STUDIES IN INTELLIGENCE [Vol 2, No. 1 - 4, Winter thru Fall 1958]

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 261
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 1, 1958
• Content Type: SINT

[CONFIDENTIAL
STUDIES
INTELLIGENCE
25X1
VOL. 2 NO. I WINTERI-fi 3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF TRAINING
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CONFlDENT1ALa
All opinions expressed in the Studies are those of the
authors. They do not represent the official views of the
Central Intelligence Agency or of the Office of Training.
tONFIDENTIAL
STUDIES 'IN 'INTELLIGENCE
Articles for the Studies in Intelligence
may be written on any theoretical, doc-
trinal, operational, or historical aspect
of intelligence.
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito-
rial Board.
The criterion for publication is whether
or not, in the opinion of the Board, the
article makes a contribution to the litera-
ture of intelligence.
This material contains information affecting the National
Defense of the United States within the meaning of the
espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which to an unauthorized person is
EDITORIAL BOARD
SHERMAN KENT, Chairman
LYMAN B. KIRKPATRICK
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
CONFIDENT
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONTENTS
CONTRIBUTIONS AND DISTRIBUTION
Contributions to the Studies may come from any member of
the intelligence community or, upon invitation, from persons
outside. Manuscripts should be submitted directly to the Ed-
itor, Studies in Intelligence, Room 2013 R & S Building 143-
and need not be coordinated or submitted through
nels. They should be typed in duplicate, double-spaced, the
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occurs. Articles may be classified through SECRET.
For inclusion on the regular Studies distribution list call your
office dissemination center or the responsible OCR desk,
= For back issues and on other questions call the OM
the Editor,
Page
Origin, Missions, and Structure of CIA
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick 1
Strategic Thinking and Air Intelligence
Major General James H. Walsh 7
Concepts for a Philosophy of Air Intelligence
Lewis R. Long 31
Developments in Air Targeting: The Military Resources
Model . . . . . . . . . Robert W. Leavitt 51
Horrible Thought . . . . . . . . . W. A. Tidwell 65
ELINT: A Scientific Intelligence System
Charles A. Kroger, Jr. 71
Report on Hungarian Refugees . . . . Guy E. Coriden 85
Paper Mills and Fabrication . . . Stephen M. Arness 95
Lost Order, Lost Cause
C. Bowie Millican, Robert M. Gelman,
and Thomas A. Stanhope 103
Critiques of Some Recent Books on Intelligence
The New Class-An Analysis of the Communist System,
by Milovan Djilas . . . . . . . . Lena Marks 115
The Soviet Secret Police, by Simon Wolin and Robert M.
Slusser . . . . . . . . . . John Rondeau 123
We Spied . . . . . . . . . Walter L. Pforzheimer 131
CONFIDENTIAL
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 ORIGIN, MISSIONS, AND STRUCTURE OF CIA
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
This is a brief summary of the history of the modern origin of
the central intelligence concept and thus of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency.
In 1940 the fortunes of Britain and France were at their
lowest ebb. Some high-level officials of the US Government
were predicting that Great Britain could not hold out against
the Germans. To check on this, President Roosevelt sent Colo-
nel William J. Donovan, prominent New York attorney and
winner of the Congressional Medal of Honor as Commanding
Officer of the 69th Regiment in World War I, abroad to dis-
cover and report his estimate of the situation. Donovan first
visited the Mediterranean area, and on his second trip talked
to leaders of both Britain and France. His report indicated
that Britain would hold out, but he urged that. the US im-
mediately organize itself for global warfare. Donovan's par-
ticular interest was in the intelligence field, and he went to
talk to Secretary of the Navy Knox, Secretary of War Stimson,
and Attorney General Jackson about his concept of an agency
which would combine intelligence with the forces of propa-
ganda and subversion.
On 10 June 1941, Donovan proposed "a service of strategic
information." This service would have an advisory panel com-
posed of the chiefs of intelligence of the Army, the Navy, the
Department of State, and the FBI. It would draw its personnel
from the Army and the Navy and would also have a civilian
staff. It would not displace or encroach upon the intelligence
prerogatives of the established departments, although it would
collect information independently. This was the start of the
Office of the Coordinator of Information which combined in-
formation, intelligence, and clandestine activities. In 1942,
however, the Coordinator of Information was split and the
Office of War Information-the predecessor of the present
US Information Agency-was created and given the respon-
sibility for all overt attributable propaganda information, and
to the Office of Strategic Services went the responsibility for
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clandestine activities and for research and analysis of intelli-
gence.
From the OSS the present day intelligence community in-
herited certain assets. Among these were records and some
methods and means of procuring both overt and secret intelli-
gence. There were certain basic counterespionage files devel-
oped with the advice and assistance of some foreign intelligence
services, particularly the British. There was a considerable
reservoir of knowledge of procedures for research and analysis
of basic intelligence information. There were some skilled per-
sonnel. Finally, but far from last in importance, there were
agreements with key foreign intelligence services.
The history of the OSS, and particularly its relationship with
other US intelligence organizations during World War II, is far
too detailed for discussion in this essay. But it should be noted
that shortly after the creation of the Office of Strategic Services,
top level officials in the US intelligence community started to
think about a peacetime intelligence service. On 25 August
1942, Brigadier General John Magruder wrote a paper on a
proposed plan for a joint intelligence bureau which would be
an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For the next two years
there was considerable discussion of this and similar papers.
On 5 October 1944 a document was originated in the office of
General Donovan entitled "The Basis for a Permanent World-
Wide Intelligence Service." Certain of the principles enun-
ciated in this document are interesting to note. This service
would collect, analyze, and deliver intelligence on the policy or
strategy level. The proposed organization would have its own
means of communication and control over its secret operations.
It would not interfere with departmental intelligence and it
would not have any police function. An individual rather than
a collective responsibility for national intelligence was pro-
posed. Finally, the director of the proposed organization would
be responsible directly to the President.
It is interesting to note that Secretary of War Stimson com-
mented on the subject of intelligence coordination in his biog-
raphy "On Active Service in Peace and War." This quotation.
reads: "Stimson was insistent that no impatience with its occa-
sional eccentricities should deprive the Army of the profits of co-
operation with General Donovan's Office of Strategic Services.
Throughout the war the intelligence activities of the United
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States Government remained incompletely coordinated, but
here again it was necessary to measure the profits of reorgani-
zation against its dislocations and on the whole, Stimson felt
that the American achievement in this field, measured against
the conditions of 1940, was more than satisfactory. A full re-
organization belonged to the post war period."
On 18 January 1945, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee
reported to the JCS on the subject of a central intelligence
organization. The members proposed first a national intelli-
gence authority composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy and the Chief of Staff to the President. There would be
an advisory board consisting of the heads of the various intel-
ligence services. The new organization would have the power
to inspect the operations of the various departmental intelli-
gence services and would have the responsibility for protecting
sources and methods.
At this juncture the press got wind of the discussions for
creating a new intelligence organization and, on 9 February
1945, fairly complete details appeared in the Chicago Tribune
and the Washington Times Herald. There was considerable
furor, and some members of Congress took a dim view of the
creation of what they felt might become a peacetime "gestapo."
Shortly after this - just a few days before his death -
President Roosevelt asked General Donovan to get together
with the heads of the various intelligence and security services
and get a consensus of views on a central service. Donovan
did this and also went further and queried by letter all of the
members of the Cabinet. Within the intelligence community
there was general agreement that a central service might be
appropriate, but there were several conflicting views as to
whether it should report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the
Department of State, or to the President, and there was also
controversy as to whether there should be individual or collec-
tive responsibility for national intelligence. The response from
the Cabinet members was varied and ranged from yes to no.
After open hostilities had ceased, as we all vividly remember,
there was almost frantic haste to demobilize not only the mili-
tary services but many of the war agencies. On 20 September
1945 the OSS was disbanded. Its Research and Analysis
Branch and its Presentation Unit were transferred to the De-
partment of State, its Secret Intelligence and Special Opera-
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tions Units were transferred to the Army, and the former were
preserved in the Strategic Services Unit which reported to the
Secretary of the Army.
On 22 October 1945 a report prepared by Ferdinand Eberstadt
on possible unification of the Army and Navy recommended a
central intelligence organization and a national security coun-
cil. On 14 November 1945 the Secretaries of State, War, and
Navy met, discussed the proposed central intelligence organiza-
tion, and set up an interdepartmental working committee to
attempt to arrive at a unanimous recommendation.
The end product of these reports and committees was the
issuance on 22 January 1946 of the Executive Order creating the
Central Intelligence Group. This Executive Order reflected
much of the thinking and work that had gone on during the
war. A National Intelligence Authority was created, composed of
the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy and the Military Chief
of Staff to the President. The Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Group was designated by the President, and personnel
were to be assigned from the respective departments as well as
recruited from civilian life. The Director of the new Central
Intelligence Group was charged by the Executive Order with
preparing plans for coordination. The new organization could
inspect the activities of departmental intelligence if such in-
spection were approved by the National Intelligence Authority.
It could recommend policies and objectives. It was responsible
for correlating, evaluating, and disseminating intelligence and
for the performance of services of common concern and such
other functions as directed. The Executive Order explicitly
stated that the departments would continue to collect, evaluate,
correlate, and disseminate departmental intelligence. Finally,
an Intelligence Advisory Board, composed of the heads of the
service intelligence agencies, was established to advise the Di-
rector of the Central Intelligence Group.
With the creation of the Central Intelligence Group there
commenced a process of accretion of functions taken from the
wartime agencies and from departments which were anticipat-
ing reductions in budget under peacetime conditions. The
Strategic Services Unit was transferred from the Department
of the Army and became the Office of Special Operations
- charged with espionage and counterespionage functions. The
Washington Document Center was taken over from the Navy
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and shortly after that the Army's German Military Documents
Center at Fort Holabird joined this unit and together became
the Foreign Documents Division. The Foreign Broadcast In-
formation Service, an organization with worldwide bases for
monitoring all non-coded radio traffic, which had originally
been under the Federal Communications Commission, was
transferred from the Army and became the Foreign Broadcast
Information Division. During World War II the Army and
Navy and OSS and occasionally other agencies had all ap-
proached US businesses and institutions in search of foreign
intelligence information. An early agreement was reached
that this domestic collection should be performed as a service
of common concern by Central Intelligence with other agencies
participating as they desired, and this became the Contact
Division. Another illustration of the type of functions taken
on is the division of responsibilities with the Department of
State on biographic intelligence. The list would be much too
long if we attempted to enumerate all of the functions acquired
in this method.
Slightly over a year and a half after the creation of the
CIG-on 25 July 1947-the Congress, utilizing most of the fea-
tures of this Executive Order, passed the National Security Act
of 1947 creating the Central Intelligence Agency.
Thus, the mission of the Central Intelligence Agency becomes
fairly obvious with the preceding background. The National
Security Act of 1947 describes the general mission with em-
phasis on coordination and on performing services of common
concern. It should be clearly noted also that the legislation
assigns two roles to the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence - over-all coordination,
as well as the role of head(s) of an Agency.
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STRATEGIC THINKING AND AIR INTELLIGENCE
Major General James H. Walsh
My purpose in this article is to discuss, in very broad terms,
some of the significant aspects of air strategy for the future
and the vital functions that intelligence must perform in order
to insure the success of future air operations. The suspicions
currently entertained that the Soviet sputnik may be getting
intelligence of both meteorological and cartographic nature re-
quired for accurate firing of ICBMs illustrate some of the possi-
ble relationships between air power and intelligence. In a rudi-
mentary way, even the first earth satellites point up the tasks
and capabilities of future intelligence systems required for
survival under conditions of international technological com-
petition - intelligence systems which must meet three basic
criteria: global coverage, instantaneous discovery, and abso-
lute accuracy.
I believe that we have a reasonably good understanding of
past and present concepts of air warfare and the relation of
intelligence to those concepts. It is far more difficult to look
into the future and to do so with the precision and clarity
needed to prepare ourselves effectively for the trials and dan-
gers ahead.
The reason for this basic uncertainty is not that many people
have neglected the problems of aerial technology and its stra-
tegic implications. The reason is rather that we are in the
midst of a technological revolution. Changes are becoming so
rapid, so penetrating and, in many instances, so contradictory
that the direct and indirect results of the technological revolu-
tion tend to control - and at the same time toy confuse - the
nature and application of tomorrow's air strategy. Neverthe-
less, it is in this setting of dynamic technical change and a
world beset by what often seems an unlimited number of
related and unrelated political, economic, and military prob-
lems that we must attempt to examine the future direction of
air power.
To begin with, we already have seen major alterations in the
basic nature of air forces since World War II. The transition
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to jets, nuclear weapons, sonic speeds, countless black boxes,
and, to a degree, missiles typifies the changed environment
which governs today's air capabilities as compared with those
of 1945.
Fifteen years ago the RAF qualitatively was the world's lead-
ing air force. Today it is in third place. More important, it
is not in a class, by a broad margin, with the air forces of the
US and the USSR. It has neither the aircraft, the equipment,
the bases, the research and development, nor the funds to
become again a truly self-sufficient force, with strategic capa-
bilities as required by world conditions.
Fifteen years ago the Soviet Air Force was an adjunct- of the
Russian army. Statistically it represented a force in quantity,
but it had poor operational know-how and no strategic capa-
bility. Its aircraft were fair, at best. Today the Soviet Air
Force is the largest in the world. It is equipped with modern
weapons, some of them as advanced as those of any other
nation. It has a well-funded and aggressive research and de-
velopment program. Although it still has many weaknesses,
the Soviet Air Force is making a bid for world air mastery.
The VS Air Force also has come of age in.the postwar period.
It has held the quality lead for most of that time and still holds
it for most of the important 'equipments. Its personnel are
superior in training and efficiency. But the USAF has prob-
lems, especially in areas outside the SAC program. Its progress
is not to be belittled, but in some areas its progress perhaps has
not been so fast or so forward as we would like it to be.
The fortunate aspect is that during the postwar period the
USAF has grown to be a global force. In fact, to this date, the
USAF - not forgetting its naval support - is the only global
force extant. This American capability is a fact of overriding
importance. It will remain a controlling factor in the inter-
national power equation, to a certain extent, irrespective of
technological slippage and of the inevitable acquisition by the
Soviet Union of a global missile force.
The most important single change since World War II is that
atomic airpower has become the dominant military force. The
only way a nation can deliver nuclear firepower over long dis-
tances and in a short time is through the air. Sea and ground
delivery of nuclear warheads is important, particularly in spe-
cial situations. But in terms of a global nuclear war, these
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systems - and some of the secondary means of aerial de-
livery - can do no more than furnish local, regional, and tac-
tical support to the strategic air strike forces.
One of the changes upon us deals with defense in nuclear
aerial war. Whereas the offense still seems to have outdis-
tanced defense, the old axiom that like weapons are the best
defenses against like weapons again could become true.
For the moment there is very little one can do when an
atomic explosion occurs except to be underground, fully
equipped with food and non-contaminated water or, preferably,
plenty of Irish whiskey. Nevertheless, the very possession of
nuclear weapons for defensive purposes may act as a "prevent-
ing" factor - not because even the best defense would be capa-
ble of halting an attack, but because a good defense system
would boost the force requirements of the attacker, lower the
probability that he can execute his plan with full success, and
thus, in some cases at least, tend to induce him to delay his
aggression until he has reached the required force and tech-
nological levels. It is in the nature of a "race," that the
aggressor may be unable to achieve such a posture of superi-
ority that he can dare take the risk of nuclear attack. If this
should be a vain hope, for example, because the defender has
failed to keep up with the pace of the race, the actual use of
nuclear warheads against incoming vehicles should reduce the
effectiveness of the offense.
Some of our forward looking scientists are optimistic about
the feasibility of employing anti-ICBM missiles, which would
take advantage of the greatest point of vulnerability of the
early ballistic missile, its fixed trajectory. Many ideas have
been proposed about nuclear predetonation and sophisticated
employment of modern electronics to interfere with incoming
nuclear attack.
There are a number of passive defensive steps which could
be taken to lessen the vulnerability of our retaliatory force.
These include the dispersal of aircraft and missiles, shelters,
and other forms of base hardening, short exposure times, rapid
reaction procedures, and maintenance of a substantial portion
of the alert force in the air at all times.
Unfortunately such systems can be very costly. They are
limited in their coverage and may not be reliable enough for
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the safety of personnel and certain equipment. Elaborate pas-
sive defenses tend to disrupt and slow the ability of an air force
to retaliate as rapidly as required. For these reasons the stra-
tegic effectiveness of passive defense is predicated upon effec-
tive warning. By warning I refer to technical alarms such as
radar and infrared sensing and to interrelated strategic and
tactical indications intelligence.
The true effectiveness of defense will be a function of the
scope, size, quality, and mental effort put into requisite weapons
systems needed to furnish capabilities for protection, warning,
interception, and countermeasure tasks. It may be dubious
whether or not even the best defensive system pitted against
combinations of different types of attack weapons ever will
attain a high kill rate, but this may not be the critical point.
Rather, countersystems embodying nuclear warheads and
built around effective warning and reaction responses suggest
that a nation may be able to close the gap between the power
of the offense and present limitations on defense. Such sys-
tems could pre-empt the advantage of surprise by sneak attacks
by an aggressive nuclear delivery force. They would force the
attacker into more elaborate and costly delivery means, pri-
marily large and massive raids which are susceptible to stra-
tegic and tactical detection and to interception measures.
Through all these means and measures the offensive may not
necessarily be priced out of business, but its effectiveness should
be reduced against its primary objective -the opponent's re-
taliatory force. Thus, it would be hoped, the attacker would
be induced not to strike because of the uncertainty over the
success of his initial blow and also because he would have -to
risk his main force at excessive loss rates. In nuclear war the
first blow must be decisive: the retaliatory force must be killed.
It is quite clear that intelligence influences the effectiveness
of defense. Whatever the technical proficiency of a defense
system, it can be improved by better intelligence, whereas even
the technically most promising defenses can be invalidated
through intelligence failure anywhere along the "assembly
line" - from scientific intelligence to tactical warning. Per-
haps it should be observed that good intelligence would allow
the utilization of foreign scientific and technological achieve-
ments for the improvement of our own posture. Beyond pro-
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viding us with better design patterns, such intelligence also
would enable us to build our equipment to such specifications
as to optimize its capabilities against the enemy's weapons.
I should like to turn now to a discussion of various tech-
nological factors, some of them here now and some on the
horizon, and try to relate them into a strategic pattern.
During the years ahead we shall be approaching practical
terminal limits in certain key parameters of weapons systems.
We already may have reached what could be called terminal
explosive power, not that it would be impossible to achieve
higher yields.
Within the next few decades we probably will attain terminal
speeds, at least for terrestrial operations. We cannot exceed
certain speeds without being forced from the earth's gravita-
tional field. Before we achieve theoretical terminal velocities
we should reach a far lower practical speed limit for operations
directed against targets on the ground. We must remember
that the attainment of maximum speed in flight may require
more time than would be necessary to reach a terrestrial tar-
get at lesser speeds.
We certainly shall be capable of terminal ranges in the sense
that future air and missile systems will be able to circumnavi-
gate the globe at least once. I am convinced that there will
be no practical limits to altitude, although there may be tem-
porary barriers to surmount before manned and powered space
flight becomes a reality. Such restrictions could occur in
metallurgy, engines, communications, aero medicine, and nu-
clear components, among other fields.
Let me dwell for a moment on the relationship of altitude to
tomorrow's air strategy. In the immediate future, altitude
essentially will be a matter of tactical advantage inasmuch
as, with respect to powered flight, we still shall be competing in
heights measured by thousands of feet. We have come to
recognize that the attack force with the higher altitude capa-
bility, generally speaking, is the force with the greater penetra-
tion capability. To achieve tactical altitude advantage we are
moving into speeds up to Mach 3 as a result of improved rocket
fuels, higher thrust engines, aerodynamic advances, and even
newer black boxes. I am talking about situations up to 100,000
feet.
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But today we also stand on the threshhold of entirely new
altitude dimensions. Space vehicles already have been climb-
ing to heights of 600 miles, and unpowered satellites, or sput-
niks, are flying around the earth approximately every hour and
a half, at heights up to over 1,000 miles. This altitude is by no
means a limit but soon will be exceeded. Disregarding the
future development of orbital flight, even at this point the
significance of the recent quantum jump is that we are acquir-
ing the capability of staying in the air.
This overriding technological fact will have the most pro-
found impact upon military operations. At present altitudes,
the airman must worry about hurricanes, fog, winds, and other
weather factors characteristic of the dense air which lies just
above the earth. Tomorrow's space flyers must be concerned
with meteoric showers, cosmic radiation, electronic barriers,
and Buck Rogers' conditions within his cabin. Instead of using
flight as a means of traveling from one point on the earth's
surface to another, either for friendly or unfriendly purposes,
the new problem will be to reach an orbit, maintain it, and
utilize nonpowered flight for scientific, military, and probably
economic purposes.
The flying machine of outer space will not spend 90 percent
of its time on the ground, but 100 percent of its time aloft. In
simple statistics, we are moving from transonic speeds and
periodic flights of several thousands miles in length into an
environment where speeds will be of the order of 16,000 knots
and "ranges," depending upon the height and shape of the or-
bit, easily may exceed 1 million miles per day and hundreds of
millions of miles per year.
The development of terminal weapons - in terms of ex-
plosive power, range, endurance, and speed - will not bring
the technological race to an end. Strategies will capitalize
on the new dimension of altitude and perhaps endurance rather
than distance as a decisive area of military competition. Mili-
tary superiority will be dependent upon relative advantages in
electronics, warning, and deception. Thus the sciences of in-
strumentation and intelligence will become truly decisive ele-
ments in the equation of a strategy in which the chief maneu-
vers seek to conquer altitude and achieve enduring control from
the ground to outer space.
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Modern air strategy will be affected by a number of additional
problems, each of which could become crucial in varying cir-
cumstances. There is, for example, the requirement that a
portion of the aerial strength must be on constant readiness
status. A strike force that requires one or two days to get
ready is a military liability. Even in today's war it would be
caught on the surface.
An effective air force must be numerically strong and able
to get its combat aircraft into the air in time. It must be
located on a large number of bases, preferably distributed on
several continents and located at varying distances from the
enemy. Moreover, it must be supported by reconnaissance
forces operating vigilantly around the clock. Only such an air
force is in a position to achieve a strategic, though not neces-
sarily physical, invulnerability.
In former wars, material strength was the decisive factor.
The speed with' which fire power could be delivered was an
important but still a subsidiary element. The nature of a
future war is essentially no longer a dispute about territory but
a competition for gains in the time dimension. This is because,
in the first place, technology is a variable in time. The speed
with which this factor varies will continue to increase as long
as technological progress continues. In the second place, sur-
prise being a key to success in air and missile warfare, the initial
rounds of conflict are little more than a contest to operate
faster than the opponent. Surprise attack will be successful
if the attacker moves faster than the defender. It will fail if
the defender's "reaction time" deprives him of targets and dis-
rupts the attack schedule.
Intelligence must come to closer grips with the time dimen-
sion. We are dealing not with one uniform period but with a
whole set of different time categories. There is the time prob-
lem of maturing manpower, scientific discovery, and technolog-
ical invention - measured in generations. There is the dura-
tion of research and development programs, decisionmaking,
production, and incorporation of weapons into battle orders -
a period of years to decades. There is the complex problem of
warning - ranging all the way from advanced strategic warn-
ing measured in weeks, months, or even years, to tactical warn-
ing, measured in minutes. There is the problem of reaction
time and interception, measured in seconds and microseconds.
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Pre-emptive, retaliation, deterrence, counterforce, retarda-
tion, and disruption attacks all, in one way or another, are tied
to a specific time requirement. The more mobile warfare be-
comes, the more moving targets are assuming significance, the
less it is a question of mere "capability" than of "capability in
time." An airplane carrying a high yield weapon can knock
out an air base; the problem is to destroy it at a time when the
target will be most lucrative - for example, just before the
moment when an attack is to be launched from that target.
Need I add that only intelligence can provide this all-impor-
tant "timing capability"?
Perhaps an additional illustration will clarify this thesis fur-
ther: "Reaction time in guided missiles." It is important to
count missiles in terms of numbers, warhead yields, and the
like. But the foremost problem is that of reaction time or
response.
If it takes a strategic missile force four hours to launch,
whereas the opponent can launch within minutes, the obvious
advantage belongs to the side with the shorter reaction time
- provided it has adequate warning. The 4-hour reacting force
will never leave the ground; its threat will be pre-empted. If
this is correct, it appears to be a mistake for intelligence to
count the degree of deterrent power primarily in numbers of
missiles or warhead yields. It will be necessary to assess, above
all, relative times of reaction.
Earlier we discussed the new parameters of altitude. It is
appropriate, I believe, that we reflect on the purpose of operat-
ing at such altitudes. The use of outer space will permit al-
most continuous observation of any point on the earth, a situa-
tion which, although not entirely without precedent, marks
a new departure in modern strategic warfare. Space platforms
are becoming indispensable elements of effective warning sys-
tems against future means of weapons delivery. Unless we
conquer space, a great deal of the scientific knowledge which
we require to remain in the technological race will not be avail-
able.
Furthermore, orbiting vehicles eventually will be used as
weapon carriers and thus will develop into crucial components
of offensive and defensive missile warfare.
All this poses the spectre of outer space military conflict
which will involve three phases: first, the competition to get
vehicles into space in sufficient quantities to occupy desirable
orbits and to make profitable scientific use of orbital flights;
second, the development of military techniques for operating
from our own orbits and for countering the enemy's militarily
significant orbital activities; and third, the ability to neutralize
or destroy terrestrial and aerial components of orbital systems
This new sphere of warfare raises some perplexing problems
in world relations. In addition to traditional surface bound-
aries, there will arise sovereignties over vacuous orbits and the
areas beneath them-a system of interlaced surface and spatial
boundaries thousands of miles in depth and tens of thousands
of miles in length.
