THE POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED FOOD PRODUCTION IN CONTINENTAL SOUTHEAST ASIA UNDER CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070024-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2006
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: March 1, 1966
• Content Type: IM

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N2 130
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
THE POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED
FOOD PRODUCTION IN CONTINENTAL
SOUTHEAST ASIA UNDER
CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
Office of Research and Reports
GROUP 1
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SECRET declassification
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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CONTENTS
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Rice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Other Food Crops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Tables
1. Actual Production of Rice in Major Producing Countries
of Continental Southeast Asia, Crop Year 1964+/65 . . . . 7
2. Hypothetical Production of Rice in Major Producing
Countries of Continental Southeast Asia, Crop
Year 196+/65 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Figure 1. Actual and Hypothetical Production and
Export of Rice in Major Producing Countries
of Continental Southeast Asia, 1965 following
page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2. Production and Export of Rice.in Continental
Figure 3. Actual and Hypothetical Exports of Food Grains
from Continental Southeast Asia as a Share
of Communist China's Production of Food Grains,
1965 ...................... 6
Southeast Asia in Selected Years following
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THE POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED FOOD PRODUCTION
IN CONTINENTA.L SOUTHEAST ASIA.
UNDER CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL*
Summary
Communist China's growing population and the poor pros-
pects of substantial improvements in domestic agricultural
production raise the Malthusian specter of increasing food
shortages. The question therefore arises as to whether
neighboring rice-producing countries could, under Chinese
control, make a significant contribution to China's food supply.
It is concluded that Communist China would not find the answer
to its food problems in a takeover of the surplus rice producers
of Southeast Asia -- Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, and South
Vietnam.
The Southeast A.sia "rice bowl" accounts for about one-
half of the world's exportable rice surplus; net exports from
the region totaled about 3. 3 million tons of milled rice in 1965.
However, the limited increase in the area's rice output that is
feasible at low cost under favorable conditions would not en-
hance China's food supplies significantly, and the capital inputs
required for a substantial increase are not likely to be forth-
coming. Increased labor inputs from a program of resettle-
ment of Chinese farm laborers could prove counterproductive.
Although production of some other food crops could be ex-
panded more dramatically than rice, achievable levels would
remain relatively low, and part of the expansion would probably
occur at the expense of rice production.
Realistically, the probable social and political dislocations
resulting from a takeover would preclude any significant
* The estimates and conclusions represent the best judgment
of this O.I ice as of 3 March 1966.
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increases in the area's food surplus in the foreseeable future
and might well reduce it, as was the case during the Japanese
occupation in World War II. It is possible, however, that the
potential for a relatively small food increase would provide
China with an added inducement for a takeover it regarded as
desirable on political grounds.
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The population problem in China raises the question as to whether
the Chinese might be able to make up domestic food shortages by taking
over neighboring countries with a rice surplus and exploiting their
potential for producing additional food. The following analysis has
been limited to the four countries of Southeast Asia that have normally
been surplus producers. Favorable conditions are assumed in order to
isolate the problem -- that is, that China's control of the area could
be asserted without cost, that no damage to productive capacity would
occur from a takeover, and that the populace would not resist China's
moderate efforts to expand food production. A hypothetical example is
employed to show that the potential expansion of food production in
continental Southeast Asia, even under these favorable conditions,
would not justify a Chinese Communist takeover on economic grounds.
Less favorable assumptions, which would be more realistic, would
strengthen this conclusion.
Rice has been historically the food staple of Southeast Asian coun-
tries despite natural conditions that are less than ideal for its growth.
The traditional approach of farmers to its cultivation and the absence
of concerted government programs to improve production have kept yields
and output below achievable levels. Consequently, there is an oppor-
tunity to increase production by increasing acreage and yields through
four means: (1) introduction of improved varieties, (2) improved
cultivation techniques, (3) expanded use of fertilizers, and (4+) im-
proved water control. Maximum results can be achieved only by intro-
ducing these improvements in combination, but favorable results could
be realized by applying only the first two methods, which are rela-
tively inexpensive. Except for some simple improvements in water control
it is unlikely that Communist China could supply the resources necessary
for introducing the last two methods; if such resources were available,
they could more appropriately be used to improve China's domestic food
production.
