COMMUNIST UNITS PARTICIPATING IN ATTACKS DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE 30 JANUARY THROUGH 13 FEBRUARY 1968

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 27, 2006
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: February 13, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
Secret
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Communist Units Participating in Attacks
During the Tet Offensive
30 January Through 13 February 1968
ARMY review(s) completed.
Secret
Copy No. 172
ER IM 68-23
February 1968
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
21 February 1968
Communist Units Participating in Attacks
During the Tet Offensive
30 January Through 13 February 1968
Summary
A review of field reporting since the start
of the current Communist offensive indicates that
approximately 58,000 Communist main and local
forces were committed in attacks on urban areas
and military installations through 13 February.
(For detailed data on forces available and engaged
in the Tet offensive, see Appendixes A and B.)
Of this total, about 37 percent were North Viet-
namese Army (NVA) troops and another 29 percent
were Viet Cong (VC) main force troops. The
remaining 34 percent consisted of VC local forces
which had been reinforced for the attacks by the
upgrading of local guerrillas. On the basis of
MACV's latest order of battle of 115,000 men, the
Communists would appear to have committed about
50 percent of their regular forces to the attacks.
If the reported losses of 32,500 killed in
action and 5,500 detained applied solely to the
VC/NVA regular forces, the Communists would have
lost more than 65 percent of the forces committed
to the Tet offensive. This would have been a devas-
tating blow. However, there are a number of
pieces of evidence which suggest that such an
interpretation would overstate the Communist
manpower drain.
First of all, VC/NVA forces participating in
the offensive were augmented by numbers of
Note: This memorandum was produced by CIA. It
was prepared by the Office of Economic Research
with the assistance of the Vietnamese Affairs
Staff and coordinated with the Office of Current
Intelligence. It analyzes developments reported
through 13 February 1968.
SECRET 25X1
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
guerrillas operating in independent units or
integrated into local force units. Second, there
was extensive VC activity to raise new recruits.
Third, casualties included laborers conscripted
to move VC supplies, as well as a number of
civilians in densely populated areas taken under
attack. Almost certainly the rate of casualties
among new and relatively untrained forces was
higher than among hard-core troops.
In summary, a number of factors suggest that
the VC/NVA losses, although high, are not as
serious as first believed. Most recently, the
enemy has been taking advantage of his greater
control of the countryside to accelerate recruiting
among the rural population. All of these develop-
ments make it difficult to assess the current
enemy manpower situation with any accuracy.
- 2 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
1. The intensity of the Communist Tet offensive
is reflected in the fact that 39 of South Vietnam's
44 provincial capitals, plus the autonomous cities
of Saigon and Da Nang, were attacked. All of them
were subjected to artillery and mortar fire or
ground assault, and most of them were hit within
the first three days. At least 35 of these capitals
and the two autonomous cities were physically pene-
trated by Communist armed forces. In addition,
at least 71 district capitals also were attacked.
(For a list of the provincial and district capitals
attacked, see Appendix B.) The offensive was aimed
at civilian centers of authority, as well as at
military installations such as base camps, airfields,
and logistical facilities.
2. The Tet offensive is a part of the winter-
spring campaign which the Communists have described
as being the "decisive" phase of the war. As a
maximum objective, the Communists hoped the campaign
would culminate in a general uprising which would
involve severe defeats for Allied military forces
and would lead to US withdrawal from South Vietnam.
At the same time, they also hoped that large-scale
political agitation combined with attacks on urban
areas would result in the collapse of the South
Vietnamese government and create conditions favor-
able for a settlement and the establishment of a
coalition government on Communist terms.
3. The Tet offensive also has several more
immediate tactical objectives: (1) to disperse
and tie down Allied military units in defensive
positions, (2) to disrupt South Vietnamese centers
of political authority, and (3) to demonstrate the
inability of the South Vietnamese government to
protect the population. In addition, the Communists
may be attempting to gain greater control over a
larger segment of the rural population by disrupting
or destroying the pacification program while Allied
forces are diverted to the protection of urban
areas.
