USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY BY THE VIET CONG AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070108-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 108
• Publication Date: June 1, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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173
CIA/RR EM 6 6 - 2 3
June 1966
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY
BY THE VIET CONG
AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
SECRET GROUP I
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d~ngrading and
declassification
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This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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This memorandum was prepared by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and has been informally coordinated with the
Defense Intelligence Agency and the Department of State.
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Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Supply Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. Organizational Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3. Types of Supplies Moved . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4. Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory 7
5. Cambodian Government Collusion . . . . . . . . 7
Map
Cambodia following page
05/
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USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY
BY THE VIE T CONG
AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY*
Summary
The Communists have increased their use of Cambodian
territory in recent months to support the insurgency in South
Vietnam, and the tempo of their activities is expected to
accelerate. Recent aerial photography reveals that the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army have established a second
base camp in the northeast corner of Cambodia.
New road construction linking the Laotian infiltration
route with Cambodia has been completed, and older roads
have been improved. The most significant development in
this regard is the construction of a new road from Cambodia
into Laos -- route 110 -- which appears almost certainly to
have been built to serve the Laotian infiltration network by
extending it southward into Cambodia (see the map). There
is, however, no conclusive evidence that this was the sole
intent of the improvements.
Supplies procured in Cambodia for support of Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese Army forces in South Vietnam appar-
ently continue to consist primarily of food and other com-
mercial items available on the open market. Cambodia,
however, is by no means a major source of food supplies to
the Communists, who continue to depend primarily on the
South Vietnamese countryside.
This memorandum was produced by the Office of Research
and Reports; the estimates and conclusions represent the
best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 1 June
1966
S-E-C R-E
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The extent to which Cambodia is used either as a trans-
fer area for or as a source of arms and ammunition is
difficult to assess although it must be small. Almost cer-
tainly, however, the Communists have established arms
caches on Cambodian territory for support of the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese Army, and Communist activity in
the northern part of the country strongly suggests that
military supplies originating in North Vietnam are mov-
ing across Cambodian territory.
There continues to be considerable evidence that the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces use Cambodian
territory in many areas along the 600-mile border for sanc-
tuary and bivouac purposes.
The Cambodian government has taken an increasingly
favorable and accommodating attitude toward the Communist
insurgency in South Vietnam but has stopped short of direct
military support. There is considerable evidence, however,
of cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower levels of the
Cambodian government.
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USE OF CAMBODIAN TERRITORY
BY THE VIET CONG
AND NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY*
Summary
The Communists have increased their use of Cambodian
territory in recent months to support the insurgency in South
Vietnam, and the tempo of their activities is expected to
accelerate. Recent aerial photography reveals that the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army have established a second
base camp in the northeast corner of Cambodia.
New road construction linking the Laotian infiltration
route with Cambodia has been completed, and older roads
have been improved. The most significant development in
this regard is the construction of a new road from Cambodia
into Laos -- route 110 -- which appears almost certainly to
have been built to serve the Laotian infiltration network by
extending it southward into Cambodia (see the map). There
is, however, no conclusive evidence that this was the sole
intent of the improvements.
Supplies procured in Cambodia for support of Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese Army forces in South Vietnam appar-
ently continue to consist primarily of food and other com-
mercial items available on the open market. Cambodia,
however, is by no means a major source of food supplies to
the Communists, who continue to depend primarily on the
South Vietnamese countryside.
This memorandum was produced by the Office of Research
and Reports; the estimates and conclusions represent the
best judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as of 1 June
1966,
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The extent to which Cambodia is used either as a trans-
fer area for or as a source of arms and ammunition is
difficult to assess although it must be small. Almost cer-
tainly, however, the Communists have established arms
caches on Cambodian territory for support of the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese Army, and Communist activity in
the northern part of the country strongly suggests that
military supplies originating in North Vietnam are mov-
ing across Cambodian territory.
There continues to be considerable evidence that the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces use Cambodian
territory in many areas along the 600-mile border for sanc-
tuary and bivouac purposes.
The Cambodian government has taken an increasingly
favorable and accommodating attitude toward the Communist
insurgency in South Vietnam but has stopped short of direct
military support. There is considerable evidence, however,
of cooperation with the Viet Cong at lower levels of the
Cambodian government.
