of the
analytic report itself, the setting out to design a Soviet elec-
tronic system on the basis of its physical appearance, was
unique; it succeeded largely because the design was so differ-
ent from anything theretofore developed.
The concern of electronics analysts about the new Soviet
guidance system has remained undiminished, because our in-
formation on its internal workings ends with the 1950-1953
period, and what the Soviets may have done in the interven-
ing years to improve its performance is a continuing problem.
Several studies have considered what improvements could be
made in the B-200, but no intelligence information has come
to light on any that have been made. And now the recent
appearance of a second-generation missile guidance system,
Fruit Set, which might be loosely described as a mobile Yo-Yo,
is tending to push the original B-200 into the background.
22 SECRET SECRET
23
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Case study of how the Sino-
Soviet Bloc intelligence-services
provide black support for overt
psychological warfare themes.
PSYWAR BY FORGERY
Alma Fryxell
There is nothing new about the use of forged documents in
the psychological warfare operations of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
intelligence services, especially in pursuit of particular aims
within a single country; West Germany, for example, has
been flooded with them for years. But the years 1957 and
1958 saw a noticeable increase in internationally distributed
propaganda-by-forgery supporting the general Bloc objectives
of discrediting the United States and other Western countries
and of promoting division in the West. For these two years
and the first half of 1959, 18 such forgeries surfaced in fac-
simile have been discovered, and a number of other instances
wherein the text of a purported document was quoted without
attempt at reproduction or a document was at least falsely
reported to exist makes a total of 32 cases available for study
from this period.
Some of these were sniper shots at individual important
targets, without relation to any of the others and usually
without any further follow-up; but most of them-25-were
interconnected into nine distinguishable series, and some
formed rather elaborate progressions in prolonged campaigns
,given heavy play in the overt propaganda media. The false
documents were many of them originally surfaced in the overt
Bloc media, but a greater number were planted, especially in
the underdeveloped countries, in small "independent" newspa-
pers subsidized for such purposes or otherwise controlled. Sev-
eral were transmitted to their targets through diplomatic
channels and a few by covert mailing.
The orchestration of these varied media in a coordinated
campaign requires central direction. We know that black
propaganda is a function of the Bloc foreign intelligence serv-
ices under close direction from high Party echelons. It is
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possible that the entire Bloc show is directed by a unit of the
CPSU Central Committee and run by the KGB through its
liaison officers with the other services.
Single Documents
An example of the isolated false document is provided by
the most recent of the cases in this period, the only one con-
cerned with Black Africa. On 4 March 1959 the Hungarian
press agency MTI transmitted in French to its outlets in Eu-
rope the purported text of a document signed by the prime
minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Roy Welensky, and
by the "head of the European organization of Central Africa,
Alfred Finsent," 1 which declared that it had been officially de-
cided to transfer African nationalist prisoners "to another
concentration camp where all those who would not express
their resolution to break with African nationalism would be
exterminated." MTI explained that this meant the Hola
camp in Kenya, and reported further:
The African prisoners involved number about 80,000. If, after
interrogation, they refuse to disown the Nationalist movement
they will be thrown into ditches called "poison wells" filled with
poisoned water. Within a few days the poisoned water will pene-
trate the body and kill.... The Cairo bureau of the Kenya African
Association states that according to their knowledge, 35 Africans
have already been exterminated "experimentally" by this pro-
cedure ...
MTI's sensational disclosure of this perhaps too heinous plan
was not picked up and used, as far as we know, in other media
during 1959.
A more ambitious single-shot effort was made in June 1958
by the Czech intelligence service. It forged, with accurate
duplication of format and style, an entire issue of Ceske Slovo,
a bona fide newspaper published in Munich by Czech emigres,
and mailed it black from Munich and Vienna to current and
former subscribers, using one genuine mailing list it had ac-
quired some years earlier by unknown means and another
recently obtained by burglarizing the Ceske Slovo offices. The
' Apparently a bad transliteration from Cyrillic through Arabic, along
with a garbled title. Alfred Vincent was chairman of the Organization
of European Members of the East African Central Legislative Assembly.
