COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78T02095R000700080038-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2009
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: July 17, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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Secret
NSA review completed
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COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS
(This report covers the period from
6 July through 16 July 1973)
This memorandum has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.
Secret
23
17 July 1973
DIA Review
Completed.
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17 July 1973
Twenty-First, Report
COMMUNIST VIOLATIONS OF THE VIETNAM AND LAOS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS*
(This report covers the period from
6 July through 16 July 1973)
The Key Points
Three new combat infiltration groups were detected
during the week, and at least 3,200 North Viet-
namese personnel have now started the infiltra-
tion trip south since the 15 June effective date
of the Paris Communique (the "second" ceasefire).
Of these, 2,700 have been combat troops, and 500
have been specialists.
Evidence received during the week suggests that
one North Vietnamese infantry regiment in north-
ern Laos is returning to North Vietnam.
North Vietnamese logistic activity continues to
follow the normal rainy season pattern of the
past several weeks.
Combat activity remained at fairly low levels in
both South Vietnam and Laos.
This report has been prepared jointly by the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Department
of Defense.
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The Details
NOTE: This is the twenty-first in a series of reports
detailing recently received evidence of (I) Communist
efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military ma-
teriel toward and into South Vietnam, (II) Communist-
initiated combat activity in violation of the Vietnam
and Laos settlement agreements, and (III) other de-
velopments affecting Communist military capabilities
I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese
Personnel and Military Supplies
A. Personnel Infiltration and Redeployments
1. Three new regular combat infiltration groups
were detected entering the pipeline in North Vietnam
during the reporting period. These groups, with a
total strength of about 1,700 personnel, are destined
for the coastal areas of central South Vietnam. Frag-
mentary information suggests that the North Vietnam-
ese may also be moving or planning to move still other
combat infiltration groups southward. In addition to
these regular combat groups, eight smaller groups of
civil and military specialists--totalling some 125
personnel--were detected moving south in the Laos
Panhandle and Cambodia.
2. Since the 15 June effective date of the Paris
Communique (the "second" ceasefire), at least 3,200
North Vietnamese personnel have started the infiltra-
tion trip south. About 2,700 of these have been com-
bat personnel, and 500 have been civil and military
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specialists. The cumulative total of southward moving
infiltrators since the 27 January "original" ceasefire
now stands at almost 54,000 personnel. Of these,
some 25,000 were in the infiltration pipeline travel-
ing south as of 27 January, while almost 29,000 have
contains a more detailed discussion of
the evi ence pertaining to infiltration which was re-
ceived during the reporting period.)
3. Recently received evidence indicates that the
88th Regiment of the NVA 308B Infantry Division may
be returning from northern Laos to North Vietnam.
On 10 July the regiment was identified near the North
Vietnamese border, considerably to the east of its
former location in the Plaine des Jarres area. If
the unit does return home, it would be the first com-
bat unit known to have left northern Laos this rainy
season, although an NVA engineering battalion also
may have withdrawn several weeks ago (see our weekly
violation report of 29 June 1973). The 88th Regi-
ment's sister regiment, the 102nd, returned to North
Vietnam from southern Laos in late May or early June.
Both of these regimen ts had originally moved into Laos
from North Vietnam in late 1972 or early 1973. Some
NVA combat units have routinely rotated out of Laos
in previous wet seasons, and then later returned. It
is therefore possible that these two regiments will
also return at the onset of the next dry season. We
have no specific evidence, however, that they in fact
will--or will not--return.
B. Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies
4. In the following paragraphs we examine the
evidence received during the reporting period of North
Vietnamese logistic activity in support of Communist
forces throughout Indochina. Geographically we move
from north to south, discussing first NVA logistic
activity in southern North Vietnam, and then in north-
ern Laos, southern Laos, Cambodia, and finally within
South Vietnam itself. It is impossible to state cat-
egorically that all of this activity is in violation
of the Vietnam or Laos settlement agreements, but
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much of it is. Even the activity within North Viet-
nam often reflects the movement of supplies which are
soon to leave North Vietnam for the south. Similarly,
Communist logistic activity which we observe wholly
within South Vietnam often reflects supplies which
have recently entered the country.
North Vietnam
5. Logistic activity within North Vietnam con-
tinued at the same moderately high levels observed
in the past several weeks. Cargo movements in the
Vinh area again included the transfer of ammunition
between units subordinate to the major NVA logistic
entity there. On 4 July, 12-15 vehicles were de-
tected transporting various types of ammunition,
including 122-mm. rockets, to an unlocated storage
facility, and on 10 July nearly 18 tons of small
arms ammunition were observed in transit between
two logistic units.
6. In addition to the observed shuttling of
cargo around Vinh, the flow of supplies from an NVA
logistic unit northwest of Vinh to another south of
Quang Khe in the southern Panhandle has continued
during recent weeks. A report of 4 July indicates
some 1,600 tons of weapons and ammunition were to
be moved between these two units, and on 10 July
41 vehicles were observed transporting 90 tons of
dried foodstuffs between these two points.
