RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL AND MANPOWER DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080072-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2009
• Sequence Number: 72
• Publication Date: March 6, 1973
• Content Type: IM

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Secret
NSA review completed
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence Memorandum
Recent Communist Logistical and ll~ianpower
.Develo~iments in Indochina
Secret
ER IM 73-19-4
6 March 1973
Copy No.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
6 March 1973
RECENT COMMUNIST LOGISTICAL AND MANPOWER
DEVELOPMENTS IN INDOCHINA
1. Communist logistical activity throughout Indochina is continuing
at a brisk pace. In southern Laos, large quantities of supplies continue
to move on an around-the-clock basis, and traffic flows into the A Shau
Valley appear to be on the increase. Significant activity has also continued
in the Cambodia/South Vietnam border area, where the first confirmation
of 130-mm field guns moving into southern South Vietnam was recently
received, and where Communist forces are reportedly establishing base areas
from which to conduct post-cease-fire activities. Inside South Vietnam,
detected vehicle activity remains at a high level in GVN Military Region
(MR) 1, and a recent report indicated that all VC units in one province
had been adequately resupplied with men and supplies from North Vietnam
by 26 February. Farther south, supplies continue to move into the Central
Highlands, the Saigon region, and the Delta.
2. Personnel infiltration continued during the past week, and there
are indications that North Vietnam intends to augment or at least maintain
unit strengths in South Vietnam. Currently, there are some 30,000
infiltrators traveling south through the pipeline, of which at least 6,000
personnel in both regular and special-purpose groups probably started south
after the cease-fire date. During the past week, 11 special-purpose infiltration
groups -- with several hundred military and civilian specialists -- were
initially detected at Binh Tram 18 in North Vietnam.
Note: Comments ,and queries regarding this publication are welcomed. They
may be directed t~
of the Office of Economic Research,
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3. No redeployments of major Communist units into or out of South
Vietnam or Laos were detected during the past week, although one NVA
armor battalion -part of the large amount of armor previously noted
deploying south -was initially located on 28 February in the South
Vietnam/Laos border area of southern GVN MR 1. Several major North
Vietnamese units within South Vietnam have been noted recently
repositioning and establishing more permanent bases of operations, and there
are indications that some units are planning to assign their personnel to
local Viet Cong units to minimize the apparent NVA in-country presence.
In Laos, some North Vietnamese units may be preparing to return home
in the near future.
Very late evidence indicates that additional regular infiltration groups
have entered the pipeline since the cease-fire in South Vietnam on
28 January. Two groups destined for MR Tri-Thien-Hue, both of which
were to be sent out through Binh Tram 18, were initially detected on 5
March. This marks the first time since the cease-fire that regular infiltration
groups have been observed in this area, and the addition of these groups
raises the number of personnel detected entering the pipeline since
28 January to more than 7,000. This development is not reflected in the
textual discussion which follows, but will be treated fully in next week's
issuance.
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Recent Communist Logistical Developments in Indochina
Logistic Activity in Southern North Vietnam
4. Although the pace of logistic activity in southern North Vietnam
as reflected in COMINT remains lower than in the pre-cease-fire period,
persistent indications of the movement of supplies in areas from Vinh south
to the DMZ reflect an ongoing substantial resupply effort. Recent evidence
has revealed that heavy barge activity is continuing in the Vinh area. On
23 February, for example, an element of Binh Tram 18 expressed concern
that the unloading of cargo was "too slow," as only 120 tons of cargo
were being unloaded daily. That this activity was continuing in early March
was reflected in a message of 2 March which revealed that the difficulties
stemmed from the fact that only one pier was available for unloading; as
a consequence the level of the daily shipments was not expected to rise
until at least 10 March. Reportedly, "there is a lot of cargo" to be delivered
south by this route.
5. Other intercepted messages during the period made it clear that
resupply activity was not confined to the Vinh area. On 27 February, Binh
Tram 25 noted that 65 tons of weapons and ammunition had been picked
up for movement to Binh Tram 26 near Dong Hoi. The message also
referenced some 1,900 tons of supplies (800 tons of ordnance and 1,100
tons of rice) which probably had been delivered south from the entity.
