THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM - - PRESENT AND POTENTIAL TARGET SYSTEMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070025-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 130
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: January 1, 1967
• Content Type: IM

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Top Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
The Rolling Thunder Program --
Present and Potential Target Systems
JCS review completed. Secondary referral
to DIA.
Top Secret
Copy 6
~DIA review completed.1 January 1967
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Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I. Rolling Thunder in 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
II. Alternative Target Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
A. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. Modern Industry in North Vietnam as a Target
System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
C. The Mining Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
D. Interdiction of. the Levees in the Red River Delta 9
E. An Unlimited Bombing Campaign . . . . . . . . 11
1. Transportation Targets . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. Other Potential Targets . . . . . . . . . . 12
F. Restriction of Rolling Thunder to Route
Packages 1 and 2 and Laos . . . . . . . . . . 12
G. Estimated Casualties Resulting from Alternative
Rolling Thunder Programs . . . . . . . . . . 13
Estimated Casualties from Rolling Thunder, 1965-66 . . . 4
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Appendixes
Appendix A. An Appraisal of the Rolling Thunder
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
I. Physical Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
II. Rolling Thunder Operations in 1966 . . . A-14
Appendix B. Modern Industry in North Vietnam as a Target
System
I. Electric Power Industry . . . . . . . . B-4
II. Manufacturing Plants . . . . . . . . . B-6
III. Iron and Steel -- Thai Nguyen . . . . . . B-13
IV. Mining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-16
V. Impact on Imports . . . . . . . . . . . B-18
Appendix C. Consequences of Mining the Seaports
of North Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1
I. The Dimensions of North Vietnam's
Foreign Trade . . . . . . . . . . C-2
II. Impact of Mining Under the Present
Rolling Thunder Program . . . . . . . C-5
III. The Cumulative Effect on Imports of a
Mining and Industrial Bombing Pro-
gram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-9
IV. Impact of Mining Under an Intensified
Armed Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . C-10
Appendix D. Interdiction of the Levees in the Red River
Delta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-1
I. The Levee as a Target System . . . . . D-1
II. Dimensions of the Air Attack . . . . . . D-3
Appendix E. Unlimited Bombing . . . . . . . . . . . . E-1
I. Transportation Targets . . . . . . . . E-1
II. Other Potential Targets . . . . . . . . E-3
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Appendix F. The Logistic Funnel as a Target System . . . F-1
1. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-1
II. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-2
III. Estimated Effects on the Flow of Supplies
to South Vietnam . . . . . . . . . . . F-3
IV. The Experience of Korea . . . . . . . . F-4
Appendix G. The Estimated Casualties Resulting from
Alternative Bombing Programs . . . . . . G-1
1. General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-1
II. Attack on Modern Industry . . . . . . . G-1
III. The Mining Program . . . . . . . . . . G-2
IV. The Attack Against Dikes and Locks . . . G-3
V. Unlimited Bombing . . . . . . . . . . G-3
VI. Interdiction of Route Packages 1 and 2,
and Laos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . G-4
Appendix H. The North Vietnamese Will to Persist . . . . H-1
I. The Effect of the Present Program . . . H-1
II. The General Effects of Escalation . . . H-1
III. The Present Program Plus Electric Power
and Major Industrial Facilities . . . . H-2
IV. The Mining of Haiphong in Addition to the
Above Targets . . . . . . . . . . . H-2
V. The Inclusion of Dikes and Locks on the
Red River in the Above Targets . . . . H-3
VI. Unlimited Bombing, Except Population
Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . H-4
VII. Striking Only Routes 1 and 2 Plus Laos . . H-4
Appendix A
Al. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Mission and
Nationality, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . A-22
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AZ. Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program and by
Service, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-23
A3. Distribution of Sorties over North Vietnam, by Route
Package, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-24
A4. Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam, by
Month and by Program, March-December 1965
and January-December 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . A-25
A5. Attacks on JCS Fixed Targets in North Vietnam,
1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-26
A6. Aircraft and Personnel Losses in Attacks on North
Vietnam, by Service, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . A-27
Appendix B
B1. Selected Industrial Installations in North Vietnam . . . B-3
B2. North Vietnam: Identified Imports Carried by Foreign-
Flag Ships, by Origin and Commodity, 1965-66 . . . B-24
B3. North. Vietnam: Identified Exports Carried by Foreign-
Flag Ships, by Destination and Commodity, 1965-66 B-25
B4. North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of Maritime Foreign
Trade, by Port, 1965 and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . B-26
B5. North Vietnam: Transport Capacity Available for Dry
Cargo Imports as of January 1967 . . . . . . . . . B-27
Appendix C
Cl. North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of Foreign Trade,
1965-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-3
C2. North Vietnam: Identified Seaborne Foreign Trade,
1964, 1965, and 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-4
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Appendix D
D1. Estimated Loss in Production of 10th Month Rice Crop
in North Vietnam Caused by Flooding . . . . . . . . D-4
Appendix E
E1. Principal Fixed Targets in an Unlimited Target Pro-
gram Against Transport in North Vietnam . . . . . . E-4
Appendix F
Fl. Logistic Capacities of Major Routes in Route
Packages 1 and 2, North Vietnam, and the Ho Chi
Minh Trail, Laos, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F-6
F2. Targets Destroyed or Damaged by Attack Sorties
Route Packages 1 and 2, North Vietnam and Ho
Chi Minh. Trail, Laos, 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . F-7
Appendix G
G1. Potential Casualties Resulting from an Attack on
Selected Modern Industrial Targets . . . . . . . . . G-2
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Figure 1. Value of Economic Damage in North
Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
(chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 2. Value of Military Damage in North
Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
(chart) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 3. Index of Sorties Flown in Southeast Asia
and Relative Amounts in Each Area,
1965 and 1966 (chart) . . . . . . . 14
Figure 4. Index of Ordnance Delivered in Southeast
Asia and Relative Amounts in Each
Area, 1966 (chart) . . . . . . . . 14
Figure 5. North Vietnam: Average Distribution
of US Sorties, by Route Package,
January-November 1966 (map) . . . 14
Figure 6. Estimated Direct Operational Cost of
US/GVN Air Operations in North
Vietnam and Cost of Economic and
Military Damage to North Vietnam,
by Month, 1965 and 1966 (chart) . . . 14
Figure B-1. North Vietnam and South China:
Uninterdicted Capacity of Selected
Transportation Lines, January
1967 (map) . . . . . . . . . . . B-20
Figure F-1. The Laos Panhandle: "The Logistic
Funnel" (map) . . . . . . . . . . F-2
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THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM --
PRESENT AND POTENTIAL TARGET SYSTEMS.,
Summary
This memorandum analyzes the effects achieved by the Rolling Thunder
Program of air attacks on North Vietnam through 1966; it also estimates
the probable effects which would be expected to ensue from restructuring
Rolling Thunder in a variety of other ways, ranging from deescalation to
substantial escalation. A summary of findings follows, with the details
contained in Appendixes A through H.
This memorandum was produced by CIA. Aside from the normal sub-
stantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, this memorandum
has not been coordinated outside CIA. It was prepared by the Office of
Research and Reports with a contribution from the Office of Current Intel-
ligence. It was coordinated with the Office of Current Intelligence and the
Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs; the estimates and conclusions
represent the best judgment of this Office as of 31 January 1967.
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I. Rolling Thunder in 1966*
The evidence available does not suggest that Rolling Thunder to
date has contributed materially to the achievement of the two primary
objectives of air attack -- the reduction of the flow of supplies to the
VC/NVA forces fighting in South Vietnam or the weakening of the will
of the Hanoi regime to continue with the insurgency. There is no
doubt, of course, that Rolling Thunder has lowered the capacity of
transport routes to the South., and hence put a lower "cap" on the force
levels which could be supported in South Vietnam. However, it is
estimated that the "cap" is well above present logistic supply levels.
Also, Rolling Thunder has not succeeded in materially lowering
morale in the North. While there undoubtedly is some war weariness,
the general indication is that the North Vietnamese people are behind
the regime.
The North Vietnamese leaders continue to insist, both in public
and private statements, that they are willing to withstand even heavier
bomb damage rather than accept anything less than their often stated
demands for a settlement in Vietnam. Hanoi has been able to adjust
its military and economic activities, which support its war objectives,
to the bombing. Hence, while there may be some degree of escalation
that would force the regime to reexamine its position, it is believed
that as far as pressure from air attack is concerned, Hanoi would be
prepared to continue the insurgency in South Vietnam indefinitely in
the face of the current level and type of bombing program.
The will of the regime to continue the war is heavily bolstered --
and this is a key factor -- by the relatively massive flow of economic
and military aid from the USSR, China, and the Eastern European
countries. A comparison of 1966 measurable damage in North Viet-
nam with aid deliveries is revealing:
Million US
Measurable Aid
Damage Deliveries
Economic 94 275
Military 36 230
Total 130 505
* See Appendix A.
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The fact that aid was almost four times the damage inflicted by
air attacks not only gives Hanoi the muscle needed to strengthen the
VC/NVA insurgency and its own air defense but also provides the
services to overcome economic difficulties. Under these circumstances,
it is concluded that Hanoi would be able and willing to persevere in-
definitely in the face of the present Rolling Thunder program.
Air attacks have not eliminated any important sector of the economy
or the military establishment. The successful attack on petroleum
storage facilities eliminated 76 percent of the JCS-targeted national
capacity, but the strikes did not come until after the North Vietnamese
had already implemented a system of dispersed storage. The petro-
leum import flow has been maintained at adequate levels. The heavy
concentration of the Rolling Thunder campaign on the lines of transpor-
tation south of Hanoi -- particularly Route Packages 1 and 2 -- has not
succeeded in cutting route capacities to the point where the flow of
supplies needed to support the expanded insurgency in South Vietnam
has been significantly impeded.
The principal losses to the economy have been indirect and stem
from reduction in agricultural output and the fish catch., the impair-
ment of foreign exchange earnings through a cut in normal quantities
of exported commodities, the cost of repairing essential transport
facilities, and disruptions of production due to dispersal and other
passive defense measures (see Figure 1).
Aircraft losses by North Vietnam amounted to an estimated $17
million in 1966, while damage to SAM's, naval equipment, barracks,
and other facilities has also been significant (see Figure 2). These
attacks have disrupted normal military practices, caused the abandon-
ment of many facilities, and forced widespread dispersal of equipment.
However, the capabilities of North Vietnam's military establishment
continue at a high level.
In 1966, the attack sorties flown against North Vietnam increased
217 percent over 1965 and the program became virtually an armed
reconnaissance campaign (see Figures 3 and 4). Attacks flown against
fixed JCS targets in 1966 (including armed reconnaissance restrikes)
amounted to less than 3 percent of total attack sorties. About one-
third of the 242 JCS targets remained unattacked; a large number of
these represent powerplants, important industrial installations, and
key transport targets. Most of the armed reconnaissance sorties
were flown south of Hanoi, particularly in Route Packages 1 and 2
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(see Figure 5'). The cumulative damage to economic and military
facilities is estimated at $200 million of which $130 million occurred
in 1966. These data plus the cost of the attack are shown in Figure 6.
Preliminary estimates for civilian casualties in 1966 are about
three times those in 1965, reflecting primarily the stepped-up level
of attack. Military casualties in 1966 are below the level of 1965,
largely because military barracks were heavily hit in 1965 but not
in 1966. Estimated casualties are presented in the table.
Estimated Casualties from Rolling Thunder
1965-66
1965
1966 a/
Total
Civilians
6,000
17,900 to 20,200
23,900
to 26,200
Fixed targets
2,000
900
2,900
Armed reconnaissance
4,000
17,000 to 19,300
21,000
to 23,300
Military
7,200
4,650
11,850
Fixed targets
4,300
400
4,700
Armed reconnaissance
2,900
4,250
7,150
Total
13,200
22,550 to 24,850
35,750
to 38,050
a.
Preliminary estimates.
While these estimates are the best presently available and are
believed to be the right order of magnitude, they are subject to error.
The estimate for civilian casualties is more reliable than that for the
military. The total casualties are small in relation to a total popula-
tion of over 18 million, but losses have undoubtedly had a disruptive
effect.
II. Alternative Target Systems
A. General
A number of alternative target systems have been examined
in order to estimate the probable effects of their neutralization. These
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alternatives include an attack on modern industry, the mining of the
major ports and water entrances to North Vietnam, interdiction of
the levees in the Red River delta, and an unrestricted bombing cam-
paign with the exception of attacks against populated centers. These
alternatives are discussed in detail in Appendixes B through E. In
addition the effects of a reduced air campaign confined to Route
Packages 1 and 2 and the infiltration network through Laos are dis-
cussed in Appendix F. The estimated casualties to be expected from
these alternative programs are discussed in Appendix G. Finally,
the effect of these programs on the will to persist of North Vietnam's
leadership is discussed in Appendix H.
B. Modern Industry in North Vietnam as a Target System*
A review of modern industry in North Vietnam has resulted
in the selection of 20 facilities for inclusion in this target system:
Seven electric power generating plants
One cement plant
One explosives plant and one potential
explosives material supplier
One rubber products facility
One chemical plant
Four engineering plants
One steel producing complex
Three coal processing plants
The neutralization of all these North Vietnamese industrial
facilities would eliminate the fruit of several hundred million dollars
in capital investment, cut off the source of perhaps one-quarter or
more of the gross national product and most foreign exchange earnings,
and could halt the construction of additional modern plants in North
Vietnam by other Communist countries. It would also disrupt the func-
tioning of other sectors of the economy through the loss of electric
* See Appendix B.
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power and such materials as cement and some fertilizers and chemicals,
add to the burden of aid from the Communist countries, and produce at
least temporary displacement of the urban labor force.
A graduated, selective program beginning with air attack
against all the facilities in one industry (such as all powerplants) prob-
ably offers a more promising vehicle for the application of pressure
against the North Vietnamese regime than a widespread escalation
against numerous industrial targets in a variety of industries. Such
a program not only would maximize the economic and military impact
of the attacks but also would provide Hanoi with a continuing opportunity
for second thoughts. If Hanoi failed to react, the completion of the total
program would deal a serious blow to North Vietnam's hopes for eco-
nomic progress and status, negating a decade of intense effort devoted
to the construction of modern industry.
There are two factors which are important to keep in mind
in considering the effects of any escalated program of air attack:
(a) The North Vietnamese leadership has been
making an even greater effort than usual over the
past two months to prepare the people of North Viet-
nam for further sacrifices during 1967.
(b) The will of the North Vietnamese to persist
in the war depends not only on the effect of the air-
strikes in the North but also on how they assess the
war situation in South Vietnam.
While severe damage to the modern industrial sector would
place additional pressures on the regime, it is not believed that this
burden by itself would be intense enough to bring Hanoi to negotiate.
The most relevant evidence -- the neutralization of much of the heavy
industry in North. Korea during the Korean War -- would suggest that
the burden would be bearable.
Modern industry in North Vietnam -- machinery, chemical,
fertilizer, cement, and electric powerplants -- makes a contribution
to the military capability of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces
in South Vietnam and/or to the air defense capability in the North, but
this contribution is not vital. The essentially agrarian nature of the
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economy together with numerous local and handicraft facilities, which
reportedly meet 70 percent of the population's demand for consumer
goods, provides a strong buffer against economic collapse.
The deficit of essential economic goods.needed to sustain
North Vietnam's economy and the military supplies which are vital
to the country's air defense, as well as to the maintenance of large-
scale aggression in South Vietnam, come from other Communist
countries. In the absence of an effective program for the interdiction
of the transport system, it is expected that the flow of imports would
increase. A successful air attack on all of the modern industry facili-
ties listed above would increase import requirements well above
present levels. The combined current capacities of the sea and
land routes leading to North Vietnam could sustain the flow.
The experience in the Korean War -- the most relevant one for
comparison - - suggests that the loss of modern industry may not be a
decisive factor, by itself, in critically reducing the will to persist, at
least as long as the abundant flow of war-supporting supplies continues.
C. The Mining Program
Two alternative mining programs were examined. The first
is a conventional mining program designed to prevent the use of deep-
draft oceangoing ships but lacking a capability to prevent the use of
shallow-draft craft such. as coasters and lighters.. The second alter-
native is a program using a newly developed mine with a capability
against shallow-draft shipping. 1114c Both mining programs assume the
use of intensive armed reconnaissance against lines of communication
and transport targets in order to maximize the potential effects of the
program.
The interdiction of the port of Haiphong would cause serious
concern to the Hanoi leadership. Their reaction would depend on the
effectiveness of the mining and the success of alternate methods of
supply. As long as North Vietnam believed that it could receive essen-
tial supplies, its resolve to fight on would probably remain.
See Appendix C.
This mine is the MK 36, a modification of the standard MK 82 aerial
bomb, which. is effective against even unpowered small craft in depths
up to 50 feet. It can be delivered by all aircraft capable of using the
MK 82, and requires the same delivery techniques as the MK 82. The
MK 36 is to go into mass production in the spring of 1967.
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The North Vietnamese could probably continue to supply the
Viet Cong, the air defense system and essential war-supporting activi-
ties in the North with. supplies for a while, using current stockpiles
and imports, even in the face of a reduced flow over Communist China's
road and connecting rail system. However, should the logistic pinch
become severe enough to deplete stocks in North. Vietnam, the chances
of a reexamination by Hanoi of its whole approach to the war would in-
crease markedly.
The immediate impact of either mining program would be a
disruption of normal transport activity ranging from a situation in which
a substantial portion of imports could be maintained by sea and coastal
water movement to one of almost complete denial of water access to
North Vietnam.
Either mining program would have serious disruptive effects
on the North Vietnamese transport system and the effectiveness with
which it accommodates the movement of foreign trade. Almost all ex-
port trade would cease and foreign exchange earnings would become
negligible. It is estimated, however, that unless the rail and road
lines to China were interdicted, surplus transport capacity and ade-
quate equipment would exist, and hence North Vietnam will attempt
to maintain the flow of virtually all normal imports plus the new im -
port requirements generated by the attacks on modern industry. Thus
the effects of the mining program will tend to be those of delay but not
denial of imports.
A mining program directed solely against oceangoing ship-
ping would increase the traffic burden on the major rail connections
to Communist China to the extent that North Vietnam would be hard
pressed to meet all normal traffic requirements by using rail connec-
tions, but the traffic could be handled by resorting to road and inland
water routes.
A program including mining of coastal and inland waters
would be much. more effective. North Vietnam would have to rely
almost completely on the existing road and rail connections to Com-
munist China and use them at or near capacity levels. If intensive
interdiction and.armed reconnaissance were carried out against these
vital transport links, North Vietnam would face increasingly serious
problems. The vulnerability of transport equipment, the difficulties
of maintaining lines of communication, and the cost and unreliability
of transport would all increase significantly. Some import programs
would almost certainly have to be reduced. These problems alone
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would not be sufficient, however, to degrade meaningfully the flow of
essential military materials or to prevent North Vietnam's continued
support of the war in the South.
D. Interdiction of the Levees in the Red River Delta"
The rice fields and populated centers of the delta are protected
by an elaborate system of levees which have greatly reduced flooding
from natural causes. Damage to the rice crop -- the staple food in
North Vietnam -- would be maximized if these levees were breached
when the Red River is at its height, some time in the period mid-July
.to mid-August.
The areas most vulnerable to flooding, if the primary levees
of this system were breached, are the Ha Dong area southwest of the
Red River and the Ha Bac area northeast of the river. If only the
main levees were breached, it is estimated that the crop loss would
be on the order of several hundred thousand tons of rice -- over 5 per-
cent of the annual production of rice. If the secondary levees were
also effectively breached, the decrease in rice production could reach
a million tons, or over 20 percent of annual, production.
To mitigate the effects of the flooding, Hanoi would be forced
to divert a very sizable work force away from other activities, in-
cluding those of a military supporting nature, for a period of weeks
until the major damage had been repaired.
A successful attack on the levee system at Ha Dong would be
exceedingly disruptive in the short run. There are probably 1. 5 mil-
lion people in the Ha Dong area, including Hanoi. This Agency has
,not made an independent study of the probable level of casualties; mili-
tary target studies estimate they would be small, numbering in the
hundreds rather than thousands. Homes in the village areas would be
destroyed, and factory activity would be halted. Over the long run,
the effect on rice availabilities would probably be the hardest problem
for the regime. The loss of at least several hundred thousand tons,
and perhaps a million tons, of rice, particularly in a year of below-
average harvests, would force Hanoi to seek outside sources of supply.
Communist China, which in an average year produces 75 million to 85
million tons of rice, could provide the necessary amount.
If the effects of the attacks on modern industrial targets and
the mining program were at maximum levels, the attack on levees
See Appendix D.
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would increase North Vietnam's cumulative import requirements from
the present level of 4, 200 tons a day to a total of from 6, 100 to 8, 000
tons a day. The transport capabilities of North Vietnam in this situa-
tion would fall short of maximum requirements by 15 to 20 percent.
Their ability to sustain imports would be influenced strongly by the
effectiveness of interdiction programs against the road and rail con-
nections to China.
If an interdiction campaign reduced the capacity of the rail
lines on a sustained basis by only one-third and of the road systems
by only one-fourth, the available route capacity would then be only
6, 400 tons a day. The rail cut could be sharper than one-third; the
road cut represents the maximum interdiction sustained to date in
North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese would then be hard-pressed
to move even their minimum import requirements. If the interdiction
program were even more successful, the regime would face increas-
ingly severe problems. Hard decisions would have to be made about
the imports which. could be forgone and a system of more rigorous
rationing would probably become necessary. More importantly the
continuity and reliability of the flow of essential military and economic
assistance from the USSR and Communist China would become a matter
of highest concern.
Since the major burden of a successful attack on the levees
would fall on the civilians in agricultural areas, there probably would
be a highly adverse public reaction in the West. This criticism would
be more strident than that which would be expected from attacks on any
other target system, with the possible exception of raids on population
per se. The military effects of "levee busting" would probably be both
limited and short lived; the effect on the Hanoi regime's will to con-
tinue would be marginal.
Hanoi's reaction to strikes on the Red River levees would
depend on the damage done by the strikes, the effectiveness of the
regime's countermeasures, and Hanoi's ability to obtain food from
China and the USSR. The Hanoi leaders probably believe that North
Vietnam can localize damage from attacks on the dike system and that
the attacks will not limit their abilities to persist in the war. The
North Vietnamese would certainly exploit the golden opportunity pre-
sented by such attack in their propaganda effort to put intense political
pressure on the United States.
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E. An Unlimited Bombing Campaign*"*
The major thrust of an unlimited bombing campaign following
the previous alternatives would be against transportation and military
targets and a small number of economic targets.
1. Transportation Targets
Although the transportation system has been a major tar-
get since the inception of the Rolling Thunder program, the weight of
the bombing effort has fallen on Route Packages 1, 2, and 3, where
military and economic requirements for traffic movement have been
relatively small in relation to route capacity. Hence, despite the
weight of attack, the North Vietnamese have been able to keep essen-
tial supplies flowing.
The basic concept of an unlimited attack on transporta-
tion would be to take advantage of the two major factors which emerge
from the bombing campaigns outlined earlier. First, a higher
import requirement -- ranging from 6, 100 to 8, 000 tons -- would result
from the neutralization of most production facilities and, second,
North Vietnamese ports and the inland waterway system would be closed,
or nearly closed, by mining. Under these circumstances, the remain-
ing rail and road connections to Communist China would be forced to
operate at -- or virtually at -- capacity. An analysis of North Viet-
nam's transport capabilities leads to two conclusions:
(a) The uninterdicted capacity of the roads
and the rail lines, allowing sufficient time to
organize the necessary truck transport, would
probably be sufficient to transport the required
daily tonnages in full to North Vietnam, even
if the ports were mined.
(b) Given a successful interdiction cam-
paign, the net capacity of the roads and the rail
lines would be insufficient to satisfy the maxi-
mum daily requirement and, therefore, some
reduction in the desired levels of supplies
would take place.
See Appendix E.
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If an unlimited interdiction program were highly success-
ful, the regime would encounter increasing difficulty and cost in main-
taining the flow of some of their most essential military and economic
goods. In the long term the uncertainties and difficulties resulting
from the cumulative effect of the air campaigns would probably cause
Hanoi to undertake a basic reassessment of the probable course of
the war and the extent of the regime's commitment to it.
