AS ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM THROUGH 30 SEPTEMBER 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070036-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 105
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2009
• Sequence Number: 36
• Publication Date: December 6, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
An Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program
Through 30 September 1967
USAF review(s)
completed.
JCS review completed.
Top Secret+
Copy No.
6 December 1967
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Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Physical Effects . . . . . . . . . . . 5
A. Economic Damage . . . . . . . . . . 6
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . 6
2. Transportation . . . . . . . . 8
a. Railroads . . . . . . . . . 9
b. Highways . . . . . . . . . 11
c. Waterways . . . . . . . 12
d. Railroad Yards and Shops 13
e. Maritime Ports and
Shipyards . . . . . . . . 13
f. Transport Equipment . . . . 15
g. Bridges . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Other Economic Target Systems . 18
a. Electric Power . . . . . . 18
b. Petroleum Storage
Facilities . . . . . . . . 19
c. Manufacturing Facilities 21
a. Agriculture and Fishing . . 24
b. Export Losses . . . . . . . 25
B. Military Damage . . . . . . . . . . 25
1. Barracks . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. Airfields . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3. SAM Sites . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4. Naval Bases . . . . . . . . . . 29
5. Radar . . . . . . . . . . 29
6. Communications . . . . . . . . 30
7. Supply and Ordnance Depots . . 30
8. Ammunition Depots . . . . . . . 31
9. Naval Craft . . . . . . . . 32
10. Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . 32
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C. Miscellaneous Targets of Armed
Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . 33
II. Air Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 59
A. Scale of Attack . . . . . . . . . 59
B. Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
C. Distribution of Attacks in
North Vietnam . . . . . . . 62
D. Cost of Air Operations over
North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . 64
III. Air Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
A. Introduction . . . . . . . . 71
B. Air Losses in Southeast Asia . . 71
C. Rolling Thunder Losses . . . . . 72
1. Loss Trends . . . . . . . . . 72
2. Losses by Type of Target . . 74
3. Losses by Geographic Area . . 76
D. North Vietnamese Claims . . . . . 79
E. Personnel Losses . . . . . . . . 80
Appendixes
Appendix A. Transportation in the Hanoi
and Haiphong Areas . . . . . 83
I. The Hanoi Area . . . . . . . . . 83
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . 83
B. The Hanoi Transportation
Network . . . . . . . . . 83
C. Attacks on the Doumer and
Canal des Rapides Bridges 84
II. The Haiphong Area . . . . . . . . 86
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . 86
B. Rail Transport . . . . . . . 86
C. Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
D. Water Routes . . . . . . 87
E. Residual Transport Capacity . 88
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Appendix B. The MK-36 Mining Program in
North Vietnam . . . . . . . 89
1. The MK-50/MK-52 Mining Program . 89
II. The MK-36 Program . . . . . . . 89
III. Implementation of the MK-36
Program Through 30 October . . 90
IV. Effectiveness of the Program . . 92
1. Value of Economic and Military Damage
Attributed to the Rolling Thunder
Program, Cumulative 1965 Through
September 1967 . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Major Railroad Yards and Shops
Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program, 1965, 1966, and January-
September 1967 . . . . . . . . .. . . 34
3. Maritime Ports and Shipyards Attacked
Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965, 1966, and January-September
1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4. Destruction and Damage of Transport
Equipment, 1965, 1966, and January-
September 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . 37
5. Strikes Against JCS-Targeted Bridges,
1965, 1966, and January-September
1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
6. Bomb Damage Assessment of Bridges
in North Vietnam, 1965 - September
1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
7. Electric Power Facilities Attacked
Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965, 1966, and January-September
1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
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8. Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked
Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965, 1966, and January-September
1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
9. Manufacturing Facilities Attacked
Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965, 1966, and January-September
1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
10. Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, January-September
1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
11. Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965, 1966, and
January-September 1967 . . . . . . . 53
12. Naval Bases Attacked Under the
Rolling Thunder Program, 1965, 1966,
and January-September 1967 . . . . . 56
13. Sorties Against North Vietnam by
Mission and Nationality, 1965, 1966.,
and January-September 1967 . . . . . 66
14. Sorties Against North Vietnam by
Program and by Service, 1965, 1966,
and January-September 1967 . . . . . 67
15. Ordnance Delivered by Air on North
Vietnam by Program, 1965, 1966, and
January-September 1967 . . . . . . . 68
16. Distribution of Attack Sorties over
North Vietnam by Route Package,
1966, January-September 1967 . . . . 69
17. Sorties, Losses, and Loss Rates for
the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965,
1966, January-September 1967 . . . . 75
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North Vietnam (map) frontispiece
Figure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Figure 8.
Value of Economic Damage in
North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965,
1966, and January-September
1967 (chart) following page . . 2
Value of Military Damage in
North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965,
1966, and January-September
1967 (chart) following page 2
Index of Sorties Flown in
Southeast Asia and Relative
Amounts in Each Area, 1965,
1966, and January-September
1967 (chart) following pace . . 4
Index of Ordnance Delivered in
Southeast Asia and Relative
Amounts in Each Area, 1966
and January-September 1967
(chart) followin age . . . . 4
Value of Economic and Military
Damage, by Quarter, 1965, 1966,
and January-September 1967
(chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Shares of Attack Sorties and
Combat Losses over Route
Package VI, January-September
1967 (chart) . . . . . . . . . 78
Hanoi Area Bypass System (map)
following page . . . . . . . . 84
Status of Haiphong Bridges,
4 September-18 October 1967
(map) following page . . . . . 86
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104
INA
TH A I L A N D
Road
New road construction
Railroad (meter gouge)
Possible railroad under construction
--- Major inlond waterway
686641167 CIA
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h Linh
DEMARCATION LINE
Do g Ha
ng Tn
u
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
THROUGH 30 SSEPTEMBER-71767-
Summary
Rolling Thunder operations have been increas-
ingly successful in imposing a burden on North
Vietnam. The costs of bomb damage, the neutrali-
zation of industry, the increased disruption of
transport, and the rigors of'daily living have
combined to make support of the war more difficult
and complex. Despite the achievements of the
bombing program, however, no significant deteriora-
tion in North Vietnam's military capabilities or
its determination to persist in. the war can be
detected.
During the first nine months of 1967 the air
campaign against North Vietnam increased signifi-
cantly in terms of sorties flown, ordnance dropped,
and targets attacked. More sorties were flown over
North Vietnam during the first nine months of
1967 -- 149,600 -- than during all of 1966. New
industrial, transport, and military targets were
effectively attacked for the first time. Intensi-
fied attacks against LOC's throughout the country --
including attacks against key and previously un-
struck targets in the Hanoi, Haiphong, and the
China border areas -- gave the Rolling Thunder
program in 1967 its first opportunity to test the
potential of a sustained and systematic air inter-
diction program.
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and coordinated with the Office of Current Intelli-
gence and the Special Assistant for Vietnamese
Affairs. The estimates and conclusions represent
the best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence
as of.5 December 1967.
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The cumulative effects of 32 months of punish-
ing air attacks have caused widespread damage and
disruption to virtually every part of the North
Vietnamese economy. The Rolling Thunder program
has been increasingly effective in 1967 in inflict-
ing damage on military and economic targets.
About one-half of the estimated $355 million total
damage inflicted on North Vietnam since 1965 was
inflicted in the first nine months of 1967 (see
Figures 1 and 2).
Damage to industry accounted for the largest
share of direct economic losses during the first
half of 1967, while damage to transport equipment
caused almost 70 percent of direct economic losses
during the third quarter. Airstrikes against
electric powerplants have reduced the country's
capacity to about 20 percent of the prestrike level,
and the main power network that serves Hanoi and
Haiphong has been kept at an operating level of
not more than 10 percent of its prestrike capacity.
Direct bomb damage or a lack of electric power has
crippled North Vietnam's small modern industry.
A halt in cement and pig iron production and a de-
crease in coal-processing capacity have caused a
major decline in the seaborne exports of bulk
goods during the third quarter of 1967. The trans-
port system has been disrupted, and large numbers
of transport equipment and facilities. have been
destroyed. Furthermore, the North Vietnamese
economy is undoubtedly hurting in ways that cannot
be measured. The populace has had to shoulder
countless new responsibilities, bear intense emo-
tional stresses, and work harder for longer hours.
Costs of damage to military equipment and
facilities during the first nine months of 1967
were almost three times as high as in 1966 (see
Figure 2). However, damage to aircraft alone
accounted for slightly more than 40 percent of this
damage during 1967. Direct attacks on military
target systems other than the air defense system
have probably had only a negligible impact on the
overall effectiveness of'North Vietnam's military
forces, which has been sustained and even increased
by large infusions of military aid from the USSR
and Communist China.
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ECONOMIC DAMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
1965
36.2
POWER
PLANTS
6.3
31.0
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
INDIRECT
LOSSES
{Agriculture,
Fishing,
Exports;
&
1966
93.3
1967
Jan- Sep
114.0
SAgdculture, Fishing
& Exports)
36.9
INDIRECT
LOSSES
MISCELLANEOUS
ARMED RECCE 0.9
Figure 1. Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
MARITIME PORTS 0.8
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MILITARY DAMAGE
1965
32.7
1966
20.3
1967
Jan-Sep
58.0
-MISCELLANEOUS
ARMED RECCE 0.7
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
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Despite the increased intensity of the air war,
especially the increased attacks against LOC's (see
Figures 3 and 4), there is still no evidence that
the Rolling Thunder program is having a significant
impact in limiting the North Vietnamese war effort
in South Vietnam. The cost of moving men and supplies
to South Vietnam has been raised, but the flow
continues. Logistics problems have not placed
a relevant ceiling on force structures or levels
of combat. The movement of supplies in the northeast
has been slowed, but all modes of transport --
rail, road, and waterway -- continue to be used.
Neither Haiphong nor Hanoi has been isolated from
other parts of the country. In spite of increased
imports, there has been an overall net decline
in the volume of goods that must be moved as a
result of the cessation of modern industrial production.
The inventory of freight cars has been maintained
and its carrying capacity increased; the number
of trucks has been maintained despite the high
level of destruction. As a result of effective
countermeasures, the North Vietnamese transport
system presently has greater capacity than it
did when the Rolling Thunder program began.
North Vietnamese success in countering the
bombing program against the logistics system is
explained by several factors. The density of
the system remains low and its diversity so great
that it is extremely difficult to neutralize.
Transport requirements are low relative to capacity.
North Vietnamese countermeasures have continued
to improve -- abetted and strengthened by large
infusions of materiel and equipment from their
Communist allies, as well as Chinese manpower.
It is difficult to conceive of an interdiction
campaign that would pinch off the flow of essential
military supplies to forces in the South as long
as combat requirements remained at anything like
current levels. Political considerations aside,
the combined interdiction of land and water routes,
including the mining of the water approaches to
the major ports and the bombing of ports and transship-
ment facilities, would be the most effective type
of interdiction campaign. While the logistics
problems would be further complicated, we believe
the flow of essential supplies would continue.
Under these conditions, the determining factor
in shaping Hanoi's outlook toward the war probably
would be the situation in South Vietnam itself.
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Although the overall loss rates of US aircraft
have steadily declined since 1965, disproportionately
high losses of both aircraft and crews have resulted
from the attacks against targets in Route Package
VI, particularly in the immediate Hanoi and Haiphong
areas. The overall 1967 combat loss rate of attack
aircraft is 2.2 per 1,000 attack sorties. In com-
parison the loss rate for attacks against the Thai
Nguyen Iron and Steel Plant was 28.6 per 1,000 sorties
and against electric powerplants it was 18.2 per 1,000
sorties. Six aircraft were lost while attacking the
Hanoi Electric Powerplant and the Hanoi Transformer
Substation which play minor roles in the overall war
effort. The recovery rate for pilots and crews
downed in Route Package VI is no more than half the
rate for the country as a whole. To date, the US
air campaign in Route Package VI, particularly in
the Hanoi-Haiphong area, involves a very high element
of risk and high costs.
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SORTIES FLOWN
'JANUARY 1965 TOTAL FOR LAOS, NORTH VIETNAM, AND SOUTH VIETNAM
Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each Area, 1965, 1966, and
January-September 1967
1966
Index of Ordnance Delivered in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each Area, 1966 and
January-September 1967
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I. Physical Effects
The Rolling Thunder program increased signifi-
cantly in both scope and intensity during the,first
nine months of 1967. Emphasis on airstrikes against
major industrial facilities, most of which had not
been previously attacked, generally neutralized
North Vietnam's limited modern industrial base in
the first half of the year. During the third
quarter the emphasis of attacks shifted from in-
dustrial targets to increased interdiction of the
transport system, particularly key targets in the
Hanoi and Haiphong areas and the Chinese buffer
zone which were struck for the first time.
The cumulative measurable damage to the economy
and military facilities and equipment through
September 1967 is estimated at about $355 million
(see Table 1). Nearly 70 percent of this damage
was inflicted on economic targets -- primarily
transport equipment, bridges, and electric power-
plants -- but indirect losses from decreases in
agricultural production and exports also occurred.
A comparison of the cost of damage by time period
follows:
Million US $
Jan-Sep
1965 1966 1967
Economic 36.2 93.3 114.0
Military 32.7 20.3 58.0
Although the amount of damage declined sharply
during the third quarter of 1967 after the more
lucrative targets -- manufacturing facilities and
electric powerplants -- were heavily attacked, it
remained well above the 1965 and 1966 levels (see
Figure 5). The high rate of damage to transport
equipment inflicted in the second quarter continued
during the third quarter, and damage to military
supplies and equipment by miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance rose significantly. The decline in
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Value of Economic and Military Damage
Million US Dollars
Tromp"'
Equipment.
32 %
Quarterly
Average
Quarterly
Average
Man -
ta cturi ng
Fouit i ties
31%
Aircraft
64%
Transport
Equipment
30%
Flectrie
Powerplants
17%
Transport
Equipment
2/o
Second
Quarter
Third
Quarter
68623 11-67 CIA
Figure 5. North Vietnam, Value of Economic and Military Damage, by Quarter, 1965, 1966, and
January-September 1967
cost of damage during the third quarter does not
reflect the increased difficulties faced by the
North Vietnamese in moving economic and military
supplies because of major damage to the transport
system.
A. Economic Damage
1. Introduction
The measurable cost to North Vietnam
of direct damage to economic targets through Sep-
tember 1967 was $165 million, about 68 percent of
the total direct and indirect economic cost and
47 percent of the combined economic and military
cost. About one-half of the cumulative direct
economic damage occurred during the first nine
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Value of Economic and Military Damage Attributed to the Rolling Thunder Program
Cumulative 1965 .Through September 1967
Direct losses
Million
US
Transportation
equipment
68.9
Railroad/highway
bridges
Manufacturing
facilities
17.8
7.5
Railroad yards and
shops
6.1
Maritime ports and
shipyards
2.1
Miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance
Million
US
Direct losses
110.9
Aircraft
33.2
Barracks
30.0
Supply areas an
d depots
9.8
SAM sites
7.4
Ammunition depo
ts
5.3
Naval craft
4.8
Radar sites
Naval bases
Airfields
Communications
Miscellaneous a
reconnaissance
sites
rmed
14.5
Indirect losses
78.5
Exports
29.5
Agriculture
39.5
Fishing
9.5
Total, direct and
indirect losses
243.5
Total economic and military 53 4.5
a. Midpoint of the range of about 7.2 million to .7.9 million.
b. Because of rounding, components do not add to the totals shown.
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months of 1967. The tabulation below summarizes
direct damage to economic targets:
Million US $
Jan-Sep 1965 -
1965 1966 1967 Sep 1967
Direct damage
to economic
facilities
and equipment 26.8 56.5 81.7 165.0
The cost of direct damage rose rapidly
from a quarterly average of $14.1 million in 1966
to $23.9 million in the first quarter of 1967 and
$36.3 million in the second quarter. The increased
damage in the first half of the year resulted from
the heavy damage to modern manufacturing facilities
and electric powerplants. After attacks on these
facilities slackened, the cost of damage dropped
sharply to $21.6 million in the third quarter.
