COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080045-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: September 5, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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NSA review completed
Twenty-Eighth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
28 August through 4 September 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
ecr
Top Secret
22
5 September 1973
DIA review(s)
completed.
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5 September 1973
Twenty-Eighth Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the week from
28 August through 4 September 1973)
The Key Points
No new southbound infiltration of North Viet-
namese personnel was detected during the week.
North Vietnamese logistic activity continued to
be high in northern South Vietnam, but was at
low rainy season levels elsewhere.
Communist regular military forces in South Viet-
nam grew slightly to an estimated 276,000 troops
between early July and the end of August. Most
Communist units in South Vietnam are now closer
to full strength than they have been at any
time since their peak levels of 1972.
North Vietnamese road building and improvement
efforts continue, both in Communist-controlled
areas of South Vietnam and in southern Laos.
The scope of these efforts strongly suggests
that Hanoi plans major logistic operations to
the south in the coming dry season.
- Combat activity in both South Vietnam and Laos
remained at a low level during the week.
* This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense,
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The Details
NOTE: This is the twenty-eighth in a series of mem-
oranda summarizing evidence received during the re-
porting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate
new manpower and military materiel toward and into
South Vietnam, (II) Communist-initiated combat ac-
tivity in violation of the Vietnam and Laos settle-
ment agreements, and (III) other developments affect-
ing Communist military capabilities in Indochina. As
I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Viet-
namese Personnel and Military Supplies
1. During the past week, no new North Viet-
namese combat troops or specialists were detected
infiltrating toward the South. Since the 15 June
"second" ceasefire, more than 7,000 North Vietnam-
ese personnel--some three-quarters of which were
combat troops--have been detected starting the in-
filtration journey southward. Since the original
ceasefire agreement of 27 January, over 57,000 per-
sonnel, have moved through the infiltration pipeline.
Of these, more than 32,000 started the trek since
27 January, while about 25,000 were in the pipeline
moving southward as of that date. (ANNEX B, for
contains a more detailed discussion
o e information pertaining to infiltration which
was received during the past week.)
2. Recent evidence indicates the presence of
a new North Vietnamese artillery regiment in north-
ern South Vietnam. The origin of the unit, however,
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is unclear. It could have been formed from existing
units within South Vietnam or from the large number
of artillery personnel which arrived in infiltration
groups in South Vietnam after the ceasefire, but it
also could have recently entered South Vietnam un-
detected as an organic unit.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
North Vietnam
3. Heavy typhoon rains brought supply move-
ments virtually to a halt this past week in the Vinh
area of the North Vietnamese Panhandle. As early as
23 August NVA logistics units near Vinh were ob-
served taking precautionary actions against the storm.
Units which had cargo in low-lying areas were ordered
to move to higher ground to prevent flood damage. Al-
though some flooding took place, no serious losses
were reported.
4. Despite heavy rains in the southern Pan-
handle between Quang Khe and the DMZ, moderate lo-
gistic activity continued, including the movement
of substantial quantities of ammunition. On 23 Au-
gust about 475 tons of cargo, including over 100
tons of ordnance, were detected moving southward to
storage areas in Quang Binh Province. During the
period 25-29 August, at least 65 trucks carrying
weapons and various types of ammunition moved through
Quang Binh Province'
ecified
In addition, another mks with unspecified
cargo also transited the area during this period.
Finally, between 26 and 29 August, some 150 tons of
cargo, including at least 60 tons of ammunition,
were transferred southward on barges between storage
areas in Quang Binh Province.
Laos and Cambodia
5. Heavy rains throughout Laos continue to
inhibit supply movements severely, and the only re-
cent logistic activity observed has been associated
with road repair and local resupply. On 28 August
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roads in the Sam Neua area of northern Laos were
impassable because of flooding, and logistic units
were reportedly spreading rocks over the roads in
an effort to return them to usable condition. Sim-
ilar reports were received from southern Laos where
portions of Route
99, the main road between Muong Nang and Ban Bac,
had become a quagmire and that high water levels at
bridges and fords were making crossing extremely haz-
ardous or impossible. (The map on the following page
shows the roads and route numbers which are mentioned
in this memorandum.)
