POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070028-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2009
• Sequence Number: 28
• Publication Date: May 8, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(THE CASE WHERE THERE IS A COMPLETE CESSATION
OF BOMBING IN NORTH VIETNAM, WITH INCREASED
ATTACKS AGAINST INFILTRATION ROUTES IN LAOS.) (NO. 8)
JCS review completed.
DIA review(s)
completed.
Top Secret
COPY NO. 1 I
MAY 19
-68
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
8 May 1968
POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES
TO THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
(The Case Where There Is a Complete Cessation of
Bombing in North Vietnam, with Increased Attacks
Against Infiltration Routes in Laos.) (No. 8)
Summary
This memorandum examines the effects of shifting
the weight of the present Rolling Thunder campaign
to Laos. There would be a complete cessation of
bombing in North Vietnam itself.
A bombing campaign confined to Laos would be
directed solely at transportation-logistic targets,
since that country's military significance derives
very largely from its role as the key infiltration
corridor to South Vietnam from the north. However,
the transportation-logistic systems in Laos are
less attractive targets than their counterparts in
North Vietnam, even including the present restricted
Vietnamese Panhandle system, which is confined to
targets below the 19th Parallel as a consequence of
a self-imposed US restriction. The Laotian trans-
port system is a more rudimentary one than the
North Vietnamese system. It has a small and
declining number of significant logistic targets
that are susceptible to detection and attack from
the air, and as a consequence, the post-attack
repair problems are considerably less burdensome.
We believe that concentrating the air effort
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence and the Director's Special Assistant
for Vietnamese Affairs.
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against Laos would have the following direct
effects:
1. Increased numbers of trucks,
supplies, roads, and bridges in Laos
would be destroyed or neutralized, par-
ticularly if the United States continues
to enhance its capabilities of carrying
out night air operations. however, ex-
pansion of the capacity of the trans-
poration routes in Laos will soon permit
the throughput of 1,000 tons of supplies
per day during the dry season and 200
tons during the wet season, in the
absence of bombing attacks. The road
network is used to only a small share
of its capacity; we do not estimate that
increased bombings would be able to slow
down the present high level of infiltra-
tion of men or supplies.
2. The weather and availability of
suitable aircraft. would impose serious
constraints in utilizing the available
aircraft sortie capability now devoted
to attacking North Vietnam. In 1967,
more than twice as many attack sorties
were flown against North Vietnamese
targets as against those in Laos. But
instead of a 200-percent increase in
attack sorties, we estimate that the
actual increase from the proposed shift
to Laos would be closer to 50 percent.
Under these circumstances, the present
rapid repair schedule could be main-
tained by the shifting of a small number
of repair crews -- not more than 5,000
men -- to Laos from North Vietnam.
3. The North Vietnamese, as soon
as they were convinced that the bombing
lull over North Vietnam was to be pro-
longed, would begin shifting more anti-
aircraft weapons into Laos. Most of
these weapons, we believe, would be of
small caliber with a few larger conven-
tional antiaircraft guns and perhaps a
token number of SAM's. When completed,
this shift could triple the present
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low loss rate of US aircraft operating
against Laotian targets to a level
closely approximating that experienced
against North Vietnamese targets.
The cessation of bombing attacks on North
Vietnam, even though attacks on Laos continued,
would be regarded in Hanoi as a propaganda and
political victory. The regime would have accom-
plished one of its major purposes in freeing its
territory from aerial attack and it would there-
fore be encouraged in its belief that the United
States would yield to additional pressures. It
is unlikely that the proposed shift in the bomb-
ing program to Laos would have any significant
effect on Hanoi's position with respect to mean-
ingful negotiations with the United States.
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I. Air Operations over Laos
A. Character of Previous Operations
Attack sorties over Laos against the Com-
munist infiltration and logistic system, base areas,
and other military facilities during the period 1965
through March 1968 totaled 128,000, about one-half
the number flown over North Vietnam.* About two-
thirds of the attack sorties over Laos during both
1966 and 1967 were flown in the first and fourth
quarters, when the weather was relatively good for
air operations. The 22,000 sorties flown during
the first quarter of 1968 was the highest quarterly
total of the war. Attack sorties over Laos, by
quarter, are given in the following tabulation:
Quarter
1965
1966
1967
1968
January-March
440
19,820
17,670
21,880
April-June
2,130
14,190
9,440
July-September
2,760
4,290
4,580
October-December
5,500
10,180
14,480
Total a/
10,840
49,120
46,160
a. Because of rounding and post-yearly correc-
tions, components may not add to the totals shown.
Air operations over Laos are divided be-
tween two operational areas: the Barrel Roll area,
extending along the North Vietnamese border in
northern Laos, and the Steel Tiger area, roughly
equivalent to the Laos Panhandle, extending south
from Route 8 to the Cambodian border. These areas
are further subdivided into seven alphabetically
designated sectors, Alpha through Golf (see the
map, Figure 1).
* In addition, 90,000 support sorties were flown
over Laos during this period. During 1967, about
one-half of the support sorties carried out forward
air control missions, 20 percent were reconnaissance
missions, 12 percent were combat air patrol and
refueling missions, and the remaining were supply,
defoliation, and search and rescue missions.