To provide a benchmark of potential production of rice in the four
countries, the performance record of 1964/65 (Table 1) has been recal-
culated (Table 2) on the basis of two key assumptions: (1) that a
5-percent greater area had been devoted to rice production, and (2) that
25-percent greater yields per hectare had been achieved (see Figure 1).
The assumptions are generous but achievable, given a concerted edu-
cational program and the discipline of nonhostile populace. A 5-percent
increase in acreage could be achieved by an expansion of cultivable
area and by additional double cropping on a moderate scale. Such an
expansion would be less than one-half the increase in acreage realized
in these countries as a group over the past decade but is about all that
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could be expected in the short run because of natural limitations. A
25-percent greater yield is feasible with improved varieties and greater
care in cultivation plus a relatively inexpensive extension of water
control. Although such an increase in yields is much greater than has
been achieved in the area in the past decade, the modest efforts of the
Thai government have helped that country realize a 19-percent improve-
ment during the past ten years. Under these assumptions the total pro-
duction of paddy rice* in these countries in 1965 would have been
31 percent, or 7.9 million metric tons, greater than the 25.4 million
tons actually grown.
Two considerations suggest that a takeover of these countries for
a food surplus of this magnitude would not be profitable for China. In
the first place, several years of effort would be required to initiate
the measures postulated, even under favorable conditions. In the time
required for a program to produce these results, population increases
at present rates in these countries would absorb most of the increase,
and accordingly, an absolute increase in the area's surplus of 7.9 mil-
lion tons would require much more than the 31 percent production in-
creases postulated (see Figure 2). In the second place, an increase
of 7.9 million tons in the area's surplus, even if available now, would
be a relatively small contribution toward China's needs. This amount
is equal to 10 percent of China's 1965 rice production of about 80 mil-
lion tons (of which 900,000 tons on a paddy basis were exported) and
constitutes only 4+.5 percent of the more relevant total estimated food
grain production of about 175 million tons. If all of the area's cur-
rent surplus.of 4.9 million tons of paddy rice were added to the 7.9
million potential increase in production, the resultant 12.8 million
tons would represent 7.3 percent of China's present food grain produc-
tion. This would be the most optimistic estimate and is not likely to
prove feasible since the favorable conditions assumed above are not
likely to be realized. The caloric contribution of this rice to China
in percentage terms would be approximately the same as the production
percentages cited above.
Substantially greater increases in output could be achieved by
expanded use of fertilizer and improved water control. The Pa Mong
project of the Mekong Basin development program, for example, will
irrigate an additional 800,000 hectares in Thailand. Fertilizer and
water control programs would, however, require enormous capital invest-
ments. Much of the investment which has occurred in Southeast Asia
in these fields has employed Free World assistance, which would be
unavailable to the area under Chinese domination, and the Chinese
would find it impractical to make the attempt.
Unless noted, all tonnages are in paddy terms. Milled rice reduces
to about two-thirds of paddy equivalent.
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Actual and Hypothetical Production and Export of Rice
in Major Producing Countries of Continental Southeast Asia, 1965*
S/KK/,yI
BIIUTA
rNniA
C H I
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PAKISTAN
10.6
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I G
ChO
KU
,
MA
(port.)
NORTH
4.2
1.6
VIETNAM
BURMA
HAINNN
12.6
96==;
0
Demarcation Line
5.7
2.7
THAILAND
3.5
6.6
ANDAMAN
2.6
5.0
ISLANDS
1.7
9
0
7 7 -7
(India)
.
CA MBODI
1
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?'3SOUTH
VIETNAM
Spratly
NICOBgR
Island
ISLANDS
(India)
Hypothetical
Actual
Share of total
supply entering
MALAY
SIA
trade
(Million metric tons, paddy rice basis)
NATUNA
ISLANDS
Production in crop year 1964/
1965, exports in calendar year
1965 converted to paddy rice
equivalent
v~
w import
SUMATRA
_
SINGAPORE BOR
~
NEO
INDONESIA
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS
NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE
INDONESIA
53331 3-66 CIA
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Figure 2
0
Production and Export of Rice in Continental
Southeast Asia in Selected Years*
PRODUCTION J - EXPORT
(converted to paddy rice equivalents)
22.9
1934-38
average
17.9
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25.4
Million
Persons
1946 1950 1955 1960 1965
*Production in crop year (the year ending in the stated year), export in calendar
year. Countries: Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, South Vietnam.
