COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080050-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 2, 2009
• Sequence Number: 50
• Publication Date: October 10, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret.
NSA review completed
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Thirty-Third Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
3 October through 9 October 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
Secret
23
DIA review(s)
completed.
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Thirty-Third Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
3 October through 9 October 1973)
The Key Points
Another 4,000 North Vietnamese troops began
their infiltration trip to the south during
the week. All were destined for southern Laos
and those areas surrounding the Communists'
new supply corridor in western South Vietnam.
The North Vietnamese have established a new
AAA divisional headquarters in northwestern
MR 3 of South Vietnam.
North Vietnamese logistic activity was light in
the Laos Panhandle and northern South Vietnam,
but further preparations were noted in North
Vietnam for a resumption of logistic movements
down the Ho Chi Minh Trail system.
Combat activity remained at low levels in both
South Vietnam and Laos.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
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The Details
NOTE: This is the thirty-third in a series of memo-
randa summarizing evidence received during the report-
ing period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new
manpower and military materiel toward and into South
Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat activity in
violation of the Vietnam and Laos settlement agreements,
and (III) other developments affecting Communist mili-
tary capabilities in Indochina.
I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnam-
ese Personnel and Military Supplies
A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments
1. Southbound infiltration from North Vietnam
continued at a substantial rate during the past week,
as six new combat groups and at least one special-pur-
pose group were observed entering the pipeline. One
other new group also was observed during the week, but
at a point farther south in the system. These groups,
all of which are moving toward the Laotian panhandle,
have a total strength of more than 3,500 personnel.
As a result of their identification, an additional
500 troops also are believed to be traveling toward
southern Laos and have been added to our estimate.
2. With the addition of these groups, the total
number of North Vietnamese personnel who have started
south since the 15 June "second" ceasefire now stands
at almost 20,000, of whom close to 18,000 have been
combat troops. Two-thirds of these troops began their
journey south since 1 September. Since the signing of
the original ceasefire accord on 27 January, some
70,000 North Vietnamese personnel have infiltrated
southward, of which about 62,000 were combat troops
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and almost 8,000 were civilian and military specialists.
Of the total, some 45,000 have started their journey
since the ceasefire, while the remaining 25,000 were
in the i eline movin southward at that time. (ANNEX
B, contains a more detailed dis-
cussion of the information pertaining to infiltration
which was received during the past week.)
3. Evidence received during the past week has
identified a new North Vietnamese AAA divisional head-
quarters--the 377th--in Binh Long Province of northern
MR 3. The division appears to have been formed in
June from the NVA 210th and the 71st AAA Regiments and
possibly other units. Although the 210th had been ob-
served infiltrating into Binh Long Province in March
1973, the 71st is a new unit, probably created from
some of the artillery groups which infiltrated south
during the 1972/73 dry season. Tenuous evidence sug-
gests that the division also has a subordinate field
artillery regiment. This is the first time that Hanoi
has ever set up an AAA divisional headquarters so far
to the south. Its formation not only improves North
Vietnam's command and control but also enhances its
air defense capability in northwestern MR 3.
4. In addition, evidence received during the
week has enabled us to identify four new NVA regiments--
three in Laos and one in South Vietnam--for the first
time. We do not know the exact functions of these regi-
ments, but they apparently are rear services units
rather than combat units. We. also do not know precisely
when they arrived in their present locations. One of
these units, the NVA 575th Regiment, was operating in
northern South Vietnam in late September, and its as-
sociation with construction materials suggests that
it is probably an engineering regiment. The three
other regiments--the NVA 2nd, 57th and 58th--were con-
firmed as being in southern Laos during the past week,
but some evidence suggests they may have been there
for several months. Again, our evidence strongly sug-
gests that the three units have engineering or trans-
portation functions.
5. All four of these units could have been
formed from new personnel entering Laos and South
Vietnam, or by combining units already in-country.
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces
VC/NVAI RVNAF2
325th
324B
320B
304th
711th
2nd
1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat
support, and air defense units and local force companies and
platoons.
2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned
personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat
support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although
present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated
to be about 85% of assigned strength.
