COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080063-9
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
16
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
April 3, 2009
Sequence Number: 
63
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 16, 1974
Content Type: 
REPORT
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PDF icon CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080063-9.pdf801.61 KB
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Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 Secret NSA review completed Communist Violations of the Vietnam and Laos Settlement Agreements and Related Developments Secret Copy No. 2.2 DIA review(s) completed. Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 25X1 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080063-9 16 January 1974 Forty-Sixth Report COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS* (This report covers the week from 9 January through 15 January 1974) The Key Points ? Troop infiltration last week continued at a high rate, as six regular groups comprising about 3,500 men destined for the B-3 Front and COSVN areas were detected in North Vietnam. ? Recent evidence suggests that travel times to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas for at least some regular infiltration groups have been considerably reduced. ? A new front headquarters has been formed in Thanh Hoa Province of North Vietnam, controlling at least three subordinate divisions. ? Communist logistic activity in southern North Vietnam and southern Laos was heavy during the week. Heavy traffic also continued on Route 9 in northern South Vietnam. ? The Communists continue efforts to collect and store rice in South Vietnam despite efforts of the GVN to limit such procurement. * This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense. Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080063-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 This report is the forty-sixth in a series summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (1) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina. Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080063-9 1. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies Personnel Infiltration 1. Troop infiltration to South Vietnam continued apace last week, as six regular groups were detected in North Vietnam. Five of these groups, with nearly 3,000 troops, are destined for COSVN, while the sixth group, comprising about 600 troops, is moving toward the B-3 Front (see the table, below). As a result of the detection of several of the COSVN-bound groups, six additional undetected groups with at least 3,000 troops are believed to have started, or soon will start, toward this area. These groups are included in our estimate of infiltration starts. 2. Eight small special-purpose groups with about 225 people also were initially reported last week. One of these groups, composed of civilian administrators, is destined for southern Laos or adjacent border areas while the other seven are traveling toward MR Tri-Thien-Hue, the B-3 Front, and COSVN. Five of the eight special-purpose groups were noted at the top of the infiltration system in North Vietnam, while the other three were detected farther south. 3. Although troop infiltration to the B-3 Front and COSVN began slowly this dry season, detections of regular groups traveling to these areas have increased sharply during the past several weeks. Since late November, some 19,000 troops - slightly less than the rate projected by Rear Services Group 472 on 11 November - have been sent to the B-3 Front and COSVN. Although it still is early, this rate suggests that the projection was valid. 4. In addition to the higher input of troops to the B-3 Front and COSVN areas noted in recent weeks, the time required for at least some groups to reach these areas from North Vietnam has been substantially reduced compared with previous dry seasons. For example, one regular group moved from Vinh, North Vietnam, more than 500 miles to the vicinity of Kratie, Cambodia, in 12 days -- a journey normally requiring 60 days. Both regular combat and special-purpose groups now could reach the B-3 Front in 20 days and COSVN in 30 days, if Hanoi continues to use vehicles to transport infiltrators. These travel times are about half the previous estimates, and they reflect not only the bomb-free environment of the last year but also the improved road network. As a result of these reduced travel times, the North Vietnamese are able to plan military activity in South Vietnam with considerably less lead time than previously. Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080063-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 Comparative Starts of Troops from North Vietnam, by Destination I September - 15 January Total 61,500 45,500 MR Tri-Thien-flue 18,500 2,000 MR 5 7,000 2,000 I3-3 Front 11,000 5,500 COSVN 15,000 13,500 Southern Laos/MR 559 10,000 22,500 Redeployments 5. Major elements of the North Vietnamese 218th Antiaircraft Artillery (AAA) Regiment have moved from southern Laos into Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam, where they apparently have been operating since late November 1972 (see the order of battle map). At least three of the regiment's eight battalions have been identified in COMINT in the province; although the remaining five battalions are unlocated, they may still be in Laos, where they have been operating since deploying there from North Vietnam in January 1973. The move of the equivalent of another AAA regiment increases the number of such units in Quang Tri Province to 18 (plus one surface-to-air missile regiment), a total that may exceed Communist air defense requirements there. Some of these units, however, may have moved undetected, or may intend to move, farther south in MR I along Communist Route 14, where there have been recent indications of Communist plans to increase air defense coverage. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies 6. Following a one-week lull, logistic activity in North Vietnam's Panhandle was brisk last week, as COMINT reflected daily southward shipments of ordnance and other supplies. Typical of this activity was an intercept from a storage area north of Vinh which indicated that it had received 250 37-mm AAA barrels and had dispatched nearly 100 tons of cargo, mostly ordnance, on 10 January. Also, a 12 January message from Binh Tram (BT) 8 at Vinh stated that it was preparing to pick up 660 tons of weapons and ammunition from a storage point in the Thanh Iioa area (see the transportation map). In other activity, BT 8 reported on 10 January that more than 400 tons of cargo, including 140 tons of 130-mm ammunition, would be sent to northern Laos during January. Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 Approved For Release 2009/04/08: CIA-RDP78TO2095R000700080063-9 Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam South Vietnam Regular Combat Forces WIN VA I R VNA F2 187,000 MR1 VC/NVA R VNA F 89,000 89,000 325th VNMC 324B Airborne 304th 1st 711th 2nd 2nd 3rd 1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons. 2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMCground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no assigned strength. MR4 VC/NVA R VNAF 1 25,000 88,000 1st 21st 9th 7th MR 3 VC/NVA R VNA F 429th Sapper 25th Command 18th 9th 5th 1 7th Regional 5th Forces Regional Forces Quang Naai MR 2 VC/NVA R VNAF 4 ,Binh Dinh 35,000 68,000 320th 23rd 10th 22nd Phu Phu Bon ) 3rd Regional Forces en Y /Khanh ra.Hoa Tuyen Phuoc Due ) Thu Long Lam Dong Tay Nlnh Binh ( {..r? (~.---, Long . l Binh ng ....1t-.1 /Lo .r Thuan Blnh 1' Khanh Duong /h Binh Haute Bt~an %Tuy IV N hie . In ong 1'huac Kien iOng\,Tuon9 A Is Tu 6VIR , Dinh Tuon v o\h\ -,!) `/ An Cilep"'"$TTT ?~ lam. ong r t 0 - -1 CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE ins Long Klen Hoe Phng 'r. ..r. Knit Dtnh Yinh VI CiEanq `1r ~. `.~ Binh Chuong Thienf./ Military region bou .. ? .t Xuynn Province boundary y sec L ?f !'?_ MR 4 US region bounda ' Lleu 50 75 N V I 1 0 25 Tt! ~ on .....