The intercept is believed to update an earlier intercepted report on deliveries
since 11 Februarys and implies a southward flow of some 75 tons of
ordnance daily during the preceding four days. Not all activity in North
Vietnam has been directed toward South Vietnam and southern Laos,
however. Some deliveries toward northern Laos along Route 7 were noted
as recently as of 4 March.
Logistic Activity in Southern Laos
and Cambodia
6. While apparently sustaining their "General Transportation
Offensive" throughout MR 559, North Vietnamese transportation forces
have since the South Vietnam cease-fire increased the pace of logistic activity
in southern Laos to a level equal to (and possibly greater than) that of
past years. COMINT reflections of logistic activity through the Ban Karai
Pass in February, for example, indicated the level of Communist truck traffic
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was at least equal to that of February 1971, when NVA forces were engaged
in a "crash" transportation phase just before and during Operation Lam
Son 719, the South Vietnamese incursion into southern Laos.
7. During the past week, ~COMINT indicated that
the heavy Communist resupply activity noted on the input corridors to
southern Laos in February was continuing. The pattern remained the same
as in recent weeks -- that is, the heaviest concentration of activity at Ban
Karai Pass, a high level continuing on routes west of the DMZ, and a smaller
but sustained movement through Mu Gia Pass.
on 28 February. On that day, close to 100
sou oun movements were detected on Route 912, just south of Ban
Karai Pass. This heavy activity continued during the first
weelc of March. The most recent COMINT reporting of vehicle activity from
Binh Tram 14 at Ban Karai came on 26 February and revealed that 112
vehicles from four transportation battalions had entered Laos that day. West
ctivity continued to be noted on Route 1033.
more than 85 southbound movements on that
route during the period 26 February through 5 March. In addition, light
but steady traffic was detected on Route 103 in the western DMZ and
on Route 1009 through the eastern half of the DMZ as trucks appear to
be moving through that area to South Vietnam.
8. Within southern Laos, roads remain in good condition and are
being heavily used. As implied in the North Vietnamese press,2 the North
Vietnamese are taking advantage of the lack of US air strikes to move
supplies both day and night. Various logistic entities acknowledge overflights
by aerial observers, but seem to show little concern, so long as the bombers
stay away.
9. The dispatching of cargo toward South Vietnam was the subject
of several important intercepted messages during the week. The heaviest
reported activity came on 26 February when an element of $inh Tram 41
reported that 48 vehicles had arrived at an unspecified location on
Route 922, an important feeder route into the center of South Vietnam's
MR 1. The supplies being carried by these transportation elements was not
reported, but an additional 10 vehicles transporting rice were reportedly
stopped at another location on Route 922. All of this cargo is believed
to be en route to South Vietnam. Binh Tram 41 was also heavily involved
during the week in the movement of a North Vietnamese radar company
from Laos to South Vietnam (see paragraph 22), a move which apparently
caused some congestion in the Binh Tram's area.
2. For a brief discussion of recent reporting by the North Vietnamese press on transportation
in Indochina, see paragraphs 17 and 18.
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Binh Tram Locations in Military Region 559
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10. On 2 March, Binh Tram 42, near the A Shau Valley, revealed
the continuation of cargo deliveries to South Vietnam. Four vehicles are
to be used "continuously" to move cargo from a storage area on Route 922
to "B-4", a probable reference to the southern sector of South Vietnam's
MR 1. Forty vehicles were to be dispatched to pick up gasoline so that
adequate supplies of that commodity "would be on hand." Finally, in the
Binh Tram 36 area, near the Bolovens Plateau, an intercept of 3 March
revealed that some southbound infiltrators headed toward southern South
Vietnam are "equipped" -probably with a weapon and a small quantity
of ammunition -- as they move toward their final destination.
