THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800030020-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 8, 2002
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 23, 1967
• Content Type: IM

S-
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Secret
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
JCS review(s)
completed.
The Effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder Program
-Secret
29
23 May 1967
No. 0648/67
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WARNING
This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
ceipt by an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNORADINO AND
DECLASSIFICATION
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
23 May 1967
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Effectiveness of the Rolling Thunder Program
Summary
Despite the increased tempo of the air war dur-
ing the last 10 weeks, the Rolling Thunder program has
made only limited progress in meeting two of its cur-
rent objectives: to limit or raise the, cost of send-
ing men and supplies to South Vietnam and to make North
Vietnam pay a price for its aggression against the
South. The damage to economic and military targets
has not degraded North Vietnam's ability to support
the war sufficiently to affect current levels of com-
bat in the South. There are no signs that the deter-
mination of the regime to persist in its aggression
has abated and despite increasing hardships, the morale
of the populace has not eroded to a point where wide-
spread apathy and war weariness are threatening the
control of the Hanoi regime. The recent expansion of
the bombing program has, however, badly damaged the
modern sector of the North Vietnamese economy and has
increased the disruption of orderly economic activity.
The cost of bomb damage to North Vietnam contin-
ues to rise. Total damage resulting from air attacks
through April 1967 is estimated to be over $233 mil-
lion. Over 70 percent of this damage was inflicted
on economic target systems. However, despite the
increasing costs and burdens resulting from the air
attacks, North Vietnam, aided by an increased flow
of imports from the USSR and Communist China, has
managed to maintain, and in many respects to improve
its organized support of the war.
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The electric power industry has been the most
heavily damaged sector of the economy and its neu-
tralization may paralyze almost all of the modern
industrial sector. This sector, however, makes
only a marginal contribution to the war effort.
other important activities have been subjected
to heavy attack--transportation and petroleum
storage--but North Vietnam has successfully im-
plemented countermeasures so that the over-all
performance and capabilities of these activities
are as high, if not higher, than when the bombing
programs started.
The attacks on military target systems through
April 1967 had not significantly reduced the capa-
bilities of the military establishment. These capa-
bilities have, in fact, been greatly expanded through
large infusions of military aid from the USSR and
Communist China.
The ability of North Vietnam to withstand the
pressures of air attacks is explained by several
factors. The economy is essentially agrarian and
provides little direct input, other than manpower,
to the war in the South. The flow of essential eco-
nomic and military aid into North Vietnam far sur-
passes the total damage resulting from air attacks
and provides North Vietnam the materials-necessary
to continue the war. This assistance also implies
that the USSR and Communist China will underwrite
the damage sustained and the eventual reconstruction
of the country, as they did in North Korea after
the war. Finally, the North Vietnamese have devised
and implemented an elaborate and highly successful
system of countermeasures which negates most of the
desired impact of air attacks on the vital flow of
men and supplies to the war in the South.
Experience indicates that the remaining land
transportation targets will be extremely difficult
and costly to interdict. Even with a more concen-
trated bombing effort against lines of communication
in the southern part of North Vietnam, it will be
extremely difficult to reduce significantly the south-
ward flow of supplies. More than 3,00 miles of road
were either upgraded or newly constructed in this
area during the latter half of 1966 in order
to reduce the reliance on the heavily bombed main
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The electric power industry has been the most
heavily damaged sector of the economy and its neu-
tralization may paralyze almost all of the modern
industrial sector. This sector, however, makes
only a marginal contribution to the war effort.
other important activities have been subjected
to heavy attack--transportation and petroleum
storage--but North Vietnam has successfully im-
plemented countermeasures so that the over-all
performance and capabilities of these activities
are as high, if not higher, than when the bombing
programs started.
The attacks on military target systems through
April 1967 had not significantly reduced the capa-
bilities of the military establishment. These capa-
bilities have, in fact, been greatly expanded through
large infusions of military aid from the USSR and
Communist China.