Neither Cyrillic nor Arabic has a c, and Arabic has no v.
26 SFrPFT
Psywar By Forgery SECRET
forged edition carried anti-West propaganda and announced
that the newspaper was going out of existence because its edi-
tors were disillusioned with the West. In an exceptional fol-
low-up, articles from it were quoted as authentic not only by
the official Rude Pravo but by Party papers in Austria and
Luxembourg and a non-Party Chicago monthly, Svobodne
Ceskoslovensko, that follows the propaganda line of the Czech
regime. The Western CP organs are generally not used in
the distribution of Bloc forgeries.
A particularly dangerous kind of forged document was put
into the mail on 5 July 1957 by the Hauptverwaltung Auf-
klaerung, the East German equivalent of the KGB, which in
January of that year had been assigned psychological warfare
as a major operational responsibility. In France that sum-
mer one of the biggest news stories was the killing of the
Strasbourg police chief's wife on 17 May by a bomb mailed
her husband in the guise of a gift package. There had been
mailed at the same time and in the same Paris post office
a batch of particularly vicious hate-letters to French officials
and private citizens in Paris and Alsace-Lorraine, and the
conviction was growing that these and the terrorist bomb
stemmed from the same source. The letters, demanding the
return of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, were one of several
series of Nazistic letters and leaflets signed "Kampfverband
fuer ein Unabhaengiges Deutschland," an organization since
determined to have been invented by the HVA for agitatory
purposes (and given a fraternal plug in a May 1958 broadcast
from Radio Moscow warning the French against it and imply-
ing that it was secretly supported by the West German gov-
ernment).
The single document mailed on 5 July 1957 was a deep and
dexterous thrust evolved from the fictitious Kampfverband's
campaign. Addressed to a high French official in West Ger-
many, it was a forged letter from Elim O'Shaughnessy, head
of the Political Division of our Bonn embassy, calling the State
Department's attention to the activity of German reactionary
and ultranationalist groups and recommending that the U.S.
Government support these groups and use them. Having been
delivered thus simply to its target, the French government,
the forgery was never published or replayed in any way. It
was convincing enough to have caused genuine damage in U.S.-
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SECRET Psywar By Forgery
French relationships-except that it had been typed on the
same machine as some other HVA psywar productions.
The remaining four individual cases were mere allegations
of the existence of incriminating documents, made once and
not repeated. One concerned the Near East: on 1 December
1958 the Czech press agency CTK attributed to "the Cairo
press" a report that the new Sudanese government had found
among the old government's papers some secret documents
showing U.S. bribery of high Sudanese officials. The other
three were targeted in the Far East and appeared in the Bom-
bay Blitz, a Soviet-controlled "independent" weekly-a State
Department directive to Ambassador Bishop in Thailand that
he "screen the loyalties of the King and his government mem-
bers"; a secret pact between Premier Kishi and Secretary
Dulles "to permit use of Japanese troops anywhere in Asia";
and a letter from Chiang Kai-shek to President Eisenhower
warning that "every third soldier" in the Nationalist army was
disloyal.
The Taipei Cables and Indonesia
Blitz was also the vehicle for an extended if not very so-
phisticated series of facsimile forgeries devised to take advan-
tage of the 24 May 1957 riot at the American embassy in Tai-
pei. On 14 September it prepared its readers for the forgeries
by reporting rumors that Ambassador Rankin was in trouble
and might be dismissed because some of the embassy's impor-
tant secret documents had been lost when the premises were
raided by the rioters. In its issue of the following week it re-
produced the first of these documents, two cables to Wash-
ington wherein Ambassador Rankin discusses with some
obliquity the methods to be used in assassinating Chiang and
others in his entourage and recommends the murders be dis-
guised as accidents. The text was couched in allusive terms
for the sake of verisimilitude, but in its accompanying com-
ment Blitz removed any uncertainty its readers might have
had about its meaning and left nothing to their imagination.