11. Heavy vehicle movement in the southern part of the Laotian
Panhandle continues to be noted in COMINT. Recently, Binh Tram 34 near
Ban Bac reported sending 16 vehicles south to Group 471. In addition,
Group 471 is receiving supplies -probably foodstuffs and gasoline -from
Group 470 located to its south: on 28 February, for example, 30 vehicles
left Binh Tram 37 (in the tri-border) for Group 471. Some of the above
activity is in support of tactical forces. Recently, an element of the NVA
29th Regiment (operating around Muong Phalane) disclosed the food and
quartermaster items it had received for the month of March, while another,
unidentified NVA element requested numerous types of ammunition --
including mortar, small arms, and grenades -- be delivered to it.
12. Other intercepts from the Group 470 area reveal continuing heavy
vehicle activity directed toward southern South Vietnam and the Central
Highlands. A plan was revealed on 2 March to transfer 285 vehicles to
B-2 (a probable reference to southern South Vietnam); whether it had
already been implemented is unclear. Two days later, 16 vehicles were
reported to be waiting in the tri-border area to go to the B-3 Front.
13. Logistic activity in eastern Cambodia remains substantial as the
Communists continue to use the region as a logistical conduit and base
for their activities in South Vietnam.
North Vietnamese were then planning to
establish base areas in Cambodia at four locations ringing the border of
Cambodia and South Vietnam's MRs 3 and 4 from which to conduct
post-cease-fire activities. Bases at Snuol and Krek were to serve VC/NVA
units in MR 3, while similar facilities farther south at Kirirong and
Kompong Trach would provide support for forces committed in MR 4.
Recent Communist tactical activity throughout southeastern Cambodia may
reflect enemy designs on gaining greater control and security around the
cited base areas.
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Logistic Developments in South Vietnam
14. Significant logistic activity inside South Vietnam was again
detected this week as the Communists support the persistent fighting in
some areas and build supply reserves in others. According to one source,
by 26 February all VC local regiments in Thua Thien Province had been
fully resupplied with weapons and personnel from North Vietnam, providing
them a strong posture there. Elsewhere in MR 1, aerial photography has
shown consistently heavy vehicle traffic on the routes around Khe Sanh:
on 1 March, 66 trucks were observed on Route 9 between Khe Sanh and
the Laos/South Vietnam border. To the east, intercepted communications
revealed that ammunition stockpiles under the care of Binh Tram 12
(headquartered around Quang Tri) are being dispersed. Trucks have also
been detected on routes leading south of Khe Sanh along the western South
Vietnam border, and tanks and trucks were again detected around the
A Shau Valley.
15. In MR 2, elements of the NVA 95B Regiment (10th Division),
which operates in the Central Highlands, reported receiving rice and other
supplies -- probably including medicine - from a major North Vietnamese
logistical element near the Pleiku/Kontum border area. In the same general
area, VC officers recently revealed that the Communists are determined
to retain control along Route 14 between Pleiku and Kontum in order
to maintain a resupply capability there.
16. During February, Communist units in Binh Duong Province, GVN
MR 3, stockpiled large quantities of supplies, reportedly bringing stockpiles
to a level adequate to meet six months' resupply requirements for the
Communist troops there. Only: some medicines reportedly are in short
supply. Most of the supplies -- mainly food -- were purchased in Saigon
by legally licensed South Vietnamese traders and then trucked to the
province. In addition, however, some military supplies have been infiltrated
from Cambodia since the cease-fire, either via the Saigon River or south
through Phuoc Long Province. The presence of at least a dozen new,
apparently logistics-related, structures in Binh Duong along the Saigon River
is further evidence of continuing supply activity there. Farther north, rallier
reports revealed that 12 130-mm field guns were being towed from Snuol,
Cambodia, to Loc Ninh, South Vietnam. This is the first report that the
Communists have introduced the long-range 130-mm field guns into the
southern half of South Vietnam. Finally, in the Delta, elements of the NVA
1st Division now in Chau Doc Province were reported being resupplied from
Cambodia during the first half of February.