2. Other Potential Targets
In addition to industrial-economic targets, there are a
number of military facilities presently on the JCS target list whose
neutralization would be of importance in blunting the military capa-
bilities of North Vietnam. The most prominent of these are 11 air-
fields. There are also a number of barracks and smaller military
supply depots widely dispersed throughout North Vietnam. In an
unlimited campaign these facilities presumably would be taken under
attack.
Other potential targets include such varied installations
as a number of primary radio communications centers, the six plants
constituting North Vietnam's pharmaceutical industry, transport re-
pair facilities, textile plants, food-processing plants, and fertilizer
plants. Neutralization of these targets would cause further disruption
of economic and military activity in North Vietnam. But the principal
gain to be expected by taking them under attack is that their neutraliza-
tion would increase North Vietnam's import requirements and aggravate
further their difficult problems in logistics and distribution.
Air attacks on the miscellaneous industrial and repair
facilities in the "unlimited" package would probably bring only mar-
ginal additional pressure on Hanoi unless the attacks significantly
impeded the flow of essential war-supporting supplies and equipment
currently flowing in from the USSR, China, and other Communist coun-
tries.
F. Restriction of Rolling Thunder to Route Packages 1 and 2
and Laos*
About 60 percent of all airstrikes in North Vietnam and Laos
during 1966 were carried out against targets in the "logistic funnel"
which comprises Route Packages 1 and 2 in North Vietnam and the
road network through the Laotian Panhandle. The total effort in these
See Appendix F.
- 12 -
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three areas during the first 11 months of 1966 amounted to about 68, 000
attack sorties delivering about 112, 000 tons of ordnance to the target
area. Despite this effort, the level of supplies currently needed to
support the VC/NVA forces fighting in the South has continued.
Concentration of all air attack forces on the "logistic funnel"
would increase by about 60 percent the bombing program in this area,
raising the level of ordnance expended from 10, 000 tons to around
16, 000 tons per month. In a short time the North Vietnamese would
respond to the intensified bombing by increasing the size of the labor
force engaged in repair work. The estimated requirement of a 30
percent increase in repair and reconstruction manpower could be
drawn from areas of North Vietnam no longer being bombed and would
be made up of experienced repair crews. Moreover, their air defenses
in the "funnel" also would be strengthened to aid in countering the in-
tensified bombing program.
If the Rolling Thunder program were cut back to an interdic-
tion campaign against Route Packages 1 and 2 plus Laos, Hanoi would
regard the limitation as a clear victory. They would see it as evidence
that political pressures on the United States as a result of the reaction to
propaganda claims about civilian casualties inflicted further north, had
been effective. The regime would be encouraged in its belief that
the United States will ultimately tire of the war and that its policy
was forcing the United States to retreat.
A similar program to reduce the logistic capacity of the Com-
munists, called Operation Strangle, was carried out during the Korean
War with only limited effectiveness. A strip across North Korea
60 nautical miles in depth was bombed day and night for 11 months
in an attempt to cut off supplies needed by the Communist armies. By
means of a system of countermeasures very similar in scope to those
now being carried out by the North Vietnamese, the Communists greatly
reduced the effectiveness of the US bombing program while at the same
time continuing to provide the necessary supplies for their war effort.
G. Estimated Casualties Resulting from Alternative Rolling
Thunder Programs*
The alternative Rolling Thunder programs examined in this
report would tend to yield casualties at a significantly higher rate than
that observed in 1966. This arises principally because these programs
tend to be centered on targets located in the more heavily populated
* See Appendix G.
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areas of North Vietnam. Specific numbers of casualties could not be
estimated for every aspect of each campaign, particularly armed
reconnaissance programs. A rough approximation indicates, however,
that total casualties resulting from attacks on fixed targets could range
from 15, 000 to 20, 000. Approximately one-third of these would be
civilian casualties, most of whom would have been engaged in war re-
lated activities. Casualties in this amount -- if they were all sustained
in 1967 -- would be at a level from two to three times higher than that
obtained by attacks on fixed targets in 1965 and 1966 combined.
Armed reconnaissance in 1966 accounted for about 95 percent
of total casualties. If the alternative bombing programs are carried
out by cutting back significantly on armed reconnaissance programs in
the areas south. of Hanoi, there probably would be a marked decline in
the number of casualties from this source. In this event the total
casualties resulting from the alternative programs might not be signifi-
cantly greater than the total casualties inflicted during the 1966 campaign.
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ECONOMIC DAMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
1965
36.2
BRIDGES
11.0
INDIRECT
LOSSES
(Agriculture, Fishing
& Exports)
9.4
POWER PLANTS
6.3
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
5.9
`PETROLEUM 1.6
`MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 1.2
POWER
PLANTS
\ 6.2
1966
94.3
BRIDGES
12.1
(Agriculture, Fish in g
& Exports)
36.9
INDIRECT
LOSSES
1,.~ // MAKIIIMt 1'VKIS U.tf
MISC ARMED RECCE 1.2 MANUFACTURING FACILITIES 0.9
Figure 1. Value of Economic Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
MARITIME PORTS 0.7
TRANSPORT
EQUIPMENT
29.8
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MILITARY DAMAGE
MILLION US DOLLARS
NAVAL
CRAFT
2.0
AMMO
DEPOTS 4.5
1965
33.6
1966
35.6
MISC. ARMED RECCE
2.3
RADAR and
COMMO SITES 1.0
Figure 2e Value of Military Damage in North Vietnam, by Sector, 1965 and 1966
-MISC. ARMED RECCE 0.7
RADAR and
AIRCRAFT COMMO SITES 1.8
3.4
NAVAL BASES 1.2
SAM SITES 0.6
AIRFIELDS 0.4
SUPPLY
DEPOTS
3.0
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I I I I I I I t I I I I I. I I
25X1
cQ'
c
N
W
C), 0 1000
0 65562 1-67 CIA
n
S
SORTIES FLOWN
F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D
1965 1966
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I I I
I I I I I I I I I I
ORDNANCE DELIVERED
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.
1966
*January 1966 total for Laos, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam
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AVERAGE DISTRIBUTION OF US SORTIES, BY ROUTE PACKAGE
nn-,;gnu - I
CHINA
LAOS
? Xinnr;
Khouen
Phur;A
YI;H
ANni
f3uc
Nina
I\ Ir-I
MAM, Nua
mmoiane _- -_
CHINA I~
Stp0 e.
SOUTH
Hue
I\A. or g No.Y_4s V1& NAIYI\\
L A 0 S t...
Figure 5. North Vietnam: Average Distribution of US Sorties, by Route Package,
January - November, 1966
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COST OF AIR OPERATIONS
Monthly VALUE OF DAMAGE
200
Figure 6, Estimated Direct Operational Cost of US/GVN Air Operations in
North Vietnam and Cost of Economic and Military Damage to
North Vietnam, by Month, 1965 and 1966
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APPENDIX A
~.r AN APPRAISAL OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM
..1 I. Physical Effects
The cost of reconstruction or repair of the economic and mili-
tary facilities in North Vietnam which have been attacked under the
Rolling Thunder program during 1965-66 is estimated at about $200 mil-
lion. About 61.3 percent of the damage was inflicted on economic targets
and 35 percent on military targets. The damage inflicted during 1966
represents $130 million of the total.
Damage to the economy accounts for more than 70 percent of
the total in 1966, whereas in 1965 economic loss represented only
about 50 percent. Indirect losses caused by shortfalls in agriculture,
fishing, and exports accounted for nearly 40 percent of the total eco-
nomic damage in 1966, and destruction and damage to transport equip-
ment accounted for a little more than 30 percent. Bridges, powerplants,
and petroleum storage sites were the principal categories of targets
responsible for the remainder.
More than 80 percent of all military damage in 1966 resulted
from attacks on aircraft, naval craft, and SAM sites, but in 1965 the
damage from such attacks amounted to less than 20 percent of the
total. Damage to barracks made up nearly one-half of the total
damage to military targets in 1965 but only a small portion of the total
during 1966.
The greatest amount of damage inflicted in 1966 occurred in
the months of June through September, the peak month being July.
During these months the attacks on bulk petroleum storage began, and
major losses in naval craft, aircraft, and transport equipment occurred.
Damage to bridges also reached a peak in July. Indirect losses were
at their highest point in June. During 1965 the monthly trend in
physical damage was generally similar to that in 1966.
The measurable effects in the major target systems are dis-
cussed in the following sections.
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B. Economic Targets
1. Petroleum Storage
On 1 January 1965 there were 13 fixed (JCS) petroleum
storage targets with a combined storage capacity of almost 128, 000 tons.
Some 26, 000 tons of capacity -- about 20 percent of the total capacity on
1 January 1965 -- was destroyed by attacks during 1965. The value of
the tankage and contents and the related support facilities destroyed in
:t965 is estimated at $1.6 million.
During 1966, about 77, 000 tons of capacity -- about 60 per-
cent of the total existing on 1 January 1965 and 75 percent of the total on
1 January 1966 -- was destroyed. The value of the tankage and contents
and the related support facilities destroyed in 1966 is estimated to be be-
tween $4. 5 million and $5. 2 million. >1>
Total residual capacity at the nine fixed petroleum storage
targets remaining on 31 December 1966 was about 26, 000 tons. There
was no indication that any of the attacked sites were being restored or
reconstructed as of 31 December 1966. There was evidence, however,
that parts from the moderately damaged tanks at Haiphong were being
salvaged.
In addition to the capacity of the JCS-targeted facilities,
the North Vietnamese have developed additional capacity in dispersed
tank sites. By 31 December 1966, more than 100 tank sites with a total
estimated capacity of between 30, 000 and 40, 000 tons probably existed.
This appendix is based on a detailed statistical analysis of each
major target system, the attacks leveled against it, the extent of damage
to the system, and the cost of restoration or repair. These statistical
summations are not published in the report but are available in the
Office of Research and Reports.
Additional tankage of about 5, 400 tons existed on 1 January 1965 but
was subsequently removed. The present whereabouts of this tankage
is unknown. This tankage was not affected by bombings and is not now
carried as usable capacity; therefore, it is excluded from all calcula-
tions.
The range in value is necessary to reflect the possible range in
the amount of petroleum in the tankage that was damaged or destroyed.
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Additional storage capacity is represented by the "55-
gallon" drums dispersed throughout the country. It is estimated that
about 170, 000 drums, representing a capacity of 28, 000 tons, had
arrived in North Vietnam by 31 December 1966. During 1966, there
were more than 1, 200 strikes against about 450 identified or suspected
dispersed petroleum storage sites, consisting of small tanks and
drums. It is estimated that these strikes may have resulted in the loss
of as much as 5, 000 tons of storage. The restoration cost of these
tanks, drums, and their contents and appurtenances as well as other
petroleum storage facilities for which no meaningful bomb damage
assessment is available may amount to about $400, 000.
The total cost of the damage inflicted by airstrikes during
1965 and 1966, therefore, is in the range of $6. 5 million to $7. 2 mil-
lion.
2. Electric Powerplants
Attacks on North Vietnam's electric power facilities since
April 1965 have put out of operation 59, 000 kilowatts (kw) of power-
generating capacity, almost 32 percent of the national total. In addition,
the attacks have prevented 24, 000 kw of new capacity from being put
into operation. The total cost of restoring damaged power facilities is
estimated at $12. 5 million, of which $6. 2 million is the estimated
value of damage inflicted during 1966.
Although airstrikes have put out of operation about one-
third of the generating capacity in North Vietnam's electric power
industry, the losses of power-generating capacity probably have had
only a minor effect on the economy and on the ability of North Vietnam
to conduct military operations. Remaining capacity has been adequate
to supply most industrial consumers and probably even to supply
minimal nonindustrial demands. There have been reports of occasional
power shortages in Hanoi and Haiphong involving nonindustrial con-
sumers, but no reports concerning restrictions on power supplied to
industry. The major part of modern industry in North Vietnam is
concentrated in and around these two cities. Shortages in the Hanoi-
Haiphong area probably have made it necessary to discontinue service
only to nonessential users during peak-load periods. The most se-
vere shortages of power to industry are estimated to have occurred at
Nam Dinh, Thanh Hoa, and Ben Thuy. It is possible that lack of
a reliable source of power was a factor in the decision to disperse
parts of the Nam Dinh textile mill.
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North Vietnam has made some slow progress in restoring
damaged power facilities. Repair work at the Nam Dinh powerplant had
progressed to a stage in October that indicated possible partial opera-
tion of this plant by the end of 1966. Restoration under way at the Thanh
Hoa and Ben Thuy plants was nullified by airstrikes during September
and October. There has been no attempt to repair the damaged power-
plants at Co Dinh* or at Ban Thach since mid-1965. The Uong Bi power-
plant was put back into service after the strikes of December 1965 and
April 1966, and work toward restoration apparently has been started
again since the heavy destruction inflicted in August 1966.
The persistence of efforts to restore damaged power
facilities underlines the importance of these plants to North Vietnam
and strongly suggests that no suitable alternative to central generating
plants has been found. Mobile generating units imported by the hundreds
during the past 18 months apparently have failed to offset the loss of
central generating facilities.
3. Manufacturing
Only four manufacturing facilities of any significance have
been attacked under the Rolling Thunder program during 1965-66, two
of which were struck in 1965 and two in 1966. In addition, one of the
facilities hit in 1965 was restruck in 1966. Although restoration costs
are estimated to be comparatively small for damage to these plants in
either year ($1. 2 million in 1965 and $900, 000 in 1966), losses in
production from these plants appear to be considerably more significant.
The two plants attacked in 1965 were the Lang Chi Ex-
plosives Plant and the Nam Dinh Textile Mill. Neither plant has been
restored, and presumably greater imports are compensating for the
loss in production from these plants. The Nam Dinh Textile Mill is
in only limited operation, but an undetermined and perhaps significant
share of its capacity is believed to have been restored by the subse-
quent relocation of much of the mill's equipment to dispersed locations.
In 1966 the Cam Pha Coal Treatment Plant was attacked
twice in April (as part of the attacks on the Cam Pha Port complex)
and reportedly again in November. Damage at Cam Pha resulted in
Additional damage on the Co Dinh plant by a November strike
:rendered the plant virtually a total loss.
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a considerable reduction in coal exports, amounting to about $4. 7 mil-
lion through December 1966. The Viet Tri Paper Mill (not a JCS tar-
get) was attacked in July and reportedly again in November. It is
estimated that the plant, which represents 80 percent of the national
capacity, will be inoperable for a long time.
A few additional manufacturing plants, which are believed
to be small, are reported to have been damaged during 1965-66. These
include a spinning cooperative, a silk mill, and a farm implement plant,
all in Nam Dinh. The Eighth of March Textile Mill, a large mill in
Hanoi, also received negligible damage from an exploding rocket during
an airstrike mission in December 1966.
4. Bridges
The total number of bridges confirmed by photography to
have been damaged or destroyed by the Rolling Thunder program in-
creased slightly in 1966 compared with 1965. The estimated cumulative
cost of complete restoration to the original condition through 1966 is
$19. 0 million, compared with $10. 1 million in 1965. Cumulative esti-
mated costs to make temporary repairs to those bridges still unrepaired
at the end of 1966 would be $1. 3 million. In addition, at least $2. 8 mil-
lion has been actually expended through 1966 for temporary repairs to
bridges. Cumulative costs, assuming both temporary repairs and com-
plete restoration of bridges, will be $23. 1 million for damage inflicted
through 1966, compared with $11.0 million for damage inflicted through
1965.
a. JCS-Targeted Bridges
Attacks against JCS-targeted bridges increased slightly
in 1966, compared with 1965, but the number of such bridges attacked
was slightly less than the total in 1965, as shown in the following tabula-
tion:
Attacks Against JCS-Targeted Bridges
1965 1966
Strikes Bridges
Strikes Bridges
Rail and rail/highway
67 l4+
110 16
Highway
77 30
76 23
Total
144 44
186 39
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b. Armed Reconnaissance Bridge Targets
The destruction or damage of nearly 390 bridges,
including those on the JCS target list, has been confirmed by aerial
photography. One hundred and eighty of these were struck initially
during 1966.
Pilots have reported destroying or damaging about
1, 920 bridges during 1966, for a total of 2, 580 bridges throughout
the bombing. This total undoubtedly contains considerable double-
counting and overstatement of the damage inflicted. A total of 389
bridges is confirmed by photography to be destroyed or damaged.
This figure understates the number of smaller bridges damaged or
destroyed because photography may not be available for some of the
bridges. A comparison of the two sets of data follows:
Bridges Destroyed or Damaged
Photographic Evidence
Pilot Reports
Railroad and combination
96
99
Highway
293
2,1!80
389
2,579
Seven comparatively important railroad yards have been
struck during the Rolling Thunder program, four of which are JCS
targets. In addition, many small yards and sidings have been attacked
by armed reconnaissance. Three significant yards -- at Thai Nguyen,
Yen Vien, and Gia Lam -- were attacked for the first time in 1966.
The cost of restoration of the damage inflicted on rail yards during
1966 is estimated at about $1. 2 million, compared with only $70, 000
for that in 1965. Most of these values stem from the cost of re-
pairing or reconstructing warehouses and other buildings rather than
yard track. Airstrikes on these yards have resulted in only temporary
disruption to through rail service on the rail lines, which usually has
been restored within about 24 hours after each attack.
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Six North Vietnamese ports representing 88 percent of the
country's total maritime cargo-handling capacity have been selected as
JCS targets. Only three of these ports -- Ben Thuy, Ham Rong, and
Cam Pha -- have been attacked. Damage to port facilities amounts to
$1. 4 million, of which about $750, 000 resulted from strikes in 1966.
The impact of this damage on North Vietnam's economy is
not significant, but major export losses have resulted. Although Cam
Pha is a major North Vietnamese port, representing 16 percent of the
country's maritime cargo capacity, the $160, 000 damage against it
is nominal. During the attacks on Cam Pha, however, the coal-washing
machinery and rail facilities at the port were also hit. The damage to
these facilities resulted in a loss of coal exports amounting to $4. 7
million in 1966.
Port facilities at Haiphong, which represent nearly
50 percent of the country's maritime port capacity, have not been
attacked. However, the petroleum terminal was damaged during the
airstrikes against petroleum bulk storage facilities in the summer of
1966. This has affected petroleum imports, since tankers must now
discharge into petroleum barges from a sheltered deep-water anchorage
in Ha Long Bay.
Only two of the eight targeted locks on the inland water-
ways in North Vietnam have been attacked. The first strike, in August
1965, was against the Bich Phuong Lock No. 3 on the Song Chu Canal
in Thanh Hoa Province and resulted in heavy damage to the lock. By
October 1965, however, temporary repairs had been made and the site
of the lock had been cofferdammed. Water-level control has been
restored, and navigation on the canal is possible, although it is inter-
rupted at the site of the lock. During 1966 a strike against the Qua
Nhue Ha Lock No. 2, on the same canal, was unsuccessful.
8. Agriculture and Fishing
Although agriculture and commercial fishing have not
been direct targets of the airstrikes against North Vietnam, these
attacks have had significant indirect effects on production during the
past two years. It has not been possible, however, to separate the
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effects of the bombing from the effects of adverse weather on agriculture,
and so the estimates of losses in agricultural output also include those
resulting from adverse weather.
The decrease from normal agricultural production and
losses in the fish catch during 1965-66 are valued at an estimated
$30. 5 million, $25. 3 million of which occurred during 1966. Of the
total amount, $25. 5 million is attributed to a shortfall in rice production
and the remainder, $5 million, is attributed to a decrease in the salt-
water fish catch.
The shortfall in rice production and the decrease in the
salt-water fish catch have contributed to food shortages in North Viet-
nam. Rice normally accounts for about two-thirds of the caloric intake
of the population, and fish is the main source of protein. There is
some evidence that these food shortages have become somewhat worse
in the past few months -- particularly in Hanoi. There are no indi-
cations of critical food shortages thus far, however, and identified
bulk food imports in 1966 were lower than those in 1965.
9. Export Losses
From 1 April 1965 to 31 December 1966, measurable
export losses attributed to direct and secondary effects of the Rolling
Thunder program totaled $15.8 million, of which $4.2 million occurred
in 1965 and $11.6 million in 1966. Reduction in exports of apatite and
coal accounted, respectively, for 60 percent and 30 percent of the
total. The remainder of the losses is accounted for by an apparent
reduction* in seaborne exports of cement since the initiation of the
Rolling Thunder program.
C. Military Targets
Although about 50 airstrikes were made against at least
19 JCS-targeted barracks during 1966, these strikes did not significantly
increase the damage to barracks inflicted during 1965. All but two of
the barracks had been struck in 1965, and more than half of them
* It is possible that undetected increases in exports of cement to China
have been made on Chinese Communist ships.
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appeared to have been inactive at the end of 1965. The attacks during
1966 increased the percent of barracks capacity destroyed or inactive
to about 23 percent of the total national capacity, compared with a little
more than 18 percent destroyed or inactive at the end of 1965. The
cost of restoration of the damage inflicted in 1966 is estimated at about
$1. 9 million, compared with about $16 million in 1965.
It is believed that the total capacity destroyed to date
represents for the most part only excess or unused capacity. Most of
the important barracks are located in the Hanoi-Haiphong area and have
not been attacked. The military strength in this area far exceeds that
in the outlying areas which have been struck, and sufficient capacity
remains to house all of North Vietnam's military forces.
The lack of barracks capacity in the areas where destruc-
tion has taken place -- in the southern part of the country along the
border of Laos, and in the northwestern provinces -- is undoubtedly
causing much inconvenience. Damage to barracks in these areas has
not been repaired, and the troops apparently are being quartered
with civilians in nearby towns, in tents, and in other makeshift
shelters in surrounding areas.
Almost no change has occurred in North Vietnam',s air-
field capability as a result of US air attacks during 1966. Of the
23 airfields in North Vietnam, 11 are targeted and are considered
to be of economic and military significance. Four of the targeted
airfields have been struck, resulting in the destruction of about
20 percent of the total targeted airfield capacity. Two of these --
Dien Bien Phu and Dong Hoi -- were restruck in 1966. The damage
inflicted on airfields has had only limited military and economic
effects.
In 1966, 115 airstrikes were carried out against
61 surface-to-air (SAM) sites. The North Vietnamese are believed
to be limited to about 25 SAM firing units (battalions), most of which
have exhibited a high degree of mobility. Therefore, although 151
SAM sites had been identified as of 31 December, not more than
20 to 25 of them are believed to have been occupied at any one time.
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The sparseness of poststrike photography prevents making
a precise assessment of the amount of damage actually sustained by
these SAM facilities; that reported by pilots could have totaled at least
$1.7 million=.,; however, only destruction of equipment valued at some
$900, 000 was verified by photography. The actual amount of damage
to SAM firing sites probably is closer to $6 million. In addition, three
attacks on the Haiphong SAM Support Facility inflicted an estimated
$70, 000 damage to buildings and a probable minimum of $100, 000
damage to equipment. Damage to SAM facilities in 1965 was estimated
at about $630, 000.
During this period, at least 1, 100 missiles (valued at about
$33 million**) were fired against allied targets, resulting in the con-
firmed destruction of 29 planes and 14 drones.
By the end of 1966, airstrikes against naval bases had
destroyed nearly 20 percent of North Vietnam's naval support facilities.
The damage is estimated at $1. 2 million during 1965 and about $400, 000
during 1966.
During 1966 an initial strike on the Bai Chay Naval Com-
plex, located in the Hon Gai port area, resulted in the destruction of only
about 14 percent of its capability. However, possibly as a consequence
of this strike, some of the command responsibilities for naval operations
in the Hon Gai area have been shifted from Bai Chay to the newly con-
structed. command post at Binh Dong in the Haiphong area. The damage
to the bases has not seriously affected operations of the small North
Vietnamese navy.