Damage to transport equipment remained at a high
level, rising from $3.3 million in the first
quarter to $14.9 million in the second quarter and
$15.0 million in the third quarter.
2. Transportation
The high level of airstrikes against
the transportation system of North Vietnam that
has been under way since June 1967 has disrupted
operations and caused substantial losses of equip-
ment and facilities. The costs and difficulties
of maintaining traffic movements have increased,
but, with extensive countermeasures and foreign
assistance, there is probably overall more surplus
capacity available today than existed at the start
of the Rolling Thunder program. North Vietnam is
far better able to cope with air attacks against
the transportation system today-than in 1965.
At the same time, some requirements
for transportation have been reduced. Airstrikes
against electric power and industrial targets have
reduced transport requirements for coal, other raw
materials, and products. The gross decline in
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traffic is estimated at about 1.5 million tons for
the first half of 1967. Although this decline was
partly offset by the increase in the volume of
imports moved through Haiphong during the first
half of 1967, the net decline in tons carried was
about 1.2 million, an amount equal to 12 percent
of the tons carried during a similar period in
1966. The following tabulation shows tons carried
on the modern transportation system during the
first half of 1967, compared with the totals in
previous years:
Railroad
Highway
Inland water
Coastal water
Total
Jan-Jun
1964
1965
1966
1967
4.13
3.7
3.3
1.6
7.18
7.9
7.9
3.9
7.01
7.7
8.5
3.2
0.37
0.4
0.5
0.2
18.69
19.7
20.2
8.9
The decline in traffic will be even greater in
the last half of 1967 unless some of the industrial
plants resume production or imports increase sub-
stantially during the final quarter.
a. Railroads
The railroad system of North Vietnam
has been subject to attack throughout the Rolling
Thunder program. During 1965 and 1966 the principal
emphasis of attack was on the railroad line leading
south from Hanoi with only sporadic strikes against
the Hanoi - Lao Cai and Hanoi - Dcng Dang lines.
Since June 1967 the bombing program has been enlarged
to include intensive and repeated attacks against
multiple targets on the vital railroad lines in the
northern areas. In addition, railroad targets in
previously restricted areas such as Hanoi, Haiphong,
and the buffer zone along the northern border have
come under repeated and heavy attacks.*
* For a detailed discussion of the current trans-
port situation in Hanoi and Haiphong, see Appendix A.
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Key railroad and combination rail-
road and highway bridges have been destroyed,
important railroad yards have been damaged, and
much railroad rolling stock has been damaged or
destroyed. In many instances, damage to bridges
has forced the North Vietnamese to employ less
efficient and more time-consuming methods to
move traffic, transshipping railroad freight to
motor trucks and water craft where bypass bridges
are not available.
Although major problems have been
created by the recent heavy attacks against rail-
road targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas,
countermeasures and alternate facilities have
guaranteed the maintenance of substantial capacity
for traffic movement.
Throughout the period of intensive
strikes against the Hanoi - bong Lang line, each
bridge attacked had at least one serviceable by-
pass available. The railroad yards, though
sometimes unserviceable immediately following
strikes, had at least one track open for through
service shortly afterward.
Attacks against the Kep - Thai
Nguyen and Thai Nguyen - Hanoi lines have not sig-
nificantly hindered the movement of traffic. Either
adequate bypasses or quick repairs obviated adverse
effects.
Constant bombing of the Hanoi-Vinh
line has made the continuation of through service
nearly impossible. The importance of this line is
demonstrated by the fact that the North Vietnamese
continue to use it to the extent possible. Sub-
stantial repair and construction efforts keep
sections of the line open for shuttle train service
between interdicted points.
Through service on North Vietnam's
secondary railroad connection to Communist China,
from Hanoi northwest to Lao Cai, has not been
possible since June 1966, when the bridge at Viet
Tri was destroyed. A railroad car ferry has been
placed in service and apparently has been capable
of carrying the relatively low level of traffic
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moving through Viet Tri. A cable bridge that can
accommodate motor trucks has also been constructed
across the damaged spans of the Viet Tri Bridge to
maintain the flow of traffic in the event that
recent mining impairs use of the railroad ferry.
Thus, North Vietnam appears to be
willing and capable, with foreign assistance, to
maintain needed rail service. The more important
the route, the greater expense and effort marshaled
to move traffic and to increase route capacity.
Measures taken to increase capacity include the
conversion of much of the system to dual gauge
and the establishment of multiple bypasses for
interdicted points. Tracks capable of accommodating
both North Vietnamese meter gauge and Chinese
standard gauge rolling stock now extend from the
Chinese border through Dong Dang to Kep. A
standard gauge line was completed-in 1966 from
Kep to Thai Nguyen. From Thai,Nguyen, dual gauge
extends to the vicinity of Hanoi. Only a few
kilometers of the line from Hanoi to Kep have not
been converted to dual gauge. No steps have been
taken to convert the Hanoi-Haiphong, the Hanoi -
Lao Cai, and the Hanoi-Vinh lines to dual gauge,
but higher capacity Chinese rolling stock can
now operate over that portion of the system most
used for overland imports from China and the USSR.
b. Highways
Airstrikes against the highway
system in North Vietnam have~had no sustained
effects on truck operations. The majority of
airstrikes have been concentrated in the region
south of Thanh Hoa, with Routes 1A, 15, 7, and
101 receiving the heaviest damage. While these
strikes have interrupted and slowed traffic,
repair efforts and countermeasures have been
effective in maintaining traffic..
Since June 1967 the air campaign
against highways has been intensified and expanded
to include highway bridges in previously restricted
areas near Haiphong and the Chinese border, but
these attacks have not stopped truck operations.
In Haiphong the three highway bridges originally
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targeted have been destroyed, but at least five
highway pontoon bridges and six highway ferries
are available and capable of moving about 4,800
trucks each way every 24 hours (see Appendix A).
In the northeast buffer zone the highway bridges
at Cao Bang, That Khe, and Chien Chang were attacked
and destroyed, but bypasses were either available
or under construction at these sites.
New road construction beginning
north of Haiphong and extending to the China
border may reflect North Vietnam's preoccupation
with the possible closing of Haiphong port.
Construction since July 1966 has included improve-
ments to 84 kilometers of road in North Vietnam
to the China border north of Dinh,Lap. The
Chinese, meanwhile, have rebuilt 56 kilometers of
road on their side of the border. In July 1967,
photography showed that a 5-kilometer gap remained
between the road segments. Since there are
numerous other border crossing roads in the
northeast, this road is probably a contingency
measure.
c. Waterways
Attacks against the waterway
system in North Vietnam have not appreciably
affected inland or coastal water transportation.
Important transshipment areas such as Quang Khe,
Dong Hoi, Vinh, and Thanh Hoa have been attacked
several times, causing supplies to be off-loaded
"over the beach" in many instances. An accidental
attack in May 1967 rendered inoperative a canal
lock on the Song Ca at Ben Thuy. However, the
waterway system is flexible and continues to play
an important role in moving supplies.
A mining program was begun in
February 1967 to disrupt watercraft operations
in five selected waterways south of 20 degrees
north latitude and was extended in June to include
all lines of communication in the country. Despite
the use of a more sophisticated magnetic weapon
(MK-36) which the North Vietnamese are not believed
to be able to disarm, there is no evidence that
mining has significantly disrupted inland waterway
traffic.*
* For a discussion of the MK-36 mining program,
see Appendix B.
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d. Railroad Yards and Shops
Railroad yards and shops in 1967
have come under sharply increased bombing attacks
that have disrupted activity and temporarily halted
through rail service. During 1967 the heaviest
strikes were concentrated on the Hanoi - Dong,Dang
line, especially at Vu Chua and Kep, and on the
Hanoi-Vinh line. The estimated total cost of
repairs to damaged rail yards for 1965 through
September 1967 is $6.1 million (see Table 2).
Photography reveals that most yards have had at
least one serviceable track available most of the
time and that near-normal operations have been
maintained.
There are 27 major railroad yards*
and related facilities in North Vietnam; four of
these yards have railroad repair facilities
(Hanoi, Gia Lam, Haiphong, and Thai Nguyen).
Twenty-three targeted major yards have been
attacked; yards at Hanoi, Haiphong, Dong Dang,
and Lao Cai have not yet been authorized for
attack. In addition to major yards, at least 30
secondary yards and numerous railroad sidings
serve as small yards.
Air attacks on railroad yards and
shops have increased dramatically since 1965. In
1967 the 23 major yards suffered 532 separate
attacks, compared with 16 attacks in 1965 and 100
in 1966. Only six of the major yards, all on the
Hanoi - Lao Cai and Hanoi-Vinh lines, were attacked
in 1965. During 1966, 15 major yards, including
three on the Hanoi - Dong Dang line and five on
the Hanoi-Vinh line, were struck.
e. Maritime Ports and Shipyards
Four of the six targeted ports in
North Vietnam have been hit by air attacks since
1965. Ham Rong, a minor facility, and Ben Thuy,
having 4 percent of national capacity, were struck
first in 1965. Restrikes on Ben Thuy in 1966 and
1967 have caused extensive damage to nearly all
* A major railroad yard is defined as one having
four or more sidings and one passing track.
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storage space, and ships cannot be berthed because
of sunken vessels. It is estimated that 85 percent
of the cargo-handling capacity at.Ben Thuy has been
destroyed.
In 1966, coal-treatment facilities
at the port of Cam Pha were struck, reducing coal-
processing capacity an estimated 20 percent. Cam
Pha was restruck in September 1967, and the loading
area and the coal-treatment facilities were damaged.
Although the port remains operational, damage to
the port, coal-treatment facilities, and related
power and transportation facilities has had the
overall effect of decreasing coal exports to 1,100
tons in September and 6,500 tons in October 1967,
compared with average monthly shipments for the
first eight months of 1967 of 33,600 tons. The
port facilities at Hon Gai, another coal-shipping
port, were attacked for the first time in April
and May 1967. The overall damage does not appear
to have seriously affected the operational capa-
bility of the port, because coal shipments continue
at previous levels.
Recent developments in and around
the port of Hon Gai may presage the use of the
port as a supplement for the more congested Haiphong
port or as an alternate to Haiphong in case of
attack or mining. Ships were seen in October
proceeding to Hon Gai apparently to unload, after
waiting two or three days at the outer anchorages
of Haiphong. Photographs of Hon Gai port in late
October showed one ship unloading at the wharf and
three others grouped nearby in the anchorage.
What may be the possible construction of a new rail
route between Hon Gai and Kep has appeared in recent
photographs. Such a rail line would significantly
enhance North Vietnam's logistics capability by
permitting the increased use of Hon Gai port.
In October 1967, three minor ship-
yards in Haiphong -- Haiphong Shipyard West, Thuong
Ly, and Lach Tray -- were attacked. A fourth,
Haiphong Shipyard No. 2, had-been damaged in Sep-
tember as a result of strikes against the adjacent
Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge. The cost of
restoring these facilities is estimated at $900,000,
of which nearly $400,000 resulted from damage in
September. Because these yards perform only minor
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repair functions, the damage inflicted does not
significantly reduce North Vietnam's overall
capacity to fabricate and repair barges, lighters,
tugs, or coastal vessels. Of the ten shipyards in
the port of Haiphong, the two most significant are
Haiphong Shipyard No. 4 and the adjacent Naval
Shipyard, neither of which has yet been struck.
The total estimated cost through September of
restoring the damaged ports and shipyards is
$2.1 million (see Table 3).
f. Transport Equipment
Damage inflicted on transport equip-
ment by airstrikes has increased significantly in
1967, compared with 1965 and 1966. Reported damage
and destruction of watercraft reached record highs
in-May 1967, and losses of trucks in August 1967
exceeded the previous record high of August 1966.
Damage and destruction of equipment is shown on
Table 4.* The total cost to the North Vietnamese
of replacing and repairing transport equipment
from 1965 through September 1967 is estimated at
$68.9 million. The cost of damage inflicted dur-
ing January-September 1967 is $33.2 million, an
increase of $8.7 million over the same period in
1966. An all-time high in monthly cost of damage
to transport equipment was reached in June of this
year.
Despite increasing damage to trans-
port equipment, the system has not experienced
any serious equipment problems. Truck imports have
been sufficient to maintain the-truck inventory at
pre-bombing levels. In addition to trucks actually
imported, trucks for use in NorthVietnam are
stored at Ping-hsiang, China, and are available
to replace losses and to meet fluctuating traffic
needs. Known imports of railroad rolling stock
have not equalled the reported** damage inflicted
* Data are based on pilot reports and have been
adjusted downward to eliminate: duplication whenever
possible.
** Reported losses of railroad rolling stock have
included many small makeshift cars used on the rail
lines south of Hanoi which are not included in the
inventory estimate of mainline freight cars.
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by bombing, but no problems resulting from shortages
of rail equipment have been identified. Counts made
from photography show more rolling stock than was
estimated to be available in 1964. Moreover,
Chinese railroad equipment can be made available
in sufficient quantity to compensate for any
shortages in the North Vietnamese inventory. More
than 20,000 watercraft have been destroyed or
damaged in North Vietnam since the bombing began,
but again there are no apparent shortages.
g. Bridges
From June through September 1967,
112 strikes were carried out against 36 JCS-targeted
bridges, compared with 125 attacks against 29
bridges from January through May 1967. Table 5
summarizes strikes against JCS-targeted bridges
since the beginning of the Rolling Thunder program.
The total number of bridges and
bypass bridges confirmed by available photography
to have been damaged or destroyed by the Rolling
Thunder program now stands at 461, including 329
highway, 91 railroad, and 41 combination railroad/
highway structures.
The estimated cumulative cost of
completely restoring the confirmed damaged or
destroyed bridges to their original condition
through September 1967 would be $24.7 million --
an increase of 30 percent since the end of 1966
and nearly two and one-half times that estimated
for 1965.* At least $5.6 million have been spent
already on temporary repairs to bridges through
September 1967, of which an estimated $2.3 million
were spent during the first nine months of 1967.
Estimated cost of temporary repairs to the number
of unrepaired bridges at the end of September 1967
is $1.6 million.
A survey of the X61 bridges showed
that 420 bridges have had one or more "serious
* The estimated cumulative costs for restoring
bridges to their original condition as of the end
of 1965 and 1966 were $10.1 million and $19.0
million, respectively.
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damage occurrences" (SDO's).* There have been a
total of 709 SDO's since the beginning of the
bombings in February 1965 through September 1967
(see table 6). The number of SDO's by year and
the average number of times each of the 420
bridges were interdicted are as follows:
Number of
Average Number
Year
SDO's
Bridges with of Interdictions
SDO's per Damaged Bridge
1965
218
177
1.23
1966
334
185
1.81
Jan-
Sep
1967
157
58
2.71
While a specific bridge may be interdicted an
increasing number of times, in most cases the
crossing is bypassed in a variety of ways. Of
the 230 bypass bridges observed in aerial photog-
raphy, 62 have sustained 98 SDO's.
The North Vietnamese have effec-
tively countered the bomb damage to JCS-targeted
bridges by concentrating their effort on building
a variety of bypasses in the vicinity of each
target. Their program has been so successful that
the average number of bypasses per bridge targeted
by JCS has increased during the accelerated bombing
program in 1967. The average has increased from
almost 2.2 bypasses per bridge through May 1967
to more than 2.9 through September 1967, as shown
in the following tabulation:
' A "serious damage, occurrence" consists of initial
hits and re-hits and-is defined as damage suffi-
ciently severe that a crossing is denied to users
until a significant amount of repair has been per-
formed -- requiring considerable time, materials,
and Labor. For examp?Ze, serious damage would
include a dropped span(s), a destroyed pier(s),
or a destroyed abutment(s). Holes in a deck,
cratered approaches, twisted superstructure, or
a slight shifting of spans is not considered
serious damage.
