MILITARY MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT IN NORTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800060002-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 20, 2000
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1968
• Content Type: REPORT

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5-2679
MILITARY MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT IN NORTH VIETNAM
Annex to SNIE 53-68
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1 APR 1968
Manpower Availability in North Vietnam
1. The availability of manpower during the next 1$ months will
probably not be a constraint on North Vietnam's contribution to the
war effort in the South. North Vietnam has an estimated 2.8 million
males in the milita a e rou 1 to ?
rY'' g g P 7 3S of which it is believed that
55 percent would be physically fit for military service. Out of the
1.5 million males fit for military service there are an estimated
x+75,000 presently in the armed forces. Thus,, a theoretical reservoir of
about 1,000,000 males are available far military service. These are
presently occupied in agriculture, industry, constructions transportation,,
and education and include personnel in the militia and those indirectly
involved in air and civil defense. The extent to which the regime draws
the remaining civilian males into military service depends an the priority
given war requirements in .the South as opposed to requirements of the
economy and defense in the North. Tt is estimated that at least 500,000
males can be diverted from the civilian labor farce to military duties
without detriment.to the civilian economy or to the North's capability
to support the war in the South.
2. During the next 1$ months it is estimated that about 300,000
North Vietnamese males will reach the age of 17 and that about 180000
~.
of these will be physically fit for military service. We believe that
up in the No~th Vietnamese armed Forces from about 240,000
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in ];965 to the present estimated 475,000 and the provision of fillers
far units in the South was accomplished primarily by recruiting the
physically fit males reaching draft age each year., Assuming that
the build up in North Vietnamese force levels is completed, the
primary requirement for additional forces is now for infiltration to
the South. ~,
3. About 50,000 additional forces could be sent South if the need
arose by drawing down the number of ground forces within North Vietnam.
'Of the tota]~ military establishment, North Vietnam has retained about
360,000 within North Vietnamese borders for logistical support, coast
and air defense,~defense against a passible alliedinvasion, administration
and training. We estimate that 310,000 of the foY~ces presently in country
would be retained for North Vietnam's defenses,, support and training
activities.
Equipment Availabilit
4. There is no foreseeable limitation on force levels due to lack
of equipment in the next 18 months. The capability of North Vietnam
to equip and support military units at home and out of country is entirely
dependent on aid from other Communist countries. Thus far Communist
countries have been willing; to keep North Vietnam supplied with the
required military goods t6 develop and sustain defenses in, the North
and to equip farces to counter US escalation in the South. Economic
goods also have keen supplied to maintain transports some industries
and civilian consumption. Since the initiation of the US bombing program
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and the increased committment of US forces in wouth Vietnam the amount
of military, aid delivered to North Vietnam by other Communist countries
'has increased steepljr from a total of only $140 million during 1954-64
to about $1,400 .million during 1965-67. Economic aid has also increased
from an average of about $90 million annually before the bombing to
about $340 million in 1967. ,
5? An increasing volume of arms and ammunition imported by North
Vietnam has been transported along the infiltration trails to South
Vietnam, significantly increasing Communist firepower in the South over
' the last year. Greater numbers of standard Soviet or Chicom weapons
such as the'7.62 mm new family of weapons- have ,been appearing in South
Vietnam in recent months.- In addition to the new family of weapons,
grenade launchers, mortars, rockets and artillery are appearing in
increasing quantities. Although weapons and ordnance facilities have
been established by the Communists in South Vietnam; the major logistical
requirement for standardized arms, 'and ammunition must b~ met by sources
outside. It ,is estimated that presently $5 percent of small arms and
ammunition, and almost all of the mortars, rockets9 and artillery
ammunition used byPCommunist forces in South Vietnam are imported. The
bulk of weapons and ammunition are ,infiltrated over the Laotian infiltration
corridor, supplemented by sea infiltration and the smuggling of~small
~ .The new family consists of the Soviet (or North Korean and Chinese
copies) AK-47 assault rifle,.SKS carbine, and~RPD light machine gun.
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quantities of arms and ammunition from Cambodia. The introduction of
new weapons to replace the old indicates- an expectation that .resupply
can be continued. ,
6. The Communist countries have indicated their willingness to
continue to support the war in Vietnam. In the fall of 1967 all Communist
countries except Yugoslavia signed trade and aid agreements with North
Vietnam. More than half of,the'agreements provided for military assistance
in 1868. Tn previous years little mention has been made of military
assistance to North Vietnam and it is 'believed that through 1967 the USSR
and Commun~.st China supplied most of the military equipment, the East
European countries providing only token amounts. North Vietnam probably
will continue to receive needed amounts of military and economic aid.
The burdens placed on the Communist donor countries are not significantly
large and the USSR~and China could continue indefinitely supplying equip-
ment to North Vietnam at present ar higher levels. It is also probable
.that. more advanced weapons systems would be?sent. to North Vietnam as
- ,
required to match US escalation.
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