A new pattern of international relations must be developed in
which orbits are occupied peacefully or conquered and in which
orbits must be delineated. During peacetime the nations must
respect each other's scientific and security operations in the
orbits, and in wartime, of course, the purpose will be to elimi-
nate all of the opponent's space vehicles. In turn, there must
be capabilities for protecting the satellites. It is clear that this
involves entirely new types of "aerial" operations, as it is also
clear that the diplomats and international lawyers will have to
do some hard thinking to settle peacefully the problems of orbit
allocation and orbit sovereignty.
The introduction of the orbital dimension into warfare sig-
nifies that factors such as Iron Curtains, the dispersal of air
bases and missile sites, and the ability of navies to "hide," so to
speak, in the vastness of the oceans will tend to lose signifi-
cance. The nature of the new implements is definitive enough
to suggest that the use of truly underground and of undersea
facilities may dominate the terrestrial scene. As a result, the
roles and techniques of surprise will undergo very profound
changes, the exact nature of which we cannot predict.
For a nation to exist and survive under these conditions, its
intelligence system must become a predominant security tech-
nique. Such a system must meet three criteria: global cover-
age, instantaneous discovery, and absolute accuracy. The sys-
tem must be fully operational both in war and peace. Intelli-
gence must be run not only for the benefit of, but by those who
are responsible for decisions of life or death.
I believe I have reached the point where it is necessary to
examine this strategic framework with its epochal implications
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in the practical light of where we are today and to consider the
future directions we must take.
The problems of strategic and technological surprise are
becoming increasingly serious. The danger of tactical sur-
prise is not lessened when the enemy, in addition to a high alti-
tude and rapid strike capability, also has a capability for low
altitude air attack and may be developing mixed high and low
altitude offensive forces.
Taking an even broader view, we can say that the nuclear
explosive and the supersonic delivery vehicle have appeared at
a moment when society is quite defenseless against such weap-
ons. During the last few centuries, war has taken place at the
margins of society. Society supported the war from its produc-
tion surpluses and remained intact as a going concern despite
losses and devastations.
You recall that during ancient times, the situation was dif-
ferent. During the Middle Ages, every town had to be self-
sufficient for defense, with walls, moats, shelters, food, and
water reserves. Practically every citizen had to bear arms.
The American frontier town serves as a more recent example
of this dangerous way of life.
I believe that society eventually will adjust itself to the mod-
em technology of destruction. Perhaps we may have to be-
come troglodytes; our ancestors were. Architects may develop
new types of resistant houses and "safe" urban settlements.
Perhaps we shall develop anti-radiation protection. The prin-
ciple of "hardening" can be applied to many human needs.
I am predicting only that the human mind will not stop in-
venting. After it realizes the grim threat of modern weapons,
society gradually but inevitably will take measures to assure
its survival. I am basing this prediction on my faith that mod-
ern man, morally and intellectually, is not inferior to previous
generations of 700 and 2500 years ago.
Whether this process of social adjustment is going to last
20 or perhaps 50 years I am unable to say. But during this
interim phase, humanity well may be passing through the
greatest peril of its existence. A war five years. from now prob-
ably will be immeasurably more destructive than a war around
2000 A. D. Our security, therefore, must be tailored to get us
and the Free World safely through this immediate period of
extreme hazard.
SECRET 17
It is this interim character of the present military situation
which confronts us with many perplexing problems. Defense
planning, which includes intelligence, is faced with numerous
paradoxes.
In this age of maximum offensive strength, there may be a
great deal of reluctance to use up-to-date weapons, simply be-
cause no one wants to unleash a nuclear war. Yet we must
prepare ourselves for a contest which requires us to put the
bulk of our resources into nuclear armaments. As a result,
we may have only limited capabilities to wage war in which
nuclear weapons do not provide the basic fire power.
Yet some people have gone so far as to advocate the retention
of full-fledged non-nuclear forces in addition to atomic forces.
It is generally agreed that we should prepare ourselves to fight
with nuclear weapons. Yet some contend that we also should
retain a capability to fight in the style of World War II - high
explosives on the ground, at sea, and even from the air.
We probably could agree that the availability of non-nuclear
forces would be very advantageous. Several types of non-nu-
clear explosives will remain with us, even in the nuclear age.
Under certain tactical conditions, those may be even more ef-
fective than nuclear materials, which is the main reason why
they should be retained.
Unfortunately, the question is not one of advantage or dis-
advantage, or even of choice. The question is one of capability
in all aspects -manpower, military organization, research,
funds, training, equipment, tactics, and so on.
Suppose that we maintain both a nuclear and a non-nuclear
defense establishment. There is the high probability or near-
certainty that the investment in non-nuclear arms would be
invalidated as soon as the first atomic weapons are used. This
will happen, almost inevitably, at the first serious military set-
back of either belligerent.
But the question of non-nuclear armaments is not just a
matter of duplication. The cost of matching atomic systems
with non-nuclear weapons in terms of relative military effec-
tiveness would be exorbitant. More significant, such a second
force could not be established on any reasonable scale unless
we acquire two sets of our national resources, two sets of our
qualified manpower, and two sets of our country.
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I am not raising the issue of limited versus general war. The
requirements of any local war situation can be met from avail-
able and programmed forces and resources.
Rather, I am addressing myself to the problem of attempt-
ing to build a non-nuclear force at the expense of our atomic
strike and defense units, which must be maintained at an in-
creasing degree of readiness because of the overwhelming pri-
ority of the Soviet nuclear threat to the US and the Free
World. We cannot turn back. There may be a collapse of
nuclear courage, but no longer can there be any doubt that
we have crossed the nuclear Rubicon.
A similar paradox confronts us in disarmament. If the
danger of attack could be eliminated by reductions of force
levels and by the outlawing of particular types of weapons, the
security of all nations unquestionably would be enhanced. The
trouble is that with the power of modern weapons, even minor
infractions to disarmament agreements may prove fatal.
After 1919, the Western Powers tried to control German arm-
aments. But practically every week a German arms violation
of the Versailles Treaty was reported. Many work shops re-
peatedly were discovered in which, it was said, machine guns
were being produced under the guise of baby carriages.
Nevertheless, the security of the Western Powers did not
seem vitally threatened, despite the fact that the Germans
maintained secret arsenals and continued surreptitiously to
produce weapons which they were not supposed to have. These
weapons did not seem powerful enough to pose a real threat to
Western security. Neither were the camouflaged divisions
which the Germans maintained secretly.
But in our time a nation which produces perhaps as few as
50, or as many as several hundred high-yield weapons could
become a real threat to the peace, even with makeshift delivery
vehicles, especially if other nations faithfully adhere to their
disarmament agreements. You are well aware of ominous in-
fractions to such agreements in North Korea.
The point is that we cannot go back in history and undo the
discoveries of nuclear fission, electronics, and aviation. We
have to live in the modern world. Technological progress
tend to "break through" even the most elaborate and sophist",
cated disarmament "controls." Each breakthrough will neces
SECRET 19
sitate renegotiation of agreements. There will be little, if any,
stability and durability, let alone guarantee of assured inter-
national safety in such arrangements.
I confess that this is a very dismal picture. It will not be
changed by expectations that the human race will become
peaceful and angelic in the next 20 years. There are two
brutal facts which we have to remember. The first is that the
Soviet regime still is around. Although it sometimes seems to
be showing signs of middle or even old age, there is no new
evidence that proves that Kipling was wrong when he wrote:
"Make ye no peace with Adanizod, the Bear who walks like a
man."
The Soviets have not changed their basic objectives. Their
policies have remained constant in areas that count, including
their fantastic military preparedness effort. It is clear that
the Soviets do not expect that the millennium of peace has
dawned. While they prepare for war we cannot turn our backs.
When they talk conflict, we cannot risk to ignore the peril.
When they arm themselves with the most modern weapons, we
cannot reduce the magnitude of the threat by wishful thinking
about their supposed inability to do that which manifestly they
are doing.
We can philosophize that the Soviet Union will enter into an
evolution which, after some time, will transform the present
Bolsheviks into Jeffersonian Democrats or Puritan pacifists. I
do not believe that anyone who has studied Russian and other
revolutionary history seriously expects such a mutation will
take place.
Naturally, I do not postulate eternity for the Soviet system:
their time will come. The question is, when? So far, reports
about their demise usually proved quite "exaggerated." Their
resilience has been extraordinary. Distinguishing our hopes
from realistic planning assumptions, we would be foolhardy not
to give them an additional life expectancy of one or two
decades. We must assume that they will remain in power dur-
ing the entire period when the technological challenge to the
US will be at a maximum.
It is not certain, of course, that the Soviets deliberately will
launch an attack on the US. But at the same time we cannot
be sure they will not. In the same vein, there is no doubt but
that the social system of Russia is changing in many ways.
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But is this necessarily a favorable development? One danger
surely is that if the Soviet dictatorship were liquidated by force
or otherwise, this event - which only optimists expect at this
time -could precipitate a major internal crisis. Such a crisis
would be uncontrollable. This means that it could lead very
easily to a world conflagration. There just is no way by which
we could conjure away the ominous dangers in our future.
This leads me to the second point of pessimism about peace
in the foreseeable future. It is a mistake to consider the Bol-
sheviks as the only cause of conflict. Wherever we look at the
continents today, there is plenty of politically combustionable
material. Old political structures are breaking down. New
nations are emerging. Most of them have their own imperi-
alistic ambitions, and some of the older nations show frighten-
ing signs of decay. Economic difficulties, cultural transfor-
mations, intellectual crises, and ideological passions acerbate
many of these political changes, not to mention inflammatory
propaganda campaigns, political warfare, and the like.
Unfortunately many of the political minds still function as
though we were living in the time of gun powder and sea power.
Few have grasped the significance of the modern technology.
There is a dangerous timelag between political thinking and
technological reality. As industrial technology advances,
psychological stability weakens. We must admit the possi-
bility that world society will grow sicker and ever more un-
stable, even as the descendants of Icarus reach out for the
moon.
It is unjustified, therefore, to expect that all nations will
observe restraint in order to avoid nuclear conflict. Perhaps
most nations will, but the odds are that there will be a few who
will act irresponsibly. Hitler was not the last specimen of his
type.
Recent sociological research asserts that a large percentage
of political rulers and regimes have been, historically speaking,
criminal in motivation and action. There is no doubt that
many rulers, especially those who acquired unlimited powers,
may have been, at least partly, insane. In fact, a German
historian coined the term "Caesarian insanity" in order to
describe the actions of many Roman emperors.
Although we have made some political progress, the world
nevertheless has had more than its share of insane, criminal,!.
SECRET 21
and power-hungry rulers during the 20th century. Crime and
insanity rates tend to rise as industrial civilization advances.
It may be very convincing to us to say that because of the
existence of hydrogen weapons the power-seekers should mend
their ways. This type of argument remains unconvincing to
the evil doer who is willing to accept the risk, regardless of the
consequences.
There is only one way to reduce the probability of criminal
aggressiveness. That is, to remain militarily overpowering
and mentally more vigilant than the would-be aggressor - to
outsmart and outarm him at every turn and to apply per-
suasive techniques to protect him - and us - from making a
miscalculation. It is not enough to possess what could be
called a "statistical posture of deterrence." The aggressor also
must be convinced that it is inadvisable for him to break the
peace. But do we master the techniques by which we could
have such an impact on the opponent's mind?
We are in the midst of a lasting crisis which Mao Tse-tung
has described as "protracted conflict." Political and psycho-
logical weapons are being used every day to advance the Com-
munist cause. In modern conflict, even though actual shoot-
ing may not be taking place, air power and the threat of almost
instantaneous massive destruction have become the key ele-
ments of the psychological as well as the physical struggle.
The extent to which we can deter the opponent from attack-
ing us determines our freedom of action on many of the world's
battlefields. If the level of our ready deterrent strength is too
low to provide the assurance that the enemy will not react with
an all-out attack, we could be inhibited in executing proper
defense actions in subsidiary theaters.
Deterrence is a necessary condition for the maintenance of
peace - and the waging of limited war - but it cannot be a
static condition if it is to keep that peace. If any nation
acquires a more effective weapons system, the best posture of
deterrence existing before the technological mutation is subject
to rapid nullification. We live in a world where the threats to
tomorrow's peace are developing today in the laboratories and
on the drawing boards.
It is true that so long as the two main competitors run neck
to neck, even a major advantage in one or more technological
fields may not necessarily upset the balance. A state of mu-
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tual deterrence may be reached which essentially would mean
that a world conflagration could occur against the deliberate
planning of both the US and the Soviet Union. Hence I do not
believe that the Soviets merely are trying to catch up in the
technological race. On the contrary, they seem to have organ-
ized themselves to win the technological race on a broad front,
not only in many significant scientific areas but also in combat
operational strengths as distinguished from mockups and pro-
totypes. In other words, they may be trying to surpass us
simultaneously by at least one whole and perhaps two weapons
generations.
The technological race is the very essence of protracted con-
flict. It is the main event which we cannot afford to lose. The
essence of this conflict is not, as many of our contemporaries
believe, a series of limited wars in the jungle and in the desert.
Any American intervention into limited war depends crucially
upon our relative technological posture. If we lose the tech-
nological race we cannot fight on local and regional fronts.
Nor will an increase in our capability to fight in Bali or Tim-
buctu improve our over-all deterrence. It certainly is not likely
that, should the US fall behind in technological capability, the
Russians will press their advantage merely to get a few fringe
benefits. The struggle between Rome and Carthage is more
meaningful to our times than the formalized and restrained
war-tournaments of some epochs in the history of Christian
Europe.
Technological superiority in means of delivery is the essence
of success in nuclear war. The idea that nuclear war will take
the form of an exchange of mutual blows perhaps forecasts Ii
correctly what is going to happen. However, this is not neces-
sarily a concept on which the military planner should work.
The purpose of planning for nuclear war is to achieve such a
predominance of strength that a nuclear blow can be delivered,
without the undue risk that a deadly retaliatory blow will be
returned. Even the Soviet military leaders who, during the
Stalinist period, belittled the importance of military surprise:
now appear to recognize that surprise could be the condition
of nuclear success.
The acquisition and maintenance of a dynamic capability to'
deliver a rapid and devastating blow - plus a proportionately,
dynamic defense - are prerequisites to survival. The natio
SECRET 23
which insures that its retaliatory force is, in fact, effective at
all times, is obtaining maximum protection against preventive
and pre-emptive attacks. The success of preventive war and
pre-emptive nuclear launchings depends upon the achieve-
ment of triple or quadruple surprise - technological, tactical,
timing, and conceivably strategic. The US can keep its re-
taliatory guard up only if it is able to render those surprises
too costly, too impractical, and too uncertain. Thus surprise
attack will be too risky for enemy resort only if the US keeps
ahead in technology and intelligence, as well as in its force
levels and, above all, in reaction times.
Should we lose tempo and should one or more of these four
pillars of our security crumble, the enemy's superiority may
become such that he need not use nuclear weapons except as a
threat. The so-called ultimate threat of large hydrogen weap-
ons could become "demilitarized" - by manipulated fear.
Suppose the aggressor says: "I grant that you can retaliate,
but you will be completely devastated through my first blows.
We leave it to you whether or not you want to elect your own
death. If you retaliate, you will die, at best with the comfort-
ing thought that you have killed some of us. Or you may
survive under our whip. That is your alternative." It is
known that the Soviets are doing considerable research on
conditioned reflexes and brain-washing techniques. Manipu-
lated fear and the conditioning of the opponents' mental and
psychological reactions are strategic concomitants to nuclear
weapons. The Soviets don't overlook a bet.
Previous wars have lasted for years. Ever since the emer-
gence of a modem industrial society with its long mobilization
requirements, war could not be short. A future war may be
decided within a matter of a few hours. I think it is wrong,
however, to place all attention on the destructive phase of this
type of conflict.
in previous times, the length of the war allowed us to remedy
the shortcomings and omissions of peace. Today and tomor-
row, once the climax of the conflict has come, we shall be the
prisoners of our previous decisions. In that critical phase we
shall not be able to increase our force levels, acquire a new set
of technological weapons, adjust our tactics to outdo those of
the enemy, or even reassure the fearful and give orders to the
panicky.
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.The protracted conflict may last longer than any previous
war. Although the climactic or decision phase of this conflict
may be short, still, the conflict could endure for many decades.
We are in the battle now. As a consequence, the main battles
are being fought by military forces in continued readiness, by
warning and intelligence services, by the research and develop-
ment community, by national and industrial planners, and by
budget makers, as well as by moral and intellectual attitudes.
Militarily speaking, the decisive phase could be won or lost
by the staff and operational officers who 5 to 10 years before
the shooting select or reject certain weapons systems, succeed
or fail in shortening lead times, organize offensive and de-
fensive forces, determine the balance between force elements,
and plan deployment and reaction times. It also may be won
or lost by the executive and congressional branches which de-
cide, with a timelag of 2 to 3 years, the force levels to be main-
tained in any technological phase; by the weapons require-
ment, procurement, and logistics planners within the military;
and by industry, all of whom, together, have the task of devel-
oping and producing superior weapons faster and in larger
quantity than the enemy; finally, by intelligence officers who
must try to forecast the relative strengths and weaknesses of
the strategic equation 5 to 10 years ahead. The latter will suc-
ceed - or fail - depending on whether or not they convince
the powers-that-be that their best estimates are valid.
In protracted conflict, the climactic phase may be war in its
most extreme form. If the climax is a matter merely of threat
and surrender, it will be the most "peaceful" of all wars. To
intelligence its most significant aspect should be that pro-
tracted conflict is a war during peace.
It is easy to enumerate the need to win the technological race,
the requirements for adequate numbers of weapons and forces,
the advantage of hardened and dispersed base locations, the ti
necessity for fast reaction times, and so forth. But the basic
reason these requirements are difficult to satisfy is that no'.,
nation has the economic capability to live up to the exigencies.,
of protracted conflict in the early period of the nuclear age.
I am not talking about budgets which can be increased anct,
I do not mean various degrees of economic mobiliza
tion and readiness. Rather, I refer to more fundamental,
limitations.
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To win the technological race a nation needs numerical and
qualitative superiority in technicians and inventive geniuses.
Unless the most revolutionary educational changes are made,
it is unlikely that sufficient scientists and technicians will be
produced to satisfy the growing needs of increasingly complex
military programs. Even a program which marshaled all edu-
cational resources into scientific and technical curricula prob-
ably would be inadequate for acquiring that degree of technical
superiority and material effort which makes the launching of a
nuclear attack or the psychological threat of such an attack
a relatively riskless affair.
The cost of weapons systems is rising geometrically, while the
increase in productive capabilities proceeds much slower.
There is the problem of protecting and rebuilding our cities and
facilities to survive in a nuclear environment. This is a prob-
lem - so far largely untouched -- which clearly accentuates
the severe limitations on our economic capabilities to meet the
challenge of the nuclear age. In this time of economic plenty,
scarcity still is the supreme fact of civilian and, above all, mili-
tary economics.
Material resources are not the only limiting factor. Time,
which is a major resource, also is in short supply. For ex-
ample, the time needed to transform a blueprint into a modern
weapons system has become such that a military force never
possesses an active arsenal without at least some obsolescence.
I mean obsolescent in the sense that certain tasks simply can-
not be accomplished against opposition or must be undertaken
at excessive risks and costs.
There is one inescapable conclusion from this discrepancy
between requirement and capability. It is this: the future
strategist has the potential choice of an entire technological
spectrum of weapons. At least several weapons systems will be
able to do the same task.
Because of the technological potential available to both sides,
he will have to decide whether to select a faster or slower
weapon, an explosive with greater or lower yield, a weapon of
endurance or of stealth. Should he guard against high or low
level attack? Should he dispense with manned bombers in
favor of missiles? Should he select an earth satellite
"anchored" approximately 21,000 miles above its target to de-
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liver nuclear firepower - or should he use a submarine from
which to la
h
unc
a missile?
In practical terms the strategist can select only a limited
number of systems from this entire technical spectrum, which
will grow as we progress further into the scientific era. Strat-
egists on the other side have to make similar eliminations.
The chances are that the choices may not be identical because
of different strategic objectives, production capabilities, opera-
tional doctrines, concepts of defensive warfare, and so forth.
In turn, because the choices probably will be different on both
sides, the possibility of surprise and other major military in-
itiatives will increase.
Therefore, intelligence must forecast, in ample time and cor-
rectly, the enemy selection so that proper defenses can be de-
signed. Of course, the choice of the enemy may impose the
need for counterweapons, which may have a feedback against
our original weapons choice.
It is necessary to insure that the relationship between what
we actually have and what we require to counter the enemy's
principal threats is such th
t
a
we are notti
accepng undue risks.
If we made a poor or overly narrow selection from the spec-
trum, if intelligence fails to guide the research and develop-
ment community concerning the enemy's probable selections,
we might invite attack, provide inadequate defense, and jeop-
ardize life and liberty. But if our intelligence is keen and our
armament effort generous we might ensure peace for the period
of the technological c
l
yc
e
.
We are in a conflict which has and undoubtedly will endure
for decades but which at present is chan
in
g
g complexion G
.en-
eral J. F. C. Fuller coined the term "machine warfare" to de-
scribe World War
I
s
and II Thi
.s expression no longer fully
applies to future "technological
arf
?
w
are
I am afraid that the Communists have shown a rather sophis=-
ticated understanding of the strategic
robl . - :____ _. .. A
p
m
tech
l
`
o
ogical strul Th
gge.ey seem to understand
nd t
h
w
ec
nical and eco
nomic competition. More than that, they are organizing them,
selves to achieve an overwh
l
i
e
m
ng strategict ih
posuren the tec nological realm
The
ar
i
.
y
e g
rding to wi th t
neechnologicd
race against the US Wh
t
a
ever the didta
.savanages of a dict tonal s
ste t
y
m,heir regime responds to rapid decisionmakin
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In this area, we do not seem to have matched their strategic
comprehension. We are said to have made the decision never
to strike the first blow. At the same time we have neglected to
introduce sufficiently into our thinking the fact that if the
opponent is allowed opportunity to achieve a broad tactical suc-
cess through an initial blow, the retaliatory strategy must be
more costly and complicated in order to compensate for the
risk and loss which could occur at the outset and weaken the
retaliatory force before it goes into battle.
Under the postulate that the enemy strikes first, defense
must be more expensive than under the postulate that we shall
not surrender the initiative. It follows that we must not be re-
luctant to pay the price of our security against an opponent to
whom we present the gift of the deliberate surprise attack.
The technological race has engulfed us exactly as a fast flow-
ing river occasionally catches the unsuspecting oarsman. Such
a situation cannot be met and overcome by preaching to the
river, by throwing away the oars, or by using only one of two
hands. In such a situation, all skills and all strengths are
needed to ride out the rapids and not get smashed against the
rocks.
The fundamental conclusion I want to leave is that the tech-
nological race, because of various economic limitations and po-
litical climates, may not be won by any super power engaging
in the competition, even with all its strengths. But this race
very well may be lost by a country which fails to put its con-
tinued best efforts into the challenge.
It is to a large extent the duty of the national intelligence
community to explain to our nation's leadership the true na-
ture of this strategic problem. I pray that we will not fail in
this task which is indispensable not only to our survival but to
the survival of civilization.
Intelligence has been getting the facts about the Soviet Bloc,
or at least enough of them to enable many right decisions to be
made. But we have not been able, often enough, to get our
Information and evaluations accepted and acted upon. The
somber fact is that as professional intelligence people we have
not entirely grasped the meaning of protracted conflict in the
nuclear missile age.
I believe it not unfair to state also that as professional intel-
ligence people we have been disappointingly slow in under-
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standing the nature of the pressing problems which are con-
fronting us. Only too often our categories of analysis and esti-
mates still reflect the strategic realities of a passing age. We
know all about the deposits of even the least important raw
materials, but we may miss major scientific discoveries. Our
battle orders of the infantry are considerably better than those
of earth satellites. We are adept in measuring floorspace, but
we are rarely engaged in comparing lead times. We are able
to refine our calculations of weapons yields to the first decimal,
but the analysts worrying about Soviet neuropsychology have
yet to break through to the national estimates. We produce
mountains of "data," but our progress in data handling para-
phrases Lenin's title, "one step forward, two steps backward."
We are considerably better in post mortems than in warning.
Our understanding of man's greatest resource, time, has re-
mained fuzzy in most areas.
All in all, although we often express our conviction as to how
important intelligence is to national security, we ourselves have
not quite realized the crucial position we are occupying in the
present power struggle. It is really the effectiveness of intel-
ligence which, together with the effectiveness of our scientists,
is the basis of technology. Beyond the development phase, in-
telligence is either. a multiplier or a divisor of military strength-
in-being. It is the one "weapons system" which by necessity
is in constant touch with the enemy, regardless of whether
there is war or peace. And in war, of course, intelligence re-
mains a key condition of success.
But we must elevate our sights beyond the old saw of intel-
ligence being the "first line of defense." Intelligence is the fac
for which should make defense economically practical, tech
nologically superior, and strategically victorious. In the mils
sile age, intelligence literally will merge with the decisive weap=
ens system, lest the missiles be entirely ineffective.
But intelligence will not be able to do this job unless it com
of age as a technological system in its own right. We mus
get the equipment our ubiquitous, instantaneous, and ency
clopedic mission requires. We must have the forces to opera'
these tools. We must develop utilization techniques which
at par with or better than those equipments. And we m
be able rapidly to feed our information to all users.
One feature will remain unchanged: the ability to think.