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Kompe
Thom
C1 KAS RONG'I
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CAMBODIA
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Province boundary,
South Vietnam
National capital
+ Railroad
Road
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BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
Senmonorum J
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Khtum
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1. Supply Routes
Information that has become available in the past six months
indicates that North Vietnam is making increased use of Cambodian
territory as a logistic supply route to support activities of the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam. Most of the
supplies acquired for use by these forces in South Vietnam and
Cambodia either are indigenous or arrived in Cambodia through
normal trade channels. Although some military supplies, other
than those carried by infiltrators, apparently move from North
Vietnam to Laos and then through Cambodia, there is no evidence
that supplies specifically intended for Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese Army forces are imported through the ports of Phnom
Penh and Sihanoukville.
Over the years, supplies have been moved into South Vietnam
from Cambodia by the following means: (a) by sampan or junk on
the inland waterways; (b) by porters on the trails that cross the
South Vietnamese border; and (c) by sampan or junk from minor
Cambodian ports to islands in the Gulf of Siam and to the west
coast of South Vietnam. In recent months traffic moving by sea
has been reduced whereas traffic moving by truck has been noted.
A substantial illegal trade for private profit has also been taking
place between Cambodia and areas in South Vietnam, held by both
South Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, especially in the Mekong
Delta. Many crossing points have been identified along the border
between Cambodia and South Vietnam that are used by the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army. The relative importance of
each area, route, and mode cannot be determined from available
information. The Communists apparently shift back and forth
from land to water transport and from one area of entry to another
as the tactical situation changes.
The land and water routes through the northeastern provinces
of Cambodia are becoming increasingly important for the move-
ment of supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam and Laos.
Photographic analysis reveals that in recent months at least one
new route has been built and old routes have been improved and
are being used more heavily than before.
Cambodian traders are reported to be moving substantial amounts
of rice northward on the Mekong River from Phnom Penh to the
Cambodian river towns of Kratie and Stung Treng. The rice is
then moved onward by small watercraft or by truck to the South
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Vietnamese and Laotian borders. Although the traders try to avoid
major roads, route 13 leading from Kratie toward Tay Ninh, Binh
Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces of South Vietnam is probably used.
From Stung Treng, route 19 and the trails leading from it toward
Pleiku Province reportedly are used for this traffic. Some of the
rice and other supplies are shipped from Stung Treng by boat on
the Se Kong River to Siem Pang or Ban Don Fai near the Laotian
border or on the Se San River to Bo Kheo. Photographic analysis
has shown river traffic by motorized craft and the locations of
land/water transloading points. With respect to all of this traffic,
it is not always clear what portion is destined for internal Cambodian
use and what for Communist forces.
The most significant development of the transport network in
this area is the construction in early 1966 of a new land route parallel-
ing the Tonle Kong River from near Si:em Pang' to Ban San- Keo,
opposite Ban Don Fai. The southern end connects with route 15
in Cambodia, and the northern end extends east into Laos to the
North Vietnamese truck route which runs through the Laotian pan-
handle. This new route is identified as 110, which is about .00
miles long, with about 30 miles in Cambodian territory.
1 ::1 Cambodian and Vietnamese troops coop-
erate in the construction of the Cambodian section of the road,
but there are no other reports to confirm this.
Route 15 from Siem Pang to a junction with route 19 near
Bo Kheo has been re-aligned in part and shows signs of increased
traffic. Photographic analysis has identified at least five truck parks
concealed in dense vegetation on side roads from route 15. From
route 19 a recently completed fair-weather truckable route, route
141, extends south and joins route 14 near the border of Quang Duc
and Phuoc Long Provinces. This route and its connections to route
'110 now provide a dry season truckable route all the way from
North Vietnam into important southern provinces such as Tay Ninh
in South Vietnam. The second road which connects Laos and
Cambodia extends west from Siem Pang into the Laotian territory
along the Mekong River in which a Communist buildup has taken
place. Evidence is inconclusive as to whether this is a new road
or an improved old road. All the evidence strongly suggests that
much of the improvement and construction of roads and waterways
in northern Cambodia is designed to serve as logistic routes and
constitute a southward expansion of the infiltration corridor into
Cambodia.