This is the usual Bloc practice in the surfacing of verbatim
forgeries; but the rest of the Taipei series used less subtle
texts.
The next issue of Blitz, 28 September, reproduced the head-
ing and first lines of two fabricated cables from Ambassador
Psywar By Forgery
Allison in Indonesia to the Department, as "repeated to Tai-
pei," and quoted their full texts. One urged increased aid,
including combat units from Formosa, for dissident Indo-
nesian movements; the other reported progress in intrigues
to overthrow Sukarno and gave directions for packaging arms
shipped from Formosa and Malaya to the Darul Islam. The
same treatment was given the final item in the series, in
Blitz' 12 October issue. Beginning on the same page that
disclosed the Kishi-Dulles secret pact, there was reproduced
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I g
s=F-.eye
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text was incomplete because "the lower portion of the second
page of this telegram was torn off during the riots."
After some months' delay the items in this Taipei series were
given further play to vulnerable selected audiences. The story
of Rankin's plot against Chiang was broadcast to Taiwan by
Radio Peking on 30 December. The State Department's
cabled views on SEATO were picked up at the turn of the year
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by the pro-Communist weekly La Patrie published in Bangkok,
the capital of the only proper Southeast Asia mainland mem-
ber of SEATO. On 3 February 1958 Radio Moscow added de-
tails implicating Ambassador Cummings in the U.S. subver-
sion of Indonesia documented in the forged Allison cables and
broadcast an account of it to the United Kingdom. On 6 April
the Djakarta Berita Minggu, another controlled "independ-
ent" weekly, announced that the authenticity of the Alli-
son cables had been confirmed, and Peking's news agency
NCNA carried this confirmation in its English-language trans-
mission for Europe.
This late replay of the Allison cables merged them into an-
other series concerned with Indonesia. The outbreak of open
rebellion there in early 1958 brought new specific and heavily
played charges that the United States had planned the revolt
and was covertly giving it military support. On 22 March
Blitz told its readers that U.S. officers at SEATO headquar-
ters in Bangkok had been ordered to submit immediately an
opinion on the construction of U.S. atom bases in Sumatra:
It is known here that a Top Secret agreement has been con-
cluded by the Indonesian separatists with the SEATO and Ameri-
can groups, which provides for both SEATO and U.S. bases in "free"
Sumatra. This agreement was finalized after secret talks which
took place recently in Tokyo between Col. Sumunal, representing
the "Separatist Government" of the Ussain-Shafruddin rump, and
representatives of the U.S. Embassy.
This report was followed up on 15 May, in the Rangoon
weekly The Mirror (a third controlled "independent"), by the
text of a letter said to be from rebel leader M. Sjamsuddin to
Ambassador MacArthur, evidently on the subject of imple-
menting the atom-base agreement. It began:
Your phone call proved to be real magic. The meeting ... was
very useful. We have agreed on practically all the details. Now,
I hope, ties v71., ? remain permanent and we will receive all necessary
..
materials without delay.
Soon, however, it became necessary to counter the effect of
the. United States' publicized friendly negotiations with the
Sukarno government, and a new forgery was promptly
launched to show that the U.S. public attitude was merely a
smoke-screen. On 8 June The Mirror printed the text of a pur-
ported letter from naval intelligence chief Rear Admiral Lau-
Psywar By Forgery
rence Frost to the rebel leader Kawilarang, telling him "not to
despair just because the U.S. issued statements expressing on
the surface `no interference' in the Indonesian civil war. We
will continue giving assistance to you through Taiwan and
the Philippines and other channels." After two weeks this
story was repeated in a chronic Indonesian vehicle for plot
charges, the "independent" Djakarta Bintang Timur, and its
version was carried by the Chinese NCNA and a week later in
Soviet domestic broadcasts.
