EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING OF THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY AND LOGISTICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900070016-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: June 28, 1965
• Content Type: BRIEF

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TOP SECRET
INTELLIGENCE BRIEF
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CIA/ RR CB
No. Pages 13
28 June 1965
Copy No. [
EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING
OF THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM
ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY AND LOGISTICS
DIA review(s) completed.
NGA Review Completed.
DIRECTORATE OIL' INTELLIGENCE
Office of Research and Reports
TOP SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING OF THE TRANSPORT SYSTEM
ON THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY AND LOGISTICS*
Since 3 April, US and South Vietnamese aircraft have bombed the
transport system in the southern part of North Vietnam extensively,
destroying or damaging railroad and highway bridges, port facilities,
airfields, and transport equipment. The bombing has increased the
time required for traffic movements in the area, has reduced the capacity
and the flexibility of the transport system, and has increased the require-
ments for motor transportation. and coastal shipping. In addition, the
air attacks have caused considerable loss of capital investment in the
form of new rail and highway bridges, many of which had only recently
been completed. They have brought to a standstill ambitious plans for
the further improvement of the transport system in the south and pos-
sibly in the north as well. As the monsoon season progresses, the
movement of traffic by ferries on Route lA will become increasingly
difficult and may halt on routes into Laos, where fords and newly con-
structed temporary bridges will be flooded. The transport problem
per se, however, may have little influence during the next few months
on Communist activities in Laos or South Vietnam, because supplies
have been stockpiled in both areas. Moreover, the Communists have
demonstrated the capability to infiltrate supplies needed in South Vietnam
directly from the Haiphong area by sea.
As previously estimated, = the effect of the air attacks on.the
overall economy of North Vietnam has been comparatively slight because
the northern part of the country accounts for the major share of the
This publication contains information available to this Office as of
21 June 1965. For locations, see the table, below, and the map, Figure 1.
For examples of ferry slips and bypasses, see the photographs, Figures
2 and 3.
The duration of the high water due to the monsoon season varies by
localities. Along Route 7 toward the Laos border the season generally
continues from mid-May through mid-October. Along the coast from the
Thanh Hoa area south, the season extends from September through
December. Rain along the Laos border, however, raises the water
level in the rivers along the coast before the monsoon begins there.
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industrial and agricultural output and does not depend on the south for
any major product. Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese have responded
to the bombing with a sense of urgency in their efforts to keep the trans-
port system in the south open to traffic, principally to insure the con-
tinued flow of military traffic. The North Vietnamese have kept traffic
moving, largely at night, by constructing fords and ferries, by erecting
pontoon bridges, and by repairing damaged bridges. To accomplish
this task, thousands of skilled and unskilled workers from other areas
in the country have been mobilized and transferred to the south with
some attendant impact on normal economic activity.
1. Transport Facilities and Equipment Destroyed by Bombing
From 3 April to 14 June, with a lull of about 1 week in May, the
transport system south of the 20th Parallel in North Vietnam was bombed
extensively, and since 14 June two bridges north of the 20th Parallel
have been attacked. South of the 20th Parallel, at least 30 important
bridges and numerous secondary bridges have been either destroyed*
or severely damaged; and approaches to bridges, ferries, and fords
have been bombed and cratered. Most of the bridges were highway
bridges, but four were railroad bridges and four were combination rail-
road and highway bridges. A majority of the bridges interdicted were
on Route 1A, the major north-south highway between Hanoi and the
Demarcation Line. Three highway bridges were on Route 7, two on
Route 8, and six on Route 15. Routes 7 and 15 are major supply
routes, and Route 8 is a minor supply route for trucks carrying sup-
plies to Communist forces in Laos.
Transport equipment found south of the 20th Parallel, including
railroad rolling stock, trucks, ships, ferries, barges, and sampans,
also has been attacked. In addition, Ben Thuy, which is the port for
Vinh, the only important economic center and the most important mili-
tary base south of the 20th Parallel, was attacked several times in
early June. Some of the main piers, the coal yard, warehouses, and
the electric powerplant located nearby were damaged. The Vinh air-
field, the airfield at Dong Hoi located further south, and associated
facilities have been bombed. Also, various petroleum storage areas,
the most important being the one near Ben Thuy, have been destroyed.
The term destroyed or interdicted in this publication means that one
or more bridge spans were either dropped or rendered completely use-
less as a structural component of the bridge.
Formerly known as Route 12 or 15/1Z.