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Through May Through September
Type of Bypass 1967 1967
Total number of
damaged JCS-
targeted bridges
(confirmed by
photography) 46 54
Total number
of bypasses 99 157
Fords (including
causeways and
culverts) 18 26
Alternate bridges 26 36
Cable bridges 9 14
Ferries and pon-
toon bridges 46 81
Average bypasses
per bridge 2.2
3. Other Economic Target Systems
a. Electric Power
Concerted airstrikes during
February-June 1967 inflicted severe damage on the
Hanoi-Haiphong main power network, and restrikes
since June have effectively nullified repair
efforts. An estimated 150,000 kilowatts (kw) of
generating capacity, or about 80 percent of the
national total, currently is out of operation.
The total cost of damage inflicted on power
facilities is estimated at $30.2 million.
The main power network centered
on Hanoi and Haiphong received the brunt of air
attacks against electric power facilities in
1967 (see Table 7). Of the 72 strikes on power
facilities during the first nine months of 1967,
60 were directed against targets in the Hanoi-
Haiphong network and 45 of these were carried out
in the first half of the year. Damage to the
nine powerplants and one key substation that make
up the main network has reduced serviceable
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capacity from 148,000 kw to between 10,000 and
15,000 kw, or roughly 7 to 10 percent of pre-
strike capacity. At present, all but two of the
facilities are known to be out of service. The
Hanoi powerplant is limited to partial operation
at 30 to 50 percent of its installed capacity,
probably for the remainder of the year. Results
are not yet known of a restrike against the Nam
Dinh plant, which apparently had been put back
into partial operation during September. Repairs
in progress at the Viet Tri powerplant may soon
permit partial operation.
Loss of the central generating
plants has eliminated the source of supplementary
power formerly received by Hanoi and Haiphong from
the main power network. Hanoi is dependent on
partially serviceable local power and on a number
of diesel-generating stations. Haiphong is with-
out a central power supply and must rely completely
on diesel stations. The two cities apparently
have a system of power rationing and experience
intermittent power outages but essential services
are being provided. With the use of diesel-
generating equipment, minimal power supplies for
high-priority consumers can be continued in-
definitely, and important urban areas can be
expected to maintain a limited power supply.
A possible decision to fragment
the central power network and to forego extensive
reconstruction of powerplants is suggested by the
removal of transformers from a number of network
substations and the lack of repair activity at
many heavily damaged plants. There has been no
evidence of attempts to repair powerplants at
Haiphong, Bac Giang, Thanh Hoa, and the Dong Anh
substation since May or June 1967, nor at Co Dinh
since November 1966. The general severity of
damage to these powerplants will deny even partial
operation of power facilities for periods ranging
from three months to one year after repair work
is resumed. Complete restoration in most cases,
if attempted, will require well over one year.
b. Petroleum Storage Facilities
By the end of September 1967, about
86 percent of the 128,000 tons of petroleum storage
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capacity that had existed at the beginning of 1965
had been destroyed (see Table 8). No repairs have
been undertaken. Seven JCS-targeted storage
facilities with residual capacity of about 16,000
tons remained operational.
During the first nine months of
1967, 13 airstrikes against JCS-targeted petroleum
storage facilities inflicted identified damage
only on Do Son, where residual capacity of about
1 percent of North Vietnam's original capacity was
destroyed. Damage to the Haiphong terminal as a
result of attacks in 1967 was restricted to rail
facilities and buildings in the terminal. No
damage to tankage was observed.
The value of tankage, contents,
and related facilities destroyed since 1965 at
JCS-targeted sites is estimated at about $6.7
million to $7.4 million. In addition, an estimated
5,000 tons of storage capacity -- including
contents -- at dispersed tank sites was destroyed
during 1966 and 1967 with a value of about $0.5
million. Although the stockpile of 55-gallon
drums also has been attacked since 1965, no
adequate assessment of the damage inflicted can
be made. Thus the measurable damage to all
petroleum facilities and contents through September
1967 is estimated at about $7.2 million to $7.9
million.
Although the cost and difficulty
of importing and distributing petroleum have been
increased, the bombing has not effectively reduced
North Vietnam's capability to maintain petroleum
supplies primarily because of the development of
dispersed bulk oil storage capacity before extensive
attacks against JCS-targeted facilities began.
By the end of September 1967, there were more than
100 dispersed petroleum storage tank sites in North
Vietnam with a total estimated capacity of between
30,000 and 40,000
tons.
The accumulation of
55-
gallon drums has
given
increased flexibility
in
petroleum storage and distribution. The storage
capacity represented by the drum inventory at the
end of September 1967 probably was about 40,000
tons. In addition, there is an indeterminate
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amount of "floating storage capacity" represented
by oil barges, rail tank cars, tank trucks, and a
small tanker now in use in North Vietnamese waters.
c. Manufacturing Facilities
North Vietnam's small modern manu-
facturing sector has been severely damaged by air-
strikes, particularly during 1967. Most of the
larger industrial plants have been virtually para-
lyzed by a combination of direct bomb damage and a
shortage of electric power. Production has been
halted at the Thai Nguyen Iron.and Steel Complex,
the Haiphong Cement Plant, the Lang Chi Explosives
Plant, the Nam Dinh Textile Mill, and several newer
chemicals plants. No attempts have been made to
repair damage at the plants.
Bomb damage, in terms of costs of
repair, to North Vietnamese manufacturing facilities
from January through September 1967 is estimated to
be $17.8 million. More than 90 percent of the total
damage occurred during 1967, as shown in the follow-
ing tabulation:
Million US $
Jan-Sep
1965 1966 1967 Total a/
Thai Nguyen Iron and
Steel Complex 10.0 10.0
Haiphong Cement Plant 3.0 3.0
Nam Dinh Textile Mill 0.8 0.2 1.3 2.4
Cam Pha Coal Treatment
Plant 0.1 Negl. 0.1
Viet Tri Paper Mill 0.1 0.7 0.8
Lang Chi Explosives
Plant 0.4 Negl. 0.4
Bac Giang Chemical
Fertilizer Plant 0.4 0.4
Hon Gai Calcium
Carbide Plant 0.2 0.2
Phu Tho Phosphate
Fertilizer Plant 0.2 0.2
Haiphong Enamelware
Plant 0.4 0.4
Total a/ 1.2 0.4 16.3 17.8
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to
the totals shown.
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Damage to the steel and cement plants, inflicted in
the first half of 1967, accounted for 56 percent
and 17 percent, respectively, of the total cost of
damage. No important strikes against manufacturing
facilities were made in the third quarter of 1967.
Table 9 shows details on manufacturing facilities
attacked through September 1967.
The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Complex halted production as a result of damage to
the coke plant, blast furnaces, steam plant, and open
hearth building and rolling mill during March- May
1967. The Haiphong Cement Plant has been inactive
since the strikes of April 1967. The plant harl
previously accounted for 95 percent of North Viet-
namese cement production. Loss of cement production
that had been more than adequate for domestic
requirements has forced North Vietnam to import
cement, mainly from Communist China.
Production at North Vietnam's major
chemicals and explosives plants has been seriously
disrupted. The Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant
is not operational because of a loss of power, and
some essential equipment may have received direct
bomb damage. The Viet Tri Chemical Plant probably
has cut back or suspended operations because of
damage r_o the Viet Tri Powerplant in March 1967.
The Phu Tho Phosphate Fertilizer Plant probably
was inactive for most of the spring and summer of
1967 because of a power shortage. Although the
plant received slight damage in recent airstrikes,
photography indicates some continuing production
activity. The Lang Chi Explosives Plant, inactive
from bomb damage since August 1965, has been
literally destroyed, having been hit in at least
12 separate airstrikes since June 1967. A minor
chemical plant -- the Hon Gai Calcium Carbide
Plant -- also has been heavily damaged by bombing.
Output of fertilizer at the Haiphong Fertilizer
Plant has been disrupted because equipment was
dismantled and moved, apparently in anticipation
of attacks on nearby important bridges. Processing
of coal for export at Cam Pha and Hon Gai has been
disrupted to an extent that coal exports were sharply
reduced in 1967.
Three of North Vietnam's most
important light industrial plants have been damaged
extensively by bombing. The Nam Dinh Textile Mill
sustained severe structural damage during several
airstrikes against an adjacent powerplant. There
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has been little damage to equipment, however, be-
cause much of the machinery was evacuated after
the first accidental strike in June 1965. A
recent decline in cloth rations may reflect the
reduced output resulting from the dispersal of
equipment. The Viet Tri Paper Mill and the Haiphong
Enamelware Factory have also suffered damage during
strikes at nearby facilities.
The small machine building industry
has remained untouched by US airstrikes, except for
possible damage to small shops located near targets.
The capacity for machine building and metal process-
ing has been enlarged since the beginning of the
air war through imports of-machinery and equipment
now being installed in small shops throughout the
country. Machine building shops are now engaged
primarily in maintaining transport equipment and
producing and maintaining the limited amount of
equipment going to the agricultural sector. The
main problem faced by machine building as a result
of the air war has been the exacerbation of an
already drastic shortage of technical cadre and
the need to rely increasingly on the use of female
workers.
Local industry is playing a more
important role in the economy during 1967 because
of the damage to modern industry. Small facilities
contribute locally to the military effort mainly
as repair facilities and as sources of a variety
of consumer goods. Handicrafts and processed foods,
primarily from local industry, have made up about
half the value of exports in the past and in 1967
probably will account for most of the reduced value
of exports. The regime has responded to stepped-
up air attacks on industry-during 1967 by increasing
the pace of the dispersal of industry. Manufacturing
operations that can be separated are being installed
in separate locations. Problems in coordinating
supplies and providing transportation have reduced
the efficiency of the dispersed factories.
4. Indirect Effects,
The Rolling Thunder program has also
resulted in significant losses to the North Viet-
namese economy that are indirectly related to the
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bombing. These losses result from disruptions of
normal economic activity, decreases in production,
and a decline in foreign exchange earnings because
of reduced exports. Losses that can be quantified --
decreases in the rice crop and the fish catch and
the loss of exports -- are estimated at nearly
$78.5 million through September 1967, or about one-
third of total economic damage. Unquantifiable
losses resulting from management problems and pro-
duction inefficiencies, the costs of dispersing
industry, production losses due to power shortages,
reallocations of manpower, and civil defense
measures including urban evacuation undoubtedly
total in the tens of millions of dollars.
a. Agriculture and Fishing
Agriculture and fishing have been
affected by bombing attacks even though they have
never been targeted. Production has been adversely
affected by the disruption of normal farming and
fishing routines, manpower diversions to war-related
tasks, and, in the case of agriculture, interrup-
tions in the manufacture and distribution of
fertilizer. A substantial but unknown portion of
agricultural losses, however, may be due to adverse
weather conditions rather than to bombing attacks.
The cumulative loss of rice production (which in-
cludes the effects of adverse weather) and of the
fish catch from early 1965 through September 1967
is estimated to be about $49 million as tabulated
below:
Million US $
Jan-Sep
1965
1966
1967
Total
Rice production
3.5
22.0
14.0
39.5
Fishing
1.7
3.3
4.5
9.5
Total
5.2
25.3
18.5
49.0
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North Vietnamese claims that US air-
craft have attacked dikes that control water levels
in the Red River delta have been shown to be false.
Aerial photography of dikes claimed by the North
Vietnamese to have been attacked in June-August 1967
revealed only minor damage in most cases. All but
three of the 24 dikes listed by the North Vietnamese
were located and covered by photography. No damage
could be found at nine of the located dikes. Only
four may have been partly cut, and there was no
evidence of significant flooding. In almost all
cases where dikes showed some evidence of damage,
military-associated targets were located nearby.
b. Export Losses
The cumulative measurable value of
the reduction in seaborne exports attributable to
the bombing from 1965 through September 1967 was
about $29.5 million. Losses of seaborne exports
in the first three quarters of 1967 were up nearly
60 percent from the comparable period in 1966.
The significant increase in the loss of exports in
1967 reflects the stepped-up attacks on industrial
facilities during the first half of the year.
Export losses by quarter since 1965 are shown in
the tabulation on the following page in million US
dollars at f.o.b. prices.
B. Military Damage
The cost of damage to military targets
systems through September 1967 is estimated at
nearly $111 million, slightly less than one-third
of the total cumulative damage from the Rolling
Thunder program. Losses of aircraft and damage
to barracks complexes comprised about 57 percent
of the total military damage. The cost during the
first nine months of 1967 was nearly three times
that for all of 1966, primarily because of the high
level of damage to aircraft and barracks in the
second quarter. In addition, a high level of
aircraft destruction in October added $8.8 million
to the cost as well as reducing the effectiveness
of jet fighters for air defense.
Damage inflicted on military targets,
however, has had little significant impact on
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Apatite
Pig
Iron a/
Cement
Coal
Total
1965 b/
3.3
0
0.9
0
4.2
2nd quarter
0.7
0
0.2
0
0.9
3rd quarter
1.0
0
0.3
0
1.4
4th quarter
1.6
0
0.4
0
1.9
1966 b/
6.1
0
0.7
4.7
11.6
1st quarter
1.6
0
0.2
0
1.8
2nd quarter
1.6
0
Negl.
1.5
3.1
3rd quarter
1.5
0
0.2
2.2
3.9
4th quarter
1.6
0
0.2
1.1
2.9
1967 b/
4.7
0.8
1.2
7.1
13.7
1st
quarter
1.6
0
0.2
1.3
3.0
2nd
quarter
1.6
0.2
0.5
2.7
4.9
3rd
quarter
1.6
0.5
0.5
3.2
5.8
a. Fluctuations in pig iron exports, due princi-
pally to changes in demand, were not measured until
after US bombing of the Thai Nguyen metallurgical
plant.
b. Because of rounding, components may not add to
the totals shown.
North Vietnam's military capabilities. Jet fighters
have never been a primary means of defense, and the
loss of barracks capacity probably is less incon-
venient now than it was at the end of 1965. Although
the radar order of battle decreased in the third
quarter of 1967, there is no evidence of a signifi-
cant deterioration of North Vietnam's air alert
capability. Attacks on SAN sites apparently have
not reduced either the total number of active SAM
battalions or the available firing sites, including
the SAM threat in the southern part of the Panhandle.
Furthermore, North Vietnam's Communist allies have
more than offset the damage; the value of military
aid rose from an estimated $270 million in 1965 to
$455 million in 1966 and may exceed $650 million
in 1967.
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1. Barracks
The number of airstrikes against JCS-
targeted barracks during the first nine months of
1967 was about three times that flown during all
of 1966. The restoration cost of the damage in-
flicted by airstrikes in 1967 is estimated at
more than $11.4 million compared with $2.5 million
in 1966 and $16.0 million in 1965 (see Table 10).
Most of the damage inflicted in 1967 resulted from
strikes against 11 JCS-targeted barracks which had
not previously been attacked. Of the total cost
estimated for the period, nearly 85 percent re-
sulted from strikes during the second quarter and
about 12 percent during the third quarter.
The bombing attacks against JCS-targeted
barracks alone resulted in a loss of capacity,
either destroyed or inactive, for about 119,000
men -- nearly 27 percent of the pre-strike national
capacity. The total loss of barracks capacity
undoubtedly is causing much inconvenience, espe-
cially in the outlying areas of the country.
Damage to barracks in these areas has not been
repaired, and troops apparently are being quartered
in makeshift shelters or in nearby villages.
However, the North Vietnamese have had time to
adjust to the loss of barracks in most areas, and
the military housing problem probably causes less
inconvenience now than at the end of 1965, when
about two-thirds of the present cumulative losses
had been inflicted.
2. Airfields
A series of airstrikes at Hoa Lac,
Kien An, and Kep commencing in April 1967
increased the cumulative cost of damage through
September 1967 to an estimated $1.2 million (see
Table 11). About 26 percent of the national
capacity of JCS-targeted airfields remained
destroyed or inactive through September 1967 --
an increase of about 7 percentage points since
March.
Despite the bombings, including initial
strikes at Phuc Yen and Cat Bi in October, no
important change in the general capability of
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North Vietnam's major airfields has occurred since
1965. Photography taken in late October 1967 showed
that, except for Cat Bi, all airfields struck in
1967 had been restored to the extent that at least
limited fighter aircraft operations could be sup-
ported. At Phuc Yen the runway was probably
repaired sufficiently to allow at least limited
MIG operations within three days of being struck.