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The North Vietnamese Press Reports an Recent Military Transportatiaa
Activities
17. A recently available 11 February editorial in the North
Vietnamese Army newspaper, Quang Doi Nhan Dan, entitled "The New
Impetus on the Military Communications and Transportation Front"
recounted the "new, outstanding achievements" currently being made by
NVA transportation elements. According to the editorial, logistical
elements -- probably subordinate to the General Directorate of Rear
Services, Hanoi's organization for shipping war materiel -- are taking
advantage of the "now more advantageous conditions" (presumably the US
bombing halt in North Vietnam and Laos) and are working hard to meet
the "higher" transportation requirements now being impressed on them.
Transportation norms are being more than fulfilled, and vehicle drivers are
surpassing prescribed mileage requirements and increasing their number of
vehicle trips to the front lines.
18. The editorial praised two NVA transportation battalions that had
been honored as "hero units" by the National Assembly. The 743rd
Battalion is responsible for the movement of supplies along Route 7 to
northern Laos and the 101st Battalion for moving supplies from southern
Laos toward southern South Vietnam. Both units were very active in supply
activity in those areas in early February. The North Vietnamese have often
been noted in COMINT honoring logistical units which have performed well,
both to acknowledge that fact and, more importantly, to heighten other
units' competitiveness and inspire them to emulate those praised. The
implication is that high levels of proficiency in logistical efforts are still
being demanded.
Recent Communist Manpower Developments in Indochina
Personnel Infiltration
19. During the past week, 15 special-purpose infiltration groups were
initially detected -- 11 at Binh Tram 18 in North Vietnam, three in southern
Laos, and one in northeastern Cambodia: 11 bore the QL designator,
indicating specially trained military and civilian personnel. In addition, two
regular infiltration groups destined for VC Military Region 5 were initially
detected in southern Laos. They had, however, been previously gap-filled
and were already included in infiltration estimates.
20. Currently, there are some 30,000 infiltrators traveling southward
through the pipeline. At least 6,000 of these personnel in both regular and
special-purpose groups probably- started south after the cease-fire date. The
Appendix analyses personnel infiltration during the post-cease-fire period
and for the 1972-73 dry season to date.
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VC/NVA Redeployments in South Vietnam
21. No redeployments of major Communist units into or out of South
Vietnam were detected during the past week. The 3rd Battalion of the
203rd Armor Regiment, however, was initially located on 28 February in
the South Vietnam/Laos border area of southern GVN MR 1. Its arrival
in-country appears to have been relatively recent. The battalion clearly was
part of the large amount of armor noted deploying south in the infiltration
system since late October 1972. It appears to be going to VC MR 5 and
may be used to reinforce the 2nd NVA Division in Quang Ngai Province
in southern GVN MR 1.
22. Recent COMINT reveals that a North Vietnamese radar company
of the 290th Reconnaissance Regiment previously believed to have deployed
from southern Laos into the Khe Sanh area in mid-February was delayed
because of difficulties in locating an acceptable new position. Under the
new schedule, the company was to begin moving into its new area of
operations near the Khe Sanh airfield on 1 March.
23. Recently, several North Vietnamese units within South Vietnam
were observed repositioning and apparently assuming a standdown posture --
possibly to refit and establish more permanent bases of operations. For
example, between 18 and 25 February, the headquarters of the 64th
Regiment, 320th NVA Division, in GVN MR 2 relocated 21 kilometers
southeast to a position near Thanh An where its subordinate battalions
were being assigned permanent billeting sites. Similarly, the 7th NVA
Division in GVN MR 3 is now apparently refitting some of its subordinate
units which were engaged in heavy fighting in Binh Duong Province just
prior to the cease-fire. Also, the 141st Regiment of 7th Division is preparing
more permanent quarters for its personnel. New billets probably are being
hurried to completion prior to the arrival of the cease-fire control teams.
Finally, a number of North Vietnamese antiaircraft regiments in Quang Tri
Province have initiated extensive training and appear to be establishing
permanent bases of operations.