Electric computers and space telescopes are no substitutes for
common sense and judgment. Reasoning by false analogy;
preoccupation with minor problems to the detriment of major
issues, emphasis on decimals and disregard for the large magni-
tude, wrong philosophies about the rules of evidence, delusion-
ary procedures such as the piling of estimates upon estimates
- not to mention normal human failings such as prejudices,
wishful thinking, parochial interest arguments, and subver-
sion - all those will remain possible in the era of technologi-
cal warfare. The machines, even the electrons, are no better
than the brains they are designed to serve. It is gratifying
to think that when the machine proves to be inadequate - for
example, because it may take three months to "program" it -
common sense and "conventional thinking" still will be called
upon to take its place.
The plain fact is that the machine, however good, will not
replace the analyst. The machine will make the human brain
a more powerful tool - this is the main reason we need it in
intelligence. Intelligence technology is indispensable for the
rapid handling of thousands of data and for the reduction of
innumerable variables to manageable factors. This technology
is the key to speed, coverage, and accuracy; to computation;
and to experimentation with, and testing of, our conclusions
and estimates (for example, through "gaining" techniques).
But intuition and insight are necessary to make the ma-
chines work. In turn, intelligence technology will make its
greatest contribution if it allows deeper insights and ever more
creative intuitions. Man has remained the key factor in tech-
nological warfare, as he was the key to victory when rocks and
clubs were the most powerful weapons. Military, or in a
broader sense, conflict intelligence will be at its best when it
is based on brain intelligence: IQ's plus wisdom.
Pending the dawn of the technological age in intelligence,
we should face up more courageously to the facts of life, how-
ever bitter.
As a nation and as the core of the Free World alliance, we
have been underrating the danger for more than twelve years.
Why was intelligence not more reliable? Why did we fail to
are the obvious? Our own thought patterns and our intel-
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30 SECRET CONFIDENTIAL 31
lectual isolationism have proved to be far more dangerous
enemies to our security than the Iron Curtain and the ominous
developments behind it.
CONCEPTS FOR A PHILOSOPHY
OF AIR INTELLIGENCE
Lewis R. Long
I should like to set forth certain concepts for air intelligence
that I feel would vitalize an air intelligence philosophy and
could lead to an air intelligence policy and doctrine consistent
with the dominant role that air power must play in the years
to come. I make no claim of originality in all these concepts;
nor do I consider that they alone would form a sound air intel-
ligence doctrine. However, together with the valid concepts
contained in the doctrinal manuals, they would, I am con-
vinced, provide better guidance to the field than has hereto-
fore been available.
I should like to emphasize that all the concepts presented
are meant to be applied within the framework of one overrid-
ing concept for a philosophy of air intelligence - that air intel-
ligence is geared to air power in a nuclear age. and that it has
the same predominant characteristics as has the air force -
range, speed, mobility, flexibility, and penetrative ability.
Because air forces have the capability of flying to any point
on the globe and returning to any desired location, air intelli-
gence must provide basic information to guide such flights in
peace or in war. Because air forces exert a dynamic impact on
all forms of international relations, air intelligence must be pre-
pared to expose for the scrutiny of air commanders the entire
structure of other nations and to advise and assist in the deter-
mination of air strategy and policies.
In the established principles for the successful employment
of air forces it is considered that the air forces are an entity.
gven so, air intelligence must be considered indivisible and re-
sponsive at all levels of operation to employment as a single
aggregate instrument. Air intelligence must be employed for
the attainment of a common objective, which - in essence -
Is to contribute to the security of the nation. Air intelligence
provides the key to proper employment of the air forces in ex-
esdaing the initiative in many different conditions of interna-
tional relations, in taking advantage of different opportunities
MORIIHRP PAGES
31-50
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as they occur, and also in creating opportunities in which bene-
fits to the US may accrue by the utilization of air forces in peace
or in war. Air intelligence must also guide the air force in ex-
ploiting the principle of surprise, in order to attain both mili-
tary and psychological advantages through speed, deception,
audacity, originality, and concentration. For the present, air
intelligence must concentrate on indications of imminence of
hostilities, without neglecting information on capabilities and
vulnerabilities of potential enemy countries. This concentra-
tion of effort not only will contribute to the security of our
forces. but also will provide guidance for combat operations if
war is forced upon us. Finally, air intelligence must be care-
fully coordinated through proper control.
CONCEPT NUMBER ONE. Intelligence agencies are never
more at war than in periods of nominal peace. The logical out-
growth of this concept is, of course, the fact that the success
of the initial phases of war (and in this thermonuclear age
these probably will also constitute the decisive phases) will de-
pend on the quality of intelligence produced in peace. Most
people can understand and pay lip service, at least, to the lat-
ter idea, but they balk completely at a rational consideration of
the first one when it comes to providing tangible support
needed by the intelligence structure. I have never, in peace-
time, seen an intelligence staff at any echelon that was not
undermanned, overworked, and restricted in its operations by
a lack of real appreciation on the part of the command for the
goals the intelligence section had set for itself to accomplish
in the light of the command mission.
At all echelons intelligence staffs must have adequate num=
bers of the best qualified personnel, maximum equipment, facil
ities, and funds; maximum freedom of action; and coequal
status with other major staff elements. It can be categorically,
stated that if the air force intelligence structure had all the
support it could profitably employ - and fully Justify-in
peacetime, its resources would be ample for any type of war W,
might become involved in.
Let us now analyse each of the requirements (personnel, m
terial support, freedom of action, and coequal status) in to
of what other writers have had to say, bearing in mind th
three basic intelligence missions: to provide timely warnin
the imminence of hostilities (whether on a total or limited w
CONFIDENTIAL 33
basis); to provide detailed knowledge of the capabilities and
vulnerabilities of potential enemy nations and of friendly and
neutral nations; and to provide the best possible intelligence as
to the intentions of foreign nations, particularly those that are
our potential enemies.
PERSONNEL. During wartime, all the services drew heavily
on civilian professions for manning intelligence posts. Law-
yers, insurance adjustors, investigators, police enforcement of-
ficers, scientific and technical personnel, and teachers were put
into uniform; and, by and large, these people carried the intel-
ligence workload of the services. By and large, too, their con-
tributions compared favorably with those of professional mili-
tary people. There have been numerous attempts made to
identify the qualifications for intelligence personnel. Farago'
lists ten major groups of traits which "the good spy is supposed
to possess" in -order to qualify for that particular aspect of
intelligence work. For the most part, these same traits could
be used as a starting basis for selection of personnel for other
intelligence tasks.
First of all, his morale must be high and he must be
genuinely interested in the job ahead.
Second, he must be energetic, zealous, and enterpris-
ing.
Third, he must be resourceful, a quick and practical
thinker. He must have good judgment and know how
to deal with things, people, and ideas. He must be pro-
ficient in some occupational skill.
Fourth, he must be emotionally stable, capable of great
endurance under stress. He must be calm and quiet,
tolerant and healthy.
Fifth, he must have the ability to get along with other
people, to work as a member of a team, to understand
the foibles of others while being reasonably free of the
same foibles himself.
Sixth, he must know how to inspire collaboration, to
organize, administer and lead others. He must be will-
Ing to accept responsibility.
1xrago. Ladislas, War of Wits (NY, Funk & Wagnalls Co., 1954),
p 187.
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34 CONFIDENTIAL
Seventh, he must be discreet, have a passion for ano-
nymity and know how to keep his mouth shut and pre-
serve a secret.
Eighth, he must be able to bluff and mislead, but only
when bluffing and misleading become necessary.
Ninth, he must be agile, rugged, and daring.
Tenth, he must have the ability to observe everything,
to memorize details accurately. He must be able to
report on his observations lucidly, to evaluate his ob-
servations and relate them to the greater complex of
things.
MATERIAL SUPPORT. I should like to stress the importance
of allocating the maximum in equipment, facilities, and funds
to intelligence work in time of peace with a quotation from
Sun Tzu,2 the Chinese military oracle, whose writings on the
art of war in 500 B. C. have influenced military thinking down
to this day.
Hostile armies may face each other for years, striv-
ing for victory which is decided in a single day. This
being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condi-
tion simply because one grudges the outlay of a hun-
dred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments is the
height of inhumanity.
One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present
help to his sovereign, no master of victory.
Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good
general to strike and conquer, and achieve things be-
yond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.
In speaking of the cost of the British secret service as
whole (both positive and counterintelligence), Seth noted:3
In 1913 the Secret Services cost 46,000 pounds; in
1939, 500,000 pounds; during the recent war 52,000,-
000 pounds annually; and in 1953, 5,000,000 pounds.
It is worth many times this amount, for though
the American, French and Russian (secret) services
tion and notes by B/G Thomas R. Phillips, Harrisburg, Pa.,
Military Service Publishing Co., 1944).
"Ronald Seth, Spies at Work, London: Peter Own Limited MC
p. 202.
CONFIDENTIAL 35
are now more extensive than at any time in. this cenr
tury, British secret service still maintains its lead in
performance and results.
Farago gives a somewhat different order of magnitude for
British expenditures for intelligence. He said that the 1954
budget was three million pounds and that this amount was the
highest in the entire history of the British Secret Service. He
pointed out, however, that this figure is deceptive because it
represents only allotments from public funds and he adds:
"The bulk of Britain's intelligence revenue comes from private
funds, such as dividends of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
some of whose shares are held by the Admiralty." 4
Farago then gave an indication of what US military services
are spending for intelligence. In fiscal year 1955, the Army
asked for $54,454,000 for intelligence, and for fiscal years 1952-
54, inclusive, the Army spent a total of $176,400,000 on intelli-
gence. Yet this represented less than one-half of one percent
of the total Army budget .5 Then, stressing his thesis that the
cold war is a "War of Wits," Farago pointed out relative ex-
penditures for intelligence in the Continental Army and in the
services today: 6
Between 1776 and 1781, George Washington spent
approximately eleven percent of his entire military
budget on intelligence operations. The fact that today
we spend less than one percent of our peacetime mili-
tary budget on these same activities shows how little
effort is being made to solve the "friction" by intel-
lectual means rather than brute force.
From the contacts I have had with various British intelli-
gence officers, visits to JIB (Joint Intelligence Bureau) and
some of the intelligence officers of the Air ministry, and from
comparing the results of British intelligence with those of USAF
Intelligence, I am certainly inclined to agree, at least partially,
with Seth's last statement for the quality of British intelligence
production is invariably very high, and the quantity compares
favorably with that produced by the much larger USAF intelli-
pence staffs. The British traditionally have been willing to
hrago, op. cit., p. 50.
' /bid.. p. 51.
/bid p. 345.
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36 - CONFIDENTIAL
spend a great amount of money, time, and effort in the collec-
tion of intelligence information, more, perhaps, than most
modern nations. They have not, in other words, weighed re-
slts obtained by intell igence efforts on a completely pragmatic
basis, as we "practical Americans" are inclined to do; they know
that one cannot package intelligence results on a "pound-for-
pound" basis. So for the past two hundred years they have
been preeminent in the field. This is not to say that they have
not made serious mistakes; but, by and large, their intelligence
estimates have been remarkably sound. Moreover, they have
used periods of nominal peace to extend and consolidate their
intelligence activities, not only for the purpose of preparing
for the next war but also (what is even more important) pre-
paring for the peace to follow.
FREEDOM OF ACTION. As background for a discussion of
the need for granting maximum freedom of action to air force
intelligence, I should like to quote the following passage from,
the Report of the Task Force on Intelligence Activities:
Effect of Diplomacy on the Over-All Collection of In-
telligence.
The task force has recognized the incompatibility in
method between the practice of diplomacy and the
more direct and active operations incident to the col-
lection of intelligence and the conduct of cold war.
While all contribute to the end in view, conflicts be-
tween them must be resolved, usually on a high level,
and always in the national interest. It must be real-
ized that diplomacy is not an end in itself; that while
political ends must be served and unjustifiable risks
avoided, the collection of intelligence is a vital element
in the fight to preserve our national welfare and ex-
istence. Instances have come to the attention of the
task force where too conservative an attitude has pre-
vailed, often to the detriment of vigorous and timely
action in the field.
Although the foregoing comment was made in connecti
with a discussion of the intelligence activities of the Dep
? Intelligence Activities, A Report to the Congress, by the Commissl
1955, pp. 42-43. (Hereafter referred to as "Task Force Report."),
CONFIDENTIAL 37
ment of State, it is every bit as applicable to air intelligence as
to the Department of State because the air attache system,
which is a major contributor of intelligence information, func-
tions as an integral part of the State Department's Forefgn
Service.
It is altogether appropriate that, generally speaking, diplo-
matic considerations take precedence over the collection re-
quirements of the attaches. Nevertheless, within the frame-
work of that principle (which is a part of the principle of civil-
ian control over the military establishment), it should be ob-
vious from the implications of the Task Force findings that a
less conservative attitude toward opportunities for collection
of intelligence information should permeate not only the diplo-
matic service but also the military establishment.
I shall not devote much attention to detailed suggestions for
carrying out intelligence operations. My concern is with the
promotion of principles that would provide the type of climate
in which competent people, using their innate intelligence and
ingenuity, can devise an infinite number of ways in which to
collect and produce air intelligence - ways which must, of
course, be within the framework of US national objectives at
all times. Nevertheless, I feel very strongly that we should
take a page out of the British Secret Service book and put our
intelligence collection efforts on a basis where they can pay
their own way, at least in part. This would be a long-term
proposition and it would be impossible of achievement under
the existing regimentation that governs all business enter-
prises in which the government is officially engaged.
COEQUAL STATUS WITH OTHER MAJOR STAFF ELE-
MENTS. There is, as far as I can discern, no rhyme nor reason
in subordinating intelligence as a staff section to operations.
My biggest objection to the subordination of intelligence to op-
erations lies in the fact that the operations officer is automati-
cully placed in the position where he frequently makes purely
command decisions. The intelligence officer is supposed to
itdvise the commanding officer as to what the enemy can and
probably will attempt to do that would interfere with the ac-
complishment of the command mission. The operations officer
iS Supposed to advise the commanding officer as to what
hta own forces can and should do. The commanding officer
t then in a position to weigh both his own and the enemy's
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38 CONFIDENTIAL
capabilities and to make a sound command decision as to
command action. It is totally wrong for the operations officer
to make such a decision, for the commanding officer is thereby
deprived of the full value (and probably full information) of
enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and intentions. Zacharias,
commenting on the fallacy of subordinating, told the Con-
gressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster
that one of the organizational deficiencies which was a con-
tributing factor was: S
That the planning officers were allowed to take over
the Intelligence function of evaluation. This resulted
in individuals without a full knowledge of the Japanese
or their psychology determining what the Japanese
might do. This practice applied not only in Washing-
ton, but also at Pearl Harbor, where the erroneous con-
clusion was reached by the planning officer that there
was no chance of an air attack on Pearl Harbor.
CONCEPT NUMBER TWO. Success achieved by intelligence
in peace will determine the outcome of the war.
General Kuter stated: 9
In jet-atomic warfare there will be no room for gross
errors of judgment. There will be no time, should hos-
tilities start, to correct mistakes in the types of forces
that we have provided, the manner in which they have
been organized and trained, or the way we fight. And
the terrible penalty for failure could be quick and com-
plete defeat.
Many factors are involved in any satisfactory an-
swer. But one thing is sure. The question cannot be
answered satisfactorily unless we have the proper doc-
trine, and unless the doctrine is accepted.
For years the US has believed that its greatest military p
tential lay in its industrial might. The validity of this bell'
n
was demonstrated in World Wars I and II and again in Kor
lanned to destroy not only our retaliatory force b
ill be
p
w
also our industrial potential. Thus we can see that "no long;
8 Zacharias, p. 253.
Kuter, Lawrence S., Lt. Gen., "No Room For Error," Air Force M
tine (AWC Curriculum Handout #36-4-a, 24 November 1955).
CONFIDENTIAL 39
will the US or any other country be able to build up its mili-
tary forces and rely on its industrial potential after the war
has begun." 1?
Intelligence must be developed before war breaks out if it is
to influence our preparations, provide a foundation for our
planning, and guide early phases of operations. It is true that
Mr. Allen Dulles, present Director of the CIA,11 achieved un-
precedented success in the history of espionage with the intelli-
gence network he established in Germany, operating from
Switzerland, during the war.
... Through this network Mr. Dulles managed to
start a conspiracy within the high command of the
German armies in the south and to bring about the
surrender of the very army on which Hitler was de-
pendent for the prolonging of the war from behind the
legendary "Alpine redoubt."
However, the situation in Japan was a far different matter.
Through shortsightedness and perhaps ineptitude and inex-
perience, the US had failed to establish the groundwork for an
effective espionage system in Japan, notwithstanding the fact
that Zacharias and other authorities on Japan had been aware
of the need and had advocated such prior planning. In view
of the steadily deteriorating relations that existed between
Japan and the US right up to the surprise attack against Pearl
Harbor, this failure to develop, in advance of war, a workable
system for systematic collection (in Japan) of intelligence in-
formation during the war that most intelligence personnel
were sure was virtually inevitable is an extremely black mark
against the US intelligence agencies of that time. Moreover,
this country made no serious effort to establish an intelligence
net within Japan during the war because it was felt that the
effort was far too great in relation to its possible value. Farago
pointed out that it is a virtual impossibility ". . . to set up a
local network in an enemy country under wartime condi-
lions...." 12 [Allen Dulles' success notwithstanding]
'Thomas K. Finletter, Power and Policy, New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Co., p. 256.
- Tango, op. cit., p. 183.
0Ibid.. p. 182.
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How can we account for the fact that, against all reasonable
odds, the US did establish a satisfactory espionage net in Ger-
many after war started but failed to do so in Japan, its other
major enemy? I suggest that the reason lies, among other
factors, in the accessibility of Germany before the outbreak
of war. In other words, more Americans and individuals from
Allied nations had contacts before the war in Germany than in
Japan. Interestingly enough, the Soviets failed to re-establish
within Germany an adequate espionage net:
... when their original network, known as the
Rote Kapelle or Red Orchestra, was smashed. They
managed to create such networks only in countries of
their wartime allies, Canada, the United Kingdom,
and the United States, and in neutral Switzerland, tra-
ditional battleground of international espionage.13
The Soviets did achieve remarkable success in Japan (remem-
ber the Sorge espionage case?) 14 It seems to me that there is a
direct correlation between the accessibility of a potential enemy,
country just before the outbreak of hostilities and the proba-
bility of being able to establish (or re-establish) and maintain;
an espionage net in that country after war breaks out. What
does this mean, as far as the US is concerned at the present
time? If it is difficult to penetrate the iron Curtain today,
it will be even harder when war breaks out. Therefore, w
must go all-out to penetrate it, and to establish many strong
'
diversified, and versatile nets as soon as possible. We canno
do this under the existing limitations of personnel, equipment,
and funds. Yet maximum reliance must be placed on the
ability of intelligence to decide by whom, when, where, and
what strength the US may be attacked. The responsibility o
the Directorate of Intelligence (ACS/I, since 1 July 1957).;
USAF, is to develop this information regarding our suscepti
bility to air attack - this in an air-nuclear age.
CONCEPT NUMBER THREE. Air intelligence must, on a con
tinging basis, encompass all aspects of power in foreign na
tions (political, economic, and psychosocial, as well as mini
-
tary), both in the present and in the historical perspectit
Moreover, it must speak out on matters of national strategy.
's Ibid., p. 182.
" Ibid., pp. 163, 166, 179, 181, 212, 219-220.
Heretofore, air intelligence (as well as army and navy in-
telligence) has confined itself primarily to an evaluation of the
military power of foreign nations. The National Security
Council has directed the air force to interest itself primarily in
intelligence of foreign air forces and has assigned responsi-
bility for covering other aspects of national power to the other
US intelligence agencies.
It has long been an American tradition that the military
establishment should remain free from the "taint of politics."
As a result, the military has shied away from any contact with
political problems. This even reached the point before World
War II where few of the regular military establishment exer-
cised their constitutional right to vote in elections.
This fear of military domination in our national life stems,
of course, from our inherited distrust of all forms of tyranny
and autocracy. Before the time that military power became
inextricably tied to the other forms of national power, perhaps
even as late as the First World War, this attitude may have had
some validity in our national consciousness. However, Clause-
witz would not have subscribed to the complete separation of
military thinking from the remainder of national life and activ-
ities. He pointed out that war is merely an extension of na-
tional, political policy by other means.15 Hitler demonstrated
his conviction that war is merely a "mopping-up process" by
capitalizing on the gains made by his fifth column. Certainly
the Marxists have from the beginning showed the world by
word and deed that the line of demarcation between politics
and military action is extremely nebulous.
It can and probably will be argued that air intelligence
should "stick to its knitting" and concentrate on ascertaining
the strengths and weaknesses of foreign air forces in the tradi-
tional fashion (in which the army is supposed to develop intel-
ligence on foreign ground forces; the navy, on foreign naval
forces: the air force, on foreign air forces; and the State Depart-
ment and CIA, on foreign political and economic strengths and
weaknesses). However, as it is air power that will have to
carry the brunt of any initial contacts with the enemy, as well
a~ continuously to seek out and destroy all aspects of the enemy
" Karl von Clausewitz, General, On War (Translation by 0. J. Mattijs
Julien). Washington, D. C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1950, p. 16.
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42 CONFIDENTIAL
warmaking potential and will to fight, air intelligence must
have the capability of advising the Chief of Staff, USAF, where
and when to hit the enemy in order to hurt him most.
It seems incontrovertible to me that we have reached a place
in history where the military establishment, particularly the
air force, must concern itself with political problems (as well
as the economic and psychosocial problems) - the traditional
American feeling in the matter notwithstanding. General
d Director of Intelligence, Headquarters USAF, agreed
Samfor ,
on this point, in response to a question asked by the writer,
ruuuwulg 111
rowing community of thought that the mili
e is a
"Th
g
er
effect, tary establishment should get into the fields_ofr " polittical and, 1 Air in-
telligence, obviously, must be in the vanguard this new,
CONCEPT NUMBER FOUR. Intelligence must take ^a dh
In speak-
o
na mic approach.
Soviet Bloc are inadequate, the Task Force Report on Intelli-I
ities considered that security measures adopted by,
ti
A
v
c
gence
the Communists have been exceptionally effective, particularly
n th A
i
--------
in compar
so
it relatively simple for foreign nations to collect vital secrets,
The task force admonishes, however:
. The information we need, particularly for our
Armed Forces, is potentially available. Through con-
centration on the prime target we must exert every
conceivable and practicable effort to get it. Success
in this field depends on greater boldness at the policy
level, a willingness to accept certain calculated politi-
cal and diplomatic risks, and full use of technological
capabilities."
Opportunities to increase air intelligence coverage of So;
d intenons
n
capabilities au. -----
a. The increasing of our clandestine operations, and,effo
to infiltrate the uULL
countries, taking maximum advantage not only of bor
Samford, John A., Mai or General, "Objectives for the Use of FO
lecture to Army War College, 2 January 1956.
17 Task Force Report, op. cit., p. 69.
CONFIDENTIAL 43
crossing techniques on land and by air drop but also neutral
shipping and US submarines, particularly in the Arctic Ocean
and the Black Sea coastal areas.
b. The establishment of contacts with and provision of sup-
port to (in return for services rendered) agents from. among
known governments in exile, such as those from the Baltic and
East European Satellite nations; the known 10,000,000 Chinese
living outside China, as minority groups throughout Asia; all
known religious organizations, business firms, and govern-
mental agencies throughout the Free World having dealings
with the Soviet Bloc; all known visitors to Soviet-dominated
territory, such as trade union officials, scientists, airline and
shipping crewmen, and others; and all defectors from iron cur-
tain countries.
c. The attempt to bribe, intimidate, subvert, or otherwise
cause Soviet and Satellite diplomats, government officials, tech-
nicians, or visitors abroad to "double" for us upon their re-
turn - or to defect and remain in the West.
d. The making of surreptitious photographic penetration
flights with high capability aircraft at irregular intervals, to
cover peripheral areas.
e. The purchase of controlling interest in the most active
Western firms having dealings with the Soviet or Satellite na-
tions in order to use these firms to collect intelligence informa-
tion, spread favorable propaganda, subvert Soviet and Satellite
nationals, and otherwise create situations behind the iron and
bamboo curtains that would be favorable to the West.
f. The employment of such outstanding historians as Alfred
J. Toynbee; political scientists, as Professor William M. Mc-
Govern and Dr. Robert Strausz-Hupe; geographers, as G. Don-
aid Hudson; ethnologists, as Margaret Meade; and authorities
on Russia and Communism as Dr. Marc Szeftel and Mr. James
Burnham. The individuals named represent only a few of the
potential list of qualified consultants; the profound and
dttutlcd knowledge of foreign peoples and areas in their re-
apcctlve professions that is possessed by people of this stature
-mold furnish a wellspring of ideas of inestimable value to air
Intelilgence. In addition to enriching the staff with people of
" caliber we should hire outstanding representatives in the
?4rrrtising and public relations fields (preferably those having
tprcnee in foreign areas), who can assist the factual experts
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in packaging the ideas we want to use in our "War of Wits"
with the Soviets, this struggle for the minds of men.
CONCEPT NUMBER FIVE. Intelligence should be used as an
offensive weapon, one capable of influencing the outcome o
either the cold war or any hot war, peripheral as well as total.
