ASSESSMENT OF THE BOMB DAMAGE INFLICTED ON NORTH VIETNAM S ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000800030018-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2002
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: May 19, 1967
• Content Type: MF

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
20 May 1967
INTEL LIGENCE MEMORANDUM
The Status of North Vietnam's Electric Power Industry
- 15 May 19 7*
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Air strikes through 15 May 1967 against 13,of the
electric power facilities in North Vietnam have put out of
operation about 131,000 kilowatts (kw) of power-generating capacity,
or 70 percent of the national total. 'Loss of generating facilities
has created a severe shortage of power and has disrupted activities
that normally depend on a central power supply, particularly those
activities in the small modern industrial sector of the economy.
Most of the industrial operations that are closely related to North
Vietnam's support of the war in the South are of the type that can
be operated by small diesel'units.
The city of Hanoi is now dependent on one local powerplant that
is'believed capable of supplying about one-half of the city's normal
needs. Haiphong is without a central power supply and must rely on
available diesel-generating equipment and the limited amounts of
power that may be sent along the transmission line from Hanoi.
This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by
the Office of Research and Reports; the estimates and conclusions
represent the best.judgment of the Directorate of Intelligence as
of may 1967?
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:nor all practical purposes power supply to non-essential con-
sumers has been eliminated. Although there is a lack of positive
intelligence on the impact of the power shortages, a system of
rationing seems imperative.
fianoi
may have inaugurated a rationing system on 10 May 1967.
North Vietnam has had. little success in restoring damaged
power facilities. The slight progress made during 1966 was set back
by later restrikes. The North Vietnamese seem willing to make sus-
tained efforts to restore facilities to partial operations when
limited damage permits equipment to be readily salvaged. They
are willing, however, to abandon plants when a major reconstruction
effort would be required. Reconstruction efforts are highly depen-
dent on foreign technical assistance and equipment.
The major countermeasure adopted by the North Vietnamese has
been the import of around 2,000 diesel-driven generating units
during the past two years. These units have. limited. practical
applications and can replace only-10-15 percent of the generating
capacity currently out of operation.
With the exception of the powerplant at Hanoi,
remaining powerplants which have not been struck make only a small
contribution to North Vietnam?s modern. industry or to the war
these facilities are located within the buffer
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'ffc,2`c, on the Electric Power Industry.
1. Through the middle cf May 1967 the Rolling Thunder l,cogra::
had attacked 13
electric power facilities
in North Vietnam. (See the Figure) The air campaign has put o,~3t
of operation 131,000 kilowatka (k-w) of capacity in the main lia.noi-
Haiphong power network and in two smaller power systems in the
southern part~of the country. (See the Table) The loss. represent
70 percent of total national installed capacity of 187,000 !?.w.
The cost of restoring these facilities is estimated at $20.5 mil-
lion.
2. The air attacks have reduced capacity in the main network
from eight plants with a total capacity of 136,000 kw toga single
plant at Hanoi with a capacity of 32,500 kw, or about-24 percent
.of the pre-strike level.. Severe damage has been inflicted on powcr-
plants at Uong Bi, Hon Gai, Haiphong East, Haiphong West, Thai
Nguyen, Viet Tri, and Nam Dinh.. Damage inflicted by strikes on
the Dong Anh substation, the most important substation in the net-
w ork, will prevent integrated operation of the network for at
least 2 to 3 months.
3. An additional powerplant at Bac Giang, which is outside the
main network, was put out of operation for a minimum of 3 rrcnths.
In addition, central, powerplants,..in' the southern part of North Viet-
nam also have sustained damage. All -four plants in the em.ll powL
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systc:.io around Thanh Hoa and 'Ben Thuy were already out of cc rvice
as a consequence of damage irt"Licted during 1965 and 1966.
i~ . Loss of the generati,ig capacity at Hon Gai, Uong B:L,
Thai N yen, and Viet Tri has eliminated the supplementary supply
of power formerly received by Hanoi and Haiphong from the main
transmission network. Hanoi .pow is dependent on one local. plant with a capacity of 32,500 kw that is believed capable of
supplying about one-half of the city's normal needs. Haiphong is
without a central power supply and must rely on available diesel-
generating equipment, and the limited amounts?of power that may be
sent along the line from Hanoi.
Other Effects
5. The neutralization of most of North Vietnam's electric
power industry is having widespread effects throughout the country.
The loss of generating facilities undoubtedly has created a severe
shortage of power and disrupted activities that normally depend on
a reliable central power supply. The precise extent to which the
supply of electric power is teing curtailed is, difficult to quan-
tify. It is probable that non-essential consumption by residences
and commercial establishments, and most street lighting have been
eli inated. Curtailment of industrial power supply almost certainly
has'caused fragmentation of industrial processes in some cases, and
in others has caused complete shutdowns. The few heavy or con-
tinuous-process industries, such as the Viet Tri chemical and
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per complex or the Haiphong cement plant,* probably will be forced
to stop operations unless some provision for power has been rraue
by the installation of diesel-generating units larger than those
currently estimated to be available. No ready substitute for indus-
trial process-steam is available to industries formerly dependent on
steam furnished by the central powerplants. Industrial or manufac-
turing processes that can be divided into small segments (such as
machine shops, truck repair facilities, coal mining, or port loading
operations) can probably be furnished sufficient power by small
diesel generating units,'but not without some loss of efficiency.