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1. Supply Routes
Information that has become available in the past six months
indicates that North Vietnam is making increased use of Cambodian
territory as a logistic supply route to support activities of the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam. Most of the
supplies acquired for use by these forces in South Vietnam and
Cambodia either are indigenous or arrived in Cambodia through
normal trade channels. Although some military supplies, other
than those carried by infiltrators, apparently move from North
Vietnam to Laos and then through Cambodia, there is no evidence
that supplies specifically intended for Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese Army forces are imported through the ports of Phnom
Penh and Sihanoukville.
Over the years, supplies have been moved into South Vietnam
from Cambodia by the following means: (a) by sampan or junk on
the inland waterways; (b) by porters on the trails that cross the
South Vietnamese border; and (c) by sampan or junk from minor
Cambodian ports to islands in the Gulf of Siam and to the west
coast of South Vietnam. In recent months traffic moving by sea
has been reduced whereas traffic moving by truck has been noted.
A substantial illegal trade for private profit has also been taking
place between Cambodia and areas in South Vietnam, held by both
South Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces, especially in the Mekong
Delta. Many crossing points have been identified along the border
between Cambodia and South Vietnam that are used by the Viet
Cong and North Vietnamese Army. The relative importance of
each area, route, and mode cannot be determined from available
information. The Communists apparently shift back and forth
from land to water transport and from one area of entry to another
as the tactical situation changes.
The land and water routes through the northeastern provinces
of Cambodia are becoming increasingly important for the move-
ment of supplies to Communist forces in South Vietnam and Laos.
Photographic analysis reveals that in recent months at least one
new route has been built and old routes have been improved and
are being used more heavily than before.
Cambodian traders are reported to be moving substantial amounts
of rice northward on the Mekong River from Phnom Penh to the
Cambodian river towns of Kratie and Stung Treng. The rice is
then moved onward by small watercraft or by truck to the South
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Vietnamese and Laotian borders. Although the traders try to avoid
major roads, route 13 leading from Kratie toward Tay Ninh, Binh
Long, and Phuoc Long Provinces of South Vietnam is probab:'Ly used.
From Stung Treng, route 19 and the trails leading from it toward
Pleiku Province reportedly are used for this traffic. Some of the
rice and other supplies are shipped from Stung Treng by boas`, on
the Se Kong River to Siem Pang or Ban Don Fai near the Laotian
border or on the Se San River to Bo Kheo. Photographic analysis
has shown river traffic by motorized craft and the locations of
land/water transloading points. With respect to all of this traffic,
it is not always clear what portion is destined for internal Cambodian
use and what for Communist forces.
The most significant development of the transport network in
this area is the construction in early 1966 of a new land route parallel-
ing the Tonle Kong River'from near Siem Pang' to Ban 'San Keo,
opposite Ban Don Fai. The southern end connects with route 15
in Cambodia, and the northern end extends east into Laos to the
North Vietnamese truck route which runs through the Laotian pan-
handle. This new route is identified as 110, which is about 1.00
miles long, with about 30 miles in Cambodian territory.
I ICambodian and Vietnamese troops coop-
erated in the construction of the Cambodian section of the road,
but there are no other reports to confirm this.
Route 15 from Siem Pang to a junction with route 19 near
Bo Kheo has been realigned in part and shows signs of increased
traffic. Photographic analysis has identified at least five truck parks
concealed in dense vegetation on side roads from route 15. From
route 19 a recently completed fair-weather truckable route, route
141, extends south and joins route 14 near the border of Quang Duc
and Phuoc Long Provinces. This route and its connections to route
110 now provide a dry-season truckable route all the way from
North Vietnam into important southern provinces such as Tay Ninh
in South Vietnam. The second road which connects Laos and
Cambodia extends west from Siem Pang into the Laotian territory
along the Mekong River in which a Communist buildup has taken
place. Evidence is inconclusive as to whether this is a new road
or an improved old road. All the evidence strongly suggests that
much of the improvement and construction of roads and waterways
in northern Cambodia is designed to serve as logistic routes and
constitute a southward expansion of the infiltration corridor into
Cambodia.