South Vietnam
6. Ever since the beginning of 1973, NVA lo-
gistic activity has been heavy in northern South
Vietnam, and the past several weeks have been no
exception. On 24 August, 97 vehicles were active
along Route 9 in Quang Tri Province. Four days
later on 28 August, 163 cargo vehicles were observed
in the Cua Viet River area and 33 cargo vehicles
were noted along Route 6089 southwest of Khe Sanh.
on 30 August some 25X1
- ,000 tons of rice were to be transferred from
an NVA storage area along Route 9 to a storage depot
along the western supply corridor. 25X1
2,750 tons of cargo were scheduled to 25X1
enter Dong Ha during September.
7. Logistic activity all along the Communists'
western supply corridor inside South Vietnam con-
tinued to be heavy. On 25 August over 500 tons of
cargo, mostly foodstuffs, were moving at various loca-
tions along this corridor, some 660 vehi-
cles were observed carrying supplies between two
storage areas located on the corridor. Also on 28
August, a major logistics unit in the area report-
edly had 650 tons of POL in storage. On 30 August,
another 230 vehicles were noted active along the
corridor,
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Udon
R al chathani
Kasai
Pass.
Khong
?edone
S iXm'
Pana
Sara'g
921
Yen
Communist Road
Construction o
Improvement Si c
---June +--
Thai
Siiem Reap
Phum Sdokr
Ach Romeas
"War
C ham rap
Karpoeg Chh\ng
C a m b:'OSd *i
Tam Ky
Tin
Binh Dinh
I ulyeri
a Laf
Dr C
South Vietnam
and
North Vietnam Panhandle
-_--^ Province boundary
Military region
International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
+-?~-+- Railroad
POL pipeline
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative
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II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South
Vietnam and Laos
8. In South Vietnam, the total number of
communist-initiated ceasefire violations reported
by the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 Janu-
ary, 15 June, and for the last week (28 Aug-4 Sep)
are shown below:
Military Total Since 27 Total Since 15 Last Week
Region January Ceasefire June Ceasefire (28 Aug-4 Sep)
Majo
r Minor Major Minor
Major Minor
MR 1 1,21
7 4,213 192 854
44 127
MR 2 44
6 3,066 182 1,212
17 100
MR 3 52
5 3,672 123 1,096
10 91
MR 4 92
8 8,545 250 2,379
26 212
Totals 3,11
6 19,496 747 5,541
97(87) 530(469)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
9. Some of these violations may have been
initiated by GVN forces rather than communist forces,
and it is impossible in all cases to determine the
actual instigator. The table above and the charts
on the following pages, however, do show fairly ac-
curately the trend in the amount of combat that has
occurred in South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The
fact that a combat incident occurred at a particular
time and place is generally reported accurately by
the South Vietnamese, even though the question of
who started it may not always be treated in objec-
tive fashion.
B. Laos
10. Communist-initiated combat activity con-
tinued at a very low level during the reporting pe-
riod,
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(See Reverse Side of Page)
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 JAN-FEB 200
MAR
APR
MAY
JUN
JUL
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btRJt-rIIt VIULR I IUI) IM )UU i n
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
, (28 JANUARY THROUGH 31 JULY 1913)
"NEW"
CEASE-FIRE
0
0
200
0
200
0
200
r% iiiiiiiiAuwIRn?mN
A 1 0
0010%, 17 % A ~ L 'A 'A' -
-1 A, joll~
loom
mom
4;4~~ -
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CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS IN SOUTH
VIETNAM AS REPORTED BY RVNAF
(1 AUGUST 1913 TO THE PRESENT)
AUG 100
SEP
r
r
~iT77m
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 1 12 13 14 1 5 16 17 118,19T 20121122123,24 25 26 27 28 29 30
OCT 100
0 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11111-
200. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
NOV 100
200 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31
0
DEC 100
TOTAL VIOLATIONS
MAJOR VIOLATIONS
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III, Other Developments Affectin Communist Mili-
tary Caps: 13.tU es n In oc na
A. Changes in the Communist Military Force
Structure In South Vietnam Between 10
Ju`y and the Present
11. Since early July, the total strength of VC/
NVA combat and administrative services troops in
South Vietnam is estimated to have increased from
268,000 to 276,000 men. All of the increase has oc-
curred in the combat forces; the size of the admin-
istrative service forces remains unchanged. The
table below shows our current enemy order-of-battle
estimate for South Vietnam.
