RADIOBROADCASTING IN THE VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA WAR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070016-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2006
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: August 1, 1964
• Content Type: BRIEF

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SECRET
Current Support Brief
RADIOBROADCASTING
IN THE VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA WAR
CIA/RR CB 64-55
August 1964
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Research and Reports
USAID review completed
State Dept. review completed
SECRET
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification
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WARNING
This material contains information affecting
the National Defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, USC, Sees. 793 and 794, the trans-
mission or revelation of which in any manner
to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
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S-E-C-R-E-T
RADIOBROADCAS TING
IN THE VIETNAMESE PROPAGANDA WAR
The dominant factor in the Vietnamese propaganda war is the
contrast between the closed radio reception base of wired loudspeakers
in North Vietnam and the free reception base of radio receivers in
South Vietnam. Because of this factor, the vigorous North Vietnamese
propaganda campaign to the South cannot be successfully countered by
an equally vigorous propaganda effort directed to the North by South
Vietnam. South Vietnam has chosen to ignore this situation, however,
and has consistently emphasized the expansion of its broadcasting
coverage to the North. Moreover, the effectiveness of domestic South
Vietnamese broadcasts has suffered from self-inflicted restrictions on
radio receivers imposed in past attempts to limit the audience for
North Vietnamese broadcasts.
In recent months the government of South Vietnam has shown a
more realistic approach to the problems of its domestic broadcasting.
Encouraging policy changes include the appointment of an experienced
man to head the broadcasting system, an accelerated program for the
distribution of radio receivers, and plans for the establishment of
provincial radio stations designed to attract the rural populace.
Although this new emphasis on domestic broadcasting lacks the appeal
of carrying the propaganda war to the North and makes considerable
demands on an already inadequate broadcasting staff, it nevertheless
focuses the propaganda effort on the only audience allowed a free
choice, the people of South Vietnam. This attempt to secure the sup-
port of the South Vietnamese people, if energetically pursued by the
government, offers considerably greater promise of success in the
propaganda war than any increase in broadcasting to North Vietnam.
1. Current Status of Radiobroadcasting
The government-owned radiobroadcasting system in South
Vietnam at present consists of 12 medium-wave and 13 short-wave
transmitters, as shown on the accompanying map, with an aggregate
power of 274 kilowatts (kw). This transmission base, which repre-
sents a significant increase above the total transmitted power of 50 kw
in 1956, provides the South Vietnamese government with the means to
broadcast to all of Vietnam and to large parts of Southeast Asia.
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During the 8-year period in which transmission power in-
creased more than 400 percent, there was not a comparable growth
either in the number of radio receivers or in the size and quality of
the broadcasting staff. The lag in the development of a broadcasting
staff commensurate with the enlarged transmission facilities has
been the result not so much of culpable negligence as of bureaucratic
inertia and the constraints of a wartime budget. The lack of develop-
mentdn the radio receiver base, however, which currently totals some
500, 000 receivers, has been the result of an earlier government ef-
fort to restrict the availability of receivers through the use of both
import restrictions and an annual user tax. By this action the govern-
ment of South Vietnam sought to limit the potential audience for the
ever-increasing propaganda barrage from North Vietnam. At the same
time, however, this action rendered partially sterile the expansion of
domestic broadcasting coverage in South Vietnam.
In recent months the government of South Vietnam, in a more
realistic attempt to meet the problems of a propaganda war, has in-
itiated a number: of changes in its broadcasting policy, including the
lifting of import restrictions on receivers. Under present arrange-
ments the Agency for International Development (AID) will be permitted
to spons.or a receiver distribution program that will deliver about
100, 000. radio receivers into the hands of the South Vietnamese by the
end of 1964. This stands in sharp contrast to the 26, 000 receivers that
AID distributed in the 1956-63 period.
An encouraging note has been the recent appointment of an ex-
perienced broadcaster, Nguyen dinh Linh, as head of the broadcasting
system. Of equal importance has been the recent emphasis on audience-
oriented programing as evidenced by the ambitious plan for the con-
struction of 25 low-power (50-watt) provincial radiobroadcasting stations
that will originate and broadcast local programs. The demonstrated
effectiveness of three such provincial stations, activated on. an experi-
mental basis in early 1964, has led AID to undertake the financing of
the program. Although this plan for provincial stations carries with it
no explicit paramilitary objectives, these stations will be able to pro-
vide information. on insurgent activities to populated points not now
associated with the military warning system.
