AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM THROUGH 31 MAY 1967

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 140
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2009
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: June 20, 1967
• Content Type: IM

Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
An Assessment of the Rolling Thunder Program
Through 31 May 1967
JCS review completed.
Top Secret
COPY No. 4
NGA ReviO%A/ ('mmnlc+crl
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
I. Physical Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-1
B. Economic Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
1. Direct Effects. . . . . . . . . . . 1-4
2. Electric Power. . . . . . . . . . . I-5
3. Petroleum Storage Facilities. . . 1-8
4. Manufacturing Facilities. . . . . . I-10
5. Transportation. . . . . . . . . . . 1-14
6. Indirect Effects. . . . . . . . . . 1-24
C. Military Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-27
1. Barracks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-28
2. Airfields . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-29
3. SAM Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-30
4. Naval Bases . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-31
5. Radar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-31
6. Communications. . . . . . . . . . . 1-32
7. Supply and Ordnance Depots. . . . . 1-32
8. Ammunition Depots . . . . . . . . . 1-33
9. Naval Craft . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-34
10. Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-34
D. Miscellaneous Targets of Armed
Reconnaissance. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-34
E. Manpower. Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . 1-35
1. Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-36
2. Diversion of Manpower . . . . . . . 1-38
II. Effectiveness of Countermeasures. . . . . . II-1
A. Civil Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . II-1
B. Air Defense Countermeasures . . . . . . 11-3
C. Decentralization of Industry. . . . . . 11-7
D. Countermeasures on Lines of
Communication (LOC's) . . . . . . . . 11-9
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Page
1. Construction and Repair Activity... 11-9
2. Manpower Involved in
Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . 11-12
3. Effectiveness of Bombing Bridges. . 11-12
E. Contingency Planning. . . . . . . . . . 11-14
F. Imports and Foreign Aid as
Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . 11-15
1. Economic Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-15
2 Military Aid. . . . . . . . . . . . 11-17
III. Rolling Thunder Operations,
January-May 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . . III-1
A. Scale of Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . III-1
B. Ordnance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111- 5
C. Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111-6
D. Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111- 9
IV. Prospects of an Effective Bombing Program . IV-1
A. The. Success to Date . . . . . . . . . . IV-1
B. Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IV-2
C. Costs to the United States. . . . . . . IV-4
Tables
1. Value of Economic and Military Damage
Attributed to the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965 Through May 1967. . . . . . . . . 1-3
2. Electric Power Facilities Attacked
in North Vietnam, 1965, 1966, and
January - 12 June 1967 following page. . . 1-40
3. Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked
Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965,
1966, and January-May 1967 following page. I-4()
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Page
4. Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the
Rolling Thunder Program, 1965, 1966, and
January-May 1967-following page. . . . . . 1-40
5. Major Railroad Yards and Railroad Shops
Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965-66, First Quarter of 1967, and April-
May 1967 following page. . . . . . . . . . 1-40
6. Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965 and 1966, First
Quarter of 1967 and April-May 1967
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-40
7. North Vietnam: Destruction and Damage of
Transport Equipment, 1965-66, First
Quarter ? 67, and April-May 1967
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-40
8. Strikes Against JCS-Targeted Bridges, 1965,
1966, and January-May 1967 following page. 1-40
9. Bomb Damage Assessment of Bridges in North
Vietnam, 1965 - May 1967 following page. . 1-40
10. Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, January-May 1967
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-40
11. Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965, 1966, and January-
May 1967 following page. . . . . . . . . . 1-40
12. Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling
Thunder Program, 1965, 1966, and January
May 1967 following page. . . . . . . . . . I-40
13. Cost of Damage to JCS-Targeted Radar Sites
Inflicted Under the Rolling Thunder
Program, 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-40
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Page
14. North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of
Imports, 1965, 1966, and January-March
1967 following pie. . . . . . . . . . . . 11-20
15. North Vietnam: Imports from the USSR,
1965, 1966, and January-March 1967
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-20
16. Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam,
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-20
17. Chinese Communist Military Aid to North
Vietnam, 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-20
18. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Mission
and Nationality, 1965 and 1966
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III-10
19. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Mission,
January-May 1967 following page. . . . . . III-10
20. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program
and by Service, 1965, 1966, and January-
May 1967 following pace. . . . . . . . . . III-10
21. Distribution of Attack Sorties Over North
Vietnam, by Route Package, January 1966 -
May 1967 following p ge. . . . . . . . . . III-10
22. Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam,
by Month and by Program, March-December
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
following page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III-10
23. Attacks on JCS Fixed Targets in North
Vietnam, 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
following page . . . . III-10
24. Aircraft and Personnel Losses in A.t-a_cks on
North Vietnam, by Service, 1965, 1966, and
January-May 1967 following page. . . . . . III-10
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Illustrations
Page
Figure 1. Value of Economic Damage to North
Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966,
and January-May 1967 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage in North
Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966,
and January-May 1967 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . vii
Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast
Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1965, 1966, and First Five
Months 1967 (chart) following page . vii
Figure 4. Index of Ordnance Delivered in
Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts
in Each Area, 1966 and First Five
Months 1967 (chart) following page . vii
Figure 5. The Laos Panhandle (map)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12
Figure 6. By-passes for the Destroyed Phuong
Dinh Railroad and Highway Bridge
(photograph) following page. . . . . 11-14
Figure 7. Effectiveness of Bombing JCS
Targeted Bridges in North Vietnam -
February 1965 - January 1967 (chart)
following page . . . . . . . . . . . 11-14
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Summary
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE ROILING THUNDER PROGRAM
THROTTGH 31 MAY 1967
S uiiuria
The Rolling Thunder program has made some progress
in meeting its current twofold objective:
1.
To limit, or raise the cost of, the move-
ment of men and supplies to
South
Vietnam.
2.
To make North Vietnam pay a
its aggression against the
price
South.
for
The recent expansion of the bombing program has
had some positive effects relative to these objectives,
particularly in the modern sector of the North Viet-
namese economy. Increased disruptions.to orderly
economic activity and sustained pressures on North
Vietnam's limited human and material resources are
evident. The damage to economic and military target
systems has not been sufficient, however, to cause a
meaningful degradation of North Vietnam's ability to
.support the war, at least at current levels of combat.
There are no signs that the determination of the re-
gime to persist in its aggression has abated. Despite
increasing hardships, popular morale has not eroded
to the point where widespread apathy and war weariness
are threatening the control of the Hanoi regime.
The bombing program has forced North Vietnam to
divert from 575,000 to 700,000 individuals, about
equally divided between full-time and part-time
workers and troops, to air defense activities and
to repair, reconstruction, and dispersal programs.
The cost of physical and military damage has been
growing. Total damage resulting from air attacks
through May 1967 is estimated at nearly $266 million.
Nearly 70 percent of this damage was inflicted on
economic target systems (see Figures 1 and 2, follow-
ing p. vii).'
This report was produced solely by CIA. It was pre-
pared by the Office of Research and Reports and coor-
dinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and
the Special Assistance for Vietnamese Affairs. The
estimate and conclusions represent the best judgment
of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 17 June 1967.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Despite the increasing costs and burdens result-
ing from the air attacks, North Vietnam, aided by an
increased flow of imports from the USSR and Communist
China, has managed to maintain, and in many respects
to improve, its organized support of the war. The
electric power industry has been the most heavily
damaged sector of the economy, and its neutralization
may paralyze almost all of the modern industrial
sector. However, the modern sector makes only a mar-
ginal contribution to the war effort since virtually
all war-supporting materiel is imported. Other im-
portant targets which have been subjected to heavy
attack -- particularly transportation and petroleum
storage facilities -- have successfully employed
countermeasures so that their overall performance
and support capabilities remain as high as, if not
higher than, they were when the bombing programs
started.
The attacks on military target systems through
May 1967 had not significantly reduced the capabili-
ties of the military establishment. These capabili-
ties have, in fact, been greatly expanded through
large infusions of military aid from the USSR and
Communist China.
The ability of North Vietnam to withstand the
pressures of air attacks is explained by several
factors. The economy is essentially agrarian and
provides little direct input, other than manpower,
into the war in the South. The increasing flow
of essential economic and military aid into North
Vietnam far surpasses the total damage resulting
from air attacks. This aid provides North Vietnam
the necessary materials to continue the war. It
also implies that the USSR and Communist China will
underwrite the damage sustained and the eventual re-
construction of the country, as they did in the case
of North Korea. Finally, the North Vietnamese have
devised and employed an elaborate and highly suc-
cessful system of countermeasures -- dispersal of
industry, mobilization of labor units, evacuation
of population, and the like -- which negates most
of the desired impact of air attack on the vital
flow of men and supplies to the war in the South.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
During January-May 1967 the number of sorties
flown against North Vietnam was at a rate about
22 percent higher than during 1966 (see figures 3
and 4 following p.vii). Over 2,500 sorties were
flown against fixed JCS targets compared with 2,620
sorties during all of 1966. The armed reconnais-
sance program changed dramatically. Almost one-
half of all armed reconnaissance sorties were flown
against non-JCS fixed targets compared with about
25 percent throughout 1966. Despite the extension
of the Rolling Thunder program to more densely pop-
ulated and heavily defended areas, the overall air-
craft loss rate during 1967 declined, with the ex-
ception of losses during strikes against targets in
the immediate urban areas of Hanoi and Haiphong.
The recent concentration of attacks agait.-.
lucrative fixed targets in the northern parts or
North Vietnam has resulted in an improved trend in
the costs of inflicting damage on North Vietnam.
There is little prospect for improved cost effec-
tiveness in the future, however, because the number
of significant undamaged targets is decreasing
rapidly.
The results to be expected trom a further ex-
pansion of the bombing program, with the possible
exception of a mining program, are limited, ruling
out attacks on dikes or population centers. Ex-
perience indicates that the remaining land trans-
portation targets will be extremely difficult and
costly to interdict. The few lucrative economic
targets remaining do not make a significant con-
tribution to the war effort, and their loss can
be compensated by additional foreign aid. The neu-
tralization of the remaining military targets, such
as airfields, SAM sites, and radars, would reduce
losses to US aircraft but would have virtually no
effect on the ability of Hanoi to support the war
in the South.
In summary, no bombing program alone is likely
to create sufficient pressures or problems to pre-
vent Hanoi from sustaining the flow of essential
military materials and continuing its support of
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
the war in the South. While the mining of Haiphong
and other ports would impose greater hardships on
North Vietnam and raise further the cost of sus-
taining the insurgency than would other alternatives,
such action, by itself, would probably not have a deci-
sive impact on North Vietnam's determination to pursue
the war.
Virtually all of the remaining economic targets
are concentrated in densely populated and heavily
defended areas of North Vietnam. Their neutraliza-
tion could be very costly to US air forces. The re-
cent attacks on targets in the immediate Hanoi-
Haiphong areas indicate, for example, that the com-
bat loss rate for US aircraft could be as much as
10 times greater than that experienced in the air
campaigns over other areas of North Vietnam.
Continued harassment and attacks on the road,
rail, and trail network in the southern portion of
North Vietnam and in Laos will not prevent or stop
infiltration but will make it more costly and will
force North Vietnam to pay a continuing price on its
own territory for its continued support of the war
in the South.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
ECONOMIC DAMAGE
1965
36.2
1966
93.3
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture,
Fishing
& Exports)
9.4
POWER-
PLANTS
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture, F i shi ng
& Exports)
36.9
POWER-
PLANTS
6.3
EQUIPMENT
5.9
-PETROLEUM 1.6
MARITIME PORTS 0.7
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
29.8
PETROLEUM
5.6
-RAILROAD YARDS 1.2
"MARITIME PORTS 0.8
1967
Jan- May
53.4
BRIDGES\
- 3.1
INDIRECT RA
LOSSES
(Agriculture
Fishing
\ & Exports) MANUFACTURING
9.4 FACILITIES
Figure 1 . Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965, 1966,
and January - May 1967
POWER-
PLANTS
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
MILITARY DAMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
1965
32.5
1966
19.1
1967
Jan-May
31.0
AIRCRAFT
8.0
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam by Sector 1965, 1966,
and January - May 1967
NAVAL, - -AMMO DEPOTS 0.2
CRAFT -SUPPLY DEPOTS 1.0
V
COMMO SITES 1.0
c-SUPPLY DEPOTS 1.6
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
SORTIES FLOWN
1965100*
SOUTH VIETNAM
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
1965 1966 1967
F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M
Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1965, 1966, and First Five Months 1967
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Figure 4. Index of Ordnance Delivered in Southeast Asia and Relative Amounts in
Each Area, 1966 and First Five Months 1967
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Physical Effects
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
I. Physical Effects
A. General
The extension of the Rolling Thunder program
during 1967 to include attacks against major indus-
trial facilities in former sanctuary areas and against
important military targets such as airfields has given
new dimensions to the nature of US air operations. How-
ever, the program remains preponderantly an interdic-
tion campaign against lines of communication and logistic
targets of opportunity in the southern part of the coun-
try.
The changed scope of the bombing program has
been sufficient to erode significantly North Vietnam's
limited industrial base. A large number of military
facilities and equipment also have been hit heavily.
The increased damage inflicted on North Vietnam un-
doubtedly will have unfavorable repercussions, par-
ticularly in the modern industrial sector of the econ-
omy. Many of the achievements of a decade of indus-
tial growth have been neutralized, if not lost.
Programs for orderly economic development have been
forgone. The allocation of limited human and ma-
terial resources has been a particularly disruptive
problem.
The cumulative measurable damage to eco-
nomic and military target systems through May 1967
is estimated at nearly $266 million.* Nearly 70
percent of the cumulative damage has been inflicted
on economic targets. A comparison of total measur-
able damage to economic and military target systems
for 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967 is as follows:
'These estimates are based on bomb damage as-
sessments using post-strike photography available
to this Agency as of 12 June 1967. This photographic
coverage, with minor exceptions, includes all major
targets as of the end of May 1967.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Million US$
Type of Target 1965 1966 Jan-Mar Apr-May
1967 1967
Economic 36.2 93.3 28.0 25.4
Military 32.5 19.1 11.9 19.1
Total 68.7 112.4 39.9 44.5
The cost of damage to both economic and mil-
itary target systems has increased as the US air
campaign has been directed against the more lucra-
tive targets in the Hanoi-Haiphong area of North
Vietnam. Economic damage in the first five months
of 1967 has been at an average monthly rate of
$10.7 million, compared with rates of $3.6 million
during 1965 and $8.5 million during 1966. Mili-
tary targets have sustained damage at an average
monthly rate of $6.2 million during January-May
1967, compared with rates of $3.3 million during
1965 and $1.7 million during 1966. The estimated
value of damage to the economic and military fa-
cilities and equipment attacked under the Rolling
Thunder program through May 1967 is given in
Table 1, following page 2.
Despite the rising costs inflicted by the
Rolling Thunder program, the damage to North Viet-
nam has apparently been within acceptable limits,
and the regime has continued its hard-nosed stand
on negotiations. No vital part of Hanoi's mili-
tary establishment has been neutralized nor has
its war-supporting capability been significantly
reduced. With the exception of electric power
generation, the North Vietnamese have been able
to devise and execute adequate countermeasures
to keep most essential economic war-supporting
activity going. The loss of electric power fa-
cilities is having unfavorable repercussions
throughout most of the modern industrial sector.
But modern industry does not play a vital part
in sustaining North Vietnam's ability to continue
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Value of Economic and Military Damage Attributed
to the Rolling Thunder Program
1965 Through May 1967
Million
US 8
Direct Losses a/
127.2
Transportation
equipment
47.1
Railroad/highway
bridges
25.4
Electric powerplants
23.4
Manufacturing
facilities
15.9
Petroleum
7.4 c/
Railroad
shops
yards and
5.2
Maritime
ports
1.4
Miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance
Exports
21.9
Agriculture
25.5
Fishing
8.3
Total, direct and
indirect losses
182.9
Million
US $
Direct Losses
82.6
Aircraft b/
28.4
Barracks
23.1
Supply depots
5.6
Ammunition depots
5.2
SAM sites
3.9
Naval craft /
3.8
Radar sites
2.6
Naval bases
1.6
Airfields
0.6
Communications sites
Miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance
7.6
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the total shown.
b. Until recently, assessments of the value of aircraft and naval
craft damaged or destroyed by air attack were calculated on the basis
of US production costs for comparable equipment. The assessment in
this report is made on the basis of Soviet foreign trade prices
(prices charged for similar equipment sold to less developed
countries) as those most closely approximating the true value of
this equipment.
c. Midpoint of the range at $7.1 million to $7.8 million.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
the war. The USSR and Communist China are under-
writing most of the costs of the war by providing
the military and economic aid necessary for the
defense of North Vietnam and its aggression in
the South. The North Vietnamese regime shows no
apparent weakening in either its determination or
its ability to continue with the war. Although
reports of food shortages, distribution problems,
and increasing hardships being borne by the people
are received more frequently, popular morale is
judged not to have eroded significantly.
B. Economic Damage
1. Direct Effects
The cost of direct damage inflicted on
economic target systems in North Vietnam through
May 1967 is estimated at over $127 million. More
than one-third of this damage -- $43.9 million --
occurred in the first five months of 1967, as shown
in the following tabulation:
Million US $
Jan-Mar Apr-May
1965 1966 1967 1967
Damage to economic
facilities and
equipment 26.8 56.5 22.9 21.0
The emphasis on the Rolling Thunder pro-
gram as an interdiction campaign is reflected in
the losses sustained by the several economic target
systems. More than one-third -- $47.1 million --
of the estimated direct damage is accounted for by
the destruction or damage of transport equipment.
Destruction or damage of railroad and highway bridges
amounts to $25.4 million. In terms of value, the
greatest amount of damage to industrial target sys-
tems was inflicted upon the electric power industry,
which lost about 80 percent of its power-generating
capacity at an estimated cost of $23.4 million.
The recent emphasis in attacks on modern industrial
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
facilities such as the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Complex and the Haiphong cement plant is reflected
in the estimates of damage to manufacturing facili-
ties. Direct damage to manufacturing facilities
is estimated at almost $15.9 million. About 90
percent of this damage was inflicted during the
first five months of 1967.
The most heavily damaged target system
in terms of loss of capacity has been the petroleum
storage system which has lost about 86 percent
of the major bulk storage facilities existing
prior to the Rolling Thunder. This loss amounted
to an estimated $7.4 million. The disruptive ef-
fects of the loss of storage facilities have been
offset by an elaborate system of dispersed storage
and distribution of petroleum stocks.
None of the remaining economic target
systems has sustained direct bomb damage to any
significant extent. The physical effects of the
direct bomb damage to each of the major economic
target systems are discussed in the following
sections.
2. Electric Power
As of 12 June 1967, airstrikes against
electric power facilities in North Vietnam had put
out of operation some 150,000 kilowatts (kw) of
power-generating capacity, or about 80 percent of
the national total (see Table 2, following P.40).
This is a provisional assessment, however, as the
status of several powerplants is uncertain. Capac-
ity out of operation during May temporarily reached
about 165,000 kw, but rapid restoration of the
Hanoi powerplant to partial operation and probable
partial operation of the Uong Bi powerplant may have
reduced this figure to 125,000 to 140,000 kw by the
end of May 1967. Subsequent strikes against Uong
Bi appear to have again put that plant ut of opera-
tion, at least temporarily. The cost of restoring
damaged power facilities is estimated at $23.4 million.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Overall damage to the Hanoi powerplant
as a result of strikes on 19 and 21 May was moderate.
Two of the boilers were severely damaged and two
additional boilers may have been slightly damaged.
The remainder of the plant, including the turbine
hall and at least three boilers, apparently was un-
25X1 damaged.
the plant was back in partial operation within
five days of the last strike, and it is believed
that some 10,000 kw (of the 32,500 kw installed)
were serviceable at that time. The plant probably
will be capable of operating at one-half of capac-
ity within one month. Results of the 10 June
strike are not known. Additional power reportedly
was being supplied to the city by five undergound
diesel generating stations. The capacity of these
emergency sources of power is estimated to be around
5,000 kw. At least 25 to 30 percent of Hanoi's normal
power requirement can be supplied by the 15,000
kw of capacity currently estimated to be available.
All powerplants in the main power net-
work, which is centered on Hanoi. and Haiphong, have
now been struck, and most of the damage has resulted
from attacks during 1967. Damage to central generat-
ing facilities has reduced serviceable capacity of
the main network from 136,000 kw to between 10,000
and 15,000 kw in Hanoi, or roughly 7 to 11 percent
of the pre-strike capacity of the network. In
addition to damaging the Hanoi powerplant, air-
strikes during January-June 1967 inflicted severe
damage on powerplants at Hon Gai (with an original
capacity of 15,000 kw), Thai Nguyen (24,000 kw),
Viet Tri (16,000 kw), Haiphong West (10,000 kw),
Haiphong East (7,000 kw), and Uong Bi (24,000 kw).
Uong Bi, which apparently was restored to service
in May, may again be out of operation. The time
required to restore the other plants to partial
operation will be a minimum of four months from
the end of May, with the exception of the Haiphong
East plant which will require at least one year.
Complete restoration in every instance will take
one year or more.
Damage inflicted by strikes on the Dong
Anh transmission substation, the most important
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
in the Hanoi-Haiphong network, will prevent opera-
tion of the installation for another two to three
months. The results of a 22 May strike on the
substation are not yet known. A powerplant at
Bac Giang (12,000 kw), which is outside the main
power network, was put out of operation for a mini-
mum of three months. Results of a 12 June strike
against the Thanh Hao plant (5,000 kw), another
plant outside of the network, are not available.