North Vietnam has 50 known radar sites, of which five
coastal sites were targeted because of their strategic location. During
1965-66 these five targeted sites were attacked. Damage or destruction
Assuming that all of the sites reported destroyed were occupiedwhen
struck and most of the major equipment was destroyed: specifically, the
Fan Song radar, cabling, and an average of five launchers and three
missiles. No attempt has been made to assign a value to the "damaged"
category.
This cost is not included in the estimated costs of physical damage
resulting from the Rolling Thunder program.
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of targeted sites amounted to an estimated $1. 7 million during 1965
and to slightly over $900, 000 in 1966, for a total of $2. 6 million.
The Rolling Thunder program has not seriously impaired
the operational effectiveness of telecommunications in North Vietnam.
By the end of 1966 the total monetary cost of damage inflicted by air
attacks on North Vietnamese telecommunications amounted to about
$185, 000, of which about $105, 000 occurred during 1965 and $80, 000
in 1966.
The full extent of physical damage to the wireline system
of North Vietnam cannot be estimated. The wireline system has not
been specifically targeted for destruction, and the damage sustained
has been a collateral effect of the bombing of railroads and highways,
which are generally paralleled by open wirelines. There is a strong
possibility -- suggested in part by the construction of seven new open
wireline routes -- that wireline damage has been extensive, but there
is no conclusive evidence of this. Cumulative monetary damage to the
open wireline system since the beginning of Rolling Thunder is esti-
mated very roughly at $100, 000, of which $80, 000 probably occurred
during 1966.
Although the total cost of damage inflicted on tele-
communications facilities in North Vietnam is small, indirect costs
in this field resulting from a need for increased domestic communica-
tions appear to be substantial. Although it is impossible to distinguish
precisely between communications requirements induced as a direct
result of bomb damage and those generated by the expansion of North
.,.r Vietnam's military establishment, it is clear that the Rolling Thunder
program has been an important, if not the prime, reason for increasing
the complexity of North Vietnam's communications problems.
7. Supply and Ordnance Depots
Twelve of the 17 targeted supply depots have been attacked
under the Rolling Thunder program. The only significant strikes during
1966 were against the Van Dien Vehicle Depot Complex, located a short
distance south of Hanoi. This complex constitutes a significant portion
of North Vietnam's military motor vehicle repair capacity. The cost
of restoration of the damage inflicted by the three strikes against the
complex in December is estimated at $500, 000. Restrikes on a few
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other depots bring the total to about $630, 000 for damage inflicted in
1966 compared with a cost of at least $3 million for damage inflicted
during 1965. Destruction of supply and ordnance depots through 1966
represents less than 15 percent of the national capacity.
8. Ammunition Depots
Available information indicates that airstrikes were
carried out against only two of the 18 JCS-targeted ammunition depots
during 1966 -- the Xom Bang and the Xom Rung depots, both of which
had been attacked in 1965 and were inactive at the end of the year. The
attacks in 1966 resulted in only slight additional damage, estimated at
about $200, 000. Attacks during 1965 against 13 depots resulted in
damage amounting to about $4. 5 million. It is estimated that airstrikes
through 1966 destroyed about one-fourth of the national storage capacity
for ammunition, exclusive of storage in barracks and headquarters
complexes. The destruction of the depots probably has caused tempo-
rary delays in distribution and inconvenience but has not caused short-
ages of ammunition in the areas where they are located.
A total of 10 North Vietnamese naval craft were destroyed
by US aircraft through 1966. In 1965, three Swatow-class gunboats
were sunk while in waters near Haiphong and Hon Gai, and a fourth
was destroyed while in tow at sea. In 1966, three PT boats were sunk
while at sea, and two SO-1 subchasers and one Swatow-class gunboat
were destroyed while moored near Cac Ba Island. The estimated
restoration cost of these naval craft totals $8. 1 million. The loss
incurred during 1966 accounts for $6. 1 million.
North Vietnamese aircraft losses increased measurably
during 1966. Six supersonic MIG-21's and 16 MIG-17's were destroyed,
compared with only five MIG-17's in 1965. The estimated cost of these
losses is $3. 4 million in 1965 and $17 million in 1966.
During 1966, Rolling Thunder became almost exclusively an
armed reconnaissance program directed primarily against the North
Vietnamese lines of communication and transport targets. The effect
of airstrikes against lines of communication and other fixed targets
is discussed in an earlier section of this appendix.
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1. Transport Equipment
Destruction and damage of all types of transport equip-
ment by airstrikes was considerably greater in 1966 than in 1965. The
following tabulation, which is based primarily on pilot reports and
includes some duplication and exaggeration, "I provides a general indi-
cation of the increase in the damage inflicted, by type of equipment.
1965
1
966
Type of Equipment
Destro
yed
Damag
ed
Destroye
d
Dam
aged
Locomotives
6
6
10
14
Rail freight cars
22
7
59
2
1,101
935
Trucks
318
487
1,935
1,801
Ferries
53
56
67
131
Barges
263
487
2,520
4,289
Other water craft
144
210
867
1,372
Total
1,011
1,838
6,500
8,5+2
no The estimated cost to the North Vietnamese of replacing destroyed and
repairing damaged transport equipment increased from $5. 9 million in
1965 to $29. 8 million in 1966, giving a total of $35. 7 million.
In spite of the significantly higher level of damage inflicted
during 1966, there has been no evidence of serious transport problems
resulting from shortages of equipment. Imports of locomotives and
trucks have been sufficient generally to maintain inventories at the
1965
level. Reported losses of freight cars have included many small,
make-
shift cars used on the rail lines south of Hanoi which are not included in
the inventory of mainline freight cars. Although the original inventory
of mainline freight cars decreased by possibly 35 percent during 1966,
Communist China probably has loaned or given North Vietnam all the
freight cars needed to compensate for any shortages. Sightings of water-
craft indicate that there has been no significant decrease in the number
of watercraft in use during 1966 in spite of the high level of destruction.
Data have been adjusted downward to eliminate duplication whenever
possible.
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2. Miscellaneous Targets of Armed Reconnaissance
Pilot and bomb-damage assessment reports have revealed
a variety of miscellaneous targets which have been destroyed or damaged
by armed reconnaissance. These miscellaneous targets consist mainly
of transport and military facilities.
The cost of restoring or repairing the miscellaneous trans-
port facilities attacked in 1966 is roughly estimated at about $1. 2 million
and the military facilities at about $2. 3 million. Damage to all such mis-
cellaneous military targets in 1965 was estimated at about $700, 000.
II. Rolling Thunder Operations in 1966
A. Scale of Operations
During 1966, US and South Vietnamese forces flew approximately
147, 850 sorties against targets in North Vietnam, nearly 2. 7 times the
number flown in 1965 (see Table A1*). Rolling Thunder accounted for about
35 percent of the total sorties flown in Southeast Asia in 1966, compared
with 30 percent the year before. Similarly, the share of Laos increased
from 9 percent of all sorties flown in Southeast Asia in 1965 to 18 percent
in 1966, while the share of South Vietnam dropped from 61 percent in
1965 to 47 percent in 1966, as is shown by the following tabulation:
1965 1966
Area of Operation
Number
of Sorties
Percent
of Total
Number
of Sorties
Percent
of Total
North Vietnam
55,210
30
147,850
35
Laos
16,030
9
76,110
18
North Vietnam and Laos
combined
71,240
33
223,960
53
South Vietnam
110,310
61
204,120
37
Total Southeast Asia
181,550
100
428,080
100
Tables Al through A6 (pages A-22 through A-27) summarize the prin-
cipal measures of the Rolling Thunder program. In addition to these, a
number of tables on air operations in South Vietnam and Laos and tables
summarizing the operations against specific target systems have been
prepared but are not published in this appendix. These tables are avail-
able in the Office of Research and Reports. A listing of the unpublished
tables is presented on p. A-28.
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Approximately 82, 170 attack sorties were flown against North Vietnam in
1966, which represents about 56 percent of all Rolling Thunder sorties
during the year. This compares quite favorably with 1965, when only
47 percent of all Rolling Thunder sorties against North Vietnam were
attack sorties, and is in contrast with a decline in the share of total sorties
represented by attack sorties against South Vietnam and Laos in 1966. The
percentages of attack and support sorties in each area are shown in the
following tabulation:
Year
1965
1966
1966
North Vietnam
Laos
South Vietnam
All Areas of
Operation in
Southeast Asia
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
47
53
68
32
85 /
15 a/
70 a/
30 a/
76 J
24 a/
56
44
64
36
79
21
68
32
a. US sorties only. Distribution of sorties by the South Vietnamese Air Force
over South Vietnam in 1965 is not available.
b. All US and South Vietnamese sorties.
The air campaign against North Vietnam was overwhelmingly
a US effort. * The South Vietnamese Air Force accounted for only about
1 percent of the total sorties flown over North Vietnam in both 1965 and
1966. Further details concerning the percentage of total sorties flown
against North Vietnam by various services are presented in the following
tabulation:
1965
1966
US
Air Force
44
53
US
Navy
53
42
US
Marine Corps
2
4
Total US 99 99
Vietnamese Air Force 1 1
* For a summary of sorties against North Vietnam, by mission and nationality,
see Table Al.
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During the first 9 months of 1966, approximately 44 percent of the total
sorties flown against North Vietnam originated from Navy aircraft car-
riers, 36 percent from US Air Force bases in Thailand, and 20 percent
from bases in South Vietnam.
Since mid-1965 the increase in sorties flown over North Vietnam
and Laos combined has been roughly parallel to the increase in sorties
flown over South Vietnam. However, when the number of sorties flown
against North Vietnam is increasing,a smaller number of sorties usually
is flown against Laos, and vice versa. During the first 8 months of 1966
the increase in sorties flown over North Vietnam was roughly proportional
to the decrease in sorties flown over Laos. Conversely, during the last
quarter of the year a decline in the number of sorties flown over North
Vietnam was accompanied by a substantial increase in sorties flown over
Laos.
The 1966 Rolling Thunder program varied radically from the
1965 campaign in the increasing emphasis on armed reconnaissance
rather than on attacking fixed targets. In 1966, only 2, 620 sorties were
flown against JCS-designated fixed targets, compared with 13, 890 sorties
in 1965. (See Table A2.) Armed reconnaissance (excluding restrikes on
JCS fixed targets) accounted for 98 percent of all sorties flown against
North Vietnam in 1966, compared with only 75 percent in 1965.
The increasing emphasis on Rolling Thunder as an interdiction
program is evident from the geographic distribution of the air effort.
During the first 11 months of 1966, approximately 63 percent of the total
attack sorties over North Vietnam were concentrated in the three southern-
most armed reconnaissance Route Package areas, Routes 1, 2, and 3. *
(See Table A3,) These three Route Package areas cover the North Viet-
namese Panhandle area south from Thanh Hoa to the Demilitarized Zone.
On the other hand, only 7 percent of the sorties were flown over Route
Package 6, the key northeast area which contains most of the lucrative
fixed targets and the two most important rail lines in North Vietnam.
During 1966, sorties flown over North Vietnam delivered a total
of 128, 070 tons of ordnance. (See Table A4.) This amounted to 27 percent
of the total ordnance delivered by all air operations in Southeast Asia.
The amount of ordnance delivered on targets in North Vietnam and Laos
North Vietnam is divided, for operations, into six geographic areas,
known as Route Packages. (See Figure 5.
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combined accounted for a little less than half of the total ordnance de-
livered by air operations in Southeast Asia. Throughout the first
9 months of the year, increases in the amount delivered on North Viet-
nam approximately offset the decline in the amount delivered on Laos.
During the last quarter of the year, however, the pattern reversed
itself, with deliveries on North Vietnam falling below the levels achieved
during the third quarter, while deliveries on Laos increased substantially.
The average ordnance load per attack sortie against North
Vietnam during 1966 was 1. 6 tons per sortie (see the following tabulation),
a slight increase over the 1. 3 tons per sortie averaged in 1965.
Ordnance in 1966
Attack Sorties
Average Load.
in 1966
Per Sortie
Area of Operation
Number
Percent
Tons
Percent
Tons
North Vietnam.
82,170
28
128,070
27
1.6
Laos
48,480
17
711,120
15
1.5
North Vietnam
and Laos com-
bined
130,650
45
202,190
42
1.5
South Vietnam
161,350
55
278,050
58
1.7
Total Southeast
292,000
100
480,240
100
1.6
Asia
The US Air Force delivered 59 percent of all ordnance expended on
North Vietnam during 1966, the US Navy 35 percent, the US Marine
Corps 5 percent, and the South Vietnamese Air Force 1 percent. The
shares in total ordnance delivered on North Vietnam in 1966 are com-
pared with those for 1965 in the following tabulation:
1965
1966
US Air Force US Navy
So
Viet
US Marine Corps Air
uth
namese
Force
62
35
N.A.
3
59
35
5
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Ordnance delivered on JCS-designated fixed targets in North
am Vietnam during 1966 was only 3 percent of the total, compared with
37 percent in 1965. This sharp decrease reflects the rapidly diminish-
ing share of fixed targets in the total attack on North Vietnam. A sum-
row mary of the attack sorties and ordnance delivered on JCS fixed targets
in North Vietnam during 1965 and 1966 is presented in Table A5.
A total of 318 aircraft and 269 men were lost in the air attacks
on North Vietnam during 1966. An additional 177 men were lost but
later recovered. The recovery rate in 1966 -- 40 percent -- was an
improvement over the rate in 1965, when 30 percent were recovered.
The improvement is particularly notable in view of the fact that many
of the losses occurred during attacks on targets located in heavily
defended areas.
In both 1965 and 1966 the service that flew the largest number
of sorties lost the largest number of planes. In 1965 this was the US
Navy and in 1966, the US Air Force. Losses, by service, are compared
for 1966 and 1965 in Table A6.
Losses as a percent of total sorties flown by models of air-
craft most used remained about the same in 1966 as in 1965 or were
slightly lower. For the most part, losses of frequently used models
were in the range of 0. 3 to 0. 5 percent.
The average number of aircraft lost per 1, 000 attack sorties
dropped from about 6. 6 in 1965 to a little less than 3. 9 in 1966. The
average number of combat losses in 1966 was only 3. 4 aircraft per
1, 000 attack sorties. See the following tabulation:
Year
Total
Attack Sorties
Losses
Total as a Perc
Losses of Total Attac
ent
k Sorties
1965
25,940
171 0.66
1966
82,170
318 a/ 0.39 a
/
a. Of the 318 aircraft lost in 1966, 282 were combat
losses and 36 were operational losses. Combat losses
represent 0.34 percent of total attack sorties.
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In 1966, as in 1965, the rate of loss over North Vietnam was
much higher for attacks on JCS'fixed targets than for armed recon-
naissance. The average number of aircraft lost per 1, 000 attack sor-
ties flown against JCS fixed targets was 10 in 1966, somewhat more
than the rate of about 8. 5 in 1965, as shown in the following tabulation.
Losses as a Percent
Attack Sorties Flown Aircraft Lost During of Attack Sorties on
On Armed Attacks Armed
Armed
Against Reconnaissance, On Reconnaissance,
Reconnaissance,
JCS Photo Recon- JCS Photo Recon- JCS
Photo Recon-
Fixed naissance, Fixed naissance, Fixed
naissance,
Year Targets and Other Targets and Other Targets
and Other
1965 8,710 17,23
0 74+ 97 0.85
0.56
1966 2,100 80,0
70 21 297 1.00
0.37
The higher loss ratio for attacks on JCS fixed targets undoubtedly re-
flects the more intensive defense around such targets.
Losses per 1, 000 attack sorties flown over North Vietnam in
1966 were higher than for other areas of operation in Southeast Asia.
The comparable figures were as follows:
Aircraft Lost
per 1,000 Attack Sorties
Area of Operation Flown in 1966
North Vietnam 3.9
South Vietnam 1.6
Laos 1.5
All areas of operation
in Southeast Asia 2.2
D. Costs of Operations Against North Vietnam in 1966
The direct operational cost of the air attack on North Vietnam
during 1966 is estimated at about $1, 250 million, or more than
2.7 times the cost of the attack during 1965. This figure includes
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the production cost of the aircraft lost, valued at $606 million;
direct sortie overhead costs, estimated at approximately $330 million
(not including any allowance for maintenance of air bases and the air-
craft carriers or for logistic support); and ordnance costs of about
$312 million. These costs are compared with similar ones for 1965 in
the following tabulation:
Million US
Total
1965
1966
1965-66
Aircraft lost
305.8
605.6
911.4
Sortie overhead cost
98.0
330.4
428.4
Ordnance
56.2
311.5
367.7
Total
460.0
1,247.5
1,707.5
The cost of air operations over North Vietnam was almost half of the
total operating cost of more than $2. 7 billion for all air operations in
Southeast Asia during 1966.
The measurable costs to North Vietnam for the reconstruction
or repair of bomb-damaged facilities and other indirect losses attributable
to the bombing during 1966 have been estimated at about $130 million.
Thus the cost of inflicting one dollar's worth of damage on North Viet-
nam during 1966 may be estimated at about $9. 60. The comparable
figure in 1965 was approximately $6. 60. The cost of inflicting damage
on North Vietnam averaged, therefore, about 45 percent more in 1966
than in 1965. The increase in cost per unit of damage is attributable
primarily to the increasing costs of a greatly accelerated air inter-
diction program concentrated on low-yield target systems. The dis-
parity between the unit cost to the United States of doing damage in
North Vietnam and the cost to North Vietnam of replacing or repairing
the damaged facilities makes it evident that the value of attacking targets
in North Vietnam must be measured in military, political, and psy-
chological terms rather than economic terms.
E. The Attack on Fixed Target Systems
The attack on JCS-designated fixed targets has represented
a much smaller effort in 1966 than in 1965. Only 2, 620 sorties were
flown against such targets in 1966, compared with 13, 890 sorties in
1965, and only 3, 560 tons of ordnance were delivered, compared with
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12, 800 tons, during a shorter time period, last year. (See Table A5. )
As of 31 December 1966, there were 242 targets on the JCS list. A
total of 158 targets from the list were struck in 1965, including 23 no
longer carried on the current list. During 1966, 73 of the targets that
were struck last year were restruck, and 27 new targets were struck
for the first time. At the end of 1966 there remained on the list 81 tar-
gets that had not been struck.
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Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Mission and Nationality a/
1965 and 1966
Year and Month
Attack,/
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Total
Sorties
Attack
Sorties
Support
Sorties
Total
Sorties
Attack
Sorties J
Support
Sorties
Total
Sorties
1965
January
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
February
130
70
200
60
0
60
190
70
260
March
530
240
770
320
Negl.
120
650
240
890
April
1,500
1,360
2,860
100
10
110
1,600
1,370
2,970
May
1,510
2,710
4,220
100
20
120
1,610
2,730
4,340
June
2,310
1,530
3,840
90
10
100
2,400
1,540
3,940
July
3,160
2,960
6,120
70
10
80
3,230
2,970
6,200
August
3,420
3,790
7,210
30
10
40
3,450
3,800
7,250
September
3,990
4,230
8,220
20
Negl.
20
4,010
4,230
8,240
October
3,460
4,550
8,010
10
Negl.
10
3,470
4,550
8,020
November
3,120
4,180
7,300
10
Negl.
10
3,130
4,180
7,310
December
2,170
3,570
5,740
30
20
50
2,200
3,590
5,790
Total 1965
25,300
29,190
54,490
640
80
720
25,940
29,270
55,210
January
130
2,890
3,020
0
0
0
130
2,890
3,020
February
2,810
3,710
6,520
0
0
0
2,810
3,710
6,520
March
4,480
4,940
9,420
10
10
20
4,490
4,950
9,440
April
5,310
5,090
10,400
140
0
140
5,450
5,090
10,540
May
4,360
4,250
8,610
110
0
110
4,470
4,250
8,720
June
7,520
5,430
12,950
270
0
270
7,790
5,430
13,220
July
9,960
6,240
16,200
240
0
240
10,200
6,240
16,440
August
11,790
7,030
18,820
20
0
20
11,810
7,030
18,840
September
12,340
6,880
19,220
10
0
10
12,350
6,88o
19,230
October
8,700
6,060
14,760
Negl.
0
Negl.
8,700
6,060
14,760
November
7,250
6,180
13,430
10
0
10
7,260
6,18o
13,440
December
6,710
6,970
13,680
Negl.
0
Negl.
6,710
6,970
13,680
Total 1966
81,360
65,670
147,030
810
820
82,170
65,68o
147,850
Total 1965-66
106,660
94,860
201,520
jL450
1,540
108,110
94,950
203,060
a. Rounded to the nearest 10 sorties. Negl. includes fewer than 5 sorties.
b. Attack sorties include strike and flak suppression sorties.
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[ l l l! E. [ I I I
Sorties Against North Vietnam, by Program and by Service
1965 and 1966
Total on
By Armed
Total on Armed
United States
South
Fixed Targets
By Fixed
Reconnaissance
Armed Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance
Total
Vietnamese
Year and Month
(Columns 2 and 3)
Target Strikes
Strikes
Not on Fixed Targets
(Columns 3 and 4)
(Columns 1 and 4)
Air Force
Navy
Marine
Air Force
1965
January
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
February
0
0
0
260
260
260
80
120
N.A.
60
March
850
850
0
40
40
890
360
410
N.A.
120
April
1,800
1,460
340
1,170
1,510
2,970
1,200
1,660
N.A.
110
May
1,790
1,300
490
2,550
3,040
4,340
2,280
1,940
N.A.
120
June
1,410
1,360
50
2,530
2,580
3,940
1,840
2,000
N.A.
100
July
1,910
1,590
320
4,290
4,610
6,200
2,380
3,600
140
80
August
1,900
1,390
510
5,350
5,860
7,250
3,030
4,030
150
40
September
1,600
1,440
160
6,640
6,800
8,240
3,890
4,160
170
20
October
770
570
200
7,250
7,450
8,020
3,480
4,370
160
10
November
1,040
570
470
6,270
6,740
7,310
3,330
3,830
140
10
December
820
530
290
4,970
5,260
5,790
2,630
2,980
130
50
January
0
0
0
3,020
3,020
3,020
1,570
1,220
230
0
February
170
0
170
6,350
6,520
6,520
3,190
3,160
170
0
March
180
0
180
9,260
9,440
9,440
4,600
4,630
190
20
April
390
50
340
10,150
io,49o
10,540
4,850
5,410
140
140
May
160
0
160
8,560
8,720
8,720
4,060
4,420
130
110
June
320
240
80
12,900
12,980
13,220
7,340
5,420
190
270
July
360
50
310
16,080
16,390
16,440
9,520
6,100
580
240
August
280
20
260
18,560
18,820
18,840
9,660
8,120
1,040
20
September
150
0
150
19,080
19,230
19,230
10,110
8,090
1,020
10
October
150
0
150
14,610
14,760
14,760
8,410
5,670
680
Negl.
November
140
30
110
13,300
13,410
13,440
7,130
5,490
810
10
December
320
30
290
13,360
13,650
13,680
8,150
4,820
710
Negl.
Total
2,620
420
2,200
145,230
147,430
147,850
78,590
62,550
5890
820
a. Also including 645 miscellaneous sorties such as leaflet drops, gift drops, and photo reconnaissance sorties not accompanying a strike mission.
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I I 1 !. l 1 1 t 1 l
Distribution of Sorties over North Vietnam, by Route Package a/
1966
Month
1
2
3
4
5
6
Unknown
Total
January
17
18
30
4
3
0
28
25X1
February
31
24
15
3
5
:0
22
100
March
34
31
13
5
11
0
6
100
April
37
29
17
3
6
3
5
100
May
30
19
26
10
6
4
5
100
June
49
19
14
8
1
4
5
100
July
47
18
12
5
4
8
6
100
August
35
16
11
9
1
12
16
100
September
39
16
12
17
5
8
3
100
October
45
8
15
13
5
7
7
100
November
43
12
16
13
6
7
3
100
December
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
Eleven-month
average 34 15 14 9 4 7 17 100
a. North Vietnam is divided, for operations, into six geographic areas, knofrn as
Route Pac'_Iages. Percentage data shorn are approximate, because of the effects of
multiple-route-package sorties and coastal sorties.
