SOUTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT: PROSPECTS FOR GOING IT ALONE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070041-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: December 1, 1968
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
South Vietnam's Military Establishment:
Prospects for Going It Alone
Secret
ER IM 68-152
December 1968
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting t:e national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
.18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declouificotion
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of .Intelligence
December 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
South Vietnam's Military Establishment:
Prospects for Going It Alone
Summary
Statistical indicators show that South Vietnamese
participation and combat experience have grown in
1968. There reportedly have been greater efforts to
seek out the enemy, and Communist losses of men and
materiel resulting from South Vietnamese military
action have increased substantially. South Viet-
namese military casualties also have risen, and there
has been a sharp expansion of military force levels.
Despite these favorable indicators, the implied in-
crease in South Vietnamese effectiveness probably is
more a reflection of the heavy support received from
US forces than of South Vietnamese initiative. With-
out the presence of US troops and artillery and air
support, it is likely that the South Vietnamese
military establishment would crumble rapidly under
a heavy Communist assault.
The present inability of South Vietnamese forces
to undertake a greater share of the fighting stems
largely from the long-standing lack of effective
leadership, an inequitable selection and promotion
system, poor training, inadequate firepower, and an
antiquated logistical system. These problems have
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intel-
ligence, the Office of National Estimates, and the
Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.
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25X1
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been aggravated by low pay scales and by the wide-
spread corruption, political favoritism, and privilege
seeking that are rife within the military establish-
ment. Although efforts are under way to minimize
these deficiencies, all evidence indicates that it
might be at least two years, if not longer, before
the South Vietnamese military establishment is
capable of carrying the bulk of the responsibility
for defense of the country.
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1. The winter-spring campaign, highlighted by
the Tet offensive in February, and subsequent attacks,
particularly the May-June and August offensives, have
placed heavy demands on South Vietnam's armed forces.
The heightened level of combat not only increased
South Vietnamese casualties, but also spurred a
nationwide mobilization effort and initiated a sharp
expansion in force levels. But perhaps more im-
portant, Saigon has had to pit a larger part of its
forces against the growing, well-organized, and better
armed North Vietnamese force at a time when the
strength of other Allied forces in South Vietnam has
leveled off.
Composition of South Vietnam's Armed Forces
2. At the end of September 1968 the assigned
strength of South Vietnam's armed forces totaled
more than 938,000 men. The primary elements are
the regular forces, the Regional and Popular Forces
(RF/PF), the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG),
and the National Police (NP) (see Table 1) . *
The Regular Forces
3. The mission of the regular forces is that
of any national military establishment -- to defend
the country against external attack and to assist
in maintaining internal security. The Army of the
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) accounts for about 90
percent of the strength of the regular units. The
balance is comprised of the South Vietnamese Air
Force, Navy, and Marines. All regular military
forces are commanded by the Joint General Staff
which is subordinate to the Ministry of National
Defense.
* In addition, there are a number of South Vietnamese
organizations whose primary responsibilities may not
necessarily include combat, but who, nevertheless,
carry arms and frequently engage the enemy. These
include Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre, Armed
Propaganda Teams, Provincial Reconnaissance Units,
and Kit Carson Scouts totaling perhaps 60,000 men.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
December 1968
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
South Vietnam's Military Establishment:
Prospects for Going It Alone
Summary
Statistical indicators show that South Vietnamese
participation and combat experience have grown in
1968. There reportedly have been greater efforts to
seek out the enemy, and Communist losses of men and
materiel resulting from South Vietnamese military
action have increased substantially. South Viet-
namese military casualties also have risen, and there
has been a sharp expansion of military force levels.
Despite these favorable indicators, the implied in-
crease in South Vietnamese effectiveness probably is
more a reflection of the heavy support received from
US forces than of South Vietnamese initiative. With-
out the presence of US troops and artillery and air
support, it is likely that the South Vietnamese
military establishment would crumble rapidly under
a heavy Communist assault.
The present inability of South Vietnamese forces
to undertake a greater share of the fighting stems
largely from the long-standing lack of effective
leadership, an inequitable selection and promotion
system, poor training, inadequate firepower, and an
antiquated logistical system. These problems have
Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA.
It was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
and was coordinated with the Office of Current Intel-
Zigence, the Office of National Estimates, and the
Director's Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs.
SECRET
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Locations of Major South Vietnamese Bases and Units*
ARVN Regular Forces 75,600
RF and PF Ur:its 148,200
US Forces 25,800
Ell ORPS
ARVN Regular Forces 211.109
RF and PF Units 87,402
US Forces 178,800
n,=ngth of m: for forces by Corps are as .130 September (968.