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NOR TI-1\
Moung
Nong-
A Shau
Da Nang
THAILAND VIETNAM
VIETNAM
ti
Figure 1. Laos: Road Network and Steel Tiger Boundaries
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
Road added or improved
since Jan., 1965
GULF
OF
TONKIN
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About four-fifths of the attack sorties
over Laos during 1966 and 1967 were against targets
in the Steel Tiger area of the Laotian Panhandle.
During the first quarter of 1968, attacks in the
Steel Tiger area increased further to almost 90
percent of all attack sorties flown over Laos.
During January-March 1968, emphasis within the
Steel Tiger area shifted from the Echo sector,
adjacent to the major logistical routes from North
Vietnam into the Panhandle of Laos, to the Foxtrot
sector, just west of the Khe Sanh area of South
Vietnam. The share of Steel Tiger attack sorties
flown against the Foxtrot sector increased from
about 25 percent in 1967 to 50 percent during this
period.
Most US sorties continue to be flown during
daylight hours, despite the increased use of detec-
tion devices (see the Appendix) that have been
developed to locate trucks that move largely at
night. In 1967 in the Steel Tiger area, there
was a ratio of two day sorties to each night sortie.
In the fourth quarter of 1967, the ratio changed
to one day sortie to each night sortie. However,
in 1968 the ratio again returned to two day sorties
to each night sortie.
There were 112 combat losses of attack air-
craft over Laos during the period 1965 through
March 1968.* During 1967, 31 fixed-wing aircraft
were downed in Laos by Communist defenses while
participating in a total of 46,160 attack sorties --
a loss rate of less than 0.7 aircraft per 1,000
sorties.** Propeller-driven aircraft flew about
one-fifth of the attack sorties but sustained
almost one-half of the losses by attack aircraft
during 1966 and 1967. However, in 1967, attack
sorties by propeller-driven aircraft were restricted
to less heavily defended areas, and the loss rate
* In addition, 33 combat Losses of support air-
craft, and 20 operational Losses of attack and
support aircraft, were sustained during the period.
Total Losses from all causes over Laos, therefore,
were 165 fixed-wing aircraft.
** The comparable Loss rate over all of North
Vietnam was 2.4 aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties --
more than three times the rate in Laos.
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by these aircraft fell to about one-half of that
sustained in 1966. The trend in combat losses of
fixed-wing aircraft and corresponding loss rates
over Laos during attack missions since 1965 are
shown in the following tabulation:
Year
Attack
Sorties
Combat
Losses of
Attack Aircraft
Losses per
1,000 Sorties
1965
10,840
17
1.6
1966
49,120
47
1.0
1967
46,160
31
0.7
Jan-Mar
1968
21,880
17
0A
Total
128,000
112
More than three-fourths of the attack
sorties against targets in Laos during 1967 were
carried out by 11 different types of jet-powered
aircraft, mostly F-4's, F-105's, and A-4's. The
characteristics of these aircraft -- high speed,
high altitude, and high fuel consumption charac-
teristics -- limit their loitering times and
target-spotting capabilities and reduce their attack
effectiveness against fleeting targets. Accordingly,
most jet strikes in Laos during 1967 were against
fixed targets such as truck parks, bridges, supply
areas, and defense sites.
Three types of propeller-driven aircraft --
A-1's, A-26's, and T-28's -- flew the remaining
attack sorties over Laos in 1967. Most attack
sorties by propeller-driven aircraft were against
trucks and other moving targets. Attack sorties
during 1967 by propeller-driven and jet-powered
aircraft over Laos and North Vietnam are given in
the following tabulation:
Type of North Laos and North
Aircraft Laos Vietnam Vietnam Combined
Jet 35,170 103,350 138,520
Propeller 10,990 3,590 14,580
Total 46,160 106,940 153,100
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B. Stepped-Up Attacks Against. Laos
Weather constraints and the limited avail-
ability of suitable aircraft and technical equip-
ment will probably restrict an increase in attack
sorties over Laos to perhaps 50 percent above 1967
levels, and many of the additional sorties would be
of marginal effectiveness. About 107,000 additional
attack sorties could be made available for use over
Laos as a result of a bombing pause in North Viet-
nam. On the basis of a comparison with 1967
Rolling Thunder statistics, however, most of these
sorties would be flown by jets: 85 percent by
F-4's, F-105's, and A-4's alone. Only about 6,000
of the jet attack sorties would be flown by A-6
aircraft equipped for radar bombing against fixed
targets during poor weather and at night, and only
about 3,600 attack sorties would be performed by
propeller-driven aircraft. Furthermore, heavy
rains and low, dense clouds brought by the South-
west Monsoon generally would sharply limit attacks
in Laos during a part of each day from approximately
mid-May to mid-September, regardless of the poten-
tial number of sorties available. Figure 2, which
compares average rainfall and attack sorties over
Laos, reflects in part the effect of weather on
the sortie rate.