4. Although the Communists have not accomplished
as much as they had hoped in this offensive, they
have dealt a severe psychological blow to an urban
population, accustomed to relative security from
the active phase of the war. The Vietnamese
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
populace. appears to be dismayed at the apparent
ease with which the Communists were able to enter
the cities in strength and attack key installations.
Large portions of some cities, including Hue, My
Tho, and Ban Me Thuot, have been destroyed, and
the increasing number of refugees and homeless
created by the attacks have imposed substantial
new economic and social burdens on an already
heavily burdened government.* The Communists also
inflicted considerable damage on Allied military
installations, in addition to tying down a number
of Allied military forces to restoring security
in urban areas.
5. Despite these achievements, the Communists
failed to organize any significant support from
the general populace. Moreover, the offensive
has been waged at a considerable cost in terms of
losses of men and weapons.** The importance of
the loss of men lies less in the numbers killed,
which are believed to be overstated, than it does
in the caliber of the troops lost. Although
guerrillas, recently infiltrated personnel, and
untrained new recruits probably account for many
of the casualties, the identification of units
taking part in the assaults indicates that a
considerable number of skilled, well-trained VC/NVA
infantry, sappers, and special-action troops also
were lost.
Forces Committed to the Tet Offensive
6. A review of field reporting since the
start of the Communist offensive, although still
incomplete, provides sufficient information to
identify most of the enemy units directly partici-
pating in the attacks against urban areas and
military installations.*** These units are listed
in Appendix B, which shows that as of 13 February
(Saigon time), approximately 58,000 Communist main
and local forces had been actively committed in
See ER IM 68--20, The Effects of the Tet
Offensive on the Economy of South Vietnam as of
15 February 1968, 16 February 1968, SECRET
For additional information on enemy losses,
see paragraph 9 and Appendix B.
*** This memorandum does not include attacks on
military installations in the Khe Sanh area.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
SECRET
the Tet attacks. The number of Communist forces
committed to reserves and defensive positions for
the Tet offensive is not considered in this memo-
randum.
7. About 22,000, or 37 percent of the 58,000
actively committed, have been identified as North
Vietnamese troops. All of these troops were
located in the I and II Corps areas, where they
accounted for 60 to 65 percent of the attacking
forces. Nearly 17,000, or about 45 percent of
the 36,000 VC forces offensively engaged, were
main force troops, the remainder being local force
troops. In addition, it is believed that a con-
siderable portion of the guerrilla forces, which
were built up in preparation for the current
offensive, directly participated in the attacks.*
Some of the guerrillas were upgraded to bring VC
main and local force units up to full order-of-
battle strength and, therefore, are believed
counted in the total estimate of VC/NVA forces.
However, the figure of 58,000 is understated to
the extent that certain main and local force units
and independent guerrilla units which participated
in the attacks have not been identified. Evidence
also indicates that the attacking units contained
a number of new, inexperienced recruits and that
civilians were impressed to provide support to
these units.
8. On the basis of MACV's order of battle of
31 December 1967, which lists 115,000 VC/NVA
maneuver and combat-support troops for the entire
country, the Communists appear to have committed
about 50 percent of their main and local forces
to the attacks. At least 7 percent of the troops
tentatively identified in the attacks, however,
are not listed in MACV's order of battle. (For
the methodology used in estimating these troops,
see Appendix C.) These units are not as yet
carried in the order of battle because they are
newly formed, recently infiltrated, or previously
unidentified.** Examples of these three include the
* A separate OER report on the role of the guer-
rilZas in the Tet offensive is being prepared.
** MACV's acceptance and rejection criteria for
Communist units, particularly for newly infiltrated
units, tend to minimize the number of units and
soldiers Listed for any [footnote continued on p. 6]
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
510th and 511th VC local force battalions, the
31st regiment of the 341st NVA division, and the
Nha Trang Municipal Unit.