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P
Da Nang
TOTAL FORCES:
ARVN Regclai Forces 427,500
RF and PF Units 388,400
US Forces 540,300
RF: Regional Forces
PF: Popular Forces
Figure 1
I CORP`-
ARVN Regular Forces 70,800
RF and PF U'sits 57,600
US Forces 199,000
ARVN Reciular Forces 70,000
RF and PF Units 95,200
US Forces 136,700
NAVAL BASE
(aAIR WING
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Composition of South Vietnam's Armed Forces
as of 30 September 1968
Organization
Number
Regular Forces
427.5
Regional Forces
216.7
Popular Forces
171.8
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups
42.5
National Police
79.6
Total
938.1
4. The ground forces of the South Vietnamese
Army, totaling more than 381,000 at the end of
September, are organized into four corps and a
Capital Military District, with headquarters at
Da Nang, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, Can Tho, and Saigon. An
army commander in the Joint General Staff exercises
control through field commanders and a number of
staff assistants. Combat units in the ground forces
consist of ten infantry divisions, one airborne
division, one separate infantry regiment, ten
armored cavalry squadrons, six separate artillery
battalions, one marine brigade of six battalions, 20
Ranger battalions, and five Ranger headquarters
groups. (For locations of major South Vietnamese bases
and units, see Figure 1.) The standard infantry
division has an authorized strength of about 12,275
personnel distributed in three infantry regiments of
four battalions each, two artillery battalions, one
combat engineer battalion, and a number of company-
sized support units. Most of the operations of
the South Vietnamese Army, usually carried out in
cooperation with other Allied forces, are designed
to destroy enemy troops and facilities and to deny
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them the use of local resources. The South Vietnamese
Army also plays a security role in the rural paci-
fication program, and at the end of June, 40 of its
161 battalions were so employed.
Naval Forces
5. South Vietnam's Navy had a total strength
of some 28,000 men at the end of September, includ-
ing about 11,000 marines. Its primary functions are
to patrol the coast and inland waterways and to
assist the ground forces in maintaining internal
security. The Navy, headed by a Chief of Naval
Operations subordinate to the Chief of the General
Staff, is organized into the Sea Forces, River Forces,
and Coastal Forces with major bases at Saigon, Da Nang,
Nha Trang, and My Tho. The Navy's ship inventory
consists of some 200 assorted small combat vessels
plus 300 junks, 100 assorted river patrol craft, and
70 miscellaneous craft and boats.
6. South Vietnam's Air Force, totaling about
18,000 men at the end of September, is charged with
providing close air support, transport, medical
evacuation, and aerial reconnaissance for the ground
forces. The Air Force organized _nto five composite
wings, one each in Da Nang, Nha Tranq, Binh Thuy,
Bien Hoa, and Tan Son Nhut. Units include six
tractical fighter squadrons, five helicopter squadrons,
four liaison squadrons, three transport squadrons,
and one reconnaissance squadron. Ostensibly under
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of National Defense
through the Joint General Staff, direct control over
the Air Force is exercised by Vice President Ky in
his role as the Air Force Commander. The Air Force
possessed 483 aircraft at the end of July, including
2.1 F-5 jet fighters, four B-57 jet light bombers,
148 propeller-driven attack aircraft, 63 transports,
102 helicopters, and 145 miscellaneous aircraft.
Regional and Popular Forces (RF/PF)
7. The capability of the regular forces is com--
plemented by a territorial force which totaled about
389,000 men at. the end of September. These Regional
and Popular Forces are primarily concerned with
providing security for the pacification program and
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for local administrative organizations and, conse-
quently, are responsible for securing and pacifying
the countryside. Perhaps 10 percent of Regional
Force companies engage in offensive operations. Al-
though under the command of the South Vietnamese Army,
they are not part of it but are directly under the
control of the Regional and Popular Forces national
headquarters, with subordinate commands at corps,
province, and district levels. There is, however,
an interlocking relationship because the Director
General for Regional and Popular Forces Affairs in
the Joint General Staff also serves as a Deputy
Chief of the Joint General. Staff.
8. The Regional Forces consist largely of
companies of fulltime, uniformed personnel whose
operations are carried out. at the district and
province levels. Platoons of the Popular Forces
perform similar roles at village and hamlet levels.
Regional and Popular Forces personnel usually are
stationed in the areas from which they are recruited.
Their mobility is limited and they are lightly armed.
The heaviest weapons of a Regional Forces company
are two 60-mm mortars; the heaviest weapons in Popu-
lar Forces platoons are Browning automatic rifles.