The ability of North Vietnam to withstand the
pressures of air attacks is explained by several
factors. The economy is essentially agrarian and
provides little direct input, other than manpower,
to the war in the South. The flow of essential eco-
nomic and military aid into North Vietnam far sur-
passes the total damage resulting from air attacks
and provides North Vietnam the materials-necessary
to continue the war. This assistance also implies
that the USSR and Communist China will underwrite
the damage sustained and the eventual reconstruction
of the country, as they did in North Korea after
the war. Finally, the North Vietnamese have devised
and implemented an elaborate and highly successful
system of countermeasures which negates most of the
desired impact of air attacks on the vital flow of
men and supplies to the war in the South.
Experience indicates that the remaining land
transportation targets will be extremely difficult
and costly to interdict. Even with a more concen-
trated bombing effort against lines of communication
in the southern part of North Vietnam, it will be
extremely difficult to reduce significantly the south-
ward flow of supplies. More than 300 miles of road
were either upgraded or newly constructed in this
area during the latter half of 1966 in order
to reduce the reliance on the heavily bombed main
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routes such as 1A and 15. In addition, there has
been widespread development of bridge bypasses, in-
cluding cable bridges, pontoon bridges, fords, and
ferries. The capacity of the highway and waterway
systems is far in excess of the comparatively small
volume of supplies required. Both of these systems
are difficult to interdict and movements at night
probably would enable the Communists to meet supply
requirements without serious difficulty.
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1. The Rising Tempo of the Air War
1. The tempo of the air war over all areas of
North Vietnam increased significantly during the last
two and one-half months as a result of new strikes
against airfields, electric power facilities, and
manufacturing plants at the same time that lines of
communication, barracks, and supply depots were being
struck with increased intensity. During January-
February a total of 12,050 attack sorties were flown
against North Vietnam. In the period 1 March - 15
May about 23,00 attack sorties were flown. The num-
ber of attack sorties flown against route packages
V and VI in the northern areas of North Vietnam in-
creased by about 70 percent between the same periods,
from 1,130 in the first two months of 1967 to over
1,900 during the period 1 March - 15 May.
2. Air strikes against the rail system have in-
creased considerably in recent weeks. Numerous facil-
ities on the key Hanoi - Dong Dang line have been at-
tacked seriously for the first time since September
1966. Strikes on the Hanoi rail and highway bridge
across the Canal des Rapides have closed the line to
through traffic until a by-pass bridge is built.
Goods continue, however, to be shuttled across the
canal. The level of damage to the road system is also
much higher than a year ago. Since 29 March four air-
fields have been attacked a total of six times. Even
targets that have been hard hit in the past--petroleum
storage and military barracks--have come under heavy
attack in recent weeks.
3. The attacks against major industrial targets
during the past several weeks are evidence of the
changing nature of the air war over North Vietnam.
During the first two months of 1967 only 4 missions
were flown against 2 thermal power plants. Since 1
March, 22 missions were flown against 6 power plants
and 1 major substation. For the first time under the
Rolling Thunder Program, preplanned attacks were car-
ried out against major industrial installations--the
Thai Nguyen iron and stell combine and the Haiphong
cement plant. Thai Nguyen has been struck 14 times
since 10 March and the Haiphong cement plant 2 times
since 20 April. The tabulation below illustrates the
general step-up in air operations that have occurred
since 1 March 1966.
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January-February 1967
Targets Missions
Electric Power 2 4
Manufacturing 0 0
Airfields 0 0
Railroad Yards
and Shops 5 31
Barracks 8 24
Petroleum Storage 2 2
Naval Bases 0 0
Maritime Ports 1 4
March - 14 May 1967
Targets Missions
7 22
2 16
4 6
7 45
13 80
3 7
2 4
0 0
II. Electric Power
A. The 1967 Campaign
4. Damage or destruction resulting from concen-
trated attacks against electric power facilities have
put out of operation virtually all of North Vietnam's
central generating capacity with the possible excep-
tion of the power plant at Hanoi.
5. In the first two months of 1967 two power
plants--Hon Gai and Bac Giang--came under attacks for
the first time. It was not until March, however, that
a concentrated and systematic attack against the major
remaining power facilities in North Vietnam got under
way. Since 1 March a total of 261 sorties have been
flown against power facilities and almost 500 tons of
bombs have been dropped against such. facilities. In
April and May the two power plants in Haiphong were
attacked for the first time. The results of strikes
carried out on 19 and 21 May against the power plant
at Hanoi, the last undamaged plant in the central power
network, are unknown. A summary of air operations
against North Vietnamese thermal power plants in 1967
is given in the following tabulation:
January-February
Bac Giang
Hon Gai
Ordnance (tons)
18.