Loss of the central generating plants
has eliminated the source of supplementary power
formerly received by Hanoi and Haiphong from the
main transmission network. Hanoi now is dependent
on one partially serviceable, local powerplant and
a number of diesel generating units. Haiphong is
without a central power supply and must rely on
whatever mobile or stationary diesel-generating
equipment is available. It is possible that a
small amount of power can be transmitted from
Hanoi to Haiphong via existing transmission lines.
The loss of powerplants undoubtedly
has created a severe shortage of electric power
and has disrupted activities that normally de-
pend on a reliable central supply of steam and
power. Many industrial processes have been frag-
mented or in some cases completely shut down.
Although there are conflicting reports on the
gravity of shortages, it seems probable that a
system of power rationing was inaugurated in
Hanoi during May and that even some diplomatic
embassies, previously allocated high-priority
service, receive power only part of the time.
Because diesel-generating equipment is
available to partly offset losses, minimal power
supplies for high-priority consumers will continue
indefinitely. Every significant town or city,
and particularly the cities of Hanoi and Haiphong,
will be able to maintain a limited power supply,
which in some cases may range from 10 to 15 per-
cent of normal requirements.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
The persistence of North Vietnamese ef-
forts to restore damaged power facilities under-
lines the importance of central generating plants
and indicates that imported diesel-driven units
have not adequately compensated for loss of the
central plants. Progress in reconstructing power
facilities that were damaged during 1965-66 had
reached a stage in May where five powerplants --
Ban Thach, Nam Dinh, Ben Thuy, Thanh Hoa, Uong
Bi -- appeared either partly serviceable or al-
most ready for partial operation. The Thanh Hoa
and Uong Bi plants were restruck in June. There
has been no known attempt to repair recent damage
at Hon Gai, Bac Giang, Thai Nguyen, Viet Tri,
or the two plants in Haiphong. Photography sug-
gests that two transformers in the on-site sub-
station of the Thai Nguyen steel plant have been
removed. If so, it seems likely that damage to
the steel plant and to the Thai Nguyen powerplant
several miles away has been severe enough to pre-
clude indefinitely the need for a bulk power sup-
ply.
3. Petroleum Storage Facilities
On 1 January 1965, North Vietnam had
a combined petroleum storage capacity of about
128,000 tons* at 13 fixed facilities that were
JCS-targeted. By the end of 1966 about 85 per-
cent of this capacity was destroyed (see Table
3, following P. 40). There were ten airstrikes
against JCS-targeted facilities during the first
five months of 1967. The only identified damage
was inflicted on Do.Son, where all of the residual
capacity was destroyed -- an additional one percent
of the original capacity. Damage to the Haiphong
terminal as a result of attacks in 1967 was re-
stricted to rail facilities and buildings in the
terminal. No damage to tankage was observed.
At the end of May 1967, therefore, a combined
* Unless otherwise indicated, tonnages are given
in metric tons.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
capacity of only about 18,000 tons, or 14 percent
of the original capacity, remained at seven JCS-tar-
geted facilities.
The total value of the tankage, con-
tents, and related facilities destroyed at JCS-
targeted sites is estimated at about $6.7 million
to $7.4 million. In addition, an estimated 5,000
tons of storage capacity -- including contents --
at dispersed tank sites were destroyed during 1966
with a value of about $0.4 million. Although the
inventory of 55-gallon drums also has been attacked
since 1965, no adequate assessment of the damage
inflicted can be made. Thus the measurable dam-
age to all petroleum facilities and contents through
May 1967 is estimated at about $7.1 million to $7.8
million.
Airstrikes against JCS-targeted pe-
troleum facilities undoubtedly have been effective
when measured in terms of the storage capacity and
petroleum destroyed. Although the cost and dif-
ficulty of importing and distributing petroleum
have been increased, the bombing has not effectively
reduced North Vietnams capability to maintain
petroleum supplies. This capability stems princi-
pally from the development of dispersed bulk oil
storage capacity before extensive attacks against
JCS-targeted facilities began.
By the end of May 1967, there probably
were more than 100 dispersed petroleum storage
tank sites in North Vietnam with a total estimated
capacity of between 30,000 and 40,000 tons, The
accumulation of 55 gallon drums also has given
North Vietnam increased flexibility in petroleum
storage and distribution. The storage capacity
represented by the drum inventory at the end of
May 1967 probably was between 35,000 and 40,000
tons. In addition, there is an indeterminate
amount of "floating storage capacity" represented
by oil barges, rail tank cars, 'tank trucks, and
a newly assigned small tanker for use in North
Vietnamese waters. Delivery procedures for pe-
troleum imports from the USSR have been modified
to provide greater flexibility in the utilization
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
of available petroleum storage capacity in North
Vietnam. Imports are now obtained from sources
of supply in the Soviet Far East -- only 5 days'
sailing from North Vietnam -- as well as from the
Black Sea -- almost 30 days' sailing.* For the
most part, small tankers, with a carrying capacity
of about 4,000 tons, are used for transport from
the Far East. The relative invulnerability of the
dispersed tank sites and drums makes it improbable
that bombing will adversely affect the North Viet-
namese capability to import and distribute petroleum.
There is no evidence that the bombing
of petroleum targets has seriously weakened the
economy, produced significant shortages of petroleum,
or diminished North Vietnam's capability to support
military activities or the infiltration of men and
supplies into Laos and South Vietnam.
4. Manufacturing Facilities
The small manufacturing sector of North
Vietnam has suffered important setbacks as a result
of US airstrikes during the first five months of
1967. North Vietnam's industry not only is now
faced by a general electric power shortage, but
also the Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex and
the Haiphong Cement Plant -- North Vietnam's largest
industrial facilities -- have been seriously dam-
aged by bombing. The value of bomb damage, in terms
of costs of repairs, to North Vietnamese manufactur-
ing facilities through May 1967 is estimated to total
$15.9 million (see Table 4, following P.40), of which
$10.0 million is accounted for by damage to the steel
plant and $3.0 million by damage to the cement plant,
both in 1967, as shown in the following tabulation:
In this report no attempt has been made to measure
the impact of the closing of the Suez Canal on
shipments to North Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0 25X1
Million US $
1965
1966
1967
Total
Jan-Mar Apr-May
Thai Nguyen Iron and
Steel Complex
9.5
.5
10.0
Haiphong Cement Plant
3.0
3.0
Nam Dinh Textile Mill
Cam Pha Coal Treatment
0.8
0.2
0.4
1.4
0
1
Plant
0.1
.
Viet Tri Paper Mill
0.1
0.1
Lang Chi Explosives Plant 0.4
0.4
Bac Giang Chemical
Fertilizer Plant
0.2
0.1
0.3
Hon Gai.Cal.cium Carbide
2
0
Plant
0.1
0.1
.
Haiphong Enamelware Plant
0.4
0.4
Total
1.2
0.4
10.2
4.1
15.9
The costs of the bombing to the manufac-
turing sector in terms of lost production and loss
of foreign exchange earnings probably will amount
to tens of millions of dollars annually. For
example, most of North Vietnam's major chemical
facilities have probably been forced to curtail op-
erations because of the damage to electric power-
plants. The more intensive use of capital equip-
ment in manufacturing and the inclusion of addi-
tional women in the labor force have mitigated
some of the losses to production. Nevertheless,
apparently the best that North Vietnam could claim
for the chemical and coal industries -- even in
1966 -- was that they "continued operating" and
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
for light industry that it "increased production
of necessities and turned out new varieties of
goods."
The effect of the airstrikes on North
Vietnam's two major manufacturing plants has been
severe. The Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex
has been engaged in two basic activities during
the past year or more: (1) the production of pig
iron for domestic use and for export, mainly to
Japan; and (2) the fabrication, from imported
steel, of barges, small watercraft, pontoons, pe-
troleum storage tanks, and construction materials.
Most of these fabricated products have been in-
puts to North Vietnam's transportation and logistics
system. As a result of 15 airstrikes and the loss
of electric power, the complex is believed not to
be producing any pig iron and the fabrication ac-
tivities have been seriously disrupted. Many months
will be required to restore pig iron production
and possibly the fabrication activities at the com-
plex. It is quiet possible that pig iron produc-
tion has been or will be abandoned until the cessa-
tion of air attacks on North Vietnam.
The Haiphong Cement Plant is inopera-
tive both because of damage to the plant in air-
strikes during the period 20 April - 27 May 1967
and because of the loss of electric power from the
damaged Haiphong Thermal Powerplant west. Partial
operation of the cement plant at about 40 percent
of its capacity of 700,000 tons a year could prob-
ably be achieved in six months, coinciding with com-
pletion of repairs of the present damage to the
powerplant. It is highly unlikely, however, that
the North Vietnamese would restore either partial
or full operation of the cement plant at the risk
of a repetition of bombing. The loss of cement
output will deprive North Vietnam of one of its
few means of earning foreign exchange.
or Vietnam could not supply 10,000 tons
of cement requested by Cambodia, and domestic
shortages in Hanoi suggest that the inventory of
cement is probably now exhausted. North Vietnam
will be forced to import cement for bomb damage
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
repair and military construction, probably from Com-
munist China.
It is not possible to quantify the effect
on production at most of the other manufacturing
facilities. No effort has been made to repair the
Nam Dinh textile mill, which accounted for half of
North Vietnam's weaving capacity in 1965. Much of
the equipment from this mill was dispersed, however,
after the first inadvertent strike in July 1965.
The Cam Pha coal-treatment plant has been inadvert-
ently struck at least three times. Although damage
to this plant apparently has been minor, this damage,
in combination with a shortage of power normally sup-
plied from Hon Gai, apparently was the reason for
a sharp drop in coal exports during April and May.
The Viet Tri Paper Mill, the largest producer of
paper in North Vietnam, was inadvertently struck
in July 1966, and the damage was repaired by the
end of 1966. Production may again have been dis-
rupted by the damage to the Viet Tri powerplant
in March 1967. The Lang Chi explosives plant re-
mains inoperable from the heavy damage inflicted
by airstrikes in July and August 1965. The Bac
Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant, a new large am-
monium nitrate facility, probably had not even
even become operational when it was struck in Feb-
ruary 1967. It is probable that its first year
of operations would in any case have been so troubled
with initial technical difficulties that it would
not have approached its estimated capacity of 100,-
000 tons. The Haiphong Enamelware Factory, a fairly
large producer of household utensils, was seriously
damaged inadvertently in April 1967 and may not be
put back into operation while airstrikes continue.
Other, minor plants have been damaged but they may
already have been at least partly evacuated.
The damage already inflicted to North
Vietnamese industry by the bombing undoubtedly has
crushed North Vietnam's once promising hopes for
a high rate of economic growth and has added to
the heavy burden on economic management. Still,
North Vietnam has always been a predominantly agri-
cultural nation with an important local industry
and handicraft sector providing for a large degree
of self-sufficiency. Moreover, industry has
played only a small role in support of the military
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
effort, with a great part of military and military-
associated materiel being imported from North Vietnam's
Communist allies. Thus the destruction of the re-
mainder of North Vietnam's major industrial facili-
ties -- mainly the large chemical, fertilizer, and
engineering plants and the undamaged part of the ce-
ment plant -- would not add significantly to the
problem of the civil population or detract signifi-
cantly from the military effort. Added imports
would be required, but not at a level beyond North
Vietnam's present import and distribution capability.
5. Transportation
Airstrikes against the transport system
of North Vietnam during the past two years have not
significantly affected North Vietnam's transport
capability or its ability to move supplies in sup-
port of the economy or the war effort. There have
been no indications of serious supply shortages or
bottlenecks. Interdictions have been effectively
repaired, and the use of rail ferries, pontoon
bridges, bypasses, and shuttling facilities has
been effective in reducing time lost due to damage
caused by airstrikes.
The capacity of nearly all major trans-
port routes continues to be greater than the volume
of traffic to be moved on the routes -- thus traf-
fic delayed due to bombing is moved after repairs
are made. Total ton-kilometer performance declined
slightly during 1963-66, but the total amount of
tons carried has increased from year to year as
shown in the following tabulation:
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Railroad
Million Ton-Kilometers
1964 1965 1966
Highway 164 179 200 200
Inland waterway 448 490 540 590
Coastal waterway 142 156 170 190
Total 1,601 1,752 1,700a 1,600
Million Tons Carried
1963
1964
1965
1966
Railroad
3.86
4.13
3.7
3.3
Highway
6.71
7.18
7.9
7.9
Inland waterway
6.56
7.01
7.7
8.5
Coastal waterway
0.35
0.37
0.4
0.5
Total
17.48
18.69
19.7
20.2
a. Total does not add because of rounding.
Performance on the rail lines has decreased from
the high in 1964, when tons carried were 4.13 mil-
lion and ton-kilometers equaled 927 million. In
1966, it is estimated that 3.3 million tons were
carried and that ton-kilometers reached 620 million.
The decline in rail performance is attributable for
the most part to the loss of apatite exports nor-
mally carried by rail to Haiphong. and to the ending
of Chinese rail transit traffic through North Vietnam.
Performance on highways has increased
slightly, and waterway and coastal transport have
shown the largest increases. The increased use of
these modes of transport reflects North Vietnam's
increasing.,reliance on means of transport which
are less vulnerable to air attack.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The data on performance make it clear
that the transport network is still providing ade-
quate service to meet the country's economic and
military needs.
a. Railroads
The Rolling Thunder program has had
some adverse effects on the railroad system of
North Vietnam, but the network generally is still
capable of fulfilling the country's requirements.
The destruction of the rail bridge at Viet Tri in
the summer of 1966, the most significant result
of the program against lines of communication dur-
ing the year, reduced the capacity of the Hanoi-
Lao Cai line from 3,000 to 700 tons each way per
day. In addition, attacks against the rail ferry
during May have probably reduced the capacity be-
low 700 tons per day. The line south of Hanoi,
which accounted for less than 5 percent of the
total rail performance in North Vietnam prior to
the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program,
has been repeatedly attacked. Capacity has been
reduced from 1,800 to 500 tons each way per day,
but this capacity can seldom be used for through
service because the line and rail yards are fre-
quently interdicted. Infrequent attacks against
the Hanoi-Thai Nguyen and Kep-Thai Nguyen lines
have disrupted through traffic for only a day or
two at a time. However, attacks against the Thai
Nguyen rail yard in the first quarter of 1967
have created more severe problems for the move-
ment of traffic on the Kep-Thai Nguyen and Hanoi-
Thai Nguyen lines.
During April 1967 the Hanoi Rail-
road/Highway Bridge over the Canal des Rapides was
struck, destroying two spans. This interdiction
cut Hanoi's connection with the Lao Cai and Dong
Dang lines, and pilot reports of large concentra-
tions of rolling stock in yards on the Dong Dang
and Thai Nguyen lines after the interdiction in-
dicated that it probably effectively limited op-
erations. Photography however, revealed
that a bypass at the site had been completed, re-
storing Hanoi's connection to the North.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The important line between Hanoi
and Haiphong, on which most of North Vietnam's import
and export materials enter and leave the country,
has been open for through traffic most of the time
during the Rolling Thunder program. The Hanoi-Dong
Dang line, the other major import and export rail
line in North Vietnam, has been only intermittently
attacked during much of the Rolling Thunder program.
During the last two weeks of April 1967 and all of
May, however, the level of airstrikes against the
line increased. The key rail yards at Vu Chua, Kep,
Bac Giang, and Cao Nung were attacked, as were the
bridges at Bac Giang and Dap Cau, probably disrupt-
ing traffic. The interdicted bridge at the Canal
des Rapides cut the lines' connection to Hanoi
for about three weeks.
Despite two years of bombing,
there have been no significant adverse effects
on the North Vietnamese rail system as a whole.
Indeed the system has been extended and improved.
The network is still able to move adequate supplies
to meet the country's requirements, although hindered
at times by interdictions, shuttling, and damaged
yard facilities. In terms of total capacity on all
lines, the system has improved slightly during the
past year, as the Kep-Thai Nguyen line has been com-
pleted and dual-gauging is in progress on the
lines between Hanoi and Dong Dang and Thai Nguyen.
.b. Highways
Airstrikes against the highway
system of North Vietnam have had no sustained ef-
fects on motor truck operations. The road system
serves primarily as a short-haul feeder service for
the railroads and connects areas not served by
other transport facilities. The majority of the
airstrikes have been concentrated in the region
south of Thanh Hoa, with Routes 1A, 15, and 7
receiving the heaviest damage. Although traffic
has been interrupted and slowed by frequent inter-
dictions and the need for shuttling operations,
North Vietnamese repair efforts have been effec-
tive and sufficient to maintain traffic at re-
quired levels. Route 15, near the Mu Gia Pass,
however, has been repeatedly attacked and seeded
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
with delayed action bombs, and maintenance of
traffic on this route has probably been difficult.
During May, several motor ve-
hicle repair shops were attacked, including Kinh
No, which represents 10 percent of North Vietnam's
motor vehicle maintenance and repair capacity
and is that country's only known armored vehicle
repair shop. Strikes against the facilities at
Kinh No, Cam Pha, Bac Mai, Van Dien, and the Ha
Don.g Army Barracks probably disrupted motor trans-
port repairs seriously, and will force the North
Vietnamese to rely more on the less efficient local
shops of which they claim to have many.
Average truck traffic, as re-
ported by ground observers, has increased signifi-
cantly during the first five months of 1967, com-
pared with that in past years. It is estimated
that the tonnage delivered daily by truck into
Laos during the current dry season is considerably
higher than that delivered during the 1964-65
and 1965-66 dry seasons.
c. Waterways
Attacks against the waterway
system in North Vietnam have not appreciably af-
fected operations on the inland waterways or along
the coast. While important transshipment areas
such as Quang Khe, Dong Hoi, and Vinh have been
repeatedly attacked, in many instances causing
supplies to be off-loaded "over-the-beach," the
system remains very flexible and capable of meet-
ing the country's requirements because of the
ability of the North Vietnamese to restore, im-
provise, or relocate their transfer operations.
Total sightings of watercraft
by pilots and naval observers have remained at
fairly constant levels -- with some minor fluctua-
tions -- throughout the bombing, but during May
reported sightings and losses increased to record
levels. This increase is probably due to the in-
creased number of sorties flown, rather than to
a large increase in watercraft activity.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The mining of the Kien Giang,
Song Giang, Cua Sot, Song Ca, and Song Ma rivers,
all key waterways in the southern portion of the
country, has probably impaired operations of
larger watercraft in these areas,, but-h.as not af-
fected activity by small craft. There are re-
ports that two large barges were sunk by mines,
but photography of the Song Ca shows small craft
sailing directly through mined areas. These are
probably small wooden sail boats of the type usually
sighted in these areas which do not produce the
proper stimuli to detonate the mines. The appar-
ent ineffectiveness of the mines and effective
North Vietnamese countermeasures have allowed op-
erations to continue at fairly normal levels.
d. Railroad Yards arid Shops
Eight comparatively important
railroads yards have been attacked- since the begin-
ning of the Rolling Thunder, program, four of which
are JCS.-targets. Two of these yards,, at Gia Lam
and Thai Nguyen, also have railroad repair facili-
ties in the complex. In addition, many small yards
and sidings have been attacked under miscellaneous
armed reconnaissance.
The key rail yard and repair
facility at Gia Lam was attacked in April~1967 in
one of the most significant airstrikes against
rail yards thus far in 1967. An initial readout
indicates that numerous buildings and some rolling
stock were destroyed. Sixteen percent of the
rail car repair shop floor plan is estimated to
be destroyed, as well as 2.7 percent of the floor plan
area of support buildings. Another very signifi-
cant rail yard attacked during May was Yen Vien,
the largest rail classification yard in North
Vietnam. The latest. photography indicates that
47 percent of the floor plan area of the support-
ing area, 21 percent of the southwest warehouse
area, and 6 percent of the northeast warehouse
area was destroyed. However, the yard is opera-
tional and damage to the adjacent support areas
should not seriously limit through rail capa
bility. In general, more than 10. percent of the
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
national capacity of North Vietnam's railroad re-
pair shops and over 20 percent of its rail yard
capacity have been neutralized as of 31 May 1967.
The minimum estimated cost of restoration of the
damage inflicted on railroad yards during April
and May is $3.1 million, compared to $0.8 million
from January through to March 1967 (see Table 5,
following P.40). The total of damage to these
facilities by the Rolling Thunder program is about
$5.2 million. Most of this estimate stems from
the cost of repairing or reconstructing ware-
houses and other buildings rather than yard track.
Airstrikes, in general, have resulted in only
minor disruptions to through rail service, which
has usually beeen restored in about 24 hours af-
ter each attack. However, the interdiction of the
Canal des Rapides bridge cut Hanoi's connection
to the Lao Cai and Dong Dang lines for about three
weeks, until a bypass bridge at the site was com-
pleted. Adequate road and inland waterway trans-
shipment facilities at the site maintained traffic
while the bypass was being completed.
e. Maritime Ports
Six North Vietnamese ports,
representing 88 percent of the country's total
maritime cargo-handling capacity, have been se-
lected as JCS-targets. Ben Thuy with 4 percent
of total capacity and Ham Rong with only 1 percent
of the capacity were struck in 1965. Ben Thuy
has been restruck many times in both 1966 and 1967.
More significant action oc-
curred during 1966 and 1967. During 1966 the sup-
port facilities and the coal treatment plant at
Cam Pha port were attacked for the first time.
During the first five months of 1967 the support
facilities and coal treatment plant at Hon Gai
were attacked. Damage to port facilities and
related support areas through 1966 is estimated
at $1.4 million (see Table 6, following P.40).