Although there are no apparent indications that the Soviet
Union, during the next few years, intends to take action of the
sort that would surely precipitate another world conflict, we
must be always on the alert to the possibility that such a con-
flict might arise through miscalculation on their part. The
dangers are greatest in the peripheral areas, where Satellite
peoples might get out of hand and take action "from which we
cannot retreat without disaster; then the chances of keeping
war limited are very remote." 18
The difficulty is not in the lack of desire to exercise such
restraint, but in the fact that the things we stand to lose are
of such great value that there is no chance of limiting phases,
of conflict. To have mutual understanding and agreement be-
tween enemies is essential if conflict is to be localized. What
does this mean to air intelligence? Simply this: we must pro-.
duce intelligence on every facet of enemy life. To do this, air,,
intelligence should control or at least coordinate all air force
agencies that to any degree operate in enemy territory or attack
behind enemy lines or perform other than strictly military,
operations in areas that may become the scene of battle or
areas where, in the cold war, the air forces encounter Com
munist influences.
CONCEPT NUMBER SIX. Intelligence must be used syst
atically. Commanders, policymakers, planners, and opera.
tions personnel at all echelons must rely upon, then plan, th
act not only upon intelligence but also upon intelligence reconi,
mendations - within practical limits of our own capability an
feasibility of such recommendations. We have long express
as a principle of intelligence the concept that it must
supplied to the interested command in time to be of
Unfortunately, in intelligence circles there has not been,
seems to me, equal emphasis placed upon submission of inte
gence to the commander and his staff in such a form and,
convincingly expressed that it will receive the prompt attentii
CONFIDENTIAL 45
and responsive command action that it warrants. Stressing
the need for reducing the margin of error inherent in any
human undertaking, General White pointed out the need for
educating our planners and our leaders. He said that poor
command decisions and inferior or unimaginative staff work
would nullify the tremendous effort that has gone into develop-
ing an extremely expensive air force. He added:
... Superior employment of air weapons must be
based on complete understanding of the nature of air
warfare, the political and military context within
which the air forces are operating, and a sound but
imaginative understanding of targets and weapons.19
There also has been entirely too little emphasis on the con-
cept that command plans and action should be based on in-
telligence. This has not always been the fault of intelligence.
Nevertheless, too often in the air force, particularly, operational
plans have been prepared with absolutely no regard for the
intelligence estimate of enemy capabilities and intentions that
these selfsame plans were designed to counter. In my experi-
ence as a staff officer at various echelons of command, there
have been few instances in which command war plans, emer-
gency plans, or operations plans have actually been geared to
the intelligence that gave rise to the necessity for such plans.
More often than not, the intelligence annex is merely prepared
at the same time as the basic plan and the other annexes and
all are stapled together at one time. The proper procedure,
and the one that we in intelligence at USAFE (US Air Forces
In Europe) were finally able to sell to the planners, should be
this. The intelligence estimate of the situation is prepared
first, and given to the commander and to all his staff agencies
in advance of the planning cycle. The basic plan and all the
annexes (including the intelligence annex) are then prepared
simultaneously, with a view to countering the threat indicated
In the intelligence estimate.
I believe this failure to take the intelligence estimate into
conhlderation at every stage in the planning cycle in the mili-
tary establishment stems by and large from an American pre-
White. Thomas D., "The Current Concept of American Military
Mtmngt.h," AU Quarterly Review, Vol. VII, Spring 1954 (AWC Cur-
rkulum Handout #56-2-B, 22 November 1955).
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46 CONFIDENTIAL
dilection for ignoring in the policymaking cycle available in-
telligence regarding the capabilities and intentions of actual or
potential enemies.
It seems to me that the intelligence family must find some
way not only to improve the quality of its product but also to
stimulate an acceptance of that product and a willingness to
act upon it. The process of making positive recommendations
by intelligence for command action would, I believe, materially
improve this situation and would lead to a command acceptance
of a principle advanced by General Ridgway, when he was Chief
of Staff of the US Army. He stressed the fact that the present
world situation makes it more important than ever to have com-
plete information upon which to base economical deployment
and effective employment of army forces, as well as to avoid sur-
prise (obviously the same principle applies to all military
forces). General Ridgway stated: "Adequate intelligence con-
stitutes the fundamental basis for the calculation of risks, the
formulation of plans, the development of materiel, the alloca-
tions of resources, and the conduct of operation." 20
CONCEPT NUMBER SEVEN. Intelligence must eontinuousl,
estimate enemy intentions as well as capabilities and vulnera",,
bilities. One of the biggest reasons that commanders at times
have made their own estimates, rather than accept those o
their intelligence officers, is simply that the intelligence office
have been unwilling to "go out on a limb" and estimate enem
intentions. Before the early 1930's the "method of intentions'
was used by the US Army. It was a method used by the eld
von Moltke. Shortly before 1936 the American Army adop
the "method of capabilities," which had been the method us
by Napoleon.21
Admittedly the "method of intentions" is a difficult one an
for the inexperienced intelligence officer, nonhabit forming:
cause the probability of error is extremely high. Success f'
this method depends not only on an intimate knowledge of th
14
mentality of the opposing commanders as well as the tactii
doctrine of the enemy but also upon such intangible things;
the physical and mental condition of the opponent, his no
reactions, and reasoning processes. On the other hand
Farago, op. cit., p. 8.
"Command and General Staff School, "Military Intelligence,
CONFIDENTIAL 47
"method of capabilities" takes into consideration all lines of
action open to the enemy. It does not discard any possible line
until the enemy's dispositions are such that, even though he
desired to adopt that line, he is physically incapable of doing
so. Thus it strives by elimination to reduce the possibility
down to one - the only one line of action which the enemy can
take. This is the ideal, as far as intelligence is concerned, but
it is seldom reached.
CONCEPT NUMBER EIGHT. Intelligence is no longer a func-
tion of command, except at the higher echelons. All of the
services (particularly the air force) have traditionally paid, only
lip service to the principle that intelligence is a function of
command. This has been amply demonstrated by a lack of
provision for suitable intelligence staffing between World War
I and World War II and by a demeaning of intelligence func-
tions. My reasons for believing that intelligence should no
longer be considered a function of command at all echelons are
different from either of these.
In the first place if an all-out global war should occur, the
US intelligence operations should be centrally controlled. Sec-
ond, the entire intelligence process cannot reasonably be car-
ried out at all echelons; therefore, even in a prolonged period
of cold war, air intelligence operations must be, if not actually
centrally controlled from Washington, at least concentrated in
a small number of locations where the complete intelligence
process is directed by one individual. Unquestionably, in the
past, commanders of squadrons, groups, wings, even air divi-
s4ons and air forces occasionally may have felt a twinge of
conscience because they have been unable to see their way clear
to carry out all the intelligence functions that manuals said
they should, from collection through dissemination. These
Individuals may now draw a sigh of relief, as I view it; for in
the air force, their primary intelligence function is to dissemi-
nate down to the troops air intelligence that has been received
from higher echelons.
It may be argued that I am hereby cutting the rug out from
under the principle I previously expressed - that the intelli-
p ncr officer should not be subordinated to other staff officers
but should report directly to the commanding officer. On the
c mtrary. in these lower units, and even when his recognized
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL 49
duties are in accord with his actual duties, I still feel that the
intelligence officer at every echelon of command should remain
responsible only to the commanding officer or the chief of staff,
and not to any other staff officer! He must maintain this inde-
pendence of other staff considerations in order best to present
to his commander the most complete intelligence picture and
the most reasonable intelligence recommendations, even though
he himself may not have developed either the intelligence esti-
mate of the situation or the recommendations based on it.
At the major air force command levels there is no question
in regard to major staff level standing for the intelligence
officer as intelligence should continue to be for his commander
a complete function of command, in the traditional sense. At
the lower echelons, intelligence would still be a command re-
sponsibility, but rather more in the "special staff" tradition
than the "general staff" concept.
CONCEPT NUMBER NINE. Major headquarters staffs should
get out of the operational aspects of intelligence to the maxi-
mum extent possible and should confine their attention largely
to policymaking and flash or spot estimating functions. This
concept is closely related to some of the thinking indicated in
the discussion of the preceding concept. Compared with the,
present tables of distribution, the intelligence staff of Head
relatively small. These staffs, however, would be comprised of
highly qualified personnel, representing the maximum Intel
primarily policymaking, inspection, liaison, and estimating
of the imminence of hostilities and spot estimates, as requir
by the commander and his staff. They would exercise st
supervision not only over the intelligence activities of all su
ordinate units of the command, but also over the collection an
production activities of the intelligence centers belonging
the command; these centers would perform the operation
aspects of the intelligence process for the entire command.
CONCEPT NUMBER TEN. Air Intelligence (to include cou
'
terintelligence) must keep under continuous review and,
the maximum extent possible, must downgrade and publish
flies concerning enemy capabilities, activities, and intentions;'
What I am proposing is nothing less than declassifying cer-
tain carefully selected items of intelligence and counterintelli-
gence regarding Soviet activities and providing such informa-
tion to the American public on a planned basis. Let the Amer-
ican people get this information, but from authoritative sources
and not from newspaper columnists.
Probably the most violent opposition to this proposal will
come from some of my fellow intelligence officers, because tradi-
tionally, intelligence has had a moral responsibility to protect
its sources, and rightly so. Nevertheless, intelligence files are
bulging with information that represents such a conglomera-
tion from so many sources that no one source could possibly be
harmed by its disclosure. Let us substitute this type of infor-
mation for at least some of the detailed data on our own mili-
tary establishment that we now hand out so freely. I am confi-
dent that the public reaction to this policy would, in general, be
very favorable, and that in the long run, the story of air power
and the capabilities of the air force to safeguard the security
interests of the US can be made synonymous in the minds of
the American people.
So let's stop giving aid and comfort to our potential enemies
and start a program designed to discomfort them on a global
talc - by informing and arousing the American public and
the rest of the free world with factual knowledge of Soviet ac-
tivities and intentions. For example, an article in the Sep-
t,-tuber 1955 Reader's Digest discussed the disturbing story of
the manner in which the Communists, who had infiltrated the
military services and governmental structure of Iran, were pre-
rnted from taking over the entire country by the merest ac-
cident. As a result of the investigation, it was disclosed that
five hundred Iranian officers were implicated in the plot, in-
cluding numerous high-ranking individuals in both the Army
and the police departments.22
This story, terrifying in its implication for other countries,
would. I submit, have had a much stronger impact on public
awareness of the Communist threat to the world today had it
bat-tt omcially released by a government intelligence agency,
rather than by a commercial writer. This is the type of run-
J?*+cph A. Mazandi and Edwin Muller, "The Hunch That Saved
hon." Reader's Digest, September 1955, pp. 59-60.
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50 CONFIDENTIAL
of-the-mill basic intelligence available to the, services which
should be released to the public as soon and as fully as is prac-
ticable and, in any event, before some sharp news reporter can
capitalize it.
All air intelligence concepts must be con-
CONCEPT ELEVEN
.
sidered dynamic, kept under constant review, and revised to
meet changing world situations. It follows that air intelligence
philosophy must be considered in its broadest sense as a con'.
---__
d -1-4oa roelilt
an
nt sear
h for princi
t
.
.
a
s
ing from this process must be changed as new concepts are.
General Kuter provides another valid con=
In this context
,
cept for developing an air intelligence policy, although he was,
of ai
r,
it in he
in
l
r
g
app
y
-- -
-force thinking. "A true air doctrine accepted and exploited
ar
mili
sour
o
k
h
_
i -
.
a
er
e
> 23
a common strategy. We don't, as yet
it i
n
must exploit
we h
air intelligence policy or doctrine in writing, lI
ave an
t that last admonition of General Kuter's as
ill ado
USAF
p
w
the basic air force intelligence policy, it will be only a matter
ntil
ti
.... ....... ...-
me u
of
which the commands may then soundly base their own intel
ligence policies.
Kuter, op. cit., p. 29.
SECRET 51
DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR TARGETING
1. THE MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL
The basic objective for air targeting is to present measure-
ments of the ability of the enemy to take actions which
threaten our national security. These measurements must be
presented in such a way as to guide our action against the
enemy's strengths. This objective is usually broken down into
subobjectives which illustrate clearly its breadth and com-
plexity. Expressed in terms of courses of enemy action which
are unacceptable to the US, these subobjectives are, in descend-
ing order of importance:
1. To deliver atomic weapons against the US, our forces
abroad, and our allies.
2. To resist the penetration of his airspace by our air forces.
3. To develop and produce potentially decisive weapons or
weapons systems.
4. To conduct large-scale land and naval operations against
our forces and our allies.
5. To develop and maintain the economic, political, and psy-
chological strengths necessary to support prolonged military
operations.
With the development of new weapons and weapons systems,
however, and the resultant capability of a single aircraft or
missile to deliver the equivalent of millions of tons of TNT on
one mission, the analysis and presentation of the strengths
supporting the first three subobjectives have assumed ever-
Increasing importance and urgency. This compression of fire-
power in time brings the realization that the decision in future
wars may be reached in a matter of hours or days at most.
Old problems have been accentuated and many new ones cre-
ated by these developments. For example, selection of target
rytems to achieve the subobjectives time-phased in the order
drown above is no longer sufficient. Analysis must produce
rat only a priority of targets within each subobjective and
target system, but also an indication of how many of them
MORIIHRP PAGES
51-64
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must be attacked to achieve the objective. Thus analysis by
increments in time and space is becoming an essential element
in the targeting process.
The complexity of these problems and the speed with which
they must be solved have led to the introduction of new statis-
tical methods and of new machine computing techniques into
the targeting analysis process. For example, immediate
assessment of the damage and contamination effect of a given
attack will be necessary in order to determine the destruction
required of succeeding attacks. This involves a continuing
evaluation of target priorities and of net offensive strengths
throughout an air offensive until a decision is reached. Two-
sided war-gaming offers the best possibility for providing the
answers needed for this and similar problems. Because of the
time element and the great volume of data required by the new,
statistical techniques, high-speed electronic computing is
By this process hypothetical but highly probable
essential
.
military situations in both peace and war can be examined and
by the analyst to guide and evaluate target selections. Only
in this way can the total targeting effort truly be said to pr
sent measurements of the enemy's strengths in such a way
to facilitate action against them.
During the last several years it has become increasing
apparent that mathematical "Monte Carlo" and "input-ou
put" type models offer a new and promising technique for "war'..
ga
m-a __
resources for targeting purposes. The rapid advances in th
speed and data handling capacity of modern electronic con%
i
on
puters have now made these models feasible for applicat
many air targets problems.
The purpose of the mathematical models is the selection
targets for optimum forestalling of enemy courses of actin
s
This requires the models to answer the following question
order.
1. Present situation
a. What is the size and composition of the enemy
tart' establishment (military resources)?
b. What is the size, composition, and productive abili:
of the enemy economy (economic resources) ?
c. What levels of military action will these resources sup-
port?
2. Mobilization capability
a. What would be the size and composition of enemy
military resources and economic resources after an all-out
mobilization period of x months?
b. What levels of military action would these resources
support?
3. Evaluation of damage
a. For any specified bombing attack what would be the
yield and location of all exploding weapons?
b. Given these explosions what would be the size and com-
position of the post attack military and economic resources
(including population)?
c. Given the post attack resources what level of enemy
military action could be maintained?
4. Recuperation
What would be the size and composition of enemy mili-
tary and economic resources y months (or days) after the
specified attack, taking into account repair, rebuilding, con-
version of other facilities, and new construction?
For "war-gaming," that is, estimating net offensive capabili-
tIes, the above questions must be asked about our own country
as well as about the enemy country.
The system of mathematical models which would answer
these questions is shown schematically in Figure 1.
The air battle, the damage, and the contamination models
would answer questions 3a and b above. Discussions of these
models are planned in subsequent issues.
The remaining questions concerning the present, post mobi-
lization, post attack, and post recuperation capabilities of the
military and the economy are the province of the military re-
aources model, which includes economic resources.
Procedurally, the military resources models determine the
number and size of missions, both offensive and defensive of
"Anus types, which each country can carry out in a given span
Cd time. This information is fed to the air battle model which
to ether with the damage and contamination models deter-
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DAMAGE
MODEL
AIR
CONTAMINATION
MODEL
BATTLE
MODEL
DAMAGE
MODEL
CONTAMINATION
MODEL
N
mines the military, economic, and population resources re-
maining in each country after a period of air battle. The dam-
age information is in turn fed back to the military resources
model which determines the number, type, and size of missions
which each country can carry out after the first phase of air
battle. The process is then repeated for later phases of the air
battle.
If the models can, as is believed possible, answer the ques-
tions posed we have an exceedingly powerful tool not only for
target selection, but also for estimating the capability of a
country to carry out military action now and in the future
under various conditions and assumptions. The testing of
alternative target systems in the first and succeeding phases
can lead to the choice of the optimum target system for any
of several different strategic situations.
When then, is the military resources model and how is it de-
signed to answer the questions put to it?
The military resources model is an input-output model. This
is a kind of mathematical model about which it has been said,
it is much easier to understand what it is expected to do than
how it does it. What the military resources model is expected
to do is to estimate the capabilities of a military establishment
and its supporting economy to carry out military action. The
r sential problem of making this estimate is that everything
must be considered simultaneously.
It Is not enough to know that the capacity of the aeroengine
Industry is so many engines per month. One must also know
whether there is enough steel (or electric power, copper, petro-
1runt, ball bearings, and so on) to produce these engines while
at the same time the tank, gun, shipbuilding, ammunition, and
many other key industries (including reconstruction in a post
attack period) are also requiring steel. Furthermore, not only
ihr direct demand for steel must be considered. The aero-
Inc industry consumes not only steel but also aluminum,
ciactrlc power, transportation, and many other inputs, the pro-
duction of which also requires some steel. In short, to know
ttw capabilities of one industry we must account for require-
tflcnta of all industries for a vast range of raw materials, labor,
akppttal equipment, components, goods in process, transporta-
Ucm and communications. Input-output models are a tech-
for doing just this. An input-output model shows for
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MILITARY
RESOURCES
MODEL
MILITARY
RESOURCES
MODEL
 Approved For Release 2005/03/15 : CIA-RDP78T03194A000100020001-2
SECRET 57
each industry (or military activity) the requirements for sup-
plies from each other industry.'
The military resources model consists of three sub-models or
grids; the military grid, the economic grid, and the transpor-
tation grid. The economic grid is in turn broken down into
geographical regions which are related to each other by the
transportation grid. The military resources model can be
illustrated schematically.
THE MILITARY RESOURCES MODEL
ids consists of an inventory of resources an
Each of these gr
a table of coefficients in the form of inputs required perrus i
ono is
h
n--- -
e ec
of Output. rur t
oe
ffi,
roducing industries. The table of
ll
o
f
p
the capacities of a
f
cients shows material, labor, and capital inputs per unit ne cult.ri
m
le
x
f
p
a
or e
dustrial output,
, bomber a
ton of aluminum and tons of aluminum per heavy bomber
ii
and
le
, ?~--~
required per unit of military activity; for examp
-r+ roe nrinm tnns of arnmur
e of airs
per nymg hour,11u11~
division month, and so on. Its invent)
Lion (by type) per
of resources is the number of military units of each kind an'
rid haste
tio
t
n g
a
The transpor
their associated equipment.
its output units of transportation capacity on a and
nomic arid
This grid acts as a restraint on both the eco
bottleneck or restrf
military grid as transportation can be a
structure its
r
ilit
y
a
both in the economy and within the m
1 Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 4, "The Role of Inte9rind
p.
t Loring Allen
"
,
Rober
Studies in Economic Intelligence,
Without knowing the full complexity of the statistical and
computational procedures (which is awe-inspiring) the reader
can now visualize the operation of these grids in answering our
initial questions. The military grid shows for a given set of
military forces the level of combat actions that could be main-
tained if the economy provides all the supplies the military re-
quires. The coefficients of the military grid determine the re-
quirements of the given level of combat actions from the econ-
omy. The economic and transportation grids determine how
much of these supplies can be forthcoming from the existing
inventory of economic resources.
At the present time the economic grid of the Soviet Bloc has
been largely completed. It has been constructed in two
parts - one covering the USSR and European Satellites and
the other the Peoples Republic of China. For the European
1i1oc the grid distinguishes 240 producing industries or sectors
and their materials, components, capital equipment, and labor
inputs. Five test runs have been made and evaluated.2 On
the basis of the evaluation of these test runs, application of
this grid to certain types of live air targets problems is now be-
in:; undertaken. However, a substantial data improvement
rrsearch program is going concurrently.
`i'hc military grid has been under development for about nine
months. It is expected that test runs of this grid will be made
in the summer of 1958.
The transportation grid has been under development for
about six months, and it is expected that test runs of this grid
rill be made in the summer of 1958. The construction of this
grid is being undertaken on two fronts. The first involves the
Er);raphic disaggregation of the economic grids in terms of
kcal regions. The second consists of the development of a
transportation grid based on these regions. To date, 159 re-
gk3n.+ covering the USSR have been designated, outlined, and
cod-vd. The transportation net has been divided according to
ttwwr regions and the terminals and links within each region
cndrd and catalogued. The 159 regions correspond to Soviet
C& Uts wherever possible in order to take advantage of the data
UsWbuUon of these runs has been made throughout the intelli-
L*ncr community. A few copies are still available for interested
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SECRET
on production and transportation published by the Russians.
The effort to gather Soviet source information for the grid is
linked to a concerted effort to gather applicable data, both
The enormous complexity of the computations ein wont d in
a
ca
? -
model analysis manes ~
rid for the European Soviet Bloc, for
ic
g
able. In the econom
example, there are per unit of output of each of the 240 sectors
uirements from each of the other 239
t re
q
the commodity inpu
sectors. This will be further broken down into 159 geograph-3
. - +n ho siMi ltane,
th
e ,,,......... -
ical regions. gnus
ously processed theoretically could be of the order
nhl m millions 0,
x lbu, or about 1111111, +_?
tic steps may be involved. Modem
eler
individual arithme
re
tronic computers, however, can perform this
----A ivifli which thel
-
the
ompu
h
es
tionary aspect of
can file, sort, recall, and manipulate large masses of data
These partially routine steps in arriving at intelligence estii
n + Tnn,. have a.lwavs beer
ch
s
u
w. -- -
mates on large areas,
time-consuming and cumbersome. For the more difficult an
e
r with
t
alytical problems, electronic computers aogr
slderii
h
for
mancai inn-r, prgreat many more of the e
and holding in juxtaposition a --
--ihla This tee
was
s
menu or the analysi
eliminate the human judgm
ns
,
nique does not, by any mea
factor.. Rather it is believed that it will prove to be a po
e"ri
lanners to m~
p
nee
lli
t
g
e
tin assis ing ll
tool
better judgments, and to be able to make them more rapidly
Some of the more specific applications of the military,
ted below
.
sources model to air targets problems are presen
i
il
it
es
1. Enemy Capab
del can be used to assess
The military resources mo
capability of the economy of the Soviet Bloc ato mount an
a
f
111111
tam elements o
J tions:
under varying Bloc objectives, policies, and assump
urces}
ilable res
o
government is constrained to work its ava
If it wants a j
i
ps.
within technological relationsh
' The number is actually smaller since many of the coefficielx
emember which o
ld
r
zero. Only a machine, however, cou
zero.
bomber regiment it must provide planes, bombs, crews, air-
bases from which to operate, and so on, in specific quantities.
If a ton of steel is needed the government must see that steel
mill capacity, pig iron, scrap, coal, labor, and so on, are avail-
able in the correct amounts. If more steel capacity is needed
it must provide the steel, concrete, machinery, and so on, in
the right quantities and types to construct a new steel mill.
These resource restraints and technological relationships are
set out comprehensively and in detail by the military resources
model. The ability of the economy to support the mobiliza-
tion of desired combinations or "mixes" of air, land, and sea
forces can be measured. A typical problem would be a deter-
mination of the maximum "balanced" air, land, and sea forces
which could be activated in a specified mobilization period with
specified stockpiling and capital expansion policies. In addi-
tion to measuring the maximum activation of combat units,
the economic grid can be used to determine under a variety of
illoc policies and objectives the maximum capability to pro-
duce specific weapons such as guided missiles and H-bombs at
specified times.
However, the economic-industrial grid does not take into
account any restraints or bottlenecks that might develop
within the military structure itself. Therefore, the outputs of
the economic grid are fed into the military grid as inputs. The
military grid is then used to assess the capability of the Soviet
illoc military structure to mount and sustain, during a pre-
attack period, elements of military strength fully prepared to
rnkage in combat activities required by given strategies. The
ability of the military structure to support desired combina-
tians or "mixes" of air, land, and sea combat activities can be
measured under varying Bloc mobilization objectives, policies,
and assumptions. In addition to measuring the maximum
r*mbat capabilities that can be sustained, the military model
can be used to determine the capability of the military struc-
14at to put into operation specific weapons, such as guided
4*411es. within the available military resources, that is, trained
patratnel, missile sites, logistics, and repair facilities.
Tic transportation grid would then be used to establish any
lttnaportation restraints or bottlenecks which might develop
the economy or military structure itself.
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SECRET 61
2. Effects Analysis
Following their use in pte-attack situations, the three grids
of the military resources model can be used to determine the
capability of the Bloc economy, military structure, ce,a trans-
portation system to re-mount various types
eriod after air attacks of different scope
k
t
p
ac
in the post at
and intensity. The analysis can be applied to various time'
of time only,
d
i
s
o
periods after the air attack. In very short per
the military and transportation grids
ibl
y
the military, or poss
as the answers needed would be the avail,
l
t
ay,
o p
might come in
immediate military structure of the Soviet
th
e
abilities within
ir attacks and to sustain ground and naval
l
e a
Bloc to re-cyc
action. These answers would be in terms of availabilities of
yinP
duce fl
aircraft, runways, fuel, men, and ammunition to pro
ound divisio
hours, and the needed inputs to produce gr
4.1- time narin
of na
it
s
months and un
involved the more industrial and economic resources must be
d
ht
?,?,,,?b
----
analyzed an
In the analyses of recuperation periods of over a fe
rces
.
sou
months the economic-industrial grid is heavily drawn upon
However,
diate post-attack military assessment, as well as long rang
t
.
economic and industrial recuperation assessmen
Selection of Air Targets
3
.
utstanding advances of the model-comput
th
e o
One of
technique is the possibility of rapidly testing a great variety
ant
tions
um
,
p
simulated air targets problems, using various ass
O
e
i
.
p
considering air attacks of varying magnitude and scop
of c
iet
y
mum air target systems can be developed for a var
pe
-
cumstanCes as a result ? e
capabilities problems and post-attack air target ae ffe t pr
-1^11 d3V
e)
iems (a. and u. auo v
sile sites, storage, supply, repair facilities, and industrial f5k 091
itin
transportation installations which prove to be lim
g -%a and inA
o
or bottlenecks in pre-attack mobilization
enn
k
t
k r
p
ac
at
o
re-mounting of combat activities in the p -tac
come the all 4als-. to actual hot
lated problems would, of course, be applied
problems.