The basic airfield and control apparatus have been
gradually expanded to counter the Rolling Thunder
program. Six airfields -- Hanoi/Gia Lam, Phuc
Yen, Kep, Hoa Loc, Haiphong/Cat Bi, and Haiphong/
Kien An -- are capable of supporting MIG operations,
and an additional airfield under construction at
Bai Thuong will be able to accommodate jet aircraft
when it is completed.
From July 1965 through September 1967,
approximately 1,200 airstrikes were directed
against SAM facilities in North Vietnam. Assess-
ment of the effects of these airstrikes has been
severely limited by a lack of post-strike photog-
raphy. The strikes have caused frequent redeploy-
ment of equipment, which probably has reduced the
efficiency of firing units and complicated
logistics. The minimum value of firm damage to
sites and support facilities is shown in the
following tabulation:
Thousand US $
SAM Facilities 1
965
1966
Jan-
Mar
Apr-
Jun
Jul-
Sep
Total a/
Firing
sites
480
2,100
.0
1,250
1,450
5,300
Support
ties
facili-
1
,600
170
300
0
0
2,100
Total a/ 2,
100
2,300
300
1,250
1,450
7,400
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the
totals shown.
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Attacks on SAM sites apparently have
not reduced either the total number of active SAM
battalions or the available firing sites. There
are now about 30 to 35 active battalions, a slight
increase from May 1967. Available to these
battalions are about 226 prepared or pre-surveyed
sites, a possible increase of about 50 sites over
the number available in May.
4. Naval Bases
Air attacks against Port Wallut in
August 1967 accounted for the only major strike
at.a naval facility since 1965. By the end of
September 1967, about 30 percent of North Vietnam's
naval base support facilities were destroyed or
inactive, compared with about 15 percent at the
end of 1965 and almost 20 percent at the end of
1966. The cumulative value of damage inflicted on
naval bases is estimated at about $1.9 million
(see Table 12). It is doubtful that the damage to
the naval bases has seriously affected the opera-
tions of the small North Vietnamese navy because
restorations can be effected quickly with indigenous
materials.
5. Radar*
No strikes were scheduled against
targeted radar sites from 1 June 1967 to mid-
October 1967, yet the number of operational early
warning and ground control intercept radars and
radar sites dropped from 180 radars at 86 sites
to 155 radars at 71 sites. The decline in the
number of operating radars occurred primarily at
the five JCS-targeted sites strategically located
along the coast and may represent losses or damage
resulting from miscellaneous armed reconnaissance
attacks. It is also possible that some radars have
been moved but not yet reactivated. The value of
damage to radar from armed reconnaissance sorties
is included in the appropriate section below.
The cumulative cost to JCS-targeted radar sites is
estimated at $2.6 million.,
Excluding radar associated with SAM sites.
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North Vietnam's telecommunications
system has escaped major physical damage and con-
tinues to satisfy essential requirements of Party,
military, and government subscribers.
Confirmed physical damage to North
Vietnam's telecommunications system thus far has
been confined to the destruction or damage of six
of 20 or so fixed radio centers, two of 50 tele-
phone exchanges, and to segments of the nationwide
open wireline network. Cumulative monetary damage
to North Vietnamese telecommunications is estimated
at approximately $240,000.
7. Supply and Ordnance Depots
Fourteen
of
the 29 JCS-targeted supply
and ordnance depots
were
struck during January-
September 1967, six
for
the first time. The most
significant strikes
were
against Thai Nguyen in
the first quarter, Ha Dong in the second quarter,
and Van Dien in the second and third quarters. In
addition, a number of important non-targeted supply
areas and motor vehicle depots were attacked, the
most significant of which were the Haiphong Ware-
house Area West and the Kinh No Motor Vehicle
Depot. All but three of the JCS-targeted supply
and ordnance depots had been attacked by the end
of September 1967, and one of these was inactive.
The Hanoi Army Supply Depot South at Quinh Loi
and the Hanoi Army Supply Depot North at Tay Ho --
representing 10 percent of-the total national
capacity -- were the only active unstruck depots.
The total cost,of damage to facilities
at both targeted and non-targeted supply centers
during 1967 is estimated at about $5.8 million,
compared with about $1.0 million in 1966 and $3.0
million in 1965. One-half of the targeted supply
and ordnance depots were inactive. However, most
of the larger depots had more than 50 percent of
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25X1
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their capacity remaining and continued to be active,
and the loss in capacity of JCS-targeted depots
destroyed or inactive was only about 19 percent of
the total national capacity. Although the total
storage capacity lost has been small, valuable
supplies and equipment have been destroyed, and
the increased requirement to operate from a dis-
persed logistics base has complicated management
problems and reduced operational efficiency.
Increased dependence on a dispersed
logistics base is exemplified by the heavy con-
centrations of storage capacity noted at Dong
Dang in the northeast, near Lao Cai and Lai Chau
in the northwest, and north of Haiphong along the
Tonkin Gulf. Significant improvements and ex-
pansion of storage capacity have been concentrated
on the road and rail line from P'ing-hsiang, China,
through Dong Dang to Kep. Excluding the sites at
Dong Dang, there is an average of one storage
site every 10 kilometers along the 93-kilometer
stretch between Kep and the China border. Expansion
at some sites has continued through the summer of
1967 (see the frontispiece).
8. Ammunition Depots
Ten ammunition depots were attacked
during January-September 1967, five of which were
struck for the first time. The most significant
strikes were against Cam Ly and Hon Gai in the
first quarter and against Haiphong/Kien An in the
second quarter. Damage inflicted during the third
quarter was relatively light. The total cost of
restoration of facilities damaged during the first
three quarters of 1967 is estimated at nearly
$600,000, compared with about $200,000 in 1966 and
$4.5 million in 1965.
All 18 JCS-targeted ammunition storage
depots,,with a total capacity of about 113,000
tons, had been attacked by the end of April 1967.
Eleven were inactive by the end of September, with
a loss of 77 percent of total capacity. This
loss probably has resulted in temporary delays in
the distribution of ammunition, but there is no
evidence of prolonged shortages in the areas where
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the depots are located. Most of the ammunition
apparently was being stored in dispersed storage
areas by the end of 1965, and airstrikes since
that time probably have not significantly affected
the overall storage of ammunition in the country.
9. Naval Craft
By the end of September 1967, destruc-
tion had been confirmed of 12 North Vietnamese
naval craft* -- four Swatow-class gunboats in 1965;
three PT boats and one SO-1 subchaser in 1966; and
one Shanghai-class patrol boat and three PT boats
in 1967. The total cost of these losses is esti-
mated at $4.8 million. The small North Vietnamese
navy currently is estimated to include 14 to 15
Swatow-class gunboats, three Shanghai-class patrol
boats, 11 to 12 PT boats, two SO-1 subchasers, and
four unidentified naval craft.
10. Aircraft
The North Vietnamese probably lost 24
MIG-21's and 70 MIG-17's through September 1967
from attacks by US aircraft.** The cost of all
aircraft losses is estimated at $33.2 million.
Only $2.6 million is attributed to losses during
July-September 1967, representing a sharp decrease
from record high losses of $14.0 million recorded
in the preceding quarter. A high level of both
air and ground losses during October 1967 probably
accounted for an additional four MIG-21's, five
MIG-17's, and five helicopters (two MI-6's and
three MI-4's), equivalent to $8.8 million.***
Although MIG losses have been heavy,
the North Vietnamese air force has taken an aggres-
sive role in air.defense when key targets have been
attacked. The MIG inventory on 30 September 1967
* Excluding the 8 to 10 naval craft destroyed
by the Pierce Arrow attacks in August 1964 follow-
ing the Gulf of Tonkin incident.
** Including an estimated eight aircraft destroyed
on the ground during rails on Kep and Hoa Lac during
May 1967.
*** Including an estimated two MIG-21's destroyed
on the ground at Phuc Yen and five helicopters
destroyed on the ground near Haiphong.
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included 22 MIG-21's and 67 MIG-15/17's, of which 13
MIG-21's and 50 MIG-15/17's were being held in
reserve in China. North Vietnam presumably could
obtain additional MIG-17's and MIG-21's from China
and the USSR, respectively.
C. Miscellaneous Targets of Armed
Reconnaissance
A variety of miscellaneous targets --
principally LOC's associated and military facili-
ties -- that are destroyed or damaged during armed
reconnaissance missions do not fit into major
target categories. Because of the nature of armed
reconnaissance operations, it is difficult to
evaluate the damage caused to such miscellaneous
targets. Pilots tend to double count, to over-
estimate the effectiveness of the attack, and to
describe targets imprecisely. The cost of damage,
therefore, is an assumed level of damage to a
typical target in each category. Within these
limitations, the total cost of replacement or
restoration of the miscellaneous targets destroyed
or damaged by armed reconnaissance strikes is esti-
mated at about $16.6 million, as shown in the
following tabulation:
Million US $
1965
Jan-
1966 Mar
Apr-
Jun
Jul-
Sep
Total
Economic facilities
and equipment
Negl.
1.2 0.1
0.4
0.4
2.1
Military facilities
5
14
and equipment
0.7
3.1 1.8
3.2
5.7
.
Total
0.7
4.3 1.9
3.6
6.1
16.6
A substantial portion of the increase in the level of
damage and destruction to military facilities during
July-September 1967 appears to be a result of increased
airstrikes on non-targeted radar installations and on
dispersed storage and supply areas.
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2=_ajor Railroad Yards and Shops Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
Cost of Restoration
(Thousand US U
Jan-Sep
6
Jan-Sep
Jan-Sep
955
1966
19
67
1965
-1966
1957
196,
1966
1967
local
Hanoi area
2
2
4
28
820
3,100
3,920
Hanoi - Dong Dang
3
7
12
199
Negl.
365
365
Hanoi - Haiphong
2
13
35
35
Hanoi - Thai Nguyen - Kep
1
2
6
52
400
770
1,170
Hanoi - Lao Cai
3
4
5
5
11
78
N.A.
500
500
70
Hanoi - Vinh
3
5
5
11
67
162
N.A.
N.A.
70
Total
6
15
23
16
100
532
70
1,220
4,770
6,060
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![ 1 I I I I[ I I I I l l t.
Maritime Ports and Shipyards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1 1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
JCS Target
Number
Percent of Total Percent of Percent of Cost of
Maritime Cargo- Target Capacity Total Capacity Restoration
Name Handling Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $) 25X1
25X5
5, 6, 8 Jun
9, 10, 11, 17,
19, 21 Jul
190
Ham Rong
660
Subtotal: 1965
1 Feb
85
3.4
590
8 Mar
30, 31 Oct
1+, 9 Nov
25X5
Cam Pha Port a/
16
6 Dec
24 Apr
21
3.4
160
8 Nov
Jan-Sep
1967
1+
7, 9, 14, 23 Jan
85
3.4
Ti. A.
Hon Gai J
18
24, 25, 26 Apr
22
3.9
.A.
24, 25, 26 May
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.'Maritime Ports and Shipyards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number Name
Tairhong
No. 2 SACRIC
Subtotal: Jan-
Sep 1967
Total: 1965-
Sep 1967
P. Strikes were not conducted against port facilities but against related areas such as support facilities and coal-treatment facilities
which affected port operations and resulted in export losses. The estimated cost at Cam Pha is the cost of damage to sup ort facilities.
b. Shiryard performs minor repairs and contains several fabrication and repair shops.
Percent of Total Percent of Percent of Cost of-
Maritime Cargo- Target Capacity Total Capacity Restoration
Handling Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand uS 25X1
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Sep
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Destruction and Damage of Transport Equipment
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
Railroad
Other
Locomotives Cars
Trucks
Ferries
Bar es
Watercraft
Destroyed
6
227
318
53
263
144
Damaged
6
592
487
56
487
210
1966
Destroyed
10
1,101
1,935
67
2,520
867
Damaged
14
935
1,801
131
4,289
1,372
Jan-Sep
1967
Destroyed
11
'(Y
2,627
10
3,180
149
Damaged
22
1,268
1,629
10
5,942
298
Total
Destroyed
27
2,107
4,880
130
5,963
1,160
Damaged
42
2,795
3,917
197
10,718
1,880
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Strikes Against JCS-Targeted Bridges
1,965, 1966, and January-September 1967
January-May
June-September
1965
1966
1967 J
1967 J
Strikes
Bridges
Strikes
Bridges
Strikes
Bridges
Strikes
Bridges
Rail and rail/highway
67
14
110
16
57
12
64
16
Highway
77
30
76
23
68
17
48
20
Total
144
44
186
12
125
22
112
36
Bomb Damage Assessment of Bridges in North Vietnam of
1965 - September 1967
Total Serious Damage
Occurrences
(Including Initial Hits
and Re-hits)
Type of Bridge
Total
Seriously
Moderately
Total
Original
Bridge
Bypass
Bridge
Total
461
420
41
709
611
98
Highway
329
292
37
447
421
26
Railroad
91
89
2
177
136
41
Combination
railroad-highway
41
39
2
85
54
31
25X1
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I I I I I I t l t l t. [[ l t
Electric Power Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program a
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
JCS Target
Number
1965
1966
Pre-Strike
Target
Capacity Percent of Total Cost of Restoratign
Name (Kilowatts) Capacity J Dates of Attack Million US $ `J
Thanh Hoa 5,000 3 4 Apr
27, 29, 30, 31 Jul
4 Aug
Ben Thuy 8,000 5 4, 4 Jun 1.0
Co Dinh 1,500 1 8, 10 Jun 0.4
Nam Dinh 7,500 4 28, 29 Jun 0.5
2, 3 Aug 1.5
Ban Thach 1,000 0.5 21, 22, 23 Aug 0.3
Uong Bi 24,000 14 15, 20, 22, 22 Dec 1.5
Subtotal: 1965 6.3
Uong Bi 24,000 13 18, 28 Apr 0.1
11, 14, 17 Aug 4.3
Thai Nguyen 24,000 13 6-8 Jul 0.8
Viet Tri 16,000 9 Prior to 19 Jul
Ben Thuy 8,000 4 13, 15 Max
23, 26, 26, 27, 28, 29 Oct 0.2
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Electric Power Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Pre-Strike
Target
Capacity
Percent of Total
Cost of Restoration
Number
Name (Kilowatts)
Capacity J
Dates of Attack
(Million US $) i
1966
Continued)
Thanh Hoa
5,000
3
22, 23, 23, 23 Sep
Trinh Xuyen
N.A.
N.A.
1 Nov
Co Dinh
1,500
1
4 Nov
Subtotal:
1966
Jan-Sep 1967
15,000
8
24,25 Feb
2, 10 Mar
20, 22 Apr
Bac Giang
12,000
6
24, 26 Feb
11, 16, 24 Mar
5 Apr
0.5
10, 20, 22 May
16, 19 Jun
0.1
1 Aug
0.1
16,000
9
12,19 Mar
24,000
13
19, 23, 24 Mar
1.5
28 Jun
0.1
6, 7, 13, 22 Jul
0.5
2 Aug
0.7
5
20, 25 Apr
1.1
10, 20, 26 May
0.5
a/
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 JCS Target
Number
Electric Power Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program a
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
Jan-Sep 1967
Continued
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l I I I I I I I I I
Pre-Strike
Target
Capacity Percent of
T9tal
~
ion s
Name (Kilowatts) Capacity J Dates of Attack (Mill u $) c
Haiphong East 7,000 20, 21 Apr 1.0
10 May 0.3
Nam Dinh 7,500 4 22, 26 Jun 0.7
22 Aug
9 Sep
Ben Thuy 8,000 4 29, 30 Jun
2, 23, 24, 25, 31 Jul 0.4
5, 15, 18, 19 Aug 0.1
Dong Anh Substation N.A. N.A. 25, 26, 30 Apr 0.2
4, 22 May 0.1
Hanoi 32,500 17 19, 21 May o.8
10 Jun
21 Aug 0.6
Cost of Restoratign
2.3
21, 25 Aug
2, 9, 13, 30 Sep 0.4
Thanh Hoa 5,000 3 12 Jun 0.7
Uong Bi 24,000 13 26 May
8, 11, 11 Jun
Subtotal: Jan-Sep 1967 17.7
Total 30.2
a. Electric generating capacity out of operation in North Vietnam was 2 percent in 1965, 32 percent in 19 , and about
80 percent in September 1967. At present, all power facilities that have been struck are estimated to be out of service
except the Hanoi plant, which is operating 30 percent to 50 percent of capacity, and the Nam Dinh plant, the status of
which is not known.
b. Based on national installed capacity of 175,000 kw in 1965 and on 187,000 kw in 1966 and 1967.
c. Lack of an entry indicates either no damage or no information available to make estimate.