24. In the northern Delta the Communists are still planning to parcel
out North Vietnamese personnel in main force units among local Viet Cong
units, reportedly to circumvent accusations that NVA troops are active
in the area. The 5th and 6th NVA Infatrtry Divisions, for example, are
still scheduled to be dissolved as divisional entities, and there is new evidence
that at least one old line Viet Cong Delta regiment -- the Dong Thap 2,
which was disbanded in 1971 -- will be reconstituted to accommodate some
of the North Vietnamese personnel. Similarly, about 3,000 North
Vietnamese troops reportedly have been assigned to local units in Thua
Thien Province where they may attempt to pass as Viet Cong.
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Developments in Laos and Cambodia
25. No major redeployments of Communist units were detected in
Laos during the past week, although there were tentative indications that
some North Vietnamese units may be preparing to return home in the near
future. The first such indication in north Laos occurred on 28 February,
when a company of the 42nd NVA Artillery Battalion was ordered to turn
over its artillery weapons to the Pathet Lao prior to moving back to North
Vietnam. The 42nd Battalion has operated recently in the Sala Phou Khoun
area, assisting Pathet Lao and Deuane Neutralist units there.
26. In southern Laos, a message of 26 February from the 29th NVA
Infantry Regiment in the Muong Phalane area indicated that the unit may
deploy to North Vietnam in the near future. An associate of the regiment's
1st Battalian was queried on its state of readiness and on the availability
of trucks prior to its return to North Vietnam. No date has yet been set
to start the move. Should the entire 29th Regiment redeploy to North
Vietnam, it would represent a change in Hanoi's previous tasking for the
25X1 unit. ,personnel of the 29th Regiment were
to be dispersed among other Communist units so that they could remain
in Laos and escape the detection of a supervisory commission.
27. Two major changes in the North Vietnamese logistic structure
in southern Laos were noted last week. Binh Tram 31 -- whose area of
operations is believed to have been near the Mu Gia Pass on the Laotian
side of the border -- has been recently resubordinated to Group 571., which
is the responsible entity for rear services operations in Quang Binh Province,
North Vietnam. Farther south,.Binh Tram 33, which operates in the Muong
Nong area, may no longer be serving as afull-fledged Bing Trarn.3 All of
its formerly known organic units have recently been resubordinated to other
commands, and Binh Tram 33 has curtailed its communications. Another
major logistical element in the central Panhandle -- Binh Tram 30 -- has
assumed some responsibilities formerly held by Binh Tram 33 along
Route 99.
28. In Cambodia, two Khmer Communist (KC) units which recently
deployed into the Banam area of Prey Veng Province have been identified
as the 126th and 173rd Infantry Regiments. The identification of these
two regiments brings the known number of KC regiments to five. In the
past, the KC have generally been organized into units of battalion size or
smaller; however, it now appears that, with their break from VC/NVA units,
they are consolidating into larger units.
3. Until further evidence of Binh Tram 33's detnise is availaUle, we will continue to show it on
the accompanying Binh Tram map.
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1972-73 DRY SEASON INFILTRATION
Thus far, the implementation of a cease-fire in South Vietnam
apparently has had little overall impact on infiltration activity. Since
1 September, about 79,000 infiltrators are estimated to have entered the
pipeline, compared with 81,000 for the same period during the 1971-72
dry season. Of the current dry season's total, more than 23,000 have entered
the infiltration system since 1 January, representing little change for this
time of the year compared with previous dry seasons. Some 14,000 of these
infiltrators have been initially detected (or gap-filled) since 28 January.
Although a number of the groups detected since the cease-fire were noted
in the Laotian Panhandle, the location of a significant portion of them
at Binh Tram 18 in the Vinh area and at Binh Tram 14 at Ban Karai.
Pass in February indicates that Hanoi has continued to insert personnel
into the pipeline during the period immediately prior to and following the
cease-fire.
The number of personnel detected moving south in infiltration groups
thus far during the current dry season is compared with those during the
previous dry season in the following tabulation.
Destination.
