COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080065-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2009
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: January 30, 1974
• Content Type: REPORT

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Top Secret
NSA review completed
Communist Violations of the Vietnam
and Laos Settlement Agreements
and Related Developments
Top Secret
Copy No. `
DIA review(s)
completed.
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30 January 1974
Forty-Eighth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
23 January through 29 January 1974)
The Key Points
? Both infiltration and logistic activity slowed last week as the
North Vietnamese celebrated the Tet holidays.
? Another antiaircraft artillery regiment deployed into South
Vietnam's central highlands last week.
? The North Vietnamese have completed a road across central
Laos to within 6 miles of the Mekong River and will begin
construction of another major road on 30 January which
will link up with NVA Route 14 near the DMZ.
? Recent satellite photography over North Vietnam showed a
new military base and new construction of rail and petroleum
pipeline/ storage facilities.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence
Agency and the Department of Defense.
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This report is the forty-eighth in a series summarizing evidence received
during the reporting period of (1) Communist efforts to infiltrate new
manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam,
(II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and
Laos settlement agreements, and (111) other developments affecting
Communist military capabilities in Indochina.
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1. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese
Personnel and Military Supplies*
Personnel Infiltration
1. The pace of troop infiltration slowed last week, as only two new
regular combat groups were detected at Binh Tram 8 near Vinh, North
Vietnam. Although these groups, which are traveling to the B-3 Front, were
reported with an aggregate strength of 215 troops, they probably have
actual strengths of at least 500 troops each. Consequently, they have been
added to our infiltration estimate at the latter strength, as has a third
"gap-filled" group which, although undetected, has been committed to
infiltrate the B-3 Front. The flow of specialists also decreased last week --
only four small groups composed of an estimated 75 specialists were
observed in southern Laos. All of these personnel are traveling to the
COSVN area. The low number of troops and specialists observed moving
southward probably reflects the celebration of the Tot holidays by the North
Vietnamese.
2. An intercept from northern North Vietnam has indicated that
about 2,500 new troops will be sent south in the near future. On
22 January, a probable training regiment in Thanh Hoa Province announced
that some 1,500 personnel were being prepared to infiltrate to South
Vietnam, while about 1,000 are to be sent to "central" Laos. All of these
personnel apparently were sent on leave for Tot about a week earlier,
probably the final step prior to the beginning of their southward journey.
The personnel traveling to Laos, however, will be the first troops sent to
that country since last November. None of these personnel are included
in our estimate of infiltration starts, shown below, since there is no evidence
that they have as yet started south.
Redeployments
Continued Augmentation of NVA Air Defenses
in South Vietnam
3. Recent COMINT indicates that at least one and possibly two
North Vietnamese antiaircraft artillery (AAA) regiments have moved from
southern Laos into the western highlands of GVN MR 2. An intercept of
* See the Special Annex for a discussion of the capabilities to detect the deployment of North
Vietnam's strategic reserve forces.
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Comparative Starts of Troops
from North Vietnam, by Destination
1 September - 29 January
Total 71,000 47,500
3.000
M R Tn-Tlucn-I luc 18,500
M R 5 9,000 3.000
11-3 Front 13,500 7,000
(YJSVN 20,GOO 14,000
Southern Laws/MR 559 10,000 2'.500
a North Vietnamese air activity report of early January indicated that the
232nd AAA Regiment probably is now operating in South Vietnam in
the tri-border area, increasing Communist strength in MR 2 by some
1,000 men. The unit had been scheduled to move into South Vietnam in
late December but was not expected to relocate this far south. In addition,
the NVA 593rd AAA Regiment in Kontum Province reported the
21 January transfer of some of its weapons to the NVA 234th AAA
Regiment - last located in southern Laos. This turnover of weapons suggests
that the 234th also may be relocating to the highlands of South Vietnam.
If true, this would be the third AAA regiment - the other was the 218th -
to move from southern Laos into South Vietnam within the past month.
4. Hanoi clearly intends to provide maximum protection to
Communist-controlled territory and major logistic corridors in western
South Vietnam. For example, because of the lack of combat activity in
southern Laos, the North Vietnamese apparently are relocating some of
their air defense forces there to areas in South Vietnam which are more
vulnerable to South Vietnamese air operations. Overall, the North
Vietnamese have expanded their air defense force structure in South
Vietnam to the largest ever noted. Currently, there are at least 25 air
defense regiments (24 AAA and one SAM) in-country - 20 in MR 1, three
in western MR 2. and two in northern MR 3.
5. The map depicting Communist and South Vietnamese Regular
Combat Forces in South Vietnam has been revised to include major
Communist AAA and artillery commands in order to reflect a more
complete listing of VC/NVA combat units. These additions, however, do
not change the total number of Communist regular combat troops as they
have previously been carried in the CIA/DIA order of battle.
