CURRENT AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000900030009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 26, 1967
• Content Type: IM

A
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
26 July 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
Current Agricultural Situation in North Vietnam
1. Current prospects point toward another
below-average rice crop in North Vietnam this year.
Production in 1966 was at least 300,000 tons below
the average of recent years. For the current year,
the spring rice crop - normally about one-third of
the annual harvest - is tentatively estimated at
about 1.4 million tons, or some 200,000 tons below
average. Reduced acreage was a primary factor in
this shortfall. Increased production of subsidiary
foods such as manioc, sweet potatoes, corn, and
green beans compensated for some, but probably not
all, of the decline in spring rice output. Pros-
pects for the more important fall rice crop are
also dim because of a current drought which appears
to have intensified during the first three weeks
of July. The outlook for this crop could change
sharply, however, before the beginning of harvest
in late October.
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2. Food imports in the first half
of 1967,
mostly from Communist countries, totaled
l
a
most
240,000 tons - an all-time high. This high level
of imports probably will continue, in view of the
mediocre spring rice harvest and the inauspicious
start for the Piclous
fall crop, and no critical food
shortage is expected. To the extent that _
diction Inter
of the rail and road
transport system
interferes with the distribution of food, minor
food shortages r
may occur in the cities.
The 1967 S rin
Rice Cro
3. The 1967 spring rice crop - normally about
one-third of the annual harvest - was transplanted
during the winter
and harvested in late May and
early June. Production
is tentatively estimated at
about 1.4 million tons, or some 200,000 tons le
than the average ss
spring rice crop for recent years.
This estimate is
supported by an editorial
14 July the
y edition of Nhan Dan in which it was
admitted
that the spring rice harvest was below last
mediocre harvest, year s
The shortfall of this crop was
caused by reduced
acreage, delayed transplanting,
shortage of rice seedlings, and insect blight. The
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bombing attacks contributed to this shortfall through
interruption of farm work, although it is difficult
to determine the extent of this contribution. The
reduced acreage was at least in part the result of
a decision last fall and winter to substitute the
more reliable subsidiary crops - particularly sweet
potatoes - for the preferred rice in some of the
marginal fields.*
4. This office has relatively little informa-
tion on the provincial breakdown of spring rice
production. The attached map locates the main
rice-producing areas and includes those provinces
where good spring rice crops were reported - Vinh
Linh Special Zone, Quang Binh, Thai Binh, and Nam
soil moisture conditions in
May-June in Thai Binh and Nam Ha provinces in par-
ticular were better than in the other rice areas.
The relatively good crop claimed for the southern
portion of the North Vietnamese panhandle is of
some importance since this area is normally a rice-
deficit area.
* A 22 July release from North Vietnam indicated
that yields of the spring rice crop were above those
of last year. No total production comparisons were
given, however, suggesting that the higher yields
failed to compensate for reduced acreage.
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AGRICULTURE
1
Rice
M Tree crop's, chiefly rubber
forested highlands where slash and burn
(shifting) cultivation may occur
Principal inland fishing area'
Scare ] X3.500 000
0 ]5 5n 15
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- Y.,Ipmale~!
r\
7?./ Van-
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aw4Nc'. M'
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-,'~94 Afe Ha `. 1
0 S ~Petching / 'ti ...
Ba Na'!
'/ I ii 4 anon?_
anvane1~15 Nam 3Pg Gun.
Areas where the 1967;
spring rice crop was
reportedly good
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The 1967 Fall Rice Crop
5. Drought conditions - somewhat unusual for
this time of the year - may have delayed trans-
planting of the fall rice crop. This crop, which
makes up most of the remaining two-thirds of the
annual harvest, normally is transplanted in July and
harvested in late October and early November.*
as of 7 July the level of the Red River was from two
to three meters below normal; this could handicap
irrigation efforts to overcome the drought.
n the first part of July
the drought was spreading and
the irriga-
tion systems might have trouble delivering the
indicates substantially below-normal rainfall in the
main rice-producing areas of North Vietnam in May
and June. This information suggests that, in spite
of above-normal rainfall in April, the dry, hot con-
ditions in May and June had caused soil moisture
conditions in these areas to deteriorate appreciably
necessary water.
6. Weather information
* There is also a midsummer rice crop - normally
less than five percent of the annual harvest. We
have received no information on the prospects of
this crop, which is normally harvested in August.
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by the end of June. Preliminary weather information
for the first three weeks of July indicates an in-
tensification of the drought. It is too early, how-
ever, to forecast the effect of the current drought
on the final outcome of the late rice crop. Favor-
able weather conditions from now to harvest time
could change the prospects considerably.