1 Sep 72 - 28 Feb 73
1 Sep 71 - 28 Feb 72
Total
79,000
81,000
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
20,500
11,000
MR 5
9,000
15,500
B-3 Front
12,500
19,500
COSVN
26,000
28,000
Southern Laos/MR 559
11,000
7,000
Most additions that have been made since 28 January are destined for the
COSVN area (GVN MRs 3 and 4 and Cambodia) -- more than 11,000 men.
This influx of personnel increases the total traveling to COSVN since
1 September to 26,000, a number approximating the 28,000 that were
deployed there during the same period last year. More personnel have now
been sent to COSVN this dry season than to any other area, apparently
indicating Hanoi's intention to rebuild its depleted main force structure
in southern South Vietnam.
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This year's pattern of destinations in other areas, however, differs
significantly from that of the September to February period of the 1971-72
dry season. The number of personnel sent to MR Tri-Thien-Hue during the
present dry season, for example, is nearly twice as great as during the
comparable period last year. While most of the groups destined for MR
Tri-Thien-Hue this year were detected or gap-filled during the first four
months of the dry season, several groups appeared in COMINT during the
latter part of February, indicating that Hanoi has resumed the flow of
manpower to northern GVN MR 1. Although we estimate that Hanoi has
replaced most of the losses suffered in northern MR 1 during the 1972
Spring Offensive, it is possible that significant infiltration to MR
Tri-Thien-Hue will continue, perhaps in expectation of renewed military
activity there at some future date.
The number of personnel who have been sent to the central portions
of South Vietnam -Communist MR 5 and the B-3 Front - is significantly
less than during the first six months of the 1971-72 dry season -- 21,500
this year versus 35,000 last year: In both these areas, the Communists
apparently have not replaced all their losses suffered during the 1972
offensive. The recent detection of a number of groups traveling to MR 5,
however, suggests that the North Vietnamese are continuing to send
personnel there and may continue to do so during the remaining months
of this dry season.
Few infiltration groups traveling to southern Laos/MR 559 have been
noted in 1973. According to both COIVIINT many
of the personnel that were sent to southern Laos in late 1972 have been
used to staff new NVA combat units as well as to bolster the logistics
system of MR 559. As a result, the Communist combat and administrative
services structures in southern Laos have been strengthened considerably.
This increase in strength, coupled with the implementation of a cease-fire
in Laos, may result in a nominal infiltration flow to southern Laos in the
next several months.
Thus far in the dry season, a total of 215 special-purpose and specially
designated groups -- with a total referenced strength of about 4,600 -have
been detected in COMINT. Most of these personnel probably are earmarked
for MR Tri-Thien-Hue and southern Laos/MR 559. The greatest number
(55) of special-purpose groups was detected in November, when the North
Vietnamese increased their efforts to send military and civilian specialists
to the south.
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The first indication that Hanoi was continuing its infiltration to the
south after the cease-fire date occurred with the initial detection of 15
special-purpose groups at Binh Tram 18 (Vinh) on 18 February. These
groups, with a total strength of more than 800, were to depart for various
areas of South Vietnam by 25 February. Subsequently, on 26 February
another message originating from Binh Tram 18 revealed that 11 more new
special-purpose groups were to be sent out by 3 March.
Thus far, no regular infiltration groups have been detected starting
south from Binh Tram 18 since the cease-fire, but the initial detection of
a number of them at Binh Tram 14 in the Ban Karai Pass area since
28 January suggests that Hanoi also has continued the flow of regular
infantry troops on a significant scale since the cease-fire. At least nine of
these detected regular groups - with a total strength of 4,500 -probably
left North Vietnam after 28 January, bringing total post-cease-fire
infiltration starts to at least 6,000 infiltrators. Several thousand other
infantry troops probably also started the journey south in as yet undetected
groups. As in the case for groups detected after 28 January, the majority
of those groups which are suspected to have entered the pipeline since then
are destined for the COSVN area. If these personnel are traveling south
on foot, the first groups would not begin to arrive until at least early May.
There are a number of indications, however, that some of the groups which
probably left North Vietnam after 28 January are being transported by
truck. If so, the recently detected groups could arrive at their designated
areas in a month or so.
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Secret
Secret
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