Information is not available to assess the dam-
age done in 1967.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The direct impact of this damage
on North Vietnam's economy is,not significant, al-
though important indirect export losses have re-
sulted, particularly from the attacks against Cam
Pha, where 21 percent of the support facilities
were destroyed at a cost of $160,000. This damage
reduced the port's capacity for Exporting washed
and graded coal, resulting in a loss of coal exports
valued at $7.6 million through may 1967. At Hon
Gai, attacks in April and May against adjacent fa-
cilities reduced its capacity for exporting coal,
resulting in a loss of coal export during the
two months of $0.1 million.
f. Transport Equipment
Destruction and damage of all
types of transport equipment by airstrikes increased
during the first quarter of 1967, compared with
the same period in.1966. However, the extent of
destruction and damage was significantly lower than
the quarterly average for 1966. Destruction and
damage of trucks and watercraft increased signifi-
cantly in the months of April and May. Losses of
watercraft reached record highs in May and truck
losses were only slightly less than the record levels
of August 1966. Table 7, following P.40, which
is based primarily on pilot reports and includes
some duplication,* provides a general indication
of the damage inflicted by type of equipment.
The estimated cost to the North
Vietnamese of replacing or repairing transport equip-
ment damaged from the initiation of airstrikes through
the first five months of 19.67 is estimated at $47.1
million. During May, costs were $5.5 million, only
10 percent less than the record high achieved dur-
ing August 1966.
While the level of damage in-
flicted during 1966 and 1967 was significantly higher
than in 1965, there has been no evidence of serious
transport problems resulting from shortages of equip-
ment. Imports of trucks have been sufficient to
''Data have been adjusted downward to eliminate
duplication whenever possible.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
maintain the inventory at previous levels. Imports
of railroad rolling stock have not equaled the re-
ported attrition rate,* but there is no indication
of any problems associated with rail equipment
shortages. In addition, Chinese rail equipment is
available in sufficient numbers to compensate for
any shortages. Destruction and damage of watercraft
have not been significant in relation to the North
Vietnamese watercraft inventory.
g. Bridges
The number of attacks against
JCS-targeted bridges increased slightly in 1966 com-
pared with 1965, but the number of such bridges at-
tacked was slightly less than the 1965 total. Dur-
ing April and May, 77 strikes were carried out against
25 bridges, compared with 48 strikes against 18
bridges in the first quarter of 1967. Table 8, fol-
lowing P. 40, summarizes strikes against bridges
since the beginning of the Rolling Thunder program.
The total number of bridges
(both JCS-targeted and non-targeted) confirmed by
available photography to have been damaged or de-
stroyed by the Rolling Thunder program now stands
at 418. In this total, which includes both original
and bypass bridges, there are 306 highway, 80 rail-
road, and 32 combination railroad/highway struc-
tures. These figures understate somewhat the num-
ber of smaller bridges (primarily highway) that ac-
tually have been damaged or destroyed because photog-
raphy may not be available for some of these bridges.
The estimated cumulative cost of completely restor-
ing the confirmed damaged or destroyed bridges to
their original condition through May 1967 would be
$20.9 million -- an increase of 10 percent since
31 December 1966 and better than double the estimate
of 1965.** It is estimated that at least $4.5 million
*Reported losses of railroad rolling stock have
included many small, makeshift cars used on the rail
line south of Hanoi which are not included in the
inventory estimate of mainline freight cars.
**The estimated costs for restoring bridges to their
original condition as of the end of 1965 and 1966 were
$10.1 million and $19 million, respectively.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
have been spent already on temporary repairs to
bridges through May 1967, of which an estimated
$1.2 million were spent during the first five
months of 1967. Estimated cost of temporary re-
pairs to the number of unrepaired bridges at the,
end of May 1967 is $1.25 million.,,
Although estimates of what
it would cost the North Vietnamese to restore
bridges to their original condition or how much
they have spent on temporary repairs are of value,
they do not give any qualitative answer to the
effects of bomb damage on bridges. Thus a survey
of the 418 bridges confirmed by available photography
to have been damaged or destroyed showed that 385
bridges have had one or more serious damage oc-
currences" (SDO's).* There'have been a total of
621 SDO's since the beginning of the bombings in
February 1965. through May 1967 (see Table 9,, follow-
ing P.40). The number of SDO's by year and the,
average number of times each of the 385 bridges
were interdicted are as follows:
Year SDO's
Number of
Bridges With
SDO's
Average Number
of .Interdictions
Per Damaged Bridge
1965 218
1.23
1966 334
185
1.81
1967 69
(through May)
3.00 a/
a.' The high figure-for 1967 is not comparable to
the earlier two periods because the time span
is too short for a meaningful comparison.
*A "serious damage occurrence"'consists of initial
hits and re-hits and is defined as damage sufficiently
severe that a crossing is denied to users. until.a sig-
nificant amount of repairs has been performed -- requir-
ing considerable time, materials, and tabor. For ex-
ample, serious damage would incZ'ude a dropped span(s),
a destroyed pier (s), or a destroyed abutment(s). Holes
in a deck, cratered approaches,'twisted superstructure,
or a slight shifting of spans is not considered serious
damage.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
While a specific bridge may be interdicted an in-
creasing number of times, in most cases the cross-
ing is bypassed in a variety of ways. Of the 147
bypass bridges observed in aerial photography, 39
have sustained 65 SDO's.
6. Indirect Effects
The air campaign has also resulted in
sizable losses to the economy of North Vietnam that
are indirect results of the bombing. The principal
indirect losses result from shortfalls in production,
disruptions of normal economic activity, and the
impairment of foreign exchange earnings through de-
creases in the quantities of goods available for ex-
port. Many of these losses cannot be quantified.
The few that can -- reductions in agricultural out-
put and the fish catch and the loss of export earn-
ings -- totaled $55.7 million through May 1967,
or about 30 percent of total economic damage. The
unquantifiable losses -- production inefficiencies,
the costs of dispersing industry, civil defense
measures, production losses because of lack of
power, the reallocation of manpower, and the like --
undoubtedly total in the tens of millions of dol-
lars.
a. Agriculture and Fishing
Although agriculture and commercial
fishing have not been direct targets of the air
strikes against North Vietnam, the bombing campaign
has had significant indirect effects on production.
These indirect effects have resulted from the dis-
ruption of normal farming and fishing schedules,
disruptions in the manufacture and distribution
of fertilizers, and the loss of some managerial
cadres and labor as a result of transfer to war-
related activities which has intensified manpower
problems during peak loads in the crop cycle. Since
it is not possible to separate the effects of the
bombing campaign from the effects of adverse weather
on agriculture, the estimates of losses in agricul-
tural output also include those resulting from
adverse weather.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The cumulative losses in agriculture
and fishing through the first. five months of 1967 are
estimated at about $33.8 million as shown in the fol-
lowing tabulation:
Million US $
1967
Source of Revenue
1965
1966 January-March
Apr
il-May
Total
and
Rice Production
3.5
22.0
N.A.
N.A.
25.5
Fishing
1.7
3.3
2.0
1.3
8.3
'w
Total
5.2
25.3
2.0
1.3
33.8
The shortfall in rice production is
estimated to be about 300,000 tons below the normal
average production of about 4.5 million tons. Al-
though all of this loss occurred in 1966, $3.5 mil-
lion is attributed to the effects of bombing in 1965
because the spring rice crop was planted in that
year. The final outcome of the 1967 spring rice
crop -- normally about one-third of the annual har-
vest -- cannot yet be evaluated. Because the acreage
planted was less than usual and transplanting of
the crop was delayed, the harvest probably will be
below normal. The decrease in the salt-water fish
catch resulted primarily from the interruption of
normal fishing activities that resulted from the
threat of air attacks.
Recent information indicates that
shortages in agricultural production and in the
fish catch have contributed to a deteriorating
food situation in North Vietnam. Not only are
such quality foods as salt water fish, fish sauce,
and meat in short supply, but also rice rations --
the staple of the North Vietnamese diet -- have
been diluted to an increasing extent with rice
substitutes (corn, manioc, and sweet potatoes).
Known seaborne imports of bulk foods in the
first five months of 1967 -- about 178,200 tons
are well over double the total imports in 1966.
There are, however, no indications that the food
situation has become critical, and it is believed
that imports have been sufficient to prevent this.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The spring rice crop will undoubtedly give a temporary res-
pite to the tight food situation in North Vietnam after
it is harvested in May and June.
b. Export Losses
The cumulative measurable value of reduc-
tions in seaborne exports attributable to the bombing
through May 1967 was about $21.9 million* as shown in
the following tabulation:
Thousand US $
Apatite
Pig Iron
Cement
Coal
Total
2nd
quarter
665
0
192
0
857
3rd
quarter
1,043
0
324
0
1,367
4th
quarter
1,554
0
395
0
1,949
Subtotal
3,262
0
911
0
4,173
1st
quarter
1,554
0
205
0
1,759
2nd
quarter
1,554
0
40
1,476
3,071
3rd
quarter
1,457
0
244
2,192
3,893
4th
quarter
1,554
0
243
1,060
2,857
Subtotal
6,118
0
733
4,729
11,580
1st quarter
1,554
0
199
1,273
3,026
April-May
1,036
49
287
1,759
3,131
Subtotal
2,590
49
486
3,032
6,157
Total
11,970
49
2,130
7,761
21,910
'Estimated dollar equivalents at f.o.b. prices.
**Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals
shown.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Seaborne exports of apatite ceased
abruptly after the interdiction of the Hanoi-Lao Cai
rail line in July 1965 and when stockpiles at Hai-
phong became exhausted in early August. It is pos-
sible, however, that some apatite has been exported
by rail from the mines near Lao Cai to China. Al-
though known seaborne exports of cement declined
after the initiation of the Rolling Thunder program,
no direct connection between the program and the
decline was determined until the Haiphong cement
plant was put out of production in April 1967. It
is possible that cement has been exported to China
without being detected. Coal shipments decreased
rapidly after the coal-processing facilities at
Cam Pha, North Vietnam's major coal port, were dam-
aged in April 1966 and huge stockpiles were drawn
down. After a slow recovery to over half the pre-
strike level, exports declined sharply again in
March, April and May 1967. This decline apparently
resulted from the combined effects of damage to the
Hon Gai powerplant, which supplies power for both
the Hon Gai and Cam Pha port areas, and direct dam-
age to coal-processing facilities. Seaborne coal
shipments in May were the lowest recorded in the
last 29 months. Pig iron has been added to the
list of exports affected by bomb damage since it
apparently is not being produced at Thai Nguyen,
because of damage to auxiliary facilities and the
loss of electric power. Seaborne exports of pig
iron customarily fluctuate widely in response to
market conditions, however, and a strong market
might result in heavy shipments of pig iron from
stockpiles.
C. Military Damage
The damage to military target systems through
May 1967 is estimated at $82.6 million. Losses of
aircraft and damage to barrack complexes comprised
most of the damage, accounting for 62 percent of
the total. The damage inflicted on military tar-
gets has had no significant impact on North Viet-
nam's military capabilities. The ammunition depots
are the only military target system to have been
attacked in depth. Yet the loss of about 74 percent
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
of ammunition storage capacity has had no measurable
impact on the availability of ammunition. No other
military target system has lost more than 25 percent
of its pre-strike capacity. Although nearly 25 per-
cent of the capacity of barrack facilities has been
destroyed, most of the barracks attacked had been
inactive by the end of 1965, the years when they
were first struck. Despite the air attacks the
North Vietnamese have been able to strengthen and
improve the capability of most military target sys-
tems since the bombings started. Fighter aircraft
facilities in North Vietnam are still sufficient
to meet requirements. The inventory of SAM sites
and radar and communications facilities has increased
markedly since the bombings started. Although fighter
aircraft losses have increased significantly in
recent months, most of these losses have been made
up through imports and the use of reserves in China.
The effects of the damage inflicted on mili-
tary target systems are discussed in the following
sections.
1. Barracks
North Vietnam had a total barracks capac-
ity for about 443,000 men at the beginning of the
bombing, of which JCS-targeted barracks had a capa-
city for 182,000 men. About 83 percent of the JCS-
targeted barracks had been attacked by the end of
May 1967, with a loss of capacity -- either destroyed
or inactive -- for about 110,000 men. This loss rep-
resents about 25 percent of the total barracks capac-
ity in North Vietnam, compared with nearly 23 per-
cent at the end of 1966 and about 18 percent at the
end of 1965. In addition, non-targeted barracks
also have been struck under the miscellaneous armed
reconnaissance program, but the loss of capacity
resulting from this program cannot be estimated.
Airstrikes against JCS-targeted bar-
rack complexes during the first five months of
1967 exceeded the total flown during all of 1966.
The damage inflicted by these strikes is estimated
at about $4.5 million, compared with $2.5 million
in 1966 and $16.0 million in 1965, (see Table 10,
following P.40). The increase in damage over 1966
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
resulted from strikes against barracks which had
not been attacked before 1967. However, nearly
90 percent of the strikes in 1967 continued to be
against complexes already damaged or inactive at
the end of 1965.
The loss of both targeted and non-tar-
geted barracks capacity in the outlying areas --
primarily in the southern part of the country,
along the border of Laos, and in the northwestern
provinces -- undoubtedly is causing much inconvenience.
Damage to barrack complexes in these areas has not
been repaired and the remaining barracks have usually
been vacated. The troops apparently are being quar-
tered with civilians in nearby villages, in tents,
or in other makeshift shelters in the surrounding
area. The North Vietnamese have had sufficient time
to adjust to the loss of barracks in these areas,
however, and the housing problem probably is less
inconvenient now than it was at the end of 1965.
2. Airfields
Although the airfields at Kep, Haiphong/
Kien An, and Hoa Lac were attacked for the first
time during April-May 1967, no major change in the
general capability of airfields has occurred since
1965. Kep and Kien An were operational for jets at
the end of May, and Hoa Lac probably was operational,
although it apparently was not being used because
of its vulnerability to attack. About 19 percent
of the national capacity of JCS-targeted airfields
was destroyed or inactive at the end of 1965, 1966,
and March 1967, compared with about 23 percent at
the end of April 1967. The confirmed damage to
date is estimated at only about $0.6 million (see
Table 11, following P. 40 ) .
Some fighter aircraft facilities in
North Vietnam, which were inadequate at the begin-
ning of the bombing, have been expanded significantly.
The gradual expansion of the basic airfield and
control apparatus apparently has been tailored. to
specific air defense needs to counter the Rolling
Thunder program. At least five airfields -- Hanoi/
Gia Lair.i, Phuc Yen, Kep, Haiphong/Cat. Bi and Kien
An -- could support MIG operations at the end of
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
May 1967, and an additional airfield under construc-
tion at Bai Thuong will be able to accommodate jets
when it is completed. North Vietnam still can ac-
commodate its present MIG force or even an expan-
sion of the MIG inventory. In the event of attacks
on the major airfield at Phuc Yen, the North Viet-
namese can still sustain a fighter force, although
less effectively, in the Hanoi area.
3. SAM Sites
From July 1965 through May 1967, approxi-
mately 630 airstrikes were directed against SAM in-
stallations in North Vietnam. The assessment of
the effects of these strikes has been severely limited
by the lack of post-strike photography.
The following tabulation reflects the
minimum damage estimated to have been inflicted on
SAM facilities:
Thousand US $
SAM Facilities
1965
1966
Jan-Mar
1967
Apr-May
1967
Total
Firing sites
310
900
--
600
1,810
Support facilities 1,600
170
300
2,070
Total
1,
910
1,070
300
600
3,880
The attacks on the SAM sites have not sig-
nificantly affected the total number of active SAM
battalions, which have increased steadily and by spring
1967 totaled from 28 to 32 units. In addition, the
number of prepared or pre-surveyed sites now totals
at least 175.
By 31 May 1967, over 2,700 SA-2 missiles
had been fired at Allied aircraft, resulting in the
destruction of 64 airplanes (49 confirmed and 15 prob-
able) and 29 reconnaissance drones.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
4. Naval Bases
By the end of May 1967, nearly 20 per-
cent of North Vietnam's naval base support facili-
ties were destroyed or inactivey compared with
about 15 percent at the end of 1965. -The cumulative
cost of repair for the damage inflicted is esti-
mated at nearly $1.6 million, (see Table 12, follow-
ing P.40 ). It is doubtful that the damage to the
naval bases has seriously affected the operations
of the small North Vietnamese navy. Restoration of
the damaged facilities can be accomplished quickly
and without foreign assistance.
5. Radar*
North Vietnam expanded its radar system
considerably during the first five months of 1967.
At the end of May the country had over 180 known
early warning and ground control intercept radars
at 86 sites, compared with 149 known radars at 50
sites at the end of 1966. Five of these sites are
JCS-targeted because of their strategic locations
along the coast.
During 1965-66 the targeted sites at
Hon Matt and Hon Nieu were totally destroyed, those
at Vinh Son and Bach Long were damaged, and there
was no significant damage to the site at My Duc.
The cumulative cost,of damage to these sites is
estimated at $2.6 million, (see Table 13, follow-
ing P. 40). The destroyed site at Hon Nieu was
reactivated during the first quarter of 1967,
and the sites at Vinh Son and My Duc were strength-
ened appreciably by the deployment of additional
early warning, searchlight control, height-finding,
and fire control radars. There were no known at-
tacks against these radar sites during January-
April 1967. Although the Vinh Son site was struck
during May, it was not damaged.
During April and May, four radars were
added to the My Duc site and a radar was installed
at Hon Matt, thus reactivating the latter site.
Sometime during May the radar at Hon Matt and four
*'Excluding radar associated with SAM sites.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
of the radars located at My. Duc stopped operating.
It is not yet known if these radars were damaged
or destroyed by airstrikes or if they were moved
to other sites.
North Vietnam's telecommunications sys-
tem remains operationally intact not only because
relatively few facilities have been targeted and
attacked but also because of large-scale imports
of equipment. In fact, the overall capabilities
of the system may have been improved since the
beginning of the Rolling Thunder program. Radio
facilities have been expanded and the message-
handling capacity of the wireline system has been
increased. In addition, the North Vietnamese have
taken steps to reduce the potential effects of air-
strikes on the telecommunications system. Newly
constructed open wirelines are being placed from
150 to 600 yards away from railroads and highways,
telephone poles are being pre-positioned along wire-
line routes, and a blast wall has been constructed
around the radio broadcasting complex at Me Tri.
By the end of May 1967, the cumulative
cost of the damage inflicted by airstrikes amounted
to only about $185,000, of which about.$105,000 oc-
curred during 1965 and about $80,000 during 1966.
No confirmed damage was inflicted on the system dur-
ing the first five months of 1967.
7. Supply and Ordnance Depots
Nine of North Vietnam's JCS-targeted
military supply and ordnance depots were attacked
during January-May 1967, four for the first time.
The most significant strike during the period was
against the Thai Nguyen Army Supply Depot North
which serves the area north of Hanoi and represents
nearly 4 percent of the total national capacity.
Only about 17 percent of North Vietnam's
supply and ordnance storage capacity was destroyed
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
or inactive as a result of airstrikes through May
1967. The damage inflicted is estimated at about
$5.6 million. Except for the depots at Thai Nguyen,
Ha Dong, and Van Dien and those at Vinh and Yen
Bai (which were struck prior to 1967), the depots
attacked are of relatively minor importance to
the North Vietnamese Army. However, the functions
that were performed by these depots are essential
to maintain the infiltration system in support
of activities in South Vietnam and Laos. The re-
quirement to operate from a dispersed logistics
base has probably resulted in increased management
problems and reduced efficiency.
8. Ammunition Depots
During January-May 1967, five JCS-tar-
geted ammunition depots -- Hon Gai, Vinh Yen, Hai-
phong, Bac Giang, and Cam Ly -- were attacked for
the first time, and five additional depots were re-
struck. The cost':.of restoration of the depot at Cam
Ly is estimated at $300,000 and those at Hon Gai
and Haiphong at $100,000 each. There was no loss of
capacity'at-the Vinh Yen and Bac Giang depots. By
the end of May 1967, about 74 percent of the capacity
of North Vietnam's JCS-targeted ammunition storage
facilities had been destroyed or was inactive. The
cumulative cost of the damage inflicted through May
is estimated at about $5.2 million.
The loss of ammunition depots has been
inconvenient to the North Vietnamese and probably
has resulted in temporary delays in distribution.
The lops apparently has not, however, caused pro-
longed shortages of ammunition in the areas where the
depots are located. More than 60 percent of the
targeted depots (all of which have been attacked)
are inactive, howbve:'r.:-'a;irstrikes'.dur,ing the past' year
apparently have not significantly affected the over-
all storage of ammunition in North Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
9. Naval Craft
The destruction of eight North Vietnamese
naval craft* has been confirmed as of May 1967: four
Swatow-class gunboats in 1965 and three PT boats and
one SO-1 subchaser in 1966. The cost of these losses
is estimated at $3.8 million. The small North Viet-
namese navy currently is estimated to include 12
Swatow-class gunboats,4 Shanghai--class patrol boats,
15 PT boats, 3 SO-1 subchasers, and 2 unidentified
naval craft.
10. Aircraft
The North Vietnamese probably lost 22
MIG-21's and at least 54 MIG-17's through May 1967
from attacks by US aircraft. Sixteen MIG-21's and
at least 33 MIG-17's were destroyed during the first
five months of 1967. The cost of all aircraft losses
is estimated At $28.4 million, of which $7.6 million
is attributed to losses during January-March 1967
and $11.8 million to losses during April-May 1967.
The MIG inventory of 1 June 1967 included 16 MIG-21's
and 71 MIG-15/17's. Thirty of the MIG-15/17's were
still being held in China.
The North Vietnamese have made up most
of their aircraft losses through the use of reserves
in China and the importation of MIG-17's from China.