CIA/DIA Order of Battle of Communist
Military Forces in South Vietnam
(in thousands)
31 August 1973*
Regular Combat Forces
180
NVA
152
VC
28
Administrative Services
96
NVA
53
VC
43
Total
276
NVA
205
VC
71
*
For
a discussion of changes in Co
mmunist mil
i-
tary
ary
forces in South Vietnam betw
and early July, see the twent
een 27 Janu
y-second
-
weekly violations report, dated 24 July 1,973.
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12. The net increase of 8,000 VC/NVA combat
troops in South Vietnam in the last two months took
place despite the fact that we have reduced our es-
timate of NVA combat forces in GVN MR 1 by four com-
bat regiments--the equivalent of some 6,000 men.*
Recent analysis indicates that these regiments re-
turned undetected to North Vietnam sometime earlier
this year. This 6,000 man reduction in the Communist
force structure is more than offset, however, by a
counterbalancing 14,000 man increase in our strength
estimate of the remaining Communist units in South
Vietnam The main factors accounting for the in-
crease are (a) the recent detection of the NVA 78th
Artillery Regiment in northern GVN MR 1, (b) the in-
clusion of additional North Vietnamese infiltrators
as replacements in Communist combat units, and (c)
most major Common st co a
units are now closer to full strength than they have
been at any time since their peak levels of 1972.
As the table shows, almost 75 percent--or some
205,000 men--of the Communist regular forces now in
South Vietnam are North Vietnamese rather than Viet
Cong. The map on the next page shows the distribu-
tion of Communist, as well as South Vietnamese, com-
bat personnel by military region. (Administrative
Service forces are not included on the map.)
nam, Sout ern aos, and Nort Vietnam'
13. Analysis of aerial photography taken over
South Vietnam and southern Laos
vindicates that Communist road improvement
and construction has been continuing at a steady--
but not all-out--pace. Major emphasis continues to
be on three road systems: the Route 14 - "Western
Supply Corridor" system in South Vietnam, an east-
west route across southern MR 1, and an as yet
The regiments involved are the 58th Artillery
Regiment of the NVA 308th Division and the three
infantry regiments--the 141st, the 165th and the
209th--of the NVA 312th Division.
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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam
Regular Combat Forces
VC/NVAI
180,000
325th
324B
320B
304th
711th
2nd
1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat
support, and air defense units and local force companies and
platoons.
2. Revised RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes
present for duty personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat
and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions.
? MR 4
VC/NVA R VNAF
? 26,000 78,000
21st
9th
7th
44th Special
Tactical Zone
Regional Forces
I Chau
Doc,j
Xuyen
x =Bae - 'tr/ Is
ien--- Dinh
Gka Chujong
mien./ Ba
VNMC
Airborne
Ist
2nd
3rd
Regional
Forces
MR 2
VC/NVA RVNAF
Kier
Tuong
"1 .. Bien Btnfi
Hoa Tuyr
'An Giang`~ Decd
y. .,r
Vinh Long
K'
Nam_
f Quan Tin
fQulang
T` ry+en
NA~
=CSILC N?nh
Military region boundary
Province boundary
ICCS region boundary
0 25 50 75 Miles
i
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
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429th Sapper 25th
Command 18th
9th 5th
7th Regional
5th Forces
IV
Ho'a CAPITAL SPECIAL ZONE
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undesignated north-south route through the Laos Pan-
handle. (The map following page 4 shows this new
road construction and improvement work.)