4. Feasibility Testing
The necessity for balancing the internal flows within the
matrix of an input-output model make this type of model par-
ticularly suitable for testing the internal consistency of either
announced Soviet Bloc plans or of US intelligence estimates of
Soviet Bloc military or economic growth patterns. For exam-
ple, the internal consistency of either Soviet Bloc plans to
mount military strength or US intelligence estimates of Soviet
Bloc military growth plans can be tested. Estimates inde-
pendently projected for various types of air combat strength
can be tested one against the other in order to determine
whether or not the total projected strength estimate is internal-
ly consistent and whether or not such total strength can be sup-
ported by the Soviet Bloc military structure. The economic
grid can be used to check production estimates independently
arrived at for various military end products to determine
whether or not the production pattern so established is eco-
nomically feasible. The transportation grid should be of great
help in checking estimates of Soviet Bloc transportation pat-
terns and capability.
5. Mobilization Indicators
The military resources model can be used to establish indi-
cators of mobilization build-up. By testing the model under
various assumed mobilization conditions certain economic
changes as well as changes within the military structure can be
Identified as indicators of partial or complete mobilization.
Specific changes in the use of resources can be identified as in-
dicating specific types of mobilization.
6. Intelligence Collection Indicators
In using the military resources model to solve a series of
simulated air targets problems, certain areas of economic and
military activity will be shown to be of critical significance to
Ut capability of the Soviet Bloc to mount and maintain mili-
tary strength. These critical sectors are those on which it is
mwt Important to obtain accurate, current data for targeting
purposes. Thus the priority list of air targets intelligence re-
gWroments can be sharpened, and emphasis can be placed on
U collection of certain key military and economic data.
7. Inputs for Operational Models
The military resources model is to be used to translate any
over-all military strategy into requirements upon the
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economic-industrial, transportation, and military structure for
the creation of military formations and military resource ele-
ments together with the necessary military supporting activi-
ties in both pre- and post-attack situations. Operational
models such as the air battle model, currently being tested,
serve to indicate these requirements in a realistic manner.
The military resources model is designed to provide appropriate
inputs for these operational models in the form of units of comp`,
bat capability and to reflect the output of operational models
in changing requirements upon the military structure. Thus
the military resources model can define the maximum levels of
combat activity possible within the limitations of the Bloc mill),
tary and economic structure at any specified time.
8. Data Requirements
The validity of problem solutions provided by the mili
resources model is dependent upon the accuracy of the data
inputs as well as the logic of the mathematical design of th
model. Each of the component parts of the model - the ee
nomic grid, the military grid, and the transportation grid
has its own data requirements which must be initially asseinn
bled and subsequently kept up to date.
The economic grid contains a classification of economic ac
tivity in the Soviet Bloc in the form of three submatrices o
grids; the commodity input grid, the capital input grid, an
the capital expansion grid. The data requirements of the co
modity input grid or matrix consist of the commodity inpu
per unit of production for each of the 240 sectors of the mat
These sectors cover most of the commodities produced in
Bloc. The data requirements of the capital input matrix c
sist of the inputs of capital equipment and labor per unit
production of each of these same commodities. The data l
u
quired by the capital expansion matrix consist of the co,
modity and capital inputs necessary to increase available ca
ital by one unit: The data described above are in the form
technological coefficients which reflect the technological r,
tionships currently operating as the economic restraints in
desired mobilization or recuperation. by the Soviet Bloc.
order to reflect fully the flexibility of the Soviet Bloc econ
in meeting mobilization or wartime requirements the data
puts must reflect not only production processes currentl;
use but also the alternative processes which could be us
SECRET 63
break bottlenecks, or stoppages resulting from air attack. Thus
the economic grid requires the introduction of all practical
alternate input coefficients in order to establish realistic tech-
nological restraints. Because production technology changes
with the passage of time, these coefficients must be continually
scrutinized to insure that they reflect current technology. In
addition, changes are necessitated in the classification of com-
modities and capital equipment in the light of experience
gained in using the model for various types of problems. Those
economic sectors which prove to be the most sensitive to mobi-
lization or recuperation demands may require a more detailed
or disaggregated classification in the model, whereas less vital
sectors may be further aggregated. .
The running of a simulation on the economic model requires,
in addition to the technological coefficients, data on the eco-
nomic resources available to the Soviet Bloc for the time period
being considered. Thus for each of the 240 commodity groups
in the grid, current data on Bloc capacity, inventory, and for-
eign trade must be assembled.
The data requirements of the military grid of the model
parallel those of the economic grid, but pertain to military
activities rather than economic activities. As previously men-
tioned, the output of the military grid, equivalent to commodity
outputs in the economic grid, is in units of frontline activity,
for example, flying hours of a specific type of bomber. For
each such military activity data on inputs of other military
activities as well as inputs of industrial commodities must be
determined. In addition, for each unit of military activity the
requirements of military capital aggregated in the form of
"resource elements" such as airstrips, naval bases, and repair
facilities must be determined together with the inputs neces-
sary to expand a military "resource element" by one unit. As
in the case of the economic grid, input data for alternative
Processes of producing a unit of military activity must be
Wembled and all coefficients in the grid must be kept in accord
11th the most modern logistical processes used by the Soviet
We. In the running of simulations on the military grid, data
pf total Soviet Bloc capacity, inventories, and possible incre-
t to from foreign trade for each of the military activities in
t11t+ grid Should be available for the time period under consid-
tton.
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The introduction of transportation factors into. the military-
resources model requires an analysis of the Soviet Bloc eco-
nomic and military commodity flow structure in terms of geo-
graphic regions, thus greatly increasing the data needs. For
each region the types and amounts of transportation facilities
available must be determined in order to establish the freight-
handling capabilities of each region. For example, the analysig
of the USSR railroad system, currently underway, requires for,
each terminal, link, and region estimates of the terminal motive.
power and freight-car handling capacities, rail-link capacities,
and regional car-day requirements. In addition to these trans
portation data requirements, the Soviet Bloc production and
consumption pattern must be established by geographic region.'
This task requires the identification of the types and amounts;
of economic and military capital facilities, or "resource el
ments," available in each region. In addition, the Soviet Bloc
"bill of goods," or final demand for military and civilian goods;
must be determined by geographic region. The regional con,
sumption of goods for military, government, and civilian use as
well as the regional consumption of construction materials an
producer durables must be estimated. Only when all th
data are introduced into the military resources model can th
transportation restraints, or "bottlenecks" under specifi
mobilization and recuperation conditions be identified.
The data problem is formidable, but considerable progr
has been made, and new sources of data are being found an
exploited. The data requirements for the model-machine tec
nique do not represent a marked change from the req
ments of traditional methods of analysis. However, the rigo
ous analysis made possible by this technique or method simpp;
makes existing data deficiencies more apparent. Moreov
this technique has the additional advantage of enabling
analyst to identify those specific data requirements which,`.'.
the most crucial in target analysis by subjecting the data,
various types of sensitivity testing, e.g., the variation of co
cients, and data aggregations. The model also offers a me,
of testing the reliability of coefficients in the light of kno
output patterns of past years. It is believed that these va i(
testing techniques will contribute to a sharpening of the,
ority list of intelligence collection requirements.
The headshrinkers' literature is full of remarks about the
efforts of mankind to avoid thinking. As a matter of fact, I
rather imagine that a very small proportion of the brainpower
of the most creative thinker alive is ever devoted to creative
thought. In our society a fairly large proportion of this small
amount of creative thought is devoted to finding ways to help
mankind avoid thinking. Games, alcohol, tranquilizers, TV,
and business routine can all be used to help an individual fill
24 hours a day without ever having a creative thought. We like
cliches because they help us sound confident without thinking.
This does not mean that the average man is idle. On the con-
trary, he is probably a very active and useful citizen. As a
matter of fact, idleness is generally abhorred because it leaves
a vacuum that is an invitation to thought.
You and I may be exceptions to this general pattern in some
small degree, but I want the reader to recognize that if this
taper contains one small original thought, it will be here only
as a result of tremendous psychic effort spent in overcoming
my own urge not to think, and that if this thought, in its turn,
sUmulates any creative thinking in the mind of the reader, it
'will be only over the opposition of your shrewd and dogged sub-
conscious which tries so hard to protect you from the rash act
of thinking.
having drafted this challenge to the reader's subconscious,
I now propose that we think about some of the problems of in-
telligence. (I almost said "look at some of the problems of in-
klligence." This just goes to show you how my subconscious
&bhors the sound of the word "think.") To pose the problems
thrt I would like us to think about, I want first to go back into
a little Intellectual history. Some of the readers will be much
more familiar with the events that I am about to describe than
1 am, but here at least is my version.
In the early days of the postwar intelligence effort, the at-
ktiUon of the intelligence community was focused primarily
'twt the interpretation of surface phenomena. Some of the
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65-70
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t issue were almost unbelievably naive. For ex-
questions a
ample, there was not complete agreement on the general nature
of the Soviet Communist system, and there was a great deal of,
i the
discuss
on __ ---and other p
eo
ple feeling that these were indigenous parties,
_
iet annara.tlus. Dur
+w S
f
ov
t the
th
-
y ..~-- r -
a
pie ieeiuir,
standards
ing this period there was no agreement concerning
At one extreme
it
y.
of analysis in the intelligence commun
ents without re
some people used biased and emotional argum
eople eiaimP.1
p
guru to system. .
that local communist parties were not part of the ,Sovieet+ap
her as
paratus because C
to settle the matter in a court of law. As time went by, how;
to acce
p
ever, the intelligence community more and more came
w r -e%nnmirc- gnni
d
,?..
the standar
ology, and so forth, and attempted to conform to academi
ement on standards of thought tended to
l
V V
agre
Genera
the major problems in intelligence into the realm of facts.
iven situation should be interpreted
d that a
g
as agree
it w the use of the techniques of economics then the size of tl
the situata
i
n
gross national product of a country involved
t having great bearin
_____+
f
ant
ac
Uilum intuuy
on the final analysis of the situation. The intell~i~gen~c Ca
munity, therefore, . ?? o
estions of the fact were important issues. SO
which major qu
blood and sweat shed over the numbers
f
th
e
emember
of us r
Soviet planes produced, the size of the gross national prodti
f the Chinese rah
d the adequacy o
of Communist China, an
The list could continue ad infinitum.
roads
.
The focusing of the intelligence community on major qi
elop
th
e fie,
tions of fact feu to
for the establishment or verification of facts. Some of. th
ouidb
'
am, c
I I;
techniques, like the factory markings progi
hou
e
erally understood and accepted' throug
fiPir1.q
involvii
hove
. -- -
Even un this field,
phisticated statistical techniques, acceptance of the new m
q
her techni
lete
Ot
_
od was neither immediate nor comp
-a YnPT4~
d
analysis in political an
aoc.w --~ their wake. At,,
gasp g
nit
y
the intelligence commu
point, the intelligence community entered a stage which
always be with us to some extent. It is the stage in which
arguments about fact are caused by the technological gap be-
tween the informed and the uninformed analyst. This is a gap
that training and experience have narrowed considerably and
which probably can be narrowed even further in the future,
but it probably will exist to some degree as long as some parts
of the intelligence community develop new methods and new
ways of thinking and other parts of the intelligence community
lag in knowledge and understanding. It is not necessarily a
bad phenomenon. It at least means that somebody is out in
front and doing some thinking. It keeps the other fellows on
their toes.
As a result of over 10 years of development, the intelligence
community has now reached a high level of sophistication in
the application of standard techniques of analysis to intelli-
gence problems.' Subsidiary methods such as style of writing
and the manner of presentation are excellent. The community
seems to have learned how to produce very good answers to
intelligence problems without generating an undue amount of
Internal friction. All this is cause for considerable pride and
satisfaction.
As good as we may be, however, we are obviously not good
enough. We have just seen a classic example of one of our
major outstanding difficulties in the question of US policy to-
ward the launching of the Soviet earth satellite. There was no
failure of intelligence to report the facts relating to the Soviet
satellite program well in advance of the event, and intelligence
also pointed out that this event would be of distinct advantage
to the Soviet Union in the field of political prestige. Intelli-
gence had done the job our customers normally expect of us,
and yet in a real sense, the US was caught napping. The US
prepared a plan of what to do after the Soviets had launched
a Jatellite, but we did not take any action or even decide to take
any action before the event. In other words, our planners did
fwt fully recognize the magnitude of the blow the Soviet
taunching would give to our prestige. It would be very easy for
us to sit back smugly and blame the unfortunate consequences
On the policymakers, who were adequately informed in advance
bnt Who did not take adequate action in advance. Could it be
*At we have not yet established adequate confidence in our
product in the minds of our consumers? Could it be that the
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fault still lay with the intelligence community? Could it be
that we have not yet devised the proper method of presentation
which would permit us to say "damn it, we mean it!"
If we are willing to recognize that it is possible for intelli-
gence to "fail" even when it is shrewdly accurate and timely
we might find further food for thought in looking at the pro
lems that we are being shrewdly accurate and timely about:
They tend to be problems that have a fairly immediate practical
application. No one could object to our tackling such problems
When one looks for analysis in depth or in terms of long-te
trends, however, we find that it is generally lacking in our for
mal publications. The bold analysis, the sharp intuition, th
long step ahead, and the provocative ideas are generally foun
in informal bull sessions; in "think" pieces that have no tru
status; in the internal staff memoranda of ONE, OCI, and so on
and in some of the briefs and background material used by th
DDI on an ad hoc basis. They are almost never found in thi
formal papers put forward by the community for the so
guidance of our planners and policymakers.
There are strong conservative influences in our present
tem of producing intelligence which would tend to resist than
in anything involving method and type of analysis, form
presentation, and so on. Might we not be at a point of develo
ment, however, where we need to make a quantum jump in
conduct of intelligence? Is there any way in which intellige
can learn to say better "we mean it," "these are the probl
that may arise in consequence," "these are the decisions
must be decided?" How can we extend our analysis in
and depth beyond present dimensions and yet carry with us
conservative elements in the intelligence community?
There might be changes in organization or in the meth
of presentation which might improve our impact on the fo
lation and execution of national policy. These things sho
be explored, but no such changes could create, by themsel,
the change in the intellectual and visceral impact of in
gence that we must aim for. The only sure way to con
national affairs with greater wisdom is for the responsible
organizational substitute for brains. Intelligence is an
portant and integral part of the process by which we condo'
our national affairs, and intelligence officers, therefore, ha
SECRET 69
tremendous responsibility to apply themselves to new ways of
thinking which will give us a more brilliant insight into the
dynamic world and our constantly changing place in it.
The real area in which we must seek improvement, there-
fore, is in that related to analysis. Perhaps we must learn to
pose a different kind of question to ourselves. Perhaps we need
to learn to think on a different time scale. Perhaps we need
to develop even more new methods of analysis. Perhaps we
need to do some combination of all of these things, and many
others as well.
There are probably many different ideas that should be ex-
amined. Here is a sample of the kind of thing that we might
think about. Might it not useful for us to engage systemati-
cally in backward analysis from hypothetical cases? For ex-
ample, intelligence predicted the launching of the Soviet earth
satellite and said that it would have unfortunate consequences.
But let us suppose that several years ago we had posed the fol-
lowing question: "What would be the impact on the policy
situation of the US and on its prestige if the Soviet Union were
to accomplish some technological breakthrough which would
support a Soviet claim for Soviet supremacy in the field of sci-
ence and technology?" If we had had this sort of analysis, it
might have been possible for us to point out in a much more
meaningful manner the way in which the Soviet missile pro-
gram and the development of a Soviet earth satellite might
place the Soviet Union in the favorable situation envisaged in
our hypothetical analysis. We could pose other similar ques-
ttons such as: "What will be the effect on the world political
altuatlon when Soviet industrial production equals US indus-
trial production?" "What would be the consequences if all
of the 'third force' groups backed by the US came to power and
'right wing' parties disappeared?" "What would the world
kink like after 20 years of disarmament and `peaceful coex-
Utance?"' Analysis of these questions might put a vastly dif-
terent light on intermediate developments leading toward the
hypothetical situation we have posed for ourselves.
There is undoubtedly room for improvement in our work, but
Unfortunately as we get better and better, we have more and
more justification for continuing to think and do exactly as
re h*ae been thinking and doing. This is more and more justi-
GtUtiort for not thinking creatively about improvement. We
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70 SECRET
know, however, that there will always remain an important
challenge to us in intelligence as long as the US does no
act to accommodate itself adequately to world developments
What do you think that we should do about it?
SECRET 71
ELINT
A SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.
Charles A. Kroger, Jr.
During the initial phases of the Battle of Britain a German
bomber, relatively safe under cover of darkness, flew over the
blacked-out landscape heading for London. At a specific mo-
ment the bomber dropped its bombs, which accurately hit their
target, and another successful German Luftwaffe attack was
history. Electronic advancements by the Germans made this
possible. British interception and analysis of this new elec-
tronic bombing device countered the Germans' success and
continued to render less effective every subsequent electronic
advantage the Germans. developed. In a parallel manner the
Germans developed a highly effective electronic intelligence
rdiort directed against the Allied raids originating from Britain.
This phase of electronic intelligence, utilizing electronic means
to determine enemy electronic capabilities, began in England
just before World War II and has been an ever increasing effort
which today is called ELINT.
ELINT is a coined word for the process of electronic intercept
and analysis or electronic intelligence - a process about which
rrry little has been written. The intelligence officer, unless he
Is In the electronics field himself, has had little contact with
FLINT. By directive ELINT is defined as: "the collection
(observation and recording), and the technical processing for
later intelligence purposes, of information on foreign, non-
communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from
Other than atomic detonation sources." In simple terms,
LLINT is the detection and analysis of radiations from foreign
*kctronic devices for the purpose of extracting information of
talus to intelligence.
Jtut as a flashlight radiates a beam of light observable to the
human eye, electronic devices emit or radiate nonvisible, non-
wdible radiations which are detectable and recordable, using
Ikttronlc devices just as the human ear hears sound. This
ptfon or collection of enemy radiations is the first stage
'6 RUNT.
lbe formal definition restricts ELINT to "noncommunica-
Oft radiations other than atomic detonation
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sources" This means that ELINT is responsible for all radia-
tions except those used in voice or other communications cCch
a
d those resulting from
legraph an
s radio or te hat other kind of radiations are there? To name a few with
What
missiles and mis
f
rom
adiations
which ELINT deals, there are r
adiations from d
r
sile guidance devices,on el tronic devices
tories and field testing stations working
'
irc
ra t g fir
d
cr
a
radar, navigational aids, antiaircraft an
for later intelligence purposes" means
in
g
ical process
"Techn subjecting the collected ELINT raw data, u
r1pi sual
a 11 d y in the fso by
of beeps on a mdr.ilr- u -
equipment p
ic euipment. This eq p p
t
x elec
ron
use of comple
to see on an oscilloscope, to
ith his ears
,
t to hear w
the analys measure very accurately, to photograph, to compare with
__---4--A ~imnai in as mano
ti
at
g
--
standards and to inves
ways as are necessary to identify the characteristics of th
nrnopSSlnP'" is complete
foreign device. vv uric u-
ass to the intelligence analyst d
t can
l
p
ys
al ana
the technic tailed information on the location and capabilities of the Pori
The int
o-- ----
eign device.
this information with other knowledge to estimate the over-
For a technical look at what ELINT really is let +usttuurn
in
a
ht
i
,v ew
, t,
-w -
g
magnetic energy, like l
in length and form a spectrum. We are all familiar with
6 iinving
ing
n
g
l
rainbow with ILS coors ra viola'
millimicrons in length (400 million megacycles/sec); e
meM
(800 millio
th
leng
with waves of 385 millimicrons in
-4-
nr +In dl
his
cycles sec). p -~
netic spectrum. The radio portion of this electromagne
,?no+innc and multi
d
ctrum is use
spe , ...-._ weapons use radio wa
y
the militar
tl
y
Curren
weapons.
varying from a few thousand cycles (waves per second) up,
n waves per sewn'
billi
o
ndred
100 kilomegacycles (one hu _ :4: of the radio
di
ng
The following
r all electromagnetic
in the ove
color spectrums e bands
an expansion of the radio spectrum showing
t
di
e.
a
different soviet electronic devices ra
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For a specific example of how ELINT works, let us take a
simplified look at Soviet radar. Soviet radar devices radiate
electronic impulses at certain frequencies and in definite beams
searching the sky for long distances and great altitudes for any
object that may be present. When these impulses strike an
object they bounce off and return to a ground or airborne re-
ceiver which calculates the length of time between emission
and reception and the strength of the signal received. From
this, the Soviet radar operator can generally tell the size, speed,
direction, altitude, and other pertinent information about the
unseen object. Our Strategic Air Command, with its retalia-
tory mission, urgently requires every possible bit of information
on Soviet radars - particularly on their location and capa-
bility. This is where ELINT goes to work. By, intercepting,
amplifying, recording and analyzing an enemy radar signal or
pulse, we can learn all about it. By studying the type of radi-
ation, its modulation (AM, FM, pulse) its pulse repetition rate,
pulse duration, pulse shape, its radio frequency (position on
the electronic spectrum), its antenna pattern characteristics,
and so on, we can identify the radar, compare it with known
information, ascertain its range, location, use, and other essen-
tial information required to evaluate its capability as a radar
and its susceptibility to countermeasures.
This same process of ELINT pertains to any and all enemy
electronic devices including airborne intercept devices used by
guided missiles, guided missile launchers, fighter aircraft, long-
range and short-range navigational aids, ground controlled in-
tercept height finders, anti-aircraft and aircraft fire control
radar, blind bombing devices, electronic radiations emanating
from scientific laboratories or production plants, and so on.
What do these radiated signals sound like? Frankly they
sound like noise or radio static during a thunder storm-in
fact, before the more euphonious term of ELINT was coined, the
British called it "Noise Listening" and, during World War II,
had a "Noise Listening Bureau."
Although ELINT is a very complex field - constantly looking
beyond present knowledge of electronics to fulfill its role of pro-
viding timely information on new foreign electronic develop-
ments, it need not be pushed aside as too complicated to be
understood. Because of its complexity, some members of the
intelligence community are inclined to throw up their hands
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and ignore this potential tool. However, FLINT is not too
difficult to comprehend or use, nor is it an end in itself, but it
can contribute essential, accurate information to the intelli-
gence process.
Scientific intelligence and, in particular, ELINT, or electronic
intelligence, had its start in England immediately before World
War II. Early in 1939 the British Committee for the Scientific
Study of Air Defense first drew attention to Britain's ignorance
of new German weapons. One scientist, Dr. R. V. Jones, was
appointed to look into the matter. Before he even started his
task the war broke out and in June 1940, Dr. Jones, after con-
siderable study, concluded that the Germans had developed a
radio beam by which their bombers could operate over England
regardless of weather, darkness, or cloud cover and still be most
accurate in their blind bombing. This beam, just a little more
than one-half mile wide, passed directly over London. Based
on Dr. Jones' conclusion, steps were immediately taken to find
any possible countermeasures. A Royal Air Force search air-
craft was outfitted and it accomplished its mission of looking
for and detecting this German beam. Technical analysis of
this information provided the radio frequency and other char-
acteristics of the beam, thus permitting the British to jam it
and render. it ineffective. Henceforth, many bombs intended
for London fell harmlessly on the open countryside. This in-
terception and analysis of an enemy electronic radiation (later
known as Knicklbein) was the birth of present day ELINT.
The Germans altered their beam system and soon began using
a better system utilizing intersecting beams referred to as the
"X" apparatus, which provided greater accuracy. These beams
were at a different frequency than Kriicklbein, requiring new
search and analysis before the British solved this new threat
and took countermeasures. With the "X" apparatus, the
bomber flew along an electronic beam while its position along
the beam was observed from a German radar station on the
continent. When the bomber was over the target, it was told
to drop its bombs. By now Britain's ELINT capability of inter-
cepting and analyzing this electronic information was quite
effective and continued to grow in scope and importance
throughout the war.
During World War II the US made extensive use of electronic
intercept devices in both the Pacific and European Theatres of
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Operation. Special USAF and Navy planes equipped with
ELINT receivers ferreted out the secrets of German and Jap-
anese antiaircraft radar and aircraft warning devices. From
the use of such planes the word "ferret" was coined, a term
Presently applied to aircraft equipped to investigate enemy
electronic radiations. Among the most deadly weapons di-
rected against the Eighth Air Force were the German antiair-
craft guns which were equipped with extremely accurate radar
directors known as "Wurzbergs." The close formations of
American aircraft made a juicy target for the more than 16,000
German antiaircraft guns. By use of radar intercept equip-
ment (ELINT equipment) information was obtained which per-
mitted the use of jamming devices, and thus the one-billion
dollar investment of the Germans in their Wurzberg radars was
literally ruined by the countermeasures made possible through
ELINT. Knowing we had this capability, the Germans began
a frantic search for non-jammable radar equipment, but the
war was over before they succeeded.