Although North Vietnam's air force has suffered in-
creasingly heavy losses, it has taken an aggressive
role in air defense systems when vital targets are
attacked. North Vietnam apparently plans to keep
the jet fighter inventory at least at the present
level or increase it in the future.
D. Miscellaneous Targets of Armed Reconnaissance
Most of the damage resulting from the armed
reconnaissance program has been discussed in earlier
*Excluding the 8 to 10 naval craft destroyed by
the Pierce Arrow attacks in August 1964 following
the Gulf of Tonkin incidents.
25X1?
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
sections of this memorandum under the major cate-
gories of targets. Pilot reports, however, have
indicated a variety of miscellaneous targets --
principally transport and military facilities as destroyed or damaged and which cannot be in-
cluded in the major target categories.
Because of the nature of air operations,
it is difficult to provide a definitive evalua-
tion of the results of airstrikes based on pilot
reports. There is considerable double-counting
in the reports and a tendency for pilots to over-
estimate the amount of destruction or damage in-
flicted. In addition, the description of the
targets is usually imprecise. The cost of damage
can thus be based only on an assumed level of
damage to a typical target in each category. With
these limitations in mind, the total cost of re-
placement or restoration of the miscellaneous
targets destroyed or damaged by armed reconnais-
sance strikes is estimated at about $9.1 million,
as shown in the following tabulation:
Mi
llion US $
1965
1966
Jan-Mar Apr-M
1967 1967
ay
Total
Economic facilities
and equipment
N.A.
1.2
0.1 0.
2
1.5
Military facilities
0.7
3.1
1.8 2.
0
7.6
Total*
0.7
4.3
2.0 2.
1
9.1
E. Manpower Effects
The effects of the Rolling Thunder program
on North Vietnam's manpower resources are twofold --
*2~ecause of rounding, components may not add to
the totals shown.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
the loss of manpower as casualties to airstrikes,
and the diversion of substantial amounts of man-
power to tasks associated with air defense and
civil defense programs and to repair, reconstruc-
tion, dispersal, and transport programs.
1. Casualties
Preliminary estimates of casualties for
the first five months of 1967 demonstrate the stepped-
up rate of the Rolling Thunder program. The monthly
casualty rate increased from an average of 2,200 dur-
ing 1966 to 3,900 in 1967. Markedly greater armed
reconnaissance strikes in the more heavily populated
northern Route Packages were chiefly responsible for
the increase in the casualty/sortie ratio from 0.32 in
1966 to 0.47 in January-May 1967. In addition,
fixed targets selected for initial strikes in 1967
were situated in heavily defended areas of greater
civilian population density. Estimated casualties
during 1965-May 1967 are as follows:
Jan
-May
1965
1966 19
67 a/
Total
Civilians
Fixed targets
2,000
900 1,
100
4,000
Armed reconnaissance
4,000
18,100 12,
800
34,900
Subtotal
6,000
19,000 13,
900
38,900
Military
Fixed targets
4,300
400 2,
200
6,900
Armed reconnaiss
ance
2,900
7,300 3,
200
13,400
Subtotal
7,200
7,700 5,
400
20,300
13,200
26,700 19,
300
59,200
a Based on Preliminary data.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
The estimates of casualties resulting
from the bombing of North Vietnam are subject to un-
known and conceivably large margins of error. In-
formation from Hanoi has generally been of little
value in estimating casualties. Two recent reports,
however, make it reasonably certain that our esti-
mates are of the right order of magnitude. The
first report, a detailed statement from Hanoi,
Report of US War Crimes in Nam Dinh City, released
a number of statistics and allegations concern-
ing the US bombing of Nam Dinh during 1965-66. The
information presented in this report seemed to be
accurate when measured against detailed studies
made on the basis of post-strike photography. The
casualties claimed by the North Vietnamese were
also consistent with independent casualty esti-
mates made by this Agency, using Nam Dinh as a
pilot study. A second report in late April,1967.?indi-
t at only 20,000 North Vietnamese had been killed
by the US bombing from August 1964 to date. This
statement closely corresponds to our own estimate
We have previously estimated
that about 40 percent of the
total casualties are killed and the remainder wounded.
On this basis, we would estimate that slightly more.
than 19,0.00 of the total casualties throw h March
1967 were killed,
Although the monthly rate of casualties
continues to increase and to be heavily weighted
with civilians, the total casualties are small in
relation to total population. North Vietnamese Brig.
General Tian Quy Hai recently wrote in Hoc T,
"Thanks to our good preparatory work in taking pre-
cautionary measures against enemy attacks, our losses
are insignificant compared with the intensity of
enemy strikes." Civilian casualties continue to
be primarily those involved in war-supporting ac-
tivities such as the repair of bomb damage and the
operation in maintenance of logistic supply lines.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
2. Diversion of Manpower
Airstrikes against North Vietnam have re-
quired the services of 575,000 to 700,000 individuals --
about equally divided between full-time and part-time
workers.
Thousand Persons
Task Full-Time Part-Time
LOC repair and reconstruction 72 100 to 200
Transport and dispersal 100 to 120 25
Civil defense 150
Air defense 83 25 to 30
Coast defense 20 to 25
Total 275 to 300 300 to 405
Most of the.full-time workers repairing lines of com-
munication (LOC's) are deployed in the four Route
Packages south of Hanoi which have borne the brunt
of the Rolling Thunder program. In addition to these
Vietnamese workers, up to 34,000 Chinese engineering
troops are employed north of Hanoi to repair and
reconstruct the two rail lines to China. An addi-
tional 19,000 North Vietnamese workers are estimated
to be in the Laotian Panhandle expanding and repair-
ing the infiltration corridors to South Vietnam.
Although the total manpower requirements
stemming from the air war may have limited some-
what North Vietnam's capability for sustained large-
scale operations in South Vietnam and to some degree
contributed to a shortfall in agriculture, the diver-
sions have not placed a relevant ceiling on North
Vietnam's ability to infiltrate troops into South
Vietnam. For example,. the full-time requirement
for 170,000 to 190,000 civilians for LOC repair
and transportation-dispersal operations is only
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
about 4 percent of the estimated 4.3 million males
in the 15 to 49 age group. Only in relatively
lightly populated but heavily attacked Route Package
1 does the labor force required to counter the bomb
damage account for a significant -- up to one-fourth
share of the labor force. In this area, substantial
numbers of laborers have probably been imported from
other areas of North Vietnam to repair roads and
speed the transport of goods.
Most of the workers perform only manual
labor requiring no special skills, and they can
easily be recruited from city evacuees, farms, and
fishing villages with a minimum of dislocation to
the economy. Other tasks such as the operation of
construction machinery, bridge repair, bypass con-
struction, and rail repair do require higher skill
levels. Permanent crews to perform these types
of functions impose a burden on the economy in two
important ways. Because personnel possessing modern
skills such as heavy equipment operation are in
short supply in North Vietnam, a step-up in the
bombing spreads a thin resource even thinner.
Second, the logistical needs of the full-time con-
struction personnel place an additional require-
ment on North Vietnam's economy for food, housing,
medical services, and the like.
In addition to skilled and unskilled
full-time workers, part-time personnel are used
on a stand-by basis to repair LOC's, transport
supplies, and serve as civil defense workers.
Typically these jobs -- such as repair of craters
or transloading a boxcar -- require a low-skill
worker and are essentially of a "one shot" nature.
The temporary absence of such laborers from their
primary jobs for several hours or days causes small
losses to the economy.
Although the total number of and the
skill requirements for full-time and part-time work-
ers are well within tolerable limits, the short-
age of experienced cadre to plan, coordinate, and
direct the ambitious and imaginative system of
countermeasures which North Vietnam has devised
is a more serious problem. The need for experienced
and aggressive cadre in the North competes directly
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
with the need for military cadre in the South. The
neutralization of North Vietnam's modern industrial
facilities will probably free some of this scarce
talent, but accelerating needs for technologically
skilled personnel for operating repair services,
transportation crews, and civil defense programs
will probably worsen the shortage. While the in-
tensification of air operations against transporta-
tion targets in the first five months of 1967 has
increased the requirement for LOC repair workers,
greater North Vietnamese experience at countermeasures
and repair techniques has had the opposite effect.
As long as morale remains high and imports of neces-
sary equipment continue, North Vietnam will not be
faced with a crippling shortage of labor, either
skilled or unskilled, unless losses in the South
increase sharply.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Electric Power Facilities Attacked in North Vietnam
1965, 1966, and January - 12 June 1967
Pre-Strike Target Capacity
Target as a Percent
JCS Target Capacity of Nation a} Dates
Number Name (Kilowatts) Capacity J of Strikes
Cost of
Percent of
Percent of
Restoration
Target Capacity
National Capacity
Attributed to
Currently Out
Currently Out
Each Strike
of Operation
of Operation
(Million US $)
5,000
3
4 Apr
27 Jul
29 Jul
30 Jul
31 Jul
4 Aug
8,000
5
4 Jun
0.3
4 Jun
0.7
1,500
1
8 Jun
0.2
10 Jun
0.2
7,500
4
28 Jun
0.2
29 Jun
0.3
2 Aug
0.3
3 Aug
1.2
1,000
0.5
21 Aug
22 Aug
0.1
23 Aug
15 Dec
20 Dec
22 Dec
0.2
22 Dec
1.5
6.3
Further damage in September
1966.
No attempt to restore
plant. Additional strike
in 1966.
Reconstruction halted in
late 1966 before plant was
serviceable. Could be put
in partial operation in
two months.
No attempt to restore plant
until first half of 1967.
Possibly in operation in
April 1967.
Out of operation until
March 1966. Additional
strikes in 1966 and 1967.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
JCS Target
Numb e r
Electric Power Tacilities Attacked in Nort' Vietnam
1965, 1966, and January - 12 June 1967
(Continued)
Pre-Strike Target Capacity
Target as a Percent
Capacity of Nation
Kilowatts Capacity
Name
Percent of Percent of
Target Capacity National Capacity
Dates Currently Out Currently Out
of Strikes of Operation of Operation
Cost of
Restoration
Attributed to
Each Strike
(Million US $) Remarks
r
18 A
0.1
Uong Bi
24,000
13
p
28 Apr
U Aug
14 Aug
17 Aug
4.3
Thai Nguyen
24,000
13
6-8 Jul
50
6
0.8
Viet Tri
16,000
9
Prior to
19 Jul
0
0
Ben Thuy
8,000
4
13 Mar
4
15 Mar
23 Oct
26 Oct
26 Oct
27 Oct
28 Oct
100
29 Oct
100
4
0.2
Restoration in progress but
3
22
Sep
plant not believed
to be
23
Sep
operating. Smoke
from
23
Sep
c.4
stack on
but
91;Y1
23
Sep
none on
in-
25X1
dicating probable
for startup.
testing
Additional strike in 1967.
Smokestack destroyed.
of operation until
No additional damage.
2X5 1
25X1
Severe damage to 24,000 kw
operating plus an addi-
tional 24,000 kw being
installed.
No additional damage.
No additional damage.
Little evidence of recon-
First strike. 12,000 kw of
capacity out of operation.
Additional strikes in 1967.
First strike. Damage neg-
ligible. Additional
strikes in 1967.
Plant already out of opera-
tion. No additional
damage.
Plant restored to partial
operation early October
1966. Plant possibly
partly serviceable in
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Electric Power Facilities Attacked in North Vietnam
1965, 1966, and January - 12 June 1967
(Continued)
Pre-Strike Target Capacity
Target as a Percent
JCS Target Capacity of Nationa],
Number Name (Kilowatts) Capacity a
1966
(Continued)
Trinh Xuyen
Substation
Photography not available
for post-strike assess-
ment.
4 Nov 100 1 0.4 Plant out of operation at
time of strike. Photog-
indicates almost total
destruction. No evidence
of reconstruction.
Cost of 25X5
Percent of Percent of Restoration
Target Capacity National Capacity Attributed to
Dates Currently Out Currently Out Each Strike
of Strikes of Operation of Operation (Million U $) Remarks
N.A. N. A. 1 Nov Substation under construc-
tion, almost read for
operation in 25X1
24 Feb No damage from February 25X5
25 Feb strikes.
2 Mar 0.4 Moderate damage.
10 Mar 100 8 1.8 Heavy damage to boilerhouse,
substation, and coal-
processing building. Esti-
mate minimum of four
months to partial opera-
tion, over one year for
completed restoration.
20 Apr
22 Apr
Photography not available
for post-strike assessment.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Electric Power Facilities Attacked in North Vietnam
1965, 1966, and January - 12 June 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number
Tan-Jun 196%
(Continued)
Pre-Strike Target Capacity
Target as a Percent
Capacity of Nation
(Kilowatts) Capacity a
Percent of Percent of
Target Capacity National Capacity
Dates Currently Out Currently Out
of Strikes of Operation of Operation
24 Feb
26 Feb
11 Mar
16 Mar
24 Mar
5 Apr 100 6
10 May
20 May
22 May
I
Cost of
Restoration
Attributed to
Each Strike
(Million US $) ~!/ Remarks
0.5 Cumulative damage: prob-
able moderate damage to
boilerhouse, operator hall,
and switchyard, and de-
struction of coal-
processing building. No
attempt to repair damage
and no additional damage
apparent since 25X1
Estimated minimum of ree
months for partial opera-
tion and six months more
for complete restoration.
2.8 Probable destruction of 3
of 4 turbines, severe
damage to 4 of 6 boilers,
and severe damage to coal-
processing building.
Estimate minimum of 4
months to partial opera-
tion, and 2 years for com-
plete restoration.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
1 1 1 1 I r t t
Electric Power Facilities Attacked in North Vietnam
1965, 1966, and January - 12 June 1967
(Continued)
JCS 'target
Number
Jan-Jun 1967
Continued
Pre-Strike arget Capacity
Target as a Percent
Capacity of Nation
(Kilowatts) Capacity a
Cost of
Percent of Percent of Restoration
Target Capacity National Capacity Attributed to
Dates Currently Out Currently Out Each Strike
of Strikes of Operation of Operation (Million US $) b/ Remarks
19 Mar
23 :tar
24 Mar
20 Apr
25 Apr
10 May
20 May
26 May
Severe damage to 2 boilers,
moderate damage to a third.
13 1.5 No attempt to repair plant
since March. Estimate
minimum of 4 months for
partial operation, over one
year for complete restora-
tion.
Damage to cooling tower and
support building.
5 1.1 Cumulative damage: severe
damage to 7 of 9 boilers,
probable heavy damage to
turbine hall, heavy damage
to coal-processing building
and cooling towers. Esti-
0.5 mate minimum of six months
for partial operation and
two years for complete
restoration.
POL storage, and heavy
damage to turbine building.
10 May 0.3 Estimate totally unservice-
able for at least one year.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
doer Attacked in ";ort_: ','ietn .,
1965, 1966, and January - 12 dune 190''
(Continued)
Cost of 25X5
P;,?-dtri'..e ,arret ca:,acit% Percent of Percent of Restoration
arg:t as c Percent Target Capacity National Capacity F,ttribute. to
2S get Can -t c' Rati.ona~ Dates Currently Out Currently Out Eac't. Strike
number ame (Kilo.ratts) Capacity a of Strikes of Operation of Operation (1illion US $) b% Remarks
an-Jun 1967
(Continued)
to main control building
and -? .ransforrrer. -3.,.-
mated three to for months
to restore to partial
service.
4 May No additional damage from
22 May 4 May strike. Recent post-
strike photography not
available.
Hanoi 32,500 17 19 May
21 May
10 Jun 65 11
Uon_ Bi 224,000 13 26 May
8 Jun
11 Jun 100 13
a. Based on national installed capacity of 175,000 kw in 1965 and on 187,000 k,: in 1960 and 1967
b. Lack of an entry indicates either no damage or no information available to make estimate.
:._o.ase the uncertain status several plants, this percentage is provisional.
10.9
8a c/ 23.4
0.8 Probably heavy damage to 2
of at least 7 boilers and
to control building. Plant
rapidly restored to partial
operation at about one-third
of capacity. Results of
10 June strike not available.
Reported heavy damage from
last strike; details not
available. Probably entire
plant out of operation at
least temporarily.
Probable damage. Post-strike
photography not available.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
JCS Target
Number Name
Target as a Percent of Percent of
Percent of Target Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Total Targeted Capacity Capacity Restoration Destroyed
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US ) (Thousand US 6)
25X5
Phu Van Negi. 6 May 100 Negl. 40 20
Vinh a/ 6 24, 26 May 34 2 120 70
11, 15 Sep 34 2 120 70
6 Oct 17 1 60 30
Nam Dinh 9 2, 4 Jul 100 9 500 270
Phu Qui 6 18 May 100 6 340 0
Subtotal: 1965 20 1,180 460
Haiphong 32 29 Jun 46 14 840 300 to 460
7 Jul 32 10 600 190 to 310
2 Aug 21 7 380 80 to 150
Hanoi 24 29 Jun 100 24 1,380 490 to 7660
Vinh a/ 30 Jul 25X5
7, 8 Aug
6 Sep
8, 11, 13, 27,
28, 29 0ct
Nguyen Khe 6 30 Jun 10
19 Jul
17, 18, 22 Aug 22 2 112 39 to 60
4 Sep
8 Oct
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 JCS Target
Number
1966 (Con-
tinued)
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the R olling T. under Prograr?
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
(Continued)
Target as a Percent of Percent of
Percent of Target Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Total Targeted Capacity Capacity Restoration Destroyed
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
Duong Nham
Ha Gia
Phu Qui b/
30 Jun
31 Jul
11 Aug
14 Sep
2 29 Jun
3 Jul
5, 8, lo, 14, 15, 50 1 64 16 to 35
17, 22 Aug
12, 22 Oct
1 Nov
1 30 Jun
19 Jul
14 Aug
5 Sep
3 1, 12, 23 Jul
17, 22 Aug
12 Sep
8 22 Nov
2, 3, 4, 5, 19,
30 Dec
1 23 Nov
2 Dec
3 Dec
8 Aug
11 Oct
0 0
97 1 2 1 to 2
0 0
0 0
185 16 to 25
24 to 50
05 3,731 1,187 to 1,889
85 4,911 1,647 to 2,349
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number Name
Target as a Percent of Percent of
Percent of Target Total Targeted Cost of Value of Petroleum
Total Targeted Capacity Capacity Restoration Destroyed
Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed Destroyed (Thousand US $) (Thousand US
25X5
January-March 1967
Vinh 1 7 Feb
Ha Gia c/ 15 Feb
Do Son / 2 5 Mar 50 1 64 35
Subtotal: First quarter of 1967 1 64 35
April-May 1967
Vinh J
Haiphong e/
26 Apr
2 May
Phu Qui b/ 20 May
Subtotal: April-May 1967 0
Total: 1965, 1966, and first
five months of 1967
86
!+,975 1,682 to 2,384
a. The facility at Vinh was attacked in August 1964, prior to the Rolling Thunder program. Pink was attacked :en ties in 1966 and five
in 1967, but no destruction of storage capacity has been identified since 1965.
b. The facility at Phu Qui was 100 -percent destroyed in May 1965 and apparently has been abandoned.
C. Ha Gia has been attacked in 1966; available post-strike photography indicates that the destroyed tankage did not contain petroleum.
d. Do Son had been attacked in 1966; the facility is now 100 percent destroyed.
e. The facility at Haiphong had not been attacked since 2 August 1966. Photography of early 1967 revealed that storage tanks previously
considered to be serviceable were being dismantled. For purposes of this table, the dismantled tanks and their contents are considered to have
been destroyed in the 2 August attack.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
Target as a
Percent of
Percent of
National
Capacity Cost of
JCS Target
Percent of
Target Capacity
Destroyed Restoration
Number Name
National Capacity
Dates of Attack
Destroyed
or Inactive (Thousand US $)
25X5
1965
100
24 July
7, 8 August
Cotton Spinning:
70 to 75
Spinning Inactive: 800
60
Cotton Weaving:
50
28 July
Weaving Inactive:
40
N.A.
April
November
100 a/
8o a/
Nam Dinh Textile Mill
Oct-Dec b/
c
c/
Subtotal: 1966
425
January-March 1967
Nam Dinh Textile Mill
January
350
Cam Pha Coal Treatment Plant
N.A.
February
N.A.
Negl.
Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant
37 d/
24, 25 February
N.A.
240
11, 16 March
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
I I I[ I l I I I l 1
Manufacturing Facilities Attacked under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number Name
January-March 1967
Continued
April-May 1967
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel Complex
Percent of
National
Target as a Percent of Capacity Cost of
Percent of Target Capacity Destroyed Restoration
National Capacity Dates of Attack Destroyed or inactive (Thousand US $)
25X5
N.A. 9, 12, 13 March N.A. N.A. 100
95 e/ 10, 11, 18, 21
25, 26, 30 March N.A. N.A. 9,500
7, lo, 18, 23
April
1, 4, 10, 27 May N. A. N.A. 500
Hon Gai Calcium Carbide Plant N.A. 16, 17 April
N.A. 25X5
Haiphong Cement Plant 95 20, 25 April 70
7, 27 May (Inactive) 95 3,050
Haiphong Enamelware Plant N.A. April 35 N.A. 360
Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer Plant 37 d/ 20, 22 May 2 37 60
(Inactive)
Subtotal: April-May 1967 4,070
Total 5, 55
a. Restored to operation by the end of 1966, but operation probably was again disrupted in March 19 7 by strike on the Viet Tri Powerplant.
b. Two strikes within the period.
c. Unknown. Relocation of much of the mill's equipment is believed to have permitted restoration of perhaps a significant share of
national capacity.
d. Percent of chemical fertilizer capacity (excluding apatite and phosphate rock). This plant represents total national capacity for
nitrogen fertilizer production.
e. Pig iron only. It is not possible to determine the plant's relative share of fabrication work.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Ta or Railroad Yards and Railroad Shops Attacked Lander the Ruling Thunder Program
1965-66, First Quarter of 1967, and April-May 1967
JCS Target
Number
Vinh Classification Yard N.W.