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Use of primitive land routes and inland waterways in the south-
ern and delta areas across the Cambodia-South Vietnam border
continues much as it has in the past. In addition, supplies now may
be moving by truck transport across the border into South Vietnam
in this area. Traditionally, traffic into South Vietnam has consisted
of Viet Cong purchasing agents and smugglers carrying supplies by
trail or small boat. The supplies are acquired in local Cambodian
markets along the border or from legal importing firms and business
houses in Phnom Penh. The Mekong-Bassac River complex formerly
was a principal route for moving supplies into South Vietnam.
Since 1963, seizures of illegal supplies on the rivers have practically
ceased. This change may reflect the increased lack of South Viet-
namese control of the border or an increasing use of land routes.
The Viet Cong control the border on four routes that enter Tay
Ninh and Binh Long Provinces. Truck convoys carrying rice now
cross the border four or five miles into Vietnamese territory after
nightfall.
In the past, some supplies were infiltrated by sea from Cam-
bodia via the islands in the Gulf of Siam. It is believed, however,
that substantial infiltration of supplies by sea from Cambodia has
been blocked for the most part by the Market Time Operation.
2. Organizational Control
Various reports indicate that the infiltration of supplies from
outside sources, including Cambodia, is under the control of the
Viet Cong Peoples Revolutionary Party apparatus. The Finance
and Economic Sections of the District Party Committees, under
the provincial-level Party Committee, appear to have immediate
supervision of these movements. Recent intelligence indicates that
military transport units of the North Vietnamese Army are also
involved in moving supplies, including food, across the border from
northeastern Cambodia.
3. Types of Supplies Moved
Most of the supplies procured in Cambodia have been purchased
on the open market. Arms and ammunition also have been infil-
trated through Cambodia from North Vietnam. Because of the
clandestine nature of the Viet Cong procurement in Cambodia, an
accurate estimate of the total volume of the shipments cannot be
made. The current volume of food shipments possibly is about
5, 000 tons per year. Cambodia is by no means a major source of
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food supplies to the Viet Cong, who depend primarily on the South
Vietnamese countryside. The Viet Cong collect more rice than they
need in the delta area, some of which is sent to Cambodia for export.
The purchase of rice in Phnom Penh is probably a logistic expedient
to supply Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army units operating in
deficit mountain areas. The Viet Cong clandestine apparatus in Phnom
Penh has regularly purchased drugs and medical supplies in the open
:market in Cambodia. Although appreciable amounts of medical and
other non-military supplies have been procured in Cambodia for use by
the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army, the bulk of such items have
been procured in South Vietnam itself or have been brought in from
North Vietnam.
The Viet Cong apparatus in Phnom Penh has successfully solicited
some contributions from the Vietnamese minority elements in Cam-
bodia who are generally unsympathetic to the government of South
Vietnam. The North Vietnamese commercial representative in Phnom
Penh reportedly pays the Cambodian merchants after the supplies have
been delivered.
The extent to which Cambodia is used either as a transfer area or
as a source of arms and ammunition is difficult to assess. Almost
certainly, the Communists have established arms caches on Cambodian
territory for support of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army? The
movement of weapons from these caches to distribution points in
South Vietnam probably accounts for some recent sightings of arms
movements. At least one report states that Cam-
bodian troops have provided arms to the Viet Cong. There is no con-
firmation of this report. If the incident did in fact occur, such
incidents have not been on a wide scale and almost certainly have
not involved collusion or foreknowledge on the part of the central
government of Cambodia.
Instructions from regional military headquarters were sent to
Cambodian border units late last year to investigate and stop arms
traffic across the border. In recent statements concerning Cambodian
support for the Vietnamese Communists, Prince Sihanouk has empha-
sized that no military equipment is moving to Viet Cong or North
Vietnamese Army forces via Cambodia.
Although the volume of supplies obtained for Communist forces
from Cambodia has always been small, Cambodian territory now
seems to be playing an increasingly important role in the movement
of military supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. This
role could eventually have an important effect on the outcome of the
war.