We happen to have some details on the mechanics through
which such counterfeit texts would be placed in The Mirror
or another of the half-dozen receptive Burmese papers. The
KGB rezidentura at the Rangoon embassy would receive them
from Moscow in Russian, translate them there into English,
and pass them in this form to the more or less controlled
press outlets. The papers would do their own translating
into Burmese, but the rezidentura would check the published
texts against the original Russian and report any variations
to Moscow.
Expansionist Israel
A most complex and enduring misinformation series using
the full orchestra of rumor campaign, diplomatic whispers,
planted intelligence information, press allegations, and pub-
lished forgeries began half a year after the abortive British-
French-Israeli invasion of Egypt. In mid-March 1957 rumors
Legan circulating in official and diplomatic circles in Paris that
llie French and Israeli General Staffs were working together
on a plan for a new joint action against Egypt. When the
rumors were traced it was learned, first, that they had no
foundation in fact and, second, that all traceable such tales
l ad a single local point of origin-one Andre Ulmann, director
()f a small "independent" weekly, La Tribune des Nations, but
notorious as a pro-Soviet propagandist. During the first weeks
of April these rumors were complernented by intelligence re-
1,orts received from Lebanon and from Italy to the effect that
France "was launching a plot in cooperation with Israel." The
Italian report said that "the Israeli press has not mentioned
t hr matter, but details are being discussed publicly."
On these subtle foundations the campaign was openly elab-
orated in the fall. On 12 October the Bombay Blitz carried
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a long article exposing "Israeli plans to dismember the Arab
states and organise an empire":
A Blitz correspondent in a West Asian country had an opportunity
of getting acquainted in detail with a secret strategic plan of the
Israeli General Staff. We may be able to publish the plan in full
in future....
It envisages military operations against the countries bordering
on Israel.... In general, the Plan provides for the annexation of
the territory bounded by the Suez Canal, the River Litani and the
Persian Gulf....
The scheme takes into account the circumstance that Israel will
not be able to rely on victory if she acts alone. In this connection,
assistance on the part of the U.S.A., Britain and France is envisaged
beforehand. The Plan especially emphasizes that "the U.S. is
interested in a clash between Israel and the Arab States" and that
"the U.S. interest in the strategic points of the Middle East is
explained by the striving to strengthen her positions in this oil-rich
area."
A month later, in fulfillment of its promise, Blitz put out a
78-page booklet, entitled Dagger of Israel, containing the
"Strategic Plan of the Israeli Army for 1956-57, translated
from the original in Hebrew." This document, an obvious
fraud, is a rambling, badly written tract with the details given
in the October article as its propaganda climax. The book
had been in preparation, according to its introduction, since
March, i.e., the time when the "French-Israeli General Staff"
rumors had appeared in France.
After this the drive apparently went into winter quarters,
but it was renewed the following spring. On 4 April 1958
Mikhail Stepanovich Rogov, Counselor of the Soviet embassy
in Paris and a KGB officer, told a Western diplomat-who of
course told his government-that the USSR was currently
"worried about increased French-Israeli political and military
cooperation." The next day Blitz took up the refrain, with
slight variations:
Diplomatic circles at Tel Aviv report that the Israeli Armed
Forces command is, elaborating jointly with the French Army Gen-
eral Staff a so-caned "Plan of Preventive Hostilities" against the
UAR. . . . Meantime, Israel is frantically seeking other al-
liances.... The Americans are now helping her to an alliance
with the anti-Arab NATO member Turkey.
U.S. involvement, not to be left thus subordinate, was the
main burden of another Blitz article on 19 April reporting
Psywar By Forgery
that Secretary Dulles had announced in a closed session of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee "that the United States
would support the demands of the Ben Gurion Government on
enlarging the territory of Israel at the cost of the Arab lands."
Recounting the year-old rumors of secret joint planning by
the French and Israeli General Staffs, Blitz said that the U.S.
Government had been kept fully informed of the plan by both
the French and the Israeli government.