429th Sapper 25th
Command 18th
9th 5th
7th Regional
5th Forces
VNMC
Airborne
1st
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces
VC/NVA R VNAF
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
21st
9th
7th
Kien
Tuong
An Giang` 58 'T -'" '?L
Dec
Uinh Lon
Kien
KiBlf Phon9~, .J
Dinh' Vinh
Gr ~'f . ~?/ Binh
Chung Thien Ba
. Xuyen
y _Bac ?s"-~ t 4
Lieu
Military region boundary
Province boundary
0 25 50 75 Miles
75 Kilometers
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L3A I
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Until further information is received on their origins,
these units will not be added to our order-of-battle
estimates.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
North Vietnam
6. In the week's major logistic development,
we received reliable evidence concerning a large
stockpile of material in southern Quang Binh Province.
According to this evidence, as of 1 October, one NVA
logistic unit in this area had some 4,000 tons of
cargo in storage, including over 1,300 tons of muni-
tions. Since early July some 7,000 tons of munitions
have been detected moving from the Vinh area southward
into Quang Binh Province, and the 1,300 tons observed
in storage are undoubtedly a portion of this. Rockets,
small arms ammunition and field artillery ammunition
made up most of the 1,300 tons. In the earlier months
of 1973, most of the identified ammunition moving
through southern North Vietnam was for antiaircraft
artillery pieces.
7. Other substantial cargoes of ammunition were
also observed in the North Vietnamese Panhandle during
the week. The most noteworthy of these was noted on
3 October when about 90 tons of material were trans-
ported from Vinh to southern Quang Binh Province, in-
cluding some 35 tons of 130-mm. field artillery ammu-
nition (roughly 400 rounds). This is the first de-
tected movement of 130-mm. artillery ammunition in
southern North Vietnam since late spring.
8. Logistic activity in the Laos Panhandle was
again very light this week. Good evidence indicates
that NVA logistic units in the Ban Karai Pass area
received "mobilization" orders which resulted in some
personnel reassignments. Since the dry season will
soon begin, the pace of logistic activity will almost
certainly increase in the next month or so. There was
nothing in the mobilization orders, however, which
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Names and boundary representation
ere not necessarily authoritative
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New Communist Supply Corridors
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
----- --?, Province boundary
la Military region
International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
- Road
- POL pipeline
25 50 75 Mlles
25
25 50 75 Kilom ele rs
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specifically indicated that large-scale cargo movements
were imminent. Some units were observed making prepa-
rations--with no great sense of urgency--to replace
damaged weapons and repair communications facilities
which had probably been disrupted by the recent heavy
rains.
South Vietnam
9. Heavy rains in northern South Vietnam are
beginning to take their toll and some NVA units are
unable to move supplies. On 2 October, a unit op-
erating along the Communists' new Western Supply Cor-
ridor near the A Shau Valley reportedly was unable to
work because of the rain. Two days later, NVA logis-
tic units in northern MR 1 near Route 9 were having
difficulties because of soft and slippery ground.
Probably as a result of these conditions, very little
cargo was detected moving in northern MR 1 during the
past week.
II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South
Vietnam and Laos
A. South Vietnam
10. In South Vietnam, the total number of com-
munist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by the
South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January, 15
June, and for the last week (3-9 Oct) are shown below:
Military
Region
Total Since 27
January Ceasefire
Total Since 15 Last Week
June Ceasefire (3-9 Oct)
Major
Minor
Major M
inor Major
Minor
MR 1
1,343
4,691
318 1
,332
27
88
MR 2
533
3,603
269 1
,749
11
68
MR 3
552
3,953
150 1
,377
3
57
MR 4
1,081
9,658
403 3
,492
28
204
Totals
3,509
21,905
1,140 7
,950
69(107)417(474)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
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11. Some of these violations may have been ini-
tiated by GVN forces rather than communist forces, and
it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual
instigator. The table above and the charts on the
following pages, however, do show fairly accurately
the trend in the amount of combat that has occurred
in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that
a combat incident occurred at a particular time and
place is generally reported accurately by the South
Vietnamese, even though the question of who started
it may not always be treated in objective fashion.
12. There was very little military activity in
Laos during the past week.
