POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070032-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2005
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: July 3, 1968
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2006/10/18: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070032-8
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The case in which the Rolling Thunder program that
existed before 31 March is resumed, but assuming
that North Vietnam attempts to infiltrate and sup-
port one, two, three, or four combat divisions into
South Vietnam.) (No. 11)
Secret
3 July 1968
Copy No. 01
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
3 July 1968
Possible Alternatives
to the Rolling Thunder Program
(The case in which the Rolling Thunder
program that existed before 31 March is
resumed, but assuming that North Vietnam
attempts to infiltrate and support one,
two, three, or four more combat divisions
into South Vietnam.) (No. 11)
Summary
The deployment of an additional four divisions
from North to South Vietnam would not place a major
burden on the Vietnamese logistical system. The
increase in the requirement for supplies from North
Vietnam would be an estimated 30 tons a day. if
the four divisions were deployed in areas where
other sources could be tapped for food supplies,
the added logistics requirements to be provided by
North Vietnam could be as little as 7 tons a day.
The logistics requirement resulting from the
new deployments would not place a major strain on
the Vietnamese logistical system, although the
movement would be more complicated and costly. The
movement of 30 tons a day would be only slightly
more than 10 percent of the estimated average daily
levels of traffic moved to the Laotian Panhandle
during the first three months of 1968. This high
level of resupply through North Vietnam and Laos has
not been seriously impeded by bombing in the past,
Note; This memorandum was produced soZeZy by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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including the concentrated level of attack since
31 March. The continued expansion and improvement
of the transport nets in North Vietnam and Laos
will provide the Communists with an even further
cushion against the effects of an attack.
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Logistical Requirements
Logistical requirements from out-of-country
sources for the Communist forces in South Vietnam
have never been large. Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese forces currently in South Vietnam require
about 300 tons of logistical support daily, of which
only about 90 tons -- 30 percent -- must come from
external sources.
Augmenting the enemy forces in South Vietnam
by an additional four divisions would increase
total enemy logistical requirements by about 60 tons
a day, 30 tons of which would have to come from
external sources as shown in the table.
Estimated Daily Logistical Requirements
for Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Regular and Administrative Support Troops
in South Vietnam
Short Tons per Day
Increment of
Current
Requirements
Four Additional
Divisions
Class
of Supply
Total
External
Total
External
I (food)
236.0
60.0
46.6
23.8
II and IV
(clothing and
equipment)
39.3
11.8
8.2
2.7
III (POL)
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
Negl.
V (Ammunition) 21.6 20.6 4.6 4.1
This estimate assumes that the four divisions
would (1) be deployed in the I Corps area, (2) be
able to obtain only one-half of their food require-
ments in-country and rely on North Vietnam for the
remainder, and (3) engage in a high rate of combat --
one day out of fifteen. If the forces were deployed
to the II Corps area, one-half of the food require-
ments would probably still have to come from external
sources, but they could be supplied with most of
these requirements from Cambodia rather than North
Vietnam. If the forces were deployed in the III
or IV Corps area, their external requirement could
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be much less. In some areas, their food requirement
could be satisfied completely from in-country
sources. Under these circumstances the supplies
to be provided by North Vietnam would be limited.
They would include small amounts of clothing,
weapons, and ammunition totaling only about 7 tons
a day.
Route Capacities
Transport capacities in Laos and North Vietnam
are already in excess of the traffic flow required
to sustain an augmented Communist force in South
Vietnam.* Routes constructed during the past year
and construction currently under way will provide
the Communists with even more capacity to move
supplies by truck into Laos, and from Laos into at
least four major areas of South Vietnam located
between the Khe Sanh area and the tri-border area.
When a third major access road into Laos is com-
pleted later this year, the throughput truck capacity
from North Vietnam via Laos into South Vietnam will
be about 1,000 tons a day during the dry season and
200 tons a day in the rainy season. The only
restricting sector in this pipeline will be Route
92/96 in the southern part of the Panhandle, which
limits the movement to the tri-border area to about
200 tons a day in the dry season and 50 tons a day
during the wet season.
Air attacks over Laos and North Vietnam have
increased the cost and complicated the movement of
supplies; however, even with increased intensity,
they are not likely to reduce the flow below that
needed to maintain an augmented enemy force in South
Vietnam. A record volume of traffic -- 240 tons
per day -- moved into the Laotian Panhandle during
the first quarter of 1968 in the face of heavy air
attacks. Even if the unusually high reported loss
rate of trucks and supplies in the first quarter of
this year is accurate and is sustained, losses could
be made good by imports from the USSR, China, and
Eastern Europe. Transport routes have considerable
* For a discussion of various aspects of inter-
dicting the flow of supplies, see Questions 7, 8,
and 10.
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excess capacity, and, even with increased bomb
damage, the rudimentary transport system is easily
repaired and the network could support increased
traffic flows. Furthermore, the present repair
force could be augmented by additional local labor
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Secret
Secret
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