The higher status of the Regional Forces is reflected
in the prevailing pay scale. Regional Forces
personnel receive pay and al.1--+wances almost equal
to those of the regular forces. 't'here is no rank
structure in the Popular Forces, and all personnel
receive a base pay and rice allowance of $20 to $30
per month, depending on their location in the country.
Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG)
9. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups,
a paramilitary force which totaled about 42,000
men at the end of September, are commanded by the
Vietnamese Special Forces and advised by US Special
Forces personnel. Their primary mission is to conduct
operations against Viet Cong bases and lines of
communication and to provide border surveillance in
remote areas not under South Vietnamese control.
The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups consist of
fulltime, irregular volunteers recruited largely
from among minority groups. They are not members
of the South Vietnamese Army, and all funds and
logistical support are provided by the US Special
Forces. The Civilian Irregular Defense Groups have
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:limited mobility and are generally restricted to small
infantry tactics. Members are armed with an assort-
ment of US small arms, largely of World War :I=_ vintage,
such as M-1 rifles, carbines, and Browning automatic
rifles. (For views of Civilian Irregular Defense
Groups Special Forces camps, see Figures 2 and 3.)
National Police
10. The basic mission of the National Police,
whose strength totaled about 80,000 at the end of
September, is to maintain law and order. In the
present emergency, however, they have the additional
function of assisting the military forces to defend
populated areas against Communist attacks. A
13,000-man unit of the National Police, the National
Police Field Force, performs as a paramilitary force,
conducting operations against the Viet Cong in-
frastructure and frequently assisting the military
in patrols against the Communists. The mobility of
the National Police is limited, and personnel are
armed primarily with revolvers, carbines, submachine-
guns, and shotguns.
Measures of South Vietnamese Military Effectiveness
11. Compared with the performance of Communist
units in South Vietnam, the military effectiveness
of the South Vietnamese, particularly as an offensive
force, has been limited. During the enemy's Tet
offensive the military forces reportedly performed
reasonably well, often exceeding the exooectations
of their American advisers. However, much of the
action in which they participated was defensive in
character and, in most instances, US troops, artil-
lery, and air support were present.
12. As the pace of combat in South Vietnam has
accelerated, however, the South Vietnamese military
establishment has gained in experience. Its in-
creased participation in combat operations is re-
flected in the statistical indicators of performance
emanating from Saigon. For example, the number of
South Vietnamese Army* personnel killed in action in
For the purposes of this and subsequent discussions
and unless otherwise indicated, the South Vietnamese
Army includes the regular forces and the Regional and
Popular Forces.
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Figune 2. SpecLc Fonceb Camp at Buon
Mi Ga, South Vietnam
F igune 3. Special Forcc.eo Camp at Buon
Brc.Leng, South Vietnam
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1967 was 6 percent higher than in 1966 and the
number of wounded rose 40 percent. During the
first nine months of 1968 the number killed each
month was at a rate about 50 percent higher than
the 1967 monthly average. Moreover, some 190 ;.000
men volunteered for service in the first nine months
of this year, about 65 percent more than the number
of voluntary enlistments for all of 1967. This up-
surge, however, probably represents, in. large part,
a response to the February moratorium on classifying
absent personnel as deserters if they returned by
15 March, stepped-up police operations against: draft
dodgers, and enlistments aimed at avoiding induction
under the general mobilization bill.
13. In their combat operations, the average weekly
number of battalion days of operations of the regular
South Vietnamese Army battalions rose from about 450
in 1966 to 635 in 1967. The average declined to 540
during the first half of 1968, due largely to the
defensive character of South Vietnamese operations
resulting from major Communist offensives. The total
number of battalion operations with enemy contacts,
which declined from about 1,685 in 1966 to 1,575
in 1967, was at an annual rate of 2,345 during the
first half of 1968. In addition, the ratio for the
number of enemy troops killed in action relative to
South Vietnamese losses and for the number of weapons
captured also increased. The killed in action ratio
for the regular forces rose from 3.8 to 1 in 1967
to 5.6 to 1 during the first half of this year. The
ratio for Regional Forces units rose from 3.7 to 4.3
during the same period and for the Popular Forces
from 1.5 to 2.5. During the period 28 I-Tanuary-2
March 1968, South Vietnamese Army forces killed
an estimated 24,000 Communists, compared with some
22,000 killed by other Allied forces.
14. The performance of South Vietnamese Army
units varied considerably during the Tet offensive,
depending largely on the competence of their
leadership and the scope of US support received.