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Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
JCS Target
Number Name
1966
N
Nam Dinh
Phu Qui
Subtotal: 1965
Percent of Percent of
Percent of Target Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Total Targeted Capacity Capacity Restoration Destroyed
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
25X5 25X1
Negl. 6 May 100 Negi. 40 20
6 24, 26 May 34 2 120 70
11, 15 Sep 34 2 120 70
6 Oct 17 1 60 30
9 2, 4 Jul
6 18 May
100 9 500
100 6 340
20 1,180
270
0
460
25X5
Haiphong 32 29 Jun 46 14 840 300 to 460
7 Jul 32 10 600 190 to 310
2 Aug 21 7 380 80 to 150
Hanoi 24 29 Jun 100 24 1,380 49o to 760
30 Jul
7, 8 Aug
6 Sep
8, 11, 13, 27, 28,
29 Oct
Nguyen Khe 6 30 Jun 10
19 Jul
17, 18, 22 Aug 22
4 Sep
8 Oct
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Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number Name
1966
Percent of Percent of
Percent of Target Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Total Targeted Capacity Capacity Restoration Destroyed 2 5X1
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
Continued)
Bac Giang
2
30 Jun
31 Jul
11 Aug
14 Sep
31
0.6
32
11 to 17
Do Son
2
29 Jun
3 Jul
5, 8, lo, 14, 15,
50
1
64
16 to 35
17, 22 Aug
12, 22 Oct
1 Nov
Viet Tri
1
30 Jun
0
0
19 Jul
97
1
2
1 to 2
14 Aug
0
0
5 Sep
0
0
Duong Nham
3
1, 12, 23 Jul
100
3
185
16 to 25
17, 22 Aug
12 Sep
24 to 50
Ha Gia
8
22 Nov
2, 3, 4, 5, 19,
30 Dec
22
2
99
0
Can Thon
1
23 Nov
2 Dec
33
0.4
37
20
3Dec
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Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)-
JCS Target
Number
1966
Continued)
Percent of Percent of
Percent of Target Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Total Target Capacity Capacity Restoration Destroyed
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
Vinh a/ 7 Feb
Ha Gia c/ 15 Feb
Do Son J 5 Mar 50 1
Subtotal; First Quarter of 1967 1
Vinh J 13, 14, 15, 16 Apr
Haiphong e/ 26 Apr, 2 May
Phu Qui bf 20 May, 12 Jun
Subtotal: Second Quarter of 1967
8 Aug
11 Oct
Nam Dinh J
Subtotal: Third Quarter of 1967
Total: 1965, 1966 and First 9 months of 1967
I
0 0 0
86 4,975 1,682 to 2,384
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Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
a. The facility at Vinh was attacked in August 196Li, prior to the Rolling Thunder program. Vinh was attacked ten times in 1966 and five times in 1967, but no
destruction of storage capacity has been identified since 1965-
b. This facility was 100 percent destroyed in 1965 and apparently has been abandoned.
c. Ha Gia had been attacked in 1966; available photography indicates that the destroyed tankage did not contain petroleum at the time of the 1966 attack.
d. Do Son had been attacked in 1966; the facility is now 100 percent destroyed.
e. The facility at Haiphong had not been attacked since 2 AugI st 1966. Photography of early 1967 revealed that storage tanks previously considered to be
serviceable were being dismantled. For purposes of this table, the dismantled tanks and their contents are considered to have been destroyed in the attack of
2 August 1966. No damage to storage was observed after the attacks in 1966.
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Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
Percent of
Percent of Total Capacity Cost of
JCS Target Percent of Target Capacity Destroyed Restoration 25X1
Number Name Total Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed or inactive Thousand US $j
rt.s __ r_t 100 24 Jul
7, 8 Aug
25X5
71 100 3 70
(inactive)
Cotton Spinning
spinning: inactive:
70 to 75 60
Cotton 28 Jul
weaving:
Weaving
inactive:
40
Cam Pna Coal Treatment Plant N.A. 24 Apr N.A. N.A.
8 Nov
Viet Tri Paper Mill 80 Mid-Jul N.A. N.A. 100
Nam Dinh Textile Mill N.A. Oct-Dec a N.A. b N.A. b/ 250
Subtotal: 1966
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 t L I
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t t t t I I t t t I t
Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Polling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
Target
;ut o r
Jan-Sep 1967
Percent ?_
Percent of Total Capacity-
Target Capacity Destroyed -estcra t
Total Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex 95 c/ 10, 11, 18, 21, 25, N.A. 95 c/ 10,000
26, 30 Mar (Inactive)
7, 10, 18, 23 Apr
1, 4, 10, 27 May
21, 27 Jun
Haiphong Cement Plant
95
20, 25 Apr
70
7, 27 May
(Inactive)
95
3,050
Lang Chi Explosives Plant
100
16, 23, 29 Jun
80
100
45
6, 8, 18, 20 Jul
(Inactive)
1, 3, 18, 19,
20 Aug
Nam Dinh Textile Mill
Cam Pha Coal Treatment Plant
N.A.
N.A.
Mar, Jun, Jul
Feb
N.A. J
N.A.
N.A. b/
N.A.
1,330
Neal.
Phu Tho Phosphate Fertilizer Plant
56 d/
Jul
3
N.A.
200
Hon Gai Calcium Carbide Plant
N.A.
9, 12, 13 Mar
75
N.A.
200
16, 17 Apr
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:anufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Polling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Percent of
Percent of
Target Capacity
Percent c=
Total Capacity
Destroyed
Cost of
=estcratier.
Number
Total Capacity
Dates of Attack
Destroyed
or Inactive
(Thousand uS $)
Sac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant
37 J
24,
25 Feb
3
37
395
11,
16 Mar
(Inactive)
10,
20, 22
j4
16,
19 Sun
25X5
Viet Tri Paper
80
,,ar
100
80
675
Subtotal: Jan-Sep 1967
16,255
Total
17,85a
b. Relocation of much of the mill's equipment is believed to have permitted restoration of perhaps a significant share of national capacity.
c. Pig iron only. It is not possible to determine the plant's relative share of fabrication work.
d. Percent of chemical fertilizer capacity (excluding apatite and phosphate rock).
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Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program /
January-September 1967
Cost of Restoration
Percent of Target Capacity (Thousand US $)
Destroyed as of
Number Name Targeted Capacity Dates of Attack End 1965
19 Apr (initial strike)
20 Apr
Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep
End 1966 1 Oct 1967 1967 1967 1967 Total
64 0 950 0 950
25X5
Xuan Mai Army
Bks SSW
13
220
0
0
220
Xuan Mai Army
Bks NNW, Hoa Muc
Son La Army
26 Mar; 2, 3, 8, 9,
52
61
61
Negl.
Negl.
0
Negl.
Bks/Hq Mil Reg
NW/Sup Dep
Ha Dong Army Bks/
14 Apr; 3, 7, 9 May
5 May (initial strike)
1
33
o
5,.000
0
5,000
Supply Depot
12, 14, 22 May
Vu Con Army
71
71
71
0
0
Negl.
Negl.
Bks/Supply Depot
Dong Hoi Army
15, 19 Jun;
(inactive)
82
(inactive)
82
(inactive)
82
0
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Bks WNW
5, 7, 8 Jul
(inactive)
(inactive)
(inactive)
Vinh Yen Army
13 May (initial strike)
J
19
0
1,300
0
1,300
Bks/Training
Area N
Son Tay Army
1.1
25 May
28 Jul (initial strike)
23
0
0
020
020
Bks SW Tong
1 Aug
(inactive)
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Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program a/
January-September 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number
Chap Le Army
Bks NW
Ben Quang Army
Bks SW
Dong Hoi Army
Bks Citadel
Phu Le Army Bks/
Supply Depot
Muong Sen Mil
Installation
Vinh Linh Army
Bks Cent NE
Thanh Hoa Army
Bks S
Percent of Total
Targeted Capacity
Dates of' Attack End 1965 End 1966 1 Oct 1967 1967 1967
24 Jan; 4, 10, 12, 13, 36 36 90 Negl. 165 0 165 25X1
23, 24, 25, 28 Mar; (inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
4, 9, 21, 27 Apr
29 Jan; 2 Feb; 5, 6, 7,
9, 12, 14, 20, 21, 21,
23, 25, 26 Mar; 2, 3,
4, 7, 13, 22, 25 Apr
66 96 96 Negl. Negl. 0 Negl.
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
6 Feb; 20 Jun;
11 Sep
25, 28 Jan; 1 Feb;
4, 6, 7, 10, 10, 11,
11, 16, 17, 19,
24 Mar; 4, 9, 10,
10 Apr; 31 Aug
Percent of Target Capacity
Destroyed as of
77 77 77 0 0 Negl. Negl.
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
48 48 48 Negl. Negl. Negl. Negl.
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
72 100 100 0 0 Negl. Negl.
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
39 52 52 Negl. Negl. Negl. Neal.
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
36 36 36 Negl. 0 0 Negl.
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
43 51 51 0 0 Negl. Negl.
(inactive) (inactive)
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Cost of Restoration
(Thousand US $)
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I I t [ t t [_ ~_ ~_ 1 t
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program a/
January-September 1967
(Continued)
Percent of Target Capacity
Cost of Restoration
(_nousand US $)
Destroyed as of
JCS Target
N
Percent of Total
Dates of Attack
acit
d Ca
t
T
End 1965
End 1966
1 Oct 1967
1967
1967
1967
Total 25X1
Number
ame
arge
e
y
p
0.9
28 Aug (initial strike)
5
0
0
320
320
4
10
9
29 Aug; 3
,
,
,
,
25, 26, 30 Sep
25X5
Mu Gia Pass Supply/
74
74
74
Negl.
0
0
Fegl.
Staging Point
Xom Bang Army Bks E
0.2
7, 8, 9, 12, 17, 22,
(inactive)
97
(inactive)
97
(inactive)
97
Negl.
Negl.
24, 27 Mar; 7, 7 Apr
(inactive)
(inactive)
(inactive)
Trai Thou Army Bks
0.4
29 Jul (initial strike)
b/
19
0
0
150
150
Vinh Army Bks NW/
0.9
31 Jul
29 Apr
53
93
93
0
Negl.
0
Negl.
Supply Depot
1.1
28 Aug (initial strike)
7
0
0
300
300
Cep Army Bks 3
0.7
19 May (initial strike)
b
6
0
385
Negl.
385
Chi Ne Army Bks
0.7
31 May; 29 Aug
1 Mar (initial strike)
35
N.A.
1,550 c/
0
1,550
24 Mar; 3 May
Quang The Army Bks
0.2
21 Feb; 25 Apr; 11, 25,
0
0
17
165
Negl.
0
165
Vinh Linh Army Bks E,
0.2
31 May; 5 Jun
7, 11, 11, 19, 24, 29,
90
90
90
Negl.
Negl.
0
Degl.
Lien Cong
29 Mar; 7, 11, 12 Apr
(inactive)
(inactive)
(inactive)
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narracks Attacked tinder the Rolling Thunder Program a/
January-September 1967
(Continued)
Cost of Restoration
Percent of Target Capacity (Thousand IS S)
Destroyed as of
025 Target
Number
Percent of Total Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Sul-Sep
Name Targeted Capacity Dates of.Att_ack End 1965 End 1966 1 Oct 1967 1967 1967 1967 Total
vin'h Linn Army Bks NW, 0.3 10, 19, 29. 30 Mar; 87 87 87 Negl. Negl. 0 Neel.
2 .._e -0 npr (inaclil.e, (inaczi-e) nact ,, c;
Vinh r'_s Military
or. Army
Bks Supply Depot
,an Ten :Army Supply 1.9 19 -ay (initial strike) b/ bj 45
Depot 4, 10, 27 Jun; 21 Aug
Subtotal
Total: San-Sep 67
Total: 1966
Total: 1965
Grand total
Cost of damage to non-JCS targeted barracks is given under "Miscellaneous Targets of Armed Reconnaissance."
b. Facility not struck.
Total damage inflicted, including that from strikes in March.
8C 9,696 65
11,440
2.545
16,000
29,985
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I I I_ I I.. I I I I I I
Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
Percent
of Target Percent of Total Cost of
Capacity Targeted Capacity Restoration
Targeted Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $)
Na San 4 25 Jun; 23 Sep; 45 4
24 Oct (inactive)
Dien Bien Phu 3 2, 8 Jul 94
(inactive) 3
Dong Hoi 6 30 Mar; 6 Jun; 53 6
1 Jul; (inactive)
17, 22, 23 Sep
Vinh 6 8 May; 30 Jun; 10 6
1 Jul (inactive)
Subtotal: 1965 19
Dien Bien Phu 3 6, 11 Feb 94
(inactive)
Dong Hoi 6 19 Nov 53 6 Negl.
(inactive)
subtotal: 1966 19 J 2
Jan-Mar 1967
Dong Hoi 6 29 Mar 67
(inactive)
Subtotal: Jan-Mar 1967 19 J
13 25X5
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Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
Percent
of Target Percent of Total Cost of
JCS Target Percent of Total Capacity Targeted Capacity Restoration
Number Name Targeted Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $)
Apr-Jun 1967
b% Hoa Lac
24 Apr
(initial strike),
28 Apr; 1, 3, 8, 19,
21, 26, 30 May;
29 Jun
Dorg Hci 6 16 May 67 6
(inactive)
Haiphong/Kien An 7 10 May N.A. N.A.
(initial strike);
14, 25 May
Kep 10 24 Apr 40 4
(initial strike);
1, 7, 21, 21, 26,
31 May; 29 Jun
Jul-Sep 1967
Hoa Lac
23 a/ 558
J 12 Jul; 30 Aug N.A. b
4 22 Jul 45 4
(inactive)
25X1
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I I I I l I I I. I I
Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
Percent of Total
Percent
of Target
Capacity
Percent of Total
Targeted Capacity
Cost of
Restoration
JCS Target
b
N
Name
Targeted Capacity
Dates of Attack
Destroyed
Destroyed
(Thousand Us $)
er
um
Jul-Sep 1967
Continued
Vinh
6
31 Aug;
10
6
Negl.
1 Sep
(inactive)
25X5
Haiphong/Kien An
7
12 Aug
N.A.
N.A.
Kep
10
4, 7 Jul;
45
4
3, 9, 30 Sep
Kep Ha
3
21 Aug
(initial strike),
24 Aug
17
(inactive)
3
26 J
26
a. Including that capacity destroyed or inactive at airfields not attacked during the time period.
b. Not JCS-targeted.
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Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
Percent of
Naval Base
~
Percent of Base
Percent of Total
Naval Base Support
Capacity Destroyed
Cost of
Restoration
Number
Name
Support Capacity
Dates of Attack 2/
Utility Destro
ed
or Inactive
(Th
d
y
ousan
US $)
15
2 Mar; 28 May;
21, 24, 27, 28 Sep
Hon Gai/Bai Chay Port
17
6 Aug; 28 Oct;
14
2
Naval Complex
4 Nov
78
l0
230
(inactive)
358
Jan-Mar 1967
78
(inactive)
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l [ I I I I t t I I I I I I I I
Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number
Apr-Jun 1967
a. Dates of attack indicate only assigned strikes; in certain instances more attacks have been made against a specific target than
is indicated below.
b. Including that capacity destroyed or inactive at naval base support facilities not attacked during the time period.