The. encouraging changes in broadcast policy that have emerged
to date are by no means a complete answer to the demands of the cur-
rent situation. Personnel ceilings and rigid salary scales still appear
S-E-C-R-E-T
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Radiobroadcasting Facilities in North and South Vietnam, 1964
?BANGKOK
"New Life" provincial broadcast station
I Medium-wave
I Short-wave
Total Power:
6 kw
5 Medium-wave
8 Short-wave
Total Power:
200 kw
Note: Proposed location of 24 additional
"New Life" stations are not shown.
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IN0 RTN
V I E T N M
PHNOM PENH
3 Medium-wave
II Short-wave
(power unknown)
I Medium-wave
2 Short-wave
Total Power:
41 kw
I Medium-wave
Total Power:
I kw
I Medium-wave
I Short-wave
Total Power:
11 kw
I Medium-wave
I Short-wave
Total Power:
5 kw
DA LAT
"New Life"
Transmitter
Medium-wave
50 watt
I Medium-wave
Total Power:
10 kw
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to hamper the development of an adequate broadcast staff. Moreover,
South Vietnam retains its enigmatic desire to expand its propaganda
effort to a North Vietnamese audience largely deafened by totalitarian
receiver control.
The North Vietnamese government operates 11 short-wave
and 3 medium-wave transmitters of unknown power in its domestic
and international radiobroadcasting service. The increase of more
than 300 percent in the number of hours broadcast in Vietnamese since
May 1956 demonstrates that substantial growth has taken place. Pro-
graming in other languages also has been expanded in recent years
and now ,includes eight major languages and four dialects of Southeast
Asia.
In addition to overt broadcasts from Hanoi, the Liberation
News Agency (LNA) -- a separately organized, clandestine broad-
casting agency -- directs approximately 33 hours per week of broad-
casts in the Vietnamese language against the "US imperialists and
their lackeys. " Although the location of the LNA transmitting facili-
ties is not known, it is likely that Radio Hanoi provides programing
support. and even that its transmitters are being used. The influence
and direction of the government of North Vietnam are not acknowledged,
however, in order to preserve the impression that the LNA is a spon-
taneous effort by the South Vietnamese to rid themselves of "oppres-
sion. " The overt broadcasts of the "Voice of Vietnam" from Hanoi
quote the LNA almost daily as a source of information, both to give it
publicity and to add credence to its ostensibly independent organization.
The domestic reception base in North Vietnam is made up, for
the most part, of a closed network of wired loudspeakers located in
private homes, factories, offices, and public places. Radio receivers
capable of unrestricted broadcast reception are available only in limited
numbers, and ownership is tightly controlled by the government. The
extensiveness of the wired network of loudspeakers can only be inferred
from a statement by Radio Hanoi that the domestic broadcasting service
reaches an audience of 3 million North Vietnamese. Making allowances
for the probable preponderance of mass-.audience loudspeakers, this
statement is not indicative of a very extensive wired network for a nation
with a population of 17 million people. Nevertheless, it is apparent that
the main thrust in developing a radiobroadcasting reception base in
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North Vietnam has been, and will continue to be, directed toward a
government-controlled wired network that is impervious to foreign
broadcasts.
2. Comparison and Prospects
Although the radiobroadcasting systems of North and South Viet-
nam vary somewhat in their transmitting capabilities, each provides
extensive coverage to the whole of Vietnam. The most significant
difference between the two broadcasting systems lies in the composi-
tion of their respective reception bases. North Vietnam's decision to
develop a closed reception base of wired loudspeakers has placed it
in the enviable position of being able to control the broadcasts available
to its people and to direct propaganda to South Vietnam without fear of
reprisal in kind. The free reception base of radio receivers in South
Vietnam, however, has presented the government with the dilemma, of
providing an expanding audience for North Vietnam broadcasts with
each addition to its own audience.
South Vietnam's past reaction to this dilemma has been to increase
the number and power of its transmitters and to restrict simultaneously
the growth of .its reception base. The recent change in South Vietnam's
policy on the distribution of radio receivers and the program of con-
structing provincial radio stations reflect the growing realization that
the propaganda war cannot be won by reducing the audience potential
for North Vietnamese broadcastsand that a more active propaganda
campaign must be conducted for the allegiance of its own people. With
continued implementation of these policy changes, along with additional
.steps needed to expand and improve the broadcasting staff, there is a
greater chance than before that the domestic propaganda effort in South
Vietnam will meet with some measure of success. It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the present or even an expanded propaganda effort directed
against North Vietnam, with its greatly restricted audience potential,
will have more than a marginal degree of effectiveness. As the free
listeners of South Vietnam represent the only audience allowed any
choice of programs, the competitive propaganda effort by North and
.South Vietnam must focus on them.
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