ROAD CONSTRUCTION IN THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE AND ADJACENT AREAS OF SOUTH VIETNAM 1967-1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070110-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 18, 2012
• Sequence Number: 110
• Publication Date: May 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Road Construction in the Laotian Panhandle
and Adjacent Areas of South Vietnam 1967-1968
ER IM 68-46
May 1968
Copy N o
152
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
May 1968
Road Construction in the Laotian Panhandle
and Adjacent Areas of South Vietnam
1967-68
Summary
The North Vietnamese are engaged in an intensive
program to construct new supply routes, with limited
all-weather capability, into South Vietnam from
Laotian trunk routes to support military operations
(see the map, Figure 1). Work started on a number
of new roads during the last quarter of 1967, prior
to the Tet offensive, and is still in progress. All
of these new roads branch off a north-south trunk
route in the Laotian Panhandle and run directly
across the border toward important US - South Viet-
namese military installations in South Vietnam.
The newly completed routes provide the Communists
with an increased capability to introduce troops,
heavy weapons, and sizable amounts of materials by
truck into four widely separated areas in the
northern part of South Vietnam.
North Vietnamese strategy provides for connecting
their road network in North Vietnam and Laos with
the existing road system in South Vietnam. To
achieve this goal, the North Vietnamese have simul-
taneously built or upgraded five new crossings of
the South Vietnamese border (a total of 215 miles
of road) during the past six months. Two of the
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Director's Special
Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs and the Office of
Current Intelligence.
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new roads parallel Route 9 in Laos and lead toward
the Khe Sanh Combat Base. Further south, a road in
Laos has been connected with a road in the A Shau
Valley in South Vietnam leading to Hue. The North
Vietnamese have joined a fourth road with an
important north-south route in South Vietnam.
From the tri-border area of Laos, Cambodia, and
South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese have also
extended a new road to the vicinity of the major US
base at Dak To. New feeder roads branch off this
route and lead southeast toward the provincial capi-
tals of Kontum and Pleiku.
The new and expanded roadnet is an attempt to
establish a more reliable year-round logistics
system. A:l the new roads crossing into South Viet-
nam, except the two roads paralleling Route 9 in
Laos, are limited all-weather; all connect with.
logistical base areas along the main trunk route.
Sections of the main north-south route in Laos, and
especially the segment north of Chavane, at times
become impassable during the rainy season, but the
enemy may be able to maintain most of this primary
logistical route for a longer period this year than
in previous ones. In addition, a new road which
appears to have limited all-weather capability is
under construction from North Vietnam around the
western end of the DMZ.
SFC:R F.T
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Road Construction 1967-8 Dry Season
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
(ig7) \\Dong Hoi
I
Stung Tren
0 25 50 Miles
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
3Chavane
Ta Luong
A Shau
,Pak Pek
I
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Past Trends in Road Construction
1. The timing of new road construction in the
Laos Panhandle follows a classic pattern based on
weather. In the dry season, villagers are impressed
into service to improve or repair existing roads and
to construct new ones. During these periods, new
truck parks, fords, and logistical facilities are
built. As the road system deteriorates during the
rainy season, the enemy abandons new construction
and concentrates on maintenance of the primary road-
net. The following table illustrates the relation-
ship between the weather seasons and the construction
effort in the Laos Panhandle.
New Road Construction in the Laos Panhandle
and Adjacent Areas of South Vietnam
1964 - April 1968
Total Additions Additions Per Month
(Miles) (Miles)
Prior to January 1965 Negl. Negl.
1965 dry season (February-March) 60 30
1965 wet season (April-August) 25 5
1965-66 dry season 415
(September 1965 - March 1966)
1966 wet season 30
(April-October)
1966-67 dry season 50
(November 1966 - March 1967)
1967 wet season
(April-September)
Negl. Negl.
1967-68 dry season 246
(October 1967 - April 1968)
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Road Construction Prior to 1967
2. Prior to 1967 the North Vietnamese concen-
trated their efforts in the Laos Panhandle on building
a logistics system which paralleled the South Vietnam-
ese border. In early 1965, Communist forces began to
expand their logistics system so that by March 1966
it extended from Route 15 at Mu Gia Pass to the tri-
bo.rder area. This strategic supply system is based
on a north-south parallel trunk route (92/96) that
has been improved each year during the Laotian
dry season, although it is not yet an all-weather
route. This infiltration corridor, the so-called
"Ho Chi Minh Trail," is also served by North Viet-
nam Route 137 southwest of Dong Hoi, an alternate
route to the Mu Gia Pass built in 1965-66.
Road Construction During the 1967-68 Dry Season
3. Since October 1967 the Communists have opened
five new motorable roads from Laos into South Vietnam.