Following World War II there was a period in which interest
in ELINT, as in many wartime activities, tapered off. Some
effort continued but the real push to provide intelligence on
electronic advancements in other countries was not initiated
until the USSR clamped down its Iron Curtain. Since that
time, the collection and analysis of electronic signals radiating
behind the Curtain has been the constant goal of ELINT. Since
the birth of ELINT in 1940 the effort has grown in size, cost.
importance, complexity, coverage, and capability, and, like
most scientific efforts, is making yesterday's limits, today's
capabilities.
Electronic intercept, to use one connotation of ELINT, pro-
vides factual information. Unlike the collection of much in-
telligence information where we are forced to rely on word of
mouth, memory, or integrity of source, electronic radiations are
intercepted and recorded by machine. If a signal is being radi-
ated it can be recorded and later reported accurately even by
someone who doesn't understand all that he is doing. Because
of this factual nature, ELINT has provided substantiation of
many intelligence estimates based on other intelligence
processes.
During World War II, Air Force B-24 aircraft and radar-
equipped Navy Catalina aircraft were assigned the job of locat-
ing enemy radar in the Pacific. They spotted and pinpointed
Japanese air warning sets scattered all the way from the Solo-
mons to the China coast. A few days before the Leyte landing
in October 1944 one of the ferrets discovered a new Japanese
radar on Suluan Island at the mouth of the Leyte gulf. As
this radar commanded the approaches to the Leyte coast line
it was necessary to eliminate it and this was done on a com-
mando raid by the US Rangers.
Currently, ELINT is providing the Strategic Air Command
with the intelligence it requires on the location and range of
Soviet radar. Through ELINT, information is acquired on the
method, capability, and limitations of Soviet long-range navi-
gation systems upon which their atomic bombers rely. Soviet
missile tests are monitored by ELINT and the point may soon
be reached where, by interception and analysis of the telemeter-
ing signal from Soviet missiles, we will acquire missile per-
formance data vital to our National Intelligence Estimates.
(Telemetering is the electronic system used in missile testing
which records, codes, and transmits to ground test stations such
things as missile speed, flight path, guidance, skin tempera-
tures, and other behavior characteristics of the missile in
flight.)
Since early in World War II the Army, Navy, and Air Force
each have expended varying degrees of effort on ELINT, and in
1952 the Central Intelligence Agency entered the ELINT field.
Although much of this individual endeavor was valuable, in
1954 better organization was given to ELINT -organization
on a national level. The lack of proper dissemination of val-
uable intelligence produced by one organization but not always
readily available to the others in the community was noted as a
serious problem. When this situation came to the attention of
the National Security Council a study was made, and National
Security Council intelligence Directive No. 17, entitled Elec-
tronic Intelligence (ELINT) was issued (in May 1955).
NSCID-17 established the first national policy for ELINT and
it is still the basic authority for the national ELINT program.
It directed that:
a. The US Communications Intelligence Board
(USCIB) shall be the national policy body for ELINT.
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b. The Department of Defense and the Central In-
telligence Agency shall be responsible for their respec-
tive ELINT collection activities.
c. The technical processing of all ELINT shall be
accomplished in a jointly-staffed center administered
by the Department of Defense.
d. All data collected by the collection agencies shall
be made available to the National Technical Process-
ing Center (NTPC).
e. The NTPC shall effect the fullest and most expe-
ditious processing possible and furnish the results to
the interested agencies.
The present national organization for ELINT is rather com-
plex, with many interlocking organizations and many formal
and informal coordinating committees. The important con-
sideration is that each of the services and CIA is free to run its
own collection operations designed to furnish information it
alone requires, but is expected to submit all collected data to
the NTPC subject only to the minimum delays necessitated by
prior exploitation for urgent tactical or operational purposes.
One can immediately see the strong vertical organization for
ELINT within each major component. It should also be appre-
ciated that much horizontal collaboration is being accom-
plished by joint participation in such organizations as the
NTPC and AFOIN-Z in an effort to coordinate individual activi-
ties into a national ELINT program.
In October 1953 a study was made of ELINT in CIA. This
resulted in the appointment of an Agency ELINT staff officer
and in the preparation of an Agency ELINT program which the
Director of Central Intelligence approved on 29 May 1954.
Within the Agency ELINT is organized generally as follows.
The Office of Scientific Intelligence develops targets and
requirements for ELINT collection, furnishes scientific and
technical guidance to Agency collectors, and performs the tech-
nical analysis and collation of ELINT with all source material
in the production of scientific intelligence. The Clandestine
Services conducts a continuing review of the potential and
capabilities for covert ELINT collection, implements specific
clandestine activity in response to approved ELINT require-
ments, and coordinates US ELINT clandestine activities with
foreign governments. The Office of Communications arranges
for research, development, and procurement of ELINT equip-
ment as required to support clandestine ELINT collection. The
CIA ELINT Staff Officer advises the Deputy Director of Central
Intelligence and appropriate operating components on the
formulation, implementation, and coordination of ELINT
plans, policies, and programs.
On the national level, much work has gone into summarizing
what each organization requires in the way of information on
enemy electronic developments. This sizeable task has re-
sulted in a formal statement of the currently definable Specific
ELINT Collection Requirements (SPECOR). This collection
guide is based on the priority of the National Intelligence Ob-
jectives. It has been disseminated throughout the services and
CIA field units for guidance as to what information the intelli-
gence community requires and in what priority.
To realize the need for an adequate requirements system,
consider that the ideal ELINT system is one capable of collect-
ing all s bgnals of interest and extracting all of the useful infor-
mation from each signal. This is neither possible nor prac-
ticable, however. The questions of just what signals are of
interest and just what information about them is needed must
be answered in the light of the gaps in our intelligence. Thus,
as in other branches of technical intelligence, ELINT is faced
with the problem of relating scientific techniques to intelli-
gence problems.
In general, ELINT targets fall into two major categories.
The Army, Navy, and Air Force, charged with the military de-
fense of our country, are primarily concerned with the location
and capability of all enemy radar on a current basis. This is
referred to as the Radar Order of Battle (ROB). The Air
Force, for instance, must know where the heavy concentrations
of enemy radar are so that its planes can either skirt the area
or take proper countermeasures. The largest portion of inter-
cepted enemy electronic information falls into this category of
maintaining an adequate radar order of battle. CIA, on the
other hand, is primarily interested in scientific break-through,
or in not being surprised by new enemy electronic develop-
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ments. This means that most ELINT effort is directed toward
the interception and analysis of new and unusual electronic
signals. Naturally in the course of searching for new and un-
usual signals, much order of battle information is received.
This serves, in addition to supplementing the services opera-
tions,
as a basis of comparison to determine what is new and
unusual. The ELINT objectives of first priority to CIA relate
to those signals which have yet to be intercepted or for which
the radiating source has yet to be seen. Specifically, the
targets are as follows:
a. Those non-communication signals which are, or
are suspected to be, associated with the Soviet or
Satellite ability to deliver atomic or other weapons of
destruction - that is, guidance or telemetry signals
associated with missiles, airborne navigation, and
bombing systems.
b. Those non-communication signals which are or
are suspected to be associated with the Soviet or Satel-
lite ability to defend their countries against the deliv-
ery of atomic or other weapons of destruction -that is,
early warning, ground-control intercept, gap-filling
radars, surface-to-air weapons systems, airborne weap-
ons systems, ground surveillance systems, jammers,
and so forth.
c. Those signals occupying an unusual portion of
the radio frequency spectrum not normally associated
with Soviet or Satellite equipment.
The equipment involved in ELINT is elaborate and com-
plex. To make matters worse, the higher up the frequency
spectrum you go the shorter your intercept range becomes,
and the present trend toward higher frequencies means that
ELINT equipment must get closer to the target or be designed
with greater ranges, both of which approach the impossible.
ELINT equipment falls into two main catagories: collection
equipment (airborne, maritime, fixed station, or agent-carried)
and analysis equipment (used on the ground to reproduce,
readout, and analyze the collected information). Basically,
the major components of an ELINT collection system are the
antenna, receiver, recorder, direction finder, and analyzer.
The antenna corresponds to the human ear. It is that com-
ponent which first detects a signal. It is, of course, desirable
that the antenna be very sensitive or, as we say in ELINT, have
high antenna gain. This permits the maximum intercept
range. The ideal antenna system would have the following
characteristics:
a. a continuous and fixed broad area coverage,
b. very broad electronic spectrum coverage,
c. very high gain,
d. inherent capability for giving directional in-
formation.
These requirements are not all compatible. In practice it is
necessary to compromise in order to gain a workable system.
The decision as to which of the desirable characteristics can
be safely compromised, and to what extent, is based on the fre-
quency range of interest and also on the specific ELINT target
under consideration. For instance, broad area coverage may
be obtained by either of two means - a broad beam antenna
fixed in space or a narrow beam, scanning antenna. The first
method demands a sacrifice in gain. The second limits the
time coverage of any part of the total area.
Following receipt of the signal by the antenna it is passed to
a receiver. The function of the receiver is to convert trans-
mitted information available at the antenna into a form that
can be measured and recorded. Basically two general types of
receivers are in use today - the superheterodyne and the
crystal video. The operating characteristics of each receiver
may be outlined as follows:
Superheterodyne - slow scan.
a. inherently high sensitivity,
b. good frequency resolution,
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c. prohibitively long search time in many cases.
Crystal video -wide open.
a. low sensitivity reducing maximum probable
range,
b. frequency resolution problems,
c. search time considerably less than the super-
heterodyne.
From the receiver the signal goes next to the recorder where
the.0"al is c,+_-3
___ _ .. .
on
main reasons for recording signals.^rA permanent record of the'
signal is required for future analysis and for records, and on
signals of
h
s
ort duration or higher complexity the operator
may not have enough time or capability to evaluate the signal
parameters before the transmission is ended.
Direction-finding equipment is sometimes utilized during the
interception of the signal. It displays incoming signals on an
oscilloscope or other azimuth-reading device giving the direc-
tion of the arrival of the signal.
Analyzers in the ELINT collection system are sometimes used
during interception to provide a preliminary observation of the
type of modulation and to measure the repetition rate, dura-
tion, and general shape of signal pulses. Signals are usually
presented by a cathode ray tube (similar to a television screen),
which provides a moving picture of the shape, size, and nature
of the incoming signal pulse or wave form. The pictures are
usually photographed as a permanent record. It should be
pointed out that ELINT collection devices need not be huge
in size, as are those used in ground, sea, and some airborne
operations. Quite to the contrary, considerable use is made of
miniature equipment no larger than a book. ELINT collection
equipment is usually designed for the specific situation in-
volved, whether it be a 60-foot parabolic antenna on the ground
or a tiny, unassuming, hand-carried package.
The major components of an ELINT analysis system vary
greatly with the purpose of the analysis. Order-of-battle
analysis is often done automatically by IBM-type equipment.
The analysis that CIA performs is not for order of battle but is
to identify new and unusual signals. For this, man-operated
equipment is required and an analysis position contains at least
. rAPE
IRON RECONOEP
ATION ON
SEW.-
PECTRON
ND
SPACENEET-
SIGNS
EIGN REAN.IOTN
D ROTATION AND/OR
NOD E
the following fundamental equipment: a tape transport used
for duplicating or monitoring; a counter that measures and
illustrates the modulation frequency; an ink-on-paper recorder
to draw a continuous trace of the signal amplitude; an oscil-
loscope, which permits observation of the wave form; a vibra-
lizer to display modulation frequency components versus time;
filters to separate signals; a rapid-advance movie camera; and
a host of other equipment to permit the analyst to scan great
volumes of tape and film to separate that minute portion which,
upon detailed analysis, may prove to be a new electronic devel-
opment.
It is hoped that this basic discussion of ELINT will provide a
general concept of this complex scientific intelligence process.
It should be realized that in the interest of readability many
points have been simplified and technical details omitted so as
not to confuse the non-technical reader.
If one considers that one-third of the cost of a modern fighter
aircraft goes for electronic equipment and that most of the
electronic devices which make up this equipment radiate sig-
nals, then one begins to understand how much there is to learn
of Soviet capabilities by examining their use of electronics.
This also applies to ground and sea weapons, including missiles.
Recent news reports of Soviet developments in the scientific
field demonstrate how heavily the Russians are relying on elec-
tronics and how advanced their development is. The Soviet
earth satellites with their radiated signals are a responsibility
of ELINT. ELINT must continue to intercept and to analyze
Soviet electromagnetic emissions preferably in the research and
development stages in order to keep abreast of Soviet electronic
advancements and to attempt to predict future capabilities.
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REPORT ON HUNGARIAN REFUGEES
Guy E. Coriden
The Hungarian Revolution of October 1956 provided an un-
precedented opportunity for the collection of intelligence on a
Soviet Bloc country. Each of the many facets of intelligence
activity played its role. Every known Free World and Bloc
intelligence organization was involved. Every Hungarian
refugee who could toddle was a potential target for an intelli-
gence-minded group. It is obviously impossible, therefore, to
claim with good conscience to tell the "intelligence story" of
the Hungarian Revolution. It is also impossible to get the
many participants to agree on which of the many efforts was
the most fruitful. This, then, will be the account of one
activity - the collection of the intelligence information and
material from the Hungarians who were admitted to the US.
Other operations will be mentioned only as they are considered
ix-rtinent. Because the opportunity was unique, certain adap-
tations in intelligence collection methods were required to take
lull advantage of it. The object was to extract the maximum
anwunt of intelligence at a minimum cost while still. abiding
by decent rules of human conduct. As the methods used were
lit-cessarily determined by the processing and resettlement pro-
erdcurs as well as by the official US Government attitude to-
ward intelligence exploitation, it might be well to begin with a
brief historical background.
'I'hc story of the revolution has been told many times, prob-
ably best by the UN in its massive report. The outbreak took
place on 23 October 1956, and in the months following, it is
ratlrnated that 188,000 Hungarians found refuge in Austria and
18.000 in Yugoslavia. As of 1 September 1957, approximately
35.000 of these refugees had accepted asylum in the US.
In early November 1956, when it became apparent that a
num"ive influx of Hungarians was going to have to be resettled,
It wu4 decided that Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, would be the
prOcessing center for all of the refugees. Because the iinstalla-
lton was an Army camp, the Army was charged with the initial
Iftlxonsibility for coordinating the resettlement effort and pro-
tiding all of the housekeeping services. On 12 December 1956,
MORI/HRP PAGES
CONFIDENTIAL 85-93
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL 87
however, the President appointed a civilian Committee for.
Tracey F. Voorhees. This Committee has coordinated all activ-'
utilized the services of more than 20 volunteer and govern-
mon4.,1 ., ..
November 1956 until early May 1957, when Camp Kilmer was'
Military Sea Transport Service (MSTS)~ocean voyages, and 133
fli
ghts chartered by the Intergovernmental Committee for,
and Naturalization and the Public Health Service performed
the functions necessary for admitting aliens to the US, and
various charitable-religious agencies arranged for most of the
resettlements. Part of the job of fitting the individual's skills'
to available employment opportunities was performed by the,
The processing and resettlement was handled with an amazing,
degree of efficiency, and the sympathetic attitude of the Amen-.
can peo
le was s
t
i
p
o sus
a
ned that by early May it was possible
to close Camp Kilmer. About 32,000 of the refugees had been
dispersed to various parts of the country, and those remaining
Lest the cursory nature of this account convey they idea
that this was a simple and smooth process, remember that the
operation involved the complete transplanting to the US of a
large number of participants in a violent revolution who h
d
a
lost most of their possessions and who had little or no knowl-
edge of the English language. Only 6,500 of these could come'
under any available immigration quota. The rest were ad-
mitted under the Attorney General's discretionary authority,
and the rules were established and changed several times.
Indeed, methods and procedures were developed, abandoned,
and reinstituted many times in the early days of the operation.
Also the prevailing attitudes, both official and public, changed
appreciably over the months. In the early days the primary
concern was to provide a humanitarian welcome for the vic-
timized Hungarian people. Every effort was made to avoid 1;A
incidents which might cause unfavorable comment. This atti-
tude was motivated by a genuine sympathy and admiration for
the Hungarians and a determination to take full advantage of
CONFIDENTIAL
the propaganda opportunity against the Soviet Bloc. As the
spotlight of international interest turned elsewhere, concern
for internal security and the collection of material bearing on
motivations came to the fore.
A few statistics may help to give some idea of the scope of
both the intelligence collection problem and the opportunities.
Hungary is a nation with a population roughly equal to that
of Pennsylvania and a land area just slightly smaller than that
of Indiana. About 65 percent of the population was consid-
ered to be rural, and 16 percent was concentrated in Budapest
and its environs. The 188,000 people who fled the country
during the great exodus represented about 2 percent of the
population. No age distribution is readily available for pre-
revolutionary Hungary, but 83 percent of the refugees received
into the US were under 40 years of age, and approximately 64
percent of them were males. This is certainly not a typical
slice from an old country in a near postwar period. Also
despite the fact that Hungary is predominately rural, less than
1 percent of the group coming to the US admitted to being
engaged in agricultural enterprises. This is probably easily
explained on two counts: first, the land owners, even collective
farmers, are less likely to leave than the landless; and second,
those of rural background, faced with new opportunities and
feeling that they have little prospect of owning land in the new
country, are likely to follow the prevailing trend toward city
occupations, even to the extent of falsifying their background
statements. Another survey of the refugees who were over 16
years of age (excluding housewives) revealed that the average
education of the group coming to the US was almost 10 years.
The fact that the refugees were young, well educated, male,
and engaged primarily in nonagricultural enterprises is a
happy one when we think of the group both as a national
asset and as a positive foreign intelligence target. The addi-
tional fact that this predominately urban group formed about
1 percent of the total population of a small agricultural country
should mean that not only every trade and industry but every
major enterprise should be represented by a delegate in the US
group. It is well recognized that a certain number of the Hun-
garians probably succumbed to the human tendency to exag-
gerate and alter their backgrounds, but it is believed that the
distortion is not significant for our purposes.
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CONFIDENTIAL
In November 1956 the intelligence community faced the pro
lem of exploiting the Hungarians without the benefit of even:
the crude statistics presented in this article. The known fac
were that tens of thousands of Hungarians were crossing th
border to seek refuge in the Free World. Some were sincere
patriots who had jeopardized their lives for their country in.,
the revolution; some were opportunists seeking economic
betterment; and some were intelligence agents with missions,
to collect intelligence, to establish nets or to report on they
activities of Hungarians in the first two categories. Austria
found its border area inundated with the Hungarians an
could not screen them thoroughly with the resources at its dis-,,,
posal. At the same time the Austrian government did note .7'
wish to provoke the Soviet Union by allowing other Western
nations to set up obvious intelligence procedures as a first step
in the resettlement process. A number of the refugees were
willing and even anxious to impart information of value to the
Western powers, both for patriotic reasons and in order to
secure more favorable treatment. The more enterprising of
these found their way to one or another of the overt US or UK,
missions operating in Austria. Reports coming back from
these missions were the first indications of the high caliber,
intelligence-wise, of the refugee horde. It was impossible to
begin the problem of cataloguing the intelligence assets in
Austria, so the next best thing seemed to be an attack on the
same problem in the US. The NSCID #7 Committee has the.
responsibility for domestic exploitation. It was now faced with .
the problem of exploiting a large, but indefinite number of
sources without any prospect of additional manpower to meet
the vastly increased workload.
In casting about for a solution to such an undertaking, the
training cadre of the Armed Services Prisoner Intelligence Com-
mittee (ASPIC) seemed best fitted for the mission in terms of
qualifications and availability. This was an Army-Navy-Air
Force-CIA unit which, in time of war, could be expanded to deal
with certain aspects of the prisoner interrogation problem. At
the time of the Hungarian eruption it consisted of a group of
intelligence language experts furnished by the Army and Air
Force as a basic cadre. Under the auspices of the NSCID #7
committee, advanced units of ASPIC were sent to Camp Kilmer
in December to establish a process for assessing the intelligence
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
value of the refugees, in preparation for a full exploitation. At
this time the prevailing sentiment among those responsible for
,'Operation Mercy" was a desire to extend undiluted Western
hospitality to the Hungarians. At this early stage there was
an attitude of mild horror toward any intelligence activity.
The advanced unit found it necessary, therefore, to act under
a cover - the Historical and Statistical Survey Team (HSS).
The activity of the unit was restricted to obtaining background
information on the individual Hungarians and collecting such
documents and possessions as could be pried loose without cre-
.ating a furor. Through its own efforts and with the coopera-
tion of the authorities who were processing the Hungarians,
HSS was given ready access to the information which was avail-
able to all processing authorities. This information generally
consisted of name, place of birth, former occupation, military
service, and, in some cases, education and language capabil-
ities. Because of language difficulties and a normal human
desire to describe one's background in the best light, the educa-
tion and occupation data were of limited value. With the per-
mission of the authorities a certain number of the refugees
were selected for extended interviews. Here again the prevail-
ing sentiment toward humanitarianism, the complications of
processing the many homeless, confused people in a humane
and overt way presented an amazing number of difficulties for
the surveying teams. Refugees were difficult to locate, suspi-
cious, or overly garrulous. The intelligence operation was at
the low end of the priority scale at the camp. There was incle-
ment weather, a complicated system of drawing meal tickets,
and the usual spate of unsettling rumors. Methods were de-
veloped by HSS on one day, altered the next, and discarded on
the third day - all in response to the changing conditions and
reactions. On the basis of the original inadequate informa-
tion, about 6,000 refugees were selected for their intelligence
potential and were asked to submit to an initial interview. Of
these, about 3,600 complied with the request, and slightly more
than 2,000 proved to have sufficient potential to justify record-
ing a Preliminary Interrogation Report (PIR). These ranged
from scientists or ministerial officials with detailed knowledge
of intra-Bloc operations to private soldiers with knowledge of
troop and supply locations in one limited area.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL , 91
After it became apparent that the refugee flow was no longe
the primary news topic in the count
it
r
Y,
was decided that ar
effort would be made to c
arry
collection effort at Cam on a more intensive intelligenc
Kil
p
mer. This decision was based OA
the fact that an
refugees before operation carried on there would catch the
they became involved in the
i
'
roblems of ad'
ng to living conditions in their n
o Just
ew envir
entail much smaller cost to the US i
ce ser
i
es W
ntelligen
v
c
ye
fact that an individual's memory of a situation does not '
prove with the passage of time wa
l
s a
so ar
decision, Primary factor in this
There was, of course, much th
securing full ought given to the method
cooperation of for
th
e refugees within the framework
of the humanitarian effort. The refugees were usually {
and eager to impart all possible inform
ti
a
on. The ommon
common
sense things were generally mo
t
s
efficacious in
cooperation. An interviewer competent in the refugee's fjeldJ
generally established satisfactor
y rapport rapidly. Cordialicreature comforts, and a symbol
f U
"i
o
S Government oificialdom'il
. For instance, invitations car
were looking helpful stamp secured far bett
large
t
er results
han those
merely
stating that the US desired that the refugee report to a par-
ticular building. The air of uncertainty
fwas also
The refugees who were contacted soo
n
to work with than a
those who w
ere around long enough to learn
that they were safe and could extract favors in return for serv-
ices or information. When the refugee reached his destination
and was integrated in a com
munity, protective relatives and
friends frequently became a barrier or encouraged a suspicious
attitude. Simply stated, the refugee, like a bewildered child
in an unfamiliar situation, responds best to a friendly, solid
person who understands him. As he becomes wise to the way
of the new world these psychological factors favoring coopera
tion disappear. Then each case takes on more individuality
and the treatment which has placed the refugee in this specific
situation is the important thing to look into for any needed
!ever to cooperation.
It was decided that to take advantage of the situation the
intensive intelligence exploitations should be carried out by a
second interagency group with the cover name of US Sociolog-
ical and Technical Research Unit (USSTRU). This unit was
CONFIDENTIAL
activated on 10 January 1957. While maintaining some sem-
blance of separate operations, HSS and USSTRU cooperated
fully; and when conditions permitted, sources were shuttled
from one to the other. About ninety different individuals
from CIA, comparable numbers from the Army and the Air
Force, and a few from Navy and State participated in the
USSTRU operation. No large portion of the group was there
at any one time - the ceiling at the peak of the operations
was about 60 persons from all participating agencies. Because
in the case of USSTRU the most effective collection could be
done by analysts and intelligence officers having knowledge of
the particular areas covered and gaps to be filled, specialists
from all parts of the intelligence community were rotated to
Camp Kilmer for time periods varying from a few days to sever-
al weeks. Members of both intelligence units operated with a
degree of dedication comparable to that shown by the people
engaged in the processing and settling of Hungarians. For
most of the period the work week consisted of seven 12- to 14-
hour days.
Although the constant flow of experts through the intelli-
gence operating units provided the best qualified interviewers,
they also created continuing problems. The light cover re-
quired a certain degree of caution which was difficult to main-
tain under the circumstances. This mass participation meth-
od, however, had the added advantage of acquainting the whole
intelligence community with the potential of the Hungarian
refugees and the problems involved in exploiting this potential.