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2. Effect on the Transport System
Various sources indicate that some traffic is moving to and in the
southern part of North Vietnam in spite of repeated day and night aerial.
attacks on all forms of modern transportation in that area. Serious
transport problems have resulted, however, in the southern part of
the country, and less serious problems have been noted in the northern
part, as well. Through-rail service from Ninh Binh, on the rail line
about 115 kilometers south of Hanoi, to Vinh is no longer possible.
Although there are indications that the North Vietnamese may still be
trying to move some supplies over certain portions of the line between
bombed bridges south of Ninh Binh, the North Vietnamese probably
have been extremely cautious in using rail transportation since 4 May,
when heavy damage was inflicted on trains caught on a section of the
line between two bombed bridges. The movement of supplies from
the northern part to the southern part of North Vietnam, therefore,
must be much slower than before the bombing and must depend prin-
cipally on highway and coastal water transportation. Trucks appar-
ently have been shifted from the north to the south to meet the in-
creased demands for motor transportation.
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Although transportation for economic purposes probably has been
affected, there are indications that the transport system generally has
been able to maintain a flow of supplies, probably sufficient to include
the comparatively small quantity of military supplies needed by the
Communist forces in the southern part of North Vietnam, Laos, and
the northern part of South Vietnam. It is estimated that for the current
comparatively low level of activity these forces need from 100 to 120
mt of supplies daily, an amount that probably could be carried from
Ninh Binh to Vinh by about 150 trucks.
The bombing, however, has not seriously affected transportation
for the North Vietnamese economy in general, because the major part
of the transport network,. almost all of the country's industry, and
more than 80 percent of its cultivated land are north of the area bombed
to date. The bombing has indirectly increased, although apparently not
seriously, the demands on the transport system even in the north, where
it already was performing at a near capacity level.
Transportation of con-
struction materials and relocation of work gangs to bombed areas also
have required additional transportation in the north as well as in the
south. Added requirements for trucks apparently have necessitated
increased imports of trucks.
>,< The civilian and military truck inventory is estimated to include at
least 10, 000 vehicles. Imports of trucks have increased considerably
since the bombing began. The loss of trucks by aerial attack appar-
ently has been more than replaced by these imports.
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3. Repair and Reconstruction
The North Vietnamese have attacked with urgency the problem of
keeping the roads trafficable and have diverted considerable men and
materials to the bombed area. They have attempted to repair a number
of bridges by constructing temporary wooden spans or by constructing
earth-filled causeways to bypass missing.spans. The North Vietnamese
have erected one or possibly two vehicular pontoon bridges to facilitate
the movement of truck traffic. The initial response of the North
Vietnamese, however, has usually been to revert to traditional methods
of fords and ferries for crossing water barriers. Within a few days
to a few weeks after bridges were destroyed, ferry crossings have been
established on coastal routes where the rivers are comparatively wide
and deep; and, in the mountainous areas where the streams are more
narrow and shallow, the North Vietnamese are using fords to bypass
damaged bridges.
To devise these temporary expedients, the North Vietnamese have
been forced to abandon their long-range plan:to improve the transport
system in the southern part of the country. During the past few years
the North Vietnamese have engaged in an unpublicized effort to construct
permanent bridges on the important routes within North Vietnam that
lead to central and southern Laos and through Laos to South Vietnam.
la large number of additional workers are possibly
being used for road maintenance and repair in an attempt to keep high-
ways open during the rainy season, or perhaps they are being stationed
near important bridges, ferries, and choke-points to repair damage and
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fill craters as rapidly as possible -- a technique widely used by the Com-
munists during both the Korean and French-Vietnamese Wars,
Thus the harassment and casualties occasioned by the air attacks,
the diversion of labor, and the allocation of materials for the construc-
tion of temporary expedients probably have had a small though not an
inconsequential impact on normal economic activity throughout the
country.
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North Vietnam: Reaction of the North Vietnamese at Site of Important Bridges Interdicted
Through 18 June 1965 /*
Map Route Dates
K Name of Bridge Number of Interdiction Reaction Taken
1 Ninh Binh Railroad./Highway lA 15 June
2 Dong Phong Thuong Railroad 1A 3 April, 1 June By ~ a temporary deck span had been 25X1
Highway constructed and a new ferry crossing had
been completed. A second strike on 1 June,
however, dropped. an additional span. 25X1
Photography evealed that a 25X1
vehicular pontoon bridge had been erected
west of the damaged bridge.