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[ t i l l l I I
Ordnance Delivered by Air on North Vietnam, by Month and by Program
March-December 1965 and January-December 1966
25X1
Year and Month
Total on JCS
Fixed Targets
(Columns 2 and 3)
By Fixed
Target Strikes
By Armed
Reconnaissance
Strikes
Armed Reconnaissance
Not on Fixed Targets
Total on mrmea
Reconnaissance
(Columns 3 and 4)
Total
(Columns 1 and 4)
March
1,130
1,130
0
0
0
1,130
April
1,830
1,620
210
430
640
2,260
May
1,420
1,420
0
380
380
1,800
June
1,900
1,900
0
1,430
1,430
3,330
July
1,490
1,410
80
1,980
2,060
3,470
August
1,470
1,280
190
3,200
3,390
4,670
September
1,790
1,780
10
3,730
3,740
5,520
>
October
700
590
110
4,390
4,500
5,090
1
November
620
480
140
3,900
4,040
4,520
N
December
450
350
100
2,060
2,160
2,510
U''
12,800
11,960
840
21,500
22,340
January
0
0
0
270
270
270
February
270
0
270
4,510
4,780
4,780
March
220
0
220
7,520
7,740
7,740
April
460
80
380
8,580
8,960
9,040
May
220
0
220
7,330
7,550
7,550
June
280
190
90
10,680
10,770
10,960
July
440
60
380
15,900
16,280
16,340
August
460
40
420
16,870
17,290
17,330
September
260
0
260
17,500
17,760
17,760
October
220
0
220
13,500
13,720
13,720
November
240
10
230
10,930
ll,160
11,170
December
490
60
430
10,920
11,350
11,410
Total
3,560
440
3,120
124,510
127,630
128,070
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I I I l IL 1. !. - I.
Attacks on JCS Fixed Targets in North Vietnam
1965 and 1966
Total
Ordnance Delivered
Year and Program
Strike and
Flak Suppression Support
Number
Percent
Tons
PE25X1 nt
1965
Fixed target 6,930
4,130
11,060
80
11,960
93
Armed reconnaissance 1,780
1,050
2,830
20
840
7
Total March-
December 1965 a/
8,710
5,180
13,890
100
12,800
100
1966
Fixed target,
270
150
420
16
440
12
Armed reconnaissance
1,830
370
2,200
84
3,120
88
Total January-
December 1966
2,100
520
2,620
100
3,560
100
a. There were no attacks on JCS fixed targets until March 1965.
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Table A6
Aircraft and Personnel Losses in Attacks
on North Vietnam, by. Service
1965 and 1966
1965
US Air Force
77
62
30
US Navy
86
76
30
US Marine Corps
0
0
0
South Vietnamese Air Force
8
6
2
Tota
l
171
144
62
1966
US Air Force
174
165
85
US Navy
139
96
86
US Marine Cor
s
4
8
2
p
South Vietnamese Air Force
0
0
0
US Army
1
0
4
Total
318 J
269
177
a. 282 combat losses and 36 operational losses.
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Unpublished Tables
Petroleum Storage Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder
Program, 1965 and 1966
Electric Power Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965 and 1966
Manufacturing Facilities Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965-66
Railroad Yards Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965-66
Maritime Ports Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program,
1965 and 1966
Barracks Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1966
Airfields Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and 1966
Naval Bases Attacked Under the Rolling Thunder Program, 1965 and 1966
Inventory of Miscellaneous Damage, by Armed Reconnaissance Sorties,
1965-66
Sorties and Delivered Ordnance in Southeast Asia, by Service,
1965 and 1966
Sorties over South Vietnam, by Mission and Nationality, 1965 and 1966
United States Sorties over Laos, by Mission, 1965 and 1966
Sorties over All Areas of Operation in Southeast Asia, by Mission
and Nationality, 1965 and 1966
Ordnance Delivered on North Vietnam, by Month and by Service,
March 1965 - December 1966
Ordnance Delivered by Air in Southeast Asia, by Month, March-
September 1965 and January-December 1966
Losses by Model of Aircraft in Operations Against North Vietnam, 1965
and 196 6
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Aircraft Losses in Southeast Asia, by Area of Operation, Nationality,
and Type of Loss, January-December 1966
Direct Operational Costs Related to Costs of Damage to the Economy
of North Vietnam, January 1965 - December 1966
Cost of Air Operations in Southeast Asia, January-December 1966
Comparison of Strikes on Major JCS Fixed Target Systems in North
Vietnam, 1965 and 1966
Comparison of Sorties and Ordnance on Major JCS Fixed Target Systems
in North Vietnam, 1965 and 1966
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Airfields in North Vietnam,
1965 and 1966
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Bridges in North Vietnam, 1965 and 1966
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Railroad Yards and Shops in North
Vietnam, 1965 and 1966
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Barracks, Supply Depots, Ammunition
Depots, and Military Complexes in North Vietnam, 1965 and 1966
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Petroleum Storage in North Vietnam,
1965 and 1966
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Ports and Naval Bases in North
Vietnam, 1965 and 1966
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Radar Sites in North Vietnam,
1965 and 1966
Statistical Summary of Attacks on Electric Power Facilities in North
Vietnam, 1965 and 1966
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MODERN INDUSTRY IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. A review of modern industry in North Vietnam has resulted in
the selection of 20 facilities for inclusion in this target system*:
Seven electric power generating plants
One cement plant
One explosives plant and one potential
supplier of explosives materials
One rubber products facility
One chemical plant
Four engineering plants
One steel-producing complex
Three coal-processing plants
2. The neutralization of all these North Vietnamese industrial
facilities would eliminate the fruit of several hundred million dollars
in capital investment, cut off the source of perhaps one-quarter or
more of the gross national product and most foreign exchange earnings,
and could halt the construction of additional modern plants in North
Vietnam by other Communist countries. It would also disrupt the func-
tioning of other sectors of the economy through the loss of electric power
and such materials as cement and some fertilizers and chemicals, add
to the burden of aid from the Communist countries, and produce at least
temporary displacement of the urban labor force.
3. A graduated, selective program beginning with air attack against
all the facilities in one industry component (such as all powerplants)
probably offers a more promising vehicle for the application of pressure
against the North Vietnamese regime than a widespread escalation against
>F For a detailed list of these targets, see Table Bl.
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numerous industrial targets in a variety of industries. Such a program
not only would maximize>the economic and military impact of the attacks
but also would provide Hanoi with a continuing opportunity for second
thoughts. If Hanoi failed to react, the completion of the total program
would deal a serious blow to North Vietnam's hopes for economic progress
and status, negating a decade of intense effort devoted to the construction
of modern industry.
4. Modern industry in North Vietnam -- machinery, chemical,
fertilizer, cement, and electric powerplants -- makes a contribution to
the military capability of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces in
South Vietnam and to the air defense capability in the North, but this con-
tribution is not vital. The essentially agrarian nature of the economy
together with numerous local and handicraft facilities, which reportedly
meet 70 percent of the population's demand for consumer goods, provides
a strong buffer against economic collapse.
5. The deficit of essential economic goods needed to sustain North
Vietnam's economy and the all important military supplies which are
vital to the country's air defense, as well as to the maintenance of large
scale aggression in South Vietnam, all come from other Communist coun-
tries. In the absence of an effective program for the interdiction of the
transport system, it is expected that the flow of imports would increase.
A successful air attack on all of the modern industry facilities listed in
paragraph one above could increase import requirements by as much as
500, 000 tons above present levels. The combined current capacities of
the sea and land routes leading to North Vietnam could sustain this flow.
6. The experience in the Korean war -- the most relevant one for
comparison -- suggests that the loss of modern industry may not be
a decisive factor, by itself, in critically reducing the will to persist, at
least as long as the abundant flow of war-supporting supplies continues.
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JCS Target Number
Electric power
Manufacturing plants
Metallurgy
Industrial Installation
Hanoi Powerplant
Haiphong Powerplant (cement)
Haiphong Powerplant
Viet Tri Powerplant
Thai Nguyen Powerplant
Bac Giang Powerplant
Hon Gai Powerplant
Haiphong Cement Plant
Bac Giang Chemical Fertilizer
Plant, Ha Bac
Lang Chi Explosives Plant
Hanoi Rubber Products Plant,
Sao Vang
Viet Tri Chemical Plant
Hanoi Engineering Plant
Tran Hung Dao Engineering
Plant
Haiphong Machinery Enterprise,
Duyen Hai
Hanoi Electrical Engineering
Plant
Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Complex
Mining
Hon Gai Coal-Processing Plant
Cam Pha Coal-Processing Plant
Vang Danh Coal-Processing
Plant
* Not on JCS Targeting List.
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I. Electric Power Industry
A. Significance to the Economy
The most important sector of North Vietnam's electric power
generating industry consists of the network centered on Hanoi and
Haiphong. The present capacity of this net is 104, 500 kilowatts (kw),
made up of seven plants, one of which is operating at half capacity be-
cause of bomb damage. Aerial attacks have already denied North Viet-
nam 83, 000 kw of capacity in all geographic areas.
Hanoi's power supply comes from one large (32, 500 kw) local
plant in poor condition and from supplemental power from the grid's
transmission network. Haiphong receives electric power from two local
plants (combined capacity, 17, 000 kw) in poor condition and from the
transmission network. Remaining powerplants that still feed the net-
work are located at Viet Tri, Thai Nguyen, Bac Giang, and Hon Gai.
In addition to the main power network, two small independent
power systems are located in the southern part of North Vietnam. Power-
plants in both systems have been heavily damaged, and all central fa-
cilities located in the two systems are now out of operation. Thus far,
US airstrikes against the power industry have been concentrated on
these two systems which serve little industry and whose powerplants are
of small economic significance. Twenty-six out of 42 strikes have been
carried out against plants at Thanh Hoa, Co Dinh, Ban Thach, and Ben
Thuy. These plants had accounted for 8 percent of total national generating
capacity.
Neutralization of about one-third of North Vietnam's power
industry has not yet greatly affected the economy. Losses of generating
capacity have eliminated margins of reserve capacity but have not
significantly curtailed the power supply for industry, because the major
part of modern industry is concentrated in the Hanoi-Haiphong region.
The margin of reserve generating capacity available in the
northern grid prior to the beginning of airstrikes apparently has been
eliminated. Industrial demands probably could be generally fulfilled
even after a loss of an additional 10 percent of the generating capacity
still intact. However, it probably would become necessary to stagger
work shifts and eliminate nonessential consumption by residential-
commercial users, public lighting, and transportation. Any further
significant loss of generating capacity would almost certainly reduce the
power supply for industry.
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The persistence of efforts to restore damaged power facilities
underlines the importance of these plants to North Vietnam and strongly
suggests that no suitable alternative to central generating plants has
been found. Mobile generating units, imported by the hundreds during
the past 18 months, apparently have not adequately offset the loss of
central generating facilities. Most of the mobile generating units are
small-sized (16 to 100 kw) and designed for low voltage generation, and
for that reason are not suited to supplying power through the existing
transmission network. They are well-suited for independently supply-
ing power to small essential services such as command posts, com-
munication centers, and hospitals. A few of the larger mobile units
probably have been used to supply small amounts of power to industrial
consumers. From the sizes and total capacity of mobile units imported
thus far, however, significant reliance on such units for industrial
power is highly unlikely.
B. Future Targets
North Vietnam's main power network can be crippled and most
of its important industry can be put out of operation by successful air-
strikes against seven large JCS-targeted powerplants still operating
in Hanoi, Haiphong, Viet Tri, Thai Nguyen, Bac Giang, and Hon Gai.
These plants, except for those in Hanoi and Haiphong, are all located
in relative isolation from concentrations of population. They represent
a capital investment of about $30 million.
The immediate effect of successful neutralization would be
a virtual shutdown of production by major units of modern industry in
North Vietnam.
The Hanoi and Haiphong local powerplants are equipped with ma-
chinery 30 to 40 years old, but the capacities are large, and by themselves
could supply from one-half to two-thirds of the local demand when operated at
capacity. Powerplants located in Hanoi and Haiphong are closer to concentra-
tions of population, and because of this, a greater political hazard is involved.
The impact of the postulated attacks on powerplants can be
maximized by carrying out strikes simultaneously. This tactic would
diminish any possibilities for scavenging and cannibalizing undamaged
equipment for use elsewhere and would overwhelm North Vietnamese
capabilities to reconstruct the facilities by creating general shortages
of materials and technicians. It is estimated that attacks on small
powerplants and the numerous agricultural powerplants located about
the country would amount to no more than a form of harassment.
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I I
C. Recuperation
North Vietnamese reaction to successful attack on its remaining
powerplants probably would be reflected in attempts to purchase large
diesel-driven generating equipment, as opposed to the hundreds of small
diesel units imported thus far. This is the only alternative to reconstruc-
tion of central generating facilities, and, even here, the order, delivery,
installation and testing would take about four months initially. In any
case, it appears highly unlikely that large diesel units could offset more
than a small fraction of the power lost from central generating facilities.
Several facts argue against the use of large diesels on a grand
scale. Heavy diesel equipment requires frequent and continuing main-
tenance and a reliable channel for spare parts. Experience in, Cuba
demonstrates the rapidity with which deterioration sets in when requisite
maintenance cannot be performed. For North Vietnam, an additional
problem would be inadequate numbers of diesel technicians, and any large
import of heavy diesel equipment would most likely be accompanied by
foreign technicians to service and operate them.
II. Manufacturing Plants
A. Haiphong Cement Plant
The Haiphong Cement Plant was built in 1 899 and rebuilt to its
present annual capacity of 700, 000 tons after World War II. The present
estimated replacement cost of the plant is $30 million.
The plant produced 650, 000 tons of grey portland cement in
1965. This amount satisfied all in-country needs and an estimated one-
third of this output was exported. In 1966, 90, 000 tons were shipped
from Haiphong, principally to Cambodia, Hong Kong, and Singapore;
exports to the Free World were valued at $1. 24 million. Cement is an
important source of foreign exchange even though exports declined. Al-
though the data are lacking on exports to Communist countries, it is
believed that at least 100, 000 tons were shipped to Communist China in
1966, possibly for re-export.
Cement is important as a basic building material in North Viet-
nam for the construction of buildings, civil defense shelters, bridges,
and airfields. During the present bombing, it has become even more
important in civil defense and construction of bridge piers and abutments.
Although most of the temporary repair on bridges has used timber and
stone, cement is necessary for rebuilding some abutments and installing
heavy anchors or deadmen for cable bridges.
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Direct military uses of cement, identified since 1965, have been
small. However, airfields under construction at Yen Bay, Son Tay, and
Bai Thuong will require surfacing with cement to be completed. Some
underground shelters and command centers have probably been built in
the Hanoi area using cement.
A steady source of electric power is vital to keep the large
rotary kilns and grinding mills continually operating. Any sudden stop
in the operation of a kiln would cause it to buckle because of the intense
heat continually being fed into it to produce the clinker from which
powdered cement is eventually obtained. Each of the rotary kilns, there-
fore, has its own auxiliary power supply. However, it is doubtful that
the auxiliary power units could operate the plant continuously if the main
supply of electric power were neutralized.
The plant is located in the northeast section of Haiphong City
on the south bank of the Cam Estuary about 0. 5 mile west of the Chamber
of Commerce docks. A thermal powerplant which also
supplies its surplus electric power to Haiphong City, is in the same com-
plex south of the rotary kilns. The southern boundary of the plant is
Route 5 which runs from Haiphong to Hanoi. Civilian housing abuts the
northwest, south, and southeast boundaries of the plant and appears to
be heavily concentrated. On the opposite bank of the Cam Estuary is
a hospital. The main target would be the seven rotary kilns located in
the north-central part of the complex. The plant covers about 39 acres
and employs about 4, 500 workers, 7 days per week in 3 shifts. Re-
portedly, women make up one-third of the work force.
It would be impractical to disperse the production facilities of
the Haiphong Cement Plant. The size of the key production units is too
large to allow dispersal. The seven rotary kilns range in size from
280 to 375 feet in length and are 8 to 10 feet in diameter.
If the rotary kilns were heavily damaged, it would take at least
a year to restore partial output and up to three years to completely
restore the plant. It has been estimated that perhaps 400, 000 tons of
cement would have to be imported to satisfy annual current North
Vietnamese requirements.
B. Ha Bac Chemical Fertilizer Plant (Bac Giang)
This new plant, built with aid from China at a cost of about
$20 million, may be completed and about to begin production of ammonium
nitrate fertilizer. Although this facility has purely economic significance,
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it can properly be regarded as a military target. Ammonium nitrate
is an explosive which can be used for demolition work or mixed with
TNT for loading in shells. Moreover, the plant will produce nitric
acid -- a vital input to various explosives and an oxidizer for the
surface-to-air missile system.
Neutralization of production facilities (for example, nitric acid,
ammonia synthesis, and boilerhouse) would impose economic difficulties
on the North Vietnamese. Its capacity for production of ammonium
nitrate, 100, 000 tons per year, constitutes about 37 percent of the cur-
rent national capacity for chemical fertilizers (exclusive of apatite and
ground phosphate rock). Plans call for eventual doubling of its produc-
tion capacity at this plant.
As a potential source of military explosives, this plant would
be an imposing addition to North Vietnam's small munitions industry.
Its loss, therefore, would constitute a serious obstacle to North Viet-
nam's objective of attaining greater self-sufficiency (and accordingly
less dependence on outside support) for explosives and other military
products. However, the supply of explosives and ammunition could
continue to flow from China and the USSR, as it does at present, unless
rail and road connections with China were seriously interdicted.
Bombing of this facility in the near future would involve less
loss of life to civilians than it would after full operation is reached,
because it seems unlikely that a large workforce is at present in the
plant area. Major damage to the plant at this juncture conceivably
could stave off its future expansion.
If it were seriously damaged, it seems doubtful that the North
Vietnamese could repair the plant on their own. Imports of vital pieces
of equipment and technical assistance could be obtained from Communist
China or the USSR, but considerable time and cost would be involved in
restoring the facility. If North Vietnam considered an amount of
ammonium nitrate equivalent to the planned output of the Ha Bac plant
to be vital, Hanoi would need to expend about $8. 3 million annually.
About 30 ships would be needed to carry the quantity of fertilizer in-
volved if the Hanoi regime decided to import an equivalent volume of
fertilizer or explosive.
C. Lang Chi Explosives Plant
In August 1965 the Lang Chi Explosives Plant sustained con-
siderable damage which probably curtailed output in subsequent periods.
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There is no indication that the damaged facilities have been repaired or
that output has resumed at this plant. Although no follow-up bombing
of this facility seems to suggest itself at the present juncture, this
target should be reviewed on a continuing basis for evidence of repair
and revitalization of its munitions production.
This plant, valued at an estimated $8. 5 million, supplied
a relatively small part of North Vietnam's explosive requirements,
most of which are imports.
D. Sao Vang Rubber Products Plant (Hanoi
The Sao Vang Rubber Products Plant is North Vietnam's only
producer of rubber products, some of which, by North Vietnamese
admission, are for military purposes. The output plan for 1965
called for 23, 000 motor vehicle tires, including those used on trucks.
This is believed to be only a small portion of the plant's capacity for
production of tires and other rubber products. The regime acknow-
ledges that the plant has experienced "unparalleled difficulties, "
possibly attributed in part to war-induced supply problems but
probably due more to problems with machinery and equipment. The
sharp drop in imports of natural rubber of over 40 percent in 1965 and
1966 implies that output at this plant has been cut back severely in
recent periods and may now consist primarily of essential products
for defense and other uses. * Thus, while the plant is not currently on
* North Vietnam's imports of natural rubber have declined significantly
in recent years, probably signifying a down-turn in output of rubber
products. Imports of synthetic rubber probably are slight. Although
complete statistics on rubber imports in 1966 are not available, it is
estimated that they did not exceed 4, 000 tons, about $2. 1 million.
This would represent a drop of about 40 percent from imports in 1965,
which amounted to about 6, 600 tons ($3. 7 million). Coincident with
this decline in imports of natural rubber, North Vietnam's purchases.
of finished rubber products, notably tires, are believed to have increased
significantly involving an additional outlay of over $600, 000. Imports
of rubber products from other countries presumably also increased sub-
stantially in 1966 and the total additional cost of imports probably was
well in excess of $1. 6 million, the amount by which imports of natural
rubber declined.
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the JCS target list, it is a legitimate war-supporting installation for
targeting. It is located in a suburban industrial section of Hanoi,
adjacent to the Hanoi Engineering Plant. There are worker housing
installations and a school in the area. Some passive defense measures
.+ have probably been taken to protect the plant and its labor force.
Neutralization of this facility would impose a small additional im-
port burden to satisfy war-supporting requirements because most tires
M+ and other rubber products are currently supplied by the USSR, China,
and other Communist nations.
so* E. Viet Tri Chemical Plant
The Viet Tri Chemical Plant, currently on the JCS target list,
is referred to as "the first child of the chemical branch" and the
country's sole producer of chlorine, caustic soda (used in paper
production), hydrochloric acid, insecticides, and polyvinyl chloride.
Chlorine is used in the production of insecticides, in metallurgical
processing, in bleaching textiles, and in water purification. It was
built with Chinese aid and began production in 1962 as part of a com-
plex which includes a power plant, a paper mill, and a sugar refinery.
The plant is valued at an estimated $5 million, although the current
economic significance of the facility is believed to be considerably
greater.
Although North Vietnam reports that dispersion of this plant
has taken place, it seems unlikely that the vital operations have been
shifted to other locations. Information as of November 1966 indicated
that the plant was in operation. Operation of this plant could be sus-
pended by inflicting serious damage on the power source or the elec-
trolytic cell building.
North Vietnam's direct loss in chemical production would
amount to several million dollars per year. Chlorine could be imported,
but this would be difficult because it is a hazardous item to transport.
In all probability the North Vietnamese would resort to importing the
finished products (insecticides, plastics, and the like) previously
produced at the plant to the extent that these were essential for war
support.
The civilian personnel in the target and adjacent areas are
estimated to number under 3, 000. These personnel include a number
of factory employees who are termed "self-defense, " or paramilitary
forces.
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F. Machine Building
The most important and largest machine building plants in
North Vietnam are the Hanoi Engineering Plant, the Tran Hung Dao
Engineering Plant in Hanoi, and the Duyen Hai Machinery Enterprise
in Haiphong. These plants account for an important share of the output
and repair of machinery in North Vietnam. In 1964 the machine build-
ing industry of North Vietnam met 20 to 30 percent of the needs of the
country for machinery and equipment; presumably now this percentage
is much lower because of greatly increased imports of machinery in
1966.
The Hanoi Engineering Plant is the largest and most sophisti-
cated machine building plant in the country, having been constructed
as a Soviet aid project in the late 1950's and expanded with Soviet
assistance in 1966. It is valued at about $8 million and is the only
machine building plant on the JCS target list Production at
the plant includes machine tools, vehicle parts, diesel engines, rail
cars, and some steel. It is the only major producer of machine tools
in North Vietnam, having an estimated annual capacity of 1, 200 units.
The plant employs some 3, 500 personnel and is located in a built-up
area. Living quarters for the factory laborers, many of whom lived
in the immediate area, have been at least partly dispersed and exten-
sive measures to alleviate the effects of airstrikes have also been
taken. These measures include dispersal of some facilities, camou-
flage, and construction of air raid shelters and trenches, and a plan
has been devised to protect equipment in the event of flooding.
The Tran Hung Dao Engineering Plant produces agricultural
implements, diesel engines, machine tools, pumps, and spare parts
for vehicles. It employed some 1, 300 personnel as of 1964 and has
a replacement value of about $3 million. It is not currently on the JCS
target list. The defense measures described for the Hanoi Engineering
Plant probably also were implemented at the Tran Hung Dao Plant.
The plant is located in a heavily populated area of Hanoi not far from
the center of the city.
The Duyen Hai Engineering Plant in Haiphong is known to
produce boilers, fertilizer crushers, pumps, and simple machine
tools. It, too, is located in a densely populated part of the city and
probably has also received the benefit of many defense precautions.
The plant is smaller than the major machine building plants in Hanoi.