In October the secret Israeli strategic plan surfaced a year
earlier by Blitz was included, as a ten-page excerpt, in a
147-page book published by the State Publishing House for Po-
litical Literature, in Moscow, under the title The State of Is-
rael-Its Position and Policies. Presented as a "history of Is-
rael and the Zionist movement," the book as a whole is a
vicious propaganda attack, of the misinformation variety,
against the State of Israel, all of its political parties except the
CP, and "the Zionist bosses"-the United States in particular
and the West in general. It seems to have been designed for
use in Communist study groups, assuming a Marxist-Leninist
viewpoint on the part of the reader. But its similarity in
other respects to Blitz's less comprehensive Dagger of Israel
is great enough to present the possibility that both manu-
scripts were prepared in the same place, if not written by the
same individual. It is notable that rather crude material like
this Israeli plan and Admiral Frost's reassurance to the In-
donesian rebels, designed for unsophisticated targets in Asia
and the Near East, is deemed suitable for the more knowl-
edgeable but carefully warped Soviet audience.
In November a new edition of the book Arab Dawn published
by Blitz carried the author's statement that he had learned
in October, in Beirut, "of the latest in the series of Anglo-
American plans to `cut Nasser down to size,' which France
has since endorsed. The plan, "scheduled to take place next
spring or earlier," provided for Western action against Leba-
non, Iraq, and the Sudan. In addition, however:
A supplementary plan has been attached to the main project.
The supplementary document introduces the latest plan of the
Israeli General Staff to take over the West Bank of the Jordan
Inver by means of a swift blitzkrieg. The Israeli plan, which ap-
parently has the approval of the CIA, the British Ambassador in
Beirut and the U.S. Ambassador in Tehran ... is built around the
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possibility of either the flight or the assassination of King Hussein
of Jordan in the near future.
The "Israeli General Staff" canard, now enshrined in an of-
ficial Soviet publication, can continue indefinitely with varia-
tions its role as a part of the Bloc psychological warfare arse-
nal. On 13 April 1959 the Turkish Foreign Ministry denied
with protest a report published in the Moscow Red Fleet that
the Chief of the Israeli General Staff had come to Ankara to-
ward the end of March and held secret talks on the question
of Turkey's support of Israel for an attack against the Arabs,
especially against the UAR, in the near future.
Other Near East Forgeries
Alleged U.S. intrigues against the UAR, a side-line in the
elaborate Israeli effort, were the whole theme of a shorter but
equally important series of forgeries. On 9 April 1958 the
clandestine Bizim Radio, located in Leipzig but broadcasting in
Turkish as from Turkey, carried the following "news item":
Report from Cairo-The American State Department has sent a
secret directive to its envoys in the Middle East with a view to
overthrowing the UAR. The directive points out that Soviet in-
fluence in the Arab countries has increased owing to Soviet recog-
nition of the UAR and urges the envoys to use every means to spoil
Soviet-Egyptian relations.
On 26 July, a fortnight after the Iraqi coup, a document
answering to this description was published in facsimile by
the Cairo daily Al Ahram. It purported to be a State Depart-
ment "circular letter" over Assistant Secretary Rountree's
signature, cabled on 17 April to diplomatic missions in the Mid-
dle East. Explaining that any apparent softening of U.S. pol-
icy toward the UAR was merely a tactical device, it stated that
one of the principal aims in the Middle East was to destroy
the UAR by splitting it into its original Syrian and Egyptian
components, to stop the growth of Egyptian influence, and to
spoil Soviet-UAR relations.
