NORTH VIETNAM: STRENGTHENING THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM JANUARY 1962 - MARCH 1965

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070107-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 49
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 107
• Publication Date: November 1, 1965
• Content Type: IR

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S
N2 146
CIA/RR ER 65-28
November 1965
INTELLIGENCE REPORT
NORTH VIETNAM:
STRENGTHENING 'YHE
T'RANSPOR'I'A'1`ION SYSTEM
January 1962-March 1965
IIRECTORA'I'E Or INTELLIGENCE
Office of Research and Reports
SECRET
Approved For Release 2006/05/24
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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The improvements made in the North Vietnamese transportation system
since 1961 are described in this report, the relationship between the
transportation system and the economy as a whole is analyzed, and the
development of the transportation system in North Vietnam as it facili-
tates Communist aggression in the Indochina area is discussed. Section I
provides a brief background of developments in transportation in North
Vietnam since the beginning of Communist rule. Section II summarizes
the performance of the transportation system since 1961. Section III
discusses the relations between developments in transportation on the
one hand and economic growth and military aggression on the other.
Section IV describes the changed emphasis in the development of the
transportation system. Appendix A gives details on the performance
of each major mode of transportation -- railroads, highways, inland and
coastal waterways, and airways. Appendix B contains 11 statistical
tables.
In general, the report presents an analysis of the transportation
system in North Vietnam as of March 1965. Only incidentally is informa-
tion introduced concerning the damage caused by US and South Vietnamese
bombing raids, which began in April, and their effect on the trans-
portation system and the economy of North Vietnam. The analysis in
this report, however, is basic to an understanding of the significance
of the bombing and to an appreciation of the ability of the transporta-
tion system to cope with further damage. Finally, it should be noted
that this report deals exclusively with modern means of transportation.
No account is taken of primitive transportation, which is important in
moving a large tonnage of agricultural and minor industrial products
short distances.
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Page
Summary and Conclusions . . .
I. Introduction . . . .
II. Performance of the Transportation System. . . . .
III. Support of the North Vietnamese Economy and
Military Aggression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Increase in Transport Performance in Relation
to Economic Growth . . . . . . . . 9
B. Support for Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. Support for Industry and Mining . . . . . . . . 10
D. Support for Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . 11
IV. Changing Emphasis in the Development
of the Transportation System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A. Early Emphasis on Economic Purposes . . . . . . . . . 15
B. Recent Emphasis on Military Purposes . . . . , . . _ 17
1. Developments South of Ham Rong . . . . . . . 17
2. Developments in the Northern
Mountainous Regions . . . . . . . . . 18
3. Developments in Air Transportation . . . . . . . 18
V. Probable Future Developments in the Transportation
Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix A. Transport Performance by Mode and Area . . . . .
Appendix B. Statistical Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1. North Vietnam: Total Freight Performance,
1960 and 1962-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
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2. North Vietnam: Average Length of Haul
for Freight and Passenger Traffic, 1960 and 1962-63 . . 38
3. North Vietnam: Planned and Actual Increases
in Transport Performance, 1961-65 Plan and
1961-63 Actual . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4. North Vietnam: Freight Performance by State-
Owned Means of Transportation, 1960 and 1962-63 . . . . 40
5. North Vietnam: Passenger Performance, 1960 and
1962-63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
6. Truck Traffic Reported by Ground Observers
on Route 7 in Laos, 1963-64 and January-
March 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
7. Truck Traffic Reported by Ground Observers
on Route 12 and Route 23 in Laos, 1964 and
January-March 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
8. North Vietnam: Percentage Distribution
of State Investment in Capital Construction,
by Sector, 1955-56 Average, 1958-60, and 1962-63 . . . . 44
9. North Vietnam: Selected Operating Data
for Railroad Transport, 1960 and 1962-63 . . . . . . . . 45
10. North Vietnam: Selected Operating Data
for State-Owned Trucks, 1960 and 1962-63 . . . . . . 46
11. North Vietnam: Selected Economic Indicators,
1956-64 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Illustrations
Figure 2. North Vietnam: Indexes of Selected Economic
Indicators, 1956-64 (chart) following page . . .
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NORTH VIETNAM: STRENGTHENING THE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM*
JANUARY 1962 - MARCH 1965
From 1962 through the first quarter of 1965, the transportation
system of North Vietnam was strengthened by
(1) the reconstruction of an additional 150 kilo-
meters (km) of the main railroad line south
of Hanoi, the section from Ham Rong to Vinh;
(2) the construction of new bridges and a general
increase in the capacity of the rail line
from Hanoi northwest to Lao Cai on the Chinese
border;
(3) the improvement of facilities at P'ing-hsiang
for transloading freight from the Chinese
standard-gauge system to the North Vietnamese
meter-gauge system;
(!) the building of new highway bridges and the
replacing of low-capacity wooden bridges,
notably on routes 7 and 15, the two most im-
portant roads used by the Communists to trans-
port men and supplies to the Plaine des Jarres
in central Laos and to southern Laos;
(5) the construction of several new roads in out-
lying areas northwest of Hanoi, in order to
hasten the settlement and economic develop-
ment of this inhospitable region;
(6) the acquisition of more than 2,000 additional
trucks from the USSR and Communist China, with
a substantial net gain in the truck fleet; and
(7) the completion of a large new wharf and other
port facilities at Haiphong, the country's
only major seaport.
These improvements were aimed primarily at facilitating support for
Communist aggression in Indochina and only secondarily at building up
the general economic strength of North Vietnam. The improvements were
made from a rudimentary base, and much remains to be done if the
* The estimates and conclusions in this report represent the best
judgment of this Office as of 15 September 1965.
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transportation system is to give adequate support to the military and
economic plans of Ho Chi Minhts government.
The small railroad network -- consisting of 950 km of single-track
meter-gauge line radiating from Hanoi -- continued to account for more
than one-half of the ton-kilometers performed by the transportation
system. Earlier plans for converting to standard gauge the two lines
to Communist China and the Hanoi-Haiphong line apparently have been
abandoned. The Chinese are building their own rail line southwest to
K'un-ming, and, when this line is completed, the importance of Chinese
transshipments through North Vietnam will be greatly reduced.
The highway network of 10,000 km supplements the rail network as a
feeder system and also is vital in the transport of men and materials
to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Construction of bridges
since 1961 increased the capacity of major strategic roads, but stand-
ards of maintenance for the road system as a whole improved little.
Lack of spare parts and inadequate maintenance were the cause of the
poor condition of many of the trucks.
Inland and coastal waterways, of primary importance to the move-
ment of agricultural, forest, and mineral products, have been improved
gradually in the last few years by the construction and repair of
watercraft and by the improvement of terminal facilities. These water-
ways accounted for about 40 percent of both the tonnage of freight and
the total ton-kilometers in 1964. Civil air traffic is only a negli-
gible part of the total transportation performance and really serves
as an adjunct to military and political activity in the movement of
priority cargoes and high-ranking officials.
Freight carried by the North Vietnamese transportation system rose
from 13 million metric tons (mt) in 1960 to nearly 19 million mt in
1964. Total freight performance, according to type of transport, is
estimated as follows:
Million Ton-Kilometers
1960
1964
Railroads
7014
927
Highways
107
179
Inland waterways
314
490
Coastal waterways
68
156
Total
1,193
1,752
In recent years the North Vietnamese transportation system has pro-
vided important support to Communist aggression in Southeast Asia, and
North Vietnam's military establishment of 232,000 men has first call
on the relatively meager transportation resources. The Vinh - Ben Thuy
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area, in the southern part of the country, which normally is served by
rail, road, and coastal water transport, appears to be a major lo-
gistics base for Communist aggression in Laos and South Vietnam.
Supplies for Communist forces in Laos are moved across the North
Vietnamese border principally by truck over route 7 into the Plaine des
Jarres and over route 15 to route 12 and into southern Laos. In 1964
the daily average number of trucks counted by ground observers located
along route 7 in Laos could have carried a sufficient quantity of sup-
plies to meet the requirements of the Communist forces in the area.
During December 1964 - March 1965 a great deal of traffic also moved
from route 12 to route 23 which leads into southern Laos. Some of
these trucks presumably carried men and supplies that were destined
for infiltration over trails from southern Laos to the Viet Cong in
South Vietnam. Other men and supplies for the Viet Cong are moved.
by coastal water transport to points along the South Vietnamese coast
or by truck down route 1A toward the Demilitarized Zone, from where
they are moved on trails running south through Laos. (A Demili-
tarized Zone that varies in width from somewhat less than 4 miles to
almost 6 miles extends north and south of the Demarcation Line.)
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The transportation system of North Vietnam was constructed origi-
nally by the French and was designed primarily to assist colonial au-
thorities in maintaining control and in facilitating the export of
agricultural products and minerals. When Indochina was divided in
1954, the system lay in ruins because of World War II and the French-
Viet Minh War (1946-54). By 1965 the new Communist government had suc-
ceeded in restoring most of the system. Except for some roads in
frontier areas and the rail line to Thai Nguyen, no major extension
had been made of the basic system inherited from the French.
The main railroad network radiates from Hanoi and in March 1965
totaled about 950 km of line in operation, all of which was meter
gauge.* This network consisted of five single-track rail lines:
(1) Hanoi northeast to Deng Dang, (2) Hanoi northwest to Lao Cai,
(3) Hanoi east to Haiphong, (4) Hanoi north to Thai Nguyen, and (5)
Hanoi south to Ham Rong and, since May 1964, to Vinh.** Several of
these lines have some track in common. The Hanoi - Deng Dang line
connects with the standard-gauge network of Communist China and has
a transloading station at Ping-hsiang in Kwangsi Province. The
Hanoi - Lao Cai line connects with the Chinese meter-gauge line to
K'un-ming in Yunnan Province. In 1963, about 24 percent of the
rail traffic in terms of ton-kilometers was Chinese transit traffic.
The main highway network also radiates from Hanoi. Five roads
connect with the Chinese road system, and several strategically im-
portant roads lead west to Laos and south to the Demilitarized Zone.
The highway network consists of about 10,000 km of motorable roads,
about 1,100 km of which have bituminous-treated surfaces. The
remainder have surfaces of stone, gravel, or earth. The highway
system acts as a feeder system to the railroads, provides access to
remote regions, and serves to support Communist aggression in Indo-
china.