27,
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March - 14 May
Plant Attacked Attack Sorties
Ordnance (tons)
Bac Giang 15
56
Hon Gai 40
57
Viet Tri 27
96
Thai Nguyen 9
29
Haiphong West 76
80
Haiphong East 36
72
Hanoi 6
3
Hanoi Transformer
Station 52
106
261
499
B. Effects on the Electric Power Industry
6. Through the middle of Ma 1967 the Rollin
Thunder program had attacked 13 25X1A
electric power facilities in North Vietnam. The air
campaign has put out of operation 131,000 kilowatts
(kw) of capacity in the main Hanoi-Haiphong power net-
work and in two smaller power systems in the southern
part of the country. The loss represents 70 percent
of total national installed capacity of 187,000 kw.
The cost of restoring these facilities is estimated at
$20.5 million.
7. The air attacks have reduced capacity in the
main network from eight plants with a total capacity
of 136,000 kw to a single plant at Hanoi with a capa-
city of 32,500 kw, or about 24 percent of the prestrike
level. If the Hanoi power plant has been put out of
operation, practically the entire main network is inop-
erative.
C. Effects on the Economy
8. The neutralization of most of North Vietnam's
electric power industry is having widespread effects
throughout the country. The loss of generating facil-
ities undoubtedly has created a severe shortage of
power and disrupted activities that normally depend on
a reliable central power supply. It is probable that
nonessential consumption by residences and commercial
establishments, and most street lighting have been prac-
tically eliminated. The few heavy or continuous-process
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industries, such as the Viet Tri chemical and paper
complex or the Haiphong cement plant,* probably have
been forced to stop operations unless some provision
for power has been made by the installation of diesel-
generating units larger than those currently estimated
to be available. Industrial or manufacturing processes
that can be divided into small segments (such as ma-
chine shops, truck repair facilities, coal mining, or
port loading operations) can probably be furnished suf-
ficient power by small diesel generating units, but not
without some loss of efficiency. Most of the industrial
operations closely related to North Vietnam's support of
the war in the South are of the type that can be operated
by small diesel units. Thus, the curtailment or shut-
down of modern industry would have relatively little
impact on North Vietnam's ability to continue the war.
9. There are few eye-witness reports about the
impact of power shortages. The first positive indica-
tion that generating capacity now falls short of meet-
ing demands was a reported announcement that power ra-
tioning was instituted in Hanoi on 10 May 1967. A few
other reports have suggested intermittent restrictions
on power supply over the past year.
D. Restoration of Damaged Facilities
10. The electric power industry has been the major
exception to North Vietnam's demonstrated ability to
recuperate from the air attacks. Although complete
restoration of the damaged facilities would require
18-24 months, most of them could be restored to partial
operation within a period of 2-4 months.
11. There are signs of strain and bottlenecks in
North Vietnamese attempts to rebuild the damaged power
facilities. Most of the reconstruction requires for-
eign technical and material assistance. Much of the
progress made during 1966 was eliminated by later re-
strikes against the power facilities. There is con-
siderable variation in the effort assigned to various
reconstruction programs. When limited damage permits
*This p aI nt a so sustained bomb damage in April 1967.
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equipment to be readily salvaged, the North Vietnam-
ese have made persistent efforts to restore facili-
ties to partial operation. They are willing to
abandon plants, however, when a major reconstruction
effort is required.
12. North Vietnam is estimated to have imported
around 2,000 diesel-driven generating units during
the past two years.
13. Those diesel units are well-suited for sup-
plying power to small independent consumers, but they
cannot be readily operated in parallel with a trans-
mission network, nor are they large enough to cover
the demands of heavy, continuous-process industry.
Moreover, the usable capacity of these units will be
substantially less than their rated capacity. The
diesels known to have been imported probably could
not supply more than 15,000 kw to 20,000 kw of usable
power. This amount is roughly 10 percent to 15 per-
cent of the central generating capacity currently out
of operation.