Many of the large number of analysts involved were given their
first experience in interviewing a source through the use of an
interpreter and in reporting on information in which they were
not expert. We have introduced the problem of interpreters,
and this might be the place to say that early in the game two
language factors came to light: (a) the intelligence community
probably has fewer language specialists in Hungarian than in
any other but the most exotic Eastern and Near Eastern lan-
guages, and (b) the Hungarians have a lower coefficient of sec-
ond-language competence than any other civilized population
except Americans. The shortage of competent Hungarian
translators was a limiting factor in the size of the operation
throughout its existence. Those who did come forward were
used for long periods of time and were released only with great
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
reluctance. Des
it
p
e this s serious handicap, inception to its demise 1 May, USSTRU, produced about 1,5QOrint
reports
Hence menu with
covering all fields of interest
.
a
ccom
of docu
possible f
and
nd other articles ?
uture operational Usefuln b~ __
ee
i
p
n for the Hungari by
CIA, under its responsibility for ans was undertaken
the exploitation sources in the US. Because man he
of all Priva
available fo
y of the
sources
r any sort of an
sources were not
their interviews shortened interview at the camp, many had'
because qualified experts resettlement opportunities ati,
nd" et was were not available in all fields at
sot necessary to compile full
2af
hat th
records on the sour
ey might be located at a later date
confusion i
h
.
n
erently attending the whole pro Because of the
compiling the records involved scoop-
Of gram the job of
opaper not only from the ing up all available piles
from all of the a intelligence components but also
agencies
gram participatin
i
T
t
g
.
n
he resettlement pro-
hen followed many hours of c
mg, discarding and
recordi
?~ng
J
ng, sort.
requestin
the gaps. The resulting compilation pof of
great data use o
?Y to all components of the ' proved
not ;A
on a n intelligen
ce
umber of occasions, to other but, also
utilizing these records and its complete Govern me
ldt foagencies. rce, supple
mented by Aii Force and Army units, 3,000 reports Icy 1 September and has CIA more t come. This
part of the collection operation faced many y Of the e. This
encountered at Camp Kilmer, with som
w
edc~~
e ne
Ones dd
Principal among these was the fact that the
finding themselves free to move about Harians,
locations with amazing frequency as they pleased, changed
ing in many cases to tom and rapidity without bother-
comply with th
re
i
qu
re that aliens register
e US regulations which
changes of address with the Bureau
of Immigration and Naturalization_
the disillusioning experience of tracin Many field collectors had
believed to have potential for ving a Hungarian refugee
only to find after knocking Considerably overstated his experience and qualifications.
The total result of the effort seemed
whelming majority of the gaps in intelli n that the over-
prerevolutionary Hungary were filled. When the Con
analysts are able to collate and digest the mountain of ~ignfore
O
C
NFIDENTIAL
oration resulting from the program, the records and facilities
available should enable the collectors to fill all but a minuscule
number of gaps. In addition the many intelligence officers
who participated in the interviewing gained not only experience
in the techniques involved but also a certain area familiarity.
It would be impossible for an interested, informed person to
talk to about forty or fifty Hungarians from all walks of life for
a total of about 200 hours without acquiring a useful knowl-
edge of the country and the people. When you add the thou-
sands of reports and items to the training and area familiariza-
tion and divide it by the cost (Army food and quarters were
provided, and no additional personnel were hired) you find that
the intelligence community has made a bargain purchase. The
Hungarian exploitation effort, American domestic style, will be
a source of example and anecdote for some time to come.
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SECRET 95
PAPER MILLS AND FABRICATION
Stephen M. Arness
The paper mill and fabrication problem has appeared in
many forms including outright fabrication, the sale of pseudo-
intelligence, false confirmation, and multiple distribution of
both valid and false information, as well as organized decep-
tion. by foreign governments.
US intelligence agencies as well as all Free World intelligence
agencies have been flooded with such information. It was esti-
mated in 1952 that more than half of all the material received
on several countries of greatest intelligence interest fell into
these categories. US estimates were thus endangered and
American intelligence efforts have been needlessly dissipated.
Multiple dissemination by paper mills operated by exiles from
the Soviet Bloc cuts particularly deeply into the professional
manpower resources of all agencies. Working independently
of each other, American intelligence agencies were slow in de-
veloping a mechanism for benefiting methodically from their
common experience in order to remedy this situation.
Paper mills are defined as intelligence sources whose chief
aim is the maximum dissemination of their product. Their
purpose is usually to promote special emigre-political causes
while incidentally financing emigre-political organizations.
The information thus conveyed consists of a mixture of valid
information, overt material, propaganda, and fabrication. Its
bulk, form, and obscure origin frequently preclude successful
analysis and evaluation.
Fabricators are individuals or groups who, without genuine
agent resources, invent their information or inflate it on the
basis of overt news for personal gain or a political purpose.
The line between the two categories, in many cases, is diffi-
cult to draw.
Competent fabrication has defied recognition on the part of
analysts and evaluators. Well-planned deception or provoca-
tion is apt to prove undetectable by analytical processes. It
cannot be assumed, therefore, that more than a fraction of the
number of actually existing cases in these categories have been
identified. The established professional competence of the
SECRET MORI/HRP PAGES 95-102
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Soviet intelligence services coupled with their known r
pation with deception aprovocation -
"disinformatione ti forcibly deception and n ;!
or, as p c it,
Mills and fabricators represent) to he USaintellig they intelligence c term eom-r
munity.
This essay is primarily intended to call attention to the
nature of this danger and to suggest the
necessity of remedial
action which may in time make the deception weapon less?
effective in the hands of the adversary and reduce his oppor-
tunity for employing it.
US intelligence-gathering agencies have spared neither
Power
power nor funds to close the gap man-
requirements and their knowledge of the SoetiBloc orGmraotips
of exiles from all target coun
____
4-1.:- . . tries reco
ni
t
g
ze
ha
personal advantage. Their i
t
l
t
v
al
n
e
ligence represen
at
s
well aware of the multiplicit
ve were
f
y o
accepting American agencies uncritically
all information offered a
d
,
n
even outbidding
another for intelligence sources
Moreover, their own exp
ence often proved to them that A.
e
ri-
m
i
er
can
agencies did not fully
coordinate their efforts, nor effectively c
fraud. ooperate to expose
Satellite politicians in exile knew that they could not return
to power in their homelands
Western except in the wake of war and
victory. The liberal
by Western monetary remuneration offered
agenci
es for information from behind
the Iron Curtain offered
ffered them
a ready-made opportunity to
remain alive and to preserve a Political organization b
Ong alleged intelligence. Careful operational analysis d m-
onstrated that few, if any, emigre organizations had valid and
unique intelligence assets; they lacked primarily the technical
communications and documentation facilities for continuous
contact with the homeland. Despite this, the unfortunate
fiction persisted that such organizations had undefined special
means of obtaining intelligence.
In many cases exile leaders neither understood nor respected
the basic preiiiise of TT o Policy theacked. "S Policy not to engage in war unless
att Their "intelligence" production, true, embroidered,
or false, was inevitably used to influence US policy in the direc-
tion of hostility to the Soviet Bloc and to satisfy the ambitions
of political pressure groups.
SECRET
To state the obvious: each exile group, as each sovereign
country, used the weapons at its command in its self-interest,
enlightened or otherwise. Emigre groups considered intelli-
gence production a weapon to be so used. Yet the record of US
dealings with them shows that in case after case it ignored the
fact that the satisfaction of US intelligence needs was clearly
secondary to their own political interests. One effect of the
cry-wolf policy on the part of the emigres and the recognition
of their efforts to mislead is that one of their reports may be
ignored.
Immediately after the war, several exile groups had man-
power assets behind the Iron Curtain. Hasty, uncoordinated,
and totally insecure operational use of these assets by both
emigre groups and Free World intelligence agencies permitted
the Communist security services to identify and destroy or to
use them. Initial failure in the West to recognize the ruth-
lessness and efficacy of the Soviet-type police state contributed
to this process which, generally speaking, was completed by
1950.
In view of this, it became apparent that nothing could be
achieved by further uncontrolled subsidies to exile groups.
Assertion of operational control by US intelligence officers
through financial or other means, it could be expected, would
normally be resented and sabotaged by such groups as it would
strike at the roots of their political purposes. Generally, it
was found advisable not to deal exclusively with the political
leadership, but to take advantage of dissidence within the
groups and to make it plain that intelligence production on our
terms was valued more highly than the leaders' political coop-
eration. The leaders, finding personal control of their groups
effectively endangered, then were apt to come to terms.
This strategy was followed increasingly in those operations
involving Satellite exile groups with which CIA had contact.
However, unless all intelligence agencies also recognize these
principles and effectively suppress extraneous, uncoordinated
aid to these groups, the uncontrolled information-peddling
pattern will certainly persist or recur.
The fact that substantial funds for intelligence procurement
have been available to numerous agencies may actually be a
handicap. Exile groups and individual intelligence peddlers
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SECRET 99
The Communist concept of intelligence operations, patterned
on the Soviet model, embraces a much broader field than does
the Anglo-American. Far from being limited to seeking infor-
mation through clandestine operations, it includes within the
scope of "state security" a great variety of tasks designed to
maintain the Communist Party in power and suppress all op-
position. This means that all activity which can be construed
as even critical of the state becomes a priority intelligence tar-
get.
The Communist security services accordingly make every ef-
fort to penetrate and control emigre movements abroad which
may endanger their regime. This is not a difficult task. Emigre
groups have operated openly in the West with little regard for
security, and normally have admitted as members anyone who
voices his anti-Communism strongly enough to be heard and
who cannot be positively identified as a Communist agent.
These two facts - that penetration and control of the opposi-
tion abroad are among the most important Soviet and Satel-
lite intelligence tasks, and that they are so easily accom-
plished - lead to the assumption that emigre groups can
keep only few secrets from the Soviet and Satellite governments,
and that Soviet and Satellite agents may be high in the coun-
cils of such organizations.
There can be no reasonable doubt, furthermore, that Soviet
and Satellite intelligence services have had the same easy access
to the bulk of the emigre "intelligence" product as we do. It
follows that Soviet intelligence analysts are apt to have a grasp
of the extent of US information on the Soviet Bloc procured
from such sources. They are thus able to base their deception
planning on a thorough knowledge both of US intelligence pro-
curement methods through exile groups and of much of the
information in US hands against which deception is likely to
be checked.
The lengths to which the Soviet Government will go in keep-
ing track of emigre activities can best be illustrated by an
historic case. During the nineteen twenties and thirties, in
France, Soviet Intelligence obtained control of the Ligne In-
terieure, an "elite secret group" within the strongest Russian
emigre organization of the day, the General Russian Military
Union (ROVS). The Ligne Interieure had been designed by
the ROVS for the centralization and political control of Rus-
assume that cost is no object to US intelligence personnel.
Innumerable instances are on record in which payment for;
both good and bad information was wholly out of proportion
to its true value. US financial liberality and competitive
bidding among agencies has led to inflation in the intelligence;
market. Quality intelligence is seldom to be found in pieces
of paper upon which a peddler has placed a price tag.
Virtually all outright fabrication cases can be attributed pri-
marily to disregard for factors such as the following:
a. Control of agents should include their direct financial
dependence upon the intelligence officers handling them.
b. Salaries of agents and sub-agents should be based upon
sound estimates of actual living costs in indigenous terms,
and exceed these only moderately. Excessive personal com-
pensation, particularly when it is used to encourage volume
,
of production, is a common cause of padding and fabrication.:
c. A portion of the agents' earnings should be withheld in.
special blocked accounts until their services are satisfactorily
completed.
d. Unless the use of funds available to agents for opera-
tional expenditures is closely controlled, security breaches or
the purchase of embroidered and fabricated material will
result.
e. Subsidies to foreign intelligence services and groups
must be carefully watched to prevent financing by them of
recognized paper mill operators and fabricators.
US intelligence agencies abroad have reacted in various ways
to the problem of uncoordinated spending on intelligence pro-
curement, provided they were aware of it. Local coordination
on a varying scale has taken place spontaneously in some areas.
In the past some CIA field stations, concentrating their avail-
able manpower on procuring good information, paid no atten-
tion to US competitors in the field; others treated the problem
as one of counterespionage. For the most part, however, efforts
have been made to establish the origin of all information from
the area, regardless of the agency purchasing it. In some in-'
stances the attendant waste of professional manpower overseas
has been prodigious. It is estimated, for example, that one-
third of CIA's intelligence officers in Austria were committed
during June 1951 to the detection and neutralization of fabri-
cators and paper mills.
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100 SECRET
sian emigre groups, especially those of military usefulness.,
This aim naturally appealed to most White Russian emigres;
however, since the Ligne Interieure was under Soviet control,
it simultaneously served the purpose of making virtually the
whole White Russian emigration subject to Soviet inspection;`
and manipulation. In 1935 this Soviet control was exposed:;"
when the head of the Ligne Interieure, the Soviet agent Gen-
eral Skoblin, was discovered to have organized the kidnapping
of General Yevgeni Miller, then head of the ROVS. His inten-
tion had been to replace Miller with a Soviet-controlled substi-
tute. In subsequent investigations the background of the So-
viet conspiracy outlined above was uncovered in detail.
These considerations should not lead to an automatic as-
sumption that information received from emigre groups is
planned Soviet deception or provocation. In most cases there
is no substantial evidence that the originators of fabrication
were, or are, agents of the Soviets, that the material has been
supplied to them by Soviet intelligence, or that it constitutes
Soviet deception. On the other hand, it is known that the
Soviets are masters of deception and provocation and are will-
ing to accept extraordinary sacrifices in terms of true informa-
tion passed, in order to make deception stick at the proper mo-
ment. This leads to the conclusion that the Soviets may be
using the present to digest their information and to develop
potential deception channels and materials, reserving decep-
'
tion operations for moments and circumstances of their own :-
choosing.
The theory that analysts in Washington are in a position to
detect deception or fabrication rests on the assumption that
they have verified material at hand against which they can
measure their reports. Under the pressure of the volume of
invalid material they must process, with little verified "control"
material to go by, evaluators must rely on their personal skill
and instinct. Their judgment is thus increasingly subject to
human error. On the whole, analysis alone, whether on a high
or low level in US intelligence, has been unable to break fabrica-
or deception cases except when the material lacked quality.
tion
Evaluators are handicapped not only by their ignorance of the
operational circumstances under which the information is pro-
cured, but by the amount of processing and re-processing to
which it is subjected before it reaches them. Translations,
SECRET 101
revisions, and summaries of spurious information frequently
eliminate the flaws which might allow an analyst to detect a
fraud in the original. It is the lesson of experience that fab-
rication and multiple false confirmation can be detected only
by the method of operational investigation of the source and
transmission channels, combined with reports analysis.
There can be no doubt that the Soviets are fully capable of
planting information in our intelligence channels which has all
the earmarks of being genuine. Only by careful scrutiny and
cross-checking of the channels through which such deception
material has been forwarded can the danger be reduced.
Unfortunately the following doctrines, which are fallacious
and detrimental to the US intelligence effort, are still wide-
spread among intelligence personnel:
a. That intelligence agents of all nationalities are entitled
to keep secret from their US intelligence officers the iden-
tities, antecedents, methods of operation, and means of access
to information produced, of their subsources.
b. That it is the mission of intelligence officers in the field
to procure information without a determined attempt to
ascertain its origin, leaving it to the experts in Washington
to judge its validity.
c. That overseas sources are in danger of compromise if
identities are revealed to other agencies of the US Govern-
ment which were established, trained, and equipped to pro-
tect such information properly.
The last mentioned concept fostered resistance among intel-
ligence officers of various government agencies which prevented
a long overdue exchange of information on fabricators and
paper mills. As a result, an excessive amount of professional
manpower had to be devoted to costly overseas investigation,
where simple headquarters coordination of suspect sources
would have revealed duplication or fraud.
The steady concentration of US intelligence agencies on mili-
tary targets in the Soviet Bloc, and the relatively small influx
after 1946 of knowledgeable new sources, have tended to solidify
the intelligence market. Since 1946, in many areas, agencies
of the Government have been dealing with identical intelligence
sources. This makes a systematic program of centralized reg-
istration of sources both necessary and profitable.
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Editor's Note
The views developed in this paper were first expressed early
1952 when the menace to the intelligence community pre"
sented by paper peddlers of various types was at its height.
Since then steps taken under the authority of the IAC give;
promise of achieving a coordinated solution to this problem
by the US intelligence community.
UNCLASSIFIED
LOST ORDER, LOST CAUSE
Millican, Robert M. Gelman, and Thomas A. Stanhope
C Bogie
The month of September
North. began T South, having repeat-
edly Civil War for
edly proved its superiority on the field of battle, was demon-
strating a spirit of resistance which boded at least an ultimate
stalemate and the separation of the former United States into
two rival nations. Before thebemonth September ended, the
eventual defeat of the
in August, Robert E. Lee had smashed and routed the Fed-
eral under John Pope at the Second Batte of of hrnmentll
leaving Henry
a a legacy gacy hysteria to the appointed Federal general-in-chief in corn-
W gallck, the recently app the suddenness
mand of all army operations, was stunned by
and magnitude of the defeat. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of
War, was busy with nervous preparations for the fall of Wash-
ington. To prevent arms and ammunition from falling into
the hands of the enemy, he gave orders toship teape arsenalweto
New York. In the War Department, important
placed in bundles which could be carried by men on foot or on
horseback. Gunboats were ordered to stand by on the Potomac
River, and a steamer was held in readiness to evacuate Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln and his Cabinet.
Other areas of the United States, although not under the
guns of Lee's army, were no less apprehensive than the canr an
In eastern Pennsylvania, Governor Andrew Gregg
begged President Lincoln for a minimum of 80,000 troops to
defend Philadelphia against the 120,000 to 190,000 rebels which
he believed were being massed in Maryland for an invasion of
Pennsylvania. In western Pennsylvania, there were fears that
Braxton Bragg somehow was going to take his western Con-
across impassable mountains to join with Lee.
federate army
In Maryland, where inemories of the April 1861 riots in Balti-
more against Federal soldiers were still Clear d bitter, there
was widespread apprehension of a rebel uprising
the loss of the state and the isolation of Washington.
1important places in the eastern united States mentioned in the text
are shown on the accompanping map.
UNCLASSIFIED
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104 UNCLASSIFIED
In New York and Indiana, potential Copperhead plots and
sabotage terrorized b
th
i
o
offic
al and public opinion. Confed=
erate armies in Kentucky unde
B
r
ragg had taken Lexington
and were threatening Louisvill
e and Cincinnati, where martial'
law was proclaimed
I
.
n each of these places the citizens dug
trenches and slept in terror
h
w
en they did not actually flee to
the countryside. A third majo
C
r
onfederate
army under Earl
enm omh __
in
con
d
k re
rr ,
up additional
nightmares for the frightened, who visualized this army sweep..
ing through or around Ulysses S. Grant and eventually over=
running the western
~,- - -.
f
Among the European powers, sentiment was building toward
mediation in the
war and recognition of the Confederacy, if not
toward actual intervention on its behalf. The British were
provoked to these attitudes by the shortage of cotton for their
textile mills, resulting in unemployment and deprivation for
hundreds of thousands of workers; by a preference of the Brit-
ish nobility for the aristocratic, Anglo-Saxon South over the
heterogeneous, "mongrelized" North; by the desire of the
British Government to see two rival pygmies instead of a single
united giant on the Ca
di
na
an frontier; and by general national
anger toward supposedly hostile Northern actions such as the
blockade and the removal by a Yankee warship of two Con-
federate agents from a British mail steamer, the Trent. Subtle
propaganda by Confederate agents in Great Britain provided a
catalyst for these sentiments, and the rout of the Federal troops
at Second Bull Run fired the retort. Recognition of the Con-
federacy by Her Majesty's Government and a negotiated peace
.on the. basis of Southern independence loomed as a startling
reality to the North in the shambles of its defeated army.
Britain would have been followed by Napoleon III of France,
who had the assurance of Confederate support and eventual
recognition of any French conquests in Mexico in return for
his recognition of the Confederacy-which had, in effect, al-
ready repudiated the Monroe Doctrine.
The South responded to news of the great victory at Second
Bull Run with a demand that the war now be carried into
Yankee territory. Newspapers in every Southern city spoke
for their readers when they clamored for an immediate invasion
of the North. Sentiments similar to those stirring the average
Southern citizen also motivated the leaders of the Confederacy.
UNCLASSIFIED
11 L ' e DaDH.
1OERICKffi'jRG
CbMelbrsnik
I
RRICHMOND
na
YORK
00
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Lee agreed that Southern military success had put the Con-
federacy in a position to state its political objectives leading to
an honorable peace, but he still felt that one more victory over
the Federal troops -- and this one a victory north of the
Potomac - would so clearly prove the strength of the Con-
federate position that the North must accede to any demand
for peace. Such a victory might well affect the coming Con-
gressional elections in the North as well as influence the waver-
ing British and French Governments to recognize Southern in-
dependence. An offer of peace after a great victory would be
considered a magnanimous gesture by a victorious power rather
than a sign of weakness by a frightened bureaucracy.
To achieve these political ends, Lee had to gain another bat-
tlefield victory over the Federals, and a major objective of an
invasion of the North was therefore the Federal. Army of the
Potomac itself. By taking the initiative, Lee could draw his
opponents, far less skillful than he, whoever they might be,
into a war of maneuver in which he could win on a field and at
a time of his choosing. As another major objective of his in-
vasion, Lee also intended to seize or to destroy the Pennsylvania
Railroad bridge over the Susquehanna River at Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. The seizure or the destruction of this bridge
would sever the connecting artery between Washington and the
\Vest. The only other through connection to the West was at
the periphery by way of the Hudson River and the Great Lakes.
Lee had the capability of attaining his objectives. With a
victorious, battle-tested army under successful veteran com-
inanders, Lee would be able to defeat the Federals if he were
permitted to select the terms of reference for the battle as he
already had done at Second Bull Run and was to do again later
at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. Lee also would be able
to destroy the railroad bridge at Harrisburg if he reached it
without having drawn the Federals into battle or to seize the
bridge if he reached it after a victorious battle.
Although his army was relatively small, Lee divided it into
several parts, with the Federal garrisons at Harpers Ferry and
Martinsburg in the Shenandoah Valley as targets for three
units. Two other units were to proceed toward Boonsboro and
Hagerstown. In his Special Orders 191 of 9 September 1862,
Lee drew up his order of march and made his troop dispositions.
Each of the key commanders mentioned in the order was sent
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UNCLASSIFIED
a copy of the order. James ("Pete") Longstreet carefully re
his copy and chewed it -- "as some persons use a little cut
tobarrn 11 ini- r yr- ,,---
pine d
-
.~ copy to the Inside of hid
jacket. Thomas J. ("Stonewall") Jackson meticulously burned
his copy.
There was a certain confusion in Jackson's mind as td
whether Daniel T-T.- ., rn:,, __
s s
w
Vol under his command 0
directly under Lee. To be certain that Hill received a copy o1
Special Orders 191 (the Arm
f N
y o
orthern Viii h
rgnaad not yet,
een n divided into } corps), Jackson, in his own hand, sent Hill a
considering Hill no longer under Jackson but idirectly yonder;
himself
also sent Hill
,
a copy Hillli
. camed that he never re-
ceived this co
py
On Saturday, 13 September, the hastily reorganized Federal:
Army of the Pn+rt- --3-- -
-L
Clellan moved into Frederick and set u
ca
p
mp
on the outskt
irs
of the town. Colonel Silas Colgrove, the commander of the
27th Indiana V
l
t
o
un
eers Third Bid
,rgae, First Division, Twelfth
Army Corps, ordered his men to stack arms in the same area
which had
revi
l
p
ous
mand of y beenHilloccupied by the men under the com-
DanielHarvey
.
While resting in this area, Private Barton W. Mitchell and
Sergeant John M. Bloss, both of the 27th Indiana, found a copy
of Lee's Special Orders 191 i
n a paperd
wrappe around three
cigars. The order was authenticated by Colonel Samuel E.
Pitman, First Division Adjutant-General, who recognized the
signature of Lee's Assistant Adjutant-General as that of Colonel
Robert H. Chilton, with whom Pitman had served in Detroit.
The order then was brought to McClellan, who set off to destroy
Lee in detail.
McClellan, dilatory by nature and convinced by his faulty
intelligence that Lee had an army about 50 percent larger than
the Army of the P
t
o
omac was nt likl t
,oeyo have attacked Lee.
Even with Lee's orders before him - orders dividing Lee's
army - McClellan inched cautiously forward.
Lee, informed of the loss of the copy of Special Orders 191
that he had sent to Daniel Harvey Hill, did his best to reassem-
ble quickly his scattered units to present a united front to the
Federals, and on Wednesday, 17 September 1862, the Battle of
Antietam took place. Lee, forced to fight on the defensive for
UNCLASSIFIED
the first time during the war and incapable of maneuver, was
able to stop the Federal attack only with great difficulty. On
19 September, Lee withdrew into Virginia, and the North was
free of the invader.
The railroad bridge at Harrisburg was not cut, and the North
was able to maintain its fundamental east-west link. Mary-
land, eager to follow a winner, not only did not secede but even
went so far as to increase its effort on behalf of the Union.
With Maryland remaining loyal, Washington was neither sur-
rounded nor isolated, and its Fifth Column remained nervously
underground. The fear of invasion among Northern states
proved to be groundless, and the governors of these states
rather than demanding troops from Washington to defend
themselves, provided troops, albeit reluctantly, to the Union
army. With substantial reinforcements from the eastern
states available, the Union was able to send Western recruits
to Don Carlos Buell and Grant to exploit their victories at
Perryville, Kentucky, and at Corinth, Mississippi.
The Copperhead movement, which needed the impetus that
a Southern victory north of the Potomac could give, never re-
ceived this impetus and gradually lost strength as the war
progressed. Even at the polls this movement proved to be weak
as Lincoln's Republicans swept the Congressional elections of
1862 to remain in power.
Lincoln, who had resolved upon the Emancipation Proclama-
tion as a military, political, and psychological measure neces-
sary to insure the ultimate conquest of the Confederacy by the
Union, leaped upon Antietam as the victory which he needed to
give meaning to the Proclamation. Even though the Procla-
mation was a political gesture, in-victory it seemed more ideal-
istic -and realistic - than if it had followed a defeat on
Northern territory. After a Union defeat the Proclamation
would have seemed to be nothing more than the empty oratory
of a beaten demagogue rather than the noble gesture of a con-
fident leader.
