RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY BY THE VC/NVA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070056-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: May 10, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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TOP SECRET
Copy No. 184
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY
BY THE VC/NVA
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
TOP SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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This memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and has been informally coordinated with the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of State.
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Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
.1. Supply Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Types of Supplies Moved . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Cambodian Government Collusion . . . . . . . . . 7
Map
Cambodia following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN THE USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY
BY THE VC/NVA*
Summary
The Communists have increased their use of Cambodian
territory in recent months to support the insurgency in South
Vietnam, and the tempo of their activities is expected to
accelerate. the
VC/NVA has established a second base camp in the north-
east corner of Cambodia.
New road construction linking the Laotian infiltration
route with Cambodia has been completed, and older roads
have been improved. The most significant development in
this regard is the construction of a new road from Cambodia
into Laos -- route 110 -- which appears almost certainly to
have been built to serve the Laotian infiltration network by
extending it southward into Cambodia (see the map). We do
not, however, have conclusive evidence that this was the
sole intent of the improvements.
Supplies procured in Cambodia for support of VC/NVA
forces in South Vietnam apparently continue to consist pri-
marily of food and other commercial items available on the
open market. Cambodia, however, is by no means a major
source of food supplies to the Communists, who continue to
depend primarily on the South Vietnamese countryside,.
The extent to which Cambodia is used either as a trans-
fer area for or as a source of arms and ammunition is
This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Research
and Reports; the estimates and conclusions represent the best
judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 7 May 1966.
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difficult to assess although it must be small. Almost certainly,
however, the Communists have established arms caches on
Cambodian territory for VC/NVA support, and Communist
activity in the northern part of the country strongly suggests
that military supplies originating in North Vietnam are mov-
ing across Cambodian territory.
There continues to be considerable evidence that the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese forces use Cambodian territory
in many areas along the 600-mile border for sanctuary and
bivouac purposes.
The Cambodian government has taken an increasingly
favorable and accommodating attitude toward the Communist
insurgency in South Vietnam but has stopped short of direct
military support. There is considerable evidence, however,
of cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower levels of the
Cambodian government.
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H/A I L
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BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
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1. Supply Routes
Information that has become available in the past six months indi-
cates that North Vietnam is making increased use of Cambodian terri-
tory as a logistic supply route to support Viet Con North Vietnamese
Arm VC NVA activities in South Vietnam.
os o t e,supp ies acquired
or use y e i ietnam and Cambodia either are
indigenous or arrived in Cambodia through normal trade channels.
Although some military supplies, other than those carried by infiltrators,
apparently move from North Vietnam to Laos and then through Cambodia,
there is no evidence that supplies specifically intended for VC/NVA
forces are imported through the ports of Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville.
Over the years, supplies have been moved into South Vietnam from
Cambodia by the following means: (a) by sampan or junk on the inland
waterways; (b) by porters on the trails that cross the South Vietnamese
border; and (c) by sampan or junk from minor Cambodian ports to
islands in the Gulf of Siam and to the west coast of South Vietnam. In
recent months traffic moving by sea has been reduced whereas traffic
moving by truck has been noted. A substantial illegal trade for private
profit has also been taking place between Cambodia and areas in South
Vietnam, held by both South Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, espe-s
cially in the Mekong Delta. Many VC/NVA crossing points along the
border between Cambodia and South Vietnam have been identified. The
relative importance of each area, route, and mode cannot be determined
from available information. The Communists apparently shift back and
forth from land to water transport and from one area of entry to another
as the tactical situation changes.
The land and water routes through the northeastern provinces of
Cambodia are becoming increasingly important for the movement of
supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam and Laos.
I frecent months at least one new route has been
ui an o routes nave been improved and are being used more heavily
than before.
Cambodian traders are reported to be moving substantial amounts
of rice northward on the Mekong River from Phnom Penh to the Cam-
bodian river towns of. Kratie and Stung Treng, The rice is then moved
onward by small watercraft or by truck to the South Vietnamese and
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Laotian borders. Although the traders try to avoid major roads,
route 13 leading from Kratie toward Tay Ninh, Binh Long, and Phuoc
Long Provinces of South Vietnam is probably used. From Stung Treng,
route 19 and the trails leading from it toward Pleiku Province re-
portedly are used for this traffic. Some of the rice and other supplies
are shipped from Stung Treng by boat on the Se Kong River to Siem
Pang or Ban Don Fai near the Laotian border or on the Se San River to
Bo Kheo. river traffic by motorized
craft and the locations of land/water transloading points. With respect
to all of this traffic, it is not always clear what portion is destined for
internal Cambodian use and what for Communist forces.