26, 27 May
Main line interdicted in four places;
four sidings interdicted
1 Jun
2,4 Aug
20 Sep
Damage to switching wye, rail sidings,
tracks, and buildings
Yen Bai Yard
11, 13, 14 Jul
Damage to rolling stock; lines
interdicted in numerous places
Ninh Binh
26, 27, 28, 30 Sep
Cratered
1 Oct
Subtotal: 1965
Vinh Classification Yard N.W. 18 Feb 75 percent of capacity destroyed as of N.A.
4, 24 Apr the end of 1966
1, 22 May 25X5
9 Jul
20, 2T, 29, 31 Dec
Thai Nguyen Railroad 29 Apr 20 percent of capacity destroyed as of 400
Station Yard and Shops 5, 8, 22 May the end of 1966
10 Jun
2 Aug
23 Apr Cratered. At 'east 20 railroad cars
27 Jun destroyed
5Dec
12, 13, 19 May Approximately 50 percent of capacity
1, 12, 23 Jun destroyed at end of 1966
22 Jul
18, 21 Aug
21, 23, 24, 25 Sep
1, 2 Oct
21, 22, 23, 31 Dec
Cost of
Restoration
(Thousand US $)
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
l t I. L I. I 1 [. I I l t
Major Railroad Yards and Railroad Shops Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965-66, First Quarter of 1967, and April-May 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number Name
1966
(Continued)
14, 18, 31 May Cratered
12 Jun
9, 24 Aug
14 Sep
26, 29 Oct
10, 13, 23, 28, 29,
31 Dec
Cost of
Restoration
(Thousand US t)
N.A. 25X1
5 percent of capacity destroyed as of 420
Yard the end of 1966
Hanoi Railroad Car Repair Shops 14 Dec 3 support buildings destroyed and 1
and Classification Yard, Gia Tam severely damaged, 1 warehouse destroyed
and 1 severely damaged, 1 possible repair
shop destroyed, and 2 unidentified
buildings destroyed
6 percent of capacity destroyed as of the
end of 1966.
Vinh Classification Yard N.W. 5, 7, 8, 9, 14 Jan 50 percent of capacity destroyed as of
25, 27 Feb 31 March 1967.
1, 3, 12 Mar
Thai Nguyen Railroad Station Yard 17, 29 Jan 90 percent of rail yard capacity and 50 770
and Shops 3 Feb percent of repair facility destroyed
as of 31 March 1967.
14, 16, 18, 24, Cratered
25 Sep
25, 27, 28 Oct
22 Nov
18, 19, 20, 31 Dec
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Na or Railroad Yards and Railroad Shops Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1955 55, rust quarter of 1967, and A= it-'..ay 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Number
January-March 1967
(Continued)
Thanh Hoa Yard
Nam Dinh Yard
Ninh Binh
Subtotal: January-March 1967
Cost of
Restoration
(Thousand US $)
10, 28, 29 Jan 100 percent of capacity destroyed as of N.A.
2, 4, 5, 14, 18 31 March 1967.
Feb
6, 7, 13, 21, 23
Mar
10, 13, 25 Jan Cratered
6, 14, 26 Feb
5, 6, 13, 14, 16
Mar
5, 6, 14, 21, 22, Cratered
26 Jan
18 Feb
12, 16, 23 Mar
1, 4, 6, 13, 16,
24, 25, 26 Apr
5, 7 May
Thai Nguyen Railroad Station 18, 30 Apr
Yard and Shops 2, 21, 24 May
13, 14, 16, 17, 18,
21 Apr
25, 26 May
19 Apr Approximately 30 percent destroyed
2, 7, 17, 22, 24, as of 31 May. No through capability.
25 May
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
I I l I l I I 1 1. l t 1
."~ia,ior Railroad Yards and Railroad Shops Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Prograr._
1965-66, First Quarter of 1967, and Aprii-May 1967
(Continued)
JCS Target
Pvumber
April-Ma- 1967
Continued
Cost of
Restoration
(Thousand US $)
Yen Vien Railroad Classification 5, 13, 20 May 47 percent of support floor plan area 1,660
Yard destroyed/dismantled.
21 percent of SW warehouse area
destroyed/dismantled.
6 percent of NE warehouse area
destroyed/dismantled.
Hanoi Railroad Car Repair Shops and 25, 28 Apr 16 percent of floor plan area of
Classification Yard, Gia Lam repair facilities and 27 percent of
floor plan area of support buildings
destroyed
16, 28 Apr
8, 12, 14, 17, 20,
25 May
3.100
5,160
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
2arizir.e Ports Attacked Under the Rolling 7runde' P ogran
1965 and 1966
First Quarter of 1967 and April-May 1967
Percent of
Percent of National National Cargo
JCS Target Maritime Cargo-Handling Percent of Target Handling Capacity Cost of Restoration
Number Name Capacity Dates of Attack Capacity Destroyed Destroyed (`h-nisand US 511
Ben Thuy 4 5, 6, 8 Jun
9, 10, 11, 17, 19,
21 Jul
Ham Rong 1 14, 16, 18 Jul
Subtotal: 1965
Ben Thuy 4 1 Feb
8 Mar
30, 31 Oct
4, 9 Nov
6 Dec
Cam Pha Port a/ 16 24 Apr
8 Nov
85 3.4 590
25X5
7, 9, 14, 23 Jan 85
24, 25, 26 Apr J
24, 25, 26 May
1,410
`,trikcS .:ere not _ nducted aEa`ns rt facilities but against related areas such as coal-treatment facilities ,ha~,_. Wort
operations and resulted in export losses. Estimated cost at Can Pha is the cost of damage to support areas.
b. Because of incomplete post-strike bomb damage assessment, total damage has not been estimated.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
I I I I I I I I I r l
North Vietnam: Destruction and Damage of Transport Equipment
1965-66, First Quarter 1967, and April-May 1967
type of Equipment
Locomotives
Rail freight cars
Trucks
Ferries
Barges
Other watercraft
Quarterly
1965 - 10 Months 1966 - 12 Months Average 1966 First Quarter 1967 April-May 1967
Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged
6 6 10 14 2.5 3.5 0 0 0 6
227 592 1,101 935 275 234 61 84 84 271
318 487 1,935 1,801 484 450 178 172 487 3 13
53 56 67 131 17 33 0 1 0 4
263 487 2,520 4,289 630 1,072 453 1,313 1,093 1,788
144 210 867 1,372 217 343 79 234 31 31
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Strikes Against JCS-Targeted Bridges
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
1965
1966 a/
January-March
1967 a/
April-May
1967_ a,
Strikes
Bridges
Strikes
Bridges
Strikes
Bridges
Strikes
Bridges
Rail and Rail/Highway
67
14
110
16
20
6
38
11
Highway
77
30
76
23
28
12
39
14
Total
144
4 4
186
339
4+8
18
77
a. Including bridges struck initially before the time period.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
I I I I 1 1. 11. 1 1 1 1
Bomb Damage Assessment of Bridges in North Vietnam a/
1965 - May 1967
Total Serious Damage
Bridges Damaged
Occurrences
(Including Initial Hits
and Re-hits)
Type of Bridge
Total
Seriously
Moderately
Total
Original
Bridge
Bypass
Bridge
Total
418
385
33
621
556
65
Highway 306
276
30
424
405
19
Railroad 80
79
1
144
112
32
Combination
Railroad-Highway 32
30
2
53
39
14
a. Damage to bridges confirmed by available photography.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program I/
January-May 1967
JCS Target
Number
Son La Army Bks/Hq Mil Reg NW/Sup Dep
Ha Deng Army Bks/Supply Depot
Vinh Yen Army Bks/Training Area N
Chap Le Army Bks NW
Percent of
Targeted
National
Capacity Dates of Attack
1.2 19 Apr (initial strike),
20 Apr
0.3 5 Feb (initial strike)
2.0 26 Mar; 2, 3, 8, 9,
14 Apr; 3, 7, 9 May
1.1 5 May (initial strike),
12, 14, 22 May
0.7 13 May (initial strike),
25 May
0.3 24 Jan; 4, 10, 12, 13,
23, 24, 25, 28 Mar;
4, 9, 21, 27 Apr
0.5 29 Jan; 2 Feb; 5, 6, 7,
9, 12, 14, 20, 21, 21,
23, 25, 26 Mar; 2, 3,
4, 7, 13, 22, 25 Apr
0.3 25, 28 Jan; 1 Feb; 4, 6,
7, 10, 10, 11, 11, 16,
17, 19, 24 Mar; 4, 9,
10, 10 Apr
Percent of Target Capacity
Destroyed as of
Cost of Restoration
for Damage Inflicted
(Thousand US $)
36 36 36
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
66 96 96
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
48 48 48
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
39 52 52
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
36 36 36
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
Jan-Mar 1967 Apr-May 1967
0 950
0
25X5
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Progran a/
January-May 1967
(Continued)
Percent o_'
Percent of Target Capacity
Cost of Restoration
for Damage Inflicted
JCS Target
Targeted
National
f Attack
D
t
End 1965 End 1966 1 May 1967
Jan-Mar 1967 Apr-May 1957
Number
Capacity
es o
a
4 74 74
0 0
Mu Gia Pass Supply/Staging Point
7
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
Xom Bang Army Bks E
7, 8, 9, 12, 17, 22,
97 97 97
0 0
24, 27 Mar; 7, 7 Apr
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
Vinh Army Bks NW/Supply Depot
93 93
Kep Army Bks S
19 May (initial strike),
(inactive) (inactive)
J b/ b/
330
Chi Ne Army Bks
Quang Kbe Army Bks
31 May
1 Mar (initial strike),
24 Mar; 3 May
21 Feb; 25 Apr; 11, 25,
N.A.
Vinh Linh Army Bks E, Lien Cong
31 May
7, 11, 11, 19, 24, 29,
90 90 90
0 0
29 Mar; 7, 11, 12 Apr
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
Vinh Linh Army Bks NW, Xon Cho
0.3
10, 19, 29, 30 Mar;
87 87 87
30 Apr
(inactive) (inactive) (inactive)
Van Dien Army Supply Depot
1.9
19 May (initial strike)
J L/ J
Subtotal
Total: January-May 1967
Total: 1966
Total: 1965
Grand total
a. Cost of damage to non-targeted barracks is given under "Miscellaneous Targets of Armed Reconnaissance.
b. Facility not struck.
c. Total damage inflicted, including that from strikes in March.
385 4,130
4,515
2,54=. 25X5
16,000
23,060
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
Target as a Percent
JCS Target of National
Number Name Targeted Capacity
,,,a S an
Dien Bien Phu
Dong Hoi
Vinh
Subtotal: 1965
Dien Bien Phu
Dong Hoi
Subtotal: 1966
Cumulative
Percent of National
Percent of Target Targeted Capacity Cost of Restoration 2 5X1
Dates of Attack Utility Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US $)
25 Jun; 23 Se-; 24 Oct
2, 8 Jul
30 Mar; 6 Jun; 1 Jul;
17, 22, 23 Sep
94
(inactive)
53
(inactive)
10
(inactive)
94
(inactive)
53
(inactive)
67
(inactive)
a. Including that capacity destroyed or inactive at airfields not attacked during the time period.
b. !Rot JCS-targeted.
c. As of the end of April.
13 25X5
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
(Continued)
Cumulative
Target as a Percent
Percent of National
JCS Target
of National
Percent of Target
Targeted Capacity
Cost of Restoration
d US $)
(
Number
Name
Targeted Capacity
Dates of Attack
Utility Destroyed
Destroyed or Inactive
Thousan
Apr-May 1967
Hoa Lac
b/
24 Apr (initial strike),
N.A.
6
28 Apr; 1 May
Dong Hci
67
6
(inactive)
Haiphong/Kien An
7
10 May (initial strike);
N.A.
N.A.
4
14, 25 May
Kep
10
24 Apr (initial strike);
40
4
236
1, 7, 21, 21 May
246
23 J J
23 c/
641
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
.,avai bases . tac ed - j.ua_ the idling rounder ?rcgrao
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
Cumulative
Target as a Percent Percent of National Naval
JCS Target of National Naval Percent of Base Base Support Capacity Cost of Restoration
Number Name Base Support Capacity Dates of Attack a/ Utility Destroyed Destroyed or Inactive (Thousand US fi)
1965
Hon Gai/Bai Chay Port
Naval Complex
17 6 Aug; 28 Oct; 14 2 25X5 28
4 Nov
10 4, 5 Apr 78 10 230
(inactive)
10 20 May; 12 Sep 78 8 815
15 2 Mar; 28 May; 21, 24, 47 7 25X5 400
27, 28 Sep
10 15 Mar 78 10 1
(inactive)
Quang lose, Cuu Dinh 15 3 Apr
Subtotal: Apr-May 1967
Total
7
19
19 b/ Negl.
1,575
Dates of attack indicate only assignod strikes; in certain instances more attacks haze been made against a specific target than is indicated below.
b. Including that capacity destroyed or inactive at naval base support facilities not attacked during the time period.
`3
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Cost of Damage to JCS-Targeted Radar Sites
Inflicted Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
JCS
t
Destroyed
Total Value or Damaged
Targe
(Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
Number
Vinh Son
1 Track Dish - fire control 245
245
2 SCR-270 - early warning 270
270
3 Firecan - fire control 1,000
645
1 Cross Slot - early warning 135
0
1 Spoonrest A - early
warning 135
0
Bach Long Vi
1 Cross Slot - early warning 135
135
Hon Matt
2 Cross Slot - early warning 270
270
Hon Nieu
1 Cross Slot - early warning 135
135
My Due
1 Cross Slot - early warning 135
0
1 Rus-2 - early warning 135
0
1 SCR-270 - early warning 135
0
1966
Vinh Son
1 SCR-270 - early warning 135
0
L lirecan - fire control 335
335
2 Firecan - fire control 670
374
1 Cross Slot - early warning 135
0
1 Spoonrest A - early
warning 135
135
Bach Long Vi
1 Cross Slot - early warning 135
80
Hon Matt
None 0
0
Hon Nieu
None 0
0
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Cost nt' Damage to JCS-Targeted Radar Sites
lnfli-'ted Under the Rolling Thunder Program
)65, 1966, and January-May 1967
(Continued)
JCS
:nrget
Number
Total Value
Destroyed
or Damaged
(Thousand US
(Thousand US
135
0
135
0
135
0
135
0
2,355
0
135
0
N.A.
0
135
0
270
0~
135
0,
135
0
135
0
70
0
320
0
2,010
0
335
0
270
(1
0 ]
166 (Cont-
Linuod
My .Doc 1 Cross Slot - early warning
Pus-2 - early warning
i]CR-270 - early warning
Vinh Son 1 SCR-270 - early warning
7 hirecan - fire control
1 Cross Slot - early warning
Unidentified
Bach Long Vi 1 Cross Slot - early warning
Hon Hiatt None
Hon Nieu 1 Kniferest B - early
warning
My Duc 2 Cross Slot - early warning
1 bus-2 - early warning
-1 .,CR-270 - early warning
I ;iniferest B - early warning
1 ;eamtrack - searchlight
crmtrol
I sock/Stonecake - height
lnder
6 i1 recan - fire control
1 >diiiff - fire control
2 Unidentified
Subtotal: Jan-Mar 1967
a. There were
no s
c
h
e
l
u
e
d
d
attacks and no known damage to these targets in the first
quarter of 1967.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Cost of Damage to JCS-Targeted Radar Sites
Inflicted Under the Rolling Thunder Program
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
(Continued)
JCS Destroyed
Target Total Value or Damaged
Number Name Radar Model (Thousand US $) (Thousand US $)
Vinh Son 1 SCR-270 - early warning 135 0
7 Firecan - fire control 2,355 0
1 Cross Slot - early warning 135 0
2 Unidentified N.A. 0
Hon Matt
Hon Nieu
My Due
1 Bar Lock - early warning,
ground controlled intercept
1 Kniferest B - early
warning
control 70 0
1 Rock/Stonecakc - height
finder 320 0
7 Firecan - fire control 2,355 0
1 Whiff - fire control 335 0
5 Unidentified N.A. 0
1 Kniferest B - early
warning
1 Beamtrack - searchlight
2 Cross Slot - early warning 270
1 Rus-2 - early warning 135
1 SCR-270 - early warning 135
0
2,62
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
II
Effectiveness of Countermeasures
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0 25X1
II. Effectiveness of Countermeasures
The major effect of the air attacks against North
Vietnam has been to force Hanoi to cope with extensive
disruption to normal economic activity. The greatest
effort has been required in the fields of transporta-
tion and.distribution, in order to keep supply lines
open to the South and to maintain the distribution of
essential economic and military supplies. A consider-
able effort has also been required to maintain the es-
sential level of output from North Vietnam's limited
industrial capacity in order to counter the effects of
air attack and to sustain a capability to support the
war in the South. These programs have forced signifi-
cant reallocations of manpower and rapid increases in
the flow of military and economic aid from other Commu-
nist countries.
Through the skillful and sometimes ingenious use of
a number of countermeasures, the North Vietnamese have
met with considerable success in withstanding the pres-
sure of US air power. These countermeasures are dis-
cussed in the following sections.
A. Civil Defense
The North Vietnamese have developed and continue
to improve an extensive civil defense system character-
ized by increased precautions to minimize casualties,
an extensive shelter system, the dispersal of large
parts of the urban population, and radical adjustments
in school, work, and marketing hours to avoid large
concentrations of people during daylight hours. This
system was an important factor in reducing the casualty
level during the recently intensified attacks against
Hanoi and Haiphong.
Of the measures employed to limit casualty
numbers, the North Vietnamese regard shelters as es-
pecially effective. In May of this year, an official
of the Ministry of Defense asserted that 95 percent
of all of. North Vietnam's air raid casualties were
people outside of shelters. Substandard shelter con-
struction was blamed for three of the 5 percent of casu-
alties sustained in shelters. During the third quarter
of 1966 there was an intensified program to refurbish
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
and to expand the shelter system. According to the
North Vietnamese press, some 55,000 shelters were
built in Haiphong during one ten-day period. In the
city of Vinh, it is claimed that every family has
its own shelter. Almost every area of the country
reports the construction of thousands of shelters and
many kilometers of trenches. Although the number of
shelters and protective facilities cannot be quanti-
fied, a new intensification of the program occurred
during the first quarter of 1967. Aerial photography
and reports of foreign observers make it obvious that
the program is extensive.
In addition to the shelter program, North
Vietnam has vigorously pursued a program of urban
evacuation and industrial dispersal.* Urban evacu-
ation was accelerated after the airstrikes on petro-
leum storage facilities near Hanoi and Haiphong in
mid-1966 and has acquired a new momentum after the
strikes in these areas during the past months. Most
cities appear to have evacuated a substantial por-
tion of their population. Foreign observers and the
North Vietnamese press agree that Hanoi and Haiphong
have probably evacuated half their population. Ninety
percent of the population of Hai Duong city is reported
to have been evacuated, and only 2,000 of Thai Binh's
19,000 residents are reported to remain. Nam Dinh re-
portedly has reduced its population of 95,000 to
20,000 or 30,000.
The urban evacuation that has been achieved
probably approximates the desired level. In fact,
recent North Vietnamese newspaper accounts of evacu-
ation appear to be more concerned with migitating
the problems encountered in resettling than with en-
couraging further evacuation. Unsanitary conditions,
separations among families, and a cool reception
by residents in resettlement areas continue to have
an adverse effect on evacuees. Moving people out
of cities, the mayor of Hanoi has conceded, is less
a problem than providing them with supplies, housing,
schools, and means for earning a livelihood. Despite
the difficulties of the program, the reduction of
urban populations is regarded by the regime as a
prudent measure and has been credited with limiting
the number of casualties.
*In ustria dispersal is discussed in C.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The North Vietnamese population is apparently
well disciplined and responsive to civil defense meas-
ures. The intensification of US air attacks has meant,
however, that routine activities have become increasingly
disrupted. In an attempt to minimize the disruptive
effect of air, 'raid alerts -- reported to number as
many as 18 a day -- North Vietnam has modified alert
procedures for port workers in Haiphong and Hon Gay.
(stevedores are
required to continue working after air alerts are
signaled, taking cover only at the sound of antiair-
craft fire. Similar steps have been taken in Hanoi
to reduce the harassing effect of air raids. Report-
edly, no alarm is sounded in the capital city until
hostile aircraft have entered within a radius of 20
to 30 kilometers of the city. In some instances, for-
eign observers in Hanoi have noted that air raid
alerts have coincided with the first bursts of anti-
aircraft artillery or the sound of exploding bombs.
B. Air Defense Countermeasures
During the past three years the Hanoi regime
has developed North Vietnam's air defenses from a
relatively rudimentary state into a complex, sophisti-
cated system. The system now includes an integrated
network of radar sites, interconnected by filter
centers and communications facilities, and a wide
spread deployment of SAM missiles, MIG aircraft, and
conventional antiaircraft guns. The number of anti-
aircraft guns of all calibers increased from about
1,200 in February 1965 to about 6,000 two years later.
Since the introduction of the Soviet-supplied
SAM system into North Vietnam in mid-1965, at least
180 SAM sites have been constructed. SA-2 missile
battalions currently are deployed in from 28 to 32
of these sites, with the remainder of the sites add-
ing to the overall flexibility of the system. North
Vietnam's radar order of battle has increased in
size from 24 pieces of equipment in 1962 to 434 pieces
in February 1967. Electronic equipment of higher
quality and sophistication has added further to the
coverage provided. North Vietnam's current inventory
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
as of the end of May of nearly 90 MIG aircraft*
was lower than the 1966 inventory of about 110 air-
craft because of losses inflicted by US forces.