The recognition which the South had expected from abroad
was contingent upon a Confederate victory, and the Southern
retreat from Maryland could hardly be construed as a victory
even by the Confederacy's most sanguine European supporters.
The retreat, in turn, led to second thoughts; second thoughts,
to inaction; inaction, to continued nonrecognition -right
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108 UNCLASSIFIED
through to the end of the war. Lincoln's Emancipation Pr
y
lamation, moreover, swayed foreign public opinion to the Nort
hi
h
w
c
now seemed to stand for the oppressed rather than
the oppressor of a popular revolt.
Finally, Southern hopes which had been raised to the hei
h
g
t,
with the victory at Second Bull Run and with the transfer o:
frustration in less than three weeks. Although the spirit a
th
e South was as reoltft Ati
sue aernetam as before, a gnawin
d
b
ou
t now marchedid bidith t
sey se whis spirit.
Lee unequivocably blamed the failure of the invasion o
Maryland on the lost order. He defended the division of his
army, pointing out the need to eliminate the threats to his
ticularly, Harpers Ferry. In addition, Jackson's investment of
clothing, and weapons which were some of the objectives of the
invasion. At the very least, if McClellan had not obtained a
copy of Lee's orders, Lee could have reunited his army lone
have re-equipped it with some of the hoard from Harpers Ferry
and given his 10,000 or more stragglers time to rejoin his army.
Thus refurbished, Lee could have gone on to Harrisburg, de-,
t
s
royed the bridge, and sought out McClellan.2
The Confederates held Harpers Ferry and had destroyed
much of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, an important east';
west link. Destruction of the railroad bridge at Harrisburg!'
_ _-_ -_ _ . I
t
Would have nn+ th
west
e eas
B
t
al
imore and rnualhi E
,aepa.ven if Lee had subsequently
b
d
f
een
e
eated by McClellt
an -a mos unlikely event on the
basis of previous encounters between these generals - many
months would have elapsed before the rail connection over the
Susquehanna River could have been re-established. Recon-
struction of the bridge from the heights over the river would
have been, at the very least, a major engineering achievement.
The cumulative effects of a victory by Lee over McClellan in
Maryland would have been devastating to the North. Lee
could have moved on to Harrisburg and with his headquarters
s Courses of action open to Lee if McClellan had not gained posses-
sion of Special Orders 191 are shown on the map.
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in the capital of Pennsylvania, astride the rail lines to Phila-
delphia, Baltimore, and Washington, would have menaced all
three of these terrified metropolises. During Lee's second in-
vasion of the North in 1863, Richard S. Ewell approached within
three miles of Harrisburg before he was called back because of
the chance encounter at Gettysburg. The panic of the Penn-
sylvania countryside at that time is a slight indication of what
Confederate headquarters at Harrisburg might have caused -
especially if Confederate cavalry under James E. B. ("Jeb")
Stuart had been permitted to raid in the direction of Phila-
delphia and even New York.
If Lee had chosen to commit himself early rather than to
wage psychological warfare against the three cities simultane-
ously, he might have marched directly from a victorious battle-
field against Baltimore or Washington. The very Maryland
farmers who watched impassively as Lee's half-starved tatter-
demalions poured across the Potomac might conservatively
have estimated that a victory by Lee on Maryland soil looked
dangerously like the beginning of the end of the war on
Southern terms. The number of recruits whom Lee might
have picked up in Maryland, under the band.-wagon steam-
roller, would have increased sharply, thus augmenting even
more an army in which straggling had suddenly disappeared.
The strong secessionist tendencies indicated by Baltimore in
April 1861 might have opened that city to Lee in 1862, per-
mitting his entry against bare token resistance..
Washington, thus isolated by a secessionist Maryland and
itself swarming with a devious, opportunistic Fifth Column,
could hardly have remained the capital. Previously prepared
evacuation plans might have moved the Government to Phila-
delphia or New York while Jefferson Davis, President of the
Confederacy, graciously doling out merciful terms to a stunned
city, rode triumphantly down Pennsylvania Avenue. Recog-
nition, but no longer intervention, would have been inevitable.
A triumphant South would have scorned intervention.
While Lee campaigned in the North, 20,000 recruits were
assembled in Richmond for his army. A victorious Lee, gath-
ering volunteers in Maryland, would hardly have needed these
recruits. Bragg, however, pressing on Buell in Kentucky, could
have used the recruits, and such reinforcements might well
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UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
have balanced the numbers in Bragg's favorgivinhim
t
, g
ht
opportunity of making good his intention to install a Confect:
erate
governor at Frankfort, the capital of Kentucky.
The Federals in the West would have had to withdraw troops
from wherever th
ey were available to relieve Buell, thus taking
_
pressure off Van Dorn i
n
for his part, then would have been free toy attain Vwhatever
;P~Emperor Maximilian of
Mexico. In the struggle to get the French army out of North
America and Maximilian off his throne, this government had
the use of an intelligence enterprise which, though conducted
on a small scale, turned out to be very effective. Up to the
last weeks this intelligence operation consisted of competent
reporting on the part of espionage agents and diplomatic
representatives; but when a crisis developed at that point, these
sources were silent, and it was a cablegram from Napoleon to
his commanders in Mexico that yielded the information needed
by the nation's leaders.
As an intelligence coup the interception and reading of this
message were hardly spectacular, for it passed over fifteen
hundred miles of telegraph wire accessible to United States
forces and, contrary to later assertions that it had to be de-
ciphered, it appears to have been sent in the clear. Neverthe-
less, the event was an outstanding one in the history of United
States intelligence operations, not simply because it represented
a beginning in a new field but also because the message in
question was of crucial importance.
State of the Union, 1861-65
The crisis in which America's intelligence capability as-
serted itself did not come until after the nation had spent five
anxious years watching the European threat develop.
Napoleon had sent an army to Mexico late in 1861, assertedly
to compel the payment of huge debts owed by the government
of Mexico. His object, however, was not simply a financial
one: a new commander whom he sent to Mexico in 1863 re-
ceived instructions (which leaked into the press) to the effect
that the Emperor's purpose was to establish a Mexican govern-
ment strong enough to limit "the growth and prestige of the
United States." 3 At a time when the American Union ap-
peared to be breaking up under pressure from its southern half,
such a statement meant to American readers that Napoleon
had no intention of stopping at the Rio Grande.
J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1926), p.
261, citing Genaro y Carlos Pereya Garcia, Documentos ineditos o
muy raros para la historia de Mejico (20 vols., Mexico City, 1903),
XIV, pp. 8-20.
82 CONFIDENTIAL
A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL
In June 1863 French arms swept the Liberal government of
President Benito Juarez from Mexico..City= and, inAhe-su of 1864 Napoleon installed the Archduke Ferdinand Maximilian,
thirty-two-year-old brother of Emperor Franz Joseph of Aus-
tria, on the new throne of Mexico. During this period the
Northern people, their belligerence aroused by the Southern
rebellion, were clamoring for action against France - action
that might well bring disaster upon them. Aggressive be-
havior by the United States might give Napoleon the popular
support he needed to join hands with the Confederacy in a
declaration of war, a development that could provide Seces-
sion with enough extra strength to prevail.
While the Civil War lasted, Congress and the public were
held in check largely through the prestige and political skill
of the Federal Secretary of State, William H. Seward. But
when the War was over - by which time the government had
reason to believe that Napoleon had become disenchanted with
his puppets in Mexico - Seward was ready to turn his people's
aggressive demeanor to advantage, and he warned Napoleon
that their will would sooner or later prevail. Before this state-
ment reached Paris, however, the United States Minister there,
John Bigelow, who had been mirroring Seward's new firmness
for some months, had in September 1865 obtained a tentative
statement from the French that they intended to withdraw
from Mexico.4
While Bigelow was shaking an admonitory finger at the
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, an American military fist
was being displayed before the French along the Rio Grande.
Promptly upon the silencing of Confederate guns, General
Grant sent Philip Sheridan, second only to William T. Sherman
in the esteem of the General-in-Chief, to the command of the
Department of the Gulf, with headquarters at New Orleans.
A considerable force was posted along the Mexican frontier
and designated an "army of observation."
4 Rippy, op. cit., pp. 264-65 and 269-72; Seward to Bigelow, September
21, 1865. All diplomatic correspondence sent or received by United
States officials that is cited herein will be found in the Papers Re-
lating to Foreign Affairs Accompanying the Annual Message of the
President to the First Session, Thirty-Ninth Congress (covering the
year 1865), Second Session, Thirty-Ninth Congress (1866), and
Second Session, Fortieth Congress (1867-68).
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Sheridan and Intelligence
1 _
'-T_
he possessor of a-reputa-
tion as a gamecock, adhered strongly to an opinion prevalent
in the Army that a little forceful military action now would
save a full-scale war later. The audacious statesman who was
directing foreign policy at Washington was, to Sheridan, "slow
and poky," and the general found ways of giving considerable
covert aid to the Juarez government, then leading a nomadic
existence in the north of Mexico.5 Sheridan and Seward,
though the policy of each was anathema to the other, made an
effective combination.
One of the ways in which Sheridan could exercise his relent-
less energy against the Imperialists without flouting Seward's
policy was in collecting intelligence on what was going on below
the border. There was an interregnum at the United States
Legation in Mexico City, and all the official news reaching
Washington from below the Rio Grande was that supplied by
the Juarist Minister to the United States, Matias Romero, a
scarcely unbiased source if a prolific one.6 Sheridan quickly
undertook to fill the gap.
This task must have been decidedly to the general's taste, for
he had been one of the most intelligence-conscious commanders
in the Civil War .7 He had achieved something of an innovation
in organizing intelligence activities when, during his 1864
campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, he established a group of
intelligence operatives under military control. His previous
sources of information, local citizens and Confederate deserters,
had both proved unreliable. "Sheridan's Scouts" were a mili-
tary organization in a day when it was customary to have
civilians perform most of the intelligence-gathering tasks other
' John M. Schofield, Forty-Six Years in the Army (New York, 1897),
p. 381; Philip H. Sheridan, Personal Memoirs (2 vols., New York,
1888), II, pp. 215-19; Percy F. Martin, Maximilian in Mexico (London,
1914), p. 432.
? Dozens of examples of this intelligence will be found in the Romero-
to-Seward correspondence in the Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs
described in footnote 4.
T When a division commander in 1862-63, Sheridan had exercised an
initiative in intelligence collection that was more likely to be found
in an army commander. His Memoirs reveal a constantly high in-
terest in intelligence activities.
84 CONFIDENTIAL
A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL
than battle-zone reconnaissance. After the war, Major Henry
Harrison Young, the- Scouts- comet- tinder; --of west
men went to the Gulf Department with Sheridan.
Sheridan also, in common with numerous other commanders
North and South, had an acquaintance with communications
intelligence as it was produced in the field command of that
day. By the time the Civil War was well advanced, Signal
Corpsmen in every theater had learned how to solve the enemy's
visual-signaling alphabets, and they derived much information
for the commanders by keeping their field glasses trained on
enemy signal stations s There was not likely to be any op-
portunity for such methods along the Rio Grande, however, and
no more likely was the possibility of tapping telegraph lines
carrying useful information.
Young and his four men were dispatched to important points
in northern Mexico to report on movements of the Imperial
forces and the various projects of ex-Confederates who were
joining Maximilian's forces and attempting to establish colonies
under his flags Judged by the accuracy of the reports reach-
ing Sheridan and the strong tendency of the Southerners'
projects to abort after coming under his notice, the work of
these five men was most effective.'0
1866, Year of Telegrams and Tension
The critical question -whether the French would tire of
their venture and withdraw - was, however, one to which no
intelligence service could divine an answer, for the French for
a long time did not know the answer themselves. In 1865
Marshal Frangois Achille Bazaine, now Napoleon's commander
in Mexico, was informed by the Minister of War that he must
bring the army home, and at about the same time he received
I War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confed-
erate Armies (Washington, 1884-1901) contains hundreds of deci-
pherments resulting from such interceptions, chiefly in the oper-
ations of 1863-65 in Tennessee and Georgia, the operations along
the South Carolina coast beginning in 1863, and the Richmond-
Petersburg siege of 1864-65.
? Sheridan, op. cit., II, p. 214.
10 See, for example, intelligence reports sent by Sheridan to Grant,
March 27, May 7, June 24, July 3 and 13,1866. All Army correspond-
ence cited hereafter in this article will be found in the United States
National Archives, except where otherwise indicated.
CONFIDENTIAL 85
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CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon
word to the opposite effect from the Emperor himself." Na-
e, by vhich-thhle latter .accepted -
the throne of Mexico contained a secret clause providing that
French military forces to the number of 20,000 were to remain
in Mexico until November 1867.12 As events were to prove,
however, this compact was less likely to determine Napoleon's
course of action than were the pressures on him represented
by the United States' vigorous diplomacy and the rising mili-
tary power of Prussia.
In April 1866 Minister Bigelow succeeded in pinning Na-
poleon down to a definite understanding, to the effect that the
28,000 French soldiers in Mexico would be brought home in
three detachments, leaving in November 1866 and March and
November 1867. Seward's reply to this promise was char-
acteristic of his tone at this time: dwelling only briefly on the
diplomatic niceties, he suggested that the remaining period of
occupation be shortened if possible. The Secretary was in high
feather; in the same month a protest by him induced the Aus-
trian government to abandon an effort to send substantial
reinforcements to the small Austrian force in Maximilian's
army .l3
In June Maximilian received a studiously insolent letter from
Napoleon containing the stunning announcement that the
French would withdraw. Attention now focused on whether
he would attempt to hold his throne without French arms.
The unhappy sovereign reacted first by dispatching his Em-
press, twenty-six-year-old Carlota, to Paris in a vain attempt
to change Napoleon's mind. He soon decided to abdicate, then
determined to remain on his throne, then wavered for many
weeks between abdicating and remaining 14
Napoleon meanwhile had to contend not only with his pro-
teg6's indecision but with some apparent recalcitrance on the
u Philip Guedalla, The Two Marshals (London, 1943) p. 130.
"Ibid., p. 112.
"Seward to de Montholon, April 25, 1866; Seward to J. Lothrop Motley
(United States Minister to Austria), April 6, 16, 30, May 3, 30, 1866;
Motley to Seward, April 6, May 1, 6, 15, 21, 1866; James M. Callahan,
American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932),
p. 235.
"Martin, op. cit., pp. 266-267 and 272-273.
86 CONFIDENTIAL
A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL
part of Bazaine, who was variously suspected of having a secret
agreement with Maan '~`uprt, of being secretly in league with the Mexican Liberals, of profit-
ing financially from his official position, and of having hopes
of succeeding Maximilian. (There is evidence to support all
these suspicions.) 16 Soon Napoleon realized he had made a
bad bargain with the United States; to attempt to bring the
army home in three parts would risk the annihilation of the
last third. Early in the autumn of 1866 the Emperor sent his
military aide, General Castelnau, to Mexico with instructions
to have the army ready to leave in one shipment in March, and
to supersede Bazaine if necessary. Thus the evacuation was
to begin four months later than Napoleon had promised, but
to end eight months earlier.16
No word of this important about-face was, however, promptly
passed to the United States government. At the beginning of
November - supposedly the month for the first shipment - the
best information this country's leaders possessed was a strong
indication that Napoleon intended to rid himself of Maximilian.
This was contained in a letter written to Maximilian by a con-
fidential agent whom he had sent to Europe; it showed the
failure of Carlota's visit to Napoleon. Somewhere between its
point of origin, Brussels, and its destination, the office of Maxi-
milian's consul in New York, it had fallen into the hands of a
Juarist agent 17 Soon after Minister Romero placed it in
Seward's hands, Napoleon's new Foreign Minister, the Marquis
de Moustier, wrote his Minister in Washington, de Montholon,
that the evacuation timetable was raising serious difficulties
but that in no case would the November 1867 deadline for its
Castelnau to Napoleon, December 8, 1866,' quoted in Georges A..M.
Girard, La Vie et les souvenirs du General Castelnau (Paris, 1930),
pp. 112-124; Marcus Otterbourg (United States charge d'affaires in
Mexico) to Seward, December 29, 1866; Martin, op. cit., pp. 298-99;
Lewis D. Campbell (United States Minister to Mexico) to Seward,
November 21, 1866.
"De Moustier (Foreign Minister) to de Montholon (Minister 2the
United States), October 16, 1866, in Foreign Affairs; Bigelow
Seward, November 8, 1866; Martin, op. cit., pp. 56-57; Guedalla, op.
cit., p. 133; Girard, op. cit., p. 122.
"Romero to Seward, October 10, 1866; New York Tribune, January 4,
1867.
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A Cable From Napoleon CONFIDENTIAL
Cruz, to find the French leaving and Juarez resuming the reins
of government: ills loo ea o ex=aenaor Lewis D.
Campbell, newly appointed Minister to Mexico, and General
William T. Sherman, sent with Campbell to give the mission
prestige, to advise Juarez in regard to the many military prob-
lems that would be plaguing him, 21 and possibly to arrange
for the use of small numbers of United States troops to assist
the Liberal regime by temporarily occupying certain island
forts.22
Evidence was accumulating that Maximilian and his Eu-
ropean troops would soon be gone from Mexico, 23 but it stood
no chance of general acceptance in Washington. Such was the
degree of trust now accorded Louis Napoleon that his promise
to evacuate Mexico would be believed on the day when the last
French soldier took ship at Vera Cruz.
At this juncture Sheridan's headquarters came into posses-
sion of a copy of a coded telegram to Napoleon from Bazaine
and Castelnau. The message had left Mexico City by courier
on December 3 and had been delivered to the French Consulate
at New Orleans, from where it was telegraphed to Paris on the
9th. As will be explained below, there is every reason to believe
that this message went unread by United States cryptogra-
phers. The possession of its contents would have been of great
value, for the message (as translated from the version given
by Castelnau's biographer) said:
completion be exceeded."' This note should have reached Sew-
ard in early November (1866), but if it did, itss, strong:.hint
not here would be no partial evacuation in that month was
apparently lost on him.
When the French felt able to promise complete withdrawal
in March, de Moustier revealed to Bigelow the abandonment
of the three-stage plan. So alarmed was Bigelow by the pros-
pect of a -major outbreak of anti-French feeling in America
that he refrained from sending the news to Seward until he had
heard it from the Emperor himself, whom he saw on November
7. The November shipment had been cancelled for reasons
purely military, the Emperor said, showing surprise that the
United States had not known of the change. The order had
been telegraphed to Bazaine and had been sent in the clear
in order that "no secret might be made of its tenor in the
United States." 19 Undoubtedly the Emperor was perfectly
sincere in implying that he expected the United States govern-
ment to make itself a tacit "information addressee" on tele-
grams of foreign governments reaching its territory.
Receiving Bigelow's report of this interview, Seward struck
off a peremptory cablegram to Paris: the United States "can
not acquiesce," he declared. The 774 words of this message un-
folded before Bigelow on November 26 and 27, their transmis-
sion having cost the State Department some $13,000. On De-
cember 3 Bigelow telegraphed the Foreign Minister's assurance
that military considerations alone were responsible for the
change of plans and his promise, somewhat more definite than
the previous one, that the French "corps of occupation is to
embark in the month of March next." 20
So strongly had this government relied on Napoleon's original
promise that President Johnson had dispatched an important
diplomatic mission to Mexico (republican Mexico, that is) - a
mission that was already at sea, expecting, on arrival at Vera
De Moustier to de Montholon, October 16, loc. cit.
Bigelow to Seward, November 8, 1866.
"Seward to Bigelow, November 23, 1866; Dexter Perkins, The Monroe
Doctrine, 1826-1867 (Baltimore, 1933), p. 534; Bigelow to Seward,
December 3, 1866.
88 CONFIDENTIAL
Seward's instructions to Campbell, dated October 25, 1866, are per-
haps the most impressive of the numerous masterful documents
produced by the Secretary in the Mexican, affair. Grant was the
President's first selection as the military member of the mission
and was excused only after a number of urgent requests. Cor-
respondence relating to the inception of the Sherman-Campbell
mission includes: Andrew Johnson to E. M. Stanton, October 26
and 30; Grant to Sherman (at St. Louis), October 20 and 22; Grant
to Johnson, October 20 and 21, and Grant to Stanton, October 27.
" Sherman to Grant, November 3, 1866 (Sherman MSS, Library of
Congress) ; Grant to Sheridan, November 4, 1866. Sheridan was
directed to "comply with any request as to location of troops in your
department that Lt. Gen. Sherman ... may make."
Campbell to Seward, November 21, 1866; unaddressed, unsigned
military intelligence report dated at Washington, November 18.
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A Cable From Napoleon
A Cable From Napoleon
CONFIDENTIAL
New Orleans, 9 Dec 1866
To Eiis Majesty the Emperor Napoleon-at Paris.
Mexico, 3rd December.
Emperor Maximilian appears to wish to remain in
Mexico, but we must not count on it. Since the evac-
uation is to be completed in March, it is urgent that
the transports arrive. We think that the foreign regi-
ment must also be embarked. As for the French of-
ficers and soldiers attached to the Mexican Corps, can
they be allowed the option of returning?
The country is restless. The Campbell and Sherman
mission, which arrived off Vera Cruz on November 29
and left December 3, seems disposed to a peaceful solu-
tion. Nevertheless it gives moral support to the Juar-
ists through the statement of the Federal government.
Marshal Bazaine and General Castelnau 24
As December wore on, rumblings from Capitol Hill indicated
that Congress - the same Congress that was even then mov-
ing to impeach President Johnson - might attempt to take
the management of the entire affair out of the Administration's
hands. Word arrived from Bigelow that transports to bring the
army home were ready to sail from French ports, but that
information would by no means be convincing enough to reas-
sure Washington. And that word was the last to be heard
from Bigelow, as competent a reporter as he was a diplomatist.
He was relieved as Minister by John Adams Dix, ex-senator, ex-
general, who did not manage to turn his hand to report-writing
until mid-February, after the crisis was past.25
Similarly, nothing that would clarify the situation was com-
ing out of Mexico. General Grant received a report from Sher-
man, at Vera Cruz, containing two items of intelligence, highly
significant and completely contradictory: two ships, waiting
at Vera Cruz to take Maximilian home, had been loaded with
tremendous quantities of royal baggage; and the Emperor had
just issued a proclamation to the Mexican people announcing
"Girard, op. cit., pp. 117-18.
sc New York Herald, December 7, 1866, p. 4, col. 3; Bigelow to Seward,
November 30, 1866; Morgan Dix, Memoirs of John Adams Dix (2
vols., New York, 1883), II, 150; Dix to Seward, December 24, 1866.
90 CONFIDENTIAL
Tiff WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
Ae~
1 k,Y u19
THE WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
First and last pages of the five-page message to Napoleon III
from his commanders in Mexico, reporting on the situation
there and asking instructions concerning the evacuation of the
European forces. The French clear-text version, as repeated
by General Castelnau in a letter to Napoleon on December 8,
1866 (and quoted by Castelnau's biographer), reads:
L'empereur Maximilian parait vbuloir rester au
Mexique, mais on ne peut y compter. L'evacuation
devant titre terminee en mars, it est urgent que les
transports arrivent. Nous pensons que le regiment
etranger doit titre aussi embarque. Quant aux offi-
ciers et soldats frangais detaches au. corps mexlcains,
peut-on leur laisser la faculte de revenir? Le pays est
inquiet. La mission Campbell et Sherman arrivee
devant Vera Cruz le 29 novembre et partie le 3 de-
cembre semble disposee a une solution pacifique. Elle
n'en donne pas moins un appui moral aux Juaristes
par la declaration du gouvernement federal.
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CONFIDENTIAL A Cable From Napoleon
his intention to remain. Sherman and Campbell were facng
a dilemma, in that they could not reach Juarez without cross-
' ; t rrifc held by the Imperialists, with whom they were
supposed to have nothing to do. Sherman invited Grant to
instruct him to go to Mexico City to see Bazaine, who, he was
sure, would tell him the truth about French intentions, but
nothing came of this suggestion. Wrote the general of the
colorful pen and the fervid dislike of politics: "I am as anxious
to find Juarez as Japhet was to find his father, that I may dis-
pose of this mission." 26
Tension mounted in Washington early in January as the
Senate prepared for a debate on the Mexican question, and a
wide variety of reports circulated, the most ominous being that
half of the French forces were to remain in Mexico through the
summer, and that Assistant Secretary of State Frederick W.
Seward, who had sailed mysteriously from Annapolis on Christ-
mas day, was on his way to see Napoleon. (He was en route
to the West Indies on one of his father's projects for the pur-
chase of territory.) 27 But on January 12, before the Senate
got around to the Mexican question, the War Department re-
ceived a message from Sheridan at New Orleans transmitting
the following telegram:
French Consul New Orleans
Paris Jany 10th
for General Cast[elnau] at Mexico.
Received your dispatch of the ninth December. Do
not compel the Emperor to abdicate, but do not delay
the departure of the troops; bring back all those who
will not remain there. Most of the fleet has left.
NAPOLEON.
"Sherman to Grant, December 1 and 7, 1866. Sherman, despite his
reputation for hard-headedness, was not one of those who favored
military action by the United States in Mexico. He wrote Grant,
"I feel as bitter as you do about this meddling of Napoleon, but we
can bide our time and not punish ourselves by picking up a burden
[the French] can't afford to carry."
21 New York Herald, January 3, 1867; New York Evening Post, January
8, 1867; Frederick W. Seward, Reminiscences of a War-time States-
man and Diplomat (New York and London, 1916), pp. 348-55.
Seward's project, a very closely kept secret, was the acquisition of
a harbor in San Domingo. A treaty was later concluded but buried
by the Senate.
92 CONFIDENTIAL
A Cable From Napoleon
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