14. A concerted effort probably will be made
to maintain minimal power supply in Hanoi and Haiphong
with available generating capacity. These cities
probably have been allocated the larger-sized diesel
units to serve select parts of the cities, possibly
through existing low-voltage distribution lines. It
is reasonable to assume that some diesel units have
been allocated for use in the areas of Thanh Hoa,
Ben Thuy, and Hon Gai where central plants are out of
operation. Some undoubtedly have been assigned to
supply power for irrigation and drainage of agricul-
ture, and some will be assigned a standby role for
emergency power. Although a number of alternatives
are open to the North Vietnamese in the use of diesels,
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it seems clear that available generating capacity
falls so far short of meeting demands that some
system for rationing electricity is imperative.
III. Manufacturing
A. The 1967 Campaign
15. Prior to 1967 only one manufacturing plant--
the Lang Chi explosive plant--had been purposely struck.
On several occasions, the Nam Dinh textile mill and
Cam Pha coal treatment plant had been hit inadvertently.
The Viet Tri paper mill also had been hit on at least
one occasion. It was not until March 1967 that major
industrial targets--the Thai Nguyen iron and steel
combine and the Haiphong cement plant--were brought
under concentrated attack. Between 3 March - 16 May
the Thai Nguyen iron and stell combine was struck 14
times with about 580 tons of bombs. The Haiphong ce-
ment plant was struck on two occasions in April. A
summary of strikes against these targets is given below.
Target Attack Sorties Ordnance (tons)
Thai Nguyen Iron and
Steel Combine 237 580
Haiphong Cement Plant 43 50
B. Bomb Damage
16. It is probable that damage to the steam plant,
coke oven and ancillary facilities combined with the
general shortage of electric power have temporarily
stopped the production of pig iron at Thai Nguyen. As
of this date, it cannot be confirmed that direct damage
has been done to the blast furnaces.
17. In assessing damage to Thai Nguyen it is im-
portant to bear in mind that the plant, as an iron and
steel producer, was never completed and much of the
steel making and.rolling mill equipment probably has
never been installed.
18. The North Vietnamese have used the numerous
fabrication shops and other facilities at Thai Nguyen
for the fabrication of significant quantities of war-
support production--barges, small watercraft, pontoons,
petroleum storage tanks, and construction materials
from imported steel. The war-supporting production
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at Thai Nguyen has undoubtedly been disrupted by
the bombings, but it can probably be restored in
relatively short order.
19. The Haiphong cement plant is believed to
be inoperative both because of the air strikes on
20 and 25 April 1967 and also because of the loss
of electric power from the damaged Haiphong West
thermal power plant. Partial operation of the
plant probably could be achieved in 90 days. How-
ever, it is highly unlikely that the plant would be
restored to full capacity until after the cessation
of the bombings. The loss of cement output will
deprive North Vietnam of one of its few earners of
foreign exchange and will increase its import require-
ments for this item.
IV. Transport Capability and Performance
20. Air strikes against the transport system
of North Vietnam have not significantly affected
transport capability or the ability to move supplies
--either into or within the country--in support of
the economy or the war effort. There has been little
indication throughout the country of serious supply
shortages or bottlenecks. Rail, highway, and inland
water connections between North Vietnam and Communist
China have the capacity to accommodate the movement
of supplies far in excess of the current volume being
imported. Thus, the recent increased interdiction
of the important Hanoi - Dong Dang rail line has not
seriously affected the flow of imports since traffic,
delayed because of interdictions on the line, can be
moved after repairs are made. In the southern part
of North Vietnam, the over-all capacity of the road
network has been generally maintained or slightly im-
proved despite concentrated air attacks and an in-
crease in the damage level. In fact--despite recently
increased levels of damage to highways, trucks, and
watercraft--the number of both trucks and water craft
sighted moving south of Thanh Hoa increased signifi-
cantly. During the first week in May, truck movement
in and out of Laos on Route 15 (south of Vinh) was
greater than during the Tet standdown in February when
the North Vietnamese had free use of the road. Also,
large convoys of trucks--one reported to number about
100 trucks--were detected during May on Route lA moving
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toward the DMZ. This increased truck and water craft
activity probably is in support of recent military
activities by the sizeable North Vietnamese forces in
that area.