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With respect to military importance, the Hanoi Engineering
Plant and the Tran Hung Dao Engineering Plant together with the Hanoi
Electrical Engineering Factory and the Sao Vang Rubber Products
Plant in Hanoi were singled out for praise in 1965 as producers of many
new products for transportation and communications. One prisoner
report claimed that the Hanoi Engineering Plant and the Tran Hung Dao
Plant were producers of ammunition, but neither the construction nor
the location (in populated area) conform with this possibility. It is
possible, however, that casings for ammunition are manufactured
there, and the plants do possess a potential capability to manufacture
small arms.
There are innumerable other machine building and repair shops
of various sizes throughout North Vietnam, some of which may be
engaged in the manufacture of small arms. In 1961 there were more
than 40, 000 employees in some 350 facilities. The number has
probably increased significantly, especially since the beginning of
the bombing, to provide greater regional self-sufficiency and faster
maintenance for the transportation system. This buildup has been
accomplished through dispersal of existing shops from urban or
heavily bombed areas as well as through the setting up of new shops.
Machine building and repair facilities lend themselves more
easily than other heavy industrial facilities to dispersal, inasmuch as
much of the capital equipment can be operated independently. This
feature would also enable at least partial production to continue with
the aid of small electric generating units. A large share of the heavy
volume of imports of spare parts and machine tools for the manufacture
of spare parts probably has been distributed to new or existing shops
in the countryside near the important lines of communication. A con-
tract signed with Rumania in 1966 for the import of five regional ma-
chine shops and an apparent agreement by East Germany to supply an
automotive repair shop probably are not the only instances in which
Communist countries are supplying "small" but complete facilities.
The smaller local facilities -- not all of which necessarily fall
under the category of machine building plants -- also are the most im-
portant producers of the more primitive transportation equipment,
including bicycles, carts, junks, sampans, and motorboats. The
assembly of barges and ferryboats is carried out on a limited scale as
is the fabrication of small containers for petroleum products. The
existence of such a large number of machine shops, however, would
only partly alleviate the loss of the three largest plants. Production
of the larger, more sophisticated machinery could not be taken over
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by local facilities which would retain their main functions as suppliers
- of small agricultural equipment and providers of local repair capability.
The dependency on imports of heavy equipment would become absolute.
The loss of the main machinery plants would probably suggest to North
...- Vietnam's Communist allies that the supply of heavy industrial equip-
ment, other than transport and construction equipment, to North Viet-
nam during the course of the bombing would be irrational. In this
case, a decrease in such supply rather than an increase would be
possible. The destruction of any large industrial facility, such as one
of the machine building plants noted above, probably would remove
any remaining North Vietnamese hopes for industrial development for
the duration of the air war.
aw III. Iron and Steel -- Thai Nguyen
The construction of the first stage of the integrated steel mill
at Thai Nguyen is nearing completion. This plant,currently on the JCS
target list, includes the following facilities: one coke oven battery;
a coke byproducts section; three blast furnaces with an estimated annual
capacity of 100, 000 tons each, an open-hearth furnace building, a roll-
ing mill; and a refractory brick plant. Fabrication areas and storage,
support, and associated administrative buildings complete the installa-
tion. Ancillary facilities include new roads and rail lines and other
installations for receiving and handling raw materials and for shipping
products. The North Vietnamese estimate that the total investment
for the entire complex will amount to about $160 million.
Recent aerial photography of the Thai Nguyen area indicates
that the plant is only partly operational. There are no indications that
either the steelmaking furnaces or the rolling mill facilities are
operating. The output from the three blast furnaces in 1966 is esti-
mated at 100, 000 to 150, 000 tons, about 50 percent of capacity.
Structural steel members and prefabricated liquid storage tanks have
been observed in the yards, indicating that the plant is receiving im-
ported semifinished steel for further fabrication. The materials ob-
served include pontoons, truss panels, plate girders, rails, and
other materials of similar size. With the exception of the storage
tanks and pontoons, all steel fabrications observed are judged to have
been assembled primarily for use in the construction of buildings at
the Thai Nguyen plant.
25X1
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The plant layout was designed for future expansion on a two-
stage building program. At the present time the facilities for stage
one, which are nearing completion, provide for the annual production
of 100, 000 tons of crude steel. Construction of the second stage is
planned to raise the total annual capacity for crude steel to 200, 000
tons, presumably by 1970.
When the three blast furnaces are at full capacity, which is
not likely to be achieved until the open-hearth furnaces are capable of
converting their output to steel, the output of pig iron at the Thai Nguyen
plant could reach 300, 000 tons annually. Depending on the availability
of scrap, maximum consumption of the output of pig iron in the produc-
tion of steel at that plant would amount to only 130, 000 tons. This
would leave upwards of one-half (150, 000 tons) of the output of pig iron
available for export or for consumption in the manufacture of iron
castings, including cast iron wheels for railroad cars.
Sufficient casting and rolling capacity is planned to allow
conversion of the crude steel output into usable finished steel products.
Initially, the rolling mills are to produce wires, reinforcing rods,
and structural shapes. Ultimately, facilities are to be added for the
manufacture of sheets and pipe. On the basis of the maximum output
of crude steel, the annual production of finished steel products
would amount to 150, 000 tons.
Except for coking coal, North Vietnam has adequate reserves
of the raw materials required to support the planned output of the new
iron and steel plant. Iron ore is of relatively good quality and available
from a nearby area. Manganese ore and limestone also exist in suf-
ficient quantities. The necessary requirements for coking coal, al-
though limited domestically, are readily obtainable from Communist
China.
B. Significance to the Economy
Contributions to the North Vietnamese military effort by the
Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant currently are limited. Producing only
pig iron, the plant provides cast iron wheels for railroad transport and
probably other iron castings, for restricted use on military vehicles
and earthmoving equipment. Other cast iron materials that could
contribute to the war effort are small tools, pipes and tubes, and hand
grenades, but there is no evidence that such items are being produced
at Thai Nguyen.
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The main contribution to the economy of North Vietnam by the
Thai Nguyen plant thus far has been as an earner of foreign exchange.
Exports of pig iron from North Vietnam reached a peak of about
58, 000 tons in 1965, but since then have declined considerably. The
estimated volume and value of these exports of pig iron from North
Vietnam for the years 1964 through 1966 are shown in the following
tabulation:
Year
Tons
Thousand US$
196+
28,317
1,349
1965
57,7-5
2,784
1966
39,600
1,910
Since 1964, about 90 percent of North Vietnam's exports of pig iron
have gone to Japan, with the remainder going primarily to Hong Kong
and Singapore.
The value of production of that portion of output of the Thai
Nguyen plant consumed domestically is difficult to assess. Recently
the output of pig iron has been divided approximately equally between
domestic use and exports. Assuming a value per ton for the pig iron
consumed domestically equal to that which is exported, the value of
production consumed in the local economy (1966) is estimated to vary
between $3 million and $4. 5 million.
C. Impact
Destruction of the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant by bombing
would not result in significant impairment of the current military
operations of North Vietnam. Losses to the war effort at the current
stage of output of the plant would be limited to wheels for railroad cars,
such iron castings as might be used in military vehicles and equipment,
and possibly hand grenades, if the plant is producing them. Industry
and transportation would also lose some significant fabrication and
assembly capacity for various types of equipment.
The principal economic loss to North Vietnam, if the Thai
Nguyen plant were to be severely damaged, would be the loss of foreign
exchange resulting from the exports of pig iron. The principal mili-
tary loss is hard to quantify. Certain of the fabrications produced by
this plant, such as pontoons, have either a direct military or logistic
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use. However, it has not been possible to quantify this dependence,
other than to note that it must be relatively small.
Regarded by the North Vietnamese as one of the most notable
advances in the industrial development of the country, the planned
achievements of the plant are an essential part of the country's eco-
nomic future. As an industrial process, it is a distinct improvement
over anything that has been attempted by the North Vietnamese to date,
incorporating modern equipment and technology. Hence its loss at
this time would constitute a distinct blow to the hopes of the Hanoi
regime for achieving rapid industrialization, perhaps until the end of
the war.
However, Thai Nguyen is in an unusual position. The opera-
tion of its blast furnaces requires the import of 150, 000 to 200, 000 tons
of coking coal from China. The mining of the ports, on the other hand,
would eliminate most exports -- certainly hard currency exports --
and hence Thai Nguyen's principal value to Hanoi at present. If the
mining of Haiphong and other ports is carried out, there would be
advantages to leaving Thai Nguyen in operation. This would be be-
cause of the need to try to supply it with 150, 000 to 200, 000 tons of
coking coal from China by rail.
IV. Mining
n.i A. Coal
Anthracite coal is North Vietnam's major source of energy
and its most valuable export. The entire needs of the country are
met by domestic production, with the exception of some 150, 000 to
200, 000 tons of coking coal imported from China. The major con-
sumers of coal are the large industrial facilities, including the
electric powerplants. Coal is not important to the military effort
of North Vietnam nor to the general population, because of the mild
climate. The requirements of the rail system are also very small.
Total output of coal in 1965 is estimated at about 4 million tons.
Some 1. 9 million tons, valued at about $30 million, were exported.
From 80 to 90 percent of North Vietnam's coal is mined
near the ports of Hon Gai and Cam Pha. A new mining center, in-
cluding a preparation plant, was probably completed at Vang Danh
near Port Redon late in 1966. This facility will become of in-
creasing importance in the future. The ports and loading facilities
near the mines are vital both for foreign trade and for internal
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distribution inasmuch as the mines do not have rail connections to
the rest of the country.
The mines themselves are unpromising targets for air
attack because of their relative dispersion. Neutralization of the coal-
preparation plants at Hon Gai, Cam Pha, and Vang Danh, however,
would eliminate the export earnings from coal, and neutralization of
the loading and conveying system at the ports -- Hon Gai, Cam Pha,
and Port Redon -- would disrupt trade and internal distribution.
The requirements of at least priority domestic industrial facilities
probably would still be met through supplies from local mines
scattered throughout the country and unprepared coal from the large
mines. If the major industrial plants and electric powerplants were
..i severely damaged, domestic requirements would be substantially
reduced. Hence, the main benefit from successful attack on the coal-
processing facilities would be the loss of hard currency foreign
rrrr exchange, which has run about $8 to $10 million a year. Coal sales
have accounted for as much as 55 to 60 percent of North Vietnam's
hard currency foreign exchange earnings. More recently, bomb
damage to Cani Pha has reduced this amount.
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V. Impact on Imports
Although the precise nature of the import program that would follow
a successful attack against modern industry is uncertain, it is estimated
r that the required level of annual imports could increase by as much as
500, 000 tons. This increased volume of import requirements, if fully
met by North Vietnam's Communist allies, would cost about $500 million.
err However, it would require utilization of less than one-half of the total
transport capacity available to North Vietnam at present. Although port
capacities are heavily utilized, there exists slack in the rail and road
connections to China, particularly the latter. The estimated increase in
imports is assumed to include sufficient cement, fertilizer, pig iron,
machine tools, spare parts, medicines, and the like to replace essential
production for domestic consumption.
A. Imports and Exports in 1965-66
North Vietnamese imports in 1966 increased substantially over
the 1965 level in both value and volume. During the same period, exports
decreased considerably. The increased imports were financed mainly by
aid and grants extended to North Vietnam by Communist countries in 1965
and the first part of 1966. The value of the goods delivered to North
Vietnam by Communist countries jumped sharply in 1965 and increased
again in 1966, from about $115 million in 1964, to an estimated $410 mil-
lion in 1965 and $505 million in 1966. The following tabulation shows the
division of the total value of these deliveries between military and eco-
nomic aid:
196+ 1965 1966
Military 40 260 230
Economic 75 150 275
Total 115 410 505
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Military aid deliveries declined in value as deliveries were
completed of integrated defense systems and major pieces of equip-
ment such as aircraft and naval craft. It is believed that military de-
liveries in the latter part of 1966 consisted mainly of replacements,
spare parts, and ammunition.
North Vietnamese imports of economic goods from the Com-
munist countries have generally been the type that would aid economic
development and growth and include complete plants, transportation and
construction equipment, machinery, petroleum, and light manufactured
goods. Although most of these goods were primarily destined for in-
dustrial development, a large portion of the goods, especially transpor-
tation and road construction equipment and petroleum, contributed to
North Vietnam's military capability as well. Consumer goods account
for only a small quantity of imports, and food in the form of aid has not
been a significant item, except possibly from China. The types of eco-
nomic goods sent to North Vietnam by the Communist countries did not
change significantly in 1966, but the quantity has increased substantially.
The total volume of imports by sea and land in 1966 is estimated
to have been about 1. 5 million tons, an increase of about 30 percent,
compared with 1965. The proportion of the total moved by international
shipping and by railroad remained about the same as in 1965. The im-
port data, as shown in the following tabulation, include the identified
seaborne imports and an estimate of the seaborne imports that were
probably carried on Chinese and North Vietnamese ships moving between
China and North Vietnam.
By sea (including petroleum
in bulk)
By rail
Thousand. Tons
1965 1966
850 1, 080
320 420
1,170 1,500
Information on the identified seaborne imports, by major
commodity group and by country of origin, is shown in Table B-2.
Identified imports increased for all major commodity groups, except
foodstuffs and timber. The largest percentage increase occurred in
the miscellaneous category. Table B-2 reveals that the volume of
identified North Vietnamese seaborne exports declined by about 35 per-
cent in 1966, compared with 1965. The decline in the volume of
commodities exported through Haiphong -- apatite, cement, pig iron,
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and miscellaneous goods -- was much greater than the decline in the
export of coal which moves through other ports. Table B-4, which
presents the estimated seaborne trade by port of entry, reveals that
the volume of dry cargo moved through Haiphong declined by nearly
15 percent in 1966, compared with 1965. The volume of imports in-
creased while exports decreased, with the result that imports accounted
for more than 75 percent of the cargo handled at Haiphong.
Estimates of imports by rail, as shown below, indicate that
about 45 percent of the volume imported in 1966 probably consisted of
military goods, about 40 percent was coal for the blast furnaces at Thai
Nguyen, and about 15 percent was miscellaneous economic goods.
Thousand Tons
1965
1966
Military
100
180
Coal
165
165
Other economic goods
55
75
Total
320
x+20
B. Transport Capacity Compared with Import Traffic in 1966
Using land and sea routes at their present capability, North
Vietnam can import about 5 million tons a year, or a daily average of
about 13, 800 tons (see Table B-5 and Figure B-1). The major ports
account for about 40 percent of the total capacity, land routes from
Kwangsi Province in China to Hanoi account for 35 percent, and land
and water routes from Yunnan Province account for the remaining
25 percent. This capability could be considerably increased within
a relatively short period of about two months by repairing interdictions
on the Hanoi-Lao Cai rail line, by improving the roads, and by ob-
taining foreign assistance in the ports to better organize cargo-handling
and port-clearance procedures. The above estimate of the North
Vietnamese capability to import does not include an estimate of the
quantity of cargo that could be offloaded from oceangoing ships into
shallow-draft craft for movement to the beaches or to small ports. The
North Vietnamese probably have considerable capability to handle dry
cargo in this manner. They have already demonstrated that they can
receive petroleum from tankers in this manner at the rate of at least
20, 000 tons a month, or 700 tons a day.
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UI\In ILRVIIoILU %.#A rMI.III VI JLLL\.ILU IRHI\JrVRIHIIVII LIII LJ
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1
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Figure B-1 , North Vietnam and South China: Uninterdicted Capacity of
C I.+ J T ...>+ +:,. I I,......,....,, 10/,7
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In 1966, North Vietnamese imports of dry cargo utilized about
one-fourth of the overall capacity and about 50 percent of the capacity of
Haiphong port and the Dong Dang-Hanoi railroad line -- the two routes
normally used for the majority of the imports.
1. Ports
Deep-draft international ships normally call at only three
North Vietnamese ports -- Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai (see Figure
B-1) but only Haiphong is served by North Vietnam's rail network.
Haiphong is the principal maritime port for nearly all seaborne imports
and all the seaborne exports except coal. The port has a theoretical
capability to handle about 4, 500 tons a day of dry cargo. Prior to the
bombing of the petroleum storage facilities in 1966, Haiphong also had
the capacity to handle about 900 tons a day of petroleum in bulk.
In 1966, estimated tonnages of dry cargo, including packaged
petroleum, moving through the port averaged about 3, 100 tons a day, or
about three-fourths of capacity. Of the total, 2, 390 tons were imports and
710 tons were exports. If North Vietnam were to forgo exports, Haiphong
port theoretically could handle dry cargo imports at the rate of 4, 500 tons
a day. During 1966, however, irregular arrivals of ships and inability
of surface transport to clear the port area of cargo resulted in delays
and congestion. Also a factor that may have contributed to the congestion
was the large volume of miscellaneous cargo imported (see Table B-2).
With some foreign guidance and additional cargo-handling equipment for
use on the dock, however, it is quite possible that the North Vietnamese
could achieve the theoretical capacity of Haiphong port.
Cam Pha and Hon Gai handle only one significant cargo, anthra-
cite coal for export. About 90 percent of the seaborne coal exports origi-
nate in Cam Pha, which is the only coal port able to accommodate large
ships at its dock. Both ports have limited wharf and storage facilities for
general cargo, which consists almost exclusively of supplies for the mines
..r and their small worker communities. In 1966, about 24, 000 tons of im-
ports were identified as being offloaded at Hon Gai. If the wharf area
usually used for loading coal were used to receive cargo, these ports
MM.1i would have considerable capability to accept cargo offloaded with ship's
gear. Surface transport to clear the port is limited to truck transport on
a poor quality road. Thus, coastal water transport would have to be
NOW used to some extent, depending on the condition and use already being
made of the road.
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2. Railroads
The uninterdicted capacity of the Dong Dang-Hanoi railroad,
which carries most of the North Vietnamese foreign trade moved by
land transport, is estimated to be 3, 000 tons each way per day.
Through traffic on the line was interrupted for a total of about two
months during 1966, but some international traffic continued to move
even during periods of interdiction. Thus the loss of daily capacity on
the average throughout the year probably was quite small. Imports on
..r this line during 1966 are estimated to have increased to about 420, 000
tons (1, 200 tons per day), compared with 320, 000 tons in. 1965. About
40 percent of the 1966 imports probably consisted of coal for the Thai
Mmi Nguyen blast furnaces, about 45 percent were military supplies, and
the remainder miscellaneous goods. Thus the imports moved on this
line in 1966 amounted to less than one-half of capacity of the line to
MW move imports and about one-half of the amount moved was economic
goods that would probably be considered of low priority if there were a
shortage of transport capacity.
Although the overall capacity of the Dong Dang line itself con-
tinues to be about 3, 000 tons, railroad construction in 1966 provided an
alternate route for the portion of the line between Kep and Hanoi. The
standard-gauge line was completed between Kep and Thai Nguyen and pre-
sumably is in service. Thus imports can now move from Kep to Hanoi
via Thai Nguyen. Furthermore, probable installation of a third rail on
the Dong Dang-Kep line to make it dual gauge may now be facilitating the
movement on standard-gauge freight cars of imports from China as far
as Kep and Thai Nguyen.
The Lao Cai-Hanoi railroad line normally has the capability
for about 3, 000 tons each way per day. The destruction of the railroad/
highway bridge at Viet Tri has reduced the present through capacity of
this line to an estimated 600 tons each way per day. Traffic at Viet Tri
now utilizes two rail car ferries and a pontoon highway bridge. Appar-
ently the capacity of these facilities is sufficient to meet the require-
ments for traffic on the line. The North Vietnamese have repaired or
built bypasses for bridges of equal or greater length. If they need
more capacity on this line, however, they could repair the bridge in a
maximum of two months. Capacity could be increased in less than two
months by the use of more ferries and other alternate facilities.
This rail line as well as road and water routes from Yunnan
Province became more significant in 1966 as alternate routes for North
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Vietnamese imports as a result of the completion of the railroad
line within China to connect Yunnan Province, with the main Chinese
rail system. North Vietnamese imports can now be moved more easily
to the K'un-ming area and thence to North Vietnam.
If China provides rolling stock to North Vietnam, equipment
to utilize the North Vietnamese railroads to capacity should be no prob-
lem in spite of the considerable destruction of rolling stock by bombing.
Meter-gauge equipment is available in Yunnan Province, and it is
possible that standard-gauge equipment is now in use as far as Kep and
Thai Nguyen.
3. Roads
At present, only small amounts of cross-border, short-haul
foreign trade move by truck between North Vietnam and Communist China.
The estimated total capacity of the roads that cross the border- and lead
to the Hanoi-Haiphong area is 4, 300/950* tons per day. A. little more
than 60 percent of this total is accounted for by roads that cross the east-
ern border of North Vietnam (from the Nanning, Canton, and Fort Bayard
areas) and the remainder by roads that cross the western border. The
road capacity from Hanoi to Haiphong is estimated to be about
1, 150/400 tons per day.
At present North Vietnam does not have enough trucks and
repair facilities to utilize the roads to capacity for imports while
continuing the present level of truck transport activities. Utilizing the
roads to capacity would require possibly 5, 000 to 6, 000 trucks daily.
Communist China, with an inventory of over 200, 000 trucks, could make
this number available.
The only inland waterway route that could contribute signifi-
cantly to the movement of supplies across the border between China and
North Vietnam is the Red River. Little if any imports are moved on this
route at present. It is estimated to have the capability for 900 tons a day
during low water and 2, 700 tons a day during high water.
* The figures separated by the slanting line show estimated minimum
capacities between terminal points under the best and worst climatic
conditions.
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I I I I M 1. [ l t l
North Vietnam: Identified Imports Carried by Foreign-Flag Ships
by Origin and Commodity a/
1965-66
USSR
Eastern Europe
Communist China
North Korea
Cuba
Cambodia
Hong Kong
Japan
Singapore/Malaysia
Western Europe
Other
Ammonium Ammonium
Sulfate Grain Sulfate Grain
and Other and Other Miscel- and Other and Other Miscel-
Fertilizers Petroleum Foodstuffs Timber laneous Total Fertilizers Petroleum Foodstuffs Timber laneous Total
162.4 170.2 118.6 14.5 2314 697.1 224.3 00.8 13.6 416.2 932.0
118.2 170.2 59.0 0 201.7 549.1 176.9 200.8 65.3 0 373.8 816.7
78.5 154.8 0.7 114.9 348.9 117.8 198.2 6.4 171.1 493.5
9.0 2.0 20.4 14.2 45.6 16.0 2.6 66.0 84.5
13.4 17.1 67.3 c/ 97.7 37.2 118.7 / 155.9
30.7 5.1 35.8 43.0 18.0 61.0
20.8 0.2 21.0 21.7 21.7
44.2 0 59 6 14 5 29 7 148.0 47.4 Negl. 11.9 13.6 42.4 115.3
14.5 14.5 29.0 10.0 13.6 23.6
0.8 3.5 4.3 0.03 0.03
3.4 14.3 17.7 16.9 Negl. 30.3 47.2
10.0 5.3 15.3 1.9 8.1 9.9
40.8 24.3 1.4 66.5 20.1 Negl. 4.0 24.2
10.0 5.2 15.2 10.4 0.04 10.4
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist ships carry an additional significant volume of trade with Hong Kong and Communist China.
c. Including 38,800 tons of coking coal in 1966 and 12,700 tons in 1965.
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1 t. [ 1 ! t. 1. I E l
North Vietnam: Identified Exports Carried by Foreign-Flag Ships
by Destination and Commodity a/
1965-66
1965
1966 25X1
Destination
Coal
Apatite
Cement
Pig Iron
Miscel-
laneous
Total
Coal
Apatite
Cement
Pig Iron
Miscel-
laneous
Total
Total
1 i
317.5
78.4
119.5
1,713.1
05.7
10.4
c7,6
67.8
1,114.0
Communist countries
611.6
317.5
10.5
0
72_1
1,011.7
488.7
10.4
7.2
1.5
37.2
545.1
USSR
42.8
42.8
11.6
11.6
Eastern Europe
10.3
183.5
14.6
208.4
16.1
16.1
Communist China hl
495.1
89.2
10.5
12.2
607.1
471.6
2.5
5.0
1.5
6.7
487.3
North Korea
11.8
44.8
1.6
58.2
7.9
2.2
1.3
11.4
Cuba
94.3
0.9
95.2
17.1
1.5
18.7
Free World
538.6
0
67.9
47.5
47.4
701.4
417.0
0
83.1
38.2
30.5
568.8
Cambodia
36.3
4.4
40.7
44.1
7.6
51.8
Hong Kong b
11.4
6.6
14.o
32.1
4.4
11.0
0.6
8.6
24.6
Japan
443.1
37.3
10.7
491.2
346.9
7.0
36.1
3.4
393.4
Singapore/Malaysia
16.5
15.0
0.2
6.4
38.0
4.0,
11.2
1.5
7.8
24.5
Western Europe
67.5
10.0
3.7
81.2
61.7
2.8
64.4
Other
10.0
8.2
18.2
9.8
0.3
10.0
a. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
b. North Vietnamese and Chinese Communist ships carry an additional volume of trade with Hong Kong and Communist China.