The inland waterway network consists of about 5,400 km of navi-
gable rivers and canals on which shallow-draft river steamers can
navigate about 2,400 km during half the year and 1,400 km throughout
the year. With the exception of the upper reaches of the Red River
and the Song Cau, these waterways are concentrated primarily in the
** Since the beginning of April 1965, bombing of bridges by the
United States and South Vietnam has stopped through rail service on
the line to Vinh from Dong Phong Thuong, which is located about 21 km
north of Thanh Hoa. In addition, truck traffic south of the 20th
parallel has been disrupted.. For an analysis of the effects of the
bombing of bridges on the economy and the logistics capabilities of
the North Vietnamese.
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Red River Delta. Coastal shipping uses North Vietnam's only major sea-
port at Haiphong, two secondary ports at Cam Pha and Hon Gai, and ten
minor ports, including one at Ben Thuy. Inland and coastal shipping
serve to move in bulk agricultural, forest, and mineral products. The
major and secondary ports also are used by ships in international trade.
There is very little transportation by air.
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II. Performance of the Transportation System
By 1965 the transportation system generally met the requirements
placed on it by economic development in North Vietnam, but it was still
rudimentary except for the areas served by the small railroad network
and the developed sections of the inland waterway system. In 1963 and
1964, performance by the transportation system of North Vietnam sur-
passed planned goals for freight -- both in terms of tons carried and
ton-kilometers -- in spite of the lack of fulfillment of plans for most
other sectors of the economy. Freight traffic in 1963 increased 21 per-
cent in terms of ton-kilometers and 9 percent in terms of tons carried
compared with that in 1962 (see Table 1, Appendix B). Increases in 1964
were less than the comparatively high rates in 1963; freight traffic in-
creased 9 percent above the volume in 1963 in terms of ton-kilometers and
7 percent in terms of tons carried.
Exceeding the plans for transport performance, in spite of not ful-
filling the plan for the economy in general during 1963-64, probably
reflects the inadequacy and imbalance of economic planning in North
Vietnam. Spotty fulfillment of plans among the various sectors of the
economy may have complicated distribution problems and contributed to
an unnecessary increase in the average length of haul for total freight.
Total traffic in 1964 reached about 1.75 billion ton-kilometers (tkm)
and 18.7 million mt carried. In 1963, the latest year for which details
of total performance by mode of transport are available, railroads
accounted for 53 percent of the total performance in ton-kilometers and
inland waterways ranked next with only 28 percent. Performance in tons
carried on the railroads was only 22 percent of the total, being sur-
passed by both inland waterways and highways, each of which accounted
for 38 percent of the total (see Table 1). Only 2 percent of the total
tons carried moved by coastal water, but because of the long haul,
coastal water freight accounted for 9 percent of the total performance
in ton-kilometers (see Table 2, Appendix B).
The total freight performance during 1961-64 not only increased
at much lower rates than it did in the last half of the 1950's* but
also failed to achieve the rates required to meet the goals for the
first five-year plan (1961-65) as shown in Table 3, Appendix B. The
average annual rate of increase for total performance in ton-kilometers
during 1961-64 was about 10 percent, compared with almost 14 percent
needed to fulfill the goal for 1961-65; the rate for tons carried was
about 9 percent, compared with about 11 percent needed to meet the goal.
* Freight performance during 1956-60 increased at an average annual
rate of 43 percent in terms of ton-kilometers and 37 percent in terms of
tons carried. These rapid rates of growth resulted from the reconstruction
of the main railroad and highway networks and the acquisition of trans-
port equipment after the Communists gained control of North Vietnam in
1954. For further analysis of transportation in North Vietnam in the
late 1950's,
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Although these shortfalls probably are due chiefly to failures in the
economy, civil transport itself has been beset with a number of prob-
lems. Most important are poor planning at the national and local
levels, inefficiency and lack of coordination between the various
modes of transport and between the transport sector and other sectors
of the economy, and the use of unskilled labor especially for mainte-
nance and repair. Civil transportation also has been hindered by the
high priority given to military traffic and by shortages of equipment,
spare parts, and fuels, almost all of which must be imported.
The share of total transport performed by state-owned means in-
creased during 1961-63 because of a significant shift to state owner-
ship of the means of transport on the highways and inland waterways.
A comparison of Tables 1 and 4 (Appendix B) shows that, in terms of
ton-kilometers, state-owned means of transportation accounted for
79 percent of the total performance in 1963, compared with 76 percent
in 1960, and, in terms of tons carried, it accounted for 614 percent in
1963, compared with 41- percent in 1960.* Nevertheless, in 1963, high-
way performance by state-owned means accounted for only 65 percent of
the total tons carried on highways, and inland water performance by
state-owned means accounted for only 41 percent of the total tons
carried by inland water.
The rate of increase in passenger performance during 1961-63 greatly
exceeded both the rate required to meet the goal of the five-year plan**
and the rate during 1958-60.*** Some of this increase in passenger
traffic probably reflected the government program to resettle large
numbers of people from the lowlands to the northern mountainous regions.
About 40 percent of the total number of passengers were carried on
highways, and passengers carried by this mode increased at an average
annual rate of 33 percent during 1961-63, compared with a rate of 20
percent for railroads during the same period. The railroads, however,
which would not be used significantly for resettlement, still carried
the largest share of passengers. The share of total passenger per-
formance accounted for by state-owned means of transportation remained
about the same during the period. (For an analysis of transport per-
formance by mode and area, see Appendix A.)
* The trend shows a considerable decrease in the rate of increase in
the share of total performance achieved by state-owned means in terms
of ton-kilometers during 1961-63 but a significant increase in the rate
in terms of tons carried. This shift resulted from lower average lengths
of haul during 1961-63 compared with those during 1958-60. For ton-
kilometers, the share of total performance by state-owned means rose
from 50 percent in 1957 to 76 percent in 1960, whereas for tons carried,
it only rose from 30 percent in 1957 to 44 percent in 1960.
See Tables 3 and 5, Appendix B.
During 1956-57, the number of passengers carried almost quadrupled
because of the small starting base, but the increase leveled off to an
average annual rate of 5 percent during 1958-60 compared with an aver-
age annual rate of 25 percent during 1961-63-
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III. Support of the North Vietnamese Economy and Military Aggression
North Vietnam, a country of about 18 million inhabitants, most
of whom are rice farmers living in the Red River Delta, is striving for
rapid economic development under the first five-year plan. The achieve-
ment of its ambitious economic goals has been impeded by lack of techni-
cal and managerial skills and by poor performance in agriculture. Since
1960, lagging agricultural output has resulted in chronic shortages of
food and of agricultural raw materials.
Because industrialization increases the scope of trade and the
volume of heavy materials moved, transport requirements in a developing
economy may increase at a considerably higher rate than the Gross
National Product (GNP). 3/ Such a situation has characterized develop-
ment in North Vietnam. For a comparison of the growth in transportation,
both in tons carried and ton-kilometers, with the growth in population,
GNP, industrial production, and agricultural production for 1956-64+,
see the chart, Figure 2.
The gross value of industrial production, excluding production
of handicrafts, increased at a higher rate during 1957-64 than did
freight tonnage carried because industry was expanding rapidly from a
small base. The more rapid growth in ton-kilometers than in tons
carried resulted mainly from the increase in the long-haul Chinese
transit traffic during 1958-59* and from the development of outlying
centers of industrial production in recent years. This trend was
reversed in 1961-62 when transit traffic decreased.
In spite of its rapid growth, the transportation sector was
criticized severely by the North Vietnamese press as a deterrent to eco-
nomic progress, even in the early 1960's, when both indexes for trans-
port performances had far surpassed that for GNP. As late as 1963 the
press reported that "compared with the demands for a strong develop-
ment of production, transport and communications are still clearly
trailing far behind ... . A major cause of the above situation is our
low standard of transportation management." 4/ Reported difficulties
in transportation were less severe after major emphasis was given to
administration and coordination in 1963. At that time, various pro-
grams were set up to promote coordination between the various modes of
transport and between the transportation sector and the producing and
consuming sectors of the economy. Shortcomings reported after 1963
usually occurred in the outlying areas of the country until the bomb-
ing began in April 1965.
* The average length of haul for rail freight traffic increased 54+ per-
cent in 1958 and 13 percent in 1959 after the rehabilitation of the
Deng Dang - Hanoi - Lao Cad rail lines.
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B. Support for Agriculture
The North Vietnamese economy is based primarily on agriculture,
which in 1963 employed about three-fourths of the total labor force.
Only about 12 percent of the total land area of about 61,000 square miles
is under permanent cultivation. A sharp contrast in the use of land
exists between the thinly populated and almost uncultivated mountainous
regions, comprising about two-thirds of the total land area, and the
over-populated and intensively cultivated regions of the Red River Delta,
which contains about 80 percent of the cultivated land. Transportation
generally has met the requirements of agriculture in recent years be-
cause most of the population, agricultural production, and the trans-
port network are concentrated in this small area of the country.
Two important trends in agriculture have necessitated the ex-
pansion of highway and inland water transportation. Of primary im-
portance to transportation is the Communist plan to increase agricultural
production in the country and to relieve the population pressure in the
delta region by developing the mountainous regions of the country. As
part of this program, the government planned to resettle in the moun-
tainous regions during 1961-65 about one million people, including farm
workers and dependents. Improvement of inland waterways and of the few
existing roads and construction of new roads connecting these regions
with the Red River Delta are required to support this agricultural
development.
Another important trend in agriculture requiring increased
support by transportation is the emphasis on socialization of agri-
culture. Before Communist control of the country, agriculture generally
consisted of small private holdings and semiautonomous villages whose
economic contacts with one another and with cities were at a minimum.
The North Vietnamese reported that, by mid-196)+, about 85 percent of
the 2.9 million peasant households had been organized into nearly
30,000 agriculture cooperatives, which encompassed about 75 percent
of the total area of cultivated land. Cooperative organization of
farming requires more transportation than the previous private organi-
zation, both in movement of supplies and the distribution of output.
C. Support for Industry and Mining
Since 1955, the Communist government of North Vietnam has fol-
lowed a policy calling for rapid industrialization of the economy. The
industrialization actually achieved has been made possible by foreign
financial and technical assistance, principally from Communist China
and the USSR. The program has been moderately successful, both in
comparison with previous efforts in the country and with industrial
efforts in most other less developed countries in Asia. The develop-
ment of light industry and industries supporting agriculture was
emphasized during 1955-60, whereas the development of heavy industry
predominated in the plan for 1961-65. In spite of this program, by
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NORTH VIETNAM: INDEXES OF SELECTED ECONOMIC INDICATORS
1956-64
*Gross value in 1959 dong.