Before being improved, these routes had been used for
the past three years as porter trails and limited
personnel infiltration routes. In addition to these
gateways, which are discussed below, the Communists
have under construction a major new road from the
Dong Hoi area in North Vietnam which will pass around
the western end of the DMZ. This well-built road,
being pushed through some of the most difficult
terrain in. North Vietnam, could provide the North
Vietnamese with another limited all-weather route
to the road complex serving the area west of Khe
Sanh. Some 16 miles of the road were built between
6 January and 8 March 1968, an impressive achievement
considering the mountainous terrain. The rapid pro-
gress and pattern of construction indicates that the
North Vietnamese are using mechanized construction
equipment and trucks (see the photograph, Figure 2).
Access to Khe Sanh
4. During the recent dry season, ending in
March, the North Vietnamese built two new roads
parallel to Route 9 west of the Khe Sanh Combat Base
to support their forces around that Marine strong-
point. The first road, north of Route 9, is an
extension of Route 92 and crosses the South Vietnamese
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Eigu.tc.e 2. Road Undet ConzttuctA,on Etom the Pong Hoi Atea
Toward the We4tetn End o6 the DMZ, 8 Match 1968
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border northeast of Ban Houei Sane, a former Royal
Laotian :base on Route 9. By late March, this road
terminated 9 miles northwest of Khe Sanh.
5. Another road was completed at about the same
time from Route 92 across the South Vietnamese border.
It now terminates about 8 miles southwest of Khe
Sanh. It was over this route that enemy amphibious
vehicles reached Lang Vei when that outpost was over-
run in February 1968 (see the photograph, Figure 3).
The roads paralleling Route 9 traverse fairly dense
jungle and are improved earth surfaces with a limited
amount of corduroying. Route 9 will probably remain
passable during the 1968 rainy season because of
continual improvements since 1965; the parallel
dirt roads have already begun to deteriorate.
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Figure 3. Un(;mpnoved Road South o~ Route 9, 13 Febnuany 1968.
Amphib,iows ^ ccnkz ,invotved in attacking Lang Vei pnobabty
entened the )LiveL at thin point.
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Route 922 and the A Shau Valley
6. An unusually large number of construction
troops have been assigned the task of converting
the A Shau Valley into a major logistics link be-
tween Laos and the coastal lowlands around Hue.
Currently there are at least three engineer bat-
talions (each with an estimated strength of 300
men) and three engineer companies (personnel strength
unknown) involved in the A Shau Valley construction
efforts. Elements of two Communist regiments, some
tanks, and artillery have also been reported in the
valley.
7. The North Vietnamese first began to extend
Route 922 toward the A Shau Valley from its terminus
near the South Vietnamese border in December 1966.
Up to that time the route had seen little use since
the capture of the A Shau Special Forces Camp in
mid-March 1966. By late April 1967, Route 922 had
been constructed across the border and connected
with the existing South Vietnamese national Route
548 at A Luoi, the northernmost airfield in the
A Shau Valley. This connection, 56 miles long,
gave the North Vietnamese the use of a motorable
road from Laos through the entire valley. Early
this year, the Communists reopened and upgraded
all of Route 922 and added more facilities to the
already extensive logistics complexes along the
road.
8. In February 1968 the North Vietnamese began
to construct a new road toward Hue from a point on
Route 548 just north of the town of Ta Bat, the
location of the central airfield in the A Shau
Valley (see the photograph, Figure 4). This new
road, which parallels part of a previously existing
road (Route 547) leading from the valley, has been
extended from Route 548 at Ta Bat to join Route 547
at a point north of Ta Luong, 22 miles southwest of
Hue. From that point towards Hue, Route 547 is only
an upgraded trail for some 8 miles. The remaining
section is reportedly in fair condition; however,
it is controlled part of the time by allied forces.
9. At Ta Luong, the newly constructed road
fords the Song Bo, a sizable stream which flows in
a northerly direction perpendicular to the road.
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Figuhe 4. Road Leading From Ta Bat in the A Shau Vcc.2.2ey
Towand Hue, 23 JanuatLy 1968
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Thi-s stream could be used to move supplies to staging
and storage areas northwest of Hue. In late March a
tracked armored vehicle, tentatively identified as a
PT-76 amphibious tank, was reported in an enemy base
area 12 miles north of Ta Luong.