7. The movement of NVA supply vehicles through
the area between Quang Khe and the DMZ also continues,
although at lower levels than in previous weeks. On
4 July, 25 southbound and 21 northbound vehicles
crossed the Troc River at a ferry southwest of Quang
Khe.
8. New evidence of construction activity in
northern Laos--most of it apparently military re-
lated--became available during the week. A new spur
road extending for 2 miles north of Route 7 (the
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major route crossing the northern Plaine des Jarres)
has been built since late April and connects the route
with a probable billeting and storage area containing
18 buildings. There were also two possible military-
related installations detected near Khang Khay: one
had 12 buildings which may be barracks and
18
other
buildings, and the second had 27 buildings
early stages of construction.
in
the
9. Communist logistic activity continued on Route
7 during late June. Late evidence indicates that on
29 June, there were five 130-mm. field guns and two
122-mm. howitzers parked in traveling mode in a park-
ing area along the route southwest of Ban Ban. There
was no indication as to whether this artillery was
being moved to the east (back to North Vietnam) or
to the west.
Southern Laos/Cambodia
10. The level of Communist logistic activity in
the Laos Panhandle remains low--as would be expected
at the height of the rainy season--but some cargoes
are still being moved. On the night of 6 July, for
example, 70 vehicles were detected on the major roads
from Muong Nong south, to the tri-border area (pri-
marily Routes 99, 92, 96 and 96/110). Other reports
indicate that NVA storage facilities in the Panhandle
still have considerable stockpiles on hand. On 8
July a group of sites along Route 99 south of Muong
Nong had at, least. 120 tons of supplies on hand. (The
map on the following page shows the roads and route
numbers mentioned in this report.)
11. Although evidence from South Vietnam was
sparse during the week, available indications con-
tinue to point to heavy logistic activity in the
northern and western portions of the country. 103
cargo vehicles were observed on Route 9 between the
Laos/South Vietnam border and the junction with Route
6088 on 6 July, and on the previous day 160 cargo
trucks were active between unspecified locations in
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 x Hon Nieu
Irih (anchorage) wfnam
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Names and boundary representstion
are not necessarily authoritative
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South Vietnam
and
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International Commission
of Control and Supervision
region boundary
Road
- POL pipeline 25X1
25 50 75 Miles
25 50 75 Kil omelers
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northern Quang Tri Province. An NVA logistic unit
operating in the new Communist supply corridor in
western South Vietnam was reported on 9 July to have
shipped nearly 7,500 tons of rice over an unspeci-
fied period and as of 11 July one of the major NVA
storage facilities on Route 548 north of A Shau
had about 8,000 tons of cargo on hand, 75% of it
rice.
II. Communist-Initiated Combat Activity in South
Vietnam and Laos
A. South Vietnam
12. In South Vietnam, the total number of Com-
munist-initiated ceasefire violations reported by
the South Vietnamese Armed Forces since 27 January,
15 June, and for the last week (10-16 July) are
shown below:
Military
Region
Total Since 27
January "Ceasefire"
Total Since 15
June "Ceasefire"
Last Week
(10-16 Jul)
Major
Minor
Major
Minor
Major Minor
MR 1
1,074
3,606
49
247
3 33
MR 2
329
2,300
65
446
13 106
MR 3
442
2,973
40
397
14 117
MR 4
763
7,090
85
924
5 144
Totals
2,608
15,969
239
2,014
35(39) 400(352)1/
1/ Denotes totals of previous week.
13. Some of these violations may have been initi-
ated by GVN forces rather than Communist forces, and
it is impossible in all cases to determine the actual
instigator. The table above and the chart on the fol-
lowing page, however, do show fairly accurately the
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trend in the amount of combat that has occured in
South Vietnam since the ceasefire. The fact that
a combat incident occurred at a particular time and
place is generally reported accurately by the South
Vietnamese, even though the question of who started
it may not always be treated in objective fashion.
B. Laos
14. Communist initiated combat activity in Laos
remained at a low level during the reporting period
except in Lao Military Region III (the central Pan-
handle). Two government positions in northern Mili-
tary Region III were abandoned under enemy pressure
leaving about 2,800 refugees under enemy control,
and a government battalion southwest of Muong Pha-
lane reported that it was being subjected to con-
tinued enemy harassment and that it had been forced
to relocate several times.
III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military
Capabilities
Tropical Storm Anita Impinges on Logistic Opera-
tions
15. Communications intercepts from Communist
units along the coast in both North and South Viet-
nam and in the central Laos Panhandle indicate that
recent tropical storm Anita has hindered NVA logis-
tic operations and has forced Communist units to
introduce emergency procedures. Anita approached
the Vietnam coast near Danang late on 7 July, then
swept northward up the Tonkin Gulf and dissipated
inland over northern Laos on 9 July. Those units
hit hardest have been Binh Trams 12 in Quang Tri
Province and 26 south of Quang Khe, although the ef-
fects were apparently felt as far north as Thanh Hoa
Province, COMINT has referred to impassable roads,
damaged bridges, ferries, and fords, and the emer-
gency evacuation of cargo from storage areas to save
it from destruction. As of 9 July, the 41st Engineer
Regiment located on Route 548 in western South Viet-
nam had embarked on a "construction offensive" aimed
at repairing the damage done by the rains.