**At market prices in 1960 dong.
***Midyear data
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION*
(Excluding handicrafts)
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mid-196)+ only about 10 percent of the labor force was employed in industry,
and of this 10 percent nearly 80 percent was engaged in handicraft in-
dustries. Food processing is the major industry, followed by textiles,
machine building, lumber, and chemicals.
North Vietnam has six important industrial centers. Three of
these centers, Hanoi, Haiphong, and Nam Dinh (which is located on the
rail line about 85 km southeast of Hanoi) were important industrial
cities before the Communists gained control. The remaining three centers,
Thai Nguyen, located about 75 km north of Hanoi, Viet Tri, located about
75 km northwest of Hanoi on the rail line to Lao Cai, and Lam Thao, lo-
cated about 20 km west of Viet Tri on the Red River, are new industrial
centers. The first integrated iron and steel complex in Southeast Asia
is being built at Thai Nguyen, and the plant is now producing pig iron
in two blast furnaces. A paper mill and a chemical plant have been
constructed at Viet Tri, and the largest operating chemical fertilizer
plant in North Vietnam is located at Lam Thao. All six industrial centers
are located on inland waterways as well as on rail lines.
The major nonagricultural resources of North Vietnam are coal,
iron ore, apatite, timber, and limestone and clay (needed for production
of cement). Most of these commodities must be transported appreciable
distances, primarily by railroad, for export or for processing in the
Red River Delta. Coal is mined in an area northeast of Haiphong near
the ports of Cam Pha and Hon Gai, and much of it is exported from these
ports, mainly to Japan and Communist China. The coal for domestic
consumption is carried by coastal ships and barges to ports along the
coast of North Vietnam for distribution within the country. Iron ore
is mined in the area of Thai Nguyen, where it is processed into pig
iron. Coking coal used in production of the pig iron is imported mostly
by rail from Communist China. A substantial amount of pig iron is ex-
ported through the port of Haiphong. Apatite is mined in the area of
Lao Cai and normally moves by rail to the Red River Delta, where most
of it is exported through Haiphong in raw or crushed form. Some apatite
also is processed into chemical fertilizer at Lam Thao and Hanoi. Major
supplies of timber are located in the northern mountains and must be
transported -- mainly by water -- to processing plants in the Red River
Delta. Limestone and clay are transported to Haiphong for processing
in North Vietnam's only cement plant. About one-fourth to one-half of
the cement produced is exported, and the remainder is distributed to
construction sites throughout North Vietnam.
In addition to supporting the North Vietnamese economy, trans-
portation supports a relatively large internal military force.* Mili-
tary trucks carry a vital flow of men and equipment for the support
-x- In March 95, North Vietnam had about 232,000 persons in the armed
forces, or 1.31 percent of the population. In comparison, Communist
China had about 2.3 million persons in the armed forces, or 0.30 per-
cent of the population.
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of Communist forces in Laos and for infiltration to the Viet Cong in
South Vietnam. Routes 6 and 7 are used to supply Communist forces
in north and north-central Laos and routes 152/15* are used to supply
forces in southern Laos. Route 8 once was a major supply route that
served the Communist forces fighting in the Lak Sao area, but since
1963, when most of the Communist forces apparently moved farther south,
the road has been less used.
Some of the men and supplies for infiltration into South Vietnam
move by truck down route 1A and parallel roads toward the Demilitarized
Zone, whence they move on trails. Other men and supplies apparently
move by truck on routes 152/15 to Laos, through Mu Gia Pass on route 12,
and down route 23 to the area southeast of Muong Phine and Sepone for
infiltration into South Vietnam. Since mid-196)+, most trucks on all
of these roads in Laos have moved at night to avoid aerial observation
and attack.
Route 7 leads from route lA about 35 km north of Vinh to the
Plaine des Jarres. Truck traffic observed in Laos on this route gener-
ally has been much greater than on any other road from North Vietnam.
On days that the road was observed in 1963, traffic averaged about 55
trucks per day moving in both directions and in 1964 it averaged about
45 trucks.** Trucks on route 7 often travel in large convoys, some
of which have totaled several hundred trucks. Traffic decreased con-
siderably during July-September 1964 because of air interdiction and
the effects of the rainy season. During October-December 196+ and
January 1965 the volume of traffic was more than double that in
September, although substantially lower than the traffic observed in
the early part of the year.
Photographic analysis shows that during the dry season the
trucks apparently were able to ford the streams and move over the
entire road even though bridges in Laos had been bombed. During 196+
and the first quarter of 1965 the daily average number of trucks
counted by ground observers located along route 7 in Laos could have
carried a quantity of supplies at a rate sufficient to meet the require-
ments of the Communist forces in the area.
Route 152 leads from route lA at Ha Tinh, about 1+5 km south of
Vinh, to route 15, which joins route 12 at the Laotian border. Route 12
extends from the border to the area of Mahaxay, but the larger share
of the truck traffic from North Vietnam on route 12 does not continue
to Mahaxay during the dry season. Instead, it moves down route 23 --
which extends south from route 12 about 20 km inside the border between
* Route 152 joins route 15 to form the connecting road between rou
lA in North Vietnam and route 12 in Laos. F_ LQ__1
I I
ee Table 6, Appendix B. For further details of truck traffic
from North Vietnam to Laos on this and other routes,
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Laos and North Vietnam -- into the southern part of Laos, where con-
siderable Communist forces are located. Route 23 is not trafficable
during the wet season, and apparently supplies are stockpiled during
the dry season to last throughout the year. No observers reported
during January and February 1964 -- normally months of heavy truck
traffic -- but the level of traffic during the first part of 1965 indi-
cated that more supplies could have been moved down route 23 than were
needed to meet the annual requirements of the forces in the area (see
Table 7, Appendix B). It can be assumed, therefore, that the excess
was moved over the South Vietnamese border to the Viet Cong.
Truck traffic from North Vietnam to Communist forces in
northern Laos moves from Hanoi on route 6 and on connecting roads to
the town of Samneua and through Dien Bien Phu to Phong Saly Province.
There is no connecting road from Phong Saly Province to Samneua, how-
ever, or from Samneua to the Plaine des Jarres, and men and supplies
transported. to these two areas are for local use only.* There is little
information, on truck traffic from North Vietnam to northern Laos, but
generally the flow is believed to be relatively light, with occasional
large convoys to support specific Communist military actions against
Royal Laotian forces.
An indication of traffic on route 1A south of Dong Hoi is
provided by a report that a daily average of 30 to 40 large, loaded
trucks, some with four-wheeled trailers, moved south on this road
during 1 through 25 September 1964. Most of the trucks probably carry
men and supplies for military forces near the Demilitarized Zone in
North Vietnam, but some carry men and supplies for the Viet Cong in
South Vietnam. A number of Viet Cong have reported that they were
transported by truck on route 1A to the area of the Demilitarized Zone
and then infiltrated on the trails through Laos into South Vietnam.
Some captured Viet Cong also revealed that the same general route is
used for transporting supplies.
* Reports based on aerial photography and from ground observers indi-
cate that a through route is being constructed between Samneua and
Ban Ban, the latter of which is located on route 7 between the Laos -
North Vietnam border and the Plaine des Jarres.
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IV. Changing Emphasis in the Development of the Transportation System
A. Early Emphasis on Economic Purposes
The Communists were faced with an almost completely devastated
transport system when they took control of North Vietnam in 1954. The
railroad network, with the exception of the Hanoi-Haiphong line, was
inoperable; large sections of the highway network were not serviceable
because of war damage and lack of maintenance; and silt had accumulated
in the inland waterways and harbors. In addition, most transport equip-
ment and repair facilities were dilapidated or had been destroyed.
The North Vietnamese, with aid mostly from Communist China,
immediately invested relatively large sums of capital to rehabilitate
those sections of the transportation system that were most vital to
the economy. During 1955-56, 44 percent of the total state investment
in capital construction was allocated to transportation and communica-
tions,* a portion more than twice that allocated to industry and about
three times that allocated to agriculture as shown in Table 8, Appendix
B. Although the share of investment in transportation and communications
declined by 1959 to about 21 percent of the total state investment, the
absolute amount of investment in this sector had increased to a level
greater than the average for 1955-56 as shown in the following tabu-
lation 7/:
Year
Total State
Investment
in Capital
Construction
(Million Dong)a/
State Investment
in Transportation
and Communications
(Million Dong)
Transportation and
Communications
as a Percent
of the Total
1955-56
average
200.3
88.4
44.1
1957
251.0
59.2
23.6
1958
314.o
73.1
23.3
1959
494.2
106.1
21.5
1960
659.5
112.8
17.1
1962
731.7
87.1
11.9
1963
714.0
119.2
16.7
a. Unless otherwise indicated, dong values in this report are given
in current dong and may be converted to US dollars at the rate of ex-
change of 3.7 dong to US $1. This rate does not necessarily reflect
the relative internal purchasing power of the dong in terms of the
dollar.
* Although the share was 44 percent during 1955-56, it was only about
25 percent during 1955-60. A share of 25 percent of the total state in-
vestment allocated to transportation is not uncommon in newly developing
economies. 6/ The share of investment in communications was 7 percent
of that in transportation and communications in 1963, the only year for
which a breakdown is available.
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A complete breakdown of investment in the transportation system
by mode is not available, but it is estimated that a major share of the
investment was allocated to railroads. Emphasis through 1958 was placed
on reconstructing the rail lines from Hanoi to Dong Dang, to Lao Cai, and.
to Ham Rong; on rehabilitating route lA and the main roads and inland
waterways in the Red River Delta; and on dredging Haiphong harbor. Once
the basic transport system had been reestablished, the rail network was
extended in 1960 to include Thai Nguyen where North Vietnam's only inte-
grated iron and steel plant was under construction.