Some units defended their positions effectively
despite high casualties, while others melted away
at the first contact with the enemy. There were
frequent engagements where South Vietnamese Army
forces stood and fought, even when seriously under-
strength, and inflicted heavy casualties on the
Communists. Less than 10 percent of some 5,000
Regional and Popular Forces outposts were lost,
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although some were abandoned without any enemy
contact or fell through internal subversion. The
number of Regional and Popular Forces personnel
killed in February during the height of the Tet
offensive was about one-third the number of combat
deaths suffered by these forces in all of 1967.
15. On the other hand, there were many instances
of indecision, conflict between commanding officers,
and frequent overriding concern for personal safety.
Some units removed their uniforms when the enemy
approached, and there were reports of territorial
units refusing to come to the aid of hamlet officials
being executed by the Viet Cong. Even now there are
instances of lack of cooperation among various
security elements. In Phu Yen Province, for example,
some Regional and Popular Forces units have been
unwilling to combine operations with the police,
whereas the police have refused to coordinate their
activities with regular South Vietnamese Army units
in the province.
16. Although the statistical indicators,
particularly those for 1968, suggest an expansion
of the combat participation of the South Vietnamese
Army and imply an increase in its effectiveness,
they tend to submerge certain qualitative factors
that are essential for an adequate assessment. For
example, the higher casualty rates for the South
Vietnamese Army, increased contacts with the enemy,
and higher ratios for enemy troops killed in action
apparently are more a result of the heightened
level of Communist offensive action than of initiative
on the part of the South Vietnamese Army. Although
South Vietnamese Army casualties have risen sub-
stantially, it is not possible to determine the
number that resulted from offensive action against
the enemy as opposed to those that resulted from
Communist attacks against defensive positions. Nor
is there any way to determine how many of the enemy
killed in action who were credited to the South
Vietnamese Army resulted from US artillery and air
support.
17. While the unit participation of US forces
has increased over time, the relative involvement
of South Vietnamese Army forces has not increased
significantly. The weekly average number of days
of operation per US battalion, for example, rose
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from 3.2 during the second half of 1966 to 7.0 by
the end of 196 7 . The average for the South Viet-
namese Army, on the other hand, increased only from
2.6 during the second half of 1966 to 3.2 during
the first half of 1968. Moreover, the number of
days that US forces are engaged in operations is
five times the number for South Vietnamese Army
forces, and US contacts with the enemy are twice
the rate for the South Vietnamese Army. Although
the contact rate for small-unit operations by the
South Vietnamese Army has increased, it still
averaged only about four per thousand in 1967.
18. Many South Vietnamese Army commanders still
display a reluctance to engage the enemy. After
the initial Tet attacks subsided and the cities
were secured, most of these commanders assumed (and
many still retain) overly defensive postures. of-
fensive actions to reclaim rural areas were minimal.
Even now, many units frequently hole up in their
defensive positions at night instead of undertaking
patrols. Elements of the 1st Infantry Regiment
assigned to pacification duty earlier this year, for
example, were reluctant to deploy much more than a
mile from Quang Tr city, generally preferring to
remain in their defensive positions and to allow
Revolutionary Development teams to make the initial
contact with the Communists. Tti reluctance to engage
the enemy, particularly at night, has kept rural
security in most areas of South Vietnam at a low
level. In most areas of the country, almost all
travel ceases at dusk, and the enemy encounters little
hindrance in traveling at night. Popular Forces units
are particularly unwilling to engage in offens:_ve
action, generally seeking the protection of their
vatic outposts. The larger share of Popular Forces
units reportedly seldom seek contact with the enemy?
19. Since the Tet offensive the Saigon govern-
ment has replaced three of four corps commanders
and at least 24 province chiefs. These changes,
however, probably were motivated as much by political
considerations as by a desire to infuse more
aggressiveness into the military forces and to re-
move ineffective officers. In the IV Corps area,
under the leadership of General Nguyen Duc Thang,
-there was a substantial expansion of offensive
operations, including an increase in the number of
night operations by Regional and Popular Forces.
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1968
Jan
Feb
Mar
Ap r
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
The performance of the South Vietnamese Army in this
area improved significantly, with 25 percent more
men reportedly present for duty each day in infantry
and ranger battalions. Improvement of this type, how-
ever, has been limited and. is unlikely to become
widespread or sustained when corruption and incom-
petence have so long prevailed. In fact, General
Thang was transferred within a few months amid an
undercurrent of references to his pressing too hard
and his "political immaturity."
20. A serious problem currently confronting the
South Vietnamese is the growing rate of desertions
from the Regular Forces. During the first quarter
of the year, the monthly rate of net desertions
(gross desertions less returnees) was substantially
less than the average monthly rate of 10.5 per
thousand troops in 1967 (see Table 2). After the
Tet offensive, however, the rate of net losses
jumped significantly and has remained relatively
high.