This forgery was apparently thought convincing enough to
be given rather wide play in the overt Bloc media, most heavily
to domestic and Near East audiences but also to Europe and
South Africa. On 2 August Blitz carried it, making explicit
the supposition that the incriminating document had come
to light in Bagdad as a result of the Republican coup. In De-
Psywar By Forgery SECRET
,L:ill ~VZAI S.L.Ii c ~1~...,YI X3.11 ~5 i i ,r, lalf
4J v.ea ' I4
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13 1'' LO J9l
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Li uL4 ,t5 _s 11 L.gtS a J. JI ujl dhaWJW U9 _ a~gc9
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II ca.a+ ul+th1l vo aJ91.)III ,_.?;,~ e3 Il c4lt;.> cal ) JU9
ING TELEGRAM AMERICAN EMBASSY, BkGHDAD
COh"FIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORM-ATION
CONTROL 2279
RECD* April 18, 1958
10 40 AM
TION: BAGHDAD, CIRCULAR 11 April 17, 5 30 Pi
This circular letter is being sent by the State Department
to all U.S. diplomatic representatives in tie Middle East
on the eubect of the United Statea'-policy in regard to
the United Arab Republic.
The State Department reaffirms that the basic objectives
of the U.S. policy in relation to the U.A.R. remain
unchanged. It stresses anew that-expansion,of Egypt's
sphere of influence is counter to the Joint Resolution
of the Congress on the fiddle East, strengthens Arab
nationalism, encourages anti-Western and particularly
anti-American tendencies in the Middle East and Africa,
undermines the Baghdad Pact, an imuortant link in the
strategic network of. the free world, and impairs the
position of Israel the interests of which the U.S. can
in no way ignore.
2. The act t.ut actual control over the transportut1on
of fiddle =ast oil to Europe both through the Suez Canal
_L1 2A all the pipelines to the Mediterranean is now
cone rated in Cairo seriously endangers American
~IISerest9 in this area, The U.A.R. is now in-a position
to exert pressure upon the U.s. and other western powers.
This possitility can become a formidable weapon in the
cards of President Nasser if he happens to fall bas, on
the Soviet bloc in the future.
.I-'i, 1 lS.J.1 k.,-' 444J
36 SECRET
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cember, when Rountree visited the Near East, Radio Cairo
and NCNA revived the story again.
The Rountree circular, like the Taipei cables, did look more
or less like the real thing, but it could not stand up under
close examination. Its "Confidential/Security Information"
classification was one discontinued in November 1953; there
is no "circular letter" in Department nomenclature, and a
"circular instruction" is not transmitted by cable; its num-
bering was bad, a real Circular 11 having been transmitted
nine months earlier; the form on which it was typed had
been replaced in August 1955; State messages are not signed
by an Assistant Secretary but only by the Secretary or Acting
Secretary. Operational carelessness is also evident in Bizim
Radio's having described it eight days before its purported date
and three months before the Bagdad coup was supposed to
have made it available.
The Rountree forgery was followed up in late March and
early April 1959 by one other, sent anonymously in photostat
to some papers and parliament and government members in
the Near East and passed around in intelligence circles there.
It was ostensibly a letter from Under Secretary Robert Mur-
phy assuring Ambassador McClintock in Lebanon that "Nas-
ser is not the man we shall support" since "you are right to
note that we have nothing in common with Nasser and his
kind" and adding, with obvious reference to the UAR and Iraq,
that "You certainly are aware of what I have in mind when I
say that after the snakes devour each other, the jungle be-
comes safer!" It was never published or otherwise replayed.
The presence of U.S. troops in Lebanon in 1958 had been the
occasion for another brief false document campaign. On 11
August Radio Bagdad reported that "in Lebanon, Saeb Salam
has received a cable from four American paratroopers ex-
pressing their desire to volunteer for service in the people's
forces." The cable was never produced nor the story elab-
orated, but on 25 August the outlawed Beirut Al-Masaa sur-
faced a forged letter addressed to members of the U.S. Army
Task Force in Lebanon and signed "John H," purportedly an
officer in the 79th U.S. Engineer Battalion. This American of-
ficer, after a salutation which showed that he was given to
the use of Briticisms like "79th Engineers" and "officers and
Psywar By Forgery SECRET
other ranks" and to solecistic military abbreviations, wrote
as follows:
I arrived together with a group of American officers from Munich
on 27 July in a Globemaster aircraft.... A few days ago we re-
ceived orders to remain in Lebanon for 15 months to safeguard the
peace and security of the United States.