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces
MR I
VC/iV VA
WIN VA 1
R VNAF2
88,000
186,000
372,000
325th
324B
304th
711th
2nd3
673rd AAA
1.
Includes
VC/NVA
personnel in
ground
combat, combat support, and air defense units and
local force companies and platoons.
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes
assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground
combat and combat support units, and Regional
Force battalions. Although present for duty
strength is no longer available, it is estimated to
R VNA F'
103,000
VNMC
Airborne
1st
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces
be about 85% of assigned strength. 320th
.3. Only one infantry regiment subordinate to 10th
the division. 3rd
MR3
VC/N VA R VNA F
38,000 94,000
9th 25th
7th 18th
5th 5th
77th AAA Regional
429th Sap Cmd Forces
69th Arty Cmd
rwDemercatian Line
1 Phuoc
I Long
Ninh ) Binh 1
MR4
VC/NVA R VNAF
24,000 97,000
21st
9th
7th
Regional Forces
``uuong'?h
r^1 Binh
\ Nghie ;~
IV
Dinh Tuen V
r
v
An 4lanQ~". Sp ~~ ~
?"t. ~Conq
'"~? ~ . CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE
A .ti , Vinh Long Klen Hoa
-.1 IN
Chuong
?
f Thian../Be.
-4 Xuyen
Lieu
VII
VI
Military region boundary
eeeeeine, Province boundary
eiiiiiiiiiii ICCS region boundary
0 25 60 75 Miles
ifTr-
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
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Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
6. In contrast to the heavy volume of traffic detected moving over
the past few months, supply shipments in the North Vietnamese Panhandle
were light last week. Most of the slowdown in activity this week probably
resulted from the celebration of the Tet holidays, as many rear service units
were given time off during the week. Despite the holidays, however, some
supply shipments did continue. Logistic units in the Vinh area reported
receiving some 20 tons of clothing on 25 January and more than 60 tons
of ammunition on the following day - including 18 tons of 130-mm
artillery ammunition. On 26 and 27 January, two shipments of 61 tons
of supplies, including 12 tons of 130-mm ammunition, were dispatched to
northern Laos. Farther south in the area between Quang Khe and the DMZ,
even less logistic activity was noted. Except for the shipment of 200 tons
of unidentified cargo on 27 January, no other significant activity was
detected in the area.
7. Following the pattern observed in North Vietnam, logistic activity
in the Laotian Panhandle declined appreciably, probably reflecting
celebration of the Tet holidays. Aerial reconnaissance from Muong Nong
to the tri-border area showed mostly small
convoys of 25 trucks or less headed south. COMINT also confirmed the
slowdown in truck traffic, as only a few convoys - the largest of which
was 160 trucks on 26 January - were detected transiting the system.
8. The downturn in activity this week is probably only temporary.
Plans for a spring "transportation offensive" shortly after Tet by logistic
units in the Panhandle were revealed in a 24 January intercept. Such drives
have occurred in previous years and normally are intended to move large
quantities of supplies through Laos and into South Vietnam and Cambodia.
9. In northern South Vietnam, there was no significant logistic
activity detected during the reporting period.
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H. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity
in South Vietnam and Laos
10. In South Vietnam the total number of Communist-initiated
cease-fire violations reported by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since
27 January 1973, since 15 June 1973, and for the past week
(23-29 January 1974) are shown below:
Military
Total Since
27 January
Total Since
15 June last Week
Region
('ease-Fire
Cease-Fire
(23-29 Jan 74)
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
lotal
4,597
30,795
2,228
16,840
33(87)1
402(613)1
MR 1
1,566
5,764
541
2,405
5
22
MR
789
5,072
525
3,218
3
58
N1 k
708
5,262
306
2,686
4
34
MR 4
1,534
14,697
856
8,531
21
288
11. Some of these violations may have been initiated by South
Vietnamese forces rather than Communist forces, and it is impossible in
all cases to determine the actual instigator. The tabulation above and the
charts following the Annex, however, show fairly accurately the trend in
the amount of combat that has occurred in South Vietnam since the
cease-fire. The fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular time
and place is generally reported accurately by the South Vietnamese, even
though the question of who started it may not always be treated objectively.
Operational reports since 19 December, however, have attempted to
distinguish between violations initiated by Communist and friendly forces.
Only those violations designated as Communist-initiated are reported in the
above tabulation.
12. There was no significant military activity in Laos during the past
week.