Monthly Rate of Net Desertions
in South Vietnam's Military Forces a/
January-September 1968
Thousand Persons b/
Net per
Gross
Net
Thousand
Troop
Strength
Desertions
Returnees
Desertions
Strength
6 46 .9
4.9
0.5
4.4
6.8
647.2
10.0
4.6
5.4
8.3
677.6
12.7
7.5
5.2
7.7
713.3
10.9
2.7
8.2
11.5
743.4
11.1
1.5
9.6
12.9
765.0
11.4
1.2
10.2
13.3
790.6
13.0
0.9
12.1
15.3
811.5
12.9
1.2
11.7
14.4
816.0
13.3
0.6
12.7
15.6
a. Including only the regular forces and the Regional and
Popular Forces.
b. Data are end-of-month figures.
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Factors Affecting the Military Performance of the
South Vietnamese Arm
Leadership and Training
21. Among the more important factors contributing
to the limited performance of the South Vietnamese
Army is an inadequate number of well-trained and
effective cadre. The need for rapid expansion of
the country's military forces under wartime con-
ditions has made it difficult to train sufficient
numbers of middle-grade officers and non-commissioned
officers. Since 1963, South Vietnam's military
forces have increased nearly 115 percent (see Table
3). The resulting staffing problem has been com-
pounded by the constant employment of much of the
cadre on combat operations and by the need to saddle
many upper-level officers with civil affairs functions.
At one point earlier this year, the regular forces
had only half of their authorized strength in the
ranks of captain and above. In units of the Regional
and Popular Forces, cadre -- already in short supply --
were particularly hard-hit during Tet. At the end
of February, officers and non-commissioned officers
in the Regional and Popular Forces were only 67
and 78 percent, respectively, of authorized strength.
Officers in the Regional Forces were still only 65
percent of the authorized strength at the end of
June. Despite the shortage of officers, Saigon has
made almost no effort to revise its highly restric-
tive promotion system. It is estimated that at the
current rate it would take two and one-half years
without losses to fill the April 1968 authorization
for the ranks of captain and above.
22. Overall effectiveness also has been affected
by the apparent lack of concern for adequate train-
ing on the part of the South Vietnamese military
command. Most commanding officers treat: lightly
the need for training programs, and battalions
scheduled for training or retraining often do not
even show up. A lack of adequate training fac:Lli-
ties and the higher priority of military operations
means that a battalion can be scheduled for re-
training only about every three years instead of
annually. Regional and Popular Forces personnel
receive from 7 to 12 weeks of basic training on
the use of weapons but apparently get their tactical
training only after joining their respective units.
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Growth of South Vietnam's Military Establishment
.1963 - September 1968
Thousand Persons
Sep
1963 1965 1967 1968
Regular Forces b/ 216.0
Regional Forces b/ 85.9
Popular Forces b/ 95.5
Civilian Irregular
Defense Groups 18.0
National Police 19.7
Total 435.1
302.6 3422.9 427.5
132.2 151.4 216.7
136.4 148.8 171.8
28.4 38.3 42.5
52.3 73.4 79.6
a. Data are for the end of the period shown.
b. Net accretions reflect volunteers and draftees
minus casualties, desertions, and other losses.
Although all Regional and Popular Forces troops
are scheduled for three to five weeks of refresher
training annually, most province chiefs are reluctant
to part with any of their security elements. Thus
many troops may never go through a refresher course.
It has been estimated that only 13 percent of the
Regional Forces units and 8 percent of the Fopular
Forces platoons conduct the required six hours of
in-place training each week.
23. Under constant US prodding, however, more
emphasis is being placed on training, and efforts
to upgrade the quality of South Vietnamese Army
forces is being made at all levels. The training
program at the Vietnamese Military Academy at Da Lat
was increased from two to four years, and the
curriculum substantially revised at the Command and
General Staff College. (A view of the Military
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Academy is presented in Figure 4.) To improve the
combat effectiveness of maneuver battalions, a
training program was started whereby battalions
are recycled through a National Training Center. A
Long-Range Reconnaissance Patrol Course has been
started to improve intelligence and reconnaissance
operations. General Thang, before his recent trans-
fer, had sought to improve troop effectiveness in
the IV Corps by adding two days of training each
week to unit responsibilities.