21. The ability of North Vietnam to expand the
level of imports and to continue the distribution of
supplies within the country also was made possible
by the effectiveness of a variety of measures under-
taken to counter the damage inflicted on the transport
system. Multiple stream coossings on important lines
of communication have ensured at least one serviceable
crossing most of the time despite concentrated air
attacks. This has been possible because of the mobil-
ization of a large work force, the use of on-site
buidling materials to carry out repairs, and preplan-
ning and rapid implementation of repair and construc-
tion work on the lines of communication. On the im-
portant Hanoi - Dong Dang rail line, at least one by-
pass bridge has been built for each bombed bridge--
e North Vietnamese were observe con-
structing a bypass bridge for the major Hanoi rail
highway bridge over the Canal des Rapides in May 1966,
one year before the bridge was struck. Therefore,
when the bridge was destroyed on 29 April 1967, the
bypass bridge could be made operational within 15 to
30 days after the strike--and it is possible that the
bridge decking can be removed during the day. When
two 50-foot spans on the rail/highway bridge at Bac
Giang (also on the Dong Dang line) were dropped on 29
April, the bridge was repaired and serviceable by 1
May. Bypass bridges on this line have been well
built, substantial structures, and probably were
erected by a Chinese railway engineering division I
22. Important crossings on the rail line south
of Hanoi have been furnished with the most numerous
bypasses. There are six bypasses in place at the
site of the Dong Phong Thuong rail/highway bridge and
four bypasses in place at the Qui Vi.nh railroad bridge.
In the southern part of the country, there has been
considerable use of fords, ferries, and pontoon bridges
to bypass damage to highway bridges. The North Viet-
namese have not only been able to generally keep main
roads open, but they have also upgraded many rural
roads and constructed new roads in the southern part
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of the country to reduce their reliance on the heavily
bombed main routes such as 1A and 15. More than 300
miles of roads were upgraded or newly constructed in
Route Packages 1, 2, and 3 during the latter half of
V. Transport Equipment
23. Destruction and damage of transport equip-
ment, especially trucks and watercraft, increased dur-
ing the period 1 March - 14 May, 1967 compared to
January-February 1967. Losses of watercraft rose
dramatically to a total much greater than the 1966
quarterly average and higher than the 1965 total.
Truck destruction and damage increased over the first
two months, with sightings during early May increas-
ing significantly. Attrition of rail freight cars
increased slightly the last two months, based on the
increased levels of damage.
24. While the level of damage inflicted during
1966 was significantly higher than in 1965, and while
the level of damage appears to be increasing during
1967, there is no evidence of serious transport prob-
lems resulting from equipment shortages. Imports of
trucks have been sifficient to maintain inventory
levels. While information on imports of rolling stock
is sketchy and not at all equal to the attrition rate,
there is no indication of any problems associated with
rail equipment shortages. Sightings of rail cars in
the badly interdicted rail yards south of Hanoi in-
dicate rail car inventory is pore than sufficient for
needs. In addition, reported losses or railroad
rolling stock have included many small, makeshift cars
used south of Hanoi which are not included in the
inventory. Sightings of watercraft, which increased
to record levels in the beginning of May, indicate
there has been no significant decrease in the water-
craft employed despite the high level of destruction.
The reported losses of transport equipment during 1967
are shown in the following tabulation:
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 Comparative Losses to Transport Equipment
Jan-Feb, 1967 and Mar - 14 May 1967
Jan-Feb, 1967 Mar - 14 May 1967
Type Destroyed Damag Destroyed Damaged
Railroad Rolling
Stock
Trucks
Ferries
Barges
Other watercraft
56
104
0
259
54
VI. Petroleum Storage Facilities
51
92
1
820
216
43
104
284
328
0
0
899
1,732
38
42
25. On 1 January 1965 North Vietnam had 13 fixed
petroleum storage facilities with a combined capacity
of about 128,000 tons By the
end of 1966 about 85 percent of this capacity was de-
stroyed. Attacks during early 1967 inflicted only minor
additional damage to the system by destroying the resid-
ual capacity at Do Son.
26. An effective dispersed storage system and
modified Soviet delivery schedules and techniques have
blunted the effects of the destruction of North Vietnam's
bulk storage facilities. There is no evidence that the
bombing of petroleum targets has seriously weakened the
economy, produced significant shortages of petroleum,
or diminished North Vietnam's capability to support mili-
tary activities or the infiltration of men and supplies
into Laos and South Vietnam.