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111. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military
Capabilities in Indochina
Results of Satellite Photography over North Vietnam
The coverage permitted comprehensive analysis
of most major military and logistic targets.
i1filitarr Equipment Imports
14. There were no indications in the photography of recent overland
or seaborne imports of armored vehicles. SAMs, artillery, or associated
military equipment. A search of the major military training and equipment
storage areas, including those at Vinh Yen, Xuan Mai, and the Cong Phu
Armor Parking Area in the Panhandle, showed no significant changes in
activity or inventories, suggesting the absence of any recent large in-country
transfers of heavy weapons. Eight canvas-covered armored vehicles, however,
were on a parked train, facing south in a rail yard on the southern edge
of Hanoi. The armored vehicles possibly were en route to the new armor
parking area south of Thanh Hoa City.
Vew Military Base
15. A new military complex was located in the central Panhandle
20 miles northwest of Vinh. This facility, constructed since
covers an area 1-1/4 by 2 miles and contains 137 buildings arranged
in five separate groups. A total of 35 field artillery pieces in groups of
12, 12, and 11 pieces were associated with three groups of structures, a
strong indication this complex probably houses an artillery regiment.
Transport Activity
16. No unusual logistic activity was noted. Preliminary scan of the
major rail and highway routes and maritime facilities showed moderate
traffic and stockpile levels, but little difference from those recorded during
the last quarter of 1973. No coverage of the cross-border routes leading
into Laos and South Vietnam was available on this mission.
17. About 5,000 vehicles - mostly cargo trucks - were in the major
vehicle parks located between Dong Dang and Hanoi, about the same
number observed during the last six months. The inventories in these parks,
however, have not been static. Comparative coverage of the Ping-hsiang
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Railyards lindicated some 200 to 300 vehicles were
offloaded and driven south across the border, probably into major vehicle
parks in northern North Vietnam.
New Petroleum Developments
18. The Chinese are building a large petroleum storage area, adjacent
to the rail line, about six miles north of the P'ing-hsiang border crossing.
At least six large vertical storage tanks are under construction and should
hold about 30,000 tons of petroleum when completed. The current storage
capacity at Ping-hsiang is about 9,000 tons. In a similar development, a
new petroleum bunkering quay was detected near Hon Gay. This quay
could also give the North Vietnamese a second point for offloading small
quantities of petroleum into the nearby pipeline and storage area. The other
receiving facility is a floating terminal at nearby Bai Chay constructed late
last year. Both of these terminals and the one at Haiphong, however, are
limited to shallow draft vessels.
19. The mission also provided evidence of new improvements to North
Vietnam's internal petroleum distribution system. A new large-diameter
(eight inch) petroleum pipeline segment is under construction south of
Hanoi. The 64 miles of pipeline will fill the last gap in the eight-inch pipeline
system built since the Vietnam cease-fire. The new line parallels the
earlier-built four-inch pipeline from Hanoi to the large dispersed storage
area at Cu Dai, northwest of Vinh. DOD analysis cannot confirm the
pipeline as being either eight or four inches in diameter.
20. After the bombing halt in January 1973, the North Vietnamese
quickly restored through service on major rail lines. The lone exception
was the Kep - Hon Gay meter-gauge rail line. No attempt was made to
repair this line until last August. Since then, a five-mile segment of new
railbed has been nearly completed from the railyards north of Kep southeast
to where it meets the existing rail line. From here to Hon Gay, about
60 to 70 miles, new construction consists of curve straightening, grade
improvement, and the building of new bridges and culverts. Although
previously meter-gauge, the construction techniques observed thus far
suggest that the line will probably be compatible with the Kep-PRC border
standard-gauge line.
21. At the present rate of construction, this major project could be
completed by the end of 1974. Completion of the new segment would
provide direct access between China and Hon Gay, the latter being a major
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coal-producing area. It is possible that there may be some link between
the opening of this rail line and the building of the new petroleum storage
area at P'ing-hsiang. Because Hon Gay Port cannot now handle large-scale
coal and petroleum shipping operations because of its shallow depths, the
new rail line may be used to ship coal overland to China, with China
reciprocating with exports of oil and other commodities.
22. The same photography also indicated the Panhandle rail line is
being improved. Four bridges are under construction on the line, two north
and two south of Vinh. The bridges being built north of Vinh will replace
existing bypasses, while completion of two south of Vinh indicates an intent
to extend through rail service another 55 miles south to within 40 miles
of Dong Hoi Port.
The North Vietnamese Have Completed
Route 8181 Across Central Laos
23. The North Vietnamese have opened Route 8/81 from the North
Vietnamese border (Nape Pass) across central Laos to the vicinity of the
Mekong River (see the map on transportation). Reportedly, NVA army
engineers and conscripted labor began restoring and clearing the western
50-mile segment of 8/81 last fall. Since then, work progressed rapidly, and
the road was complete and
open to track traffic. Photography confirmed reports that
the final gaps had been cleared and graded. and a motorable route now
led to a junction with Route 13, some six miles from the Mekong. Other
reports indicate that the North Vietnamese have also cleared a road west
of Route 13 to the Thai border, which, by January, was supporting truck
traffic. The road leading from Route 13 to the Mekong, however, has not
yet been confirmed in photography.