**Midyear population. Population data shown for 1934-38 average are for 1937.
25X1
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A large-scale movement of Chinese to these countries is unlikely
to overcome the above limitations on production increases, as labor
shortage is not a significant problem in these countries. It might be
easier for Chinese laborers to improve techniques on land now being
farmed than to teach indigenous farmers, but this would only increase
the underemployment that presently exists among the local agricultural
population. If the Chinese were to attempt to cultivate additional
land, production would have to be extended to areas of lower quality
and yields would tend to decline. The outcome would be only slightly
less negative if the Chinese were to take the best land for themselves
and drive the indigenous population to the marginal lands. As indicated
above, the primary requirement for significant increases in agricultural
production is capital investment, and the indigenous people, under well-
managed programs, could increase output to the degree feasible without
such investment. It is also noted that the Communist approach has not
markedly improved agricultural yields in other countries and that native
reaction to a large influx of Chinese would almost certainly have an
adverse effect on agricultural output. On balance it is believed more
likely that production would be improved by Chinese management of the
area's present population than by the migration of Chinese farmers.
The most that China would be likely to gain from a migration is slight
temporary relief from its population pressures.. This could only occur
at the expense of Southeast Asia's present per capita food consumption
and at the risk that the area for many years would fail to produce the
surplus that is feasible by other means.
Other Food Crops
The only other food grain of importance in these countries is maize.
Total production of maize exceeds one million tons, most of which is
exported. Thailand is by far the most important producer of maize in
the area and production is now more than five times the low production
of 1958. Such rapid expansion, however, is not likely to continue;
if a further rapid expansion were attempted in these countries, it would
probably be in part at the expense of an expansion in rice acreage. One
million tons is the equivalent of 1 percent of China's production of food
grains other than rice and 0.6 percent of China's total food grain pro-
duction. The present production of maize and the assumed maxim-Lures:ice
surplus potential of the area through the introduction of low-cost
measures would account for 8 percent of China's present food grain pro-
duction (see Figure 3). Data on production of other food crops in this
area and in China do not permit ready comparison, but present and
likely exports of other crops from these countries constitute a negli-
gible fraction of China's present requirements.
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Actual and Hypothetical Exports of Food Grains from Continental
Southeast Asia as a Share of Communist China's
Production of Food Grains, 1965
Hypothetical Exports, 1965
(8%)
-6-
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Actual Production of Rice in Major Producing Countries
of Continental Southeast Asia
Crop Year 1964/65
Production
(1,000 Metric
Area
(1,000
Yield
(Kilograms
1965 Exports
(1,000 Metric
Tons Paddy Rice
Tons Paddy Rice)
Hectares)
per Hectare)
Equivalent
Burma
8, loo
5,100
1,588
1,650
Thailand
9,625
5,995
1,6o6
2,700
Cambodia
2,643
2,240
1,180
900
South Vietnam
5,031
2,555
1,969
-350
25,399
15,89o
1,598
)4, goo
3 , 300
Hypothetical Production of Rice in Major Producing Countries
of Continental Southeast Asia a/
Crop Year 1964/65
Production
(1,000 Metric
Area
(1,000
Yield
(Kilograms
1965 Exports
(1,000 Metric
Tons Paddy Rice
Tons Paddy Rice)
Hectares)
per Hectare)
Equivalent
Burma
10,630
5,355
1,985
4,180
Thailand
12,64o
6,295
2,008
5,715
Cambodia
3,469
2,352
1,475
1,726
South Vietnam
6,603
2,683
2,461
1,222
33,342
16,685
1,998
12,843
8,669
a. Assuming (1) 5-percent greater area than actual, (2) 25-percent
greater yield than actual, and (3) all increases in production available
as exportable surplus.
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