9. More than 32,500 of the attacking forces
reportedly had been killed and another 5,500
detained as of 13 February. The many uncertainties
attached to these data make them extremely difficult
to evaluate, particularly in terms of their impact
on enemy strength. The compilation of field report-
ing on enemy forces committed in the III Corps
area, for example (see Table 4), falls far short
of the numbers reported killed and detained (see
Table 5). Even allowing for incompleteness in the
identification of units, the implied loss rate of
the data presently available for the III Corps area
imply a loss rate far in excess of that which is
reasonably possible. It seems clear, therefore,
that the number of enemy losses should not be
compared with the number of main and local forces
listed in the order of battle or the numbers en-
gaged in the attacks. There is sufficient evidence
to support a judgment that the enemy casualties
include (1) guerrillas operating in independent
guerrilla units; (2) guerrillas recently upgraded
to main and local force units; (3) new recruits;
(4) laborers conscripted to move supplies for the
attacks; and (5) civilians in densely populated
areas taken under attack.
point in time. MACV's order of battle of 31 December
1967 indicates a decline in the size of the main and
local forces from the order of battle of 31 October.
Evidence suggests, however, that the Communists
actually were in=the process of increasing the size
of their regular units during this period in prep-
aration for the Tet offensive.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
SECRET
Forces Available and Engaged in the TET Offensive
(30 January-13 February 1968
- 7 .-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SLUKt"I'
Countrywide Data on the Tet Offensive
Friendly force available
1,186,700
US forces a/
490,700
(153,600)
Third-nation forces
60,700
(33,800)
South Vietnamese forces c/
635,300
Communist forces available I/
224,500
55,600
168,900
Maneuver
45,500
55,200
Combat support
10,000
4,500
Administrative service
100
37,600
Guerrilla
71,600
Estimated Communist main and local
forces identified as attacking
urban areas and military installa-
tions
57,600
North Vietnamese
21,500
36,100
Main force
16,800
Local force
19,300
Casualties and weapons losses J
Casualties
US
South
Vietnamese
Third-Nation
Forces
Total
Communist
Killed in action
1,073
2,245
65
3,383
32,549
Wounded in action
5,488
8,373
259
14,120
N.A.
Detained.
5,528
Enemy weapons losses
Individual
7,967
Crew served
1,227
a. As of 29 January 1y 1
b. Numbers in parentheses represent ground combat forces.
c. Preliminary figures; as of 1 January 1968. Includes RF/PF forces.
d. As reported in MACV Order of Battle Summar , 1 November through
31 December 1967.
e. As reported by MACV as of 13 February 1968 (Saigon time).
- 8 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
Total
I Corps
II Corps
III Corps
IV Corps
US forces 490,700
(153,600) J
138,700
(61,000)
148,400
(39,000)
189,200
(49,500)
14,400
(4,ioo)
Ar
-j 327,000
(115,200)
33,600
(22,600)
118,000
(39,000)
166,100
(49,500)
9,300
(4,loo)
Ma
rine Corps 74,600
(38,400)
74,500
(38,400)
Negl.
100
Na
vy/Coast Guard 32,600
23,400
2,000
3,800
3,400
Ai
r Force 56,500
7,200
28,400
19,200
1,700
Thir
d-nation forces 60,700
(33,800)
6,200
(3,800)
39,000
(24,400)
15,500
(5,600)
Sout
h Vietnamese forces J
99,700
142,200
217,200
176,200
Re
gular 340,200
55,400
70,500
152,500
61,800
RF
/PF 295,100
44,300
71,700
64,700
114,400
700
Total 1,186
244,600
329,600
421,900
1 600
2
a.
As of 29 January 1 .
b.
c.
Numbers in parentheses represent ground combat forces.
Preliminary figures; as of 1 January 1968.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
Communist Forces Available J
Total
I Corps
II Corps
III Corps
IV Corps
2200
63,200
57,500
541%100
49,700
NVA
VC
NVA
VC
NVA
VC
VC
26,900
36,300
17,700
39,800
11,000
43,100
49,700
Maneuver
100,700
21,900
10,600
14,100
10,100
9,500
17,100
17,400
Combat support
14,500
5,000
700
3,500
800
1,500
2,200
800
Administrative service
37,700
7,600
100
5,500
16,200
8,300
Guerrillas
71,600
17,4oo
23,400
7,600
23,200
a. As reported in MACV's Monthly Order of Battle Summary, 1 November through 31 December 1967.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
Table 4
Estimated Communist Main and Local Forces
Identified as Attacking Urban Areas and Military Installations
Total
I Corps
II Corps
III Corps
IV Corps
North Vietnamese
21,500
9,800
11,700
Viet Cong
36,100
5,200
6,200
10,300
13,400
Main force
16,800
2,400
3,900
6,000
4,500
Local force
19,300
3,800 J
2,300
4,300
8,900
Total
57,600
16,000
17,900
10,300
13,400
a. Including 1,500 unidentified troops, believed to be Viet Cong local
force.