6,000
0
0
4,000 Q
Figure 2. Attack Sorties Compared with Rainfall over Laos, January 1965-March 1968
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C. Communist Air Defense
Communist air defenses in Laos are composed
of at least 15 antiaircraft battalions, with a
total of 3,200 air defense personnel and about 150
to 300 14.5-mm weapons and 250 to 400 weapons of
37-mm or larger. The weapons are mobile and dif-
ficult to locate and can be deployed in more remote
areas where transportation problems hinder the
movement of heavier weapons. The 14.5-mm weapons
have a maximum effective range of 4,600 feet and
are used against low-flying strike aircraft,
drones, and helicopters. The 37-mm weapons have
a maximum effective range of 8,200 feet. A few
57-mm weapons with a maximum effective range of
19,600 feet may also be in the Panhandle. Thirteen
of the battalions have been identified as Pathet
Lao, one as a Deuane/Pathet Lao battalion, and
one as a North Vietnamese battalion. A minimum of
six battalions, about 40 percent of the total air
defense strength in Laos, are known to be located
in Southern Laos.
In the event the Rolling Thunder program
were halted, the air defense system in the Laotian
Panhandle could be readily augmented by redeploying
as many as 1,500 antiaircraft weapons and 6,000
antiaircraft personnel from North Vietnam without
a serious impairment of North Vietnam's air defense
capability. About 60 percent of these could
consist of weapons of 37-mm or larger. Such a
redeployment could be accomplished within a month
and would at least double and possibly triple the
number of antiaircraft weapons presently in the
Laotian Panhandle. Trucks available in North
Vietnam could readily transport the required
ammunition, and resupply requirements would not
impose a significant burden on the transport system.
Up to five SAM firing battalions and one
support battalion could be deployed to the Laotian
Panhandle from the Hanoi-Haiphong area without
seriously impairing the air defense system in
North Vietnam. It is probable that any deployment
of SAM's in Laos would be restricted to the Echo
and Foxtrot sectors of the Steel Tiger area against
which most US air attacks in Laos are concentrated.
To support five firing battalions, about 25 SAM
sites would probably be built. Construction of
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the sites and feeder roads would require up to
2,000 engineering workers and would take at least
six weeks to complete. The SAM equipment, weighing
3,000 to 3,500 tons, and personnel, numbering less
than 1,000, could easily be moved to these sites
during the dry season. A more limited and less
rapid movement of SAM equipment could be made
during the rainy season.
Although the introduction of SAM's into
Laos would have considerably more than a nuisance
value, it is doubtful if the SAM's would be an
effective air defense system in view of the kind
of air war presently being fought in Laos. The
SAM's have proved to be relatively more effective
in defending industrial and fixed lines of com-
munication (LOC) targets in the Northeastern
areas of North Vietnam than the fleeting and
widely dispersed targets characteristic of the
air war in Laos. It is likely, therefore, that
the North Vietnamese would deploy only one or two
SAM battalions involving five to ten sites in the
Laotian Panhandle, thus providing a threat to US
strike forces with a minimum expenditure of
resources. A system of this magnitude could be
completed in less than three weeks, would involve
the movement of around 1,000 tons of SAM equipment,
and would require up to 700 construction workers
and 350 SAM personnel.
A small MIG effort could be conducted
against US aircraft over the Laos Panhandle. MIG's
can now be staged from an airfield at Vinh and an
airfield under construction at Bai Thuong, but it
will. take six months before construction of the
Ba} Thuong airfield can be completely finished.
Aircraft losses as a result of these rein-
forcements in the defense system could be expected
to increase, possibly from the 1967 rate in Laos
of 0.7 aircraft per 1,000 attack sorties to a rate
closer to the average of 2.4 aircraft per 1,000
attack sorties experienced in North Vietnam.
II. The Logistic System in Southern Laos
A. The Road Network
The great bulk of the logistical supplies
moved by the Communists into and through the Panhandle
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of Laos is moved by truck. The :movements are sup-
plemented by primitive transport -- bicycles,
porters, and carts -- on innumerable trails and by
small craft on a few minor waterways during the
rainy season.
The road system has been progressively
expanded and upgraded until it
now
contains more
than 1,600 kilometers of road
(see
Figure 1). Dur-
ing each dry season, engineer
units
and laborers
construct new roads, bypasses,
and
fords, and repair
and improve existing roads. New road construction
is usually halted during the rainy season except
for short bypasses to keep the routes open. Since
1964 the Communists have added about 1,300 kilome-
ters of roads to the Laotian network.* The most
significant routes completed during this time in-
cluded a second major access road (Route 137/912)
into Laos, a limited all-weather road** (Route
92/96) to the tri-border area, and six roads pushed
across the Laotian border into South Vietnam. About
670 kilometers of this construction, consisting of
the primary trunk road system, was built in the
1965-66 dry season. During the recent 1967-68 dry
season, another major construction effort resulted
in about 350 kilometers of new roads, mainly con-
sisting of roads extending eastward into South
Vietnam. A third major access road from North
Vietnam into Laos is also nearing completion, pos-
sibly by May or June of this year. Most of the new
roads appear to have limited all-weather capability
and should remain open to vehicular traffic for a
major part of the rainy season.