There are also plans to undertake large scale works with the
object of transforming the airfields of Rayack and Kolein't into
American atomic bases; furthermore, 5 rocket launching pads will
be erected along the Lebanon-Syrian border. More atomic weap-
ons will be dispatched soon to Lebanon, and Beirut harbor will be
transformed into America's principal naval base for its Near East-
ern Fleet.
One cannot fail to realize that the object of all these preparations
is to wipe out the millions of Arabs who are struggling for
national independence. . . . That is why I am asking you, my
comrades, to demand that we be withdrawn from Lebanon to the
United States quickly, and if we truly love our country we should
return there without further delay. American officers and troops:
Don't allow yourselves to be fooled; don't allow yourselves to become
involved in military adventure for the benefit of any of the war-
mongering factions!
The Chinese NCNA, picking up this story, credited the il-
legal Beirut Al-Masao for it; but Soviet media-TASS, the
Daily Review of the Soviet Press distributed by the Soviet In-
formation Bureau in Moscow, and a widely broadcast Radio
Moscow commentary-introduced it with only the phrase, "It
has become known here," and they gave the writer's name as
"Johnson" rather than "John H," apparently having been
furnished a different draft of the forgery.
irresponsible U.S. Atom Pilots
The black support of propaganda campaigns aimed at Eu-
rope was more sophisticated. The principal series began with
Khrushchev statement possibly designed for the purpose,
possibly only later recognized as exploitable. In his interview
with Hearst and two other American journalists on 22 Novem-
ber 1957, Khrushchev stressed the danger inherent in a con-
tinuous airborne, nuclear-armed SAC alert and continued, ac-
cording to TASS:
When planes with hydrogen bombs take off that means that
many people will be in the air piloting them. There is always the
possibility of a mental blackout when the pilot may take the
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slightest signal as a signal for action and fly to the target that he
had been instructed to fly to. Under such conditions a war may
start purely by chance, since retaliatory action would be taken
immediately. , . .
. In such a case a war may start as a result of sheer misunder-
standing, a derangement in the normal psychic state of a person,
which may happen to anybody.... Even if only one plane with
one atomic or one hydrogen bomb were in the air, ... it would be
not the Government but the pilot who could decide the question of
war. ?
Some five months later, on 7 May 1958, the official East
German Neues Deutschland reproduced what purported to be
a letter dated 27 March from Assistant Defense Secretary
Frank B. Berry to Secretary McElroy reporting that 67.3
percent of all USAF fliglit personnel had been found to be
psychoneurotic, a condition which led to all sorts of phobias,
unaccountable animosity, and other irrational behavior. Ex-
cessive drinking, drug-taking, sexual excesses and perversions,
and constant card-playing were mentioned as further evidence
that "moral depression is a typical condition of all crew mem-
bers making flights with atomic and H-bombs."
Although perhaps convincing to the man in the street, this
forgery was full of errors. The letter format would hardly
have been used for this kind of report. The vague "group of
experts" said to have reached the medical findings would have
been named, and no such obscure and ineffectual corrective
measures as "further improvement .of aircraft equipment"
would have been proposed. There is much wrong military
terminology-Internal Zone, Air Force Command and AFC,
the Patuxent River AFB (Md), the Cooke AFB (Calif). More
esoterically, Dr. Berry happened to be away on an official trip
on the date of the letter; and finally, it was typed either on a
machine assembled in composite from several different makes
or one of unknown foreign manufacture.
The letter was widely publicized in the overt media, espe-;
cially to European audiences. After a month the Delhi Times;
perennial purveyor of Bloc propaganda, replayed it, and this
Delhi Times. After almost three months more, on 30 August`;
the- Bombay Blitz carried it, explaining that it had been pub
hshed."ea,rly this month" in Neues Deutschland: the replay
copy fabricated for Blitz had apparently been delayed -fn
Psywar By Forgery
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