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
Table 5
Casualties and Weapons Losses J
Total I Corps II Corps III Corps IV Corps
Total friendly casualties
Killed in action 3,383 1,186 506 1,137
Wounded in action 14,120 4,788 1,788 5,370 2,174
Killed in action 1,073 524 120 346 83
Wounded in action 5,488 2,686 605 1,787 41o
South Vietnamese
Cl)
Killed in action 2,245 638 363 775 469
Wounded in action 8,373 1,986 1,132 3,491 1,764
H
Third-nation forces H
Killed in action 65 24 23 16
Wounded in action 259 116 51 92
Communist casualties
Killed in action 32,549 10,592 5,539 11,195 5,223
Detained 5,528 2,255 1,693 800 78o
Enemy weapons losses
Individual 7,967 2,049 1,672 2,653
Crew served 1,227 496 177 315 239
a. As reported by MACV as of 13 February 1968 (Saigon time y.
1,593
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
bJ UiU1 i
List of Provincial and District Capitals Attacked
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
Quang Tri
Quang Tri City b
812th NVA Regt.
2,600
Cam Lo J
1st Bn, 803rd NVA Regt.
500
Hai Lang J
1st Bn, 270th Regt.
350
Mai Linh J
5th NVA Regt.
1,340
Trieu Phong J
27th Ind. WA Bn.
300
3 U/I Bns.
1,200
6,290
Rue City Phu Loc 21
Hue Municipal Unit
(Hue Sapper Bn.)
225
800th VC Bn, 6th NVA Regt.
300
4th NVA Regt. Ind.
2,000
2, 525
Quang Nam
Da Nang (Auton City)
Hoi Ai City b
R-20 VC LF Bn.
400
Dien Ban J
V-25 VC LF Bn.
400
H1.eu Nhon J
3rd Bn, 31st Regt. 341 NVA Div.
500
Dui Xuyen J
3 U/I Co's - est.
300
Hoa V ang c
Poss els GK 31 AA Bn NVA Ad Bn.
400
2,000
I Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified, and
Their Streng%hs, by Province J
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
City in Province Strength
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
Quang Tin
Tam Ky City b
72nd VC LF Bn.
300
21st NVA Regt.
1,500
70th VC MF Bn.
400
V-12 VC LF Co.
V-13 VC LF Co.
v-16 vC LF Co.
500
74th VC LF Co.
78th VC LF Co.
F. 105 VC LF Co.
Total
2,700
Quang Ngai
Quang Ngai City /
48th VC LF Bn
400
Binh Son
Son Tinh
Nghia Hanh J
401st Sap Reg. & Sub Bns
1,700
Mo Due `/
406 Sap Bn.
(450)
120th Mont. Bn.
(400)
107th AA Bn.
(400)
405th Sap Bn.
(450)
81st VC LF Bn.
360
2,460
a. Identifies all province and district towns reported attacked
during the Tet offensive. Communist units identified in the attacks
do not necessarily correspond to the cities and towns as listed.
b. Province capital.
c. District capital.
I Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province
(Continued)
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
City in Province Strength
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
II Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province J
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province _ Strength
Kontum City J 4th Bn, 24th NVA Regt. 4.35
Dak To c/ 6th Bn, 24th NVA Regt. 335
66th NVA Regt. 1,560
40th Arty Regt. 1,000
2nd Bn, 174th NVA Regt. 220
Pleiku City b 407th VC Sap Bn 500
Le Trung J H15 VC LF Bn 400
Thanh An J 408th VC Sap Bn 360
4th Bn, 95B NVA Regt. 475
5th Bn, 95B NVA Regt. 375
Hq & Spt Bn NVA Regt. 500
32nd NVA Regt. 1,600
200th VC Arty Bn 400
Tuyen Duc
4,10
Dalat City J C-809 VC LF Co.