During 1961-62, decreasing emphasis was given to the. development
of the transport network. The share of state investment allocated to
transportation and communications declined from about 21 percent in 1959
to about 12 percent in 1962. Plans for several major improvements to
the transportation system were completed during 1961, but little was
done to implement them. Of primary importance were the plans for the
reconstruction of the rail line from Ham Rong to Vinh and the conver-
sion from meter gauge to standard gauge of. the rail lines connecting
Dong Dang and Hanoi, Hanoi and Lao Cai, and Hanoi and Haiphong. 8/
Conversion of these lines, in conjunction with the projected conver-
sion of the rail line from Lao Cai to K'un-ming in Yunnan to standard
gauge, would have increased considerably the. capacity of the network
and would have permitted Chinese traffic to move to and through North
Vietnam without being transloaded at P'ing-hsiang.
The normal level of traffic on the Deng Dang - Hanoi, Hanoi -
Lao Cai, and Hanoi-Haiphong meter-gauge rail lines, however, has never
reached the capacity of the lines, and their conversion to standard
gauge has not yet appeared to have economic justification. Plans for
the conversion probably were made in conjunction with the vast railroad
expansion program planned by the Chinese Communists under their "leap
forward" program of 1958-60. Work was started on a new standard-gauge
roadbed for the Dong Dang - Hanoi line, which was to be converted with
aid from Communist China, but construction was discontinued late in
1961 or early in 1962, and even those sections of the roadbed that were
completed. have been left to deteriorate.
It is likely that North Vietnam started the construction work
and then found that China would not help in the conversion of the lines
after the collapse of the "leap forward" program. Construction work
leading to the conversion of the Hanoi - Lao Cai and Hanoi-Haiphong
lines probably never was begun. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists
have made no effort to convert the Lao Cai - K'un-ming line to standard
gauge. Instead, they are presently working on standard-gauge lines
to connect K'un-ming directly with the main Chinese rail system in
Kweichow and Szechwan Provinces.
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B. Recent Emphasis on Military Purposes
From the beginning of 1963 to April 1965, emphasis on the develop-
ment of the transportation system increased, and improvements had prima-.
rily military and political, rather than economic, implications. In
1964, for example, the segment of the rail network from Ham Rong to Vinh
was restored, and improvement of several strategic roads to Laos was
accelerated. The two most important recent developments, primarily for
economic purposes, were the extensive improvement of the Hanoi - Lao
Cai rail line to increase its capacity (which included the construction
of new bridges) and the expansion of port facilities at Haiphong. About
60 percent of the Hanoi - Lao Cai line was rebuilt during 1964. 9/ Ex-
pansion of port facilities at Haiphong has been extensive but has fallen
far short of the original plan to triple capacity for handling cargo.
1. Developments South of Ham Rong
During January 1963 - March 1965 the most significant ex-
pansion of the network with extra-economic justification was in the
southern part of North Vietnam. Reconstruction of the rail line from
Ham Rong to Vinh and the port of Ben Thuy was not warranted by existing
levels of economic activity. Even less economic justification can be
attributed to the reconstruction work done on the rail line south of
Vinh nearly half way to the Demilitarized Zone. Although two major
bridges and about 18 km of line were. not reconstructed between Vinh
and Duc Tho, near the Ngan Pho River, the North Vietnamese reported
the operation of trains on the line from Duc Tho to Do Vang, about 30 km
south of Tan Ap, the point where route 15 turns southwestward toward
Laos. Reconstruction of the bridge over the Ngan Pho was underway early
in 1965, but nothing had been done on a bridge over the Song Ca.
Aerial photography indicated that a spur line from Tan Ap
running parallel with route 15 toward Laos was more heavily used than
the main line south of the junction of Tan Ap. The rail line, there-
fore, probably was being used for military supplies that were being
moved from the terminus of the spur line by truck over route 15 into
Laos. The emphasis on rapid replacement of low-capacity, wooden
bridges on routes 7 and. 15 with concrete bridges -- a total of 15
was either completed or under construction between early 1963 and
October 196+ -- also had important military implications.
The North Vietnamese claimed that this reconstruction was
intended to open the mountain areas for economic development... More
likely, however, reconstruction of the rail line and improvement of
the roads contributed to a contingent plan to support anticipated
large-scale Communist military activity in Laos and South Vietnam and
eventually to provide a basis for trade within a reunified country.
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2. Developments in the Northern Mountainous Regions
There is significant economic justification for the develop-
ment during recent years of the transport network north of Hanoi, but
this development also has important political and military implications.
Since 1960 the North Vietnamese have emphasized strongly the need to tap
the resources of the northern mountains. More than half a million per-
sons were moved from the lowlands to the mountains during 1962-6i., and
more than 1,200 agricultural cooperatives were established. 10 In
conjunction with the migration, emphasis has been given to the improve-
ment of route 6 and the construction of a road between route 6 and Lao
Cai in the northwest.*
Road construction in the north has included the completion
of roads connecting route 2 with Na Hang, Dong Van, and Hoang Su phi,
and, in the northeast, improvement of bridges is underway on the coastal
route from Mong Cai to Hon Gai and to Bac Ninh where the road joins
route IA. The clearance of rocks and reefs from the Black River, which
parallels route 6, also has been emphasized, and the North Vietnamese
reported that navigation for 2.5-ton craft on this river was extended
in 1963 as far north as Quynh Nhai. 12
The development of the transport network and the resettle-
ment of lowlanders in the northern mountains should facilitate tighter
political and economic control of an area that formerly was inhabited
largely by relatively autonomous minority ethnic groups. In addition,
improvement of route 6 will facilitate the shipment of men and supplies
to northern Laos from both China and North Vietnam. Improvement of the
Black River will provide an important supplementary route for this
traffic from Hanoi. The road from Lao Cai to route 6, when completed,
will provide a more direct connection in the northwest between route 6
and the K'un-wing - Lao Cai rail line than is available at present.
3. Developments in Air Transportation
Developments in the air network during 1962-64+ appeared to
have been primarily for military purposes and may have come largely
from the military budget rather than from state investment in trans-
portation. The most important development was the construction of a
large airfield at Phuc Yen, about 4+0 km north of Hanoi, which began
in February 1962 and was designed for military rather than for civilian
service.** There appears to be little economic justification for the
* For further details on road construction in the border area between
North Vietnam, Laos, and Communist China,
** The runway at Phuc Yen is 8,720 feet y ee wide, paved
with concrete, and is capable of accommodating throughout the year mod-
ern jet fighters and bombers as well as transports. Although work had not
been completed on all taxiways and petroleum storage facilities, this
airfield was being used by aircraft at least as early as July 1964. 13/
To date, it has been used almost exclusively as a base for jet fighters
from Communist China. 14
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Phuc Yen airfield because the previously existing airfields were more
than adequate for North Vietnam's civil air fleet of piston transports
and. trainers and for foreign planes engaged. in international air service
to North Vietnam. North Vietnamese planes do not participate in sched-
uled. international air service. Another development in the air network
in 1963, the extension of the runway of the airfield at Vinh by about
25 percent, was not accompanied by an increase in civil air traffic at
Vinh.*
* Improvement of the airfield to handle jet fighters increased its
usefulness both for defense and for air support to Communist forces
in Laos and in South Vietnam if the need arose.
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V. Probable Future Developments in the Transportation System*
Emphasis on the development of transportation in the future is ex-
pected to consist primarily of improvement and consolidation of the
present system for economic purposes and improvement and, depending
on the course of the present hostilities, expansion of the system for
military purposes. In order to accomplish these goals, the share of
state investment allocated to transportation probably will continue
to be large. On the economic front, better coordination among the
various modes of transportation and between the transport sector and
the production and consumption sectors of the economy will continue
to be stressed.
A North Vietnamese report in March 1965 indicated the creation of
an organization for establishing priorities in the movement of traffic
and for allocating traffic among the various modes of transportation. 15/
The need for increased efficiency is indicated by the failure in the
past to reach the planned average annual rate of increase in produc-
tivity for transport workers of 7.5 percent during the first five-year
plan (1961-65). Increases in labor productivity have ranged from only
4 percent during 1961 to 5 percent during 1963. 16/
Improvements in the alignment of the Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line to
eliminate sharp curves and steep grades is expected to continue, but
conversion of this line and the Dong Dang - Hanoi and Hanoi-Haiphong
lines to standard gauge probably will not take place in the near
future. Until the North Vietnamese economy has developed considerably
above its present level, a standard-gauge line through the country will
not be needed, especially since Chinese transit traffic probably will
decrease after a direct rail line, which is now being built, between
Yunnan and the rest of China has been completed, probably within the
next two years. Furthermore, conversion to standard gauge will yield
benefits only in the long run, and North Vietnam has pressing short-
run needs for its meager resources.
Facilities at Ping-hsiang, in Communist China, for transloading
freight between the Chinese rail system and the North Vietnamese
* Future developments as analyzed in this section do not take into
consideration the effects on the transport network of the continuation
of extensive bombing that began in April 1965. Most large bridges des-
troyed or seriously damaged by bombing probably will not be rebuilt,
and, in general, development of the transport network in the southern
part of North Vietnam probably will cease for as long as extensive
bombing continues. Instead, the North Vietnamese probably will rely
on temporary measures for keeping open important routes for the move-
ment of men and supplies to the southern part of North Vietnam and to
Laos and for infiltration to South Vietnam. Temporary measures would
include the minimum repair of some bridges and the additional con-
struction of fords and ferries wherever possible.
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system were expanded during 1963-64 and can be expanded still more with-
out great difficulty if the need arises. Dredging of inland waterways
in the Red River Delta and-improvement and expansion of port facilities
at Haiphong will continue to receive strong emphasis. Reportedly, traffic
through the port surpassed the planned goal for 1963 by 5 percent, but
congestion and delays of traffic persisted in 1964-65. Continued ex-
pansion of building and repair-facilities for watercraft and expansion
of the inland water fleet also are expected.
Major emphasis on the development of the transportation system in
the future will be influenced very much by the course of the present
hostilities. The desire of the Communists to bring South Vietnam and
Laos under their control suggests continued improvement of route 6 to
the border between Communist China and North Vietnam and construction
of the road connecting that route with the rail line at Lao Cai. This
work could be completed in 1965 or 1966.* Of even greater strategic
importance is the expected continuation of improvement of routes 7 and
152/15 as well as improvement of route 1A and alternate routes from
Vinh south to the Demilitarized Zone.**
Reconstruction of the rail line from Vinh to Duc Tho and improve-
ment of the line from Duc Tho to route 12 probably will continue. It
is not known whether North Vietnam intends to reconstruct in the near
future the rail line from the area of route 15 to Dong Hoi and the
Demilitarized Zone.*** There is little present economic or compelling
military justification for extending the line to the Demilitarized
Zone, but completion of the line would conserve the scarce supply of
trucks, spare parts, and fuel particularly in the event that the
infiltration of men and supplies from this area increased.