Percent of Total
Percent of Naval Base Support Cost of
Naval Base '~ Percent of Base Capacity Destroyed Restoration
Name Support Capacity Dates of Attack J Utility Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
25X5
(inactive)
Quang The, Cuu Dinh
15
3 Apr; 22 Jun
47
7
L9 bJ
Neg1.
Jul-Sep 1967
Phuc Loi
10
7 Sep
78
(inactive)
Port Wallut
15
21 Aug
(initial strike);
25 Aug
Quang The, Cuu Dinh
15
19 Aug
90
13.5
100
Subtotal: Jul-Sep 1967
30 J
350
Total
0
1,925
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II. Air Operations
Over 40 percent of the more than one million
sorties flown over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and
Laos since February 1965 were carried out during
January-September 1967. The 412,500 sorties flown
during the first nine months of 1967 exceeded those
during January-September 1966 by about 30 percent
and showed almost a three-fold increase over the
same period in 1965. As shown in the tabulation
below, about 1,500 sorties are being flown per day,
of which about 550 are over North Vietnam.
Average Sorties Per Day
Area of Operation
1965
1966
Jan-Sep 1967
North
Vietnam
152
405
548
Laos
44
212
234
South
Vietnam
304
558
729
Total Southeast Asia
500
1,175
1,511
The distribution of sorties among targets in North
Vietnam, Laos, and South Vietnam was about the same
during the first nine months of 1967 as during 1966.
The numbers of sorties and the percentage share of
the total sorties for each country, by year, are
shown in the following tabulation:
1965 1966
Jan-Sep 1967
Area of Operation
Number
of
Sorties
Percent
of
Total
Number
of
Sorties
Percent
of
Total
Number
of
Sorties
Percent
of
Total
North
Vietnam
55,560
30
147,840
35
149,600
36
Laos
16,050
9
77,370
18
63,980
16
North
Laos
Vietnam and
combined
71,610
39
225,210
53
213,580
52
South
Vietnam
110,980
61
203,600
47
198,910
48
Total Southeast Asia
182,590
100
428,810
100
412,490
100
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Through September 1967, attack sorties* made
up 56 percent of total sorties in North Vietnam and
79 percent in South Vietnam, the same as in 1966,
but in Laos attack sorties showed a substantial
decline from 63 percent to 50 percent of total
sorties. The decline in the share of attack
sorties over Laos this year probably reflects the
heavier attack against North Vietnam and the
increased use of reconnaissance aircraft to detect
infiltration and logistic movements at the same
time that attack sorties were being limited by the
southwest monsoons.
The air war in North Vietnam, as in virtually
all of Southeast Asia, is almost totally a US under-
taking. In 1967 the South Vietnamese Air Force has
averaged only 13 sorties per month over North
Vietnam, a negligible share of total sorties.
Table 13 shows sorties over North Vietnam by
nationality, 1965 through September 1967.
The relative share of total US sorties
flown over North Vietnam through September 1967 by
each military service remains the same as in 1966.
The Air Force flew 53 percent of the total, the
Navy 42 percent, and the Marine Corps 5 percent.
Table 14 shows sorties by each US service for
1965 through September 1967.
Total ordnance delivered over Southeast
Asia during the first nine months of 1967 amounted
to approximately 645,400 tons, a one-third increase
above the total for all of 1966 and more than three
times the amount delivered in 1965. The increase
results
from an increase both in the number
of
sorties
being flown and in the average load
of
ordnance
delivered per sortie. A comparison
of
average
ordnance loads delivered per attack
sortie
in 1966 and in January-September 1967 is shown in
the following tabulation:
Attack sorties carry out strike and flak
suppression missions. Support sorties make up
the remainder and conduct photo and electronic
reconnaissance, combat air patrol, search and
rescue, electronic countermeasure, refueling,
and forward air control missions.
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Average Tons per Attack Sortie
Area of Operation 1966
Jan-Sep 1967
North Vietnam 1.6 2.1
Laos 1.5 2.7
South Vietnam 1.8 2.4
Increased employment of B-52 aircraft over
Southeast Asia is a major factor contributing to
both the overall rise in ordnance delivered and the
increased rate of ordnance delivered per attack
sortie. Ordnance loads delivered per sortie by
B-52's have averaged about 23 tons -- nearly 10
times the overall average. Since June 1965, when
the first Arc Light (B-52) strikes were carried
out against targets in South Vietnam, about
14,000 sorties by these aircraft have delivered
more than 320,000 tons of ordnance against targets
in all three countries. Somewhat more than one-
half of this amount, about 180,000 tons, was
delivered during the first nine months of 1967 and
accounted for more than one-fourth of the total
ordnance delivered during this period. As a result
of the campaign against North Vietnamese units
located near the DMZ, the number of B-52 sorties
against North Vietnam during September exceeded
B-52 sorties over South Vietnam and Laos combined
for the first time since the beginning of the Arc
Light program.
Ordnance delivered over North Vietnam
during the first nine months of 1967 totaled
approximately 175,200 tons, or 27 percent of the
ordnance delivered by all air operations in
Southeast Asia -- the same share as during 1966
(see Table 15). A comparison of the shares of
ordnance delivered on each area in 1966 and 1967
is shown in the following tabulation:
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1966 Jan-Sep 1967
Area of Operation
Tons
Percent Tons a/ Percent
North
Vietnam
128,590
27 175,160'
27
Laos
73,690
15 86,930
14
North
Laos
Vietnam and
combined
202,280
42 262,090
41
South
Vietnam
281,250
58 383,340
5599
Total Southeast Asia
483,530
100 '645,430
100
a. Tonnage for September is an estimate.
The distribution of attacks against the six
Route Packages during January-September 1967 saw
some changes from 1966. Route Package I continued
to be the primary target area in 1967 as in 1966.
There was a significant increase in strikes against
Route Package VI, which includes the industrial
targets in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas and key
LOC targets in the northeast. Thus during January-
September 1967, Route Package VI received an average
of 17 percent of attack sorties compared to-about-
7 percent in 1966. Table 16 shows distribution of
attack sorties by Route Packages for 1966 and the
first nine months of 1967.
Although beginning in March 1967, an
intensified program was carried out against pre-
viously unstruck JCS-numbered industrial targets,*
armed reconnaissance continues to dominate the
Rolling Thunder program as it has since 1965. The
following tabulation shows the percent of sorties
In recent months a series of previously unstruck
fixed targets have been attacked which are not JCS-
numbered but are treated operationally as JCS-
numbered targets. These include such targets as
railroad and highway bridges, railroad yards and
sidings, shipyards, and supply and storage areas
in the Hanoi and Haiphong areas and the Chinese
buffer zone. The inclusion of attacks against
such targets with attacks against JCS-numbered
targets would increase only slightly this share
as a percent of the total.
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flown and ordnance delivered against JCS fixed
targets in North Vietnam.
Percent a/
1965 1966 Jan-Sep 1967
Ordnance
(tons) 37 3
a. AZZ sorties flown and ordnance
delivered over North Vietnam
equal 100 percent in each case.
Although the share of total sorties flown
and ordnance delivered against JCS targets during
1967 is small, the effort is still substantially
higher than during 1966. The 1967 quarterly
average for sorties is more than twice that of
1966, whereas the average for ordnance delivered
is more than three times that of 1966. The 1967
figures are still below those of 1965, however,
as shown in the following tabulation:
Quarterly Averages 1967
1965 1966 Jan-Mar Apr-Jun Jul-Sep
Sorties 3,470 655 980 2,320 1,570
Ordnance
(tons) 3,200 890 2,070 3,720 2,830
The current year has seen a marked increase
in the number of strikes carried out against pre-
viously unstruck JCS targets that included industrial
installations, targets on lines of communications,
and military facilities. Through September, 36
JCS targets were attacked for the first time.
Almost half of these initial strikes were made during
the second quarter of 1967. A third of the 36 targets
are located within 10 nautical miles of Hanoi or
Haiphong. The number of strikes, of sorties flown,
and amount of ordnance delivered in initial strikes
on JCS targets, by quarter, during 1967 are shown
in the following tabulation:
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Initial Strikes
Hanoi- Ordnance
Haiphong Attack Delivered
1967 Total Area Sorties (Tons)
January-March 7 0 158 680
April-June 17 11 381 1,170
July-September 12 1 173 580
Total 36 12 712 2,430
D. Cost of Air Operations over North 'Vietnam
The direct operational cost to the United
States of air operations over North Vietnam during
January-September 1967 is estimated at about
$1,250 million -- slightly more than that estimated
for all of 1966. This amount includes the pro-
duction cost of aircraft lost, valued at about $525
million; direct operational cost of sorties flown
estimated at about $350 million; and ordnance costs
of about $375 million. The following tabulation
gives estimated costs during 1966 compared with
those of January-September 1967.
Million US $
January-September
1966
1967
Aircraft lost
605.6
525.2
Operational cost of
sorties flown
330.4
349.4
Ordnance
311.5
373.5
Total
1,
247.5
1_,248.1
The measurable costs to North Vietnam for
reconstruction or repair of bomb damaged facilities
and for indirect losses attributed to the bombing
during January-September 1967 are estimated to-be
$172 million. The trend of the cost of inflicting
one dollar's worth of damage on North Vietnam is
as follows:
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Million US $
Operational Cost
Cost of Damage Operational Cost per Dollar of Damage
1965 68.9 460.0 6.68
1966 113.6 1,247.5 10.98
Jan-Sep 1967 172.0 1,248.1 7.26
The increase in cost per dollar of damage
in 1966 was attributable primarily to the increasing
costs of the accelerated air interdiction program
that concentrated on low-yield target systems. The
improved cost trend in 1967 reflects the increased
number of attacks against significant economic
targets in industry. Prospects for further improve-
ment in cost effectiveness are dim, however, as
the number of these significant targets is de-
creasing, a fact pointed up by the decline in
cost of damage during the third quarter of 1967
compared with that of the second quarter.
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Sorties Against North Vietnam by Mission and Nationality J
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
25X1 By US Services By South Vietnamese Air Force Total
Year and Month
Attack
Sorties /
Support
Sorties
Total
Sorties
Attack
Sorties /
Support
Sorties
Total
Sorties
Attack
Sorties /
Support
Sorties
Total 25X1
Sorties
6
19
5
25,270
29,570
54,840
610
110
20
25,880
29,680
55,560
1
51,360
65,660
147,020
810
10
820
82,170
65,670
147,840
1967 (Jan-Sep)
8%?.310
65,170
149,480
120
0
120
84,430
65,170
149,600
January
6,580
7,160
13,740
0
0
0
6,580
7,160
13,740
February
5,470
5,620
11,090
0
0
0
5,470
5,620
11,090
March
8,490
6,880
15,370
10
0
10
8,500
6,880
15,380
I
April
8,960
7,150
16,110
0
0
0
8,960
7,150
16,110
May
11,310
8,630
19,940
20
0
20
11,330
8,630
19,960
June
11,460
8,160
19,620
10
0
10
11,470
8,160
19,630
July
11,290
8,240
19,530
20
0
20
11,310
8,240
19,550
August
11,850
7,360
19,210
40
0
40
11,890
7,360
19,250
September
8,900
5,970
14,870
'20
0
20
8,920
5,970
14,8go
a. Rounded to the nearest 10 sorties.
b. Attack sorties include strike and flak suppression sorties.
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1 1 1 1[ 1 1 I I I 1 1 1 1
Sorties Against North Vietnam by Program and by Service a/
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
B
Armed
United States
South
Total on
By Fixed
y
Reconnaissance
Armed Reconnaissance
Total on Armed
Vietnamese
Year and Month
Fixed Targets
Target Strikes
Strikes
Not on Fixed Targets
Reconnaissance
Total
Air Force
Navy
Marine
Air Force
(Col. 2 & 3)
(Col. 3 & 4)
(Col. 1 & 4)
8
06o
ii
2
830
41
670
44,500
55,560
24,620
229,220
1,000
720
1965
90
13,
,
2,
,
620
2
420
2
200
145
220
147,420
147,84o
78,580
62,550
5.890
82
1966
,
,
,
4
8
10
960
3
144
730
148,690
149,600
79,050
62,500
7,930
120
1967 (Jan-Sep)
,
70
2
,
,
January
200
0
200
13,540
13,740
13,740
7,500
5,750
400
0
February
200
80
120
10,890
11,010
11,090
5,590
4,860
640
0
March
580
170
410
14,800
15,210
15,380
7,680
6,790
900
10
April
750
350
400
15,360
15,760
16,110
7,760
7,470
880
0
May
830
110
720
19,130
19,850
19,960
9,710
9,340
890
20
June
740
0
740
18,890
19,630
19,630
10,710
8,140
770
10
July
480
50
430
19,070
19,500
19,550
10,410
8,070
1,050
20
August
710
150
560
18,540
19,100
19,250
10,770
7,190
1,250
40
September
380
0
380
14,510
14,890
14,890
8,920
4,890
1,060
20
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Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam by Program J
1965, 1966, and January-September 1967
(1)
Total on JCS
(2)
Fixed
B
(3)
By Armed
Reconnaissance
(4)
m
A
d R
i
(5)
25X1
(6)
Year and Mcnth
Fixed Targets
y
Target Strikes
Strikes
r
e
econna
ssance
not on Fixed Targets
Total on Armed Reconnaissance
(Col. 2 & 3)
(Col. 3 & 4)
(Col. 1 & 4)
1965
12,800
11,960
840
21,500
22,340
34,300
1966
3,560
440
3,120
125,030
128,150
128, 590
1967 (Jan-Sep)
8,620
1,510
7,110
166,540
173
650
175
160
January
450
0
450
11,050
,
11,500
,
11,500
February
430
230
10,000
10,230
10,430
March
1,190
340
850
14,690
15,88o
April
1,360
460
goo
16,390
17,290
17,750
May
1,260
160
1,100
20,330
21,430
21, 590
June
1,100
0
1,100
23,090
24,190
24,190
20,750
21,560
21,670
August
1,190
24,540
25,490
25,730
September
25,700
26,420
26,420
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Distribution of Attack Sorties over North Vietnam by Route Package a/
1966, January-September 1967
Year and Month I II III IV V VI Unknown
1966 37 15 13 9 4 7 15
1967
January 44 6 15 21 4 10 0
February 63 7 9 12 3 6 0
March 59 10 12 8 4 8 0
April 49 11 13 7 5 13 0
May 39 13 18 11 3 16 0
June 36 13 17 11 4 19 0
July 38 9 7 9 4 33 0
August 48 7 10 8 2 22 0
September b 58 8 6 8 3 17 0
Nine Month
Average 47 10 12 10 3 17 0
a. North Vietnam is divided, for operation, into six geographic
areas, known as Route Packages. Percentage data shown are approxi-
mate, due to the effects of multiple-route-package sorties and
coastal sorties.
b. In addition, shares of 3 percent during August and 1 percent
during September were flown in the Buffer Zone.
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III. Air Losses
A. Introduction
The ratio of US air losses to the number of
sorties has declined each year since the beginning
of 1965, when US air involvement in Southeast Asia
increased sharply. This trend has prevailed in
South Vietnam, Laos, and North Vietnam, but the
decline in North Vietnam has been more pronounced.
Continued improvement in the loss rate in North
Vietnam is particularly significant in view of the
vast expansion of the North Vietnamese air defense
system and the intensification of the US attack
against heavily defended targets in the northeast.
The decrease in the Rolling Thunder loss rate
results primarily from improved electronic counter-
measures and increased experience in evasion. tactics.
Even though loss rates are declining, the rates
against specific targets such as industrial instal-
lations and particularly targets in the Hanoi and
Haiphong areas are many times higher than the
overall average.
B. Air Losses in Southeast Asia
US and South Vietnamese air losses over all
of Southeast Asia since the introduction of US air
advisory groups in 1962 through September 1967 total
at least 2,860 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.
About 540 of these losses -- 19 percent -- were
aircraft of the Vietnamese Air Force or US aircraft
flying non-combat associated missions. Of the
remaining 2,320 losses, 93 percent have been downed
since 1965. The following tabulation shows US losses
by year through September 1967 of helicopters and
fixed wing aircraft flying attack and support missions.