F gune 4. Mititatcy Academy at DaZat, South
Vietnam
24. In an effort to overcome some of the train-
ing inadequacies in Regional Forces units, US
advisory teams are being assigned to newly organized
companies. Teams of two officers and three non-
commissioned officers remain with a new company as
advisers until its performance is considered satis-
factory. In addition, mobile teams are being used
to upgrade the effectiveness
of
older Regional Forces
companies. As of 31 August,
232
US advisory teams
were in the field. Although
353
teams are scheduled
to be in operation by the end
probably will not be met.
of
the year, this goal
Arms and Logistics
25. Until recently, most of the equipment used
by South Vietnam's armed forces was of World War II
vintage, and until late in 1967 none of the regular
units of the South Vietnamese Army had M-16 auto-
matic rifles. Almost all Viet Cong and North Viet-
namese regulars and many Viet Cong guerrillas, on
the other hand, are equipped with the fully auto-
matic AK-47 rifle. At the end of June, more than
40 percent of Regional Forces and about 55 percent
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of the Popular Forces units were rated inferior
to the Communists in firepower. A major effort to
increase the firepower of the South Vietnamese Army
was begun late in 1967 when the US military command
in Saigon requested nearly 110,000 M-16 rifles,
more than 4,100 M-79 grenade launchers, about 2,500
M-60 machineguns, and sizable numbers of M-29 mortars,
M-101 and M-114 howitzers, and a variety of vehicles
and communications equipment for distribution to
the regular forces during the last half of 1968. It
also was planned that all military forces would be
equipped with these weapons by mid-1969.
26. As a result of the Tet offensive and the
desire to increase the pace at which the South Viet-
namese government will assume more of the combat
burden, US weapons deliveries have been accelerated.
Moreover, an additional 11,200 M-79 launchers and 158,000
M-16 rifles were authorized. By the end of May,
approximately 130,000 M-16's had been distributed
to maneuver battalions of the South Vietnamese Army.
The next objective is to equip all other military
units with the M-16. In the meantime, almost 30,000
M-2 automatic rifles are being issued for immediate
replacement of M-1 rifles. Priority of M-16 issue
apparently was given to the government forces around
Saigon. Some 27,000 M-16's were issued to the police
and to Regional and Popular 1 urces and Provincial
Reconnaissance Unit personnel in Saigon and the
surrounding areas of Gia Dinh Province. By 15 July,
more than 3,400 M-16's had been issued to the police
in the Saigon area, far in advance of the original
anticipated delivery date.
27. But the South Vietnamese military establish-
ment cannot even begin to carry any significant
share of the combat burden until it can assemble its
own supporting firepower, build an infrastructure,
and create a logistic system independent of the
United States. Because it. is not authorized ade-
quate numbers of artillery, tanks, helicopters, jeeps,
trucks and communications equipment, a South Viet-
namese infantry division lacks the mobility and
supporting firepower of a US division. A regular
South Vietnamese division, for example, has about
30 howitzer-type artillery pieces, compared with
70 in a US division. Shortages of trucks are par-
ticularly critical because distribution is one of
the primary logistical problems. From half to
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two-thirds of all Regional and Popular Forces units
consider their supply system to be slow or unde-
pendable.
Low Pay Scales
28. Another factor which adversely affects the
willingness of South Vietnamese Army personnel to
make sacrifices and encourages corruption is the
low pay scale. A captain with 12 years of service
and four dependents, for example, receives pay and
allowances of about $130 a month.* A police private
with the same number of dependents receives more
than $75. A private in the Regional Forces is
paid less than $50 monthly, while personnel in the
Popular Forces and most of those in Civilian Irregu-
lar Defense Groups, where no rank structures exist,
earn $20 to $30 monthly. In contrast, at the be-
ginning of 1968 a clerk-typist with four dependents
received more than $90 monthly, while a skilled
laborer earned about $60 a month. Table 4 indicates
some representative military pay scales for a pri-
vate stationed near Can Tho.**
29. South Vietnamese government officials
claim that they are aware of the need to raise pay
scales and improve the living conditions of de-
pendents if morale is to be improued. Although a
dependent housing program and commissary privileges
exist, Saigon is unwilling to allocate adequate
funds to these programs. Over the last five years,
75,000 housing units were constructed, but it is
estimated that five to ten years will be required
to relieve the dependent housing shortage for The
present number of raqular and Regional Forces
personnel. Popular Forces troops are not included
in the current housing program, but the United
States provides them with cement and tin to con-
struct their own houses. The commissaries currently
Converted at the official rate of .118 pias?:ers
to 51. Because the real rate is much higher, she
amount actual Zy received is substantially less.
In Pay scales for Regional Forces, Popular Forces,
and Civilian Irregular Defense Groups personnel in
this discussion differ from those in Table 4 because
they represent country-wide averages, Table 4 re-
flects pay scales in only one Zocalit..