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4. Viet Cong Bases in Cambodian Territory
The Viet Cong and, more recently, North Vietnamese forces
use Cambodian territory in many areas along the 600-mile border
for sanctuary and bivouac purposes. Viet Cong elements have been
located on Cambodian territory
although it appears that these elements are shiftedback and forth
across the border. Important Viet Cong and North Vietnamese
Army military facilities, such as rest camps, training areas, hos-
pitals, workshops, and storage depots, now operate in Cambodia.
Photography shows at least two Communist base areas in northeast
Cambodia and new construction activity to the west near the newly
built route 110.
A recently captured Viet Cong document reveals in the clearest
terms to date how the Communists have been using Cambodian terri-
tory for sanctuary with the complicity of at least local Cambodian
officials. The document is a report of an early April 1966 Viet
Cong meeting dealing with problems associated with the use of Cam-
bodian territory. It makes clear the importance which the Viet
Cong attaches to its Cambodian sanctuary and suggests that Cam-
bodia will loom even larger in Communist planning as the war in-
tensifies in South Vietnam. The document indicates that the prin-
cipal use of Cambodian territory, at least in the Tay Ninh-Svay
Rieng area, is to harbor rest and recovery camps for Viet Cong
wounded.
5. Cambodian Government Collusion
The Cambodian government has taken an increasingly favorable
attitude toward the, Communist insurgency in South Vietnam. The
Cambodian government has expressed its official goodwill for the
National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV,).
Sihanouk supports the NFLSV's claim to represent the South Viet-
namese people, he has presented medical supplies to North Vietnam,
and he has presided at a ceremony in which medical supplies were
presented to a representative of the NFLSV. He has publicly stated
that Cambodian hospitals would care for the Viet Cong wounded
although he also stated that his principal purpose was to prevent
the establishment of Vietnamese colonies on Cambodian soil. In
addition, he has raised the North Vietnamese commercial delegation
to a governmental level short of diplomatic status.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
is considerable evidence of cooperation with the Viet Cong
at lower levels of the Cambodian government. The active assistance of
Cambodian armed forces in Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
refuge activities :in Cambodia has been noted. There have been some
reports of Cambodian and Viet Cong troops fighting together against
South Vietnamese troops. Viet Cong prisoners of war in 1964 stated
that the Cambodian troops attempted to cover up their cooperation with
the insurgents, and they also reported that local Cambodian authorities
have made no effort to interfere with Viet Cong procurement of supplies
in Cambodia. On the other hand, in some areas the Cambodians have
tried to police the border against the Viet Cong as well as against South
Vietnamese troops with whom they frequently clash. Instances of small
skirmishes between Cambodian and Viet Cong intruders have been reported.
Cambodian border outposts apparently had been instructed to stop illicit
rice shipments to South Vietnam prior to more recent government state-
ments seeking to profit from the rice transactions.
In summary, the Viet Cong use of Cambodian territory appears to be
due to active Cambodian cooperation in some areas, a laissez-faire
attitude in others, and the inability of the Cambodian government to con-
trol its frontiers in isolated regions. The increasing intensity of the war
in South Vietnam is putting a severe strain on Sihanouk's principal short-
term policy objective -- to keep the Vietnam war from spreading to
Cambodia. He has through the years cultivated Cambodia's international
posture as a "neutral" in large measure to further this objective. At the
same time, acting on the calculation that the Communists would win in
South Vietnam, he has moved circumspectly toward a political accom-
modation with Hanoi and the Viet Gang. The continuing problem for
Sihanouk has been to improve relations with the Communists without
inviting retaliation from South Vietnamese and US forces.
This has been a difficult game but Sihanouk has played it adroitly
and successfully. He has been able to do so principally because the
Communist use of Cambodian territory to date has been relatively
limited and covert in nature and generally deniable. In recent months,
however, the Communists have been forced to make increasing demands
on Cambodia at the same time that Sihanouk has been increasingly irri-
tated by Khmer Serei activities. Sihanouk has met Communist demands in
a characteristic way -- giving the Communists what they want but without
officially admitting that he is doing so. He probably hopes that by ex-
panding contacts with the West and pushing for an expanded International
Control Commission operation at the port of Sihanoukville he can con-
tinue to portray Cambodia as the innocent victim of the South Vietnam
war.
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SECRET