Because of the necessity for reconstructing a number of large bridges,
reconstruction of the line to the Demilitarized Zone would take at least
3 or 4 years of concentrated effort even with assistance from Communist
China in a period of no hostilities. Although reconstruction has pro-
gressed past route 15, rapid rehabilitation of the entire line would be
a costly method of saving trucks, spare parts, and fuel. If North Viet-
nam and South Vietnam were united, connection of this line with the rail
line to Saigon would improve political control over the country and
facilitate the exchange of agricultural crops from the Mekong Delta for
industrial and mineral products from North Vietnam. North Vietnam ap-
parently has planned to develop its transport network so that it can be
unified with that of the rest of Indochina in anticipation of the area
eventually being under Communist domination.
* Recent information indicates that route 6 to the China border has
been improved to a point where trucks can now be used.
** Little improvement of these roads can be made by the North Viet-
namese as long as extensive aerial bombing continues. Instead, con-
struction efforts almost certainly will be directed toward the tempo-
ary repair of bridges and the development of bypasses to maintain a flow
of vital supplies.
*** It is unlikely that extensive reconstruction work on rail lines south
of the 20th parallel will resume while the bombing continues.
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APPENDIX A
TRANSPORT PERFORMANCE BY MODE AND AREA
I. Railroads
A. Rail Traffic
During 1961-63, rail performance in North Vietnam increased at
lower average annual rates than performance by any other mode of trans-
port, and these rates were considerably less than those required to
meet the goals of the first five-year plan. Except for the railroads,
all modes of transport generally surpassed the rates required to meet
the goals -- a reversal of the trend during 1956-60, when rail per-
formance generally increased at much higher rates than did performance
by other modes of transport. The railroads, however, surpassed their
annual plan goals for 1963 and 1964 and during that time apparently pro-
vided adequate service for the economy. Since the bombing of North
Vietnam began, rail congestion on the Hanoi - Dong Dang line has re-
sulted. from the increased quantity of military supplies being shipped.
to North Vietnam.
1. Economic Significance of the Various Rail Lines
The Hanoi - Lao Cai rail line connects the industrial
centers of Viet Tri and Lam Thao and the major apatite mines located
near Lao Cai with Hanoi. Before the aerial attacks on this line, which
began in July 1965, the volume of traffic probably was as large as that
on any line in North Vietnam. A reported average of seven freight
trains moving each way per day in December 1964 indicates the volume of
traffic on this line between Lao Cai and Yen Bai, the latter town
located about half way between Lao Cai and Hanoi. 17 Probably about
half of these trains were domestic and half were trains carrying transit
traffic for Communist China. The rail line between Hanoi and the port
of Haiphong also has a comparatively large volume of freight traffic.
In addition to North Vietnamese imports and exports, some Chinese
transit traffic to and from Yunnan Province normally moves on this line
and through Haiphong. The average number of cars per train observed by
aerial photography on the Hanoi-Haiphong line is about the same as that
on the Hanoi - Lao Cai line and the density of trains probably is as
great. Also from aerial photography, trains on the Hanoi-Haiphong line
appear to travel at higher average speeds than those on any other line.
No major industrial centers or mining areas are located
along the Hanoi - Dong Dang rail line, and the volume of freight carried
on this line probably is normally a little less than that on the Hanoi-
Haiphong and Hanoi - Lao Cai lines. By the end of 1964, however, the
line carried a significant amount of transit traffic between Kwangsi and
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Yunnan Provinces in China and international traffic between North Viet-
nam and China. Freight traffic on the Hanoi - Dong Dang line and on
the rail line between Hanoi and the major industrial center of Thai
Nguyen probably increased in December 1963 and again in September 1964
with the respective openings of the first and second blast furnaces at
the Thai Nguyen iron and steel plant. Operation of the two furnaces
requires about 500 mt of coal per day, most of which probably was being
imported from China on these rail lines at the end of 1964. Iron ore
used at Thai Nguyen is obtained locally. The pig iron produced at Thai
Nguyen, a substantial amount of which is exported, probably is trans-
ported by rail, but some could move by barge down the Song Cau to
Haiphong. The volume of freight carried on the Hanoi - Thai Nguyen
line is a relatively minor part of the total tons carried by the rail
system.
The Hanoi-Vinh rail line serves Nam Dinh, one of the six
important industrial centers in North Vietnam. Traffic between Hanoi
and Nam Dinh probably is relatively heavy, but in 1964 through traffic
to Vinh consisted of only two scheduled mixed passenger and freight
trains each way per day. The number of freight cars per train, as
determined from aerial photography of the Hanoi-Vinh line, was less
than that on the other rail lines, and the tonnage carried, like that
on the Hanoi - Thai Nguyen line, probably was a minor part of the total
tons carried by the rail system. (Through rail service on the Hanoi-
Vinh line is no longer possible south of the 20th parallel because of
US bombing.)
2. International Rail Traffic
An important share of the freight performance by railroads
through 1964, especially in terms of ton-kilometers, can be attributed
to Chinese Communist transit freight carried on North Vietnamese rail
lines. Transit freight normally is carried between Kwangsi and Yunnan
Provinces in China on the Dong Dang - Hanoi and Hanoi - Lao Cai rail
lines and between the port of Haiphong and Yunnan on the Haiphong-Hanoi
and Hanoi - Lao Cai lines. The estimated volume of transit traffic dur-
ing 1960 and 1962-63, as derived from North Vietnamese data, is pre-
sented in the following tabulation*:
* The North Vietnamese have published data on the volume of total trans-
port performance and also on the volume of domestic goods transported
for 1960 and 1962-63. The difference between these two volumes, or the
"non-domestic" goods transported, has an average length of haul which
apparently is much too long to be anything but Chinese transit traffic
moving on North Vietnamese railroads. In 1963, about 300 freight cara
would have been required to carry this transit traffic.
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Transit Traffic
Percent
of Total Rail Traffic
Year
Thousand
Ton-
Kilometers
Thousand
Tons
Carried
Average
Length
of Haul
(Kilometers)
In Terms
of Ton-
Kilometers
In Terms
of Tons
Carried
1960
267,300
617
433
38
21
1962
164,700
367
449
24
11
1963
201,900
420
481
24
11
The average length of haul in 1960 indicated that approxi-
mately half of the transit traffic moved by rail between Haiphong and
Lao Cai and about half moved between Dong Dang and Lao Cai. After 1960
there apparently was a trend to shift transit freight to rail through
Dong Dang rather than by sea through Haiphong. By 1963 the average
length of haul approximated the entire length of the Dong Dang - Hanoi -
Lao Cai rail lines, indicating that almost all of the transit traffic
moved through Dong Dang.
Observations at Lao Cai indicate that the total transit
traffic in 1964 could have reached 480,000 mt or about 1,300 mt per
day. The average volume of traffic moving from Kwangsi into North
Vietnam through Dong Dang during the latter part of 1964 is estimated
at about 1,200 to 1,500 mt per day.* During the latter part of the
year, about 600 mt of the 1,200 to 1,500 mt per day moving through Dong
Dang probably represented North Vietnamese imports, which consisted
mainly of coal from China for the two blast furnaces at Thai Nguyen.
The remaining 600 to 900 mt per day moving through Dong Dang probably
represented Chinese transit traffic moving to Yunnan Province. Petroleum
products, almost all of which were destined for Yunnan Province,**
accounted for about 350 mt per day of the traffic through Dong Dang and
Lao Cai. Most of the freight cars returning through. Dong Dang to
Kwangsi were reported to be empty.
A further conclusion can be drawn from the above analysis
of this information. If total transit traffic in 1964 amounted to
about 1,300 mt per day and if 600 to 900 mt per day entered North Viet-
nam through Dong Dang and only a small amount left North Vietnam through
Dong Dang, it can be concluded that most of the remainder of the transit
* Based on the estimated number of freight cars per day moving through
Dong Dang and a net load of 15 mt per car, two-thirds of the reported
average gross weight.
** North Vietnam imports the bulk of its petroleum products by sea
through Haiphong.
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traffic must have moved through Haiphong. Thus it appears that as much
as 400 to 700 mt per day of Chinese transit traffic may have been
shifted back to Haiphong.
Some shipments of military supplies for North Vietnam prob-
ably were transported from Kwangsi by rail before the withdrawal of
observers from Dong Bang, but such shipments were never verified.*
Because however, supplies could have
moved undetected by rail.
some military supplies may have been
transported by rail to the transloading station at P'ing-hsiang and
then moved by truck through Dong Dang to avoid detection.
B. Inventory and Operating Efficiency
North Vietnam probably in operation in 1964 a minimum of 120 loco-
motives, practically all of which were steam powered. Possibly a few
of these were Chinese locomotives used on North Vietnamese rail lines,
but known Chinese locomotives were eliminated from the estimate. Also,
North Vietnam is estimated to have had a minimum of 1,800 freight cars in
operation in 1964.** The inventory of rolling stock is continually
being expanded by imports, mainly from China, the USSR, and Rumania,
of rolling stock and parts for assemblage. Although North Vietnam has
no facilities for manufacturing the basic components of locomotives or
freight cars in significant numbers, a small amount of rolling stock
recently has been manufactured, apparently including most of the basic
components. In January 1965 the North Vietnamese boasted that they had
produced their first locomotive. 19/ Railroad shops are used primarily
for assembling and repairing rolling stock, and most spare parts must
be either imported or cannibalized from old rolling stock. The major
rail shops are located at Hanoi, Gia Lam (5 km northeast of Hanoi), and
Haiphong. 20/
in a 1 ion o e norma ai sc
0 our 1'reight rains, two trains carrying military supplies and
usually consisting of about 15 freight cars per train moved from
China through Lang Son (near Dong Dang). 18/
3 An estimate of at least 1,800 freight cars in 1964 is obtained by
assuming that North Vietnam probably had about 15 freight cars per
locomotive. It is also estimated that about 1,800 freight cars would
have been required to transport the tonnage carried in 1963. This
estimate is calculated as follows: the number of freight cars required
equals the average daily tons originated divided by the average tons
carried per freight car times the turnaround time per freight car.