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Comparative Pay Scales for a Private in Can Tho
with one Year of Service and One Dependent
US $ per Month
Type of Pay
Civilian Irregular
Defense Groups
South
Vietnamese
Army
Regional
Forces
Popular
Forces
Revolutionary
Development
Cadre
Strike Mike
Team Team a/
9.3
9.3
18.6
21.2
12.7 43.2
CC
trt
CJ.
i
Family allowance
Cost of living allowance
Member
7.6
5.7
5.9
H
Family
4.5
3.3
1.7 3.4
H
Soap allowance
0.1
June 1966 increase
7.6
6.4
June 1967 rice allowance
5.1
5.1
1.7
Total
38.0
32.6
20.3
27.5
20.3 46.6
a. Elite units which include paratroops.
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meet only about one-fourth of total needs, and the
United States has plans to pump in $42 million to
improve the system.
Political and Cultural Factors
30. Perhaps the most enervating factors affect-
ing South Vietnamese military effectiveness are
political and cultural. The involvement of the
military establishment in politics in particular
has a direct effect on the performance of the
Army. There have been instances of province chiefs
or unit commanders refusing to cooperate with. other
chiefs or commanders because they represented
different political factions. The military forces
also continue to be affected by the constant politi-
cal maneuvering in Saigon, and some commanders
are too often concerned with pleasing the "ins"
instead of vigorously prosecuting the war. Changes
in high-level military commanders are often based
on purely personal and political considerations
which have adverse repercussions down the chain
of command. President Thieu's recent moves to
reduce the influence of Vice President Ky, for
example, have involved the removal of certain corps
commanders loyal to Ky and their replacement with
men presumably responsive to Thieu's guidance.
31. The widespread corruption anu privilege
seeking prevailing among civilian offic Lals also
are rife in the military as well. The officer
corps particularly brings into the military
establishment the rigidities of the country's
social structure. For example, anyone entering
service and possessing a high school diploma in-
variably is assigned to an officers' school, while
those without di~Jlomas become enlisted men. Since
the country's arc laic educational system is highly
restrictive, only the sons of the well-to-do obtain
an education.
32. Under US prodding, there has been some
effort to alter the pattern of officer selection
and promotion. For example, some 2,000 inductees
with diplomas recently entered a basic training
training the
selected for
will be sent
In addition,
dicated that
upper half of the group would be
officer training while the remainder
to non-commissioned officers' schools.
the Saigon regime reportedly has in-
it plans to promote into the officer
It was expected that upon completion of
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corps several thousand non--commissioned officers
who did well during the Tet offensive. While such
beginnings are encouraging, it is unlikely that the
present socio-cultural patterns in the military
establishment can be altered significantly in a
short period of time without the problem first
being attacked in the society at large.
33. Finally, there are strong reservations in
some US and South Vietnamese circles about the
wisdom of having South Vietnamese military forces
adopt US strategy and tactics. Created in the
image of a modern army, the South Vietnamese
armed forces have never acquired the arms, equip-
ment, or the skills necessary to conduct modern
warfare. As a result, the South Vietnamese Army
utilizes US tactics of pulling back and calling
for artillery and air support when contact is made
with the enemy. Thus they are highly dependent on
US support and frequently do not attack without
it. On the other hand, South Vietnamese forces
also are not geared for unconventional warfare.
The use of maneuver battalions backed by artillery
often is not the most effective strategy for
countering prolonged domestic insurgency. A
recent South Vietnamese study prepared for Presi-
dent Thieu has in fact recommended a sweeping
reorganization of the military establishment which
would concentrate on developing a capability to
conduct Viet Cong-type warfare.
Saigon's Efforts to Increase Its Commitment
34. About half of South Vietnam's regular forces
have been deployed in III Corps, largely to defend
Saigon. Nearly 40 percent. of Saigon's Regional and
Popular Forces are in IV Corps (see Figure 1). Thus,
it has been left to US forces to engage the enemy's
main units. At the end of September, approximately
70 percent of US troops and a similar share of the
North Vietnamese and Viet Cong main forces were in I
and III Corps, where most of the more conventional-type
war has been fought. The Tet offensive spurred the
Saigon regime into greater efforts to mobilize the
population and to increase South Vietnam's commitment
to its own defense. Conscription has been stepped up,
and during the first nine months of 1968 more than
72,000 men were drafted, compared with some 48,000
during all of 1967. Recent draft legislation seeks
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to increase the size of the armed forces by 1.35,000
men this year -- more than double the number sought
prior to the Tet offensive.* Under the military
mobilization bill, most physically fit males between
16 and 50 are subject to being called up. Those
between 18 and 38 will serve in the regular forces,
while the others will be detailed to self-defense
groups, and those 39 to 43 will serve in noncombat,
rear service units.**
35. The government also is pushing a self-defense
program designed to establish civil defense groups
for urban areas and self-defense militia to supplement
Popular Forces in the villages and hamlets. By the
end of October, more than 330,000 civilians reportedly
received some self-defense training, although only
some 85,000 weapons had been issued to them. Most
of those trained, however, apparently are in the
vicinity of Saigon, and most of the arms distributed
are to civil servants responsible for defending
government buildings. Nearly 3,400 personnel have
been organized in the I Corps area, about one--third
of them in Da Nang. In each of the five coastal
provinces of the II Corps area, groups of 400 to
750 civil servants are being trained to defend public
buildings. More than 2,700 civil servants have been.