Currently, there are an estimated 12,000
full-time workers, including engineering units,
assigned to repair and maintain the road net in
* Included in this total are 68 kilometers of
roads in North Vietnam (42 kilometers of Route 137
and 26 kilometers of a new unnumbered road) and 127
kilometers of extensions within South Vietnam.
** A limited all-weather road has greatly reduced
capability in the rainy season, but with proper
construction and appropriate maintenance or repair
techniques it remains open for a low level of daily
traffic during the rainy season except for occasional
periods of a few days.
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the Laotian Panhandle, supplemen ad by some 4,000
part-time laborers or conscripted villagers. The
full-time workers also operate ferries and fords
and are responsible for traffic control. At the
peak of road construbtion in Laos in 1965-66, an
estimated 25,000 workers, comprised mainly of North
Vietnamese army troops, were engaged in road expan-
sion.
Materials utilized in constructing and
maintaining the Laotian road net are, for the most
part, obtained locally. Small amounts of cement,
steel, asphalt, and fuel must come from North Viet-
nam, but there is no apparent shortage of those
items required for the primary routes. Only small
numbers of bulldozers, rock crushers, and road
graders are in the Panhandle, but additional con-
struction equipment could be easily obtained from
equipment parks in North Vietnam. A standdown of
the bombing in North Vietnam would probably result
in a major effort to improve the all-weather capa-
bility of the road system in the Laos Panhandle.
About 10 major Communist base areas and
many shelters have been built along the supply
routes in the Panhandle. These facilities are often
located under heavy tree cover or in caves at least
several hundred yards distant from the main road.
Their locations can sometimes be detected by
determining where the trucks leave the main road. The
number of such facilities was greatly increased in
1965 and 1966, probably as a result of a step-up in
the war and as a countermeasure to aerial attacks.
A network of fixed wirelines apparently
intended for logistics functions has been under
rapid construction by the Communists since November
1967 from north of the DMZ, through the Laotian
Panhandle, and into South Vietnam. The fixed
character of the wirelines, involving laborious
clearing of vegetation and mounting of poles, testi-
fies to the extent of the North Vietnamese logistical
buildup in Laos. Construction of wirelines is under
way for more than 300 kilometers, with poles and
wires in place for much of the way. The wirelines
apparently will parallel supply and infiltration
routes at a distance of a kilometer or more from
the roads. The precise location of all of the lines
is unclear, but the northern end of the network
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seems likely to be near Route 101, about 30 kilome-
ters north of the DMZ, where it would link up with
the North Vietnamese wireline network. At the
southern end, vegetation has been cleared all the
way to the A Shau area and slightly beyond. Prob-
ably only a Sepone - Ban Bac segment of the network
and a north-south line located east of Sepone are
operational.
B. Capacity
The capacity of the roads in Laos and the
distance that supplies can be moved forward by truck
from North Vietnam is steadily increasing. In 1964,
Route 15/12 through Mu Gia Pass was the only all-
weather route available from North Vietnam into
southern Laos. It had a capacity of about 400 tons
a day during the dry season and 100 tons a day in
the rainy season. At that time, trucks could move
south to Muong Nong, a straight line distance of
more than 150 kilometers from the Pass, during the
dry season. During the rainy season, trucks could
move only about 13 kilometers south from Mu Gia
Pass. Thus most of the supply movements by truck
into Laos took place during the dry season, supple-
mented by small movements over the trail network
around the DMZ during the rainy season. Supply
movements south of Muong Nong and east into South
Vietnam were totally dependent on primitive trans-
port.
After the major construction of the 1965/66
dry season a total of about 650 (dry season)/150
(wet season) tons a day could enter the Laos Pan-
handle on the two major access roads, and about
400/100 tons a day could be delivered by truck to
several points within a few kilometers of the South
Vietnamese border. About 150/30 tons of this total
could be delivered about 500 kilometers south to the
tri-border area. From these points along the border,
primitive transport still had to be used for forward
movements.
The routes constructed during the past year
and the construction currently under way, however,
will provide the Communists with a considerably
higher capacity to move supplies by truck into Laos
and from Laos into at least four major areas of
South Vietnam located between the Khe Sanh area
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and the tri-border area. When the third major
access road into Laos is completed in the near
future, the throughput truck capacity from North
Vietnam via Laos into South Vietnam will be about
1,000 tons a day during the dry season and 200 tons
a day in the rainy season. The only restricting
sector in this pipeline will be Route 92/96 in the
southern part of the Panhandle, which limits the
movement to the tri-border area to about 200/50
tons a day.
C. Operation of the Transport System
The Laotian supply system is an extension
of the North Vietnamese logistical supply system.
The North Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense
establishes general policies for the procurement
of supplies destined to transit Laos, and its
General Directorate of Rear Services (GDRS) is
responsible for detailed planning and supervision
of procurement, storage, issue, and distribution of
supplies. The movement of supplies into Laos is
controlled by the Transportation Directorate, GDRS,
which also furnishes vehicles to units that need
them, and North Vietnamese trucks move directly to
supply depots in Laos. Transportation in the Com-
munist part of southern Laos is primarily the
responsibility of the 559th Transportation Group.