C-810 VC LF Co. 210
C-610 VC LF Co.
2 Coos, 145th NVA Regt. 1.50
Total 360
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
II Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province 2l
(Continued)
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks
in Province
Estimated
Strength
Qui Nhon City 3/
36th Sap Bn
245
PhuCat2J
E 2 BVC LFBn
200
-c
An Nhon
36B Sap Bn
250
~
Phy My J
18th NVA Regt.
1,250
Tuy Phuoc 2
Hoai Nhon 2
Total
1,945
Ban Me Thuot City J
33rd NVA Regt.
860
Buon Ho J
E301 VC LF Bn
470
Thuan Hieu c/
95th NVA Regt.
1,275
Lac Thien c
H-5 VC LF Bn
45
381st VC Sap Bn
200
86th VC LF Bn
300
88th VC LF Bn
300
181st Mont. Bn, 95th NVA Regt, VC
300
481st VC Sap Bn
200
Total 3,950
Tuy Hoa City b 5th Bn, 95th NVA Regt. 280
Haiku Xuong c. 4th Bn, 95th NVA Regt. 260
30th VC Bn 200
U/I El-MS, 91st NVA Regt. 200
85th VC Bn & 1 TWA Plt. 300
Total 1,240
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
II Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,,
and Their Strengths, by Province a/
(Continued)
Communist:. Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
City in Province Strength
Nha Trang City J 7th Bn, 1SB NVA Regt. 205
Ninh Hoa c/ 8th Bn, 18B NVA Regt. 290
Cam Lam 9thiBn, 18B NVA Regt. 270
Nha Trang Municipal Unit 20
K90 VC Sap Co. 35
95th NVA Arty Bn. 150
K89 VC Sap Co. 120
T86th VC Sap Co. 120
K91 VC Sap Co. 35
T88 VC Sap Co. (Recon) 120
1,365
Phan Thiet City J 482 VC LF B. 400
Thien Giao J 840 VC MF Bn. 250
430 VC LF Co. 50
2 U/I LF Co's 120
Total 820
Phan Rang J I. U/I LF Co.
a. Identifies all province anI distr.i-~t towns reported attacked
during the Tet offensive. Co=a:n.ist up-its identified in the attacks
as listed do not necessarily correspond to the cities and towns as
listed.
b. Province capital.
c. District capital.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Phuoc Binh City J
Song Be J
VC LF Co's
Long Khanh
Xuan Loc City b
Dinh Quan J
(H.4 PLT) VC LF
Bien Hoa City b/
274th VC MF Regt.
1,650
Duc Tu J
275th VC MF Regt.
1,650
Tan Uyen c/
Phu Loi VC LF Bn
400
Long Thanh J
Dong Nai VC MF Bn
400
4th VC LF Bn
200
Total. 4,300
Tay Ninh
Tay Ninh City b VC LF Dist. Co's
.Phu Khuong J
Hieu Thien J
Phuoc Ninh J
Hau Nghia
Bao Trai City b VC LF Co's
Cu Chi J
Duc Hoa J
Duc Hue J
An Loc City b/ VC LF Co's
Loc Ninh c
Chon Thanh J
III Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province J
City
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
III Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province J
(Continued)
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks
in Province
Estimated
Strength
Phu Cuong City J 273rd VC MF Regt.
Ben Cat J 681 Bac Ben Cat LF Co
Phu Hoa J
Phu Giao C/
Tri Tam c
Long An
1,750
50
1,800.
Tan An City b/ 80
Ben Luc J 317 Binh Luc Dist. LF Co 100
Total 180
Phuoc Tuy
Phuoc Le City J C 41 Chan Duc LF Co. 85
Gia Dinh/Saigon (Autonomous City)
Gia Dinh City J 269th VC MF Bn 300
Hoc Mon J 2nd VC LF Bn 270
Thu Duc J 6th VC LF Bn 450
D-14 LF VC Bn 300
D-12 LF VC Bn 300
C-10-VC SAPPER Bn 350
D-16 LF VC Bn 420
1 Co. 3C6 MF Bn 150
Total 2,540
a. Identifies all province and district towns reported attacked
during the Tet offensive. Communist units identified in the attacks
as listed do not necessarily correspond to the cities and towns as
listed.
b. Province capital.
c. District capital.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
IV Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Dinh Tuong
My Tho City b
512th VC LF Bn. 5 50
Cai Be c/
514th VC LF Bn. 100
Cai Lay J
DT1 VC MF Regt. 1, 500
207th VC MF Bn. 400
Total 2,550
Go Cong
Go Cong City ,
514th VC LF Bn.