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Communists Continue to Emphasize Local Supply
Procurement in South Vietnam
16. There is growing evidence that in order to
promote increased procurement of supplies locally,
the Communists have ordered many of their combat
forces in South Vietnam to become self-sufficient
in food and other non-military goods. For example,
an intercepted message of 2 July indicates that ele-
ments of the NVA 711th Division in southern MR-1
were advised that higher headquarters would not is-
sue any rice to them in the future. In the B-3 Front,
a high-ranking North Vietnamese officer reportedly
emphasized recently that "the important mission con-
fronting units of the B-3 Front was food production."
Moreover, in the COSVN region two sources have re-
ported that difficulties in obtaining rice from Cam-
bodia led COSVN in mid-April to direct its subordinate
rear service groups to develop rice sources within
South Vietnam and to begin supplying food to main
force units only. At the same time COSVN reportedly
instructed province and district level units to be-
come self-sufficient in foodstuffs. We do not have
enough evidence at this point to judge the degree of
success the Communists are having in this self-suf-
ficiency campaign.
Communist Logistic Support for Civilians
17. Some of the recent logistic activity in
northern South Vietnam appears related to Communist
efforts to establish civilian settlements along the
new western supply corridor. Photography
revealed that seven villages containing a o a
of more than 100 huts had been erected in the A Shau
Valley since mid-May. South of the A Shau, according
to a recent rallier, North Vietnam is providing con-
struction materials for the "economic development and
resettlement of North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese
personnel" in and around the town of Ben Giang at the
junction of Routes 614 and 14 in western Quang Nam
Province. Reportedly, the new residents will con-
tinue receiving food supplies for about six months,
and thereafter are expected to be self-sufficient.
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18. Communist resettlement aid is also report-
edly being extended to civilians in both the high-
lands and northern coastal areas of MR-2. In the
B-3 Front, Viet Cong units in Darlac Province report-
edly have been receiving daily shipments of farming
equipment, including plows, tools, generators, water
pumps, and rice-processing machines.. Additionally,
the VC reportedly had received bulldozers in early
June which were being used to clear roads and farm-
land. Some clearing activity of this type has been
confirmed in Darlac Province by aerial reconnaissance.
In coastal Binh Dinh Province, Communist cadre were
reportedly instructed in. late June to prepare a num-
ber of "reception stations" which are to be used to
house civilian farmers who "have volunteered to come
from North Vietnam to cultivate the land and set up
production areas." At present, the scope of this ac-
tivity appears to be fairly modest. Unless it is
greatly expanded, it is not likely to encourage the
movement of large numbers of South Vietnamese into
Communist-controlled areas.
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Post-Ceasefire Infiltration of North
Vietnamese Personnel to the South
1. Between 12 and 17 July, three regular infil-
tration groups--1042, 1060, and 1085--with a total
of some 1,700 men, were initially detected entering
the system in North Vietnam. The designators of
all of these groups do not follow the previously
established pattern of numerical sequence within
the lxxx (VC MR 5) series. The last group detected
in the lxxx series was Group 1005, which was ob-
served in southern Laos in mid-February. It is
possible that these groups are anomalies--as yet
unexplained--within the current numbering system.
It is more likely, however, that the numbering sys-
tem is being altered, and that additional groups
of combat personnel may be infiltrating to the south
as yet undetected. Pending further clarification,
only the groups 1042, 1060, and 1085 will be ac-
cepted as reported and no allowance will be made
for gap-filling undetected groups.
2. Eight special-purpose groups, totalling about
125 civilian and military personnel, were also noted
in the pipeline in southern Laos and Cambodia since
6 July. Table 1, below, summarizes our current in-
formation on infiltration starts from North Vietnam.
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INFILTRATION STARTS: COMBAT TROOPS LEAVING
NORTH VIETNAM FOR THE SOUTH*
1972-1973
Infiltration Year**
Total Infiltration Starts 94,000 (1 Sep 72-
Through 30 June in the 30 Jun 73)
"Infiltration Year"
(broken down by area
of destination)
MR Tri-Thien-Hue 33,000(CIA)., 36,000(DOD)
MR 5 9,000
B-3 Front 14,000(CIA),:11,000(DOD)
COSVN 26,000
Southern Laos
and MR 559 12,000
Total Infiltration Starts
From 1 Through 15 July 1,700
(broken down by area
of destination)
MR Tri-Thien-Hue 0
MR 5 1,700
B-3 Front 0
COSVN 0
Southern Laos
and MR 559 0
*This Table includes only combat infiltration groups,
and omits special purpose groups. There .are minor dif-
ferences between the DOD and the CIA on the number of
personnel destined for specific areas listed on this
table. Where such differences exist, both the CIA and
the DOD estimates are given.
**For accounting purposes, we arbitrarily define the
"infiltration year" as beginning on 1 September, which
roughly coincides with the start of the dry season along
the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the Laos Panhandle each year.
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Secret
Secret
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