Most of the industrial operations that are closely related to North
Vietnam's support of the war in the South are of the type that can
be operated by small diesel units. Thus, the curtailment or shut-
down of modern industry would have little impact on North Vietnam's,
ability to continue the war.
.6. There are few eye-witness reports about the impact of power
shortages, The first positive' indication that generating capacity
now falls short of meeting demands wasi
power rationing was instituted in Hanoi on 10 May 1967.
suggested intermittent restrictions on power supply over
the past year.
This plant also sustained bomb damage in April 1967.
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Ito: ,fiiou of Dan= od 11acil if a
7. T-hu 0loctric power 111,l:3try has been the major excontjon
to North Vietnam's dcmonstratoi ability to recuperate from the
attacks. Although complete re. toration of the damaged facilit:i.ej
r,uld .r~~rltlire from 18-24 month.;, most of thcrrr.could be restored to
opc;' tl on irithin a y criod of 2.11? months.
o. There are signs of strain and bottlenecks in North
attc:snts to rebuild the damar,c, power faeiltics. Not of the recon-
struction requires foreign tcc%niical and material acsistancc. ::uch
of the progr s s made during 1966 was eliminated by later re striI,c s
z.,-ainst the rower facilities. There is considerable variations in
she effoi ~s put into reconstz x::tion porgratis. When limited C'. wt,?:, . f.
crmi:;s cqui;,mment to be readily calvaged, the North Vietnariesce have
..'.,;.de n.~rsistent efforts to restore facilities, to partial operation.
They are willing to abandon plants, however; -when a major recon-
Strizct e: fox v would be requircd. Repair of the Thai I'101uyen
4,1 an 'or ex_?Y?1Tl a was rapidly accomplished in the latter part of
1966 after moderate damage ,,_
Inflicted in July. The Uong Bi planat,,
d.umaged in August 1966, showed little sign of reconstruction in
January 1967 although Soviet, technicians currently are believed to
be wor:W ng at the plant. The Thanh Iloa and Ban Thuy plants ,inch
were 'attacked in 1965 were still unserviceable in April 1967 al;;hour;';
reconstruction work on both now is in progress. Restoration of the
e a 1'J L h plant progressed stca(iily until late 1966, and than apparently
halted before the plant was ready for service. Reconstruction of .:Oa
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Mar, at Co Dinh and at Lanz ?i hhaeh % ~rarently has been
Coi::.t. action of the large hydroelectric plant at Mac Ba.,
bcin , built with assistance from the USSR, bras halted in :real--j
1)roba11y to. forestall damage from air strikes. The status of pos
ble reconstruction efforts at powerplants struck during the last
few months is not knoim.
Other Co ntcrrccasures
Other than the measures discussed above the major counter-?
neasu-'e used by the North Vic tnamcse has been the development of
altcrnatc power-generating capacity. This has been done principally
by ir.7portinv diesel-driven e;rneratin g units.
10. 'North Vietnam is cs.:i;:va,ted to have imported around. 2,000
diesel-driven generating units during the past two years. The large: s
units imported were two from the USSR with a capacity of 600 1:7-T cc,
-lift:--en from CzechowlovakiE capacity of 320 kw c ci], ; c' ....
uns?ccifi, u ntiur~ber of 500 1?,,.T units also imported from
The remaining units imported have capacities ranging from 5 1.~r to
100 kw, w1.th about 75 pcrcc:ir:; leaving ca..c)acities of less than 20 k I.
`fhegrcgatc capacity l Iof
~qui,: ert known to have ben imported amounts to an cstirm~a?Ced 25,C`00
kw to 30,000 kw.
11. Those diesel unitr_z tire woll-suited for supplying pow or to
small independent consumer.,,, but they cannot be readily operated in
parallel frith a transmission network, nor are they large cnou;,h to
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cover the demands of heavy, continuous-process industry. Moreover,
the usable capacity of these units will be substantially less than
their rated capacity. When power is supplied independently to
separate consumers each consumer maintains reserve capacity. Sortie
consumers undoubtedly will bE: assigned generating units larger than
needed. Thus the diesel ;eru1rating units will not supply dicperse~?
consumers with as much power
and will not fully compensate for the lose of an equivalent amour.of
impo~'.sd
central generating capacity. The diesels known to have been
probably could not supply more than 15,000 kw to 20,000 kw of usable
power. This amount is roughly 10 percent to 15 percent of the
central generating capacity currently out of operation.
12. Almost nothing is I:nown about the location of diesel units.
However,,it is reasonable to assume that some units have been
allocated for use in the areas of Thanh Hoa, Ben Thuy, and Hon Gal
where central plants are out of operation. Some undoubtedly have
been assigned. to supply power for irrigation and drainage of agri-
culture, and some will be assigned a standby role for emergency
power. Although a number of alternatives are open to the North
Vietnamese
generating
in the use of diesels, it seems clear that available
capacity falls so far short of meeting demands that some
syptem for rationing electricity is imperative.
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