Year
Fixed Wing Aircraft
Helicopters
1962
4
21
1963
11
34
1964
35
60
1965
305
170
1966
492
319
Jan-Sep
1967
410
459
Total
1,257
1,063
Total
25
45
95
475
811
869
2,320
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Total losses in the first nine months of 1967
exceeded those for any full previous year, primarily
because of the heavy losses of helicopters over
South Vietnam. About 60 percent of the fixed wing
aircraft losses occurred over North Vietnam, about
30 percent over South Vietnam, and 10 percent over
Laos.
C. Rolling Thunder Losses
During the period 1965 - September 1967,
US losses over North Vietnam, both operational and
combat, totaled 772 fixed wing aircraft, with combat
losses alone totaling 689 aircraft. Antiaircraft
artillery (AAA) downed 579 US fixed-wing aircraft
over North Vietnam, three-fourths of total US
losses in the Rolling Thunder program in this
period. The following tabulation shows the causes
of downings of US aircraft over North Vietnam from
1965 through September 1967.
Losses of Fixed
Wing Aircraft
Percent
AAA
579
75
SAM
84
11
MIG
26
3
Total combat losses
689
89
Operational losses
83
11
Total
772
100
An increasing share of US aircraft lost
over North Vietnam is attributable to the more
sophisticated SAM and, to a lesser extent, MIG
defenses, although AAA remains the primary cause
of US air losses. The share of total losses
caused by AAA decreased from 84 percent in 1965 to
76 percent in 1966 and 67 percent in 1967. Con-
versely, from 1965 to January-September 1967,
losses attributable to SAM's as a share of total
losses rose by 10 percentage points and losses from
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MIG attacks rose by 4 percentage points. The
following tabulation gives percentages of aircraft
losses by cause during
through September 1967:
1965,
1966, and January
Jan-Sep
Cause
1965
1966
1967
Antiaircraft
artillery
84
76
67
SAM
6
10
16
MIG
1
3
5
Total combat
91
89
88
Operational
9
11
12
Total
100
100
100
The overall loss rate of US aircraft has
decreased since the Rolling Thunder program began
in 1965. During 1965, 187 US attack and support
fixed-wing aircraft were lost because of both
operational failure and combat causes while flying
54,840 Rolling Thunder sorties -- an overall loss
rate of 3.4 aircraft per 1,000 sorties. During
1966 this overall rate decreased to 2.1 and in
1967 it decreased to 1.8.
During the period February 1965 -
September 1967 about!79 percent of the combat-
caused losses were sustained by aircraft carrying
out attack missions and flying 54 percent of the
Rolling Thunder sorties. The remaining 21 percent
of the combat-caused losses were sustained during
support missions by aircraft flying 46 percent of
the sorties.* Table 17 shows the trends of the
* Causes of aircraft Losses fall into two cate-
gories, operational losses caused by equipment
failure and combat Losses resulting from damage
inflicted by the enemy's defenses. Aircraft downed
by either of these causes may be flying one of two
basic types of [footnote continued on p.74.1
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`'loss rate for the Rolling Thunder program for the
period 1965 through September 1967.
2. Losses by Type of Target
The emphasis placed on armed reconnais-
sance and interdiction campaigns has meant that
most US aircraft losses have been sustained in
attacks against transport targets. US forces have
reduced the combat loss rate of aircraft flying
attack missions, and in the first nine months of
1967 this rate averaged only 2.2 aircraft per
1,000 attack sorties, compared with a rate of 5.1
during 1965. This improvement reflects both the
changing nature of the Rolling Thunder program and
the increased effectiveness of US pilots and the
countermeasures available against the North Viet-
namese air defense system.
The combat loss rate varies significantly,
however, with the type and location of target taken
under attack. Thus, attacks against key industrial
facilities in the heavily defended Hanoi-Haiphong
area have sustained the highest loss rates. During
the first nine months of 1967, for example, the
attack against North Vietnam's petroleum and electric
power facilities and the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Plant, accounted for about 1 percent of all Rolling
Thunder attack sorties, but-the combat loss rate
for these attacks soared to an average of 21.5
aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties. By contrast, a
combat loss rate of less than one aircraft per
1,000 attack sorties was sustained by aircraft
attempting to interdict nine of North Vietnam's
primary infiltration routes-into South Vietnam.
Almost 60 percent of Rolling Thunder attack sorties
were flown against these routes. Strikes against
railroads accounted for 14 percent of the attack
sorties and 25 percent of the combat losses -- a
rate of four aircraft downed per 1,000 attack
sorties -- attack sorties which carry out strike
and flak-suppression missions, and support sorties,
which conduct photo and electronic reconnaissance,
combat air patrol, search and rescue, electronic
countermeasure, refueling, and forward air control
missions.
25X1
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Sorties, Losses, and Loss Rates
for the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, January-September 1967
Combat Losses
per 1,000
Sorties Losses
sorties a/
1965
25,270 129
5.1
1966
81,360 226
2.8
Jan-Sep 19
67 84,310 186
2.2
Support missions
1965
29,570 41
1.4
1966
65,660 56
0.9
Jan-Sep 19
67 65,170 51
0.8
1965
54,840 170
3.1
1966
147,020 282
1.9
Jan-Sep 19
67 149,480 237
1.6
Combat and Losses
Total Operational per 1,000
Sorties Losses Sorties
Total losses b/
1965
54,840 187
3.4
1966
147,020 315
2.1
Jan-Sep 19
67 149,480 270
1.8
a. Previously reported loss rates of 6.7, 3.5, and
3.0 during 1965, 1966, and 1967, respectively, were
based on attack sorties and combat-caused losses sus-
tained by attack and support sorties. The rates used
in this text are more comprehensive measures of com-
paring losses to attack and support sorties, both
separately and combined. The decreasing trend is noted
in all comparisons.
b. Combat and operational losses.
- 75 -
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sorties. The following tabulation shows the varia-
tions in combat loss rates sustained by attack air-
craft against representative target systems during
January-September 1967.
Target Category
Total
Percent
Total
Percent
Rate a/
Electric power
550
0.7
10
5.4
18.2
Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel
280
0.3
8
4.3
28.6
POL b/
100
0.1
2
1.1
20.0
Industry total
930
1.1
20
10.8
21.5
Highways c/
49,000
58.1
31
16.7
0.6
Railroads
11,370
13.5
46
24.7
4.0
Land transport
route total
60,370
71.6
77
41.4
1.3
All other
23,010
27.3
89
47.8
3.9
Total
84,310
100.0
186
100.0
2.2
a. Combat Losses of attack aircraft per 1,000 attack
sorties.
b. Numbers listed are for attacks against JCS POL targets
only.
c. Numbers Listed include attacks against 9 roads uti-
lized by Hanoi as primary infiltration routes into South
Vietnam. They total 1,200 miles in Length -- about 70
percent as Long as North Vietnam's 1,700 miles of prin-
cipal highways.
3. Losses by Geographic Area
Analysis of Rolling Thunder sorties and
losses, by Route Package, shows clearly the higher
risk associated with attacks against the more
lucrative industrial and transport targets in Route
Package VI. During the first nine months of 1967,
missions targeted against Route Package VI carried
out 17 percent of total Rolling Thunder attack
sorties but sustained 52 percent of the combat
losses during attack and support sorties over
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North Vietnam. Figure 6 shows shares of total
attack sorties and combat losses of attack and
support sorties over Route Package VI during
January-September 1967. During this period
the combat loss rate in Route Package VI was 8.5
attack and support aircraft downed per 1,000 attack
sorties, a rate ranging from more than three to eight
times that sustained in the other Route Package
areas. The following tabulation gives loss rates
and shares of sorties and losses, by Route Package,
during January-September 1967.
Route Package
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Combat losses of
attack and support
aircraft per 1,000
attack sorties a/
1.4
1.0
2.3
2.1
2.4
8.5
Attack sorties
(percent)
47
10
12
10
3
17
Combat losses of
attack and support
aircraft (percent)
23
3
10
8
3
52
a. Available data do not give breakdowns by Route
Package either of combat Losses of attack sorties
alone or of attack plus support sorties. Therefore,
the Listed Loss rates are ratios of attack sorties to
combat Losses of attack and support sorties. These
Loss rates are comparable only to the Loss rates
listed in the footnote to Table 17. However, ratios
of attack sorties to combat Losses of attack sorties
would show little difference in the relative Loss
rates between Route Packages.
The disproportionately high loss rates
in Route Package VI are attributable in large
measure to the losses sustained while attacking
targets close to Hanoi or Haiphong. The loss rate
over these areas during April-September 1967 came
to 19.5 combat losses of attack aircraft per 1,000
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Shares of Attack Sorties and Combat Losses, 1967
Loss Rate Over Package VI
4 o
0
0
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
Figure 6. Shares of Attack Sorties and Combat Losses Over Route Package VI, January-September 1967
attack sorties. During April, May, and August,
attacks over Hanoi and Haiphong accounted for more
than one-fourth of the attack aircraft lost in
combat under the Rolling Thunder program, although
the targets taken under attack accounted for less
than 3 percent of total attack sorties. Six of
the ten aircraft losses in action against electric
powerplants occurred on about 100 sorties that
attacked the Hanoi Thermal Powerplant and the Hanoi
Transformer Substation. The following tabulation
gives sorties, losses, and loss rates recorded
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during attacks within 10 nautical miles of Hanoi
and. Haiphong during April-September 1967.
Hanoi/Haiphong Areas
Month
Attack
Sorties
Combat Loss
Losses Rate a/
Second quarter
800
21
26.2
April
313
11
35.1
May
389
9
23.1
June
98
1
10.2
Third quarter
685
8
11.7
July
91
0
0
August
372
7
18.8
September
222
1
4.5
Total
1,485
29
19.5
a. Combat losses of attack aircraft per
1,000 attack sorties.
D. North Vietnamese Claims
Since the first US attacks against North
Vietnamese targets during August 1964, North
Vietnam has claimed shooting down a total of
2,343 US aircraft through September 1967. The
actual figure of 689 combat losses amounts to
less than one-third of the claimed number. A
breakdown by area given by the North Vietnamese
during August 1967 for about 2,200 of the claimed
downings shows a Route Package distribution similar
to that indicated by US data. The largest differ-
ence is in Route Package VI, where Hanoi claims
downing only 32 percent of the total number of
aircraft lost since the start of the Rolling Thunder
program (compared with an actual of 52 percent
during January-September 1967) suggesting that air
defense units in this Route Package make less
exaggerated claims than those in the rest of the
country. The following tabulation gives a break-
down, by Route Package, of claims by North Vietnam
of downed US aircraft through August 1967.
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Route Package
I II III IV V VI Total
Claimed aircraft
downings 447 143 279 379 242 715 2,205
Percent based on
US data, Jan-Sep
1967 a/ 23 3 10 8 3 52 100
a. Combat Losses of attack and support aircraft.
Because of rounding, components may not add to the
totals shown.
E. Personnel Losses
During the period August 1964 through
27 November 1967, 1,058 US Air Force, Navy, and
Marine Corps personnel went down with aircraft
disabled by hostile action over North Vietnam.
One-third of the downed personnel -- 349 men --
were rescued by US search and rescue forces.
Intelligence reports and reports based on observa-
tions by crews of aircraft accompanying downed
Air Force and Navy sorties have established that
at least 20 percent of the downed personnel have
been captured and 10 percent were killed. More
than one-third are carried as missing,
e o owing a u a-
tion shows the status of personnel in each service
downed during August 1964 through 27 November 1967.
Downed
Rescued
Captured
Killed
Missing
Air Force
636
203
92
29
312
Navy
395
135
113
80
67
Marine
Corps
27
11
5
0
11
Total
1,058
349
210
109
390
Percent
100
33
20
10
37
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Heavy defenses around Hanoi and Haiphong
severely limit search and rescue efforts in these
areas. Only 16 percent of 141 personnel downed
by enemy action in Route Package VI during the.
period January through September 1967 were rescued,
compared with the overall share since August 1964
of 33 percent. Because of hostile surroundings,
no search and rescue efforts were initiated
for at least 20 percent of the 141 personnel
downed by defenses in Route Package VI.
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Appendix A
Transportation in the Hanoi and Haiphong Areas
I. The Hanoi Area
.A. General
Attacks in, the Hanoi area have resulted in
the most significant damage against the North Viet-
namese transportation system yet inflicted by the
air campaign. The successful. interdiction of the
two key Hanoi bridges -- the Hanoi Railroad/Highway
(Paul Doumer) Bridge over the Red River and the
Hanoi Railroad/Highway Bridge over the Canal des
Rapides -- has forced the North Vietnamese to
rely on an elaborate series of rail and highway
bypasses at each of the two bridges, increasing
the time and labor needed to maintain traffic (see
Figure 7). The total capacity of these bypasses
is substantial, however, and if all are used at
the same time the North Vietnamese can move a
considerable volume of traffic.
B. The Hanoi Transportation Network
The transportation network in the immediate
Hanoi area -- from the center of Hanoi to the Yen
Vien classification yard, 11 kilometers from
Hanoi -- is a key connection for all traffic moving
between Hanoi and China, south to Vinh, or east to
Haiphong. This section contains two of North Viet-
nam's most important railroad/highway bridges and
three of its largest railroad classification yards,
Yen Vien, Gia Lam, and Hanoi. All rail and highway
traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong, Dong Dang, Lao
Cai, and Thai Nguyen must cross the mile-long Hanoi
Railroad/Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the Red
River. In addition, traffic from areas north of
the Canal des Rapides must use the Hanoi Railroad/
Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides to reach
the yard at Gia Lam and the Doumer Bridge. The
rail line from Haiphong to Hanoi joins the rail
line into Hanoi at Gia Lam, south of the Canal
des Rapides bridge.
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C. Attacks on the Doumer and Canal des
Rapides Bridges
The key Doumer Bridge was interdicted
initially on 11 August by an attack that destroyed
250 feet of the bridge and effectively disrupted
through rail and highway traffic between Hanoi and
Haiphong, and between Hanoi and points north of the
Canal des Rapides. It is possible that damage
would have been much greater if the North Viet-
namese had not built 29 additional supporting piers
before the attack. The piers reduced the possibility
that long bridge sections would be dropped. After
11 August traffic across the Red River was limited
to the use of four highway ferry facilities, one
highway pontoon bridge, and a series of three
pairs of rail ferry slips. All of these were
available before the attacks started. If all the
highway and rail bypasses in place across the Red
River on 11 August were in operation at one time,
an estimated 5,000 to 5,500 tons each way per day
could be moved, of which 1,300 tons could be
handled by the rail ferries. Later photography
revealed two other highway ferries about 11 kilo-
meters northwest of the Doumer Bridge and an
additional highway pontoon bridge 10 kilometers
to the south. These additions represented increased
capacity of about 3,100 tons. In addition, there
are at least 34 highway ferries shown in photog-
raphy between Hanoi and Phu Tho, about 100 kilometers
from Hanoi, which could have been used as alternates.
The Doumer Bridge was reopened to truck traffic on
9 September, less than 30 days after being inter-
dicted. Limited rail traffic across the bridge
was restored by at least 4 October. Collateral
sources indicate the bridge probably could not
support a locomotive because rail freight cars
were shuttled across the repaired span.
The main bridge over the Canal des Rapides
was damaged on 12 August, but through rail service
was not seriously affected, because a previously
constructed rail bypass bridge equal in capacity
to the main bridge was available. On 22 August
this bypass bridge was interdicted, thus disrupting
the flow of traffic from Dong Dang, Thai Nguyen,
and Lao Cai to the Red River and to Haiphong. After
22 August, traffic across the Canal des Rapides
was temporarily forced to use either a highway
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Original Canal des Rapides Bridge
Highway ferry and pontoon bridge
Highway cable bridge
Alternate rail/highway bridge
Probable rail/highway bridge (u/c)
Rail ferry
Highway ferry
Highway ferry
9 Three highway ferries
to Rail ferry
ii Two highway pontoon bridges or one
highway pontoon bridge and one
highway ferry
Figure 7. Hanoi Area Bypass System
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ferry, a highway pontoon bridge, or?a-rail ferry.