3 Thanh Hoa Railroad/Highway lA 4 April, 7 May, the rail portion had been re- 25X1
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16 June paired to support heavy truck traffic and 25X1
a ferry crossing had been reactivated south T
of the bridge. Vehicular pontoon sections
were also observed near the bridge on
photography.
4+ Qui Vinh Railroad Near 1A 9 April
a new ferry crossing had been con-
5 Phuong Can Highway lA 9 April a temporary span had been constructed
for foot traffic in preparation to rebuild 25X1
the bridge to prestrike condition. A newly
built ferry crossing also had been constructed.
6 Ly Nhan Highway lA. 23 April an existing ferry crossing had been
7 Dien Chau Railroad Near lA 16 April no attempt had been made to repair25X1
the bridge or construct a ferry crossing.
8 Tam Da Railroad/Highway lA 9 April Ian existing ferry crossing had
been reactivated.
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North Vietnam: Reaction of the North Vietnamese at Sites of Important Bridges L terdicted.
Through 18 June 1965 -
(Continued)
Map Route Dates
K Name of Bridge Number of Interdiction Reaction Taken
9 Tho Son Highway
10 Xom Gia Highway
San Dinh Highway
12 Kinh Thuong Highway
13 Ha Tinh Highway
14 Tho Ngoa Highway
15 Tu Dung Highway
16 Thanh Yen Highway
17 Xom Phuong
(two bridges;
1A 23 April
a new ferry crossing had been con- 25X1
new ferry crossing had been con- 25X1
no attempt had been made to repair 25X1
the bridge or construct a ferry crossing.
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10 May
10 May
10 May
lA 10 May
1A 13 April
lA 23 April
18 Dong Hoi Highway lA 4 April
19 Ban Ca Nan Highway
7 May or June
An alternate bypass in the vicinity s prob-
ably in use.
structed.
structed.
structed.
a new ferry crossing had been con-
a new ferry crossing had been con-
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a new ferry crossing had been con-
an existing ferry crossing had
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temporary repairs had been made to 25X1
the bridge to the east, permitting traffic
to pass.
a new ferry crossing had been con- 25X1
a new ferry crossing had been con- 25X1
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North Vietnam: Reaction of the North Vietnamese at Sites of Important Bridges Interdicted
Through 18 June 1965
(Continued)
Map
Key Name of Bridge
20 Khe Kien Highway
21 Phuc Thiem Highway
22 Kim Cuong (2 bridges)
23 Kom Thai Xa Highway
24 Trai Hoi Railroad.
25 Bai Duc Thon Highway
Route Dates
Number of Interdiction
7 9 April
7 23 April
8 10 April, 16 April
15 / 23 April
Near 15 16 April
15 16 April, 18 June
26 La Khe Thon (two bridges -- 15
one railroad and one
highway)
27 Xom Ca Trang Highway
(two bridges)
28 Don Bai Dinh Highway
26 April
16 April
2 June
29 My Due Highway 101 22 April
a temporary causeway and. culvert 25X1
had been constructed.
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no attempt had been made to repair25X1
the bridge or construct a ferry crossing.
a new ford had been constructed. 25X1
An existing ferry is probably in use.
temporary repairs were completed on
the bridge, but on ~~ a second. span was
dropped..
a new ford had been constructed
and an existing ford had been reactivated.
An existing ford probably has been reactivated.
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no attempt had been made to repair
the bridge'or construct a ferry crossing.
a. Based. on NPIC interoffice memorandum and. photo intelligence briefing notes by DIA.. Other than the Thanh
Hoa bridge, which suffered. extensive damage without a span's being dropped, the term interdicted., as used in
this publication, means that one or more bridge spans were dropped by aerial bombing.
b. Formerly referred as route 12 or 15/12.
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Vang
Vieng
Xieng
Khouang
Ching h
iai
Duon
Railroad
Road
Track or trail
VI h Linh
:i`'.DEMARCATION LINE
pgng Ha
Quang Tri
NORTH VIETNAM
LOCATION OF INTERDICTED
BRIDGES
As of 18 June 1965
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N
9nhtTaY
Ni Ni
~. _ nh
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PHUONG CAN HIGHWAY BRIDGE
19?14'N/ 105?42'E
ROUTE lA
TEMPORARY DECK SPAN
"Al
AFOR LIGHT TRAFFIC
NEW FERRY CROSSING
TRUSS UNDER CONSTRUCTION
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XOM CA TRANG HIGHWAY BRIDGES
17?57'N/105?49'E
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TOP SECRET
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