The most significant development of the transport network in this
area is the construction in early 1966 of a new land route paralleling
the Se Kong River from near Siem Pang to Ban San Keo, opposite Ban
Don Fai. The southern end connects with route 15 in Cambodia, and
the northern end extends east into Laos to the North Vietnamese truck
route which runs through the Laotian panhandle. This new route is
identified as 110, which is about 100 miles long, with about 30 miles
in Cambodian territory. Cambodian 25X1
and Vietnamese troops cooperated in the construction of the Cambodian
section of the road but there are no other reports to confirm this.
Route 15 from Siem Pang to a junction with route 19 near Bo Kheo
Tias been realigned in Dart and shows signs of increased traffic
rom roue a recen y
141, extends south and
joins route 14 near the border of Quang Duc and Phuoc Long Provinces.
This route and its connections to route 110 now provide a dry-season
truckable route all the way from North Vietnam into important southern
provinces such as Tay Ninh in South Vietnam. The second road which
connects Laos and Cambodia extends west from Siem Pang into the
Laotian territory along the Mekong River in which a Communist buildup
has taken place. Evidence is inconclusive as to whether this is a new
road or an improved old road. All the evidence strongly suggests that
much of the improvement and construction of roads and waterways in
northern Cambodia is designed to serve as logistic routes and constitute
a southward expansion of the infiltration corridor into Cambodia.
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Use of primitive land routes and inland waterways in the southern
and delta areas across the Cambodia-South Vietnam border continues
much. as it has in the past. In addition, supplies now may be moving
by truck transport across the border into South Vietnam in this area.
Traditionally, traffic into South Vietnam has consisted of Viet Cong
purchasing agents and smugglers carrying supplies by trail or small
boat. The supplies are acquired in local. Cambodian markets along
the border or from legal, importing firms and business houses in Phnom
Penh. The Mekong-.Bas sac River complex formerly was a principal.
route for moving supplies into South Vietnam. Since 1963, seizures of
illegal supplies on the rivers have practically ceased. This change
may reflect the increased lack of South Vietnamese control of the border
or an increasing use of land routes. The Viet Cong control the border
on four routes that enter Tay . Ninh and Binh Long Provinces.
I truck convoys carrying rice now cross
the border seven or eight kilometers into Vietnamese territory after
nightfall.
2. Organizational Control
the infiltration of sup-
plies from outside sources, including Cambodia, is under the control
of the Viet Cong Peoples Revolutionary Party apparatus. The Finance
and Economic Sections of the District Party Committees, under the
provincial-level Party Committee, appear to have immediate super-
vision of these movements.
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3. Types of Supplies Moved
Most of the supplies procured in Cambodia have been purchased on
the open market. Arms and ammunition also have been infiltrated
through Cambodia from North Vietnam. Because of the clandestine
nature of the Viet Cong procurement in Cambodia, an accurate estimate
of the total volume of the shipments cannot be made. The current vol-
ume of food shipments possibly is about 5, 000 tons per year. Cambodia
is by no means a major source of food supplies to the Viet Cong, who
depend primarily on the South Vietnamese countryside. The Viet Cong
collect more rice than they need in the delta area, some of which is
sent to Cambodia for export. The purchase of rice in Phnom Penh is
probably a logistic expedient to supply VC/NVA units operating in deficit
mountain areas. The Viet Cong clandestine apparatus in Phnom Penh
has regularly purchased drugs and medical supplies in the open market
in Cambodia. Although appreciable amounts of medical and other non-
military supplies have been procured in Cambodia for VC/NVA use, the
bulk of such items have been procured in South Vietnam itself or have
been brought in from North Vietnam.
The Viet Cong apparatus in Phnom Pent has successfully solicited
some contributions from the Vietnamese minority elements in Cambodia
who are generally unsympathetic to the government of South Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese commercial representative in Phnom Penh re-
portedly pays the Cambodian merchants after the supplies have been
delivered.
The extent to which Cambodia is used either as a transfer area or
as a source of arms and ammunition is difficult to assess.