about 10 miles have been added to the central and
southern protions of the Route 14 system--south of
A Shau and within Kontum and Darlac Provinces. A gap
totaling 30 miles still zemai,tis in the tri-border
region, but the road is now motorable from the DMZ
to Kontum Province. From the tri-border region, a
new motorable road already extends southward through
western Pleiku into Darlac Province. Much of this
new road, however, appears to be an access route
used mainly by construction personnel and machinery,
and not yet by through traffic.
14.1 some 38 miles of new or
improved roadbed has been added to the eeast-west
corridor cutting across southern MR 1 to Route 966
in Laos. With this most recent construction, the
Communists now have a route built since early this
year extending over 100 miles eastward from the Laos
border to within 15 miles of the GVN coast. The new
construction provides the Communists with a logistic
corridor extending nearly the entire width of South
Vietnam in southern MR 1--an asset that they lacked
during last year's offensive. If used for military
purposes, the corridor would facilitate the deploy-
ment of armor and artillery to points well within
range of key targets along the coast.
a major north-south route'is still incomplete, but
is progressing at more than a dozen sites. The
latest photography shows that about 55 miles of new
road has been cleared in different areas since June,
and the total new construction now covers about one
third of the distance between the major entry points
from North Vietnam into Laos and the probable termi-
15. In southern Laos, road improvement work on
nus of the new road on the Cambodian border.
hotography of the North Viet-
namese Panhandl lso shows extensive road
construction underway along the Mu Gia and Ban Karai
Pass access routes within North Vietnam. Both of these
logistic corridors join the new north-south corridor
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through the Laos Panhandle. Construction work ap-
pears to be more extensive along route 15 near the
Mu Gia pass, with some 22 miles of upgrading under-
way between the Bai Duc Thon logistic center and the
Laos border. Near the Ban Karai Pass, early stages
of road clearing were observed aong on a five mile
segment of route 137 near the border. This latest
photographic coverage of North Vietnam strongly
suggests that the North Vietnamese intend to make
a substantial transportation effort into and through
southern Laos during the coming dry season.
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ANNEX B
Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North Vietnamese
Personne to t e Sout
1. No new combat or special-purpose infiltra-
tion groups were detected in the pipeline during the
past week. During the two month period of July and
August 1973, less than 6,000 North Vietnamese per-
sonnel, including some 4,600 combat troops, traveled
southward. Nearly three-quarters (3,100) of the com-
bat troops traveled to VC Military Region 5 on South
Vietnam's central coast, to strengthen Communist com-
bat units there. A number of NVA/VC units in this
area, however, reportedly still remain understrength.
Only 9,000 infiltrators traveled to MR 5 during the
1972/73 dry season cycle--fewer than to any other area
of Indochina--and this number probably was insufficient
to replace the losses which occurred. The remaining
1,500 combat troops who started south in July and Au-
gust traveled to southern Laos,?where they probably
were used to bolster NVA infantry units. As in the
case of combat infiltration,. most of the specialists
who started south during July and August of this year
infiltrated into VC MR 5.
2. Table 1, below, summarizes the southward
movement of all North Vietnamese--including special-
ists--by month since January 1973.
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Number of Personnel Entering the Pipeline
Since 1 January 1973
Total
Special-Purpose
January
20,000
1,600
February
10,200
2,100
March
3,250
2,250
April
1,925
1,200
May
7,175
300
June
2,200
700
July
3,650
600
August
2,200
700
September 1-4
0
0
1/
Including gap-filled groups, except groups 7001-
7009 and 5057. Assuming that these groups de-
parted after 1 January, about 5,000 combat
troops would be added to the infiltration starts
shown above.
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Top Secret
Top Secret
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