This group has two main subordinates: the 70th
Transport Regiment, which is responsible for trans-
portation from the Mu Gia area south to the A Shau
Valley area and Route 92, and the 71st Transport
Regiment, which is believed to be responsible for
transportation in the rest of the Panhandle area.
Most supplies are moved at night by truck
into base areas and other smaller storage areas
located only a few kilometers apart. The trucks
travel about eight hours a night at about 10 kilome-
ters an hour with little or no lights. The trucks
are probably loaded and fueled in the late after-
noon and unloaded, drained of fuel, and camouflaged
early the next morning to counter air attacks during
the daylight hours. Porters and other forms of
primitive transport are used when trucks are not
available or cannot be used because of poor road
conditions.
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The daily volume of goods delivered from
North Vietnam into the Panhandle has increased
markedly during the last three years, as shown in
the tabulation below. The increase was especially
high in the first quarter of 1968, an estimated
90 percent greater than during the same period
last year. Preliminary data for April indicate
that traffic may have increased again, by as much
as 40 percent above the March level.* There are
indications, however, that some of the trucks mov-
ing south in recent months have carried troops
instead of cargo.
Year
Tons Per Day
Percent Increase
Over Previous Year
1965
35
1966
75
114
1967
95
27
The above estimates are based on roadwatch
team reports of trucks counted moving south toward
Mu Gia Pass on Route 15. During 1967, for example,
an average of 17 trucks a day moved into southern
Laos over Route 15. If each truck carried an average
load of 3 tons of supplies, then more than 50 tons of
supplies would have been moved daily on this route.
During 1967 there were no roadwatch teams consistently
reporting on traffic movements on Route 137. However,
if Route 137 was used to the same percent of its capa-
city as was Route 15 -- an assumption supported by
pilot sightings of traffic on Route 137 -- then about
35 tons per day would have entered Laos over this
route. An average of 8 tons a day was believed to
have been delivered over trails around the DMZ.
* Reporting for the first time in over a year from
a team located along Route 9.72 covering about three
days in March and most of April indicates that truck
traffic on this second major access route may not
have been as high since the beginning of 7968 as
has been estimated. However, this team is located
about 3 kilometers from the road and, therefore,
may not be able to see or hear all the truck traffic
moving past it on the road, There is ample other
evidence that the total traffic into Laos has been
increasing throughout this dry season,, Furthermore,
traffic during April is normally the highest of any
month of the year, as preparations are made for the
rainy season that usually begins in May.
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III. Air Attacks on the Logistics System
A. Truck Losses
The North Vietnamese have lost an estimated
5,300 trucks in Laos since 1965. Reported truck
losses have increased dramatically since the fall
of 1967 and have continued at a high level in the
first quarter of 1968. Almost as many trucks were
lost in the first quarter of this year as in all of
1967. During 1967, 22 sorties were flown for each
truck destroyed, but since January 1968 the ratio
has been 11 to 1. Estimates of the yearly losses
in Laos are given in the tabulation below:
Year
Effective Truck Los-es
1965
45
1966
1,153
1967
2,072
1968 (Jan-
Mar) 2,039
a. To arrive at an estimate of effective
truck losses in both North Vietnam and
Laos, pilot reports are first adjusted to
eliminate double counting, Then a de-
flation factor is applied to adjust for
inaccuracies in the data and for the
North Vietnamese ability to repair and
rebuild trucks. Inaccuracies are caused
by high aircraft speeds; poor visibility
resulting from weather, smoke, and dust
after attacks; night operations, and
intense antiaircraft fire. The formula
for computing effective Losses used by
CIA and DIA is as follows: 75 percent of
those trucks reported destroyed and 25 per-
cent of those reported damaged are con-
sidered to be effective Losses and are
deducted from the inventory. For 1966,
however, the number of trucks reported
destroyed and damaged was further
deflated by a factor of 20 percent.
25X1
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Some of the increase in truck losses is due
to the high number of sorties flown at night, when
the majority of the trucks are operating; the in-
creased use of Forward Air Controllers in spotter
aircraft; and the increased use of new technical
devices to detect and attack trucks. The new
technical devices (see the Appendix) have enabled
aircraft to more effectively attack moving targets
at night.
The unusually large number of trucks reported
destroyed, however, particularly in the first quarter
of this year, may be overstated. Part of the reported
losses may be the result of changes in pilot criteria
for reporting numbers of trucks destroyed, compared
with the number damaged. In Laos during January-
September 1967, 62 percent of the trucks were re-
ported as destroyed, while 38 percent were reported
as damaged. In North Vietnam the ratio has been
about one to one. In the last quarter of 1967 and
the first quarter of 1968 the ratio in Laos has
changed to nine reported destroyed to one reported
damaged. It is not clear why the ratio should
have changed so dramatically, and it is possible
that the formula (see the footnote to the tabulation
above) for computing effective losses should be re-
vised to further deflate pilot reports of enemy
truck destruction. Many of the trucks reported
destroyed or damaged by pilots were attacked at
night, when it is extremely difficult to assess the
effectiveness of an air attack.