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I I I I I t I l
Table B4
North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of Maritime Foreign Trade, by Port
1965 and 1966
Thousand Tons
Tons per Day
1965
1966
1965
1966
Total W
2 10
2,246
7,150
6,150
Dry cargo
2,450
2,060
6,710
5,640
Imports
687
896
1,880
2,450
Exports
1,763
1,164
4,830
3,190
Haiphong
1,299
1,130
3,560
3,100
Dry cargo imports c/
686
872
1,880
2,390
Dry cargo exports
613
258
1,680
710
Hon Gai and Cam Pha
1,151
930
3,150
2,550
Dry cargo imports (to Hon G
ai) 1
24
3
70
Dry cargo exports
1,150
906
3,150
2,480
Petroleum in bulk
160
186
440
510
a. Data include the identified seaborne trade shown in Table B2 and an estimated
150,000 tons of imports and 50,000 tons of exports carried by Chinese and North
Vietnamese ships.
b. Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.
c. Including petroleum imported in drums on dry cargo ships.
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North Vietnam: Transport Capacity Available for Dry Cargo Imports a/
as of January 1967
Tons per Day
Dry Season
Rainy Season
Annual
Average b/
14,300
12,800
13,800
Major ports c/
5,500
5,500
5,500
Haiphong
4,500
4,500
4,500
Hon Gai and Cam Pha
1,000
1,000
1,000
Routes from Kwangsi
5,700
3,650
5,000
Dong Dang - Hanoi Railroad
3,000
3,000
3,000
Roads
2,700
650
2,000
Routes from Yunnan
3,100
3,600
3,300
Lao Cai - Hanoi Railroad d/
600
600
600
Roads
1,600
300
1,200
Red River
900
2,700
1,500
a. These estimates do not include amounts that could be offloaded from
oceangoing ships into shallow-draft craft and moved to inland ports or
coastal ports other than Haiphong or moved over the beaches. Also no
estimate is included of the amount that could be moved directly from
South China ports to minor ports and beaches in North Vietnam by
shallow-draft craft.
b. The dry season during which road conditions are at their best ex-
tends from about October through May. Heavy rains, beginning about May
in the northern part of North Vietnam, reduce road capacity until late
September. The annual average has been computed using a four-month
(June-September) rainy season and an eight-month dry season.
c. Total theoretical dry-cargo handling capacity. In order for this
capacity to be achieved at Haiphong, no exports could be handled.
Import arrivals would have to be scheduled perfectly. Cam Pha and
Hon Gai together have an estimated capacity of 2,800 tons per day to
accept cargo offloaded with ship's gear, but only 1,000 tons has been
entered in this table because of the problem of clearing the port. If
the road that connects these ports with Hanoi were already utilized by
other traffic, the ports would have to be cleared with shallow-draft
coastal craft that could move to ports other than Haiphong.
d. Normal capacity is about 3,000 tons each way per day. At present
the Viet Tri Bridge is not usable, but present capacity could be in-
creased quickly by installation of additional alternate facilities at
Viet Tri and the bridge could be restored in a maximum of three months.
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CONSEQUENCES OF MINING THE SEAPORTS
OF NORTH VIETNAM
Introductory Note
This appendix analyzes the effects of a program of mining the sea-
ports and coastal entrances of North Vietnam, including selected inland
waterways, in conjunction with the semistrategic attack discussed in
Appendix B.
Two alternative mining programs are examined. The first is a
conventional mining program designed to prevent the use of deep-draft
oceangoing ships, but which lacks a capability to prevent the use of
shallow-draft craft such as coasters and lighters. The second alterna-
tive is a program using a newly developed mine with a capability against
shallow-draft shipping. * Both mining programs assume the use of inten-
sive armed reconnaissance against lines of communication (LOC's) and
transport targets in order to maximize the potential effects of the program.
The immediate impact of either mining program would be a severe
disruption of normal transport activity, ranging from a situation in which
a substantial portion of imports could be maintained by sea and coastal water
movements to one of almost complete denial of water access to North
Vietnam.
This mine is the MK 36, a modification of the standard MK 82 aerial
bomb, which is effective against even unpowered small craft in depths
up to 50 feet. It can be delivered by all aircraft capable of using the
MK 82 and requires the same delivery techniques as the MK 82. The
MK 36 is to go into mass production in the spring of 1967.
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Although the precise nature of the import program that would follow
a successful attack against modern industry is uncertain, it is estimated
that the required level of annual imports could increase by as much as
500, 000 tons.
Either mining program would have serious disruptive effects on
the North Vietnamese transport system and the effectiveness with which
it accommodates the movement of foreign trade. Almost all export trade
would cease and foreign exchange earnings would become negligible. It
is estimated, however, that as long as it has surplus transport capacity
and adequate equipment, North Vietnam will attempt to maintain the flow
of virtually all normal imports plus the import requirements generated
by the attacks on modern industry. Thus the effects of the mining pro-
gram will tend to be those of delay but not denial of imports.
A mining program directed solely against oceangoing shipping would
increase the traffic burden on the major rail connections to Communist
China to the extent that North Vietnam would be hard pressed to meet all
normal traffic requirements by using rail connections. But the traffic
could be handled by resorting to road and inland water routes.
A program including mining of coastal and inland waters would be
much more effective. North Vietnam would have to use all existing road
and rail connections at or near capacity levels. If intensive interdiction
and armed reconnaissance were carried out against these vital transport
links, North Vietnam would face increasingly serious problems. The
vulnerability of transport equipment, the difficulties of maintaining
LOC's, and the cost and unreliability of transport would all increase sig-
nificantly. Some import programs would almost certainly have to be
reduced. These problems alone would not be sufficient, however, to
degrade meaningfully the flow of essential military and economic materials
or to prevent North Vietnam's continued support of the war in the South.
I. The Dimensions of North Vietnam's Foreign Trade
A. Volume of Foreign Trade
Despite the intensified bombing program in 1966 the volume of
North Vietnam's foreign trade moving by sea and by railroad declined
by less than 10 percent and was still above the level of 1964. The total
foreign trade of North Vietnam in 1966 amounted to about 2. 8 million
tons (see Table Cl). About 80 percent of the total moved through the
principal maritime ports -- Cam Pha, Haiphong, and Hon Gai. Most
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North Vietnam: Estimated Volume of Foreign Trade a/
1965-66
Total Volume Imports Exports
1965 1966 1965 1966 1965 1966
Total
3,0800
2816
167~ 1 50
1,
2
1 913
1,3 4
Rail
470
570
~
320 42
0
150
150 b/
Seaborne
2,610
2,2+6
847 1,08
2
1,763
1,16+
Identified
2,410
2,0+6
697 93
2
1,713
1,114
Unidentified J
Estimated additional
(on North Vietnamese
and Chinese ships)
200
200
150 15
0
50
50
a. Estimated trade moving by rail and oceangoing transport. Only a
small amount moved by road and inland waterway routes.
b. Estimates of exports by rail in 1966 are only approximate, having
been derived mainly as extensions of scant information for 1965.
c. The estimate is a rough approximation derived from information
on the pattern and nature of trade engaged in by Chinese and North
Vietnamese shipping for which specific data on cargo volumes actually
carried are lacking.
...r of the remainder, an estimated 570, 000 tons, moved overland by rail
across the North Vietnamese-Chinese border. A small amount of
trade moved by road and air transport.
The volume and commodity composition of seaborne trade in
:1964, 1965, and 1966 are shown in Table C2. * Due to the reduced volume
of exports of coal and apatite and increased imports of petroleum, fer-
tilizer, and miscellaneous and general cargoes, imports accounted for
about 45 percent of identified seaborne trade in 1966, compared with
about 30 percent in 1965. Especially noteworthy were the increased
deliveries from Communist countries of machinery, vehicles, rolled
Comparable commodity data for overland trade are not available.
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I I l I I 1 1' 1 I [ I
[
North Vietnam: Identified Seaborne Foreign Trade
1964, 1965, and 1966
1964
1965
i 66
Total
2,200
2,410
2,050
638
667
3322
Petroleum
142
170
201
Fertilizers
140
162
224
Grain and bulk food
162
119
77
Timber
32
15
14
Miscellaneous
162
231
416
Exports
1,565
1,713
1,114
Coal
950
1,150
gob
Apatite
338
318
10
C eme nt
14o
78
go
Miscellaneous
137
167
108
a. Additional volumes were carried. by Communist Chinese and North Viet-
namese ships. No estimates are available for 1964, but in 1965 and 1966
these ships probably carried an additional 150,000 tons of imports and
50,000 tons of exports.
b. Rounded to the nearest 10,000.
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steel, manufactured and processed goods, and other economic aid items
vital to the small modern sector of the economy and to the country's
ability to absorb the impact of the air war.
The foreign trade carried by railroad in 1966 consisted of about
420, 000 tons of imports and 150, 000 tons of exports. Overland imports
are estimated to have consisted of military supplies and equipment (45
percent), bituminous coal (40 percent), and miscellaneous economic
goods. Exports by rail consisted of apatite, anthracite coal, and prod-
ucts of North Vietnam's food-processing and handicraft industries.
B. Level of Traffic Compared with Route Capacity
The details of the route capacities of each of the North Viet-
namese transport systems were discussed in Appendix B. These
systems have a combined average daily capacity of 13, 800 tons. This
capacity is well in excess of the daily level -- 7, 700 tons - - of foreign
trade moving in North Vietnam. Only the port of Haiphong, which
handles almost all seaborne imports, is being used to any extensive
degree, about three-fourths of its normal capacity of 4, 500 tons a day.
The ports at Hon Gai and Cam Pha, which are engaged almost exclu-
sively in the coal-export trade, would have a combined capacity to handle
about 1, 000 tons of imports a day. The Hanoi - Dong Dang rail line
which carries most of North Vietnam's foreign trade moving by land is
utilized at only 40 percent of its capacity of 3, 000 tons a day. With
the cessation of apatite exports via Haiphong, the Hanoi - Lao Cai line
has been relatively unimportant in the present patterns of foreign trade.
The North Vietnamese, for example, have made no significant effort
to maintain its capacity at more than 600 tons a day, compared with its
normal uninterdicted capacity of 3, 000 tons a day. The road and inland
routes connecting North Vietnam and Communist China have a combined
daily average capacity of 4, 700 tons per day. These routes play an
insignificant role in North. Vietnam's foreign trade and are used prin-
cipally for the movement of small amounts of cross-border trade.
II. Impact of Mining Under the Present Rolling Thunder Program
A. General Effects
If mining of the ports were carried out without warning, a num-
ber of foreign-flag ships might be caught in the ports. =,< The average
It would be possible for mines to be equipped with delayed action
fuses to provide sufficient time for foreign-flag ships to clear the port
or for shipping en route to the port to be diverted.
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daily number of ships at Haiphong during July-December 1966 included
nine freighters (three Soviet, two Eastern European, two Free World,
and two Chinese Communist) and one Soviet tanker. In addition, two
to four ships (of the flags listed above) were loading at Cam Pha and
Hon Gai on any given day.
The immediate effect of mining the ports would be an intensive
disruption of normal transport activity. If the mining program were
applied only to oceangoing shipping, the disruption would be severe be-
cause of the need to adopt alternative distribution procedures, to re-
route import traffic, and to undertake a comprehensive reallocation of
rolling stock, vehicles, and water craft and to reassign personnel.
The maximum impact of the program would be to delay but not
deny the delivery of imports. North Vietnam has already demonstrated
its ability to maintain petroleum imports at some 700 tons a day despite
the severe disruption caused by the attacks on the petroleum storage
and handling facilities at Haiphong. In addition to maintaining imports
at least at essential levels, North Vietnam would also be able to main-
tain the flow of the export trade that would remain, particularly after
attacks on modern industry.
A mining program including mines capable of stopping the move-
ment of shallow-draft shipping and inland watercraft would, of course,
bring about an almost complete cessation of waterborne foreign trade.
The disruptive effect would then be compounded by the need to reallocate
resources in order to maintain foreign trade exclusively on the rail and
road connections to Communist China.
Under either mining program the amount of delay or denial of
normal foreign trade movements would depend on the extent of North
Vietnam's contingency planning. The organization of transport to cope
with the effects of bombing has improved substantially in the past year.
The extensive publicity given to possible US courses of action against
the port of Haiphong makes it highly probable that plans to deal specifically
with a mining of the port are well developed.
The principal means adopted to maintain foreign trade would
involve, if possible, the use of shallow-draft watercraft to transport
supplies from oceangoing ships to shore facilities. There are probably
more than 900 motor-powered junks and about 4, 800 sailing junks
operating in the waters off southern China and the northern coast of
North Vietnam that might be used to improvise lighterage in addition
to the craft normally available for this purpose.
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In addition to using this expedient to move traffic through the
major ports of Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai, the North Vietnamese
would probably try to make increased use of the river port of Nam Dinh.
The port area of Nam Dinh, including wharfs and riverbank suitable for
handling cargo, has a cargo-discharge capacity of about 3, 625 tons a day.
Although access to these facilities would be restricted by draft limitations
9 feet -- the port and river facilities would be a valuable adjunct to emer-
gency cargo-handling programs.
To the extent that coastal shipping and lightering could not be
effectively used, particularly if the use of mines effective against
shallow-draft craft denied all sea access to North Vietnam, the burden
of maintaining foreign trade would fall on the land transport connections
with Communist China. Land transport from the Chinese port of Fort
Bayard or other Chinese ports via the Chinese rail network to the border
at Dong Dang provides the North Vietnamese with a significant alternative
route for their foreign trade if the ports are mined. This route probably
could provide sufficient capacity for all of the normal imports of North
Vietnam. If US airstrikes against the rail network continue at the level
achieved in 1966, North Vietnam should have no difficulty in maintaining
both the current volume of imports and exports moving by land and the
imports normally received by sea.
The Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line, which could serve as another
alternate route, was effectively disrupted for through service for about
five months in 1965 and for at least as long in 1966. There are indica-
tions, however, that the North Vietnamese may have begun to ship apatite
from Lao Cai through Yunnan Province to the rest of China over the new
K'un-ming - Kuei-yang railroad, which was opened to traffic during the
first part of 1966. Thus North Vietnam now has a second rail line to
China which can be used for imports and exports.
As of 1 January 1967, North Vietnam had nearly 1, 100 freight
cars remaining in its freight car inventory, including an estimated
200 tank cars. Some meter-gauge freight cars, including about 150
tank cars, may also have been obtained from Communist China, and
North Vietnam may now be using standard-gauge rolling stock from
China. Thus it is estimated that sufficient equipment and excess
capacity is available on the railroad lines to carry any tonnage that
might be diverted to them by mining North Vietnam's ports and water-
ways.
Although road transport has not been used for a significant
quantity of North Vietnamese foreign trade, it is available as an
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alternative to sea or rail transport. The North Vietnamese have shown
considerable ability to maintain motor transport operations in spite of
the airstrikes delivered thus far. The approximately 11, 500 trucks in
the North Vietnamese civilian and military truck inventories would
probably be sufficient to move over the roads such import and export
tonnages as might not be handled by rail movement for various reasons.
A final alternative would be rail-water shipments using the new
railroad within Communist China to Yunnan Province and thence via the
Red River to Hanoi.
The semi-strategic attack discussed in Appendix B should
eliminate most of North Vietnam's seaborne exports. Export of coal
from Hon Gai and Cam Pha represents about 80 percent of the volume
of North Vietnam's total seaborne exports in 1966. Coal exports nor-
mally account for about 25 percent of its foreign exchange earnings.
Even if the export of coal were possible, the time and expense involved
in its transportation by means other than water would probably make it
an unprofitable trade. A similar situation would apply to the export of
cement and apatite. In fact, the export of apatite had been reduced
drastically by August 1965. If these exports had to be forgone, North
Vietnam's seaborne exports would decline from about 4, 800 tons per
day, including coal, to less than 460 tons a day at the 1965 rate, and
from about 3, 200 tons per day to 300 tons a day at the rate of 1966.
North Vietnam would find it more difficult to cut back on its
imports. Fertilizers, grains, and other bulk foodstuffs are important
to the economy, and although the volumes could be reduced somewhat,
the North Vietnamese would probably try to maintain them as long as
possible. The need to import coal for the coking plant at Thai Nguyen --
an estimated 150, 000 to 200, 000 tons in 1966 -- would be eliminated if
this plant were attacked.
With this exception it is estimated that as long as North Viet-
nam has the route capacity and necessary transport equipment it will
seek to maintain both its normal imports and the added import burden
caused by the attacks on its modern industrial system.
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III. The Cumulative Effect on Imports of a Mining and Industrial
Bombing Program
Imports by North Vietnam in 1966 amounted to about 1. 5 million
tons. In terms of daily traffic movement these imports were trans-
ported as follows:
By sea
3,000
By rail
1,200
Total
4,200
In Appendix B it was estimated that the attacks on the modern in-
dustrial target system would increase annual import requirements by
500, 000 tons, or 1, 400 tons a day. On the assumption that North
Vietnam would maintain both the normal and added import requirements,
the total volume of imports would then amount to about 2 million tons.
Depending on the nature of the mining program, North Vietnam
could use several alternatives to maintain the volume of imports. It
has been estimated that if the mining program were confined exclusively
to oceangoing shipping, North Vietnam could maintain seaborne imports
at about one-half the 1966 level, or 1, 500 tons a day. The import re-
quirement to move only by land routes would then be about 4, 100 tons a
day. The following tabulation shows the daily capacity available to move
these imports on the northeast or northwest land routes singly or in
combination:
Railroad
Road
Inland. water
Assumed imports
Deficit or surplus
capacity
Northeast Routes
Northwest Routes
Total J
3,000
600
(3,000)
3,600
(6,000)
2,000
1,200
3,200
1,500
1,500
5,000
3,300
(5,700)
8,300
(10,700)
4,100
4,100
4,100
goo
-800
(1,600)
4,200
(6,600)
a. Data in parentheses are based. on the assumption that the railroad.
from Yunnan is restored to its original uninterdicted capacity.
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The North Vietnamese would find it difficult if not impossible to
maintain all imports by relying solely on the northeast or the north-
west route, particularly under interdicted conditions. The combined
capacity of both routes, however, is well in excess of requirements,
even with the Hanoi - Lao Cai line measured in terms of its presently
low, interdicted capacity.
If the mining program included the laying of mines capable of neu-
tralizing both inland water and coastal craft, the entire import burden
would then fall on the road and rail connections to Communist China. -,,
The comparison of route capacity and imports would then be as follows:
Railroad.
Road.
Total
Assumed imports
Deficit or surplus
capacity
Northeast Routes
Northwest Routes
Total
600
(3,000)
3,000
3,600
(6,000)
1,200
2,000
3,200
1,800
(44,200)
5,000
6,800
(9,200)
5,500
5,500
5,500
-3,700
(-1,300)
-500
1,300
(3,700)
In this situation, either import route alone would be inadequate to
maintain import traffic. Imports could be maintained, however, by the
combined use of both routes, although at considerable cost in time,
money, and physical effort. All of the routes would also be operating
at near capacity levels, particularly if a sustained interdiction and
armed reconnaissance program is undertaken.
IV. Impact of Mining Under an Intensified Armed Reconnaissance
The effectiveness of a comprehensive mining program would be
greatly enhanced by an expanded bombing program, including intensive
interdiction of road and rail connections with China and 24-hour armed
reconnaissance against all forms of transport -- particularly in the
northern part of North Vietnam. -"",
This appendix does not consider a third alternative in which the
mining of inland waterways would not be a part of the mining program.
See Appendix E.
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The main rail connection to Communist China, the Hanoi-Dong
Dang line, is currently oper ating at about 40 percent of its capacity
to carry imports. The additional import requirements resulting
from the mining program and the attack on industrial targets would
raise traffic to a level considerably in excess of the uninterdicted
capacity of the Dong Dang line. The North Vietnamese would then be
forced to try to use the new Chinese railroad through Yunnan Province
and thence the Hanoi-Lao Cai line as well as the highways and inland
waterway. The rail distance to Hanoi from Fort Bayard via Lao Cai
is over 2, 000 kilometers, nearly three times the distance via Dong
Dang, thus adding to the cost and effort. Nevertheless, the alternate
railroad connection, in addition to the highways and inland waterways,
would represent considerable additional transport capacity.
Interdiction of the lines would force the Communists to allocate
considerable amounts of manpower and rra terials to maintain the
railroad lines and alternative highway routes. The repair of major
bridge structures would be measurably more complex and expensive
than the relatively simple expedients which keep traffic moving in the
southern provinces and in Laos. Sustained 24-hour attacks on loco-
motives and rolling stock by armed reconnaissance would stop all
daylight traffic and disrupt nighttime traffic, thus slowing down move-
ments and making the flow of traffic uneven. The North Vietnamese
would probably be forced to make greater use of highway and inland
water traffic. Although it is extremely difficult to interdict these
systems, their greater use would increase the opportunities for
harassment of actual traffic movement.
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APPENDIX D
INTERDICTION OF THE LEVEES IN THE RED RIVER DELTA
I. The Levee as a Target System
A. Geographic Characteristics
The Red River Delta is a flat plain of about one million h.ec-
tares* crisscrossed by natural rivers and manmade canals for
irrigation and drainage. It constitutes the rice bowl of North Vietnam.
From the head of the delta at Viet Tri, which is 100 miles inland, the
average fall of the Red River to the Tonkin Gulf is less than six inches
per mile, a factor which strongly influences its flood characteristics.
The rice fields and population centers of the delta are protected
by an elaborate system of levees which have greatly reduced flooding
from natural causes. Two rice crops a year are grown -- the fifth
month rice is harvested in May-June and the tenth month rice in October-
November. In pre-Communist times, heavy rains during July and August,
when the river rises to a seasonal peak, frequently caused, through
breaches in the levees, extensive floods and destruction to property and
agricultural crops. No major breaches in the dikes have occurred since
the mid-1940's; however, heavy rains continue to cause substantial
losses to the rice crop. The Hanoi regime has moved about 1 million
Vietnamese out of the delta over the past five years and has resettled
them in highland tribal areas in an attempt to increase the food supply
and reduce the pressure on the delta food base.
B. Vulnerability of the Levees and the Rice Crop
In order to inflict maximum damage to the rice crop -- the
staple food in North Vietnam -- these levees would have to be breached
at some time in the period mid-July to mid-August, when the Red River
is at its height. During this period the level of the Red River is con-
siderably above the level of the surrounding plain. At this time, the
tenth month rice crop -- normally about two-thirds of the annual harvest --
is vulnerable to flooding and would be completely destroyed if the sub-
mersion of the rice plants persisted beyond two weeks. The rice plants
are most vulnerable to shorter periods of submersion 10 to 20 days after
transplanting, or around mid-August. Aerial reconnaissance and weather
data could identify an optimum attack time.
One hectare is equal to 2.471 acres.
D-1
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The areas most vulnerable to flooding, if the primary levees
of this system were breached, are the Ha Dong area southwest of the
Red River and the Ha Bac area northeast of the river. A secondary
system of levees in these areas has tended to confine the damage from
major floods in the past to roughly 200, 000 hectares. Breaching of
the secondary levees could substantially increase the acreage flooded.
If only the main levees were breached, it is estimated that the crop
loss would be on the order of several hundred thousand tons of rice. If
the secondary levees were also effectively breached, the decrease in
rice production could reach a million tons.