Stepped-up employment of MIG's in their air defensive
role, however, has been noted in recent periods in
the Hanoi/Haiphong area. Although enemy aircraft
have not yet inflicted major losses on US air
forces, their presence has posed a threat which
has sometimes caused US pilots to jettison ordnance
short of the assigned targets.
The growing threat presented by North Vietnam's
air defense system is illustrated by defensive activi-
ties encountered by US forces while carrying out at-
tacks against the Hanoi Transformer Station during a
nine-day period in April and May of this year. Enemy
air defense operations over this target, which is
about seven miles north of Hanoi, included multiple
SAM firings, harassing flights of MIG's, and heavy
antiaircraft fire. US forces, made up of a minimum
of 56 strike aircraft, suffered damage amounting to
five aircraft lost; one mission was forced to abort
short of the target; and several aircraft had to
jettison their ordnance in order to react to MIG at-
tacks.
As shown in the tabulation below, the primary
cause of US losses over North Vietnam is conventional
ground fire. The threat imposed by SAM missiles, how-
ever, presumably accounts indirectly for an unknown
percentage of these losses because it forces US air-
craft to fly at lower altitudes lying within the
range of the antiaircraft guns,.
Including approximately 30 MIG's believed to be
filling a reserve role at bases in Communist China.
IN%
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
US
Aircraft
Cause Losses Percent
Ground fire/other 493a/ 85
SAM 6417/ 11
MIG 23b/ 4
Total 580 100
a. Including nine GVN aircraft, which were
lost to ground fire in 1965.
b. Including possible/probable downings
from these causes.
In view of the buildup in the enemy's air de-
fense system, US losses over North Vietnam have remained
surprisingly low, and the overall rate actually has
declined as the hostilities have progressed. The lower
trend in US losses has been especially apparent since
the spring of 1966. A comparison of US and VNAF loss
rates by year for operations over North Vietnam is
shown below:
Year
Total
Attack
Sorties
Combat
Losses a/
Losses as a
Percent of Total
Attack Sorties
1965
25,940
173
0.67
1966
82,170
284
0.35
1967b/
40,840
123
0.30
a. Excluding operational losses due to
equipment failure.
b. January-May.
There are some indications, however, that the
favorable decline in the loss rate may be reversed if
there is continued escalation in the number of US at-
tacks against industrial and military targets in the
densely populated northern areas of North Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The loss rate for attacks on JCS-designated fixed
targets within a 10-mile radius of Hanoi and asimilar
area around Haiphong during the 41-day period from
April 20, 1967 to May 31, 1967 was 3.1 percent,
compared with the 1967 average for all areas of
about 0.30 percent. About 60 percent of US combat
losses during the period January-May 1967 were
over Route Packages 5 and 6, although only about
15 percent of total attack sorties were flown
over these areas. These route packages are defended
by almost 67 percent of the enemy's inventory of 37
to 57 millimeter guns and more than 90 percent of
the inventory of 85 to 100 millimeter guns. Further-
more, an increasing threat from SAM defenses is ap-
parent from the following tabulation which gives
SAM missiles fired by North Vietnam per 100 attack
sorties flown over Route Packages 5 and 6.
Attack Missiles
Missiles Fired
Year and Month
Sortiesa/ Fired
Per 100 Sorties
1966
March-April
900 64
7.1
May-June
770 65
8.4
July-August
2,900 389
13.4
September-October 2,350 144
6.1
November-December 2,030 384
18.9
1967
January-February
1,430 394
27.6
March-April
2,650 558
21.1
May
2,048 556
27.1
a. Rounded to the nearest 10.
As shown above, in the first five months of
this year, more.than 20 SAM missiles were launched
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
by the North Vietnamese for every 100 attack sorties
flown over the northern route packages by US air
forces. The effectiveness of the SAM response to US
attacks should be increased by the recent indications
that Soviet personnel have assumed more control over
SAM operations.
C. Decentralization of Industry
Although North Vietnam asserted the importance
of local industry and called for its continued growth
long before the country was subjected to US bombing,
the country's main industrial objective before 1965
was to establish a heavy industrial base consisting of
large capital-intensive plants. The advent of US air-
strikes in 1965 forced an admitted reversal of these
priorities and resulted in a renewed and sharply in-
creased emphasis on local industry, which was to be
expanded through the dispersal of industry from po-
tential urban target areas as well as through the con-
struction of small facilities supplied with new equip-
ment.
Dispersal of existing facilities reportedly be-
gan early in 1965, just before the start of the Roll-
ing Thunder program. It is estimated that most dispersal
has involved those facilities -- small factories and
cooperatives -- with easily moved machines and easily
divisible production processes. Dispersal has been ap-
plied both to facilities in urban areas and to those
near probable targets in the rural provinces.
The extent of dispersal of even small facilities
in 1965 and 1966, however, is unclear. Several con-
flicting reports have been received on dispersal of
industry in Hanoi and Haiphong, some suggesting almost
total economic dispersal of industry, others emphasiz-
ing the large numbers of facilities still operating.
The mayor of Hanoi, in an interview with a Czechoslovak
reporter' in January 1967, said that, although several
enterprises were evacuated from the city, there were
still more than 200 industrial enterprises of various
sizes remaining. The North Vietnamese press also has.peri-
odically criticized the slow pace of dispersal. On
the other hand, there is little doubt that many small
facilities have been dispersed, and the movement
11-7
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
probably has been stepped up since the heavy raids in
the vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong in the spring of
1967. One Czechoslovak report from Haiphong, dated
29 April, said that production in several industrial
plants has been stopped and will be transferred else-
where.
Only two large industrial facilities -- both
textile plants which accounted for about 75 percent of
the national weaving capacity -- are known to have been
extensively dispersed. Evacuation of the Nam Dinh
Textile Mill probably began even before it was unin-
tentionally damaged by an airstrike in July 1965, and
all spinning and weaving equipment probably was dispersed
by the spring of 1966. Photography confirms the absence
of equipment in a sizable area of the plant. North
Vietnamese films show that the 8 March Textile Mill
in Hanoi also had a large part of its capacity re-
moved by early 1966. The Hanoi Engineering Plant is
the only large plant reported to have dispersed some
equipment, but this plant also has had new equipment
installed at the original site.
North Vietnam's heavy industrial plants gen-
erally are not easily dispersed because of technolog-
ical considerations and/or because of the size of
equipment involved. Photography has even shown re-
cent construction activity at the 8 March Textile Mill
in Hanoi, at the Hanoi Chemical Fertilizer Plant, and
adjacent to the Hanoi Engineering Plant. This activity
remains unexplained and conceivably is not associated
with industrial expansion. The phychological effects
of the recent strikes near urban areas cannot be dis-
counted, however, and a determined effort may be under
way or in planning to disperse parts of heavy indus-
trial plants -- perhaps machine shops from the large
engineering plants and batch operations at the large
chemical plants -- which may not have been affected
before. Nevertheless, such industrial processes as
the blast furnace operations at Thai Nguyen, chlorine
production at Viet Tri, and the kiln operations at
the Haiphong Cement Plant still would not lend them-
selves to dispersal.
Little is known about the locations to which
the evacuated equipment is taken. Most North Vietnamese
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
commentary refers to movement to the "countryside."
The return to Hanoi at night of many evacuees from
the city suggests that the facilities dispersed from
the city may not have been moved very far. Some fa-
cilities, however, have been moved to the mountainous
northwest, reportedly to take advantage of the power
potential presented by the presence of numerous small
streams. This movement also fits in with North Viet-
nam's longstanding interest in settling and culti-
vating the land in the northwest. Several locations
have been reported as sites for dispersed equipment
from the Nam Dinh Textile Mill, ranging from near Nam
Dinh to 50 to 100 miles distant. Caves, jungle, and
other natural protection or camouflage are utilized
whenever possible in order to provide maximum protec-
tion against air attack.
On balance the decentralization program prob-
ably has been successful from North Vietnam's stand-
point. Efficiency of production and some production
per se certainly has been lost in the evacuation pro-
cess as well as in the installation of equipment in
less than ideal circumstances. Probably more impor-
tant, though, has been the accelerated establishment
of new machinery and repair shops, new food-process-
ing facilities, new irrigation facilities, and new
handicrafts, all of which have added to the economy
of the rural areas without detracting from the econ-
omy elsewhere.
D. Countermeasures on Lines of Communication
LOC s
1. Construction and Repair Activity
The main effect of the Rolling Thunder
program against LOC's in North Vietnam has been a
strenuous and successful effort by the North Vietnam-
ese to keep all important transportation routes open
to traffic. Besides diversifying the means of trans-
port to include greater use of inland waterways and
porter trails, the North Vietnamese have constructed
multiple bypasses at road and railroad bridges on all
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
important stream crossings, built alternate roads, and
upgraded the rural road system to provide alternatives
to heavily bombed routes. The program of counter meas-
ures has had equal priority on LOC's in North Vietnam
and the Laos Panhandle and has been accomplished at
relatively low cost because of a willingness and ability
to use primitive methods and materials. The net effort
in terms of logistic supply capability has been to make
North Vietnamese transport more flexible than before
the bombing by offering more choices of possible cross-
ings and routes by which to supply the Communist war
effort in South Vietnam. Added routes, moreover, fur-
ther reduce a rather low average daily tonnage require-
ment per LOC.
The success of the North Vietnamese in out-
pacing the damage inflicted on LOC's by airstrikes can
be measured by the change in the number of bypasses
built over stream crossings.* A comparison of the
period from the start of the bombing through September
1966 with the period from October 1966 through May
1967
shows that the average number of separate bypasses
for
damaged bridges increased from 0.98 to 1.19 per highway
bridge and from 0.51 to 0.87 per railroad and combina-
tion railroad/highway bridges.** In addition, the
Communists are in a less vulnerable position because
they have had time to put in alternative crossings
even at points not yet struck. In addition to the
construction of bypasses, the North Vietnamese often
repair the original bridge if the damage is not too
*Bypasse zs ncZude temporary bridges, fords/culverts,
ferries, and pontoon and cable bridges.
**A study of the Dong Dang to Hanoi tine and the
tines to Haiphong and to Vinh shows a ratio of Z.64
bypasses per rail and combination bridge or almost
twice as high as for all rail lines.
25X1
4W
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0 25X1
extensive, if the bridge is not too long, or if the
terrain is too rugged to rapidly construct multiple
bypasses.
Greater speed in repairs during 1966-67
can be directly attributed to an extensive develop-
ment of bypasses and to a variety of deception tech-
niques. To augment traditional bypasses such as
fords, ferries, and timber bridges, more use was ob-
served in 1966 of prefabricated movable spans, steel
cable bridges, and camouflage. The use of a variety
of multiple stream crossings suggests that the only
effective way for airstrikes to render a crossing
unserviceable is to destroy the original bridge and
all bypasses simultaneously -- a very difficult
and costly tactic.
A slightly different but equally effective
pattern of countermeasures emerges in the Laos Pan-
handle where an interdicted bridge or ford is usually
bypassed by construction of a short road around the
entire chokepoint. Crossings that have been repeatedly
bombed take on a cobweb pattern of bypass roads, of
which one is serviceable most of the time.
New road construction and the upgrading of
rural roads and trails also provides the North Vietnam-
ese with additional supply routes to counteract the
effects of the bombings and reduce the tonnage per road.
In North Vietnam during 1966 a system of alternative
roads was built to bypass the.main coastal route 1A
between Thanh Hoa and Quang Khe, while a new border
crossing road into Laos was built as a supplement to
route 15 through Mu Gia Pass. The pattern of road con-
struction in the Laos Panhandle during the 1967 dry
season has emphasized many short bypasses around
heavily interdicted points on the existing road sys-
tem that was so greatly expanded during 1966. The ex-
tension of route 922 east into the A Shau Valley of
South Vietnam has been the most strategically important
new road built thus far in 1967 and the first time
a part of the Ho Chi Minh Trail has been made into
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
a motorable road across the border into South
Vietnam (see the map, Figure 5).
2. Manpower Involved in Countermeasures
The most important resources employed
by the North Vietnamese in their countermeasures
on lines of communication have been mass labor and
local materials. It is estimated that up to
125,000 workers and Chinese engineering troops,
the latter north of Hanoi, are currently engaged in
the full-time repair of LOC's in North Vietnam and
in the Laos Panhandle (72,000 North Vietnamese, up
to 34,000 Chinese engineering troops north of Hanoi,
and 19,000 North Vietnamese Army troops and Pathet
Lao in the Laos Panhandle). The use of part-time
workers primarily from the agricultural sector has
added at least 100,000 to 200,000 additional day
laborers for road, rail, and bridge repair work as
needed. About 40 percent of the workers in North
Vietnamese repair crews are women.
3. Effectiveness of Bombing Bridges
The bombing of bridges in North Vietnam
has been unsuccessful in reducing the flow of men
and material toward South Vietnam. Moreover, bridge
targets have been very costly in terms of planes
lost and have been effectively and quickly bypassed
when they were destroyed.
A sample of 49 JCS-numbered bridges has
been analyzed in detail to determine the effective-
ness of bombing bridges in North Vietnam as a tactic
to interdict traffic. Since the start of the Rolling
Thunder program in February 1965, the US and the
South Vietnamese have bombed 49 out of a total of
61 JCS-targeted bridges in North Vietnam. During
the numerous strikes and restrikes against these
bridges, at least 37 planes were lost with a total
value of about $74 million.
The North Vietnamese have been able to
offset the effects of bomb damage to bridges by
constructing multiple bypasses for every chokepoint
bridge in the country. (For an example of this type
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Nakhon Phon~~m?` Thakhek
Mukdahan
TH4ILAND
Mu G1a
D.ong Hoi
Don Ha
Quan Tri
SOUTH VIETNA
('r ~1.? A Shau
Ban B1
924
Saravane
CAN%ODIA
GULF OF TONKIN
Bouang
Nam
Is
Serviceable road during
1967 dry season
New service facility observed
along road Jan-May 1967
25 50
STATUTE MILES
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
of activity, see the photograph, Figure 6). Avail-
able photography shows that they have been able to
build 99 separate bypasses within the immediate
vicinity of 46 of the 49 JCS-targeted bridges or an
average of slightly more than two bypasses per
bridge.* A single bridge is a very difficult target
to destroy by aerial bombardment, and construction
of multiple bypasses at a crossing site further re-
duces the probability of effectively interdicting
a LOC. The following tabulation shows a breakdown
of the North Vietnamese countermeasures used to by-
pass 46 JCS targeted bridges:
Type of Bypass
Number
Alternative bridges
26
Pontoon bridges
15
Cable bridges
9
Ferries
31
Fords
18
Total
99
The construction of multiple bypasses, in
addition to ensuring a.flow of traffic for the North
Vietnamese, greatly increases the cost of the bombing
program to the US. In general it takes as many sorties
and as much ordnance to interdict bypasses as to in-
terdict the original bridge.** The cost to the US of
*Adequate photography is not available for the re-
maining three bridges.
''*If it is assumed, for example, that 10 tons of
supplies each day are moving over a LOC containing
one bridge, past performance suggests that one hit
on the bridge will be scored and traffic interdicted
if 47 bombs are dropped. The average ordnance load
carried by aircraft over North Vietnam is just under
2 tons. If the load consists of 500-pound bombs, it
takes approximately six sorties to interdict a bridge.
To interrupt the same 10 tons of traffic which can be
handled by three possible crossings -- the original
bridge or each of two separate bypasses -- 141 bombs:
in the 500-pound class must be expended and 18 sorties
flown.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
bombing, therefore, increases at a much more rapid
rate than the cost to the North Vietnamese because
the majority of the bypasses are low-cost expedients
which can be repaired rapidly. This cost relation-
ship is illustrated graphically in Figure 7.
E. Contingency Planning
Along with reacting to existing bomb damage,
the North Vietnamese have, since the inception of
the bombing, developed contingency plans -- counter-
measures taken before bombing occurs -- to cope with
escalation and shifts in emphasis of the Rolling
Thunder program. These contingency plans are diffi-
cult to separate from other reactions to existing
bomb damage and thus often not easily recognizable.
In addition, contingency plans-and countermeasures to
existing bomb damage must compete for the same scarce
resources.
The civil defense evacuation system in effect
in Hanoi and Haiphong before these areas were inten-
sively attacked and the elaborate system of bridge
bypasses are examples of ambitious contingency plan-
ning. The effective civil defense evacuation sys-
tem in the Hanoi-Haiphong area which was nearly
complete in early 1967 is credited with keeping
civilian casualties at remarkably low levels dur-
ing the recently intensified attacks against areas.
A number of unstruck North Vietnamese bridges have
highway and rail bypasses already in place in anti-
cipation of future possible strikes. Before the
Hanoi Highway and Rail Bridge over the Canal des
Rapides (JCS 13) was struck in late April, piers
for a bypass span had been in place for a number
of months, and bridge decking was stored on the
river bank. A 7.3-mile rail bypass and rail ferry
skirts the unstruck Hanoi "Doumer" Bridge
Despite an ability to transport an adequate
level of supplies to the South with its existing
although constantly attacked transportation network,
North Vietnam has continued to expand the capacity
of the network. For example, the Don Dang rail
line has been dual gauged and extended from Kep
to Thai Nguyen. An alternative road network to
25X5
"now
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
BY-PASSES FOR THE DESTROYED PHUONG DINH
RAILROAD & HIGHWAY BRIDGE
NAME: Among Dinh Combination Railroad and Highway Bridge.
I. O(A l l,: 7f-_l: 0, 5 Nautical Miles North of Yen Vuc Thuong on tht
i Vinh Rail Line and Route IA.
1~i1?Sl SII,,(I Sometime between July 1965 and September 1966
Ity September 1966, however, the bypasses were i rther
xpr rational or under construction. Main bridge ix
J,oppt d and is rinserviceable.
i YI'f: OF BYPASSES:
P!~~ limber hridcje serviceable to rail traffic
iglu 2 limber bridge for rail traffic, under construction
No. 3 - l irnber bridge: spans removed as a deception technia e but
.iiil serviceable for highway traffic
1`1\~ 4 Pkobably a timber bridge, serviceable for highway I r ;ffi
Figure 6, f `` ro~Ct~c: tr r thP r 7lC~Y'fY\/Pfi Pk nnn ninh Rnilrnnr~ nnfl Hinhwr, f?r (bit
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
EFFECTIVENESS OF BOMBING JCS TARGETED BRIDGES
IN NORTH VIETNAM - FEB. 1965-JAN. 67
BRIDGES
j s r RGETED BRIDGES,
~ q- 11-11-1 -,-B
I I I I I I I I I I
COSTS (Million Dollars)
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
OST OF DAMAGE TO BRIDGES
66963 6-67 CIA
Figure 7. Effectiveness of Bombing JCS Targeted Bridges in North Vietnam -
February 1965 - January 1967
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Route 1A is nearing completion south from Thanh
Hoa. Presumably Hanoi is preparing for the con-
tingency that the US will greatly escalate the
LOC campaign or mine Haiphong harbor, necessitat-
ing the use of this extra capacity.
In other areas, Hanoi's contingency plans
have been less ambitious because of the strain
placed on resource availability by countermeasures
to existing bomb damage. Although small portable
diesel electric power generators were received from
the USSR in small number during 1964 (22 in 1964)
purchases did not pick up to their present high rate
until the US had begun attacking thermal powerplants
in the southern route packages in mid-1965. Although
partial dispersal of several textile mills and some
handicraft industry took place in 1965, other major,
unstruck plants appear to be in full operation de-
spite their vulnerability.
Some dike and road interdiction contingency
plans appear to have been put into operation. Steel
mesh for repairing breaches has been reported in
storage along dikes. Piles of stone and earth have
been observed along roadsides; local village "vol-
unteer" crews are ready to fill crater holes.
F. Imports and Foreign Aid as Countermeasures
1. Economic Aid
The sharp and continuing rise in economic
aid to North Vietnam in the form of imports from the
other Communist countries has been an important coun-
termeasure to the bombing effort in North Vietnam.
(See Table 14 for the estimated volume of imports and
Table 15 for a listing of major imports from the USSR;
both tables following P. 19). This aid has risen from an
estimated $150 million in 1965 to $275 million in 1966,
and it seems to be increasing again in 1967. Most of
the aid extended through 1964 was for North Vietnam's
economic development program. The more recent aid
agreements make it clear that the Communist countries
have implicitly guaranteed to finance the economic
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
losses incurred by North Vietnam in its war effort.
An unconfirmed report following the Warsaw Pact
meeting in November 1966 stating that the Pact
countries had pledged $1 billion to support Hanoi's
war effort seems an indication of the effort that
the Communist countries seem willing to make.
The value of this aid can be seen princi-
pally in the rise in imports in the 1965 and 1966,
particularly the rise in imports of those goods sup-
porting the war effort.
The Communist countries have provided
substantial quantities of equipment for transporta-
tion, construction, power, communications, and main-
tenance programs. Furthermore, machinery and equip-
ment apparently have been made available for both
new and continuing aid projects which are not mili-
tary associated, although this category of aid goods
seemed to decline in 1966, and seems likely to de-
cline even further in 1967.
There have been sharp increases in im-
ports of machinery and equipment -- machine build-
ing shops, repair shops, small manufacturing enter-
prises, vehicles (road, rail, and water), heavy trans-
port and roadbuilding equipment, machine tools, small
diesel generators, and volumes of spare parts -- all
related to the repair and replacement of parts in the
transportation and power sectors of the economy and
to repair and reconstruction programs. The power
sector is particularly dependent on diesel generators
because the regular electric power industry has been
so heavily damaged by the bombing and because of the
decentralization of industry. Telecommunications im-
ports are another valuable but small-volume category,
with most military communications equipment supplied
by Communist China, probably by rail.