The 1966/67 Subsidiary Crops
7. The subsidiary crops - manioc, sweet
potatoes, corn, and green beans - are important
food substitutes for the preferred rice. In the
1966/67 winter-spring season, when most of the
subsidiary crops are normally grown, the North Viet-
namese attempted to make up for the poor rice pro-
duction in 1966 by expanding the acreage of these
rice substitutes at the expense of the marginal
areas of spring rice. While this may have resulted
in a substantial increase in the production of
subsidiary foods, it is believed that the produc-
tion of these crops was not sufficient to make up
for the rice deficit in 1966 and the first half of
1967.
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The Effects of the Harvests on Food
Ava ? lab iii ties
8. The land area now comprising North Vietnam
was historically a food-deficit area - normally
from 150,000 to 300,000 tons of rice were shipped
from the south annually. Since 1959 the per capita
production of rice - the mainstay of the North
Vietnamese diet - has been declining. In addition,
the per capita production of rice and subsidiary
foods, combined on a rice equivalent basis, has
declined although at a slightly slower rate* (see
the attached chart). The production of rice in 1966
was estimated at no more than 4.2 million tons, or
at least 300,000 tons below the average of recent
years.** Since the normally tight food situation
in North Vietnam has been exacerbated by poor har-
vests in the last 18 months, North Vietnam has been
compelled to step up imports of bulk foods substan-
tially. During the first half of 1967, almost 240,000
* Subsidiary foods are converted to rice equiva-
lents on the following basis: one ton of paddy
rice equals 4 tons of manioc or sweet potatoes,
three tons of green beans, and one ton of corn.
These conversion factors are based on the relative
caloric value of these foods.
** No official production figures for rice or sub-
sidiary crops were released for 1966. We cannot,
therefore, estimate the production levels of the
subsidiary crops, and the 1966 rice production esti-
mate is not firm. Reports from Hanoi have suggested
that the 1966 shortfall may have been as high as
1 million tons. While it is difficult to credit
such a high figure, it is possible that the 1966
shortfall was above 300,000 tons.
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Rice and Subsidiary Foods in
Rice Equivalents*
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 196+ 1965
Subsidiary foods are converted to rice equivalents on the following basis:
One ton of paddy rice equals four tons of manioc or sweet potatoes , three, tons
of green beans and one ton of corn. No information on the production of
subsidiary foods in 1966 was available,
Per Capita Production of Food Crops - North Vietnam
1959 - 1966
(in Kilograms per Capita)
1966
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tons were imported - or about three times the amount
imported in all of 1966. Nearly all of these imports
originated from Communist countries and did not
involve use of valuable foreign exchange, although
the terms of agreement with these countries are not
known. The greatly increased imports of bulk foods
during the first half of 1967 contributed to the
increased port congestion in the Haiphong harbor.
However, except for a decrease in the importation
of chemical fertilizers in May and June, the importa-
tion rate of other goods has not decreased.
9. The poor performance of the spring rice
crop suggests that the imports of bulk foods will
continue. If the estimate of the spring rice short-
fall of about 200,000 tons is approximately correct,
it is likely that these imports will continue at
the current rate of about 40,000 tons a month. The
North Vietnamese can handle their current rate of
food imports without difficulty and will experience
no critical food shortages in the near future if
the Communist countries continue to provide them
with grain. The North Vietnamese have been able to
maintain the level of their basic rations of staples
although, in some cases, increased substitution of
non-rice staples has been reported.
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Food Distribution Problems
10. The shortfall of 200,000 tons in the spring
rice crop will not raise new distribution problems
in North Vietnam but will aggravate present problems.
Distribution problems started in early 1965 with the
initiation of US bombing of the lines of communica-
tion and the inability of the state marketing organi-
zation to cope with the additional tasks imposed on
it by the evacuation of part of the urban population.
Marketing difficulties were intensified in 1966 by
the shortfall of at least 300,000 tons in the rice
crops that required substantial increases in imports,
by additional evacuation of people from urban to
rural areas, and by continued interdiction of the
lines of communication.
11. Both the urban and rural areas have suffered
from marketing problems as a result of the evacuation
movement. In the cities, many of the small free
traders who were not part of the state distribution
system were. evacuated, restricting an important mar-
keting facility. The state stores, despite a reduced
demand from a smaller population, have been unable
to compensate for the loss of the small traders.
.the rural areas the evacuees were expected by the
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regime to subsist on local sources of food; but when
this plan proved unsuccessful, the state was com-
pelled to organize additional purchasing and selling
cooperatives to serve the evacuees. The North Viet-
namese press indicates that the regime has not been
successful in solving the problems even with the.
The current shortfall will mean that more. of the
creation of additional distribution cooperatives.
the current shortfall could increase state marketing
increase in demand on the state distribution system,
on the free market and that there is a consequent
grain distribution will be made up from imported
stocks. To the extent that less grain is available
problems.
12. Transportation problems may be minimized by
the shortfall as a greater share of the domestically
produced rice will be consumed in the producing
rice on the local free market rather .than to sell it
to the state. The urban dwellers, therefore, may
have to rely increasingly on rice and other grains
imported from Communist countries.
areas. The peasants have preferred to sell their
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