Freight carried on railroads in 1963 amounted to 3.86 million mt, or
an average of 10,600 mt originated per day. The average net load per
freight car in 1963 is estimated at 15 mt, two-thirds of the reported
gross weight, and the turnaround time per freight car was reported to
be 2.6 days. Therefore, 101500 x 2.6 = 1800 freight cars in operation.
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The efficiency of the utilization of freight cars and locomo-
tives probably did not change much during 1961-63. Data published by
the North Vietnamese are conflicting and show increases in some indi-
cators of efficiency and decreases in others (see Table 9, Appendix B).
Freight cars reportedly continued to carry heavier loads, and the average
consumption of coal per locomotive declined during 1961-63. On the
other hand, the North Vietnamese also reported that tonnage per freight
train remained the same during the period and that turnaround time for
freight cars increased.* The average length of haul also was reported
to have decreased, a situation that would have facilitated a decrease,
rather than an increase, in turnaround time. Maintenance and repair
of both railroad rolling stock and the rail network appeared to be
adequate to meet the needs of the system before the bombing. The
North Vietnamese reported that trains were checked thoroughly before
starting a run to insure safe and efficient operation, and observers
reported that rolling stock generally appeared to be in good condi-
tion. 21/ Maintenance of the rail lines was done primarily by hand,
but observers reported that the lines were kept in good condition, and
seldom was there any indication in recent years of disruption of the
traffic flow resulting from faulty maintenance.
II. Highways
A. Highway Traffic
Highway transportation accounted for the largest share of the
total tons of freight carried in 1963, but because of the short length
of haul -- only 2L km or 11 percent of the length of haul for rail-
roads -- highway performance was only about 10 percent of the total
ton-kilometers. Ton-kilometer performance on the highways increased
at a substantially higher rate than that required to meet the goal of
the five-year plan, and the tonnage carried increased at about the
required rate. Nevertheless, rates of growth during 1961-63 were con-
siderably lower than those during 1956-60, when the primary road net-
work was being rehabilitated and the truck inventory was being ex-
panded rapidly.
The road network in North Vietnam is used primarily for carry-
ing freight relatively short distances either as feeder service for
* The relationship between tonnage per freight train and tonnage per
freight car does not appear reasonable. This relationship indicates
that there was an average of about 34 freight cars per train in 1960
compared with about 29 in 1963, but reports by observers indicate that
the number of cars per train, at least for international trains, in-
creased rather than decreased during the period. Furthermore, even an
average of 29 cars per train appears to be unreasonably high because
information from both aerial photography and from observers indicates
that only a small share of the trains has from 30 to 40 cars. It is
possible that data for the tonnage per freight train include the weight
of the locomotive, contrary to statistical practice in almost all coun-
tries.
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railroads and waterways or as local service. Most of this traffic
occurs in the area of the Red River Delta, where economic activity is
concentrated and the road network is relatively extensive. Even in
this area, highway transportation was characterized in 1964 as con-
sisting of poor roads and a minimum of traffic, practically all of
which was truck movement. Long-distance truck service is provided
mainly to areas not otherwise connected with the Red River Delta, such
as large parts of the northern and northwestern mountainous regions of
North Vietnam, the southern part of North Vietnam, and Laos. Some of
this traffic is for military rather than economic purposes and prob-
ably is not counted in data on transport performance published by the
North Vietnamese. Military trucks are used sometimes for such eco-
nomic purposes as transporting workers, food, fertilizer, and other
materials to farm cooperatives and work sites in northwestern North
Vietnam. 22/ Civilian trucks also are used sometimes for military
purposes.
B. Inventory and Operating Efficiency
North Vietnam had about 5,000 civilian trucks and 1,200 pas-
senger cars at the end of 1962. 23/ Operating statistics for 1962
indicated that about one-half of the total number of trucks were under
the control of state-owned transport agencies in that year. A little
more than 30 percent of the highway freight that moved by state-owned
means of transportation was moved by trailers. Both trucks and fuel
are imported; the trucks are supplied primarily by Communist China,
the USSR, and Czechoslovakia, and the fuel is supplied primarily by
the USSR. The total imports are not known, but the USSR alone sup-
plied more than 1,300 trucks during 1959-63. Although the North
Vietnamese claim to produce spare parts for motor vehicles, most of
these parts also must be imported. The importance of spare parts is
indicated by the fact that the value of spare parts imported from
the USSR during 1959-63 was almost as high as that for trucks, auto-
mobiles, and buses combined. 24 In 1964, petroleum imports -- mainly
from the USSR -- amounted to about 140,000 to 150,000 mt.
Data on state-owned motor vehicles indicated that operating
efficiency probably was less in 1963 than in 1960, although the
statistics for 1963 appear to be inconsistent. The North Vietnamese
reported a significant increase in the average performance per truck,
but the amount transported in terms of ton-kilometers per truck-ton
decreased during 1961-63, as did both the number of days that trucks
were in good condition and the number of days that they were in opera-
tion (see Table 10, Appendix B). In 1963, state-owned trucks were in
operation about 68 percent of the time, an increase above 1962 but less
than in 1960.* In general, even before the bombing, civilian trucks
* The percentage of days in which state-owned trucks were in operation
increased steadily during the latter half of the 1950's from 59 percent
of the time in 1955 to a high of 71 percent in 1960.
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were poorly maintained, not only because of a shortage of spare parts
but also because of inadequate repair facilities and the lack of
skilled personnel. Furthermore, using the trucks on poor roads un-
doubtedly increases the need for maintenance. Military trucks usually
are maintained better than are civilian trucks, but even these some
times have been reported as being in poor condition.
Unlike the railroad network, the road network generally was not
well maintained. Maintenance was most nearly adequate on the main roads
in the Red River Delta, on route 1A from Communist China through Dong
Dang and Hanoi to the Demilitarized Zone, and on strategic roads lead-
ing to Laos, whereas usually only minimum maintenance was performed on
most of the other roads. Even sections of route IA were reported in
poor condition, especially in the areas of Dong Dang, Vinh, and Dong
Hoi, aswere sections of routes 6, 7, and 15 leading toward Laos. The
road from Hanoi to Haiphong was reported to be the best in the country,
and the road from Hanoi to Thai Nguyen also was reported as being in
good condition. Most road maintenance was performed by manual labor
using simple tools and sometimes being aided by one or two old steam-
rollers. Much of the labor for road maintenance was performed by local
people, including all types of workers from peasants to civil servants,
who had to contribute a certain number of days per year for road work. 25/
Maintenance, therefore, was often inadequate both in quality and in
quantity. One observer stated that, in general, the roads appeared to
be in poorer condition in 1963 than they had been when he saw them in
1956.
By 1963 the tonnage carried on inland waterways had risen
almost to the level of freight carried by highway transport. Rates
of increase during 1961-63 for both tons carried and ton-kilometer
performance were at about the level required to meet the goals of the
five-year plan and were slightly above those for total transportation.
Although rates of growth during 1956-60 were higher than during 1961-63,
increases in performance by the inland waterways were considerably be-
low those for any other mode of transport during the earlier period
because inland water transport had been affected less by the war and
had a relatively large starting base in 1955.
Inland water traffic is heaviest in the area between Hanoi,
Haiphong, and Nam Dinh, but efforts are being made to remove obstruc-
tions in the Black River in order to facilitate traffic between Hanoi
and the northwest mountainous regions. Major inland waterways outside
the Red River Delta currently include only the upper reaches of the
Red River to Lao Cai and Communist China and the Song Cau to Cho Moi,
north of Thai Nguyen. The seasonal flow of traffic on much of the
inland waterway network varies considerably because of climatic condi-
tions. All six of North Vietnam's major industrial centers are served
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by the inland water network. The major commodities carried are rela-
tively heavy, low-cost goods, such as rice, coal, fertilizer, lumber,
and other forest products, and sand, gravel, and stone. Data are not
available to estimate accurately the number of boats used on the inland
waterways, but there are possibly as many as 30,000 junks, as well as
numerous smaller craft and some tugs, barges, and river steamers. 26/
The North Vietnamese reported in 1964 that junks carry about one-half
of the total inland water traffic moved by modern and primitive
means. 27/ Major complaints concerning the inland waterway system
include the lack of adequate dredging, especially in the Red River
Delta, the lack of adequate rock removal, and the lack of coordination
between the production, transportation, and consumption sectors of the
economy.
Much emphasis has been given to the construction and repair of
barges and junks for use in inland water and coastal water traffic as
well as local construction of more primitive boats and rafts. The
only significant shipyard in North Vietnam, located at Haiphong, was
expanded during 1964, although there was no evidence of the construc-
tion of craft larger than barges and junks at this shipyard. The
North Vietnamese reported the completion of a new shipbuilding section
at the Haiphong shipyard in 1964. Construction of facilities was con-
tinuing in December 1964 as shown by photography that revealed con-
struction of an L-head pier, measuring about 67 x 11 meters, which
probably is a fitting-out pier for the shipyard, and the construction
of two smaller piers, which also may be associated with the shipyard.
During 1964 there was no expansion of the building ways, but a large
new building -- probably a fabrication building -- was under construc-
tion at the end of 1964. Completion of this building will make a total
of five fabrication-type buildings at the Haiphong shipyard with a total
floorspace of about 16,500 square meters. Facilities for repairing
boats at Haiphong, the most important in North Vietnam, also were being
expanded. New graving docks were being added to at least three and
possibly four boatyards, and a new boatyard may be under construction.
In mid-1964 the construction and repair of steel barges were
being maintained on a 24-hour a day basis in Haiphong. The North
Vietnamese announced the construction of 15,000 mt and the major re-
pair of more than 7,000 mt of boats, presumably including barges,
during 1963. North Vietnam reported earlier that, during the first 9
months of 1963, the river transport branch had constructed 7,100 mt of
new junks and 20 new barges and had repaired 120 old barges.
IV. Coastal Water and Port Traffic
Coastal water performance in terms of ton-kilometers increased at a
rate nearly double that for any other mode of transport during 1961-63,
reflecting the large increase in the average length of haul in 1963.
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The increase in tons carried, although much less than that for ton-
kilometers, also was higher than that for any other mode of transporta-
tion. These increases continued the general trend that had developed
during 1956-60, when coastal water performance expanded at higher rates
than performance by any other mode except that of the railroads in terms
of ton-kilometers.