Almost certainly, the Communists have estab-
lished arms caches on Cambodian territory for VC/NVA support. The
movement of weapons from these caches to distribution points in South
Vietnam robabl accounts for some recent sightings of arms move-
ments. Cambodian
troops have provided arms to the Viet Cong. There is no confirmation
of this report. If the incident did in fact occur, such incidents have
not been on a wide scale and almost certainly have not involved collu-
sion or foreknowledge on the part of the central. government of Cambodia.
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In recent statements concerning Cam o ian
support for the Vietnamese Communists, Prince Sihanouk has empha-
sized that no military equipment is moving to VC/NVA forces via
Cambodia.
Although the volume of supplies obtained for Communist forces
from Cambodia has always been small, Cambodian territory now
seems to be playing an increasingly important role in the movement
of military supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. This role
could eventually have an important effect on the outcome of the war.
The Viet Cong and, more recently, North Vietnamese forces use
Cambodian territory in many areas along the 600-mile border for
sanctuary and bivouac purposes.
Important VC/NVA military facili-
ties, such as rest camps, training areas, -hos-pitals. workshops. and
storage depots, now operate in Cambodia.
A recently captured Viet Cong document reveals in the clearest
terms to date how the Communists have been using Cambodian terri-
tory for sanctuary with the complicity of at least local Cambodian
officials. The document is a report of an early.April 1966 Viet Cong
meeting dealing with problems associated with the use of Cambodian
territory. It makes clear the importance which the Viet Cong attaches
to its Cambodian sanctuary and. suggests that Cambodia will loom even
larger in Communist planning as the war intensifies in South Vietnam.
The document indicates that the principal use of Cambodian territory,
at least in the Tay Ninh-Svay Rieng area, is to harbor rest and recovery
camps for Viet Cong wounded,
4. Cambodian Government Collusion
The Cambodian government has taken an increasingly favorable
attitude toward the Communist insurgency in South Vietnam. The
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Cambodian government has expressed its official goodwill for the
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV). Sihanouk
supports the NFLSV's claim to represent the South Vietnamese people,
he has presented medical supplies to North Vietnam, and he has presided
at a ceremony in which medical supplies were presented to a representa-
tive of the NFLSV. He has publicly stated that Cambodian hospitals would
care for the Viet Cong wounded although he also stated that his principal
purpose was to prevent the establishment of Vietnamese colonies on Cam-
bodian soil. In addition, he has raised the North Vietnamese commercial
delegation to a governmental level short of diplomatic status.
There is considerable evidence of cooperation with the Viet Cong at
lower levels of the Cambodian government:. The active assistance of
Cambodian armed forces in VC/NVA refuge activities in Cambodia has
been noted. There have been some reports of Cambodian and Viet Cong
troops fighting together against South Vietnamese troops. Viet Cong
prisoners of war in 1964 stated that the Cambodian troops attempted to
cover up their cooperation with the insurgents, and they also reported
that local Cambodian authorities have made no effort to interfere with
Viet Cong procurement of supplies in Cambodia.
In summary, the Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory appears to
be due to active Cambodian cooperation in some areas, a laissez-faire
attitude in others, and the inability of the Cambodian government to
control its frontiers in isolated regions. The increasing intensity of
the war in South Vietnam is putting a severe strain on Sihanouk's prin-
cipal short-term policy objective -- to keep the Vietnam war from
spreading to Cambodia. He has through the years cultivated Cambodia's
international posture as a "neutral" in large measure to further this
objective. At the same time, acting on the calculation that the Com-
munists would win in South Vietnam, he has moved circumspectly toward
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a political accommodation with Hanoi and the Viet Gong. The continu-
ing problem for Sihanouk has been to improve relations with the Com-
munists without inviting retaliation from South Vietnamese and US
forces.
This has been a difficult. game but Sihanouk has played it adroitly
and successfully. He has been able to do so principally because the
Communist use of Cambodian territory to date has been relatively
limited and covert in nature and generally deniable. In recent months,
however, the Communists have been forced to make increasing demands
on Cambodia at the same time that Sihanouk has been increasingly
irritated by Khmer Serei activities. Sihanouk has met Communist de-
mands in a characteristic way .- ,- giving the Communists what they want
but without officially admitting that he is doing so. He probably hopes
that by expanding contacts with the West and pushing for an expanded
International Control Commission operation at the port of Sihanoukville
that he can continue to portray Cambodia. as the innocent victim of the
South Vietnam war,
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