Petroleum products are an extremely large
volume import -- imports by sea increased to 200,000
tons in 1966 compared with 170,000 tons in 1965.
Early 1967 reports show another large increase.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Petroleum imports are essential to the transportation,
construction, and power sectors of the economy, par-
ticularly to the power sector since it has become so
dependent on diesel generators.
Almost all iron and steel products must
be imported because North Vietnam makes no steel,
although it produced pig iron at the Thai Nguyen Iron
and Steel Complex until recently. Products related
to the war effort -- such as barges, POL storage tanks,
pontoons, building members, possible bridge trusses,
and other structured shapes -- are fabricated at Thai
Nguyen and at other locations. Most of these metal
products come from the USSR and Japan by ship, although
Communist China probably ships some steel products by
rail. Imports of these metals by sea during 1966 were
double the volume in 1965.
Bulk foodstuffs imported by sea have in-
creased sharply in 1967. This increase parallels
the reports of losses of rice production in North
Vietnam in 1966, and it may also reflect internal dis-
tribution problems. Food imports could become impor-
tant if the-seeming food shortage worsens. Another
factor in the food supply has been the large and in-
creasing imports of fertilizers. Maintenance of the
food supply may be more difficult if the fertilizers
are not received and distributed properly.
The relative backwardness of North Vietnam's
economy, however, makes it less vulnerable than its de-
pendence on imports might suggest. The economy of North
Vietnam is still basically one of subsistence agricul-
ture, with an essentially self-sufficiency in food,
although continuation of the shortages reported in late
1966 could bring about a critical situation if imports
are cut off. Denial of imports to North Vietnam other-
wise would have minimal effect on the nonindustrial
economic organization generally. Even the loss of
transport equipment could be compensated for in the
domestic economy by the extensive use of manpower for
the transportation of necessary goods.
2. Military Aid
In addition to increasing their deliveries of
economic goods, the USSR and Communist China responded
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
to the Rolling Thunder program by increasing sharply
the levels of military assistance, as shown in the
following tabulation:
Million US $a/
Jan-Mar Apr-May
Country
1953-64
1965
1966
1967
1967
Total
USSR
70
200
360
90
93
813
Communist
China
70
45
85
27
23
250
Total
140
245
445
117
116
1,063
a. These values are based on Soviet foreign trade
prices (prices charged for similar equipment sold to less
developed countries), which are believed to most closely
approximate the true value of this equipment.
Deliveries of military equipment, which pre-
viously had been on a very small scale, reached an es-
timated $245 million in 1965 and $445 million in 1966.
Deliveries in the first five months of 1967 have been
at a slightly higher rate than that observed during
1966, and may increase even more during the remainder
of 1967.
Soviet and Chinese military aid programs
follow well-established lines which reflect the capa-
bilities of the donors. The USSR has provided heavier
and more advanced equipment such an antiaircraft guns,
radar, tanks, artillery, SAM systems, and most of the
advanced fighter aircraft. The Chinese have been the
major suppliers of trucks, small arms and ammunition,
and equipment for the ground forces. A breakdown of
the major items of Soviet and Chinese deliveries of
military equipment is shown in Tables 16 and 17,
following P..19.
In addition to deliveries of military
equipment, the USSR and Communist China have provided
military advisers and technicians to North Vietnam.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
The Chinese contribution in this area is far greater
than that of the USSR. Up to 48,000 Chinese support
troops are presently in North Vietnam working on the
construction, repair, and defense of transportation
facilities. in contrast, the number of Soviet mili-
tary technicians ranged between 2,500 and 3,000 dur-
ing 1965 and currently is estimated at from 1,000 to
1,500.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of Imports a/
1965, 1966, and January-March 1967
1965
1966
January-March 1967
Rail
320
420
N.A.
Seaborne
847
1,082
340
Total
1,167
1,502
N.A.
a. Estimated trade moving by rail and oceangoing transport.
Only a small amount moved by road and inland waterway routes.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
North Vietnam: Imports from the USSR J
1965, 1966, and January-March 1967
Bicycles
Motorcycles
Trucks
GAZ-63 J
ZIL-1301
Dump trucks J
Fire trucks
Other
GAZ-69 (jeep) 21
UAZ-450A (ambulance)
Rail (principally rails, new and used)
Air (parts and Mi-6 helicopters in 1966)
Sea (small craft and equipment)
Spare parts
Bulldozers
Scrapers
Graders
Cranes
Road rollers
Excavators
Value Value Value
(Thousand US $) Number Metric Tons (Thousand US $) Number Metric Tons (Thousand Number Metric Tons
8,735
6 96-,
2,970 6,297
82 5,500
2,412 517
189
788
3, 014
1,774
861
34,961 18,875 2,007 1,041
21,797 12,433
4,714 4,146 713 783 641
392 654 12 680 19
462 700 313
3,866 633 3,123 673 103 617
1,060 212 709
258 43 179
1,673 239 1,193 288 48 320
240 12 93
635 127 949 385 55 297
94 34 56
43 17 27
51 17 29
841 6,372
12,000 6 454 28 5
35 6 92
4,107 1,369
13,164 6,442 1,294 131 400
8,570 348 4,412 69 20 59
4,422 201 2,690
1,152 36 496 69 13 59
490 35 393
700 35 350 7
140 7 29
1,666 34 454
I
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Table 15
North Vietnam: Imports from the USSR a
1965, 1966, and January-March 1967
(Continued)
25X1
Value
(Thousand US $) Number
Metric Tons
Value
(Thousand US $) Number
Metric Tons
Va-ue
(Thousand US $) Number
Metric Tons
Other 62
480
250
100
124
Agricultural (tractors) 851
4,114 374
1,772
1,125 ill
217
Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, and Minerals
40
and Metals
13,217
19,261
212,250
T
3,
9,254
11,808
80,235
28
Aluminum
477
69
123
Iron
159
1,868
Steel (bars,
sheets, and shapes)
4,133
25,000
3,737
33,976
Bolts
376
627
Miscellaneous
and unspecified
1,888
17,159
Cable
1,669
1,192
Electrical
298
213
Other
1,371
979
Pipe
201
611
2,442
28
110
Wire
1,582
2,099
2,560
Sulfur pyrite
s
248
19,098
Miscellaneous
nonferrous metals
952
1,190
1,329
486
243
282
141
Instruments
933
2
1
Medicines
396
486
243
280
140
Chemicals
2,634
6,967
131,772
3,097
20,900
Fertilizer
1,543 39,100
4,861
121,516
760
19,000
Ammonium sulfate
3,984
99,605
760
19,000
Potassium chloride
877
21,911
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
North Vietnam: Impc?ts from the USSR J
1965, 1966, and January-March 1967
(Continued)
Value
;Thousand US $)
Number
Metric Tons
Value
(Thousand US $)
lumber
Metric Tons
Value
(Thousand US $)
Number
Metric Tons
DDT
100
2,261
Soda
431
6,536
50
749
Tires
627
8,800
1,351
819
2,286
33,132
1,145
46!
224
6 _
1
6
Textiles
6,415
8,420
5,261
2,801
Cotton
1,872
4,954
3,096
2,635
Yarn
1,183
661
413
166
Textiles
(million meters)
3,360
2,805
1,752
34
942
6,775
5,795
36,029
Flour
148
858
5,361
5,760
36,000
Milk
320
59
1,344
Miscellan
eous
15
25
70
35
29
1,135
5,340
26
126
Paper bag
s
294
1,306
Newsprint
841
4,042
26
126
665
1,264
26
Rubber bo
ots (pairs)
40
40,060
141
405
1
Shovels
330
330,000
380
80,000
8
Miscellan
eous, unknown, and uns
pecified
295
743
17
119,800
8,787
209,471
2,795
65,000
Benzine
329
10,294
Diesel
3,174
79,500
1965 1966 January-March '967
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
l I I 1 1. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
North Vietnam: Imports from the USSR /
1965, 1966, and January-March 1967
(Continued)
Diesel fuel (AK-15)
Diesel oil (DP-14)
Gasoline
Kerosene
Aviation oil (MK-22, MS-20)
Miscellaneous oil (spindle oil,
machine oil)
Grease
Mager
Paraffin
Miscellaneous and unspecified
Compressors
Marine diesels
Diesel motors
Diesel generators
Electric power units
Stern gears
Repair shops
Welding machines
Winches
Transformers
Dredges (suction)
Oil tanks
Miscellaneous and unspecified
Unknown and General
Total
Value
(Thousand US $)
Number
Metric Tons
Value
(Thousand US $)
Number
Metric Tons
Value
(Thousand US $)
Number
Metric Tons
43,200
1,777
57,325
1,397
22,175
1,534
42,100
2,455
76,727
970
26,800
481
15,500
1,117
7,700
164
1,950
235
3,737
1,175
1,175
7
225
150
454
617
19,909
341
132
33
199
262
436
6
5
5
90
88
120
54
114
194
1,329
236
394
7
7
3
20
33
56
44
77
77
86
35
35
50
20
16
36
372
12
93
218
216
20
15
120
36,260
3,526
10,075
133
711
i3, o65
37,333
74,894 92,434
508,645
a. The 1965 data is taken from the 1965 Soviet Statistical Handbook. The 1966 data is taken from shipping reports and includes no goods transported by rail;
all values are at least partially estimated for 1966. The 1967 data 'ncludes both sea and rail shipments, and covers items either
shipped or loaded in the first quarter of 1967. Some values are estima e .
b. These vehicles are listed in "Identification Handbook: Soviet and Satellite Ordnance Equipment".
c. In 1965 this item includes the categories Iron, Bolts, and Miscellaneous and Unspecified which are itemized separately for 1966 and 1967. The value figure
for 1966 is undoubtedly understated because of the volume listed for Miscellaneous and Unspecified in that year.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
:969 , _ anuar -
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US 5)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million '2S 3)
25X1
4cra1 value
200.0
360.0
90.0
93.0
Surface-to-air missile systems
72.0
77.0
40.0
25.5
Firing battalions
15
66.0
10
44.0
5
22.0
Replacement missiles
200
6.0
1,100
33.0
600
18.0
850
25.5
Aircraft
54
16.2
85
44.5
0
6
6.0
11-28 light jet bomber
8
2.8
MIG-21 jet fighter
11
8.8
26
20.8
5
4.0
MIG-15/17 jet fighter
32
4.2
42
5.5
Mi-6 helicopter
6
12.0
Mi-4 helicopter
7
1.4
U-MIG-15 jet trainer
3
0.4
An-24 medium transport
3
2.8
I1-18 heavy transport
1
2.0
1
2.0
Armor
20
0.5
20
0.5
0
0
196
11.e
T-54 medium tank
60
5.2
T-34 medium tank
70
3.6
P1-76 amphibious tank
5
0.3
5
0.3
42
2.2
SU-76 assault gun
5
0.1
5
0.1
4
0.1
BTR-40 AR
10
0.1
10
0.1
20
0.3
100-mm AAA
100
5.2
75
3.9
85-mm AAA
315
12.4
620
25.0
150
6.0
57-mm AAA
485
17.0
8oo
27.9
75
3.0
200
7.0
37-mm AAA
250
2.2
1,949
17.5
75
0.5
200
1.8
Field artillery (76-152-mm)
100
1.1
105
1.6
25
0.3
Radar
23
4.4
160
30.1
60
11.0
50
9.0
Trucks and vehicles
11000
5.0
11000
5.0
300
1.5
600
~.0
Small arms and infantry weapons
2.0
4.0
1.0
1.0
Ammunition
17,000 tons
62.0
33,000 tons
.123.0
9,000 tons
33.0
6,000 tons
c2. C,
I
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
I I l [, t t 1 1. 1 1 l I t
Table 17
25X1 25X1
Chinese Communist Military Aid to North Vietnam a!
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
1965
1966
January-March 1967 April-May 1967
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US $)
Quantity
(Units)
Value
(Million US 8)
Total Value
45.0
85.0
27.0
23.0
Aircraft
8
1.0
0
0
0
0
16
2.0
MSG-15/17 jet fighter
7
1.0
16
2.0
Naval craft
4.0
14
7.0
6
3.3
Shanghai-class PTF
4.0
P-6 class MTB
6
3.3
Light cargo ship
Artillery
300
5.3
100
3.5
0
100
57-mm AAA
100
3.5
loo
3.5
50
1.7
37-mm AAA
200
1.8
50
0.5
Radar
a
3.7
112
9.0
10
1.0
10
1.0
Trucks and vehicles
1,000
0
100
0.5
200
1.0
200
1.0
Small arms and infantry weapons
10.0
30.0
8.0
6.0
Ammunition
8,000 tons
20.0
15,000 tons
38.0
4,000 tons
10.0
3,0CG tons
7_5
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
III
Air Operations, January - May 1967
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0 25X1
III. Rolling Thunder Operations, January-May 1967*
A. Scale of Attack
The increasing intensity of the air war in
the first five months of 1967 resulted in more than
76,000 sorties of all types against targets in
North Vietnam. At this rate, sorties over a full
year would number approximately 180,000 -- a 22-
percent increase over 1966 and a 226-percent in-
crease over 1965.**
The Rolling Thunder program accounted for
about one-third of the total number of sorties flown
over Southeast Asia in the first five months of 1967,
compared with slightly more than 34 percent in 1966.
Sorties against targets in North Vietnam and Laos
combined accounted for more than one half of the
sorties flown in Southeast Asia -- approximately
the same share as in 1966. The total number and
percentage shares of sorties of all types in
each area of operation are shown in the follow-
ing tabulation:
*See Tables 18 through 24, following P. 10.
**Yearly projections cannot be precise, because
sortie rates have fluctuated between North Viet-
nam and Laos, especially when winter weather con-
ditions have dictated that missions that normally
would be targeted to North Vietnam be diverted to
Laos. Data based on only the first three months
of this year would have projected only an 8-percent
increase for sorties over North Vietnam for 1967
over 1966, compared with the 22-percent projection
.given above.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
WWI
25X1
'Jan-May 1967
Number
Percent
Number Percent
Number
Percent
of
of
of of
of
of
Area of Operation Sorties
Total
Sorties Total
Sorties
Total
North Vietnam 55,210
30
147,850 34
76,280
33
Laos 16,030
9
76,110 18
44,350
20
North Vietnam
and Laos Com-
bined 71,240
39
223,960 52
120,630
53
South Vietnam 110,310
61
204,120 48
108,390
47
Total Southeast
Asia 181,550
100
428,080 100
229,020
100
Beginning in March of this year, attacks
against heretofore immune industrial JCS designated
fixed targets have received increasing emphasis within
the Rolling Thunder program. Armed reconnaissance
strikes, however, continue to account for an over-
whelming percentage of activity. The shares of sor-
ties flown and ordnance delivered against JCS fixed
targets in North Vietnam are shown below:
a. A Z sorties flown and ordnance delivered over North
Vietnam equal 100 percent in each case.
Percent a/.
January-February March-May
1965 1966 1967,
1967
Sorties 25 1.8 1.6
4.1
Ordnance 37 2.8 4.0
7.6
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
During the period March-May 1967 larger
tonnages of ordnance were delivered against JCS
targets than the quarterly averages in both 1965
and 1966. As a result of the employment of new
aircraft capable of carrying heavier loads, higher
ordnance delivery rates were also achieved during
March-May of this year than in any preceding three-
month period. The number of sorties flown against
JCS targets in this period.was more than
three
times the number in 1966, although still
well be-
low 1965. A co
mparison of sorties flown
and ord-
nance delivered against JCS targets by three-
month period is shown in the following tabulation:
January-March March-May
1965 a/ 1966 a/ 1967
1967
Sorties 3,470 655
2,120
Ordnance
(tons) 3,200 890 2,070
3,780
a. Figures are quarterZy averages.
In addition to the increased number of sor-
ties flown against JCS targets, the Rolling Thunder
program during 1967 has been marked by an increasing
share of the armed reconnaissance effort being flown
as pre-planned strikes against fixed targets. During
1966, for example, armed reconnaissance strikes against
non-JCS designated fixed targets accounted for about
one-fourth of the total armed reconnaissance program.
During the January-May 1967 period, however, roughly
one-half of the armed reconnaissance sorties were flown
against these fixed targets.
During January-May 1967, almost 41,000 attack
sorties, or 54 percent of total Rolling Thunder sorties,
were flown against targets in North Vietnam. Attack
sorties as a percentage of total sorties dropped slightly
in North Vietnam, compared with 1966. This same trend
is identifiable in both South Vietnam and Laos. In
North Vietnam and Laos it reflects the need for
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
greater numbers of support aircraft to counter the
increasingly efficient Communist air defense system.
The percentages of total sorties made up by, attack
sorties in each area are shown in the following tabu-
lation:
Percent a/
North Vietnam
South Vietnam
Laos
Total Southeast Asia
1965
1966
January-May 1967
47
56
54
85 b/
79
77
68
64
58
70 b/
68
a. Total sorties equal 100 percent in every case.
b. US sorties only. Distribution of sorties by
the South Vietnamese Air Force over South Viet-
nam in 1965 is not available.
The air effort against North Vietnam continued
to be primarily a US undertaking, with sorties flown
by the South Vietnamese Air Force accounting for a
negligible percentage of the total. The share of
total sorties flown by each service over North Viet-
nam is presented in the following tabulation:
US Air Force
US Navy
US Marine Corps
Total US
Vietnamese Air Force
Total
1965
1966
January-May 1967
44
53
50
53
42
45
2
4
5
99
99
100
1
1
Negl.
100
100
100
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
B. Ordnance
Total ordnance delivered over North Vietnam
during January-May 1967 amounted to about 71,450 tons.
This amounted to 22 percent of total ordnance delivered
by all air operations in Southeast Asia, compared with
27 percent in 1966. As with sorties, the share of
total ordnance that is delivered over North Vietnam
increases as more favorable weather develops during
the summer months. A rise in the share of ordnance
delivered over North Vietnam from 20 percent at the
end of the first quarter of 1967 to 22 percent for
the first five months indicates a recurrence of this
trend. The tabulation below compares the share of
ordnance delivered in Southeast Asia in 1966 and
the first five months of 1967, by area of operation:
Ja
nuary-May 1967
Area of Operation
Tons Percent Tons
a/ Percent
North Vietnam
128,070 27 71,45
0 22
Laos
74,120 15 59,30
0 18
North Vietnam and
Laos combined
202,190 42 130,75
0 40
South Vietnam
278,050 58 194,31
0 60
Total Southeast
Asia
480,240 100 325,06
0 100
a. Tonnages for April and May are estimated.
The weight of ordnance delivered over North
Vietnam during January-May 1967 was almost 2.5 times
the amount delivered during the same period in 1966.
The rising trend results from increases both in the
numbers of sorties flown and in the average loads of
ordnance delivered per sortie. A comparison of the
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
average tonnage of ordnance delivered per attack
sortie in 1966 and in January-May 1967 is shown be-
low:
1966
Average Tonnage
Jan-May 1967
Average Tonnage
Area of Operation
per Attack Sortie
per Attack Sortie
North Vietnam
1.6
1.8
Laos
1.5
2.3
South Vietnam
1.7
2.3
Total Southeast Asia
1,6
2.2
C. Losses
The rate of losses sustained by aircraft par-
ticipating in the Rolling Thunder program continued to
show the decline noted during 1966. Total aircraft
losses over North Vietnam for the five months of 1967
totaled 142. This amounts to 3.5 downed aircraft per
1,000 attack sorties flown, compared with 3.9 in 1966
and 7.4 in 1965. Losses due to combat (excluding op-
erational losses due to equipment failure) were even
lower, totaling 3.0 per 1,000 attack sorties, compared
with the 1966 and 1965 rates of 3.5 and 6.7, respec-
tively. A comparison of aircraft losses as a percent
of attack sorties is as follows:
Year
Attack To
Sortie Los
tal a P
ses Atta
ercent of
ck Sorties
Combat a Percent of
Losses Attack Sorties
1965
25,940 19
2
0.74
173
1966
82,170 31
8
0.39
284
Jan-May
1967
40,840 14
2
0.35
123
0.30
2
25X1
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
A combination of factors probably has con-
tributed to the continuing improvement in the loss
rate in the face of North Vietnam's increasingly in-
tense employment of surface-to-air missile, MIG air-
craft, and conventional antiaircraft defenses. An
increased degree of pilot familiarization with ter-
rain and defenses apparently has resulted from assign-
ment of primary areas of responsibility to each US
service. Moreover, improved US electronic counter-
measure equipment and greater experience by US forces
in executing evasive tactics undoubtedly have de-
graded the accuracy of North Vietnam's antiaircraft
gunners and SAM personnel.
Current figures indicate, however, that the
favorable trend noted in the loss rate during 1966
and the first part of 1967 has had a slight reversal
in the period March-May of this year. Specifically,
loss rates during May of 4.1 per 1,000 attack sorties
based on total losses and 3.8 based on combat losses
were higher than corresponding figures of 3.9 and
3.5, respectively, for the year 1966. This trend
is shown in the following tabulation.
Year
and
Month
Attack
Sorties
Total
Losses
Total Losses as
a Percent of
Attack Sorties
Co
Lo
mbat
sses
Combat Losses as
a Percent of
Attack Sorties
1966
82,170
318
0.39
284
0.35
1967
Jan-Feb
12,050
37
0.31
28
0.23
March
8,500
28
0.33
23
0.27
April
8,960
31
0.35
29
0.32
May
11,330
46
0.41
43
0.38
As noted previously, attacks against targets
in the immediate vicinity of Hanoi and Haiphong in
late April and May have had loss rates as high as 31
per 1,000 sorties flown (see II,B, above).