In spite of its relatively small share of total transport performance,
coastal water traffic is important in the shipment of heavy, low-cost
goods -- such as coal -- between certain areas. Much of the coastal
traffic is carried by junks and barges because the merchant fleet con-
sists of only two small tankers and five dry cargo ships, the largest
of which is 2,500 deadweight tons. Some coastal traffic also is carried
by foreign ships. Coastal traffic, however, accounts for only a small
part of the total port traffic at Haiphong, Cam Pha, and Hon Gai because
the majority of North Vietnamese imports and exports flows through these
ports.
Haiphong
The volume of dry cargo, the major part of which was interna-
tional traffic, passing through Haiphong in 1963, and probably also in
1964, approached the capacity of the port. About 425 foreign merchant
ships, including tankers, called at Haiphong in 1964. An estimated 250
of these ships were Free World ships, some of which were chartered by
Communist countries. The importation of military equipment and ammuni-
tion through Haiphong has not been detected, but ships can easily anchor
outside the harbor and unload these supplies on small craft to be taken
elsewhere. Although congestion in the port apparently was not as acute
in 1964 as in 1963, there were still reports of delays in off-loading,
and port facilities were said to be in poor condition and in need of
extensive repairs.
Photography during 1964 showed significant expansion of port
facilities at Haiphong but not at the level of the agreement with the
USSR in 1962, which provided for assistance to triple the cargo handling
capacity of the port. 28/
ere was no expansion of the main wharf area. A pos-
sible facility for transshipment of cargo also was under construction
in 1964 with two rail lines leading to the area. The basin is large,
but the turn that must be navigated to enter it probably will restrict
the use of the area to coastal ships or barges.
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B. Can Pha and Hon Gai
Cam Pha and Hon Gai, located on the coast northeast of Haiphong,
handle the bulk of the estimated 1.5 million.mt of coal exported
annually from North Vietnam. Of the two ports, Cam Pha can accommodate
larger ships and reportedly has better coal-loading facilities. 29/
In 1964, an average of about 10 to 15 foreign ships, including many
Chinese Communist and Japanese ships, called at these ports each month.
In addition, the most important coastal water traffic in North Vietnam
is the shipment of coal by barge from Cam Pha and Hon Gai to Haiphong. 30/
The volume of this coal traffic is not known, but one barge berth in
Hon Gai, at which barges were reported to be loading continually, is
used exclusively for loading coal for Haiphong and other North Viet-
namese ports. 31/ Several tugs at Cam Pha are used exclusively for
hauling coal barges in coastal traffic. Coal for both coastal and
export trade is carried to these ports from nearby mines on a small,
meter-gauge rail system which is not connected to the main rail network.
Although both ports are used almost exclusive for coal, they do have
facilities for handling a small volume of general cargo. At Cam Pha,
where one quay possibly is used in connection with off-loading goods,
photography in 1964 revealed the construction of a small storage build-
ing. Hon Gai has a general cargo area with one small wharf, which is
being widened, and a number of warehouses that are used for mining
supplies and equipment. A small boat repair yard also has been con-
structed at Hon Gai.
C. Ben Thuy
Traffic at Ben Thuy, the most important of the southern ports,
is primarily coastal traffic. In addition to barges and junks, an
average of about 2 to 4 coastal ships per week, including a few of
Chinese Communist origin engaged in coastal trade, apparently called at
Ben Thuy during the first quarter of 1965. Coal transported from Cam
Pha and Hon Gai by coastal ships and barges probably made up the bulk
of the cargo entering Ben Thuy, and coal storage areas near the wharf
were expanded by almost 80 percent. A spur line, which has been con-
structed from Vinh to a new railroad depot at Ben Thuy, was being
extended to the wharf area, and the expanded coal storage yards may
have been related to increased imports of coal for the railroad.*
Other important goods entering the port included corn, fertilizer,
steel products, and some construction materials. Logs and lumber were
the primary outgoing products. Transportation of these goods by
coastal water continued at about the same level after the completion
of the rail line to Vinh, and water traffic at Ben Thuy apparently was
* Since the rail line south of the 20th parallel has been bombed, the
requirements for coal in the Vinh area probably are much lower. This
freight probably has been replaced by construction materials (for the
temporary repair of bridges) and by other supplies, which have been
shifted to coastal water transportation because of the bombing of land
transport routes.
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not replaced by rail traffic, because it was more economical to handle
this type of goods by water transportation.
Warehouse space at Ben Thuy is much larger than at any port in
the southern part of North Vietnam, and these storage facilities were
being expanded in March 1965, whereas expansion of such facilities in
other southern ports was insignificant. The Vinh - BenThuy area there-
fore probably is the most important logistics base in North Vietnam for
transporting supplies to the Communist forces in Laos over routes 7, 8,
and 15, and to the large North Vietnamese military force in the area of
the Demilitarized Zone. Also, it is possibly one of the major bases for
transporting supplies to the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. Storage build-
ings either recently constructed or under construction when the bombing
began would have increased the storage facilities at Ben Thuy by about
10 percent. Although military supplies probably were transported by
coastal ships or barges to Ben Thuy, such traffic never was observed.
A. Air Traffic
. Civil air transport accounts for only a negligible part of the
total transport performance,. and the North Vietnamese do not include it
with the other modes of transport in their statistical reports. Although
flight schedules are not available, regular air transport service during
the first quarter of 1965 probably was flown on the Hanoi-Vinh - Dong
Hoi and Hanoi - Na San - Dien Bien Phu routes. 32/ Transport flights on
most of the other routes probably were not on a regular basis. Reports
indicate that a large share of air activity in North Vietnam is connected
with training flights rather than transport flights. North Vietnamese
planes do not participate in scheduled international air transport,
although two foreign airlines provide service for Hanoi. The Chinese
civil airline provides at least two scheduled flights each way per week
between Hanoi and Nanning, and, since May 1964, the Cambodian airline
provides one scheduled flight per week between Phnom Penh, Hanoi, and
Canton. 33/
Until recently, all aircraft in North Vietnam were publicly
designated as civil aircraft, but in practice, air transport for mili-
tary purposes probably has been more important than that for economic
purposes.
B. Inventory and Maintenance
Until recently, aircraft in North Vietnam consisted, primarily
of piston transports obtained from the USSR in 1962 after the end of
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the airlift to Laos. An estimate of the inventory of civil aircraft
in North Vietnam at the end of 1964 is as follows J:
Aircraft Designation
Number
of Aircraft
Type of Aircraft
Il-14 (Crate)
13 to 18
Twin-engine transport
Li-2 (Cab)
22 to 26
Twin-engine monoplane
transport
An-2 (Colt)
10 to 12
Single-engine biplane
transport
Yak-18 (Max) and Zlin-226
25 to 30 a/
Monoplane trainer
Mi-4 (Hound) and Mi-1 (Hare)
6 to 12
Helicopter
a. In addition, there may have been some Aero- 5 trainers.
All aircraft, spare parts, servicing equipment, and aviation
fuel are imported, mainly from Communist China and the USSR. Only
minor maintenance and repair can be performed at Gia Lam in North
Vietnam, and aircraft are flown to China for overhaul about once a
year. Before the US bombing, North Vietnam had 21 usable airfields
with runways at least 2,000 feet long. Two of these airfields -- Phuc
Yen and Haiphong/Cat Bi -- could accommodate I1-18 Coot transports,
much larger planes than the North Vietnamese I1-14 transports.
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APPENDIX B
STATISTICAL TABLES
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North Vietnam: Total Freight Performance a/
1960 and 1962-64
Mode 1960 1962 1963 1964 J 1960 1963
Percent
Million Metric Ton-Kilometers of Total
,
Millio
n Metric Ton
s Carri
ed
Percent
of Total
Railroads 2.92
3.22
3.86
4.13
22
22
Highways 5.01
6.53
6.71
7.18
39
38
Inland waterways 4.84
5.95
6.56
7.01
37
38
Coastal waterways 0.24
0.35
0.35
0.37
2
2
Total / 13.00
16.05
17.48
18.69
100
100
25X1
a.
25X1
b. Based on
e
unroun e pe
rcentag
e breakdown of
total
Railroads 704.2 699.1 846.9 926.8 59 53
Highways 107.5 148.3 164.0 178.7 9 10
Inland waterways 313.6 379.5 448.2 490.5 26 28
Coastal waterways 67.6 94.8 142.3 155.9 6 9
192.9 1,321.7 1,601.4 1,751.9 100 100
Total 1
performance in 19 3.
c. Because of rounding, components may not agree with the totals shown.
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North Vietnam: Average Length of Haul
for Freight and Passenger Traffic a/
1960 and 1962-63
Mode
1960
1962
1963
Total Freight Traffic
Railroads
242
217
219
Highways
21
23
24
Inland waterways
65
64
68
Coastal waterways
283
272
Freight by State-owned Means
407
Railroads
242
217
219
Highways
29
22
24
Inland waterways
136
98
75
Coastal waterways
292
297
Total Passenger Traffic
404
Railroads
45
46
Highways
51
35
34
Inland waterways
65
50
a. Calculated from unrounded data.
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North Vietnam: Planned and P^tual Increases
in Transport Performance
1961-65 Plan and 1961-63 Actual
Total freight performance
Average Annual
Rate of Increase
Index (1960 = 100) (Percent)
19651963 1961-65 1961-63
Plan-a/ Actual Plan a Actual
Ton-kilometers
190
147 J
13.7
10.1 J
Tons carried
170
144 J
11.2
9.5 J
Ton-kilometers
212
120
16.2
6.3
Tons carried
192
132
13.9
9.8
Highways
Ton-kilometers
163
153
10.3
15.1
Tons carried
160
134
9.9
10.3
Ton-kilometers
163
143
10.3
12.6
Tons carried
172
136
11.5
10.7
Ton-kilometers
219
211
17.0
28.2
Tons carried
181
146
12.6
13.6
Total passenger performance
Passenger-kilometers
199
176
14.8
20.6
Passengers carried
200
196
14.9
25.3
a. 39
b. Data are for 1963, unless otherwise indicated. 40
c. Data are for 1964. 41
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North Vietnam: Freight Performance
by State-Owned Means of Transportation
1960 and 1962-63
Mode
1960 1962
1963
1960
1963
Million Metric Ton-Kilometers
Percent of Total
Railroads
704.2
699.1
846.9
78
67
Highways
56.2
89.8
103.8
6
8
Inland waterways
81.1
160.5
202.4
9
16
Coastal waterways
59.2
73.6
116.7
7
9
Total
900.7
1,023.0
1,269.8
100
100
Million Metric Tons Carried
Percent of Total
Railroads
2.92
3.22
3.86
52
34
Highways
1.94
4.05
4.36
34
39
Inland waterways
0.60
1.63
2.70
11
24
Coastal waterways
0.20
0.25
0.29
4
3
Total
5.66
9.15
11.22
100
100
a.
b. Because of rounding, components may not agree with the totals shown.