300
361st VC LF Bn.
300
600
Ben Tre City b
Mo Cay J
Binh Dai J
516th VC MF Bn.
Tra Vinh City b
503rd VC LF Co.
130
Cang Lon
505th VC LF Co.
120
g
Tieu Can c
525th VC LF Co.
80
509th VC LF Bn.
250
501st VC 1F Bn.
350
531st VC LF Bn.
300
527th VC LF Bn.
300
306th VC MF Bn.
Total
(Elms)
1,530
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks Estimated
in Province Strength
Vinh Long
Vinh Long City J
306th VC MF Bn.
500
Vung Liem c/
857th VC LF Bn.
200
Cho Lach J
308th VC MF Bn.
500
Tam Binh J~/
Binh Minh J
Total
1,200
Chuong Thien
Vi Thuah City J
3 VC LF Co's & 2 Pits.
Sac Trang City /
2 VC LF Co's
200
My Xuyen c/
606 My Xuyen LF Co.
100
Thanh Tri J
Tran Tri LF Co.
80
380
Vinh Loi City Y 5 VC LF Co's
An Xuyen
Quan Long City J U Minh 11 VC LF Bn
Cai Nuoc J New 306th, VC LF Bn.
Phong Dinh
1,200
Can Tho City b 303rd Bn, D2 VC MF Regt. 500
Phung Hiep c Tay Do VC LF Bn. 400
Phong Dien J New Tay Do VC LF Bn. (AKA 307 Bn.) 400
Thuan Nhon 309th VC MF Bn. 550
Total 1,850
22 -
IV Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province a/
(Continued)
City
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
SECRET
IV Corps
Cities Attacked, Communist Units Identified,
and Their Strengths, by Province
(Continued)
City
Communist Units
Identified in Attacks
in Province
Estimated
Strength
Kien Giang
Each Gia City b/
Ha Tien j
Kien An c
2 Co's U Minh 10 LF Bn.
Chau Phu City
512th VC LF Bn.
550
An Phu c
510th VC LF Bn.
500
Tri Ton J
511th VC LF Bn.
500
Total 1,550
Cao Lanh City J U/I Elms, 502nd LF VC Bn. 300`
Hong Ngu c/
Kien Tuong
Moc Hao City J 267th VC MF Bn.
Sa Dec
Sa Dec City 3 VC LF Co's
Duc Ton c/
Duc Thanh J
a. Identifies all province and district towns reported attacked
during tY Tet offensive. Communist units identified in the attacks
as listed do not necessarily correspond to the cities and towns as
listed.
b. Province capital.
c. District capital.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
bhu.IKET
Methodology Used in Estimating Strength
of Communist Units Attacking Urban Areas
and Military Installations
1. Estimates of enemy troop strengths deployed
in the Tet offensive are based on the compilation
of units identified in MACV, CIA, and State report-
ing from the field. Although in most cases,
reporting is fragmentary and obviously incomplete,
efforts have been made to include as many positive
identifications as possible, while attempting to
preclude duplication of units and consequent double
counting.
2. Enemy unit strengths were generally taken
directly from the MACV'Order of Battle Summary.
In cases where identified units did not appear in
the MACV order of battle, strengths were assigned
on the basis of similar units prevalent in the
particular area, and/or estimated strength cited
in field reporting. Unit code names, newly formed
units, units not identified previously, or units
dropped for lack of recent verification, explain
differences in units listed and the MACV order of
battle.
3. In several instances, the same units were
identified as active in attacks in more than one
area. This was resolved by splitting the estimate
of the units total strength between areas or by
listing the unit in only one area.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78T02095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
k_,1_ t4ItI'II
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9
A3. U nAr- l
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800070005-9