VII. Railroad Yards and Shops
27. Several significant rail facilities have been
attacked during 1967, with the most significant strikes
occurring during April and May. During April the Hanoi
railroad car repair shops and classification yard, Gia
Lam was attacked, destroying an estimated 16 percent of
the floor plan area of repair buildings and 27 percent
of the floor plan area of support buildings. This
facility represents 65 percent of North Vietnam's rail-
road car repair capacity and was initially struck in
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1966, when an estimated 6 percent of capacity was
destroyed. Damage to this facility will probably
temporarily disrupt the repair of freight cars,
although repair activity can be dispersed and con-
ducted at local levels.
28. During May the important rail classifica-
tion yard at'Yen;Vien, which'is at the crossroads ofthe
Hanoi - Dong Dang and Hanoi - Lao Cai lines, was
attacked. As all traffic from Lao Cai and Dong
Dang must use this yard before entering Hanoi, strikes
against it have probably interrupted service on both
lines.
29. Other facilities struck from March through
May include the yards at Vinh, Thanh Hoa, Nam Ding,
Ninh Binh, and Thai Nguyen, all of which were struck
during January and February 1967, and during 1966.
The most important of these is at Thai Nguyen, which
serves the steel complex and accounts for about 9 per-
cent of total North Vietnamese capacity. Cumulative
results show that about 90 percent of rail yard capa-
city and 50 percent of repair facilities have been
destroyed at Thai Nguyen.
30. While the level of air strikes against rail
facilities has increased since 1965, when only Vinh,
Nam Dinh, and Yen Bai were attacked, the cumulative
effects have not been disastrous to the rail system
as a whole. Repairs are very effectively and easily
accomplished. In several instances bypass tracks
have been noted laid around the rail yard, decreas-
ing the effectiveness of air strikes and assuring
through service. The air strikes against rail yards
and shops probably have temporarily disrupted but not
adversely affected the rail capability.
VIII. Airfields
31. North Vietnam's jet airfield capacity re-
mained virtually unattacked throughout 1965, 1966,
and the first two months of 1967. Only four minor
airfields--two of which had limited jet capacity--had
been struck and inactiviated in 1965. Then on the
29th of March 1967, US aircraft began to interdict
North Vietnam's major airfields capable of handling
jet aircraft. Kep and Haiphong/Kien An airfields
have been struck in rapid succession.
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32. Preliminary bomb damage assessment returns
indicate that these attacks were generally unsuccess-
ful in limiting air operations. The light to moderate
damage inflicted could be repaired within 30 days. One
side of the runway at Kep has been cratered, but fighter
aircraft should be able to use the other side of the
runway. Damage to Hoa Lac airfield (initially struck
24 April) and Haiphong/Kien An airfield (initially
struck 10 May) was light. According to JCS estimates,
only 23 percent of North Vietnam's airfield capacity
is destroyed or inactive. However, even if the capa-
cities at Kep and Hoa Lac were completely lost, North
Vietnam's ability to mount air operations would not
be seriously impeded.
33. North Vietnam's fighter aircraft facilities,
which were inadequate at the beginning of the bombing,
have been expanding significantly, outpacing the growth
of the MIG inventory to the point where slack capacity
now exists. At least six airfields are presently capa-
ble of supporting MIG operations, and an additional
airfield under construction at Bai Thuong will be able
to accommodate jets when it is completed. Successful
attacks against the major airfields at Kep and Phuc
Yen would somewhat reduce fighter effectiveness over
the capital area, but the North Vietnamese would still
-be capable of maintaining an aggressive fighter force.
34. Effective interdiction of all North Vietnam-
ese jet capable airfields would force North Vietnamese
aircraft into China--possibly to Peitun/Yunnani, Nan-
ning, Ning Ming, or other airfields. From these bases,
North Vietnamese aircraft would be far less effective
in defending the Hanoi/Haiphong area dur to protracted
reaction times and high fuel requirements.
25X1
Approved For R - 095R000800030020-7
 Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800030020-7
aucret
Secret
Approved For Release 2002/11/08 : CIA-RDP78TO2095R000800030020-7