24. The Route 8/81 corridor has long been used as an infiltration
route by Communist insurgents moving to and from North Vietnam and
Laos to Thailand. The completion of a motorable road along this route
will enhance Hanoi's logistic capability and bolster NVA and Pathet Lao
security and control in central Laos. The route also could be used to move
supplies from North Vietnam to insurgents operating in northeast Thailand.
New Road Constnection in Southern North Vietnam
Slated to Begin Soon
25. Work on a new road that will extend about 95 miles from the
Mu Gia Pass along the eastern slope of the Annamite Mountains in Quang
Binh Province to a juncture with NVA Route 14 near the DMZ was ordered
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 ~- x Hob Nleu
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Paksane Nape +rrn vierRam 11039
.r+.~ Pass hla Tinh
033
6090/
0091
Khe nh
1000 '
Cam Lo
South
Vietnam
rs New Communist Supply Corridors
The Communists have designated
NEW ROAD
CONST.
13 i"
(Mu Gi
Pass
udon
Ratchalhanii-
.Phu m Sdo"k
Ach Rome,
Khanlr
Flung
WKham
Duc
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
-,,?.n, Province boundary
ME GM Military region
7-T,7 T~ International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
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to be begun on 30 January. This order was contained in a 21 January
directive from Headquarters, Military Region 559 which directed the 14th
Fngineer Regiment to transfer all its personnel, immediately after Tet, to
an undisclosed area to begin construction on the new road. By avoiding
low-lying areas susceptible to flooding, the road will ease logistic movements
through the North Vietnamese Panhandle and by-pass portions of the
recently upgraded Ito Chi Minh Trail in Laos. According to earlier reporting
(see the 3 January report), the road is slated for completion within a year.
26. Recent analysis of COMINindicates that
the understrength North Vietnamese isinfantry Division in northern GVN
MR 4 is no longer operating as a division-size force. The Division's 44th
and 46th Regiments apparently have been-deactivated and their personnel,
along with the Division's support units, assigned to the IOID Regiment,
the only remaining regiment of the Division. The deactivation apparently
was the result of losses incurred during heavy fighting along the South
Vietnam/Cambodia border in the fall of 1973 and reduces Communist
combat strength in GVN MR 4 by some 1,000 troops. The 1st Division
headquarters and its reinforced 10113 Regiment have both recently relocated
from Cambodia into South Vietnam's Kien Giang Province, where they
currently are operating.
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INFILTRATION OF NORTH VIETNAMESE
PERSONNEL TO THE SOUTH
In the year since the cease-fire accord for South Vietnam was signed,
almost 109,000 North Vietnamese troops and specialists have infiltrated
southward. Of this total, some 84,000 have started south since 27 January
1973, and the other 25,000 were moving through the pipeline on that date.
Since the reaffirmation of the original agreement on 15 June 1973, about
58,000 troops and specialists have been sent south. The following table
shows the number of North Vietnamese troops starting south, by month
and destination, since 1 January 1973.
Number of Troops Entering the Pipeline Destined
for South Vietnam, Southern Laos, and Cambodia
Since I January 19731
COSVN
B-3 Front
MR 5
MR Tri-
Thien-Hue
Southern Laos/
MR 559
Total
Total
27,000
12,500
9,000
14,000
26,500
89,000
1973
Jan
7,000
5,000
4,000
2,500
....
18,500
Feb
5,000
500
....
1,500
1,000
8,000
Mar
....
....
....
1,000
....
1,000
Apr
1,000
....
....
....
1,000
May
....
....
....
7,000
....
7,000
Jun
....
....
....
....
1,500
1,500
Jul
....
....
3,000
....
3,000
Aug
....
....
....
....
1,500
1,500
Sep
....
....
2,000
2,000
3,000
7 000
Oct
....
....
....
14,000
14,000
Nov
1,000
1,000
....
....
5,500
7,500
Dec
3,500
1,000
....
....
....
4,500
1974
Jan 1-29
9,500
5,000
....
....
....
14,500
1. Excludes special purpose personnel. The totals are rounded to the nearest 500.
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IrLR It'iltit VIULM I IU11J I" JUU 1 n
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1913)
JAN-FEB 200
0
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
L Ii 0 ''
1 0 I S
piiiiii 10
IT
0
200
I NEW'
CEASE-FIRE
JUL
1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 lb I/ LD 17
1. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 S 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 Aj -1 lil I I I
11101 NO % .0 00 %
Lll A IL
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AUG 100
CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(1 AUGUST 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
ME 00
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
OCT 100
NOV 100
DEC 100
0
200
JAN 100
OA 00 M41000
4! 1000 me
el~4 ~ ]
ID 71
-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 2A 25 26 27 29 29 30 31
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Top Secret
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