Data from roadwatch teams also indicate that
data on truck losses may be overstated. The team at
Mu Gia Pass, one of the entrances to the road net
in the Laotian Panhandle from North Vietnam, has
reported slightly more than 3,700 trucks moving
southbound and slightly fewer than 3,700 trucks
moving northbound between October 1967 and March
1968; yet during the same period, 3,200 trucks were
effectively lost according to pilot reports. Recent
reports from roadwatch teams on Route 912, although
incomplete, indicate that approximately the same
volume of traffic on that route is moving northward
as is moving south.
Furthermore, there has been no apparent
shortage of trucks in either North Vietnam or Laos.
Compared with reported losses of about 10,500 trucks
in the two countries from 1965 through the first
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quarter of 1968, imports of more than 13,000 trucks
during the same period have increased the North Viet-
namese truck inventory from about 9,000 trucks at
the beginning of 1965 to more than 11,000 at the
present. Each year, newer and larger trucks have
been observed in Laos by roadwatch teams and in
aerial photography. If truck losses have in fact
increased sharply, the USSR and East European Com-
munist countries could step up their supply of
vehicles because production rates are ample.
B. Supply Losses
The total loss of supplies sustained by the
Communists in Laos is now assumed to be about 20
percent of the tonnage delivered into Laos. In
1967, 8 percent of the supplies moved into the Laos
Panhandle may have been lost as a result of the
destruction of trucks, with about five trucks a day
destroyed. If half of these trucks were loaded with
three tons of supplies -- trucks delivering supplies
would probably be fully loaded, trucks returning
would probably be empty -- about 7.5 tons of supplies
were destroyed daily, compared with the 95 tons of
supplies moving into the Laos Panhandle. Daily
destruction of trucks in the first quarter of 1968
has reportedly been four times the daily rate in
1967, raising the calculated losses of supplies to
30 tons a day, or 12 percent of the 240 tons of
supplies per day estimated to have been moved into
the Laos Panhandle during the same period. In
addition to the direct loss of cargoes resulting
from destroyed trucks, the Communists also suffer
losses from air attacks on storage depots and base
areas and suffer additional losses from pilferage,
spoilage, or other normal causes. The above esti-
mates of supply losses are extremely tenuous, how-
ever, because of the limited amount of intelligence
available on losses.
C. Fixed Targets
During 1966 and 1967, pilots flying attack
sorties over Laos reported destroying or damaging
a total of about 24,000 fixed targets. More than
one-third were roads cratered or cut, one-quarter
were buildings, one-quarter were ammunition and
supply areas and miscellaneous targets, and the
remainder were weapons, bridges, and tunnels.
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Numbers of each type of fixed target reported by
pilots to be destroyed or damaged in Laos during
1966 and 1967 are given in the following tabulation:
1966 1967 Total Percent
Road craters or cuts 4,146 4,605 8,751 37
Buildings 4,731 1,758 6,489 27
Ammunition and supply areas 3,294 2,186 5,480 23
and miscellaneous
Bridges and tunnels 1,258 397 1,655 7
Weapons 536 855 1,391 6
Total 13,965 9,801 23,766 100
Attacks against fixed targets have had
little lasting effect on the logistics system.
There has been a sharp decrease in the number of
buildings, storage areas, and bridges attacked in
1967 compared with 1966, reflecting the inability
of pilots to find suitable targets under the jungle
canopy. Road cuts and craters -- about one cut or
crater daily per 150 kilometers of road in the
Panhandle during 1967 -- have not seriously impeded
traffic flows, and the roads have been quickly
restored.
D. Increased Air Attacks
An increase in attack sorties over Laos
made possible by a cessation in the bombing of
North Vietnam would increase the cost and complicate
the movement of supplies through Laos; however, it
would not likely be any more successful than previous
attacks in reducing the flow below that needed to
maintain enemy forces in South Vietnam at present
or even increased rates of combat. Bridges, buildings,
and storage areas would be more heavily attacked, but
Laos has a small and declining number of significant
fixed targets that are susceptible to detection and
attack from the air. Even if the unusually high
reported loss rate of trucks in the first quarter
of this year is accurate and is sustained, losses of
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trucks and supplies could be made up by increasing
the volume of traffic, by bringing in more trucks
from North Vietnam, and by importing additional
trucks from the USSR and Eastern Europe. Transport
routes have considerable excess capacity -- the
road network has not often been used to more than
15 percent of capacity in the past -- and even with
increased bomb damage, the network could support
increases in traffic flows caused by the need to
make good a greater loss of supplies, increased
consumption within Laos, or higher levels of combat
in South Vietnam. The rudimentary road system is
easily repaired, and the present repair force could
be quickly augmented by relocating repair crews
idled by a bombing pause in North Vietnam. Further-
more, an increase in air attacks would almost
certainly be countered by an increase in air defenses,
which would lower the accuracy of attacking aircraft.