The damage to agricultural crops in the Ha Dong area would
be less than the damage to agriculture in the Ha Bac area. It is esti-
mated that the tenth month rice culture, within the delta, beyond the
left bank of the river (the Ha Bac area) occupies nearly 90 percent of
the total area and that the rice fields beyond the right bank (the Ha Dong
area) occupy only about 60 percent of the area. Estimates of rice losses
as a result of flooding in these two areas are shown in Table D-1.
Successful breaching of these levees would also affect the one
and one-half million people in this area, which includes the city of
Hanoi. Furthermore, most of the industrial, commercial, and military
activity in Hanoi and its suburbs would be temporarily halted until the
water receded.
To mitigate the effects of the flooding, Hanoi would be forced
to divert an undetermined but very sizable work force away from other
activities, including those of a military-supporting nature, for a period
of weeks until the major damage had been repaired.
JCS targets which would be vulnerable to inundation are as
JCS
Target BE
Number Number
Hanoi/Gia Lam Airfield
Hanoi/Bac Mai Airfield
Hanoi Railroad Yard
Ha Dong Army Bks and Supply Depot
Hanoi POL Storage Thanh Am
Hanoi POL Storage Bac Mai
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JCS
Target
Numb e r
BE
Number
Hanoi MND/Army & MZ Hqs/Bks & Supply Depot
Hanoi Army Bks S Quinh Loi
Hanoi Army Supply Depot N Tay Ho
Van Dien Army Supply Depot
Hanoi International Radio Transmitting
Station, Dai Mo
Hanoi Port Facilities
Hanoi Engineering and Machine Tool Plant
Hanoi Thermal Powerplant
In addition, there are additional war-supporting military bar-
racks, storage areas, and communications facilities which would be
affected by the flooding.
A. Over-Target Weapon Requirements
Target studies have identified the Ha Dong and the Ha Bac areas
southwest and northeast of the Red River, respectively, in the vicinity
of Hanoi as the most promising for attack, since they have been particu-
larly vulnerable to flooding in the past. The areas are traversed by
Route 1A, the main road from Hanoi southward along the coast; the Hanoi-
Thanh Hoa rail line; and Route 6 which leads to the Dien Bien Phu area.
These transportation routes are on embankments.
The bombing objective would be to create a series of levee cuts.
Since the thickness of levee crown is approximately 80 feet when the Red
River is at the 33-foot stage, a series of overlapping craters across the
entire levee crown would be necessary to create a breach. A single hit
by a 1, 000-or 2, 000-pound bomb would not be sufficient to create a breach
and generate the necessary scouring action of water rushing through to
widen and deepen the break. The most economical means of creating the
series of overlapping craters is with eleven-bomb trains of 1, 000-pound
general-purpose bombs, which penetrate about 10 feet in average soil and
produce craters about 37 feet in diameter. (An intervalometer setting of
30 feet has been assumed.) The following tabulation shows three assur-
ance levels of cutting the levee when the river is at the 33-foot level:
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I I I I I I I I [ I. ! C
Estimated Loss in Production of 10th Month Rice Crop
in North Vietnam Caused by Flooding J
Area Beyond Right Bank
Area Beyond Left Bank
(Southwest) of Red River
25X1
(Northeast) of Red Riv
Area in
Area in
Area
Fall Rice
Estimated
Percent of
Area
Fall Rice
Estimated
Percent of
Flooded
Affected
Loss
Annual
Flooded
Affected
Loss
Annual
(Thousand
(Thousand
(Thousand
Harvest
(Thousand
(Thousand
(Thousand
Harvest
Hectares)
Hectares)
Tons)
of Rice
Hectares)
Hectares)
Tons)
of Rice
50
30
60
1
50
45
go
2
100
60
120
3
100
go
180
4
150
go
180
4
150
135
270
6
200
120
240
5
200
180
360
8
250
150
300
7
250
225
450
10
300
180
360
8
300
270
540
12
350
315
630
14
400
360
720
16
450
405
810
18
500
450
goo
20
a. Based on the assumption of submersion of rice ?plants for a minimum of two weeks.
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Percent
Assurance
Number of
Trains
Number of
1,000-Pound.
General-Purpose
Bombs
Tons
50
5
55
27.5
70
6
66
33.0
85
8
88
44.o
These assurance levels apply only to one breach; from two to four sep-
arate and almost simultaneous breaches are probably required to
achieve the type and extent of flood damage discussed above. Additional
strikes would be necessary to breach the secondary levee system.
If the bombs were not dropped in trains but were individually
aimed, over-target tonnage requirements would be substantially higher
than those in the tabulation above.
A successful attack on the levee system at Ha Dong would be
exceedingly disruptive in the short run. There are probably 1. 5 million
people in the Ha Dong area, including Hanoi. This Agency has not made
an independent study of the probable level of casualties; military target
studies estimate that they would be small, numbering in the hundreds
rather than thousands. Homes in the village areas would be destroyed,
factory activity would be halted, and the flood would be exceedingly dis -
ruptive in the short run to the social order in the affected areas. Over
the long run the effect on rice availabilities would probably be the hardest
problem for the regime. The loss of at least several hundred thousand
tons, and perhaps 1 million tons, of rice, particularly in a year of below-
average harvests, would force Hanoi to seek outside sources of supply.
Communist China, which in an average year produces 75 million to 85
million tons of rice, could provide the necessary amount. Under con-
ditions of continuing air interdiction of the land links between North
Vietnam and Communist China, transport of such supplies could be
difficult. Also, China would be forced to purchase offsetting quantities
of grain in Free World markets because its food supply is not adequate
to cover fully its domestic requirements.
Apart from the short-term disruption of military supplies mov-
ing to South Vietnam, there would be few other military effects. Any
food deficit in North Vietnam which could not be made up by imports
would fall on the peasantry and not on the military or government forces.
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Since the major burden of a successful levee attack would fall
on the civilians in agricultural areas, there probably would be a highly
adverse public reaction in the West. This criticism would be more
strident than that which would be expected from attacks on any other
target system, with the possible exception of raids on population per se.
Since the military effects of "levee busting" would be both limited and
short lived, the effect on the Hanoi regime's will to persist would be
marginal. Indeed, Hanoi would be presented with a propaganda theme
which would win it widespread sympathy and support in the West.
The North Vietnamese are well aware of the importance of the
levee system,and the regime has maintained and strengthened the system
over the years. The existence of a secondary system of levees, which
also would require breaching to maximize effectiveness, tends to limit
the effects of breaching the primary system. Well before the initiation
of US air attacks in 1965, discussions within the North Vietnamese
regime of the importance of the levee system highlighted the success of
the Viet Minh in countering the effects of French destruction of levees
and dams and suggests that past experience has in part prepared the
regime for such eventuality. One method of countering the effects of a
breach in the levees in the target area is to deliberately breach a number
of the levees upstream and divert the water into less important agricul-
tural areas. Defensive breaching of this type could rapidly drop the
level of flood water at Hanoi by as much as six feet. A specific illus -
tration of the sensitivity of the North Vietnamese regime to possible
attacks on levees was contained in a recent report which mentioned the
collection of materials in the Hanoi area to fill breaches in the levees.
However, these countermeasures would probably be ineffective if an
attack of adequate size were carried out quickly and successfully.
D. The Effect on Imports
Depending on the extent of the flooding, crop losses in the Red
River Delta would probably range between 250, 000 and 1 million tons.
In view of the tight food situation in North Vietnam at present, it is
believed that it would be necessary to replace the entire loss with im-
ports in order to avoid severe food shortages or to adopt more rigorous
rationing programs. In terms of refined rice (using a milling ratio of
about 70 percent) this loss would amount to about 175, 000 to 700, 000
tons. Presumably, importation of this requirement could be spread over
about nine months because the amount destroyed would consist of not
more than one-fourth of the annual crop, or three months' supply.
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The importation of an additional 175, 000 to 700, 000 tons, or
640 to 2, 500 tons a day, during nine months would present problems of
varying severity, depending on many factors such as whether there were
damage to the railroad and road network by the flooding, the nature of
the mining programs, and the intensity of the armed reconnaissance and
interdiction campaigns against the logistic target system.
The breaching of the levees is assumed to follow the attacks on
modern industry discussed in Appendix B and the execution of the mining
program discussed in Appendix C. If the North Vietnamese were to
attempt to maintain the normal flow of imports plus the import require-
ments generated by the attacks on industry and the levee system, the
cumulative import requirement would be between 2. 2 million and 2. 7
million tons. About 2 million tons of these imports could be moved
throughout the entire year, at an average daily rate of 5, 500 tons a
day. The rice movement, however, is assumed to be accomplished with-
in a nine-month period at a daily rate of from 640 to 2, 500 tons a day.
Thus the North Vietnamese during most of the year would have to main-
tain a maximum importmovement of 8, 000 tons a day.
The ability to move this amount of cargo on a sustained daily
basis will depend in part on the nature of the mining program and on the
intensity of armed reconnaissance and air interdiction programs.
If the mining program adopted is the one directed solely against
oceangoing shipping, the North Vietnamese would be able to import an
estimated 1, 500 tons a day by use of shallow-draft coastal shipping and
lighters. They would, moreover, have access to the inland water ap-
proaches to North Vietnam. In this situation there would be from 8, 300
to 10, 700 tons of route capacity available on a daily basis to accommodate
the movement of 6, 500 tons of import cargo. * With this amount of capa-
city available the North Vietnamese would be able to move all of the import
requirements, provided that the major routes were not heavily interdicted.
An intensive interdiction program would, however, make the flow of im-
ports considerably more uncertain and costly.
* The lower limit of the range includes the Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line at
its present interdicted capacity of 600 tons a day. The upper limit assumes
that the line is maintained at essentially.its uninterdicted capacity.
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If the mining program were directed at shallow-draft craft
and the inland waterways system, however, water access to North
Vietnam would be cut off. In this case the North Vietnamese would
have route capacity ranging from only 6, 800 to 9, 200 tons a day to
handle daily imports of 8, 000 tons. If the levee program achieved its
estimated maximum effect, the North Vietnamese import capability
would then fall short of requirements by about 15 percent. Total im-
ports could be maintained only by restoring the Hanoi - Lao Cai line
to its uninte rdic ted status.
The nature of the terrain and the more complex bridges found
in the northeast and northwest transport connections to China make
them much more vulnerable to interdiction programs. For example, if
an interdiction campaign reduced the capacity of the rail lines on a sustain-
ed basis by only one-third and of the road systems by only one-fourth,
the available route capacity would then be only 6, 400 tons a day. The
North Vietnamese vo uld then be hard pressed to move even their mini-
mum import requirements, and if the interdiction program were even
more successful, as an all-out attack should be, the regime would face
increasingly severe problems. Hard decisions would have to be made
about the imports which could be forgone, and a system of more rigor-
ous rationing would probably become necessary. More importantly, the
continuity and reliability of the flow of essential military and economic
assistance from the USSR and Communist China would become a matter
of highest concern.
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APPENDIX E
UNLIMITED BOMBING
I. Transportation Targets
An unlimited camps.ign against transportation targets, particularly
those in the northern area, holds promise of significant results. Al-
though the transportation system has been a major target since the
inception of the Rolling Thunder program, the weight of the bombing
effort has fallen on Route Packages 1, 2, and 3, where military and
economic requirements for traffic movement have been relatively small
in relation to route capacity. Hence, despite the weight of attack, the
North Vietnamese have been able to keep essential supplies flowing.
The basic concept of an unlimited attack on transportation would be
to take advantage of the two major factors which emerge from the bomb-
ing campaigns outlined in earlier appendixes. These are (1) the emergence
of a higher import requirement as the result of the neutralization of most
production facilities and (2) the anticipated closure, or near closure, of
North Vietnamese ports and the inland waterway system by mining. Un-
der these circumstances, we estimate a daily import requirement of
between 6, 100 tons and 8, 000 tons, depending on the extent to which the food
supply is impaired through an attack on dykes or as a byproduct to attacks
on other target systems in the north. Under these circumstances, the
remaining rail and road connections to Communist China would be forced
to operate at -- or virtually at -- capacity. Should these circumstances
prevail, disruptions to main rail and road arteries created by airstrikes
would then begin to bite into the movement of traffic and to force Hanoi
to make meaningful decisions on the pattern of imports, with consequent
effects on the economic and possibly the military establishment.
The capacity of the two railroad lines connecting Communist China
with North Vietnam is currently estimated at 3, 600 tons per day. The
average capacity would increase to 6, 000 tons per day if the bridge at
Viet Tri is restored or if ferrying arrangements are made to effectively
transfer this capacity to other means. In any event, there would be a
delay of at least two months to restore this capacity.
The daily capacity of the five roads leading into North Vietnam from
China is very tentatively estimated at 3, 200 tons. There is a fairly wide
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margin of error associated with this estimate. To effectively utilize
these roads,) several thousand motor trucks would be needed for the
movement. Given the sponginess of the data, we cannot be too precise
about the ratio of capacity to import requirements. However, the fol-
lowing two conclusions seem warranted:
(a) That the uninterdicted capacity of the
roads and the rail lines, allowing sufficient
time to organize the necessary truck transport,
would probably be sufficient to transport the
required daily tonnages in full to North Vietnam,
even if the ports were mined.
(b) That given a successful interdiction
campaign, the net capacity of the roads and the
rail lines would be insufficient to satisfy the
maximum daily requirement, and therefore some
reduction in the desired levels of supplies would
take place.
In an unlimited target program the aim would be to neutralize as
much railroad and road capacity as possible and to saturate the enemy's
capability to repair or to improvise alternates to restore it. There are
nine JCS bridge targets on the two railroad lines connecting Hanoi with
the border of China, four of which have been struck and restored, and
one of which has been struck and not restored. In addition to these
bridge targets, there are 132 bridges on the railroad lines not on the
JCS target list. On the major road routes leading from Hanoi
to China, there are 13 JCS bridge targets and over 500 bridges not on
the JCS target list. For the most part, these bridges are not located
in populated areas, although several bridges are not recommended as
targets because of the potentially high incidence of civilian casualties.
In addition to the bridges, targets of opportunity will become apparent
such as trains and trucks moving through the open country, concen-
trations of railroad equipment, and trucks.
The target value of the major railroad yards and shops on the JCS
Target List is discussed later in this appendix.
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The effect of a successful unlimited program against transport as
discussed herein would be that the North Vietnamese would be hard-
pressed to maintain the movement of their import requirements. If
the interdiction program were highly successful, the regime would
encounter increasing difficulty and cost in maintaining the flow of some
of their most essential military and economic goods. This could force
Hanoi to make difficult decisions about the imports to be forgone and
to adopt more rigorous systems of rationing. In the long term the un-
certainties and difficulties resulting from the cumulative effect of the
air campaigns would probably cause Hanoi to undertake a basic reassess-
ment of the probable course of the war and the extent of Hanoi's commit-
ment to it. A recapitulation of the principal fixed targets in this program
is given in Table E 1.
II. Other Potential Targets
A. Military
In addition to industrial-economic targets, there are a number
of military facilities presently on the JCS target list whose neutraliza-
tion would be of importance in blunting the military capabilities of North
Vietnam. The most prominent of these are 11 airfields. There are al-
so a number of barracks and smaller military supply depots widely
dispersed throughout North Vietnam. In an unlimited campaign these
facilities presumably would be taken under attack.
B. Primary Telecommunications Targets
There are four installations within the telecommunications
system which are of primary importance. The four are radio communi-
cations centers located, respectively, near Phu Coc, Dai Mo, Son Dong,
and Me Tri. The first three are on the JCS Target List but have never
been struck; the fourth has not previously been targeted. Each is
situated at least a half mile away from civil population centers.
Neutralization of these radio centers could prcduce the follow-
ing effects: (1) a temporary disruption of top-priority command and
control channels used by Armed Forces High Command in Hanoi; (2) a
similar temporary disruption of international telephone and telegraph
service; (3) enforced use of less efficient transmission media; and (4)
severe curtailment, if not cessation, of operations by North Vietnam's
primary propaganda broadcast facility.
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Principal Fixed Targets in an Unlimited Target
Program Against Transport in North Vietnam
1. Targets to Halt Movements by Water
a. Haiphong mineable area
Gulf of Tonkin
b. Cam Pha approaches mineable area
c. Hon Gai approaches mineable area
d. Channels in the Red River Delta
mineable area
e. Upper reaches of the Red River
in North Vietnam mineable area
2. Targets to Halt Movements by Land
JCS No.
Various and
armed reconnaissance
a. Continuation of present program in
Route Packages 1, 2, 3
b. Targets north of Hanoi
1. Railroad targets
(a) Hanoi railroad and highway
bridge over Red River
(b) Hanoi railroad and highway bridge
over Canal des Rapides a/
(c) Viet Tri railroad and highway bridge
over Riviere Claire
(d) Dap Cau railroad and highway bridge
over Song Cau
(e) Lang Son railroad and highway
bridge over Song Ky Cung a/
a. High level of potential civilian casualties precludes recommendation of
this target.
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2. Targets to Halt Movements by Land - continued
JCS No.
(f) Bac Giang railroad and high-
way bridge over Song Thuong
(g) Cao Nung railroad bridge over
Song Hoa
(h) Lang Dang railroad bridge
over Song Thuong
(i) Vu Chua railroad bridge
over Suoi Ngang
3. Highway Targets
(k) 132 additional bridge targets
a. Kep highway bridge over Song Thuong 25X5
b. Thai Nguyen highway bridge over Song Cau
c. Cho Moi highway bridge over Song Cho
d. Ha Gia highway bridge over Song Cong
e. Long Khap highway bridge over Song Chay
f. Bac Can highway bridge over Song Cau
g. Lang Luong highway bridge over Song Mo Ga
h. Vinh Tuy highway bridge over Song Con
i. On highway bridge over Song Thuong
j. Me Xa highway bridge over Song Ky
k. Chieng Chang highway bridge over Song Luc Nam
1. Lang Met highway bridge over Song Thuong
in. Lam highway bridge NE over Song Luc Nam Tributary
n. Over 500 additional bridge targets
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Whether concentrated on these four targets or substantially
amplified, Rolling Thunder attacks are unlikely to produce more than
temporary and/or localized disruptions of communications regarded
by Hanoi as critical. In addition to its major fixed. installations, North
Vietnam has available several hundred small radio stations, almost all
of which are readily transportable and easily concealed from detection
by, air. These -- together with an extensive wireline system which
could not be seriously interdicted at practicable cost -- provide North
Vietnam with a virtually irreducible base of telecommunications. The
availability of these alternate facilities almost certainly assures that,
except for transient disruptions, the flow of essential military, economic,
and administrative communications will be sustained.
Output from North Vietnam's pharmaceutical industry stems
primarily from six plants, all of which are located in the Hanoi area,
and one of which is on the JCS target list at present. These plants are:
Pharmaceutical Products Plants No. 1 and 2, the Central Anti-Tuberculosis
Institute, the Hygiene and Epidemiology Institute, and the Central
Pharmaceutical Works, and the Veterinary Drug Factory. Pharmaceu-
tical Products Plant No. 2, the country's most modern facility, was
constructed with Soviet aid in 1958-60. Antibiotics reportedly are
produced at this plant and at Pharmaceutical Products Plant No. 1,
although fermentation capacities of both probably are small. The
Veterinary Drug Factory, built with Communist Chinese aid in 1963,
produces hog cholera vaccine and other pharmaceuticals for animal
use.
Production by North Vietnam's pharmaceutical industry con-
sists largely of repackaging and processing bulk pharmaceuticals imported
from other Communist countries and from the Free World. Total pharma-
ceutical output for any time period is unknown, but is believed to be
inadequate for basic peacetime needs.
Bombing of the pharmaceutical plants in Hanoi would have a
small impact on North Vietnam's overall supply problem and could re-
sult in significant civilian casualties.
D. Transport Repair Facilities
Almost all of North Vietnam's capacity for the repair of rail-
road stock and equipment is accounted for by the Hanoi Railroad Car
Repair Shops Gia Lam, the shops at the Hanoi Railroad Station and
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Classification Yard, and the Haiphong Railroad Car Repair Shops. The
first two facilities are on the JCS target list, the third is not. Most
major repairs and overhauls are accounted for at this site, and the only
three locomotives known to have been produced in North Vietnam were
manufactured there. Despite some earlier bomb damage the great part
of this capacity is still intact. About 3, 000 civilians are estimated to be
employed or living in the area in and around the shops, which are located
near a village northeast of Hanoi.
The shops at the Hanoi Railroad Station and Classification Yard
are the most important facilities for the repair of locomotives in the
country. Located in the heart of Hanoi, the facility includes two large
locomotive repair shops, one railroad car repair shop, and one turn-
table. The Haiphong Railroad Repair Shops are also in the center of
Haiphong and consist of two large shops, with an estimated replacement
cost of some $2 million.
The extended loss of the locomotive and rolling stock repair shops
would be a serious setback to North Vietnam and require an increased
rate of imports of transportation equipment to compensate for a reduced
repair capability. China could supply North Vietnam about 1, 000 meter-
gauge freight cars, 150 of which are tank cars, and about 100 to 120
meter-gauge locomotives, which have become surplus to China's needs
by virtue of conversion of some internal rail lines to standard gauge.
This quantity of transportation equipment is roughly equal to the size of
the rail park being operated in North Vietnam at present. The transfer
of such rolling stock to North Vietnam would neutralize for a period of
from six months to a year most of the effects expected from successful
attacks on the North Vietnamese transport repair facilities.
Increased US/GVN bombing of the major textile plants will de-
crease the output of the plants and may cause an initial decline in the
standard of living of the North Vietnamese population. The major tex-
tile plants in North Vietnam are the 8 March Textile Plant in Hanoi;
the Dong Xuan Weaving Factory in Hanoi; the ready-to-wear clothing
factory near Hanoi; and the Nam Dinh Textile Combine, which probably
has been dispersed after the bombing of July 1965. The 8 March Textile
Plant, the most modern of the textile installations, can produce between 35
million and 45 million meters of cotton cloth annually, along with 80, 000
meters of other cloth. It can also produce about 5 million jute bags.
With its labor force of 7, 000 workers (70 percent of which are women)
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it is one of the largest industrial installations in North Vietnam. It
has been operating on three shifts during both 1965 and 1966. Reports
have been received that at least part of the plant has been dispersed and
that transportation and distribution difficulties have arisen as a result
of the partial dispersal.
The Dong Xuan Weaving Factory, which is primarily a knitting
mill, is much smaller than the 8 March Plant. In 1966 the factory has
been trying to cope with producing under war-time conditions. It has
been trying to repair its own machinery and to manufacture some of the
spare parts for the knitting machinery.
F. Food-Processing Plants
Bombing of the food-processing plants in North Vietnam may
initially cause a decline in the standard of living and will almost cer-
tainly end North Vietnamese exports to the Free World and to Eastern
Europe. In 1965 North Vietnam exported about 30 percent of its total
production of foodstuffs; these exports probably declined in 1966.
North Vietnam has at least four major canneries, numerous sugar
mills, and about 14 major rice mills -- gifts of Communist China.
The canneries are located in Hanoi, Haiphong, Son Tay, and Phu Tho.
Bombing of these canneries will reduce the supply of canned fish, meat,
and fruit. The sugar mills can be classified as local industry and are
located in most provinces.
The rice mills are located in Hanoi, Bac Giang, Viet Tri,
Haiphong, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Dap Can, Nam Dinh, Thai Binh,
Ninh Binh, Ham Rong, Vinh, Ninh Giang, and Thanh Hoa. They have
a total milling capacity of between 15 and 20 percent of the average
annual rice production. It is not known whether the small cottage-type
mills in the provinces and districts have sufficient capacity to fill the
gap that would be created by the destruction of the major mills.
More primitive means of processing foodstuffs could be
resorted to if the major commercial facilities were denied. Apart
from the likelihood of greater spoilage and hence some decrease in
domestic availabilities, we are unable to specify the effects of success-
ful attack on the food-processing sector.