III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Capabili-
ties in Indochina
A. North Vietnam: Fall Induction Phase Ends
13. Hanoi's fall induction campaign which be-
gan in early August apparently trailed off and ended
in September. The preliminary total of intercepted
induction-related personal messages in September was
19--far below the total of 106 in August. Although
such messages are at best an imprecise indicator of
conscription trends over time, North Vietnamese press
reports also reflect a decline in recruitment in Sep-
tember. Nevertheless, both press reports and personal
messages suggest that the fall induction drive was
substantial. Allowing for a training cycle of 3-4
months plus infiltration time, troops recruited in
this, the first significant campaign since the Paris
Agreement was signed last January, could not be made
available in the southern war zones until the end of
this year. If the training cycle has been extended
to six months as some recent. evidence suggests, the
recruits would not be available until early spring.
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(See Reverse Side of Page)
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 I,tRJt-tlnt VIULM i IUna in auu i n
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1913)
0
200
TO IIO I IIS
1
0
V 1
0000%, w
I 1 -1 1-71 1 R&
TfILII IIII
MAR 100
APR
lll l ICI-I.Il' I I_ T~ I I IThl~
0
0
200
MAY 100
JUN
"NEW"
CEASE-FIRE
JUL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1#4 ro 0000
100010
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CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH-
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RYNAF
(1 AUGUST 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
AUG 100
0
200
SEP 100
200 1 2 3 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
NOV 100
0
200
DEC 100
JAN 100
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Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
Personnel to the South
1. Regular combat infiltration groups continued
to be detected moving south during the past week. Six
regular groups (5072, 5074, 5080, 5082, 5083, and
5084), all destined for southern Laos/MR 559, were ob-
served entering the pipeline at Binh Tram 8 in the
Vinh area between 3 and 9 October, while a seventh
group--5081--was detected farther south in the infil-
tration system. Since the step-up in combat infiltra-
tion occurred in mid-September, fourteen battalion-
sized groups have been detected at the top of the
pipeline in North Vietnam, eleven of which bore
designators in the 5xxx series.* The detection of
the seven new groups and the inclusion in our esti-
mate of one other undetected groups which also is be-
lieved to have started south result in a total in-
crease of more than 4,000 troops. One special-purpose
group, also destined for southern Laos/MR 559, was ob-
served at Vinh during the reporting period. In addi-
tion, five other small groups, consisting of high-
ranking cadre, probably have now started toward south-
ern Laos. These groups were initially reported in
North Vietnam several weeks ago, but were not sched-
uled to depart until 9 October.
2. Since 1 September, more than 12,000 troops
are estimated to have started southward from North
Vietnam--a level greater than during the comparable
period a year ago. Two-thirds of these troops, how-
ever, are destined for the southern Laos/MR 559 area.
The exact disposition of these 8,000 personnel is un-
known, but with the extension of MR 559's area of op-
eration well into South Vietnam, at least some of them
probably will not stay in southern Laos.
*In addition to the eleven detected groups, there is
a gap of seven 5xxx series groups (with some 3,500
men) which probably have been scheduled for infiltra-
tion to the south but which have not yet been detected
entering the system.
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3. Table 1, below, shows infiltration starts,
including specialists, from North Vietnam since 1 Jan-
uary 1973. Table 2 compares the infiltration of com-
bat troops, by destination, since 1 September 1973
with the comparable period a. year ago.
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Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Destined for South Vietnam, Southern
Laos, and Cambodia Since 1 January 1 73
Total Special-Purpose
January
20,000
1,600
February
10,200
2,100
March
3,250.
2,250
April
1,925
1,200
May
7,175
June
2,200
July
3,650
August
2,200
September
7,000
October 1-9
5,100
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Table 2
1972
1973
t
l
T
8,500
1,2,000
a
o
MR Tri-Thien-Hue
7,000
2,000
MR 5
1,500
2,000
B-3 Front
0
0
COSVN
0
0
Southern Laos/MR 559
0
8,000
* This table covers the infiltration of North Viet-
namese troops to South Vietnam, Cambodia, and
southern Laos. Infiltrators moving to northern
Laos are not included.
Comparative Starts by Combat Troops From
North Vietnam, by Destination
1 September - 9 October*
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Secret
Secret
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