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North Vietnam: Passenger Performance a/
1960 and 1962-63
Mode 1960 1962 1963 1960 1962 1963
Percent Performed
Million by State-Owned
Passenger-Kilometers Transportation
Railroads 622.9 1,032.5 1,155.2 100.0 100.0 100.0
Highways 372.7 503.2 582.9 25.7 26.5 31.7
Inland waterways 27.5 49.2 57.8 Negl. 5.5 lo.4
Total 1,023.1 1,584.9 1,795.9 70.2 73.7 74.9
Percent Performed
Million by State-Owned
Passengers Carried Transportation
Railroads 13.76 22.44 23.95 100.0 100.0 100.0
Highways 7.24 14.22 16.93 13.9 12.1 14.2
Inland waterways 0.42 0.99 1.21 Negl. 1.5 5.1
Total L/ 21.43 37.65 42.09 68.9 64.2 62.8
a. 3
b. Because of rounding, components may not agree with the totals shown.
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 Approved For Release 200ptQ5//4 _gI~-RDP78T02095R000800070107-7
Truck Traffic Reported by Ground Observers on Route 7 in Laos a/
1963-64 and January-March 1965
Maximum Number
of Trucks Moving
Total Number
of Trucks
Number of
Average Number
of Trucks Moving
Year
in One Direction
Reported Moving
Days Covered
in Both Directions
and Month
in Any One Day
in Both Directions
by Reports
per Day
1963
500
8,310
151
55
January
200
1,003
27
37
February
53
332
8
42
March
180
926
13
71
April
68
233
21
11
May
106
692
19
36
June
150
888
15
59
July
200
971
14
69
August
J
J
0
c/
September
500
2,229
12
16
October
107
668
14
48
November
100
178
4
44
December
110
190
4
48
1964
350
5,094
114
45
January
J
CJ
0
J
February
50
50
1
50
March
320
1,187
13
91
April
350
1,491
9
166
May
J
J
0
C/
June
57
151
4
38
July
62
73
3
24
August
19
56
7
8
September
80
314
21
15
October
116
729
22
33
November
120
508
15
34
December
93
535
19
28
1965
January
90
491
15
33
February
50
308
15
21
March
30
191
18
11
a. Based on roadwatch reports of traffic and reports from other sources. Data
may include some duplicate counting of the same trucks if the trucks passed more
than one observation post along the route. Such duplication has been eliminated
whenever possible.
b. Total number of trucks divided by the number of days covered.
c. No reports for the month.
Approved For Release 200?( -@1A-RDP78T02095R000800070107-7
 Approved For Release 2006/05/24E-C P78T02095R000800070107-7
Truck Traffic Reported by Ground Observers on Route 12 and Route 23 in Laos
1964 and January-March 1965
Maximum Number Total Number Average Number
of Trucks Moving of Trucks Number of of Trucks Moving
Year in One Direction Reported Moving Days Covered in Both Directions
and Month in Any:One Day in Both Directions by Reports per Day J
1964
January
J
C/
0
J
February
J
J
0
J
March
4
25
10
2
April
36
141
16
9
May
35
154
22
7
June
7
35
13
3
July
27
63
28
2
August
4
43
22
2
September
7
46
26
2
October
6
56
30
2
November
10
88
30
3
December /
55
203
31
7
January
30
182
31
6
February
13
135
28
5
March
6
93
31
3
January
c
0
February
L
0
March
63
274
5
55
April
47
94
15
6
May
60
217
29
7
June
0
0
17
0
July
0
0
31
0
August
0
0
31
0
September
0
0
31
0
October
0
0
31
0
November
0
0
30
0
December
100
206
31
7
January
80
661
22
30
February
40
483
27
18
March
95
1,243
30
41
a. Based on roadwatch reports of traffic and reports from other sources along route
12 between its junctions with routes 23 and 8 and along route 23 between its junc-
tions with routes 12 and 9. Route 12 in Laos joins with route 15 in North Vietnam
at Mu Gia Pass. Data may include some duplicate counting of the same trucks if the
trucks passed more than one observation post along the route. Such duplication has
been eliminated whenever possible.
b. Total number of trucks divided by the number of days covered.
c. No reports for the month.
d. Including traffic through 10:00 a.m. on 1 January 1965.
- 43 -
Approved For Release 2006/05124F--Chi-i IP78T02095R000800070107-7
 Approved For Release 290w/~5/R4E_ lA-RDP78T02095R000800070107-7
North Vietnam: Percentage Distribution of State Investment
in Capital Construction, by Sector a
1955-56 Average, 1958-60, and 1962-
1955-56
Average
1958
1959
1960
1962
1963
Productive sector
87.8
82.6
82.8
81.3
84.8
86.9
Industry
20.5
35.4
37.4
38.8
45.2
43.5
Agriculture
14.8
15.2
11.5
10.7
21.3
23.4
Transportation and
communications
44.1
23.3
21.5
17.1
11.9
16.7 J
Construction
1.8
1.8
2.9
7.7
3.4
1.4
Trade
6.6
6.9
9.6
7.0
3.0
1.9-
Nonproductive sector
Total
12.2 17.4 17.2 18.7 15.2 13.1
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
b. Because of rounding, components may not agree witti the totals s own.
c. Includin 1.2 percent of the total state investment allocated
separately Ito communications.
Approved For Release 20 QS( ESgIA-RDP78T02095R000800070107-7
 Approved For Release 2006/05, ^:--FRDP78T02095R000800070107-7
North Vietnam: Selected Operating Data for Railroad Transport a/
1960 and 1962-63
Factor
Average gross tonnage per
freight train J
Average gross tonnage per
freight car J
Average turnaround time
per freight car
Average speed of freight
trains, including stops
Average speed of freight
trains, excluding stops
Average daily run per freight
locomotive
Coal consumption per freight
locomotive
Average speed of passenger
trains, including stops
Average speed of passenger
trains, excluding stops
Unit of Measure
1960
1962
1963
Metric Tons
637.8
613.7
637.8
Metric tons
18.8
21.4
22.2
Days
2.3
2.6
2.6
Kilometers per hour
19.0
19.7
19.0
Kilometers per hour
27.1
28.5
28.0
Kilometers
241.0
250.0
263.7
Kilograms per 10,000
metric ton-kilometers
354.3
385.8
338.2
Kilometers per hour
21.8
22.6
22.8
Kilometers per hour
29.1
30.4
30.6
a. 7
b. Translated as "average total capacity" of one freight train.
c. Translated as "average capacity" of one freight car.
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 Approved For Release 20 ;6/kQ5~2~_p-RDP78T02095R000800070107-7
North Vietnam: Selected Operating Data for State-Owned Trucks a/
1960 and 1962-63
Factor
Unit of Measure
1960
1962
1963
Days in good condition
Percent
80.9
67.7
73.6
Days in operation
Percent
71.3
62.7
67.9
Operating capacity
used
Percent
96.7
96.0
96.3
Average daily length
of run for one truck
Kilometers per day
146.1
140.4
138.6
Average annual
performance
Thousand metric ton-
kilometers per truck-
ton per year
24.4
21.8
21.0
Average annual
performance, including
truck-trailers
Thousand metric ton-
kilometers per truck-
ton per year
N.A.
31.9
30.6
Average daily
performance per truck
Metric ton-kilometers
per day
226.4
229.5
375.0 J
a.
b. Translated as "rate of use of truck capacity."
c. The figure, 375.0 metric ton-kilometers, appears to be much too high
to be consistent with other operating data for 1963.? In order for this
figure to be valid, North Vietnam would have had to add a considerable
number of large trucks to its civil inventory during 1963. More than
likely the figure is wrong.
Approved For Release 2PQ?LW?4E @IA-RDP78T02095R000800070107-7
 Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070107-7 ?
North Vietnam: Selected Economic Indicators
1956-64
Economic Indicator Unit of Measure 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964
Absolute Data
Population J Million persons 15.0 15.2 15.4 15.7 16.0 16.3 16.6 16.9 17.3
Gross national product b Million 1960 dong 2,665 3,135 3,40l 3,906 4,007 4,282 4,602 4,723 5,134
Industrial production Million 1959 dong 245.8 344.6 447.4 648.1 840.4 1,046.8 1,372.6 1,513.5 1,750.1
(excluding
handicrafts) /
4
046
2
224
2
2
349
2
3
309
2
464.0
2
464.o
Agricultural production c/ Million 1959 dong
1,743.4
1,816.9
2,039.1
2,22
.9
.
2,
.9
,
0
06
,
.
1
21
7
.
,
601
4
1
,
9
751
1
Transport performance Million
332.2
367.1
566.8
903.5
1,192.9
.
1,3
,3
.
.
,
.
,
in metric ton-kilometers
Transport performance Million
5.02
5.46
7.00
10.43
13.00
14.80
16.05
17.48
18.69
in metric tons carried
Population
100.0
101.3
102.7
104.7
106.7
4
108.7
60
110.7
172
7
112.7
2
177
115.3
192
6
Gross national product
100.0
117.6
4
127.6
182
0
146.6
263
7
150.
341
9
.7
1
425.9
.
558.4
.
615.7
.
712.0
'Industrial production
100.0
0.2
1
.
.
.
(excluding handicrafts)
04
2
0
117
6
127
117.4
127.6
134.7
141 3
Agricultural production
100.0
l
.
110
.
6
170
.
0
272
359.1
393.1
397.9
132.5
527.3
Transport performance
100.0
.5
.
.
in metric ton-kilometers
Transport performance
100.0
108.8
139.4
207.8
259.0
294.8
319.7
348.2
372.3
in metric tons carried
a. Midyear data.
b. At market prices in 1960 dong. Dong values may be converted to US dollars at the rate of exchange of 3.7 dong to US $1. This rate
does not necessarily reflect the relative internal purchasing power of the dong in terms of the dollar.
c. Gross value in 1959 Bong.
Approved For Release 2006/05/24: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070107-7