IV. Personnel Infiltration System in Southern Laos
A. Infiltration Intelligence
Intelligence on the numbers and timing of
North Vietnamese infiltration of troops through
Laos into South Vietnam is limited but improving.
Aerial photography and air observers are of
little help in providing additional evidence of
infiltration because the trails used are covered
by the jungle canopy. Friendly guerrilla teams
occasionally report troop movements in the Laos
Panhandle but can provide few details. Consequently,
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Most of the intelligence on the infiltration
network has been derived from captured documents
and prisoner interrogations; this information is
still somewhat limited, however, because of the
compartmentation applied to all phases of the
infiltration system. For example, prisoners have
reported that way stations on the infiltration
trails are usually located about a kilometer away
from the bivouac areas used by the infiltrating
troops. Apparently, only the commanding officer,
communications personnel, and occasional supply
carriers from the infiltrating groups are permitted
to go to these base areas. The same principle is
applied in keeping base personnel at adjacent way
stations from knowing the locations of each other's
sites. Those who are assigned to guide infiltration
groups customarily meet their opposite numbers from
the next station at some intermediate point along
the trail and pass over control of the groups at
that time. Nevertheless, a good deal has been
learned about the infiltration network from captured
documents and personnel.
B. Infiltration Network
All infiltration groups transiting Laos are
supported and controlled by an effective organization
of administrative, logistic, communications, and
transport personnel. This system extends over a
complex network of trails as far south as the delta
region below Saigon, through lengthy portions of
eastern Laos and Cambodia, and extreme western
South Vietnam.
Way stations are scattered along all the
infiltration trails at intervals of about a day's
march. In much of North Vietnam these stations
are established in or around villages or hamlets,
but, as the infiltration routes approach the North
Vietnamese border and pass into Laos, sites are
selected in remote jungle areas. Way stations have
two major functions: to provide rest and replenish-
ment areas for infiltrating personnel and a base
for the individuals who control and support the
infiltrators. The stations vary in their facilities
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from mere stopping points in the jungle to major
depots equipped to provide food, shelter, and
medical care.
The infiltration network is highly efficient.
Small craft are provided at every water way which
the infiltrators cannot ford. Prisoners have re-
ported little delay or confusion at these potential
bottlenecks and have remarked on the competence
of the network personnel.
C. Level of Infiltration
Hanoi probably has committed more than a
quarter of a million men to the conflict in the
south,
known how many of these troops
transited Laos.
ave actually
Infiltration groups have ranged in size
from about 20 to 2,000 men. The small groups prob-
ably are composed of personnel whose unique training
or responsibilities justify the formation of a
special infiltration unit. The larger units appear
to be made up of regular army formations or groups
of unassigned replacement personnel. The typical
infiltration group is battalion size -- about 400
to 500 men. This figure probably represents a
practical number in moving personnel on the
infiltration trails and suggests that large groups
are subdivided into marching elements of about this
size. In the case of a regular North Vietnamese
battalion, the component companies appear to move
separately at intervals of a few kilometers between
each unit. Infiltrating battalions are normally
separated by at least a day's march.
The infiltrators are usually not accompanied
or supported by supply vehicles on the trip south.
Bicycles may, however, be employed to carry some
items of heavy equipment, such as communications
gear. Each man carries his own food, medicine,
field equipment, and weapons and is periodically
resupplied from depots along the route of march.
The infiltration groups are kept apart from the
supplies that they will eventually use in South
Vietnam.
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D. Method of Movement
The great majority of the infiltrating
personnel have proceeded on foot,
prisoner interrogations
have suggested that a substantial percentage of
the infiltration during the first quarter of 1968
has been accomplished by truck. Over the years,
however, infiltration by vehicle has been confined
to high-ranking cadre or individuals with special
skills -- such as medical or weapons technicians.
Prisoners have indicated that infiltration by truck
can be accomplished in two weeks or less; by foot,
at least six to eight weeks are required. Infiltrators
shift from a night to a day march schedule on entering
Laos from North Vietnam, probably because US air
interdiction efforts are less intense in Laos and
because of the concealment afforded by heavy jungle
growth in this region. The group normally sets out
about 0600 and will march for about six to nine
hours, depending on terrain.
Every effort is made to conceal the presence
of the unit. For example, temporary planking is used
when crossing dirt roads in order not to leave foot-
prints. Infiltration groups are careful to keep
away from main lines of communications in Laos.
Prisoners have reported hearing supply trucks on
parallel routes, but for the most part, the
infiltrators move on trails which are a safe
distance from the often-bombed supply roads.
Infiltrators face a variety of perils on the
way south. Malaria is the most frequent problem
encountered by the infiltration groups. Reports
from captured troops indicate that among some
groups as many as 100 percent of the infiltrators
contract this disease in varying intensity at some
point during the march south. Each man is supplied
with anti-malaria medication, however, and most are
able to complete the trip. Dysentery, beri-beri,
and respiratory diseases also are reported to plague
the infiltrators. Morale declines in response to
the increasing hardships as the troops move south,
particularly during the rainy season. The proportion
of personnel lost en route varies widely, captured
documents and prisoners reporting from 5 to 50 per-
cent. It is likely, however, that very few casualties
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are permanent and that after a period of recuperation
or re-indoctrination, the detained individuals join
another group and continue south.