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
Reports covering three-fourths of the losses
suffered by Rolling Thunder aircraft during the
1967 period to date indicate that 60 percent of these
losses due to combat damage were suffered over Route
Packages 5 and 6, despite the fact that only about
15 percent of total attack sorties were flown over
these areas during January-May 1967. This is
attributable to the great concentration of North
Vietnam's air defenses in these locations. The per-
cent of total losses and the percent of total sorties
flown, by Route Package during January-May 1967, are
as follows:
Locations of Combat Losses Over North Vietnam
January Through May 1967
Percent
Route Packages
I
II
III
IV
V
VI
Total
Losses
18
Negl.
14
8
10
50
100
Attack sorties
49
10
14
11
4
12
100
Losses per 1,000 attack sorties flown over
North Vietnam continued to be substantially higher
than for other areas of operation in Southeast Asia.
However, this rate decreased in all three areas com-
pared with 1966. The comparable figures are as
follows:
Aircraft Lost Per 1,000 Attack Sorties Flown
Area of Operation
North Vietnam
South Vietnam
Laos
All areas of operation
in Southeast Asia
1966
3.9
1.6
1.5 0.9
2.2 1.5
Jan-May
1967
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
During the period January-April 1967, over 130
US pilots and aircraft crewmen were downed over North
Vietnam. About 30 percent were recovered, a smaller
share than during 1966 when 40 percent were recovered.
A high percentage of the downings took place over
heavily populated industrial areas where search and
rescue operations are hampered by a hostile environ-
ment. Personnel losses and recovery rates, by year
are as follows:
Personnel Percent Percent
Year Downed Lost Recovered
1965 206 70 30
1966 446 60 40
Jan-April 1967 132 70 30
The direct operational cost of air operations
over North Vietnam during the first five months of
1967 is estimated at about $608.6 million. This
amount includes the production cost of aircraft lost,
valued at about $283.5 million; direct operational
costs of sorties flown, estimated at $174.8 million;
and ordnance costs of about $150.3 million. Increased
costs for 1967 are noted by comparing corresponding
averages for 1966 (see the following tabulation).
Million US $
Average for 5 Months January-May
1966
During 1966
1967
Aircraft lost
605.6
252.5
283.5
.Sorties overhead
330.4
137.5
174.8
Ordnance
311.5
130.0
150.3
Total
1,247.5
520.0
608.6
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
The measurable costs to North Vietnam for the
reconstruction or repair of bomb-damaged facilities
and other indirect losses attributable to the bombing
during January-May 1967 have been estimated at about
$84.4 million. The trend of the cost of inflicting
one dollar's worth of damage on North Vietnam is as
follows:
Cost of Damages/Operational Costa/Damage/Operational Cost
1965 68.7 460.0
1966 112.4 1,247.5
January-May
1967 84.4 608.6
a. Million US $.
$1/$6.70
$1/$11.10
$1/$7.20
The increase in the cost per dollar of damage in
1966 was attributable primarily to the increasing costs
of a greatly accelerated air interdiction program that
concentrated on low-yield target systems. The improved
cost trend evident so far in 1967 reflects the increas-
ing number of attacks that have been made against signif-
icant economic targets. There is little prospect for
improved cost effectiveness in the future, however,
because the number of significant targets is decreasing
rapidly.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
r t
Sorties Against -North Vietnam, by Mission and Nationality a/
1965 and 1966
By US Services By South Vietnamese Air Sores
Attack Support Total Attack Support
Year and Month Sorties Sorties Sorties Sorties b/ Sorties
1965
January 0 0 0 0 0
February 130 70 200 60 0
March 530 240 770 120 Negl.
April 1,500 1,360 2,860 100 10
May 1,510 2,710 4,220 100 20
June 2,310 1,530 3,840 90 10
July 3,160 2,960 6,120 70 10
August 3,420 3,790 7,210 30 10
September 3,990 4,230 8,220 20 Negl.
October 3,460 4,550 8,010 10 Negl.
November 3,120 4,180 7,300 10 Negl.
December 2,170 3,570 5,740 30 20
Total 1965 25,300 29,190 54,490 640 80
January 130 2,890 3,020 0 0
February 2,810 3,710 6,520 0 0
March 4,480 4,940 9,420 10 10
April 5,310 5,090 10,400 14o 0
May 4,3660 4,250 8,610 110 0
June 7,520 5,430 12,950 270 0
July 9,960 6,240 16,200 240 0
August 1,790 7,030 18,820 20 0
September 12,340 6,880 19,220 10 0
October 8,700 6,060 14,760 Negl. 0
November 7,250 6,180 13,430 10 0
December 6,710 6,970 13,680 Negl. 0
Total 1966 81,360 65,670 147,030 810 10
Total 1965-66 106,660 94,860 201,520 1,450 90
a. Rounded to nearest 10 sorties. Negl. includes less than 5 sorties.
b. Attack sorties include strike and flak suppression sorties.
Total Attack Support Total
Sorties Sorties b/ Sorties _ties
25X1
0 0 0 0
60 19o 70 260
120 650 240 890
110 1,600 1,370 2,970
120 1,610 2,730 4,340
100 2,400 1,540 3,940
80 3,230 2,970 6,200
40 3,450 3,800 7,250
20 4,010 4,230 8,240
10 3,470 4,550 8,020
10 3,130 4,180 7,310
50 2,200 3,590 5,790
720 25,940 29,270 55,210
0 130 2,890 3,020
0 2,810 3,710 6,520
20 4,490 4,950 9,440
14o 5,450 5,090 10,540
110 4,470 4,250 8,720
270 7,790 5,430 13,220
240 10,200 6,240 16,440
20 11,810 7,030 18,840
10 12,350 6,880 19,230
Negl. 8,700 66,060 14,760
10 7,260 6,180 13,440
Negl. 6,710 6,970 13,6680
820 82,170 65,680 147,850
1,540 108,110 24,950 203,060
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Mission
January-May 1967
Attack Support Total
Year and Month Sorties Sorties Sorties
1967
January
6,580
7,160
13,740
February
5,470
5,620
11,090
March
8,490
6,880
15,370
April
8,960
7,150
16,110
May
11,310
8,630
19,940
Total
40,810
35,440
76,250 J
a. Rounded to the nearest 10 sorties. Negl. includes fewer
than 5 sorties.
b. Attack sorties include strike and flak suppression
sorties.
c. In addition, the South Vietnamese Air Force flew 30
attack sorties against North Vietnam in January-May.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
[ 1 t. r ( I 1
I I l
Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program and by Service
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
(l) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
By Armed
Year and Total on By Fixed Reconnaissance Armed Reconnaissance Total on Armed
Month Fixed Targets Target Strikes Strikes Not on Fixed Targets Reconnaissance Total
1965 Col. 2 & 3) (Col. 1 &
January 0 0 0 0 0 0
February 0 0 0 260 260 260
March 850 850 0 40 40 890
April 1,800 1,460 340 1,170 1,510 2,970
May 1,790 1,300 490 2,550 3,040 4,340
June 1,410 1,360 50 2,530 2,580 3,940
July 1,910 1,590 320 4,290 4,610 6,200
August ]-,goo 1,390 510 5,350 5,860 7,250
September 1,600 1,440 160 6,6640 6,800 8,240
October 770 570 200 7,250 7,450 8,020
November 1,040 570 470 6,270 6,740 7,310
December 820 530 290 4,970 5,260 5,790
Total 13,890 11,060 2,830 41,320 a/ 44,150 a/ 55,210 a/
1966
January 0 0 0 3,020 3,020 3,020
February 170 0 170 6,350 6,520 6,520
March 180 0 180 9,260 9,440 9,440
April 390 50 340 10,150 10,490 10,540
May 160 0 160 8,560 8,720 8,720
June 320 240 80 12,900 12,980 13,220
July 360 50 310 16,080 16,390 16,440
August 280 20 260 18,560 18,820 18,840
September 150 0 150 19,080 19,230 19,230
October 150 0 150 14,610 14,760 14,760
November 140 30 110 13,300 13,410 13,440
December 320 30 290 13,360 13,650 13,680
Total 2,620 420 2,200 145,230 147,430 147,850
(7)
(8)
(9)
(lo)
United States
South
Vietnamese
Air Force
Navy
Marine
Air Force
0
0
0
0
80
120
N.A.
60
360
410
N.A.
120
1,200
1,660
N.A.
110
2,280
1,940
N.A.
120
1,840
2,000
N.A.
100
2,380
3,600
14o
80
3,030
4,030
150
40
3,890
4,160
170
20
3,480
4,370
160
10
3,330
3,830
140
10
2,630
2,980
130
50
24,500
29,100
890
720
1,570
1,220
230
0
3,190
3,160
170
0
4,600
4,630
190
20
4,850
5,410
140
140
4,060
4,420
130
110
7,340
5,420
190
270
9,520
6,100
580
240
9,660
8,120
1,040
20
10,110
8,090
1,020
10
8,410
5,670
680
Negl.
7,130
5,490
810
10
8,150
4,820
710
Negl.
78,590
62,550
5,890
820
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Sorties 0gaiost, Tar-i _et::, a, - ?r gasx: 3. Ly Sevo ice
1965, 1966, and January-ay 1967
0 c_~tinued
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
By Armed United S-25X1 South
'ear and Total on By _='ixed Reconnaissance Armed Reconnaissance Total on Armed Iietnanese
Month Fixed Targets Target Strikes Strikes Not on Fixed Targets Reconnaissance Total Air Force Navy Marine Air Force
Col. 2 & 3 Col. t & u
January 200 200 13,540 13,7!'0 13,74 7,502 5,75: 490
February 200 80 120 10,890 11,010 11,090 5,590 4,860 640 0
March 580 170 41o 14,800 15,210 15,380 7,680 6,790 goo 10
April 75C 350 400 15,360 15,760 16,110 7,760 7,470 88c Negl. b/
May 79C 110 680 19,170 19,850 19,960 9,710 9,340 890 20
Total
for
first
five
months
of 1967 2,520 710 11810 73,760 75,570 76,280 38,240 34,210 3,800 3C
Also includes 645 miscellaneous sorties such as leaflet drops, gift drops, and photo reconnaissance sorties not accompanying a strike missio
Negl. includes fewer than 5 sorties.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Distribution of Attack Sorties
over North Vietnam, by Route Package /
January 1966 - May 1967
Route Package
Year
and Month
1
2
3
4
5
6
Unknown
Total
1966
January
17
18
30
4
3
0
28
100
February
31
24
15
3
5
0
22
100
March
34
31
13
5
11
0
6
100
April
37
29
17
3
6
3
5
100
May
30
19
26
10
6
4
5
100
June
49
19
14
8
1
4
5
100
July
47
18
12
5
4
8
6
100
August
35
16
11
9
1
12
16
100
September
39
16
12
17
5
8
3
100
October
45
8
15
13
5
7
7
100
November
43
12
16
13
6
7
3
100
December
50
9
7
5
7
9
13
100
Average 1966
37
15
13
9
4
7
15
100
1967 b/
January
44
6
15
21
4
10
0
100
February
63
7
9
12
3
6
0
100
March
59
9
12
8
4
8
0
100
April
49
11
14
7
5
14
0
100
May
39
13
18
11
3
16
0
100
Average 1967
49
10
14
11
4
12
0
100
a. North Vietnam is divided, for operations, into six geographic
areas, known as Route Packages. Percentage data shown are approxi-
mate, due to the effects of multiple-route-package sorties and
coastal sorties.
b. A more detailed data base, available for 1967 figures,
dispensed with the unknown factor.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Ordnance Delivered by Air on l,orth Vietnan, by Month ant by Program.
`arch-Decemiber 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
By Armed
Total on JCS By Fixed Reconnaissance Armed Reconnaissance Total on
ear and '_or.th Fixed Targets Target Strikes Strikes Not on Fixed Targets Armed Reconnaissance Total
Col. 2 & 3 Col. 3 & col. I &
T-T
1965
:.arch 1,130 1,130 0 0 0 1,130
April 1,830 1,620 210 430 640 2,260
1,420 1,420 O 380 380 1,800
June 1,900 1,900 0 1,430 1,430 3,330
July 1,490 1,410 80 1,980 2,060 3,470
August 1,470 1,280 190 3,200 3,390 4,670
September 1,790 1,780 10 3,730 3,740 5,520
October 700 590 110 4,390 4,500 5,090
November 620 480 140 3,900 4,040 4,520
December 450 350 100 2,060 2,160 2,510
Total 1965 12,800 11,960 840 21,500 22,340 34,300
January 0 0 0 270 270 270
February 270 0 270 4,510 4,780 4,780
,-'.arch 220 0 220 7,520 7,740 7,740
April 460 80 380 8,580 8,960 8,040
May 220 0 220 7,330 7,550 7,550
June 280 190 90 10,680 10,770 10,960
July 440 60 380 15,900 16,280 16,340
August 460 40 420 16,870 17,290 17,330
September 260 0 260 17,500 17,760 17,760
October 220 0 220 13,500 13,720 13,720
November 240 10 230 10,930 11,160 11,170
December 490 60 430 10,920 11,350 11,410
Total 3,560 440 3,120 124,510 127,630 128,070
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
l[ 1. t t t I. t! t r 1
25X1
Ordnance Delivered by Air on Borth Vietnam, by 'Month and by Program
March-December 1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
(Continued)
On JCS Fixed Targets On Armed Reconnaissance Total
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
By Armed
Total on JCS By Fixed Reconnaissance Armed Reconnaissance Total on
Year and Month Fixed Targets Target Strikes Strikes Not on Fixed Targets Armed Reconnaissance
Col. 2 & 3 (Col. 3 & 4)
Total
Col. 1 & 4
1967
January 450 0 450 11,050 11,500 11,500
February 430 200 230 10,000 10,230 10,430
March 1,190 340 850 14,690 15,540 15,880
April a/ 1,350 450 900 13,770 14,670 15,120
May a 1,240 160 1,080 17,280 18,360 18,520
Total for first five
months of 1967 a/ 4,660 1,150
66,790 70,300 71,450
a. Columns 2- for the months of April and May are estimates derived from sorties flown to ordnance delivered ratios computed from data compiled during
the period February 1966 through February 1967.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
L. ack n JCS =ixel '.iargets i Z or ri e a
96 , 1y66, .aid an_. a_ - y -9? 7
Tota_
Ordnance
)e_ivered
Strike and Flak Suppression
Support
Number
Percent
Tons
Percent
,06
Fixed Target 6,930
4,130
11,060
80
11,960
93
Armed Reconnaissance 1,780
1,050
2,830
20
84o
7
Total January-December 1965 8,710
5,180
13,890
100
12,800
100
1966
Fixed Target 270
150
420
16
440
12
Armed Reconnaissance 1,830
370
2,200
84
3,120
88
Total January-December 1966 2,100
520
2,620
100
3,560
100
1967
Fixed Target 64o
70
710
28
1,150
25
Armed Reconnaissance 1,730
80
1,810
72
3,510
75
Total January-May 1967 2,370
150
2,520
100
4,660
100
I
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Table 24
Aircraft and Personnel Losses in Attack on
North Vietnam, by Service
1965, 1966, and January-May 1967
Service
Aircraft
Lost
Recovered
1965
USAF
78
62
30
USN
86
76
30
USMC
0
0
0
VNAF
9
6
2
Total
173 J
124
62
1966
USAF
USN
174
139
165
96
85
86
USMC
4
8
2
VNAF
0
0
0
US Army
1
0
4
Total
318 J
262
177
1967
USAF
68
40
18
USN
72
50
21
USMC
2
2
1
VNAF
0
0
0
Total 142 J 92 J 40 J
a. Excluding operational losses.
b. 284 combat losses and 34 operational losses.
c. 123 combat losses and 19 operational losses in January-
May.
d. Data are for the period January-April.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
IV
Prospects of an Effective Bombing Program
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
IV. Prospects of an Effective Bombing Program
A. The Success To Date
The objectives of the bombing program are stated
currently to be twofold:
1. To limit,or raise the cost of, the movement
of men and supplies to South Vietnam
2. To make North Vietnam pay a price for its
aggression against the South.
To the extent that any degradation of enemy capa-
bilities or any penalties imposed on his aggressive conduct
in South Vietnam are indicative of successful achievement
of US objectives, the US bombing program must be judged to
be meeting with some success. But the degree of success is
limited. The bombing program has undoubtedly raised the
cost and increased the burdens of maintaining the aggression
in South Vietnam. These exactions appear to be within ac-
ceptable limits to the Hanoi regime. Given a continuing
flow of economic and military aid from Communist China and
the USSR, North Vietnam remains capable of maintaining and
supplying its forces in South Vietnam at both present and
higher levels of combat. The price of its aggression, with
the exception of manpower losses,, and the general economic
and social disruption in North Vietnam is largely being
assumed by its Communist allies.
Despite the increased weight and broadening of the
air attack, North Vietnam nas expanded its support of the
insurgency in South Vietnam. There was a threefold in-
crease in the level of personnel infiltration in 1966, and
additional thousands of troops have been positioned in and
around the DMZ. The flow of material supplies to the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam during
the current dry season is at least equal to and may well
exceed the volume made available last year.
The North Vietnamese economy has suffered increas-
ing damage, but this has had no decisive effect on the at-
titude of the regime toward the war, nor has it caused a
deterioration of popular morale to the point where the re-
gime has lost the support of its people. The performance
of the domestic transportation system exceeds that achieved
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
before the Rolling Thunder program; imports both by sea and
by rail have moved to increasingly high levels. Deficiencies
in domestic food supply are being met by the USSR and Commu-
nist China, and food shortages have not attained serious
proportions. The vital petroleum storage system, as cur-
rently dispersed, has survived the destruction of more than
85 percent of its major bulk storage capacities, and petro-
leum stocks have been maintained at essentially early 1966
levels. The neutralization of about 80 percent of the
country's electric power generating capacity has created
severe shortages of power and disrupted much of North
Vietnam's modern industrial economy. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the loss of electric power can have a signifi-
cant impact on military operations.
The outlook for marked success of the US bomb-
ing program in limiting communist support to the forces
in the South is not bright. By the end of April the
US bombing program had attacked 209 targets, or more
than three-fourths of the targets on the JCS list.
About 13 of these struck targets (11 bridges and 2
ammunition depots) received only minor damage, so
that their pre-strike capacity is relatively intact.
The 53 unstruck targets are grouped, by category, as
follows:
Target System Number
Bridges 10
Airfields 5
Military barracks headquarters
and storage depots
12
Powerplants
5
Locks
6
Industry
4
Mineable areas
4
Miscellaneous
7
Total
53
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
In addition, there are seven non-targeted industrial facili-
ties that are significant to the North Vietnamese economy
and its war-supporting activities.
The returns that can be realistically expected from
the neutralization of the remaining economic, military, and
land transport JCS targets are small. The two most promising
target systems -- locks and mineable areas -- have been un-
acceptable to date on humane grounds or because of the po-
litical problems their neutralization would create. The
enemy's success in countering attacks on bridges and in sus-
taining traffic movement is too well catalogued to warrant
further discussion. Attacks on military installations would
have only limited effects. Many of these facilities are in-
active, and contingency plans to counter their loss are un-
doubtedly well-developed. Even if North Vietnam were denied
complete access to its airfields, this alone would be unlikely
to significantly alter the regime's attitude toward the war
because it would have only a marginal effect, through increas-
ing costs, on the flow of men and supplies to the South.
The neutralization of North Vietnam's remaining in-
dustry would extract a high price in terms of the elimina-
tion of the results of years of economic development and
the displacement of the urban labor force and would add to
the burden of aid from other Communist countries. There
is no apparent reason why such losses would force Hanoi to
the negotiating table. The loss of its modern industrial
sector is apparently a tolerable burden in a country that
has an overwhelmingly agrarian economy. The contribution
of North Vietnam's modern economy to the war effort is
small, and its loss can be countered as long as essential
economic and military supplies can be obtained from the
USSR and China.
The greatest possible impact on Hanoi would re-
sult from a US strike program which would include mining
the major ports and inland waterways, to which the re-
maining JCS transport targets, other than the locks, would
make a useful addition. It has previously been estimated
that such a program would be a matter of serious concern
to the Hanoi leadership, particularly if accompanied
by more extensive attacks on the supply routes from
Communist China. Some import programs would have
to be forgone and problems of supply and distribution
would be acute. However, even this program's success-
ful execution would be unlikely to dampen down the con-
tinued movement of men and supplies from North Vietnam
to the South.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
C. Costs to the United States
The United States would probably pay increasing
costs -- both political and military -- in choosing any
of the available options for escalation of the air war.
The political costs in terms of both domestic US and in-
ternational reactions would vary with the options
chosen. Losses of US aircraft from combat causes dur-
ing attacks on JCS targets located within a 10-mile
radius of Hanoi and a similar area around Haiphong
during the 41-day period April 20, 1967 to May 31, 1967
were inflicted at a rate of 3.1 percent, about 10 times
the corresponding rates experienced during the 1966 cam-
paign and in attacks on more isolated targets during
1967. The preponderance of the targets yet unstruck
are in the more heavily defended areas of North Vietnam.
More than 90 percent -- 49 targets -- are in Route
Packages 5 and 6. Of these four are in Route Package 5,
36 are in Route Package 6, which includes Hanoi and
Haiphong, and nine targets are in the buffer zone along
the Chinese-North Vietnamese border.
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070026-0
 Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0
Top aecrei
Top Secret
Approved For Release 2009/02/25: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000900070026-0