10. In the A Shau Valley, the North Vietnamese
have built bunkers, antiaircraft sites, and truck
parks, the largest of which is just northeast of
Ta Bat near the junction of Route 548 and the new
road towards Hue. At the A Luoi Airfield, the
Communists have cleared a 535-by-60-foot area, which
may be either a helicopter pad or a drop zone for
airborne supplies. The A Shau airfield also has a
cleared area which in early March was observed to be
littered with boxes, crates, and POL drums. The
North Vietnamese are using pierced-steel planking
from the airfields to make Routes 548 and 922 as
all-weather as possible.
11. The Communists
have continued Route
548 through the valley
into a salient of Laos
southeast of A Shau.
Between 28 March and
9 April the enemy built
18 miles of road through
dense jungle and difficult
mountainous terrain east-
southeast in the general
direction of South Viet-
namese Route 14. The
last reported terminus
of the road was in South
Vietnam, some 10 miles
northwest of an enemy-
controlled town on Route
14 west of Da Nang (see
the photograph, Figure 5).
Figurce 5. Route 548 Extended
F om the A Shau Vattey into the
Laotian Satient West o Da Nang,
17 Matcch 1968
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Route 165
12. Further south, Route 165 has been extended
steadily eastwards since October 1967 from Chava.ne,
Laos, towards the South Vietnamese border. In
January 1963 the roadway had been cleared to the
border, and in early April 1968, Route 165 was
connected to Route 14. Route 165 is a well-con-
structed road with numerous switchbacks and good
grades. Major streams present no obstacles, and
the soil structure in the region is good for road
construction. These factors and the quality of
construction observed will probably make this an
all-weather route (see the photograph, Figure 6;,.
13. Route 165 will allow the introduction of
troops and supplies by truck to threaten isolated
US Special Forces camps north of Kontum. Dak Pek
camp is only 9 miles south of the connection, while
the camp at. Khan Duc is 18 miles north of the
junction. Moreover, the area surrounding Route 165
in Laos contains an extensive trail network, some
of which has also been upgraded to motorable by-
passes for sections of Route 165. At least two of
these trails run in a general north-south direction
and also allow the movement of men and supplies
along a wider section of the border.
Route 110
14. By January 1966, Route 92/96 had been observed
in photography as far south as the Se Sou River, where
it joined an east-west road under construction from
Cambodia to the tri-border salient. In mid-March
1966 this east-west road was completed, and in
December 1967 the road was pushed through the Jungles
and rugged terrain of the tri-border area into South
Vietnam. At the same time a major bypass was built
to shorten the distance from Route 96 to points on
the western end of Route 110.
15. In early February 1968 one branch of Route
110 had been connected with South Vietnamese Route
512 -- a few hundred yards from allied strongpoints
and only 17 road miles west of the major allied
camp at Dak To (see the photograph, Figure 7).
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Figure 6. Route 165 near the South V-etname6e 5on.de'.,
21 January 1968
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F igutce 7. Ju.nct,io o a 3tcanch o Route 110 with South Viet-
namese Route 512 west any Dak To, 9 FebrcuaJLy 1968
AW'AA POSITION
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Another branch had been cleared southeastwards to a
point some 28 miles northwest of Kontum. From the
latter branch a 30-mile-long road segment had been
extended by mid-April 1968 southwest along the
Cambodian border, where a well-developed trail system
leads southward to Communist bases north of Route 19.
16. Most of Route 110 across southern Laos
traverses gentle rolling terrain that presents no
major construction problems. The soil in this area,
however, will not support wet-weather travel, and
Route 110 will be the first road to become impassable
during the Laotian wet season. Flooded streams
during this season, however, will offer the North
Vietnamese a limited waterborne resupply capability.
17. The North Vietnamese evidently intend to
keep the road complex through the Cambodian salient
into South Vietnam open as long as possible in the
rainy season. The soil in this area possesses a
greater load-bearing capability, enabling the enemy
to make this section limited all-weather. The enemy
has already stacked large piles of corduroy materials
at potential troub.lespots. The North Vietnamese also
have improved the road grades and drainage and de-
veloped an extensive system of bypasses.
Prospects
18. The rapid growth and improvement of the Com-
munist road system from Laos into South Vietnam
during the 1967-68 dry season will permit the Com-
munists to sustain a much higher level of logistical
activity during this rainy season than in previous
years. In past seasons, the North Vietnamese stock-
piled materials in the logistical/storage areas
along the roads in Laos to be portered to their
forces during the rainy season. The Communists now
have a limited all-weather, motorable road system
leading from these storage facilities in Laos into
South Vietnam at four widely dispersed locations.
They are also rushing to completion a new limited
all-weather road around the western end of the DMZ.
At the termination of the Laotian rainy season, the
allies in South Vietnam will be confronted with a
greatly extended and improved road system, which
will permit the rapid redeployment of enemy forces
through Laos and the support of these forces for
longer periods of combat.
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Secret
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