V. Attacks on the Personnel Infiltration System
Air strikes in Laos have not had an appreciable
effect on personnel infiltration, and intensifed air
strikes are not likely to. Air harassment has prob-
ably indirectly increased the sickness and desertion
rates. Several prisoners of war have recounted
being bombed by US aircraft. Air attacks on
occasion may have made the resupply of food and
medicines to way stations in Laos difficult. How-
ever, interrogation of infiltrators who traversed
the trails during 1967 indicates that a small
number of those leaving North Vietnam became
casualties of air strikes.
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New Detection Systems In Laos
Several new detection systems recently intro-
duced in Laos have significantly increased the cost
to the enemy of moving supplies from North Vietnam
to the south. Most enemy traffic in Laos moves
by truck at night, and previously with little risk
of detection and destruction. These new devices
have enabled Allied air operations to increase the
detection and destruction of trucks and other
logistics targets at night.
1. Starlight Scope
The Starlight Scope is a device used for
night observation which passively captures and in-
tensifies ambient light emitted from the sky, ground,
and general surroundings without emitting any light
itself. It does not see through direct obstacles
to vision such as low clouds, jungle canopy, and
terrain features such as hills and trees and can
be limited in effectiveness by small differences
in contrast between target and background. The
smallest and most common model of the Starlight
Scope weighs six pounds and is about one-half meter
in length. It has a field of view of 10 degrees
and is capable of identifying a human-sized figure
at 400 meters. The Scope may be attached to a rifle
or used as a hand-held observation piece. The most
fruitful application of the Starlight Scope has
been in Forward Air Control missions in the Laos
Panhandle where it has played an important role in
the recent increase in sightings and destruction of
enemy trucks. The Scope is in use as a hand-held
observation piece by all Forward Air Controllers in
the Steel Tiger area. Starlight Scopes also have
been provided to roadwatch teams and to some armed
helicopters.
2. Night Observation Device
The Night Observation Device is used aboard
C-130 aircraft and armed helicopters. It weighs
forty pounds, is mounted on a tripod, has a range
of up to 1,000 meters on a moonless night, and
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provides better resolution and a idrger optical
gain than the Starlight Scope. The effectiveness
of the Device is enhanced on C-130 aircraft by the
presence of other equipment such as a Xenon search-
light capable of providing light in the ultraviolet
and infrared spectrums as well as the visible spec-
trum. This enables the Device, with its limited
field of view, to be trained more quickly on suspect
targets. Only small quantities of the Night Obser-
vation Device are currently available, but production
is now being accelerated. The Device is not used on
high-performance jet aircraft because its effective-
ness would be limited by the speed and altitudes of
these aircraft, the visibility limitations imposed
by canopies, the small field of view of the Device,
and the need for viewing through an eyepiece.
3. Low-Light-Level Television
The Low-Light-Level Television (LLLTV) con-
sists of a light intensifier tube similar to that
used in the Starlight Scope connected to a TV camera
tube with a standard TV display. The LLLTV has a
20-degree field of view -- double that of the
Starlight Scope. The TV screen is a more conven-
ient viewing mode than the eyepiece of the Starlight
Scope, although it has a slightly degraded image
compared with the Starlight Scope. The TV appara-
tus can be tied in with a camera and is particular-
ly useful in conjunction with fire-control equip-
ment. The LLLTV system is currently in use on
three B-57's flying missions over Laos and South
Vietnam. An LLLTV system with a longer range and
an improved image display is planned for installa-
tion on some sixteen B-57's by March 1969. An im-
proved system is also planned for installation with
a fire-control system on several UH-1 helicopters
in 1969.
4. Aerial Surveillance Device
The Aerial Surveillance Device will, when
deployed, augment a Starlight Scope or LLLTV on
helicopters; it will utilize a pulsed laser illum-
inator to provide better target contrast when a
target is viewed through a Scope or on a TV screen.
Some three or four devices are expected to be in
operation soon.
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5. Infrared Sensors
New infrared sensors permit fast detection
by aircraft of heat-emitting vehicles and camp-
fires. Earlier infrared systems did not provide
advance notice of targets being approached by high-
speed aircraft because the detection systems were
aimed directly downward and had to photograph in-
frared emissions before alerting pilots to targets.
Current systems are "forward looking" and provide
immediate target information to pilots. The system's
effectiveness is limited over heavy jungles and by
occasional incorrect target identification caused
by emissions of heat from land masses or bomb craters.
6. HARK-1
HARK-1 is a radio-counter used by indigenous,
non-English-speaking roadwatch teams in Laos to
notify Allied forces of the type and quantity of
observed enemy traffic. The observgr turns picture-
labeled knobs, pushes a button, the device relays
information to a plane flying on station, and equip-
ment on the plane relays the' information to a tele-
printer at a ground station. About 200 of these
units have been made available to roadwatch and
guerrilla teams operating in Laos and South Vietnam.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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