These bypasses could probably accommodate traffic
of about 5,000 to 5,500 tons each way per day, of
which about 1,800 tons could be moved by rail ferry.
This capacity is compared to an estimated inter-
national traffic of 800 tons per day moving south
from Dong Dang in August 1967. In October, the
number of bypasses. across the Canal des Rapides
was increased to include one highway pontoon
bridge, one highway ferry, a highway cable bridge,
and a rail ferry. The concrete and steel railroad
bypass bridge was interdicted and not available.
The combined capacity of these bypasses is estimated
at 5,600 tons each way per day. The Canal des
Rapides Bridge was noted to be restored for both
rail and truck traffic in 17 September photography.
The Doumer Bridge was attacked again on
25 October and two spans were destroyed. Through
rail and highway traffic between Hanoi and Haiphong
and Hanoi and points north of the Canal des Rapides
was again effectively disrupted and dependent on the
bypasses to the Doumer Bridge. However, photography
of 17 November showed that this bridge had been
restored for truck traffic. In the past, the bridge
required about 30 days to repair for truck traffic
and an additional 23 days for restoration of limited
rail traffic.
The Canal des Rapides Bridge was reattacked
on 28 October, and one span displaced, thus dis-
rupting the flow of traffic to the Red River and
Haiphong from Dong Dang, Thai Nguyen, and Lao Cai.
Both rail and truck traffic from these. areas were
again forced to use the bypasses over the Canal
des Rapides. However, photography of 17 November
showed that this bridge was serviceable to truck
traffic.
Rail traffic moving south from Dong Dang
could be accommodated by the rail ferry over the
Canal des Rapides. To enter Hanoi by rail, however,
trains from Dong Dang would have to cross the
Canal des Rapides, enter Gia Lam, and move east on
the Haiphong line to the rail ferry bypass line,
then ferry across the Red River and enter Hanoi
from the south. This routing would interfere
with traffic from Haiphong which also must use the
Red River rail bypass to enter Hanoi. Thus it is
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more likely that goods from Dong Dang are being
transshipped at Gia Lam and moved into Hanoi by
truck. The several highway bypasses over the Red
River and the inland water system in the Delta area;.
are more than adequate to handle the diverted
traffic in the Hanoi area, should the restored
bridge be interdicted again.
II. The Haiphong Area
A. General
The transportation system between Haiphong
and the interior has been disrupted by recent air
operations. Slight increases in cargo in some
open storage areas and no increase in other areas
are apparent in comparative photography of 4 and
18 October. This stockpiling may reflect North
Vietnamese use of the area as a safe haven, pro-
tected from attack by its proximity to foreign
ships and to heavily populated civilian residential
areas. Photography showed an increased number of
sampans and barges at the port. Although all the
original targeted bridges in Haiphong have been
damaged, at least ten recently constructed highway
bypasses assure the movement of a considerable
volume of traffic (see Figure 8).
B. Rail Transport
Rail traffic to and from Haiphong has been
seriously affected by airstrikes during the past'
few months. Strikes were directed against the
railroad/highway bridges and railroad yards at
Hai Duong, Hai Duong East, and Ngoc Kuyet. Through
rail traffic at these points was disrupted for
short periods; however, the system of rail and
highway bypasses was capable of maintaining the
movement of traffic and supporting about 5,500 tons
each way per day. The limiting capacity for through
rail traffic was apparently the pontoon rail ferry
at Hai Duong Bridge East. This ferry probably
restricted through rail traffic to 1,000 tons each
way per day. By transloading and using the highway
bypasses at this point, however, the uninterdicted
capacity of the line - 4,000 to 5,000 tons each
way per day - could have been achieved. It is
estimated that the line handled only 3,150 tons
daily of international traffic in August 1967
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Li
U
1 HIGHWAY BRIDGE 735' steel thru-truss
I span and lift tower dectroyed` 18 Sep 1967
2 approach spans destroyed
30 Sep 1967-no change
2 FERRY LANDING-i8 Oct 1967
3 PONTOON BRIDGE-30 Sep 1967
4 PONTOON BRIDGE -3o Sep 1967
5 FERRY LANDING -30 Sep 1967
1 ferry noted
6 RAIL/HIGHWAY. BRIDGE 300' steel thru-truss
I span dropped 30 Sep 1967
2 spans destroyed
7 PROBABLE RAILROAD BRIDGE BYPASS
under construction -2 Jul 1966
work continuing-18 Oct 1967
8 FERRY LANDING
2 ferries noted -30 Sep 1967
9 PONTOON BRIDGE-,8 Oct 1967
10 FERRY LANDING-4 Oct 1967
1 ferry noted
11 PONTOON BRIDGE -4 Oct 1967
12 PONTOON BRIDGE -4 Oct 1967
13 FERRY LANDING
no ferry noted l4 Oct 1967
I landing damaged
14 HIGHWAY BRIDGE (SW) 665' half thru-truss
2 spans destroyed-4 Oct 1967 and deck
15 HIGHWAY BRIDGE (SSE) 520' steel thru-truss
4 spans dropped l4 Sep 1967
2 piers destroyed
16 FERRY LANDING and POSSIBLE
PONTOON SECTIONS
no ferry noted-18 Oct 1967
Figure 8. Status of Haiphong Bridges, 4 September-18 October 1967
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(2,900 tons westbound and 250 tons eastbound). In
September the railroad/highway bridge and the rail-
road yard (west) at Haiphong were attacked. On 28
September the railroad/highway bridge was destroyed,
effectively stopping through rail traffic out of
Haiphong proper. No rail bypass is avaiable, but
one is under construction. However, rail traffic
can continue on the Hanoi-Haiphong line west of
the interdicted bridge, and trucks can be employed
to move goods to Haiphong Railroad Yard West near
the bridge, where the material can be transshipped
to trains.
The several major and numerous secondary
roads serving Haiphong have been moderately damaged
during the course of the Rolling Thunder program.
The most important of these comprise Route 5,
paralleling the rail line to Hanoi with a capacity
of 5,000 tons each way per day, and Route 10,
serving the areas north and south of Haiphong with
a capacity of 1,000 tons each way per day. In
addition, a number of secondary roads connect
these routes and provide a. flexible network for the
movement of goods in the region south of Haiphong.
In September, three vital highway bridges in
Haiphong (Kien An Highway Bridge on Route 10 and
Haiphong Highway Bridges South Southeast and North
Northwest on Route 5) were destroyed. The loss
of these key bridges undoubtedly disrupted the
movement of goods out of the port by truck until
effective countermeasures, such as highway pontoon
bridges or highway ferries, were organized.
D. Water Routes
Two principal and numerous minor water routes
connect Haiphong and Hanoi. The southern route via
the Canal des Bambous and the Red River has the largest
capacity and is used most intensively: The northern
route consists of the Song Thai Binh and Canal des
Rapides. Available photography of these waterways
reveals large numbers of barges and sampans, repre-
senting a substantial carrying capacity. While
attacks against watercraft in these areas have;ood'rred
occasionally during armed reconnaissance missions,
no sustained air campaign was conducted against the
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waterway system in the area until June 1967. At
that time a mining program was extended from water-
ways south of 20 degrees north latitude to all the
principal lines of communication in North Vietnam,
particularly those between Hanoi and Haiphong. A
new more sensitive magnetic-influenced mine for
use on land routes as well as waterways was also
introduced (see Appendix B).
E. Residual Transport Capacity
Five highway pontoon bridges and six high-
way ferries determine the remaining capacity of the
Haiphong transportation system. Three of the
highway ferries have been noted in operation. If
all three highway ferries and all pontoon bridges
leading out of Haiphong were in operation at one
time, an estimated 14,200 tons each way per day
could be moved, of which about 700 tons could be
handled by the three ferries and 13,5Q0 tons by
the pontoon bridges. This volume represents nearly
twice the uninterdicted capacity of the Hanoi-
Haiphong railroad line and about two times the daily
movement of traffic to Hanoi at the peak of imports
during 1967. Photography of 18 October indicates
that construction is proceeding on the rail bypass
to the interdicted Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge.
The completion of this rail bypass, first seen in
the early stages of construction in July 1966, will
eliminate some of the time-consuming and less
efficient operations of moving goods out of the
port by truck or watercraft.
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Appendix B
The MK-36 Mining Program in North Vietnam
The concentration of the interdiction effort
against rail and highway lines of communication
in North Vietnam and the increasing disruption of
land traffic operations forced the North Vietnamese
to resort to greater use of the inland water system
in 1965-66 This system for the most part had to
cope only with armed reconnaissance attacks against
barges and watercraft through 1966. In early 1967
a mining program was undertaken as part of an
overall effort for more effective interdiction of
inland water traffic.
I. The MK-50/MK-52 Mining Program
A modest mining program using conventional
MK-5.0 and MK-52 mines was undertaken during the
period 26 February - 21 May 1967 to disrupt inland
water transport in the area south of 20 degrees
north latitude. A total of 143 mines were placed
in or near the mouth of five southern rivers. These
waterways were the principal routes for waterborne
traffic in the area south of the Red River and
included the Song Ma, Song Ca, Cua Sot, Song
Giang, and Kien Giang Rivers.
The program was not effective -- principally
because the conventional acoustic- and magnetic-
detonated mines being used were not suited for the
area where they were employed. The mines require
minimum depths of 12 or 18 feet to be armed, depths
seldom found in these areas. Moreover, the North
Vietnamese were able to mount simple and well-
organized countermeasures that effectively neutralized
the program.
II. The MK-36 Program
The development of a more sophisticated magnetic
weapon, the MK-36, made. it possible to undertake
a more extensive mining program with a greater
potential for interdicting all of the principal
lines of communication in North Vietnam.
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The MK-36 weapon is a converted MK-82, 500-
pound, low-drag bomb with a life span of about
four months. It is armed on land or water impact
and is effective in water up to depths of 60 feet.
This device differs from the MK-50 and MK-52 mines
because it does not require a minimum water depth
for arming. It can be detonated by the magnetic
influence of rifles at 10 to 15 feet or trucks at
40 to 60 feet. Its effective radius of destruction
is believed to be 20 feet on land and 35 feet in
water. Tests are still being conducted to determine
the actual radii of destruction.
The MK-36 program is a three-phase operation
with emphasis on the Haiphong area. Phase I is a
plan to isolate the Hanoi-Haiphong area by seeding
the most vulnerable points along the important
transportation routes between the two cities.
Selective seeding of the Lao Cad and Dong Dang
railroad lines at priority areas is also part of
Phase I as is the mining of key transport routes
in the southern part of the country, particularly
in the vicinity of Vinh, Cap Mui Ron, Quang Khe,
and Dong Hoi. Phase II is designed to isolate
Vinh and to seal off the major lines of com-
munication south toward the DMZ and north toward
the northeast sector. Phase III calls for the
mining of all major land and waterway routes
throughout the country and the use of the MK-36
to neutralize all countermeasures taken to reduce
the effects of interdiction. Some parts of each
phase of the MK-36 program have been implemented,
but other parts, such as the attempted isolation
of Vinh, have not been undertaken.
III. Implementation of the MK-36 Program
Throug]. 30 October
Use of the newly developed MK-36 weapon against
transport targets in North Vietnam began on 20
June of this year. About 26,000 MK-36 weapons
are required to implement the three-phases of the
program. Between 20 June and 30 October, nearly
4,300 MK-36 weapons have been placed in various.
rivers and estuaries, near highway ferries or
fords, on roads, and near rail and highway bridges.
About 50 percent of the weapons have been placed
in the Hanoi - Haiphong area, with 666 weapons
placed in the immediate vicinity of the port of
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Haiphong. The Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge,
several ferry crossings near the three targeted
highway bridges, and strategic stretches on the
Cua Cam River also have been seeded, as shown in
the following tabulation.
Number
of MK-36
Weapons
Haiphong Highway Bridge South Southeast 63
Haiphong Boat Yard at Lach Tray 62
Haiphong Railroad/Highway Bridge 56
Haiphong Highway Bridge and
Pontoon Bypass 169
Loi Dong POL Transshipment Area 15
Cua Cam River 40
Kien An Highway Bridge 83
Kien An Ferry 16
Kien An Ferry Northeast 47
Kien Bai Highway Ferry 67
Vat Cach Ha Junction 48
Total 666
The major transportation routes connecting
Hanoi and Haiphong have been seeded-with 600
weapons. Devices have been placed at important
ferry crossings along the Song Thai-Binh River,
which connects with the Canal des Rapides.
Important ferries and bridges on the Hanoi-Haiphong
railroad line and highway Route 5 have been heavily
seeded, especially near Hai Duong. In the immediate
Hanoi area, the MK-36 has been placed at the Hanoi
Railroad/Highway (Doumer) Bridge over the Red
River and the railroad ferry bypass three miles
south of this bridge. In addition, the Kim Quan
Highway Ferry south of the rail ferry bypass has
been seeded.
In the area between Haiphong and 20 degrees
north latitude, nearly 500 weapons (12 percent of
the total) have been planted along Routes 6 and 10,
along the Canal des Bambous, and at major ferries
and highway bridges. These include the Tu-Y High-
way Bridge and the Lang Lien and Noi Thang ferries.
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A little less than half of the weapons have
been placed south of 20 degrees north latitude.
The five selected rivers (Song Ma, Song Ca, Cua
Sot, Song Giang, and Kien Giang), which were
attacked under the first mining program continue
to be seeded. In addition, other key facilities
such as the Ron Ferry Complex, the Vinh Son
Highway Ferry (at the junction of Routes 7 and
15), the Song Kinh Highway Bridge, and Tho Ngoa
Ferry and Highway Bridge have been seeded. More
than 25 percent of weapons deployed in this area
have been placed along the Ben Hai River in the
DMZ.
The Red River near Phu Tho and the Viet Tri
Railroad Ferry have recently been seeded with 260
weapons in accordance with Phase I for selective
seeding of the Lao Cai railroad line.
In addition, the dropping of more than 100
weapons on the Kep Airfield and areas nearby
illustrates the program's broad application to
land areas as well.
IV. Effectivenss of the Program
Little evidence is available regarding the
effectiveness of the MK-36 program. It seems
clear, however, that the MK-36 program has had a
greater impact on North Vietnamese logistic opera-
tions than the ineffective MK-50/MK-52 mining
program. Photography has revealed that the ferry
at Ben Thuy did not operate for two months after a
seeding on 20 June, although other ferry sites
were used and the movement of traffic continued.
Photography also shows that MK-36's probably damaged
the northern low-water ferry slip on the railroad
bypass around Hanoi. This damage did not halt the
movement of traffic, however, because the northern
high-water ferry slip was in use.
Apart from these possibilities, photography
supplies no evidence of disruption to traffic that
can be attributed to the use of the MK-36 exclusively.
In about 30 target areas searched for effects of the
MK-36, only three areas in addition to those noted
above showed significant change in traffic patterns.
These were the Loi Dong Transshipment Area on the
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Cua Cam near Haiphong, the Haiphong Railway/Highway
Bridge, and a segment of the Red River at Lang Tien
Ca. In all of these cases, however, it is impossible
to determine whether the change observed resulted
from the MK-36 or from regular bombs, including
delayed action bombs, that have been dropped in
all target areas. In all other MK-36 target areas
searched, there appeared to be little change in
the low level of traffic observed during daylight
hours.
delayed action bombs, or both, are creating addi-
tional problems and some apprehension. For example,
it is quite possible that repairs have been delayed
on land routes out of Haiphong because of such
weapons. There is no evidence that the North Viet-
namese have yet developed a capability to disarm the
MK-36, and there is some opinion that they will not
be able to develop this capability. On the other
hand, the MK-36 program is still just getting under
way, and the North Vietnamese have shown over the
past two and one-half years a considerable capability
for developing simple and effective countermeasures
to modern weaponry.
25X1
sum
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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