trained in the highland provinces of Darlac, Kontum,
Phu Bon, and Tuyen Duc.
36. In Saigon, about 93,000 people have received
some self-defense training. In an additional effort
tno stop Viet Cong infiltration into Saigon, a
"crash" program was launched to provide several
days of training to 1,000 to 1,500 students and
civilians who have had some military training.
These cadre ostensibly were armed and sent to their
own neighborhoods to train other self-defense units.
In Kien Hoa Province in the IV Corps area, 370
civil servants received three weeks of military
training and were assigned to guard government
buildings. In Bac Lieu Province, more than 1,700
civilians had been organized into self-defense
units by the end of April, of whom 550 are civil
It 2is not clear whether the net accretion for the
first half of 2968 is included in this figure o;' is
in addition t.> it.
A# For selected indicators of South Vietnamese miZi-.
tart' activity during the period 1966 through. June 1968,
see Tab Ze 5.
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Selected Indicators of South Vietnamese
Military Activity
1966 - June 1968
1966 1967 1968
(Jan-Jun)
South Vietnamese Casualties
Killed in action
11,953
12,716
10,084
Wounded in action
20,975
29,448
31,385
Missing in action
3,283
2,340
1,972
Weapons Losses
Total friendly forces
9,381
8,039 a/
3,319 b/
South Vietnamese Army
8,309
8,292 a/
2,757 c/
Battalion Days of Operations
Weekly Average
US forces
215
535
918
Battalion days per battalion
4.0
6.2
7.0
South Vietnamese Army
448
634
540
Battalion days per battalion
2.9
3.9
3.2
Battalion-Sized Operations
Total friendly forces 5,142
5,458
3,581
South Vietnamese Army 3,942
3,874
2,762
South Vietnamese Army
as a percent of total 77
71
77
Battalion-Sized Operations Involving
Contact with North Vietnamese Forces
Total friendly forces 2,394
2,038
1,414
South Vietnamese Army 1,684
1,574
1,172
a. Reported.
b. Excluding February, for which no information is available.
c. Excluding January-March for the II and III Corps,
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servants responsible for guarding government
buildings in the provincial and district capitals.
37. The self-defense program, however, has
come under fire from some Vietnamese officiaLs,
including the Mayor of Saigon. The government
apparently is reluctant to arm any of the civilian
population except those considered most reliable.
The program is being criticized for moving too
slowly, for not having legislative authority or
legal status, and for not being integrated into
a cohesive operation. Many of the South Vietnamese
Army commanders of the program were relieved of
other duties because of incompetence or corruption.
Other South Vietnamese officials believe that. the
civil servants are not reliable and will not defend
public buildings in the face of a Communist attack.
Outlook
38. Although South Vietnam's military establish-
ment is being modernized and is gaining combat
experience, all available information indicates
that it still is far from becoming an effective
military force. Despite its numerical superiority
over the enemy, there is little doubt that without
the presence of US forces the South Vietnamese
military establishment would rapidly disintegrate
under a heavy and sustained Communist offensive.
Overall leadership remains weak, training is in-
adequate, and the selection and promotion system is
poor. Although Saigon should be able to increase
the size of its armed forces to planned levels, it
has not yet come to grips with the problem of
meeting the current shortage of cadre, let alone
those required for an expansion of forces. The
factors which affect basic motivation show few
signs of being significantly improved. Corruption
in the military forces is widespread, and most of
the middle-level and upper-level cadre are suscepti-
ble to shifts in the prevailing political environ-
ment. Thus it is unlikely that the South Vietnamese
military forces will achieve any significant
degree of effectiveness any time soon or that they
can assume a larger share of the combat burden in
the near future. Some military sources have esti-
mated that it will require at least two years to
equip and train the South Vietnamese Army before
it can assume a primary combat role against the
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present level of Communist forces. Even this
estimate assumes a much more favorable social and
psychological environment than currently exists
in South Vietnam.
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Secret
Secret
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