There are two fertilizer plants, the Lam Thao Superphosphate
Plant and the Van Dien Phosphate Fertilizer Plant, which, while not
connected with the explosives industry, are important in providing
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chemical fertilizer for North Vietnamese agriculture. The Lam Thao
Plant, built with Soviet aid, is North Vietnam's largest producer of
fertilizer. Neutralization of this plant, representing about 56 percent
of the national capacity, would undoubtedly result in some loss of rice
production unless Hanoi were able to increase imports. About 150, 000
tons of imports would be needed. The Van Dien plant has an annual
capacity of about 20, 000 tons and accounts for about 7 percent of the
national capacity to produce chemical fertilizer.
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APPENDIX F
THE LOGISTIC FUNNEL AS A TARGET SYSTEM
I. Conclusions
Over 60 percent of all airstrikes in North Vietnam and Laos during
1966 were carried out against targets in the "logistic funnel, " which
comprises Route Packages 1 and 2 in North Vietnam and the road net-
work through the Laotian Panhandle (see the map Figure Fl). The
total effort in these three areas during the first 11 months of 1966
amounted to about 68, 000 attack sorties delivering about ll?-, 000 tons
of ordnance to the target area. Despite this effort, the flow of sup-
plies currently needed from North Vietnam to support the VC/NVA
forces fighting in the south has continued. The physical damage caused
by the present bombing program in the "funnel" has been offset by the
determined effort of the Communists to keep the routes open. Their
willingness and ability to resort to primitive methods of crossing
streams and transporting supplies has been a major factor accounting
for continued logistic movement.
Concentration of all Rolling Thunder attack forces on the "logistic
funnel" would increase by about 60 percent the weight of the bombing
program in this area, raising the level of ordnance expended from
10, 000 tons to around 16, 000 tons per month. In a short time the North
Vietnamese would respond to the intensified bombing by increasing the
size of the labor force engaged in repair work. The required 30 percent
increase in manpower could be drawn from areas of North Vietnam no
longer being bombed, and would be made up of experienced repair crews.
Moreover, the air defenses in the "funnel" also would be strengthened
to aid in countering the intensified bombing program. Hence, it is
believed that the logistic support to the VC/NVA forces would be con-
tinued. Unless the Communist order of battle in South Vietnam were
substantially increased over current levels, supplies should continue
to be available.
A similar program to reduce the logistic capacity of the Communist
Chinese and North Korean forces, called Operation Strangle, was carried
out during the Korean War with only limited effectiveness. A strip
across North Korea, 60 nautical miles in depth, was bombed day and
night for 11 months in an attempt to cut off supplies needed by the Com-
munist armies. By means of a system of countermeasures very
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similar in scope to those now being carried out by the North Vietna-
mese, the Communists greatly reduced the effectiveness of the US
bombing program while at the same time continuing to provide the
necessary supplies for their war effort. Operation Strangle is
generally credited with holding down the flow of supplies so that Com-
munist offensive actions were limited, but defensive actions were
virtually unimpared. In any event, Communist logistic requirements
in Korea were of a completely different order of magnitude -- a few
thousand tons a day were needed by Communist armies.
..r II. Background
The "logistic funnel" consists of transportation Route Packages
1 and 2 in North Vietnam and the connecting road network in the Laos
Panhandle. In North Vietnam, this includes all transportation routes
south of Vinh to the Demilitarized Zone. In Laos the road network
extends south from the Mu Gia Pass area to the end of Route 96 oppo-
site Kontum Province, South Vietnam. The logistic capacities of the
major routes in the "funnel" are contained in Table Fl. These theo-
retical pre-strike capacities range from 92 tons per day in the southern
Laotian Panhandle to 1, 025 tons per day in the Vinh area of North
Vietnam. Because of the primitive level of economic development in
the area, the use of these major routes either for economic purposes
or as supply channels to support the Communist war effort has never
placed a strain on the nominal capacities of these routes. It is
wr probable that, given the extensive system of countermeasures developed
by the Communists in the "logistic funnel", their capacities have not
been reduced by more than 20 percent. A more intensive bombing
program could reduce the capacities of these routes to less than
50 percent, which would still be well above the relatively low logistic
support requirements. During the rainy season the problems of
transportation are multiplied as are the problems of bombing the
supply lines. Washouts and mud make overland movement difficult
and uncertain. At the same time, high water makes many more
streams navigable and vastly increases their total length of naviga-
bility. The rainy season also provides large amounts of cloud cover
which affords an additional amount of protection for Communist
logistics operations. Since the logistics net in the "funnel" is com-
posed of both land and water routes, and tonnage requirements are so
small when compared with total capacity, the rainy season does not
present a serious problem to the Communists at this time.
During 1966, over 60 percent of all airstrikes against North Viet-
nam and Laos were concentrated on "logistic funnel" transportation
targets -- bridges, rolling stock, trucks, watercraft, supply dumps,
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LAOS PANHANDLE - THE LOGISTIC FUNNEL
Route a Tnuv
Package 2
Nakhon Phonoi
-- ' NORTH
...m , VIETNAM
Khong Sedone ~~-
Unusable -
CABODIA
Road
Figure F--1 o The Laos Panhandle: "The Logistic Funnel"
Ban Xam
KaRg
Road
Bypass road
AREA
OF
MAIN
Route
Package
Don Ha
Quan Tri
Hues
SQUTH Vl5TNA,
Bouang
Nam
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and other related targets. In 1966 the average monthly ordnance
dropped on the funnel targets amounted to over 10, 000 tons (see
Table F2). As can be seen from the increased rate of infiltration
of North Vietnamese troops to South Viotnam and the countering of
bomb damage to routes in the funnel, however, the present level of
bombing has had little adverse effect on Communist ability to sup-
port the war in South Vietnam.
Concentrating all ordnance tonnage on the "logistic funnel"
target, instead of the present share of 60 percent,would permit de-
livery of over 16, 000 tons per month on "funnel" targets.
III. Estimated Effects on the Flow of Supplies to South Vietnam
In 1966, more than 250 bridges in the funnel area were confirmed
by aerial photography to be damaged or destroyed. Most identified
fixed targets were struck more than once. Despite the intensive
bombing, the supply lines from North Vietnam to the VC/NVA forces
fighting in the south have been kept open. To accomplish this feat,
the principal input has been labor, with about 40, 000 workers engaged
in full-time repair activity along Route Packages 1 and 2 and with
another 25, 000 repairing roads in the Laos Panhandle. Hundreds of
work teams have been organized and stationed at chokepoints, together
with the necessary materials, to repair bridges and cratered roads.
Speed and simplicity of repair have been the hallmark of the
program. Hand tools and local building materials (mainly timber and
stone) are used, for the most part, to carry out repairs and construc-
tion work. Destroyed bridges have been replaced by multiple stream
crossings such as bypass bridges, fords, ferries, and culverts. Al-
ternate routes have been built. A new bridging technique has been
developed using steel cables and removable bridge decking to reduce
the vulnerability of bridges to air attack. Camouflaged bridges and
alternate dummy bridges with rope and netting have been constructed
to deceive pilots. In heavily forested areas, repair work has been
carried out during daylight hours under a canopy of natural foliage,
mow but a great deal of work also has been undertaken at night to protect
workers from attack.
The work units in North Vietnam have now developed a high degree
of skill in making quick repairs and constructing bypasses. If the
bombing were shifted entirely to the funnel area, additional manpower
would be needed to maintain the lines of communication to South
Vietnam. It is estimated that 20, 000 more workers,about a 30 percent
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increase over the present work force, would be required. However,
a sudden shift in the bombing pattern would not, in all probability,
be responded to immediately by the North Vietnamese. It would
take time to shift experienced repair crews to the south and to
and arrange for the additional flow of repair supplies to the area. Tempo-
rarily, the flow of supplies to South Vietnam could be impeded while
countermeasures were being organized -- probably a period of several
d weeks.
It is expected that the North Vietnamese would respond by making
;r.r greater use of camouflage, pontoon bridges, and other bridging
techniques which would allow removal of bridge deck sections during
daylight to simulate unserviceable bridges. Besides increasing their
effort to repair the existing routes and more intensively using foot
trails, the North Vietnamese would probably construct new north-to-
south roads through the highlands of southern North Vietnam and in
Laos. There are probably greater opportunities for cave storage.
It is probable that many more antiaircraft artillery and SAM sites
would be deployed in the target area within two to three weeks after the
Hanoi regime realized that the United States had changed its bombing
strategy. For example, a SAM site was established within target
range of Mu Gia Pass within two weeks after the first bombing raid
by B-52's in April 1966.
Finally, shifting the bombing entirely to the southern part of
North Vietnam and Laos would provide a boost to the morale of the
North Vietnamese. The main industrial, agricultural, and adminis-
trative centers are in the north. Most of the population, therefore,
would be freed from problems engendered by air attack. The Hanoi
regime would believe that its constant and strident propaganda to end
the bombing had succeeded in large measure. Military and war-
supporting civilian goods would again be moving unimpaired from the
USSR and China into North Vietnam over the connecting rail lines and
through the port of Haiphong. Hanoi could be expected to continue
pressure to "end the bombing. "
IV. The Experience of Korea
To strike the "end of the funnel" would be similar in objective to
the famous Operation Strangle of the Korean War. Operation Strangle
lasted 11 months and was a continuing day and night bombing attack
of a strip 60 nautical miles deep across the entire Korean Peninsula.
It was a comprehensive effort within a limited area to interdict North
Korea's railroads and highways, thus impeding the flow of materials
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to such a degree that the Communists would "not be capable of opposing
the US Eighth Army effectively. " Operation Strangle was terminated
when it became evident that the Communists still were able to supply
their frontline units by employing the same type of countermeasures
the North Vietnamese are presently using. Operation Strangle is
usually credited with holding down the flow of supplies so that
Communist offensive operations were limited, but defensive actions
were virtually unimpaired. In any event, the logistic requirements of
the Communist forces in Korea were of a completely different order of
magnitude -- a few thousand tons a day were needed by the Communist
Given the present rate and scale of the conflict being carried out
by the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong units in South Vietnam, a
"Strangle" program in the "funnel" would probably be less effective
than it was in North Korea. The total daily tonnages of material needed
by the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese regulars from North Vietnam
is very small compared to the estimated 3, 000 tons per day supplied to
the North Korean and Chinese units during Operation Strangle. More-
over, the North Vietnamese have a more flexible area of operation than
the North Koreans because they are not effectively blockaded by the
US Navy on both sides of a peninsula.
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I I
Logistic Capacities of Major Routes
in Route Packages 1 and 2, North Vietnam,
and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Laos
1966
Major Routes
Unattacked Capacity
(Tons per Day)
Route Number
Dry Season
Wet Season
North Vietnam
Route Package 2
1A
861
108
15
459
92
8
459
92
82
1,025
205
152
803
161
Route Package 1
1A
861
108
101
612
122
137
459
100
102
92
0
103
92
0
Laos
Mu Gia Pass to the
tri-border area
12
367
0
23
510
102
911
408
0
912
459
100
91
306
41
9
490
0
914
204
41
92
153
31
96
92
0
110
112
0
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Targets Destroyed or Damaged by Attack Sorties
Route Packages 1 and 2, North Vietnam
and Ho Chi Minh Trail, Laos a/
1966
Route
Type
Package 2
Route
Package 1
Laos
Total for Route
Packages 1 and 2 and Laos
_
`rTotal all targets 6,692
11,457
11,104
29,253
Total moving targets 2,651
3,090
2,074
7,815
Motor vehicles 802
1,686
1,982
Watercraft 1,696
1,355
91
Railroad rolling stock 153
49
1
ri
a
Total fixed targets 4,041
8,367
9,030
21,438
..r
Weapons
174
596
354
Bridges/tunnels
941
1,030
856
Road cuts
1,659
2,610
2,476
Buildings
718
1,980
3,182
Other b/
549
2,151
2,162
Number of attack sorties
11,707
27,204
28,634
67,545
movi
Ordnance expended (tons) 16,794
49,793
45,035
111,622
a. Information based on data through November 1966 obtained from OASD/Systems Analysis.
"b. Including ammunition and supply, railroad track, and other non-personnel targets.
NEW
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THE ESTIMATED CASUALTIES
RESULTING FROM ALTERNATIVE. BOMBING PROGRAMS
In this appendix the air campaigns analyzed in this memorandum
are examined to obtain a rough order of magnitude of the probable level
of casualties.
On balance, the campaigns being considered would tend to yield
casualties at a significantly higher rate than that observed in 1965 and
1966. This higher level arises principally because the new campaigns
tend to be centered on fixed targets located in the more heavily popu-
lated areas of North Vietnam. Specific numbers of casualties could not
be estimated for every aspect of each campaign. A rough approximation
indicates, however, that total casualties resulting from attacks on fixed
targets alone could range from 15, 000 to 20, 000. Approximately one-
third of these would be civilian casualties, most of whom would have
been engaged in war-related activities. Casualties in this amount --
if they were all sustained in 1967 -- would be at a level from two to
three times higher than that resulting from attacks on fixed targets
in 1965 and 1966 combined.
II. Attack on Modern Industry
The majority of the remaining unstruck modern industrial facilities
are located within the greater Hanoi-Haiphong area. Most of the re-
maining economic facilities in North Vietnam are located in Route
Package 6 and many of them are within the greater Hanoi-Haiphong area.
A total attack against these facilities would result in a higher rate of
civilian and military casualties than that observed in 1965 and 1966 (see
Table G1).
A. Powerplants
The seven powerplants on the modern industry target list
are located in Route Package 6 and are generally close to the heavily
populated Hanoi-Haiphong area. It is estimated that 8, 500 people
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Potential Casualties Resulting from an Attack
on Selected Modern Industrial Targets J
Civilian Military
Powerplants 300 to 500 20 to 70
Manufacturing plants 900 to 1,300 0
Total 1,200 to 1,800 20 to 70
a. Assuming a 70 percent damage level.
(7, 000 civilians and 1, 500 military) will be exposed to accurate bomb-
ing if all of the powerplants are attacked. Cumulative casualties are
estimated to include 300 to 500 civilians and 20 to 70 military per-
sonnel if a total attack is launched.
Strikes against the Hanoi , Haiphong East
and Sac Giang powerplants would
probably cause high civilian casualties because of their close proxi-
mity to industrial/ heavily populated areas. Moderate civilian casual-
ties appear likely if Hanoi and the Hon Ga'
powerplants are hit. Strikes against the remaining facilities probably
would cause light civilian casualties.
B. Manufacturing Plants
The majority of the manufacturing plants considered
for attack are located within the greater Hanoi-Haiphong area and are
located within fairly heavily populated areas. About 20, 500 civilians
will be at risk if all of the facilities in the Hanoi-Haiphong area are
struck. Cumulative civilian casualties resulting from such an opera-
tion are estimated to range from 900 to 1, 300,.
III. The Mining Program
A limited mining operation directed against reducing seaborne
imports carried by relatively deep-draft oceangoing ships could be
carried out with a minimum number of casualties. This is particu-
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larly true if the mines are equipped with delayed-action fuses that
would provide ample time -- 48 hours -- for shipping to clear or
to avoid Vietnamese ports.
The use of mines with a capability against shallow-draft coastal
shipping and inland water craft would expose a much greater popula-
tion to risk of injury. It is unlikely, however, that these casualties
would be excessive. The experience of similar mining programs
during World War II was that navigation of mined waters was soon
stopped and other means of transport were adopted.
IV. The Attack Against Dikes and Locks
The breaching of the levee systems in the Hanoi area would not
result in a large number of casualties. JCS pre-strike estimates of
the number of casualties resulting from the actual bombing attacks
do not exceed 200. This number could be less in view of the popula-
tion's experience in taking shelter from air attacks. The number of
casualties resulting from the flooding of adjacent areas would be
even smaller. There is some prospect that North Vietnamese con-
tingency planning and countermeasures, such as defensive breach-
ing, would reduce the flood level. Moreover, the areas to be
breached are areas in which flooding is not uncommon and housing
is built to withstand high water levels, which would limit flood
damage.
V. Unlimited Bombing
The major impact in terms of casualties from an unlimited
bombing campaign against specific targets (including populated areas)
would be in the military target system. If the campaign were extended
to include all of the 39 unstruck JCS-designated military targets, the
estimated military casualties would range from 10, 000 to 13, 000.
Civilian casualties would be at about one-fifth this number.
The casualties resulting from possible unlimited bombing of
economic targets such as pharmaceutical plants, food-processing
plants, fertilizer plants, and textile plants would probably be of a higher
order of magnitude than that estimated for the attack on the modern
industrial target system outlined in Appendix B. A greater number of
the industrial targets considered for an unlimited bombing program
are located in densely populated parts of Hanoi and Haiphong. The
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undertaking of an unlimited armed reconnaissance program against
targets located in heavily populated areas also would probably result
in a civilian casualty rate much higher than that obtaining in 1966.
VI. Interdiction of Route Packages 1 and 2, and Laos
The intensive bombing of the lower section of the "logistic
funnel" would undoubtedly reduce the number of civilian casualties
if the effort were restricted to logistics targets. It is estimated
that over 8, 000 civilian casualties were inflicted in Route Packages
1 and 2 during 1966. It is doubtful that this estimate would radically
increase if the number of sorties and the amount of ordnance
expended in the two lower route packages were to increase consider-
ably. Both the sparse population in the rural areas of Ha Tinh and
Quang Binh Provinces and adequate civilian defense measures seem
to indicate that casualties would not drastically increase. The sparse
population along the infiltration routes in Laos would also mean that
there would be no dramatic increase in casualties there.
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APPENDIX H
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE WILL TO PERSIST
I. The Effect of the Present Program
The present Rolling Thunder program has not, as yet, produced
any apparent weakening in Hanoi's will to persist. The North Vietna-
mese leaders continue to insist, both in public and private statements,
that they are willing to withstand even heavier bomb damage rather
than accept anything less than their often-stated demands for a settle-
ment in Vietnam.. Hanoi has been able to adjust its military and eco-
nomic activities, which support its war objectives, to the bombing.
Hence, while there may be some degree of escalation that would force
the regime to reexamine its position, it is believed that as far as pressure
from air attack is concerned, Hanoi would be prepared to continue the
insurgency in South Vietnam indefinitely in the face of the current level
and type of bombing program.
Available evidence on popular attitudes in North Vietnam indicates
that Ho Chi Minh's regime still enjoys strong support and that the Hanoi
leaders have been successful in adapting for their own ends the upsurge
of national pride and identity created by the airstrikes.
This is not to say that there has been no slippage in public morale
over the past two years. A. strong note of fatalism is apparent
the leadership has thus far been successful in
focusing popular anger at the bombings on the United States.
II. The General Effects of Escalation
There are two factors which are important to keep in mind in con-
sidering the effects of any escalated program of air attack:
a. The North Vietnamese leadership has been making an even
greater effort than usual over the past two months to prepare the
people of North Vietnam for further sacrifices during 1967. A
series of year-end statements by regime leaders highlighted their
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belief that the United States will continue, and expand, the program
of airstrikes during the year. Speeches and articles by Premier
Pham Van Dong, Party First Secretary Le Duan, and Defense Min-
ister Giap in December and January predicted ultimate victory, but
warned of further difficulties before victory could be achieved.
b. The will of the North Vietnamese to persist in the war depends
not only on the effect of the airstrikes in the North but also on how
they assess the war situation in South Vietnam. Hanoi undoubtedly
realizes that its chances for a military victory in South Vietnam
have vanished. In addition, the strains on the Communist side are
great and are increasing. If, during 1967, the South Vietnamese
government's pacification program makes steady progress and if
Saigon continues to gain in stability, it is possible that Hanoi would
reconsider its policy.
III. The Present Program Plus Electric Power and Major Industrial
Facilities
While severe damage to the modern industrial sector would place
additional pressures on the regime, it is not believed that the burden
from air attack alone would be heavy enough to bring Hanoi to negotiate.
The most relevant evidence -- the neutralization of much of the heavy
industry in North Korea during the Korean War -- suggests that the burden
would be bearable. While the continued loss of important economic fa-
cilities was undoubtedly a factor in Pyongyang's decision to negotiate,
the major factors were the pressure of the ground war and the threat of
further escalation of the air war. It is also evident that North Vietnam
has already implemented measures designed to offset, as far as possible,
many of the effects of intensified bombing. These measures include
evacuation of personnel from urban areas, dispersal of some industrial
equipment and supplies, and relocation of a few plants.
IV. The Mining of Haiphong In Addition To the Above Targets
The interdiction of the port of Haiphong would cause serious
concern to the Hanoi leadership. Their reaction would depend on the
effectiveness of the mining and the success of alternate methods of
supply. As long as North Vietnam believes that it can receive essen-
tial supplies either by offloading seaborne supplies along the coast or
overland through China, its resolve to fight on will probably remain.
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There is no evidence that the current disorder in Communist China
has thus far significantly interfered with the flow of vital supplies to
North Vietnam. Should the situation inside China deteriorate to the ex-
tent that the supply of goods overland became unreliable, the North
Vietnamese might be faced with the necessity of reconsidering their
whole approach to the war. At the present, most of North Vietnam's
military supplies come overland through China. The North Vietnamese
could probably continue to supply the Viet Cong, the air defense system,
and essential war-supporting activities in the North with supplies for
a while, using current stock piles, even in the face of a reduced flow
over Communist China's road and connecting rail system. However,
should the logistic pinch become severe enough to deplete stocks in
North Vietnam, the chances of a reexamination by Hanoi would increase
markedly.
V. The Inclusion of Dikes and Locks on the Red River in the Above
Targets
A, gauge of how Hanoi would react to strikes on the dikes and locks
along the Red River was provided during the 1966 flood season when
the North Vietnamese appeared genuinely concerned that the United States
intended to strike these targets. The North Vietnamese reaction at that
time was to attempt to build alternate dikes, to organize work teams for
the rapid repair of damaged dikes, and to evacuate people from low-lying
urban areas close to the Red River.
A.s in other instances, the impact on North Vietnam's will to persist
would depend on: (1) the damage. done by the strikes and the effectiveness
of the regime's efforts to offset such damage, and (2) Hanoi's ability to
obtain food from China and the USSR to offset the loss of the rice crop.
The Hanoi leaders probably believe that North Vietnam can localize damage
from attacks on the dike system. Even if such attacks should result in
extensive damage to the October/November rice harvest and significant
civilian casualties, there is no reason to believe that the leadership in
Hanoi will call off the war in the south. A rationing system, in all
likelihood already devised, would probably assure adequate food for the
military forces, government cadres, and key industrial workers. More-
over, the North Vietnamese would certainly exploit the golden opportunity
presented by such losses in their propaganda effort to put intense political
pressure on the United States.
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VI. Unlimited Bombing, Except Population Centers
Air attacks on the miscellaneous industrial and repair facilities
in the "unlimited" package would probably bring only marginal additional
pressure on Hanoi. However, as noted under V above, the most likely
bombing pressure to force Hanoi to reexamine its position would be the
denial of essential war-supporting supplies and equipment currently
flowing in from the USSR, China, and other Communist countries. Should
the attack on the key rail and road (including inland waterway) connections
to China succeed in materially reducing the flow of supplies -- economic
as well as military -- which Hanoi needs to support its activities, a
major reconsideration of the insurgency would probably be forced on it.
VII. Striking Only Routes 1 and 2 Plus Laos
Hanoi would regard the limitation of US airstrikes to these areas,
the so-called "logistic funnel, " as a clear victory, demonstrating that
political pressures on the United States as a result of reaction to prop-
aganda claims about civilian casualties inflicted further north had been
effective. The regime would be encouraged in its belief that the United
States will ultimately tire of the war. The North Vietnamese would
almost certainly not accept the limitation of the airstrikes as a gesture
toward deescalation, but as a sign that its policy was forcing the United
States to retreat.
The effect of concentrating US airstrikes on the infiltration and
supply route complex would be further blunted by the fact that Hanoi
may have already decided to slow down the infiltration of regular North
Vietnamese units to South Vietnam. It appears to have decided not to
attempt, in 1967, a buildup of regular forces in the south on the same
scale as in 1965-66. In addition, both the recent activity of the Communists
on the ground and their published statements on military tactics and
strategy indicate that Hanoi may have decided to intensify, at least for the
time being, guerrilla tactics rather than to expand further its capability
for large unit actions.
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